


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HISTORY

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THE
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STATES; MILITARY POWER AND RESOURCES; RELIGION, EDUCATION, CRIME; LAND TENURES;
STAPLE PRODUCTS; GOVERNMENT, FINANCE, AND COMMERCE.

WITH A FULL ACCOUNT OF THE
MUTINY OF THE BENGAL ARMY; OF THE INSURRECTION IN WESTERN INDIA; AND AN EXPOSITION
OF THE ALLEGED CAUSES.

BY R. MONTGOMERY MARTIN,

AUTHOR OF THE "HISTORY OF THE BRITISH COLONIES," ETC.

ILLUSTRATED WITH MAPS, PORTRAITS, AND VIEWS.

VOL. II.

THE MUTINY OF THE BENGAL ARMY; INSURRECTION IN WESTERN INDIA; AND AN EXPOSITION OF THE
ALLEGED CAUSES.

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
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Portrait of Napoleon Bonaparte

THE INDIAN EMPIRE.

HISTORY OF THE MUTINY OF THE SEPOY TROOPS.

INTRODUCTORY CHAPTER.

ALLEGED CAUSES OF DISCONTENT—OPPRESSIVE AND PAUPERISING TENURE OF LAND—INEFFICIENT ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE—EXCLUSION OF NATIVES FROM ALL SHARE IN THE GOVERNMENT—IGNORANCE OF THE LANGUAGES, AND AVERSION EVINCED TOWARDS THE NATIVES—EDUCATION, RELIGION, AND MISSIONARY OPERATIONS—CASTE—FREE PRESS—DEFECTIVE CURRENCY—OPIUM MONOPOLY—NEGLECT OF PUBLIC WORKS—REPRESSION OF BRITISH ENTERPRISE—RECENT ANNEXATIONS—INFRACTION OF THE HINDOO LAW OF INHERITANCE—EXTINCTION OF NATIVE STATES—SATTARA, NAGPOOR, CARNATIC, TANJORE, JHANSI, OUDE, Etc.—STATE OF THE BENGAL ARMY; RELAXED DISCIPLINE; REMOVAL OF REGIMENTAL OFFICERS TO STAFF AND CIVIL EMPLOYMENTS; PAUCITY OF EUROPEAN TROOPS; SEPOY GRIEVANCES; GREASED CARTRIDGES—MOHAMMEDAN CONSPIRACY—FOREIGN INTRIGUES; PERSIAN AND RUSSIAN.

NEVER, perhaps, was the condition of British India deemed more fair and promising than at the conclusion of 1856. The new governor-general, Lord Canning, who arrived in the spring of that year, had seen no reason to question the parting declaration of his predecessor, Lord Dalhousie—that India was “in peace without and within,” and that there appeared to be “no quarter from which formidable war could reasonably be expected at present.”*

The British and Anglo-Indian press, adopting the same tone, declared “the whole of India” to be “profoundly tranquil.”† The conviction seems to have been general amid all ranks and classes, from the viceregal palace at Calcutta, to the smallest and most distant English post; and thus it happened that the vessel of the state pursued her course with all sail set, in the full tide of prosperity, till a series of shocks, slight at first, but rapidly increasing in strength and frequency, taught a terrible lesson of the necessity for careful steering amid the sunken rocks, the shoals, and quicksands,

heretofore so feebly and faintly traced in those famous charts and log-books—the voluminous minutes and correspondence of the East India Company.

The sky had been carefully watched for any indication of the storms of foreign invasion; but the calm waters of our “strong internal administration,” and the full current of our “unparalleled native army,” had so long borne the stately ship in triumph on their bosom, that few attempts were made to sound their depths. Those few excited little attention, and were, for the most part, decidedly discouraged by the authorities both in England and in India. The consequence has been, that at every step of the revolt, we have encountered fresh proofs of our ignorance of the first conditions on which rested the general security of the empire, and the individual safety of every European in India.

Our heaviest calamities, and our greatest advantages, have come on us by surprise: we have been met by foulest treachery in the very class we deemed bound to us by every tie of gratitude and self-interest, and we have found help and fidelity among those whom we most distrusted. We have failed where we confidently looked for

* Minute by the Marquis of Dalhousie, 28th February, 1856.—Parliamentary Papers (Commons), 18th June, 1856; pp. 6—8.

† The *Times*, 9th December, 1856.

triumph; we have succeeded where we anticipated failure. Dangers we never dreamed of, have risen suddenly to paralyse our arms; and obstacles which seemed well-nigh insurmountable, have vanished into thin air before us. Our trusted weapons have proved worthless; or worse—been turned against us; and, at the outset of the struggle, we were like men whose pistols had been stolen from their holsters, and swords from their scabbards, while they lay sleeping; and who, starting up amazed and bewildered, seized the first missiles that came to hand to defend themselves against a foe whose numbers and power, whose objects and character, were alike involved in midnight darkness.

Very marvellous was the presence of mind, the self-reliance, the enduring courage displayed by English men and women, and many native adherents, in their terrible and unlooked-for trial; and very comforting the instances of Christian heroism which adorn this sad and thrilling page of Anglo-Indian history: yet none will venture to deny, that it was the absence of efficient leaders on the part of the mutineers, and not our energy and foresight, which, under Providence, was the means of enabling us to surmount the first overwhelming tide of disaster. Nothing can be more contradictory than the opinions held by public men regarding the immediate object of the mutineers. Some deny that the sepoys acted on any "prearranged plan;" and declare, that "their primary and prevailing motive was a panic-terror for their religion."* Others regard the revolt as the issue of a systematic plot, which must have taken months, if not years, to organise; and compare the outbreak to the springing of a mine, for which the ground must have been hollowed, the barrels filled, the train laid, and the match fired, before the explosion.† A third party assert, that our own impolicy had gathered together masses of combustibles, and that our heedlessness (in the matter of the greased cartridges) set them on fire.

It is quite certain that the people of India labour under many political and social evils, resulting from inefficient administration. Human governments are, at best,

* See *Indophilus* (Sir Charles Trevelyan's) Letters to the *Times*. Republished by Longman as a pamphlet: p. 37.

† See Sir E. Bulwer Lytton's speech at the Herts Agricultural Society, October, 1857.

fallible and weak instruments. In Christian England, after so many centuries of freedom, kept and strengthened by unceasing effort, we all acknowledge how far the condition of the masses falls short, in reality, of what in theory we might have hoped for. How, then, can we doubt, that there must be in India much greater scope for oppression, much greater need for watchfulness. We have seen, in Ireland, a notable example of the effects of absentee proprietorship; but here is a case of absentee sovereignty, in which the whole agency is systematically vested in the foreign delegates of a foreign power, few of whom have ever acquired any satisfactory insight into the habits, customs, or languages of the people they were sent to govern.

It is easier to account for the errors committed by the Company than for the culpable neglect of Parliament. We know that an Indian question continued to be the "dinner-bell" of the House of Commons, notwithstanding the revelations of the Torture Committee at Madras, until the massacres of Meerut and Cawnpore showed that the government of India was a subject which affected not only the welfare of the dark-coloured millions from whom we exacted tribute, but also the lives of Englishmen, and the honour of Englishwomen—the friends or relatives, it might be, of the heretofore ignorant and listless legislators.

A right understanding of the causes of the revolt would materially assist all engaged in framing measures for the restoration of tranquillity, and for a sounder system of administration. The following enumeration of the various causes, distant and proximate, which are asserted by different authorities to have been concerned in bringing about the present state of affairs, is therefore offered, with a view of enabling the reader to judge, in the course of the narrative, how far events have tended to confirm or nullify these allegations.

Land-tenure.—The irregular, oppressive, and generally pauperising tenure of land, has been set forth in a preceding section: and since every scopy looks forward to the time when he shall retire on his pension to live in his own cottage, under his own fig-tree, the question is one in which he has a clear and personal interest. Irrespective of this, the manner in which the proprietary rights of the inhabitants of the Ceded and Conquered provinces have been dealt with,

is a matter of history with which the land-owners in native independent states are sure to make themselves acquainted; and the talookdars and hereditary chiefs of Oude, could not but have remembered with alarm, the grievous breach of faith committed against the proprietors of the soil in the North-Western Provinces.

A general allusion to this disgraceful procedure has been already made;* but the following detail is given on the authority of various papers drawn up by Mr. Henry St. George Tucker. The views of Mr. Tucker were, it should be premised, utterly opposed to any system "founded on the assumption of the government being the universal landlord;" which sweeping assumption he regarded "as a virtual annihilation of all private rights."

The Ryotwar Settlement made by Munro, in Madras, he thought tended to the impoverishment of the country, the people, and the government itself; and was, in fact, a continuation of the policy of Tippoo Sultan, who drove away and exterminated the proprietors; his object being to engross the rents as well as revenues of the country.

The landowners of the North-Western Provinces—including Delhi, Agra, Bareilly, and the cessions from Oude in 1801—have, however, peculiar and positive grievances to complain of. In 1803, under the administration of the Marquis Wellesley, a regulation was passed, by which the government pledged themselves, "that a permanent settlement of the Ceded provinces would be concluded at the end of ten years;" and proclaimed "the proprietary rights of all zemindars, talookdars, and other descriptions of landholders possessing a right of property in the lands comprising their zemindari, talooks, or other tenures, to be confirmed and established under the authority of the British government, in conformity to the laws and usages of the country." In 1805, a regulation was passed by the same government, in nearly corresponding terms, declaring that a permanent settlement would be concluded with the zemindars and other landholders in the Conquered provinces, at the expiration of the decennial leases. But, in 1807, the supreme government being anxious to extend to the land-

owners of our newly-acquired territory those advantages which had been conferred on the zemindars of the Lower Provinces, by fixing the land-tax in perpetuity, a new regulation was enacted, appointing commissioners for superintending the settlement of the Ceded and Conquered provinces; and notifying "to the zemindars, and other actual proprietors of land in those provinces, that the jumma which may be assessed on their estates in the last year of the settlement immediately ensuing the present settlement, shall remain fixed for ever, in case the zemindars shall now be willing to engage for the payment of the public revenue on those terms in perpetuity, and the arrangement shall receive the sanction of the Hon. Court of Directors."† Far from objecting to the pledge given to the landholders in those regulations; far from contending against the principle of a fixed assessment, either on the ground of policy or of justice, the Court expressed their approbation of the measure contemplated, and gave it their unreserved sanction. To as late a period as 1813, not even a doubt was expressed in the way of discouragement; and the government of India had every reason to presume that they were proceeding in this great work with the full concurrence and approbation of the controlling authorities in this country. Mr. Edmonstone, in his able and instructive letters to the Court (of 31st July, 1821), has shown most conclusively, that the plans and proceedings of the government abroad received an ample confirmation. "Unhappily," says Mr. Tucker, "different views were adopted at a subsequent period; and since 1813,‡ the whole tenor of the Court's correspondence with the supreme government, has not only discountenanced the idea of a permanent settlement of the lands in the Ceded and Conquered provinces, but peremptory injunctions have been issued to that government, prohibiting the formation of such settlement at any future period." The pledge so formally given to the landholders in 1803, and 1805, and 1807, has accordingly remained unredemmed to the present day; temporary settlements have been concluded, in various ways, with different classes of persons; some of the principal talookdars have been set aside, and deprived of the management of their estates; and the great object seems to have been, to introduce the system of revenue administration§ which obtains in

* *Indian Empire*, vol. i., p. 579.

† Calcutta Records—Regulation X. of 1807; sec. 5.

‡ See Letter of Court of Directors to Bengal, 16th March, 1813.

§ The Ryotwar: see *Indian Empire*, vol. i., p. 575.

the territory of Fort St. George. I (in 1827) was a party to the introduction of leases for thirty years in the Western Provinces, by way of compromise for violating the pledge which had been given to the landholders in 1803 and 1805, to confirm the settlement then made with them in perpetuity. "I trust that this long term will operate as some compensation for their disappointment, and that it will, in a great degree, answer the ends proposed by a permanent settlement; but, as a principle, I still maintain, that permanency of tenure, and a limitation of the public demand upon the land, were boons bestowed under the dictates of a just and enlightened policy, and that Lord Cornwallis is to be regarded as the greatest benefactor of India."*

The measure referred to by Mr. Tucker, which I had myself the satisfaction of assisting to procure, was, however, partial in its extent, as well as temporary in its operation. It can hardly be called a compromise; it was simply a sop thrown by the stronger party who broke the bargain, to certain members of the weaker party, who had no resource but to accept it. The public pledge of a permanent settlement with the whole Conquered and Ceded, or, as they are now styled, North-Western Provinces, remains unredeemed. Moreover, even supposing the landholders could forget the manner in which that great boon was freely promised and arbitrarily withheld, they would still have reason to complain of the irregular and often oppressive assessments to which they were and are subjected. There is abundant evidence on this head; but none of greater authority than that of Colonel Sleeman, the resident at Lucknow; who, being commissioned by Governor-general Dalhousie to inquire into the state of Oude, became incidentally acquainted with the results of our fifty years' government of the half of Oude, ceded to us by the treaty of 1801.

"The country was then divided into equal shares, according to the rent-roll at the time. The half made over to the British government has been ever since yielding more revenue to us; while that retained by the sovereign of Oude has been yielding less and less to him: and ours now yields, in land revenue, stamp-duty, and the tax on spirits, two crore and twelve lacs [of rupees]

a-year; while the reserved half now yields to Oude only about one crore and thirty-three lacs. Under good management, the Oude share might, in a few years, be made equal to ours, and perhaps better; for the greater part of the lands in our share have been a good deal impoverished by over-cropping; while those of the Oude share have been improved by long fallows." Colonel Sleeman would seem to attribute the greater revenue raised from our territories, to that obtained by the native government, simply to our "good management;" for he adds, that "lands of the same natural quality in Oude, under good tillage, now pay a much higher rent than they do in our half of the estate."† Yet, in another portion of his Diary, when describing the decided aversion to British rule entertained by the landed aristocracy of Oude, he dwells on our excessive assessments, as co-operating with the cost and uncertainty of the law in civil cases, in causing the gradual decay of all the ancient families. "A less and less proportion of the annual produce of their lands is left to them in our periodical settlements of the land revenue; while family pride makes them expend the same sums in the marriage of their children, in religious and other festivals, personal servants, and hereditary retainers. They fall into balance, incur heavy debts, and estate after estate is put up to auction, and the proprietors are reduced to poverty. They say, that four times more of these families have gone to decay in the half of the territory made over to us in 1801, than in the half reserved by the Oude sovereign; and this is, I fear, true. They named the families—I cannot remember them."‡

To Mr. Colvin, Lieutenant-governor of the N.W. Provinces, the Colonel writes, that on the division of Oude in 1801, the landed aristocracy were equal in both portions. "Now (28th Dec., 1853) hardly a family of this class remains in our half; while in Oude it remains unimpaired. Everybody in Oude believes those families to have been systematically crushed."§

The correspondence in the public journals, regarding the progress of the mutiny, affords frequent evidence of the heavy rate of assessment in the North-West Provinces. For instance, the special correspondent of the *Times* (Mr. Russell), writing from the

* See *Memorials of Indian Government*; a selection from the papers of H. St. G. Tucker, edited by J. W. Kaye; pp. 106—137.

† *Journey through Oude*, in 1849-'50, by Colonel Sir W. Sleeman; vol. i., p. 169.

‡ *Ibid.*, vol. i., p. 169. § *Ibid.*, vol. ii., p. 415.

camp at Bareilly, speaks of the "indigent population" of Rohilund; and asserts, on the authority of Mr. Donalds, a settler and planter there, that the Company's land-tax on certain districts was not less than sixty-six per cent.*

It is to be hoped that a searching and unprejudiced inquiry will be instituted wherever decided and general disaffection has been manifested—wherever such statements are made as that from Allahabad; in which it is asserted, that "one, and only one, of the zemindars has behaved well to us during the disturbances here."†

An exposition of the working of the "model system" in Southern India, is given by Mr. Bourdillon, secretary to the government at Madras, in the revenue department, in a pamphlet published in 1852, in which he showed that, in the year 1848-'9, out of a total of 1,071,588 leases (excluding joint holdings in the fourteen principal ryotwarree districts), no fewer than 589,932 were each under twenty shillings per annum; averaging, in fact, only a small fraction above eight shillings each: 201,065 were for amounts ranging from twenty to forty shillings; averaging less than 28s. 6d. each; and 97,891 ranged between forty and sixty shillings; averaging 49s. 6d. each. Thus, out of 1,100,000 leases, 900,000 were for amounts under sixty shillings each, the average being less than 19s. 6d. each per annum. Mr. Bourdillon thus describes the condition of several million‡ of people subject to the Crown of England, and under its complete jurisdiction in some parts for more than half a century:—"Now it may certainly be said of almost the whole of the ryots paying even the highest of these sums, and even of many holding to a much larger amount, that they are always in poverty, and generally in debt. Perhaps one of this class obtains a small amount out of the government advances for cultivation; but even if he does, the trouble he has to take, and the time he loses in getting it, as well as the deduction to which he is liable, render this a questionable gain. For the rest of his wants he is dependent on the bazaar-man. To him his crops are generally hypothecated before they are reaped; and it is he who redeems them from the possession of the

village watcher, by pledging himself for the payment of the kist (rent claimed by government.) These transactions pass without any written engagements or memoranda between the parties; and the only evidence is the chetty's (bazaar-man) own accounts. In general, there is an adjustment of the accounts once a year; but sometimes not for several years. In all these accounts interest is charged on the advances made to the ryot, on the balance against him. The rate of interest varies with the circumstances of the case and the necessities of the borrower: it is probably seldom, or never, less than twelve per cent. per annum, and not often above twenty-four per cent. Of course the poorest and most necessitous ryots have to pay the highest. A ryot of this class of course lives from hand to mouth; he rarely sees money, except that obtained from the chetty to pay his kist: the exchanges in the out-villages are very few, and they are usually conducted by barter. His ploughing cattle are wretched animals, not worth more than seven to twelve shillings each; and all the rest of his few agricultural implements are equally primitive and inefficient. His dwelling is a hut of mud walls and thatched roof, far ruder, smaller, and more dilapidated than those of the better classes of ryots above spoken of, and still more destitute, if possible, of anything that can be called furniture. His food, and that of his family, is partly thin porridge, made of the meal of grain boiled in water, and partly boiled rice with a little condiment; and generally, the only vessels for cooking and eating from, are of the coarsest earthenware, much inferior in grain to a good tile or brick in England, and unglazed. Brass vessels, though not wholly unknown among this class, are rare. As to anything like education or mental culture, they are wholly destitute of it."

Mr. Mead, who resided several years at Madras, and who visited other parts of India, declares, that by the system which the British government have pursued, "the native aristocracy have been extinguished, and their revenues lost equally to the rulers and the multitude. The native manufacturers are ruined; and no corresponding increase has taken place in the consumption of foreign goods. Not a fourth of the land is taken up for tillage; and yet 200,000 men annually leave these shores, to seek employment on a foreign soil. The taxation of all kinds, and the landlord's rent,

* *The Times*, July 6th, 1858.

† *Parl. Papers*, 4th February, 1858.

‡ According to Mr. Mead, "18,000,000 souls, in Madras, have only a penny a-week each to subsist on."—(p. 3.)

6 INEFFICIENT ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE THROUGHOUT INDIA.

amount to but 5s. per head; and yet the surplus production of 23,000,000 is but 2s. 7d., and the imports but 1s. 6d., each person."*

The people of the North-West Provinces are being rapidly reduced to the condition of those of Southern India; and it is asserted, that they would rejoice at any change which promises relief from a "system" calculated to weigh down, with unceasing pressure, the energies of every man who derives his subsistence from the cultivation of the soil.

The Inefficient Administration of Justice is an admitted evil; the costliness, the procrastination, above all, the perjury and corruption for which our civil and criminal, our Sudder and Adawlut courts, are notorious. Shortly before the outbreak of the mutiny, Mr. Halliday, the lieutenant-governor of Bengal, urged, in the strongest language, the necessity for measures of police reform, which should extend to "our criminal judicatories as well as to the magistracy and constabulary organisation." He adds, after referring to the evidence brought forward in Mr. Dampier's elaborate reports—"I have myself made much personal inquiry into this matter during my tours. Whether right or wrong, the general native opinion is certainly that the administration of criminal justice is little better than a lottery, in which, however, the best chances are with the criminals; and I think this, also, is very much the opinion of the European mofussil [country] community. * * * Often have I heard natives express, on this point, their inability to understand the principles on which the courts are so constituted, or so conducted, as to make it appear in their eyes as if the object were rather to favour the acquittal, than to insure the conviction and punishment of offenders; and often have I been assured by them, that their anxious desire to avoid appearing as prosecutors, arose in a great measure from their belief that prosecution was very likely to end in acquittal, even, as they imagined, in the teeth of the best evidence; while the acquittal of a revengeful and unscrupulous ruffian, was known by experience to have repeatedly ended in the most unhappy consequences to his ill-advised and imprudent prosecutor. That this very general opinion is not ill-founded, may, I think, be proved from our own records."†

The youth and inexperience of the ma-

* Mead's *Sepoy Revolt*; p. 313. (Routledge, 1858.)
† Minute to Council of India, 30th April, 1856.

gistrates, which contributes so largely to the inefficiency of the courts over which they preside, arises out of the numerical inadequacy of the covenanted service to supply the number of officers required by the existing system. The Hon. A. Kinnaid stated, in the House of Commons, June 11th, 1857, that in Bengal, there were but seventy covenanted and uncovenanted magistrates, or one to 460,000 persons; and that there were three or four cases of a single magistrate to more than a million souls. It is terrible to think of the power such a state of things must throw into the hands of the native police, and this in a country where experience has taught us, that power, thus delegated, has invariably been employed as a means of extorting money. No wonder, then, that "from one end of Bengal to the other," the earnest desire and aim of those who have suffered from thieves or dacoits, should be, "to keep the matter secret from the police, whose corruption and extortion is so great, as to cause it to be popularly said, that dacoity is bad enough, but the subsequent police inquiry very much worse."

The frequent change, from place to place, and office to office, is urged as another reason for the inefficiency of our system. In the district of Dacca, for instance, the average time of continuance in the magistrate's office, has been, for the last twenty years, not ten months. The extent of the evil may be understood by looking over the register of civil servants, and their appointments. The *Friend of India* quotes the case of a well-known name among Indian officials—Henry Lushington—who arrived in India on the 14th of October, 1821, and, by the 9th of May, 1842, had filled no less than twenty-one offices—a change every year. But during this time he returned to Europe twice, and was absent from India four years and a quarter: his occupancy of each office, therefore, averages scarcely nine months. The journalist adds—"Thousands of miles of country, inhabited by millions of people, would have neither justice nor protection, were it not for the illegally assumed power of the planter and zemindar. There are districts in which the magistrate's court is sixty miles away; and in one case, I know of a judge having to go 140 miles to try a case of murder—so wide does his jurisdiction extend. This very district contains upwards of two millions of people; yet to

govern it there are just two Europeans; and one of these spends a considerable portion of his time in sporting, shooting wild animals, and hunting deer.*

The diminished numbers and impaired efficiency of the rural police, or village chowkedars, during the last twenty years, is another reason why "our magistracy is losing credit and character, and our administration growing perceptibly weaker." They are, says lieutenant-governor Halliday, so inadequately and uncertainly paid, as to be kept in a permanent state of starvation; and though, in former days, magistrates battled for them with unwilling zemindars and villagers, and were encouraged by government to do so, they are now declared to have no legal right to remuneration for service, and have themselves become too often the colleagues of thieves and robbers. The measures suggested by Mr. Halliday as indispensable to the effectual improvement of the Bengal police, were—the improvement of the character and position of the village chowkedars, or watchmen; the payment of adequate salaries, and the holding forth of fair prospects of advancement to the stipendiary police; the appointment of more experienced officers as covenanted zillah magistrates; a considerable increase in the number of the uncovenanted or deputy magistrates; an improvement in our criminal courts of justice; and, lastly, the establishment of sufficient means of communication with the interior of districts: because no system could work well while the police-stations and the large towns and marts in the interior continued to be cut off from the chief zillah stations, and from one another, by the almost entire absence of roads, or even (during a large part of the year) of the smallest bridle-roads or footpaths.

The proposer of the above reforms added, that they would involve an increased expenditure of £100,000 a-year on the magistracy and police of Bengal; and this statement, perhaps, furnishes an explanation of the little attention excited by a document full of important but most unpalatable assertions. The onus cannot, however, be allowed to rest solely on the local authorities. The consideration of the House of

Commons has been urgently solicited, by one of its own members,† to the report of the lieutenant-governor; and the fact of such flagrant evils being alleged, by a leading functionary, to exist in the districts under the immediate eye of the supreme government, is surely a sufficient warning, not merely of the necessity of promptly redressing the wrongs under which the Bengalees laboured, but also of investigating the internal administration of the distant provinces. It is unaccountable that the judicial part of the subject should have been so long neglected, after the unreserved condemnation of the system, pronounced by Lord Campbell in the House of Lords in 1853. In reply to the complaint of the Duke of Argyll regarding the strong expressions used in a petition for relief, presented on behalf of the people of Madras, his lordship adverted to the mode in which "ingenuous youths" were dispatched from the college at Haileybury, with, at best, a very imperfect acquaintance with the languages of India, and were made at once judges. Even the advantage of only acting in that capacity was withheld, the same youth being one day a judge of civil cases, the next a collector of revenue, and the next a police magistrate. Speaking from experience derived from the appeals which had come before him as a member of the judicial committee of the Privy Council, he thought, "as far as regarded the administration of justice in the inferior courts, no language could be too extravagant in describing its enormities."‡

The testimony borne by Mr. Halliday, in Bengal, entirely accords with that given by other witnesses regarding the administration of justice in the North-Western Provinces. Colonel Sleeman, writing in 1853, declared—"There is really nothing in our system which calls so much for remedy." He says, that during his recent tour through Oude, he had had much conversation with the people generally, and with many who had sojourned in our territory in seasons of disturbance. They were all glad to return, rather than remain in our districts and endure the evils occasioned by "the uncertainties of our law, the multiplicity and formality of our courts, the pride and negligence of those who preside over

* Quoted by Mr. Kinnaird, in *Bengal, its Landed Tenure and Police System*. (Ridgway, 1857; p. 14.) The series of measures provided by Lord Cornwallis, to protect the cultivator under the Permanent Settlement from oppression on the part of the proprie-

tors, have been disregarded; and the consequence of this neglect has been to leave too great power in the hands of the zemindars.—(*Ibid.*, p. 6.)

† By the Hon. A. Kinnaird, June 11th, 1856.

‡ *Hansard's Debates*, vol. cxxiv., p. 647.

them, and the corruption and insolence of those who must be employed to prosecute or defend a cause in them, and enforce the fulfilment of a decree when passed." Colonel Sleeman cites the statements made to him by the Brahmin communities of two villages, invited back by the native authorities from the Shahjehanpore district, and resettled on their lands; "a mild, sensible, and most respectable body, whom a sensible ruler would do all in his power to protect and encourage; but these are the class of landholders and cultivators whom the reckless governors of districts under the Oude government most grievously oppress. They told me:—

"Your courts of justice are the things we most dread, sir; and we are glad to escape from them as soon as we can, in spite of all the evils we are exposed to on our return to the place of our birth."
 * * * The truth, sir, is seldom told in these courts. There they think of nothing but the number of witnesses, as if all were alike; here, sir, we look to the quality. When a man suffers wrong, the wrongdoer is summoned before the elders, or most respectable men of his village or clan; and if he denies the charge and refuses redress, he is told to bathe, put his hand upon the peepul-tree, and declare aloud his innocence. If he refuses, he is commanded to restore what he has taken, or make suitable reparation for the injury he has done; and if he refuses to do this, he is punished by the odium of all, and his life becomes miserable. A man dare not put his hand upon that sacred tree and deny the truth—the gods sit in it, and know all things; and the offender dreads their vengeance. In your Adawlut, sir, men do not tell the truth so often as they do among their own tribes or village communities: they perjure themselves in all manner of ways, without shame or dread; and there are so many men about these courts, who understand the 'rules and regulations' (aen and kanoon), and are so much interested in making truth appear to be falsehood, and falsehood truth, that no man feels sure that right will prevail in them in any case. The guilty think they have just as good a chance of escape as the innocent. Our relations and friends told us, that all this confusion of right and wrong, which bewildered them, arose from the multiplicity of the 'rules and regulations,' which threw all the power into the hands of bad men, and left the European gentlemen helpless!"*

The comment made on the above assertions, tends to establish their accuracy. Colonel Sleeman says—"The quality of testimony, no doubt, like that of every other commodity, deteriorates under a system which renders the good of no more value, in exchange, than the bad. The formality

of our courts here, as everywhere else, tends to impair, more or less, the quality of what they receive. The simplicity of courts composed of little village communities and elders, tends, on the contrary, to improve the quality of the testimony they get; and, in India, it is found to be best in the isolated hamlets and forests, where men may be made to do almost anything rather than tell a lie. A Mahratta pundit, in the valley of the Nerbudda, once told me, that it was almost impossible to teach a wild Gond of the hills and jungles the occasional value of a lie. It is the same with the Tharoos and Booksas, who are almost exclusively the cultivators of the Oude Turace forest, and with the peasantry of the Himalaya chain of mountains, before they have come much in contact with people of the plains, and become subject to the jurisdiction of our courts. These courts are, everywhere, our weak points in the estimation of our subjects; and they should be everywhere simplified, to meet the wants and wishes of so simple a people."†

The Exclusion of the Natives from all Share in the Government, has been acted on as necessary to our retention of India. Yet many leading authorities agree in viewing the degraded state in which they have been held as a great defect in our system. "We exclude them," said Sir Thomas Munro, "from every situation of trust and emolument. We confine them to the lowest offices, with scarcely a bare subsistence. * * * We treat them as an inferior race of beings. Men who, under a native government, might have held the first dignities of the state; who, but for us, might have been governors of provinces, are regarded as little better than menial servants, and are often not better paid, and scarcely permitted to sit in our presence."

Lord Metcalfe, Lord William Bentinck, and others, have taken the same tone; and the opinions of the Duke of Wellington, Sir Robert Peel, and Lord Glenelg, are sufficiently evidenced in the 87th clause of the Charter Act of 1833, which declares the natives eligible to all situations under government, with certain exceptions. This clause,‡ so generously intended, has

* Sleeman's *Journey through Oude*, vol. ii., p. 68.

† *Ibid.*, vol. i., p. 168; vol. ii., p. 415.

‡ The clause runs as follows:—"That no natives of said territories, nor any natural born subject of her majesty resident therein, shall by reason only of

his religion, place of birth, descent, colour, or any of them, be disabled from holding any place, office, or employment under the said Company." Mr. Cameron, a gentleman long and intimately acquainted with India, writing in 1853, says—"During the

proved a cruel mockery, by exciting expectations which have been frustrated by the conditions attached to it, and the determined opposition of the Court of Directors, even when those conditions, including the voyage to England, have been fulfilled.

The monopoly of commerce was the worst feature of the E. I. Company, as regarded the British nation; the monopoly of patronage is its worst feature as regards the Indian population, and not its best as regards that of England. Lord William Bentinck stated the case very ably in his evidence before the select committee on steam communication with India in 1837. "The bane of our system is not solely that the civil administration is entirely in the hands of foreigners, but that the holders of this monopoly, the patrons of these foreign agents, are those who exercise the directing power at home; that this directing power is exclusively paid by the patronage; that the value of this patronage depends exactly upon the degree in which all the honours and emoluments of the state are engrossed by their clients, to the exclusion of the natives. There exists, in consequence, on the part of the home authorities, an interest in respect to the administration precisely similar to what formerly prevailed as to commerce, directly opposed to the welfare of India; and, consequently, it will be remarked without surprise, that in the two renewals of the charter that have taken place within the last twenty-five years, in the first, nothing was done to break down this administrative monopoly; and in the second, though a very important principle was declared, that no disability from holding office in respect to any subjects of the Crown, by reason of birth, religion, descent, or colour, should any longer continue, still no provision was made for working it out; and, as far as is known, the enactment has remained till this day a dead letter."*

The number of natives employed in the administration, notwithstanding the large accessions of territory between the years 1851 and 1857 (inclusive), has actually decreased from 2,910 to 2,846. Of the latter number, 856 receive less than £120 *per*

twenty years that have [since] elapsed, not one of the natives has been appointed to any office except such as they were eligible to before the statute." Mr. Henry Richard, commenting on this policy, remarks—"In adopting this course, and treating the natives as a conquered and inferior race, on no account to be admitted to political and social equality with ourselves, we are not only violating the dic-

annum; 1,377 from £120 to £240 *per annum*; and only eleven receive above £840.† These figures, when compared with the increased numbers and high salaries of the European covenanted and uncovenanted servants, can hardly fail to suggest a reason why the Hindoos—who frequently filled the chief positions in Indo-Mohammedan states, and almost invariably that of Dewan (or chancellor of the exchequer)—may think the rule of power-loving, money-getting Englishmen, worse for them than that of the indolent Moslem, who, though he sometimes forcibly destroyed the caste of thousands, yet never withheld from their race the honours and emoluments of high office. Rajpoots led the forces of Delhi; Rajpoot-nies (though that they affected to consider a degradation) sat within its palaces in imperial state—the wives and mothers of emperors: Brahmins filled every revenue office, from that of the treasurer-in-chief to the lowest clerk; all the financial business being transacted by them. The Great Moguls, the minor Mohammedan sovereigns, and their chief retainers, were spendthrifts rather than hoarders: they won kingdoms with their swords; and, like all conquerors, looked to reap where they had not sown; but avarice, or the love of money for its own sake, was very rare among them. They sat on their silver howdahs, on the backs of their elephants, and threw rupees, by bagful, among the people, who always benefited, at least indirectly, by the lavish expenditure for which they furnished the means.

The modern Brahmins (whatever their ancestors may have done) certainly evince more acquaintance with, and predilection for, the practice of the rules of Cocker, than for the abstract study of the Vedas, and the geographical and astronomical absurdities of the Shastras. They are born diplomatists, as well as financialists. Our greatest statesmen have acknowledged their remarkable ability. The despatches, especially the supplementary ones, of the late Duke of Wellington, abound with evidence of this: and when describing the character of Talleyrand, the duke could find no better comparison than that he was "like Eitel Punt (the tates of justice and of Christian morality, but we are disregarding all that the experience of the past has taught us to be wise policy with a view to permanent success."—(*Present and Future of India under British Rule*, p. 37.)

* Parl. Papers, 26th April, 1858; p. 201.

† Parl. Paper (House of Commons), 16th April, 1858.

Brahmin minister of Sindia); only not so clever."* Such men as these can hardly be expected to endure, without resentment, treatment which keeps the promise to the ear, yet breaks it to the sense.

In England we have grown used to the assertion, that there is no such thing as public opinion or discussion among the natives: but this is a mistake, and only proves that we have overlooked its rise and progress. The public meetings held in every presidency, the numerous journals, and, still more, the political pamphlets published by natives, attest the contrary. Of the latter class one now lies before me, written in English—fluent, grammatical English—with just a sufficient tinge of Orientalism to give internal evidence of the veritable authorship. The writer, after admitting the protection afforded by British rule from external violence and internal commotion, adds—"But it has failed to foster the growth of an upper class, which would have served as a connecting link between the government and the mass of the people. The higher order of the natives have, ever since its commencement, been shut out of all avenues to official distinction. They may acquire colossal fortunes in commercial and other pursuits, or obtain diplomas and honours in colleges and universities, but they cannot be admitted into the civil service, or the higher grades in the military service, without undertaking a voyage to England, and complying with other equally impracticable conditions. The highest situations to which they can aspire, are deputy-magistrateships and Sudder ameenships."†

Ignorance of the Languages, and the Aversion evinced towards the Natives, are the causes alleged by Baboo Shew Purshad (inspector of schools in the Benares division), for the "unpopularity of the government, and, consequently, of all the miseries under which the country labours." The reluctance of the English functionaries to mix with the natives, has prevented their acquiring that thorough knowledge of their sentiments and capabilities, social and moral condition, internal economy, wants, and prejudices, which are essential to successful government. "In England," says

the writer just quoted, "you have only to pass good acts, and draw good rules, and people will take upon themselves to see that they are worked in the right way, and for their benefit, by the local authorities; but here the case is otherwise: the best regulations can be turned into a source of the worst oppression by an unscrupulous and exacting magistrate; and if you give us a good magistrate, he can keep us happy without any regulation at all. The Punjab owes its happiness more to Sir John Lawrence and Messrs. Montgomery and Macleod, than to any system or regulation. * * * It is owing to these few officers, who come now and then to the lot of some districts, that people have not yet despaired and risen in a body. * * * The government will feel, no doubt, stronger after the suppression of the mutiny than they ever were. If the hatred of their countrymen towards the natives increases in ratio to the increase of power, as hitherto, the disaffection of the people, and the unpopularity of the government, will increase also proportionally. The consequences are obvious: and, be assured, the country will be desolated and ruined."‡

Englishmen, generally, have no gift for languages; and this has been always one of their weak points as rulers of India, where it is of the first importance that all functionaries, whether civil or military, should be—not first-rate Grecians, or versed in black-letter lore—but able to converse, in the vernacular dialect, with the men over whom they bear rule. Had such knowledge been at all general, warnings would, in all human probability, have been received of the combinations (such as they were) which preceded the massacres of Meerut, Cawnpore, and Jhansi. It is a serious defect in the system (springing, no doubt, from the monopoly of patronage), that so little trouble has been taken to promote the efficiency of the servants of the Company, as administrators of a delegated despotism. Lord Wellesley strove earnestly for this end; but his efforts were coldly received, and are even now insufficiently appreciated.

So far as the natives are concerned, sending out "incapables" to bear rule over them, manifests a shameful indifference to

* *Kaye's Life of Malcolm*, vol. i., p. 241.

† *The Mutinies, the Government, and the People*; by A Hindoo; p. 36. (Printed at Calcutta, 1858.)

‡ *Thoughts of a Native of Northern India on the Rebellion, its Causes and Remedies* (Dalton, Cock-

spur-street, 1858): with a Preface, written at Calcutta, and signed "M. W."—initials which suggest the name of a well-known member of the Bengal (uncovenanted) service. The Dedication to H. C. T., Esq., is similarly suggestive.

their interests, and is inflicting a wrong, of which we cannot hope to escape the penalty. "It is suicidal to allow India to be a refuge, as it is at present to a great extent, for those of our youth who are least qualified to make their way in their own country; and it is such an insult to the natives, who are full of intelligence, and are making great progress in European knowledge of all kinds, that if anything could excuse them for rebelling, it would be this."

This is plain speaking from an authority like Indophilus; and what he adds with regard to young officers is equally applicable to civilians:—"It should not be left, as it is at present, to the decision of a young man whether he will pass in the native languages or not. The power of understanding his men, and of rendering himself intelligible to them, should be considered an indispensable qualification; and those who cannot, or will not, acquire this necessary accomplishment, should be removed from the service. Every officer should be presumed to understand the language of his soldiers."*

The change which has taken place in Anglo-Indian society, has, without doubt, been a painful one for the natives. The very large increase in the proportion of Englishwomen who now accompany their husbands, fathers, and brothers to India, has tended to decrease the association with the native gentry; and these are becoming yearly less able to vie with the Europeans. One branch of the intercourse of former days has greatly diminished; the conventionalities have become more stringent; the temptations have decreased; the shameless profligacy described by Clive† no longer exists; and a dark-coloured "beebee" (lady), the mother of a large family of Eurasians, would not now be considered a fit head for the household of a distinguished military or civil servant. How far any radical reform has taken place, or whether the great "social evil" has only changed its hue, it is hard to say; but several trustworthy witnesses assert as an evident fact, that the Europeans and natives of all classes associate far less than they used to do, and that many of the former have adopted a supercilious tone towards the latter, which is equally impolitic, unjust, and inconsistent

* Letter to the *Times*, September 25th, 1857.

† *Indian Empire*, vol. i., p. 307.

‡ A writer in the *Times*, "who has passed his life in India," asserts, that "the white and the dark man are no more equal, and no more to be governed by the same rules, than the man and the ape."—"H."

with the usual refining and softening effect of legitimate domestic intercourse.

The repeated use of the word "niggers" in recent books of Indian memoirs, and in the correspondence published in the public journals,‡ is itself a painful and significant symptom. An American traveller asks, how we can reconcile our denunciation of the social inequality of the negro and white races in America with our own conduct to the East Indians? "I allude," he says, "to the contemptuous manner in which the natives, even those of the best and most intelligent classes, are almost invariably spoken of and treated. The tone adopted towards the lower classes is one of lordly arrogance; towards the rich and enlightened, one of condescension and patronage. I have heard the term 'niggers' applied to the whole race by those high in office; with the lower order of the English it is the designation in general use."§

Sir Charles Napier considered, that nothing could be worse than the manners of Englishmen in India towards natives of all ranks. Therefore, when endeavouring to bring into operation the resources of Sind, he refused British officers a passage on board his merchant steamers, knowing that "if granted, they would go on board, occupy all the room, treat my rich merchants and supercargoes with insolence, and very probably drink and thrash the people."||

Religion and Education.—Missionary operations are alleged to have had their share in jeopardising the permanence of our power; while, on the contrary, the advocates of religious enterprise assert, that had the messengers of the glad tidings of universal peace and good-will been suffered to have free way in India, as in every other dependency or colony of the British empire, such an exposition of the tenets of Protestant Christianity would long since have been afforded to the intelligent and argumentative Hindoos, as would have rendered it impossible for the most artfully-concocted rumours, founded on the most unfortunate combination of circumstances, to persuade them (in the teeth of a hundred years' experience to the contrary), that force and fraud would ever be used to compel the

Nov. 23rd, 1857.) It is much to be regretted, that such mischievous and exceptional opinions as these should find unqualified expression in a journal which circulates largely throughout India.

§ Taylor's *Visit to India*, &c., in 1853; p. 273.

|| *Life*, by Sir William Napier; vol. iii., p. 473.

adoption of a creed which appeals to the reason, and requires the habitual exercise of the free-will of every disciple.

With some few and partial exceptions, the policy of the home and local government has been steadily and even sternly repressive of all attempts for the extension of Christianity; and every concession made has been wrung from them by the zeal of influential individuals, supported by public opinion. It needs not to establish this fact on evidence, or to remind the reader that English missionaries were not even tolerated in India until the year 1813; that Marshman and Carey were compelled to take up their residence without the British frontier, in the Danish settlement of Serampoor; that Judson and his companions were actually deported; and that Robert Haldane's munificent and self-sacrificing intention of expending £40,000 on the formation of an effective mission for Benares, was frustrated by the positive prohibition of government, despite the efforts of Wilberforce and others.

An Indian director is said to have declared, that "he would rather a band of devils landed in India than a band of missionaries;"* and his colleagues acted very much as if they shared his conviction.

Secular education was long viewed by the East India Company as a question in which they had no concern; and the efforts made by the Marquis Wellesley and others, were treated with an indifference amounting to aversion. At length public opinion became decided on the subject; and, in 1813, the sum of £10,000 was, by the determination of parliament, decreed to be annually appropriated, out of the revenues of India, for the cultivation of exclusively Hindoo and Mohammedan lore.

In 1824, Mr. Mill (the historian, who entered the service of the Company after writing his famous exposition of the worst features of their rule) was ordered to prepare a despatch on the subject of education. He did so, and in it boldly laid down the principle of inculcating sound truth, in opposition to the absurd fictions of the Shastras. The directors accepted his *dictum*, and founded English schools and colleges for exclusively secular instruction. Lord W. Bentinck, in 1834, pursued a similar course; and a few thousand youths (including Nana Sahib) learned to talk English fluently,

to quote Shakespeare, Pope, Addison, and Byron, instead of the Ramayana and the Mahabharata, Hafiz or Sadi; and to jeer with the flippancy of superficial scepticism at the ignorance of their parents and countrymen, in asserting that the earth rests on eight elephants, a serpent, a turtle, and such like;† and at the Mussulmans, for believing in Mohammed's journey to the moon. After all, such instruction was a direct and tangible interference with the religious views of the people. No greater would have been committed, had we placed before them a frank and full exposition of our own creed, choosing Moses rather than Milton to narrate the origin and fall of the whole human race, and trusting to the equally inspired record of the evangelists, to impart, with resistless power, the divinely revealed mystery of man's redemption.

We have taught the whole truth as regards material things—that the earth is round, for instance, and that the ocean is everywhere the same; in opposition to the Brahminical doctrine, that the earth consists of seven continents, divided by seas composed respectively of salt-water, wine, sugar-cane juice, clarified butter, curds, milk, and fresh-water. Spiritual truth we have not ventured to set forth; and the conquerors who represent a nation which applauds itself for the maintenance in strict union of church and state, have become the voluntary exponents of a neutral system which closely resembles practical infidelity. And practical infidelity is the cause to which alone our conduct is attributed by the more intelligent class of the natives. They know that the government is firm even to obstinacy in the maintenance of its convictions, and they utterly discredit the reality of a belief which can co-exist with the temporising and cowardly half measures employed by those who are in all other things habitually positive and outspoken.

The Anglo-Indian authorities were not, however, all blind or indifferent to the workings of the "Godless colleges." In Madras, a strong feeling grew up in favour of the teaching of the Bible in government schools. The Marquis of Tweeddale, then governor, shared and ably expressed this opinion, declaring, that "it required a more solid foundation than is to be found in the Hindoo or Mohammedan faith, to bear the change which learning operates on the mind of those who emerge out of a state of ignorance, and attain those mental

* Quoted by the Hon. A. Kinnaid—Exeter Hall, Jan. 5th, 1858.

† Arthur's *Mysoor*, p. 91.

acquirements which enlarged education gives. * * * Nor do I see how native society itself can safely and permanently advance except upon this basis. I would therefore adopt the rule proposed by the council, which recognises the Bible as a class-book in the government schools, but at the same time leaves it free to the native student to read it or not, as his conscience may dictate, or his parent may desire.”*

The Court of Directors refused to comply with Lord Tweeddale's recommendation, and persevered in their previous resolve, despite the remonstrances of the Madras council, and their clear exposition of the mistaken view on which that determination was founded. An able pen wrote a denunciation of the system, which now reads like a prophecy:—"The government does not know what it is doing. No doubt it is breaking down those superstitions, and dispersing those mists, which, by creating weakness and disunion, facilitated the conquest of the country; but, instead of substituting any useful truth, or salutary principles, for the ignorance and false principles which they remove, they are only facilitating the dissemination of the most pernicious errors, and the most demoralising and revolutionary principles. I have been appalled by discovering the extent to which atheistical and deistical writings, together with disaffection to the British government and hatred to the British name, have spread, and are spreading, among those who have been educated in government schools, or are now in the service of government. The direction of the government system of education is rapidly falling into the hands of astute Brahmins, who know how to take advantage of such a state of things, and at the same time to strengthen themselves by an alliance with Parsee and Musulman prejudices; while the European gentlemen who still remain nominally at the head of the system, know nothing of the under-currents which pervade the whole, or consider themselves as bound, either by principle or policy, not to make any exertions in favour of Christian truth; while the professed object of the government is to give secular instruction only.”†

* See Lord Tweeddale's Minute, August 24th, 1846, and reply thereto.—Sixth Report of House of Lords, 1853; pp. 189; 152.

† Testimony of Professor Henderson, of the Bombay Government Schools, dated 31st October, 1803; published in a Discourse upon his death, by Dr. Wilson president of the Bombay Literary Society.

In April, 1847, an order was issued by the Court of Directors to the governor-general, requiring, that the principle which had been "uniformly maintained, of abstaining from all interference with the religion of the natives of India," should be rigidly enforced. A paragraph in a previous despatch (to Madras, 21st May, 1845), declared it to be "the duty of government, and not less of its officers, to stand aloof from all missionary labours, either as promoting or as opposing them." At this time, it was well-known that many of the most esteemed officials, civil and military, were, and had been for years past, members of committees of Bible and Missionary societies. A public demand for "specific instructions" regarding the meaning of the directors, was made by their servants; and this, together with the privately expressed opinions which reached the governor-general (Lord Hardinge), induced him to withhold the despatch and recommend its suppression; in which the directors concurred, because its publication "might give rise to discussion on a subject on which it is particularly desired that the public mind should not be excited."‡

In the year 1849, a native of high-caste, occupying a responsible position in the Calcutta college, publicly embraced Christianity, and was immediately dismissed by the English authorities.§

The government pursued the system of excluding the Bible from its schools, while the missionaries persisted in making it the foundation of theirs; and the opinion of the natives was evidenced in the large voluntary contributions made by them to the latter. The statistics of 1853 gave the following result:—Government schools, 404; scholars, 25,362; Christian Mission schools, 1,668; scholars, 96,177. The returns showed some singular facts: among others, that the only school at Bangalore in which Brahmin youths were found, was a missionary one.

In 1854, the duty of adopting measures for the extension of education, was avowed in a despatch by Sir Charles Wood; and the doctrine of grants in aid for the support of all schools, without reference to the religious doctrine taught therein, was plainly set forth.

‡ Parl. Papers (House of Commons), 12th February, 1858; pp. 3, 5, 11.—*Letter from a Layman in India*; pamphlet, published by Dalton, Cockspur-street, 1858; pp. 11, 12.—Speech of Rev. W. Chalmers, Exeter Hall, January 5th, 1858.

§ *Christian Education for India in the Mother-Tongue*, p. 15.

A minister of public instruction for India was appointed, with a salary of £3,000 a-year; four inspectors, with salaries varying from £1,500 down to £750; and a large number of sub-inspectors: but no single vernacular school* was established, neither was any attempt made to frame and circulate tracts on agriculture and mechanics, or to convey, in the native languages, the more elementary and practical portions of the knowledge generally availed of in Europe for the furtherance of various branches of trade and manufacture.†

The extensive scale on which preparations were made surprised the natives, and the unauthorised and improper statement of some of the officials, that "it was the order of government that people should now educate their children,"‡ created much anxiety. Yet proselytising was neither contemplated nor desired. The Calcutta Bible Society requested permission of the Council of Education to place a copy of the Bible, in English and the vernacular, in the library of each government school and college. It was notorious that the Koran and the Shastras were there; yet the council declined to give the Bible a place beside them, because it would be a breach of "neutrality."§

In England, and even in India, the authorities generally seem to have had no misgivings as to the result of purely secular teaching. Some few, however, deprecated education of any kind to any extent; and this party included a late governor-general, Lord Ellenborough, who declared his belief of its incompatibility with the maintenance of British dominion in India—a conviction, the ground of which is explained by a subsequent statement made by his lordship in his place in parliament (in 1852), that "no intelligent people would submit to our government."||

With such views, it is not surprising that Lord Ellenborough, when addressing the House of Lords on the 9th of June, 1857, on the recent tidings of the mutiny of the Bengal army, should have adverted with extreme astonishment to a statement which he could "scarcely believe to be true," though he had seen it "distinctly stated in the papers, that the governor-general himself,

Lord Canning, subscribed largely to a missionary society, which has for its object the conversion of the natives." The reply of Lord Lansdowne was, that if "Lord Canning had so acted as to give countenance to such belief as the noble earl inferred, he would no longer deserve to be continued in his office." These, and similar expressions of opinion, have done good by affording unmistakable evidence of the feelings entertained by men of high talent and position. A cry arose for "Christian emancipation," and several public meetings took place. On one of these, held at Exeter Hall on the 5th of January, 1858, the *Times* commented in the following terms:—"We have made a great mistake in India. The religious policy pursued by the government of that country, has made us, as one of its own servants declared, 'cowards in the eyes of men, and traitors in the eyes of God.'"

* * * A stranger to the question, after reading the noble chairman's speech on that occasion, might well imagine that the Hindoos were the conquerors, and we the subjects; that we had been tyrannically debarred, for more than a century, from the free exercise of our religion; and that we were at length seizing a favourable moment to demand relief from these unjust disabilities. All that his lordship, and those who followed him, asked for, was Christian emancipation; * * * and that, under a government acknowledging faith in Christ Jesus, the profession of the Gospel should no longer be visited with penalties of civil disqualification. These are literally the conditions to which our policy has driven us. * * * We were never really neutral; we made ourselves partisans; but, unfortunately, in our anxiety to escape the charge of favouring Christianity, we actually favoured heathenism. * * * All this must now end, if not for truth's sake, for the sake of government itself. Our policy has broken down utterly, and proved destructive to its own objects. There is no mistaking the results of the experiment. Where, asked Lord Shaftesbury, did the insurrection break out? Was it in Madras, where Christians are most numerous, and where Christianity has been best treated? Was it in Bombay, where caste was scouted,

* A Vernacular Society is now being organised in London. It is much needed; for, as its chief promoter, Mr. Tucker, truly says, no people have ever been Christianised through a foreign language.

† Report of Public Meeting for the Formation of

a Christian Vernacular Education Society, 20th May, 1858; p. 8.

‡ Parl. Papers, 13th April, 1858; p. 2.

§ Letter from a Layman, p. 13.

|| Dickinson's *India under a Bureaucracy*, p. 117.

and Hindoos taught that government could pay no heed to such pretensions? No; it was in Bengal, where idolatry and caste received the greatest reverence; and in the Bengal army, which represented the most pampered class of the whole population."

One last incident, illustrative of the anti-Christian policy of the Indian government, remains to be quoted. The Sonthals—a wild tribe, resembling our gipsies—were driven into rebellion in 1856, by the misconduct of some railway contractors, the exactions of native bankers, and the outrages committed by the native police. The missionaries materially aided in restoring tranquillity, and succeeded in obtaining the confidence of these poor savages, who were without the pale of Hindoo caste; and the Calcutta authorities entered into arrangements with the Church Missionary Society for the establishment of schools of religious and industrial instruction among them, and specially among the females.* When the measure became known in England, the home government refused its sanction, and ordered the establishment of schools on its own plan, the teachers of which were to be "most strictly enjoined to abstain from any attempt to introduce religious subjects in any form."†

It is interesting to learn, from one of the Hindoos themselves, the view taken by them of our so-called neutrality. Shew Purshad says—"It is absurd to think that the English are hated by the Hindoos on account of their religion. * * * It is not religion, but the want of religion, which has brought so much evil to this country. The people know that the government is a Christian one. Let it act openly as a true Christian: the people will never feel themselves disappointed; they will only admire it. * * * Education must be carried on upon a

* See Mr. J. M. Strachan's *Letter to Captain Eastwick*. (Seeley, 1858.)

† Parl. Papers (Commons), 24th Aug., 1857; p. 2.

‡ See *Indian Empire*, vol. i., p. 46.

§ "Active resistance to the recently introduced messing system in the gaols of Bengal and the N.W. Provinces, has produced bloodshed."—Col. Sykes' *Letter to the Times*, October 8th, 1857.

|| *Thoughts of a Native*, &c., pp. 18—34.

¶ Mr. Tucker was connected with the Benares district for twenty-five years: during this period he avowed and acted up to his own high standard of Christian duty, at the risk of being deemed a dangerous fanatic; the more so because the "Holy City" of Benares is the stronghold of the Brahmins, and holds a somewhat similar position, in the estimation of the Hindoos, to what Mecca does in that of the Moslems. Yet, on his departure for Europe

sounder principle, and religion must be fostered. Don't turn India from idolatry to atheism. * * * Who can detest 'religion?' It is the order of their own Shastras‡ that every man is to revere his own religion. You may have a thousand missionaries to preach, and another thousand as masters of the schools, at the expense of the government, or distribute a thousand Bibles at the hands of the governor-general. The people will not murmur out a single syllable, though they may laugh and jeer; but take care that you do not interfere with their caste—you do not force them to eat the food cooked by another in the gaols,§ or thrust grease down their throats with the cartridges made by Europeans. * * * Difference of caste must vanish, with many other offsprings of folly and ignorance, when its proper time comes. To try to exterminate it now must end in bloodshed."||

Mr. Henry Carre Tucker, the son of the late chairman of the East India Company (and himself no mean authority¶), confirms the statement, from long personal experience—that so long as we scrupulously abstain from any direct interference with the ceremonial observances of caste, we may teach Christianity as much as we please, adding—"This view is strengthened by the fact, that during the late mutiny, those large military stations have escaped the best where the governors were most zealous for Christianity." He proceeds to instance Peshawur, under Herbert Edwardes; and Lahore, under "those brave Christian men, John Lawrence and Robert Montgomery:" but here we cannot follow him without anticipating the subsequent narrative. His conclusions, however, are too important to be omitted: they are—"That we ought to assume a bolder position as a Christian gov-

in March, 1858, a valedictory address was presented to him, signed by all the principal inhabitants—expressing sorrow at the termination of their official connection, a "deep sense of admiration of his enlarged spirit of philanthropy and almost boundless benevolence," and "gratitude for his zealous exertions in extending the benefits of education." In token of their sense of the manner in which he had employed his few leisure hours in furthering "the welfare, here and hereafter, of those committed to his charge," the subscribers to the address collected among themselves 6,000 rupees, for the obtaining of a full-length portrait of their friend, to be placed in the Benares college; and with the balance, after defraying the cost of the picture, they propose to found a scholarship to commemorate his name. Certainly the Hindoos know how to appreciate Christian disinterestedness when they meet with it.

ernment; that it is quite feasible to Christianise our education; and that, instead of causing alarm and disaffection, those dangerous points have, through God's blessing, been the most quiet where Christian exertion has been the greatest. Oude, destitute of all missionary effort, and the sepoy, to whom Christian instruction was closed, were the worst of all.*

The ignorance displayed by the sepoys, and that large part of the Indian population connected with the army, regarding Christianity, is remarkable, even after making every possible allowance for the rigid exclusion of missionary teaching, and the absolute prohibition of proselytism among their ranks.† The cause is obvious—not simply to the minds of earnest Christians, but to the class who have least sympathy with anything approaching religious enthusiasm.

The *Times*,‡ in one of its leading articles, is constrained to admit, that it is because the superior beneficence and purity of our religion have not been vividly and transparently exhibited in practice, that we “have not converted the people who have witnessed the every-day life of British gentlemen and ladies—we will not say to an acceptance of our religion, but even to any high regard for it. * * * We ought to have stood high in that land of many religions, as a consistent, believing, just, kind, and holy people. That we have not even done this, and that we are regarded simply as unbelievers, with little religion except a few negative tenets, which we find convenient for political purposes, must be deemed a shortcoming in our practice. It must be our fault that we Christians stand so much lower in the religious scale of India than we did in the scale of ancient paganism.”

While (according to the above impartial testimony) we have not taught Christianity either by precept or example, and while among the sepoys the Bible has remained a

sealed book, no such embargo has ever been laid on the Koran. The Mohammedans, themselves essentially propagandists, have remained masters of the situation. Wrapped in a complacent belief of their own superiority, as believers in a revelation more recent and complete than that of their conquerors, the followers of the False Prophet adopt their own classification of “Jews, English, infidels, and heretics;” and really viewing us (in a certain sense) as we do the Jews, have taken pains to communicate this impression to the Hindoos.

Indeed, who will venture to defend from the charge of practical atheism, a government that causes such sentences as “God is a Spirit,” to be expunged from its school-books;§ being apparently ignorant that this fundamental truth is the very essence of all that is sound in Mohammedanism, and is acknowledged, at least in theory, by every Brahmin and Buddhist in India.

Caste, and the panic-terror which the idea of its violation may have occasioned, constitute a social and political, even more than a religious question.|| Sir Charles Napier well defined the difference when he said, that what the natives dreaded, was “not conversion, but contamination.” Caste is no universal, immutable law: it is a pure convention; but one which, by the nature of our position, we are bound to respect to a certain reasonable extent.

The traditional four castes¶ have merged into innumerable others. Human passions have proved too strong for the strongest fetters ever forged by a wily priesthood. Intermarriages have taken place between every variety of caste; and the result is, the general division of the Hindoo population into high-caste (consisting of Brahmins who compose the priest and scholar class, and the Rajpoots, who are hereditary soldiers), low-caste (in which all the Mahrattas, and

* It would seem as if the government had feared the influence of Christianity among the English soldiery; for it is only very recently that chaplains have been appointed to accompany expeditions. No provision of the kind was made in the Cabool war; and Sir Charles Napier loudly complained of a similar deficiency among his force in Sind.

† Witness the case of Purrub-deen Pandeh, a high-caste Brahmin (a naik in the 25th regiment), who, though “previously much esteemed in the corps,” was summarily removed for having received Christian baptism. This occurred at Meerut in 1819.—(Parl. Papers, 8th February, 1858.)

‡ October 6th, 1857.

§ See *London Quarterly Review*, October, 1857:

article on the “Sepoy Rebellion,” by the Rev. W. Arthur; p. 259.

|| No European can form, though they ought to form, a correct idea of the difference between the prejudices of caste and those of religion. Give a couple of gold mohurs to a pundit, and he will cheerfully compose a book in refutation of his own religion; but give him a glass of water openly touched by you, even through the medium of a stick a hundred feet long, and he will not drink it, though you offer him a thousand gold mohurs. Secretly, perhaps, he may not have objection to do anything either to please you or satiate his own passions.—(*Thoughts of a Native*, &c.: p. 18)

¶ See *Indian Empire*, vol. i., p. 14.

most of the remaining native princes, are included), and, thirdly, out-caste—a section diffused all over India, and forming a large proportion of the entire population. The Abbé Dubois maintained, that they were, in his time, one in five; but an able writer of our own day suggests one in ten as nearer the truth: adding—“Even in this proportion the Indian out-castes would be twenty millions of human beings, or more than the population of all England.”*

This class includes the aborigines, or at least the predecessors of the Hindoos, the Gonds, Bheels, Sonthals, &c., who have never accepted caste; and, indeed, could not by Brahminical law find place in it. The barrier is equally impassable for the Mussulmans, whose observance of certain caste rules is worthless in the sight of the Hindoos. No man can venture to foretell how much longer the system may endure, or how soon it may be thrown to the winds. The Jains have caste; the Buddhists (who still linger in India) have none. Then there are the Seiks, originally a peaceable, religious sect, founded by a Hindoo, whose creed was derived from the Vedas and the Koran. Caste was suddenly abolished among them by Govind, their tenth “Guru,” or spiritual chief; converts were gladly welcomed from all quarters, and admitted to a perfect equality.†

A similar change may come over the mass of the Hindoos; and as the teaching of St. Paul produced the simultaneous conversion of two thousand persons, so here, whole communities may be led at once to renounce the error which has so long enthralled them. Or, the work may be more gradual—individual enlightenment may be the thin edge of the wedge: but in either case, Christian civilisation is the instrument which alone can prosper in our hands—the only one that affords any rational prospect of leading to the voluntary renunciation of caste. This renunciation does not necessarily accompany conversion to Christianity; though it would seem to be an inevitable consequence.

Some of the Hindoo pamphleteers, however, declare that caste can hardly be deemed incompatible with Christianity, when it exists so evidently, although under peculiar forms, among the English. They ask, whether we do not treat all men whose skins are darker than our own, as if of quite

another caste or *breed*? Whether half-caste is not our contemptuous term for an-Eurasian? They point to the whole framework of Anglo-Indian society, to its “covenanted” service, to the rigid exclusiveness produced by patronage alike in the military and civil service, in confirmation of their assertion. High-caste, low-caste, and out-caste, with their various subdivisions, are, they say, pretty clearly defined in our practice, however forcibly we may repudiate such distinctions in theory.

To return: the Indo-Mohammedans have, to a certain extent, imitated Brahminical practices as conventional distinctions, and are interested in inciting the Hindoo sepoys to maintain a system which enables them to dictate to their officers the what, when, how, and where, in a service in which unhesitating and unquestioning obedience is otherwise exacted. The natives are perfectly aware that caste is a great inconvenience to the Europeans, and that it materially impedes their efficiency as soldiers and servants. It is this which made them so watchful of every measure of government that might infringe on the caste monopoly of privileges and immunities, which we had unwisely made their “Magna Charta,” and which we, strangely enough, took no pains to investigate or define. The consequence of our ignorance of its theory and regulations has been, that we have been perpetually falling into opposite errors—vacillating between absurd deference to pretended scruples, and real infraction of the first and most invariable observances. Persecution on the one hand, undue concessions on the other, have been our Scylla and Charybdis; but it is our ignorance that has made them so.

In considering the operation of caste in India, we must bear in mind that it is a thing hard to preserve intact, and easily destroyed, either by force or fraud. Many comparatively recent instances of both are on record; and Tippoo Sultan especially delighted in compelling Brahmins to forfeit their privileges by destroying kine. The natives know us too well to fear any such ebullitions of insane barbarity or fierce zeal; but it is quite possible they may anticipate our desiring the annihilation of caste on the score of policy, and dread our attempting it by a *coup d'état*. It is alleged that articles in the public journals, regarding the need of soldiers experienced by England in carrying out the Russian, Persian, and Chi-

* *Sepoy Rebellion in India*; by the Rev. W. Arthur.—*London Quarterly Review*, October, 1857.

† See *Indian Empire*, vol. i., p. 154.

nese wars, gave rise to rumours which were circulated among the sepoys, of the anxiety of government to get rid, at once and for ever, of the shackles which prevented the Indian troops from being sent across the *Cala-pani*, or Black water, to fight our battles in foreign climes.* A Hindoo would naturally cling to the system which was at once his reason and excuse for avoiding expatriation; which he fears worse than death; and his suspicions would easily be roused on the subject.

The readiest way of destroying caste, is by forcing or tempting the party concerned to taste anything prepared by unclean hands—that is, by persons of an inferior, or of no caste; or which contains the smallest particle of the flesh of kine. The Mohammedans abstain as rigidly from tasting the flesh of the impure hog, as the Hindoos from that of the sacred cow. The motive differs, but the result is the same. In both cases, the abstinence respectively practised is one of the first and most generally recognised of their rules. The Indian government could scarcely have been ignorant, when issuing a new description of fire-arms to the sepoys, that to bite a cartridge greased with cows' or pigs' fat, was more to Hindoos and Indo-Mohammedans, than "eating pork to a Jew, spitting on the Host to a Roman Catholic, or trampling on the Cross to a Protestant."† To the Hindoos it was indeed much more, so far as temporal welfare was concerned; for it involved practical outlawry, with some of the pains and penalties specially attached to conversion to Christianity. It is clear, that if it had been necessary to distribute greased cartridges, to be bitten by the troops, not only the greatest care ought to have been taken that no contaminating material should be used in the manufacture, but also that an explicit assurance should have been given to this effect. Yet, the inspector-general of ordnance has stated, that "no extraordinary care appears to have been taken to ensure the absence of any objectionable fat."‡ So that, so far from endeavouring to remove all suspicion from the minds of the sepoys, of any intention to inflict on them the calamity they most dreaded, we did not even guard against its perpetration.

The issue of the greased cartridges, under

such circumstances, was unquestionably a gross blunder, and is viewed by many as the exciting cause of the mutiny.

The *Free Press*, and the so-called *Gagging Act* of Lord Canning, have given rise to discussions which bring to mind Dr. Johnson's remark, that opinions formed on the efficacy of a certain branch of scholastic discipline, are apt to be materially influenced by the fact, "of which end of the rod falls to one's share." The evils alleged to have been produced by unrestricted publication, are too circumstantially stated by official authorities to be omitted in the present category; and it becomes necessary to show, if possible, the two sides of the question—that is, the case of those who wield, and those who wince under, the rod of censorship. It is now little more than twenty years since complete freedom of the press was bestowed by Sir Charles Metcalfe.§ The measure was sudden and startling: it was scarcely in accordance with his own previous views; and it was in decided opposition to the opinions which the Court of Directors had from time to time enunciated.

A recapitulation of the restrictive measures adopted in the three presidencies, from 1799 to 1819, is given in an important communication made by "the Chairs"|| to the president of the India Board, on the 17th of January, 1823. Among other evidence in support of the necessity for a rigid censorship, they quoted the following Minute, written in 1807, by Lord William Bentinck (then governor of Madras), regarding a charge delivered by one of the judges of the Supreme Court (Sir Henry Gwillim) to the grand jury:—

"It is necessary, in my opinion, for the public safety, that the press in India should be kept under the most rigid control. It matters not from what pen the dangerous matter may issue; the higher the authority the greater the mischief. We cannot prevent the judges of the Supreme Court from uttering, in open court, opinions, however mischievous; but it is in our power, and it is our duty, to prohibit them from being circulated through the country by means of the press. Entertaining strongly this sentiment, I would recommend that the order of government may be given to all proprietors of printing-presses, forbidding them, upon pain of the utmost displeasure of the governor in council, to print any paper whatever without the previous sanction of the governor in council, communicated by the chief secretary."¶

* Mead's *Sepoy Revolt*, p. 37. (Routledge and Co.: London, 1858.)

† *Letters of Indophilus*, p. 33.

‡ Parl. Papers (by command), 1857; p. 7.

§ *Indian Empire*, vol. i., p. 431.

|| The chairman and deputy-chairman of the E. I. Company (J. Pattison and W. Wigram.)

¶ Parl. Papers (Commons), 4th May, 1858.

The opinion pronounced by Sir Thomas Munro, regarding the revolution which a free press would produce throughout the native army, is next quoted; and the writers proceed to express similar and very decided views on the subject:—

"A free press is a fit associate and necessary appendage of a representative constitution; but in no sense of the terms can the government of India be called a free, a representative, or a popular government; the people had no voice in its establishment, nor have they any control over its acts. . . .

Can it be doubted that the respect of the natives for our authority would be greatly diminished, and the energy of the government impaired, by a free press?

. . . It is impossible to suppose that a foreign government, however strong and beneficent its character, should not be obnoxious in some degree to those who live under it. It is humbling to the pride of the people; and where they differ, as in India, in religion, in language, in manners, in colour, and in customs from those who administer the government, there cannot be much sympathy or attachment between them. Though the situation of the large body of the people may now be greatly better, on the whole, than it was under their native governments, there are not a few, particularly among the Mohomedans, who have suffered from the change. These, we may be sure, will always be ready to avail themselves of any opportunity of retrieving their fortunes, and we know not that they could desire a more efficient auxiliary than a licentious press, labouring daily to extinguish all respect for our character and government in the minds of their countrymen. The tendency and effect of our system, too, has been to beget in the minds of the people at large a respect for themselves, and notions of their own importance, which makes the task of governing them a more difficult one than it was when they first came under our rule. But the delicacy of our situation in India cannot be well understood without special advertence to the circumstance of the government being dependent in a great degree for its security on a native army, which, though better paid, with reference to the wages of labour, than any other army in the world, contains in its organisation some elements of discontent. The exclusion of the natives from its higher ranks must necessarily be a source of heart-burning to men of family and ambition; and when a sense of mortification is united with a spirit of enterprise, their joint workings are not easily daunted or repressed. It may be difficult to retain the fidelity of men of this description, with all the care and caution that can be exercised; but it would appear to be either a lamentable infatuation, or unpardonable rashness, to allow them to be goaded on to revolt, by means over which we possess or may obtain control. Whatever English newspapers are published at the presidencies will naturally find their way to the principal military stations. Many of the native officers can read and understand English; and by means of the native servants of the European officers, it will not be difficult for them to obtain the perusal of those papers, containing a perhaps exaggerated representation of their grievances or an inflammatory incentive to rebellion, which, from their assemblage in garrisons and cantonments, they have better means of concerting than any other portion of the population."

• Parl. Papers, 4th May, 1858; pp. 20—23.

The degree of severity with which the restrictions enacted to control the press were enforced, depended of course materially on the character of those by whom the supreme authority was wielded. Lord Amherst used his power as governor-general in such wise as entirely to stifle all public discussion; and Lord William Bentinck, his successor (in 1828), was so impressed by the mischievous effect of this policy, that though, as has been shown, very ready to repress, in the most summary fashion, any real or imagined excess on the part of journalists, he, nevertheless, deemed it necessary to issue a notice inviting suggestions from any quarter for the improvement of public measures, and the development of the resources of the country; and the result was the publication of letters from various quarters, written with much ability and freedom; among which, the first and most important were those afterwards embodied by the Hon. Frederick Shore, in his *Notes on Indian Affairs*.

Lord William Bentinck quitted India in 1835; Lord Auckland came out as his successor in the same year; and it was during the brief provisional sway of Sir Charles (afterwards Lord) Metcalfe, that the important measure was adopted of giving complete freedom to the press. In explaining the difference between his own opinions and those of his predecessor, Sir Charles says—

"His lordship, however, sees further danger in the spread of knowledge and the operations of the press. I do not, for my own part, anticipate danger as a certain consequence from these causes. I see so much danger in the ignorance, fanaticism, and barbarism of our subjects, that I rest on the spread of knowledge some hope of greater strength and security. . . . The time is past when the operations of the press could be effectually restrained. Even if that course would be any source of safety (which must be very doubtful), nothing so precarious could in prudence be trusted to. If, therefore, increase of danger is really to be apprehended from increase of knowledge, it is what we must cheerfully submit to. We must not try to avert it; and, if we did, we should fail."

Lord Elphinstone (the present governor of Bombay), in commenting on this passage, truly says, that Lord Metcalfe "considers the freedom of the press, and the diffusion of knowledge, as convertible terms;" and expresses his surprise that a statesman who entertained such alarming notions of the insecurity and unpopularity of our rule, should have been the man to abolish the

† *Selections from the Metcalfe Papers*, p. 197.

few remaining restrictions deemed indispensable by his predecessor.*

In 1841, Lord Auckland revoked an order passed in 1826, prohibiting public servants from being connected with newspapers as editors or proprietors. Next came Lord Ellenborough; who found his tranquillity so disturbed by the "abuse" of the press, that after three months' residence in India, he ceased "to read a word that appeared in the newspapers."† The commander-in-chief, Lord Gough, is alleged to have avowed with yet more stoical philosophy, that "for his part, he never read any paper but the *Tipperary Journal*." The governor-general deemed it the most judicious course to treat all attacks on his administration with silent contempt; and, in 1843, he issued an order of opposite tenor to that of Lord Auckland; which, by enforcing strict secrecy regarding all information officially obtained, neutralised the power which had been freely exercised under the express sanction of the three previous rulers.

"Lord Ellenborough's general order," says Indophilus, "and the disposition which was shown to place a strict interpretation upon it, effectually restrained the pens of the Company's servants; and no government could stand such pounding and kicking, and bedaubing and besmearing, as ensued." Statements, however false, put forth in ignorance or from malice prepense, were left to be copied into the native papers; and no denial, no antidote in any shape, was offered. For instance, a paragraph went the round of the newspapers, that it was intended to annex the Rajpoot states; and although great disquiet was thereby occasioned throughout Rajpootana, no contradiction was ever published.‡

The Afghan war, and the annexation of Sind, were subjects on which the authorities were perhaps wise in preferring to

submit to comments which they might treat as calumnious, rather than engage in controversy; but sometimes leading officials, more sensitive or less discreet than their superiors, broke all bounds, and declaimed against the press in terms of unmeasured invective. The brave, testy, inconsistent general, Sir Charles Napier, who came to India at sixty years of age with five pounds in his pocket, for the sake of providing for his family,§ and who did provide for them magnificently, by what he termed that "very advantageous, useful, humane piece of rascality," the seizure of Sind;||—this man (who was as ready with his pen as with his sword, and, in either case, fought ever without a shield) fairly flung himself into a hornet's-nest by his reckless and indiscriminate abuse of those "ruffians,"¶ whom he boasted of taking every public opportunity of calling "the infamous press of India."** One of them excited his special displeasure by taking part against him in the Outram controversy—Dr. Buist, of the *Bombay Times*, whom Sir Charles alternately threatened with a law-suit and a horse-whipping, and of whom he spoke at a public dinner as that "blatant beast;"†† a *mot* which he duly records, and which Sir William has not thought it derogatory to his brother's fame to publish.

With such personal feelings as these, it is not to be wondered that Sir Charles should regard the public statements of the journalists with jealous aversion, and should accuse them of desiring to excite mutiny among the troops; of inciting the hostile tribes to rise against them; of glorying in the sufferings of their countrymen; and many similar accusations in which the fiery old warrior gave vent to his irrepressible belligerence. His is not fair testimony concerning the operation of a free press; and it is necessary to turn to more impartial witnesses. Sir Charles Trevelyan

* Minute of 24th June, 1858. Parl. Papers (House of Commons), 4th May, 1858; pp. 52, 53.

† Debate, 27th Dec., 1857.—*Times* report.

‡ *Letters of Indophilus*, p. 48.

§ *Life*, vol. iii., p. 194. || *Ibid.*, vol. ii., p. 218.

¶ *Ibid.*, vol. ii. p. 305. Dr. Buist (editor of the *Bombay Times*, and sheriff of Bombay), in a pamphlet entitled, "Corrections of a Few of the Errors contained in Sir William Napier's Life of his Brother, in so far as they affect the Press of India," gives some valuable statements regarding the Indian newspapers; of which he says there were, in 1843, about thirty; costing close on £100,000 a-year for their maintenance—deriving their chief support, and nearly all their intelligence from officers of the

British army. The *Englishman* (Calcutta) was conducted by Captain McNaughton (Bengal Army) and Mr. (now Sir Ronald McDonald) Stevenson, projector and engineer of the great Bengal railway: *Hurkaru*—Mr. John Kaye, Bengal artillery, now of the India House (author of the *History of the Afghan War*): *Calcutta Star and Morning Star*—Mr. James Hume, barrister, now police magistrate of Calcutta: *Friend of India*—the well-known Mr. John Marshman: *Bombay Courier*, by Mr. W. Crawford, barrister, now senior magistrate of police; and *Bombay Gentleman's Gazette*, by Mr. P. J. McKenna.—(p. 15.)

** *Life*, by Sir William Napier, vol. iii., p. 124.

†† *Ibid.*, vol. iii., p. 294.

asserts, that it has been, "on the whole, highly beneficial:" and that—

"There cannot be a greater evil than that public officers should be exempted from the control of public opinion. In Lord William Bentinck's, Lord Metcalfe's, and Lord Auckland's time, the press was held in wholesome respect by the public functionaries at the most remote stations, and it acted as a sort of moral preventive police. . . . We used to call it the Parliament of the Press. It may safely be said, that there was not a single good public measure which was not powerfully aided by it. As regards the native press, some newspapers were conducted in a creditable manner in the English language, by and for the natives, who had received an English education; others were published in the native language by the missionaries: and it must not be supposed that the remainder, which were written by natives in the native languages, did nothing but preach sedition. Their standard, both of intelligence and morality, was, no doubt, below that of the English newspapers; but they opened the minds of the natives to an interest in general topics, and taught them to think, from which every thing else might be expected."*

Sanscrit literature proves that the Hindoos were a thoughtful people before the English set foot in India; but the spread of European and "non-religious" theories, has been certainly likely to teach them to reason in an entirely different fashion. We know that Voltaire, Rousseau, Diderot, and Condorcet gave currency to ideas which took a very practical form in the French Revolution. These writers, with the English infidel, Tom Paine, have found imitators and admirers in India, and their doctrines are flung abroad like firebrands by the native press. A blind, unreasoning distrust of all governments—a fierce disaffection towards all constituted authorities—thirst for license under the name of freedom; such are the fruits of the tree of knowledge, apart and contra-distinguished from the tree of life. A saying, attributed to the Duke of Wellington, is often cited against the danger attendant on promoting education without religion—that of making men "clever devils." No better illustration of this need be adduced than the terrible scenes enacted by the Bengal sepoys, among whom native newspapers of the worst class have freely circulated. The utter indifference so long evinced by government, regarding the number, tone,

and character of the native journals, is almost incredible;† indeed, that complete freedom should have been accorded even to the European press, is strangely at variance with the general policy of the Company.

In 1857, the adult male European population scattered throughout India, not in the service, was estimated at only 4,000.‡ The journals must, therefore, to a great extent, have been maintained by officials. Some of them, especially the *Madras Athenæum*, uniformly deprecated annexation; and thus its supporters contributed with their purses, and sometimes with their pens, to oppose the very acts which, in their official capacity, they were bound to enforce.§ It was impossible that the natives should not take a lively interest in discussions which immediately affected them. Even a child, hearing its own name often repeated, would listen; and the natives have done so to some purpose.

Five years ago, one of the ablest and most disinterested advocates for the necessity of Indian reform, as the sole means of averting the blow which has since fallen, wrote:—

"The free press is doing its work in India: the Parsee merchants, the zemindars, the native heads of castes, are beginning to feel their power, to combine, and to ask for redress of grievances; some of them are violent, and these do not alarm me; but some are remarkably temperate; and I confess, that knowing the strength of their case, I fear the men who begin so temperately, and have reason on their side."||

Sir Charles Metcalfe, in establishing, and Lord Auckland in confirming, the freedom of the press, especially insisted that the boon thus granted might be withdrawn, in the event of its proving injurious in operation. "Should the safety of the state ever demand such a course, in a single hour a law may be passed to stop or to control every press in India: nothing has been lost of useful power."¶

In the middle of June, 1857, when the mutiny was at its height, the supreme government deemed it necessary to pass an act, which, for the space of the succeeding twelvemonth, was intended to replace the press in the position it occupied

ions of European settlers in the country, or half-castes not in the Company's service," whom it describes as a class bitterly hostile to government. (October, 1847.) Mr. Mead, on the contrary, affirms, that "six out of seven of the whole body of subscribers are in the Company's service."—*Sepoy Revolt*, p. 183.

|| Dickinson's *India under a Bureaucracy*, p. 20.

¶ Minute, by Lord Auckland, 8th August, 1836.

* *Letters of Indophilus*, p. 45.

† On application to the East India House for some additional details to those given in the *Indian Empire* (vol. i., p. 523), the writer was informed that the directors had no information on the subject.

‡ Dr. Buist's *Corrections of Sir W. Napier*, p. 40.

§ The *Edinburgh Review* speaks of the Anglo-Indian press as exclusively representing "the opin-

in 1835, before the removal of all restrictions by Sir Charles Metcalfe. The authorities were unanimous regarding the necessity of the measure, which involved the re-institution of the licensing system, together with a rigid censorship. The act was passed by the governor-general in council in a sitting; and Lords Harris and Elphinstone, the governors of Madras and Bombay, expressed their entire acquiescence. No distinction was made between the English and the native press, the government being desirous to avoid drawing invidious distinctions between European and native subjects. They add, moreover—

“We do not clearly see how any distinction of the sort could be really carried into effect, for there are now more than one newspaper in the English language written, owned and published by natives, almost exclusively for circulation amongst native readers; and although we have no reason to fear that treasonable matter would be designedly published in any English newspaper, we have to guard in these times against errors, indiscretion, and temper, as well as against international sedition. * * * To show that the necessity of controlling the English as well as the native press, is not merely imaginary, it will be enough to state, that the treasonable proclamation of the king and mutineers of Delhi—cunningly framed so as to influence the Mohammedan population as much as possible against the British government, and ending with the assurance, that the multiplication and circulation of that document would be an act equal in religious merit to drawing the sword against us, was published by a respectable English newspaper of this town without comment. For doing the very same thing, with comments having the outward form of loyalty, the publishers of three native Mohammedan papers in Calcutta, have been committed to the Supreme Court, to take their trial for a seditious libel.”*

Lord Harris went further than this, and declared “the larger portion of the British press throughout the country,” and particularly in the Madras presidency, to be “disloyal in tone, un-English in spirit, wanting in principle, and utterly regardless of correctness in statement.”† He complained especially of the seditious matter circulated among the sepoys by a newspaper entitled the *Examiner*, “the mouth-piece of the Roman Catholic priests.”‡ Lord Elphinstone considered the unrestricted liberty of the press incompatible with the continuance of British rule. “Systematic abuse of the government,” he writes, “mis-

* Despatch to the Court of Directors, dated 4th July, 1857. Signed—Canning, Dorin, Low, Grant, and Peacock. Parl. Papers (Commons), 28th August, 1857; pp. 4, 5.

† Minute, by Lord Harris, dated “Fort St. George, 2nd May, 1857”—*Ibid.*, p. 11.

‡ Minute, 22nd June, 1857—*Ibid.*, p. 13.

representation of its acts, and all attempts to create ill-feeling between the different classes of the community, especially between the European officers and the native soldiery, must be prevented.”§ The home authorities confirmed the act, declaring that they felt no doubt of its necessity.||

The first English paper threatened with the revoke of its licence, was the well-known *Friend of India*, which, in an article entitled “The Centenary of Plassy,” censured the mammon-worship of the East India Company, and declared that “only the intense greediness of traders could have won for us the sovereignty of the country.” Mohammedan princes and Hindoo rajahs were spoken of as a class that would speedily die out; and in conclusion, the writer held forth a hope that the second centenary of Plassy might be “celebrated in Bengal by a respected government and a Christian people.”

The secretary to government (Mr. Beadon) officially informed the publisher, that the circulation of such remarks, in the existing state of affairs, was dangerous “not only to the government, but to the lives of all Europeans in the provinces not living under the close protection of British bayonets.” This communication was published in the *Friend of India*, with satirical comments, which the authorities considered so offensive, that the licence would have been withdrawn but for the resignation of Mr. Mead, who was acting as provisional editor during the absence of the proprietor, Mr. Marshman.¶

The *Bengal Hurkaru* (Messenger) was warned for its exaggerated echo of the vengeance-cry of the *London Times*; a writer, styling himself “Militaire,” denouncing the just and wise recommendation of government not needlessly to “embitter the feelings of the natives,” and urging that, “for every Christian church destroyed, fifty mosques should be destroyed, beginning with the Jumma Musjid at Delhi; and for every Christian man, woman, and child murdered, a thousand rebels should bleed.”**

Ten days later, another article appeared, which contained the following passage:—

§ Minute, 24th June, 1857. Parl. Papers (Commons), 4th May, 1858; p. 53.

|| Letter of Court of Directors, 26th August, 1857—*Ibid.*, p. 30.

¶ Parl. Papers—*Ibid.*, pp. 42—46. Mead’s *Sepoy Revolt*, pp. 359—376.

** *Bengal Hurkaru*, 5th September, 1857.

"There are many good, honest, simple people in Calcutta, who are both surprised and disappointed that popular indignation has not boiled up to a higher pitch. They are astounded at finding that Lord Canning has not been already ordered home in irons, and that Mr. Beadon has not been sentenced to be tarred and feathered, and ridden upon a rail, previously to being placed in some extremely uncovenanted situation under a native superior. We are very far from saying that these proceedings would not be appropriate in the cases in question; but we would say to our enthusiastic friends, 'My dear sirs, you are too impatient. All in good time.'"^{*}

The licence of the *Hurkaru* was revoked; but the editor (Mr. Blanchard) having resigned, a new licence was issued to the proprietor. Other English papers have been warned for transgressing the conditions of their licences; but the native editors generally do not appear to have incurred censure.

The existing difficulty seems to be, the course to be adopted with regard to the republication of articles from English papers. The following, for instance, is styled by Mr. Frere (commissioner of Sindh), "a very mischievous perversion of an Indian debate, which, in quieter times, might be amusing." A summary of grievances could hardly be deemed amusing at any moment. At the present crisis, it is not only humiliating, but alarming, to find such statements circulating in Hindoostan on the authority of British parliamentary debates; for the so-called perversion is really a summary of the leading arguments advanced by members of both houses against the East India Company, more especially by the Marquis of Clanricarde, whose speech, it was predicted at the time, would occasion great excitement among the natives of India.

"The *Jam-i-Jamsid* of Meerut relates, that in durbar of —, the Marquis of Clanricarde complained much of the Indian government; that a vast amount of rupees was expended among the home authorities in the way of pay, they knowing little of the circumstances of the country; that the nobles and great men of Hindoostan were becoming extinct; and the middle classes gradually suffering damage, and poor people being ruined. It would be proper that the country should be so governed, that the people do not suffer. Some zillahs require a decrease of taxation, and the salt-tax is very wrong. In whatever countries there was fitting management, the latter impost had been abolished. Beside

this, in Hindoostan, the system of justice was defective. Moreover, on this account, the English name suffered; and, in Hindoostan, amid ten judges, nine are Hindoostanees, but their pay and position was unimportant and inconsistent with their duties. And the heads of the E. I. Company say, that amid fourteen crore (million) of Hindoostanees, not one is worthy of rank or trust; a very sad and distressing statement, enough to break the hearts of the people of Hindoostan, and cow their spirits. Besides which, he said many more things; in answer to which, the Duke of Argyll was unable to advance any clear argument."[†]

It would be difficult to know on what ground an editor could be warned for the republication of the above statements, unless it were on the strength of the now repudiated axiom, "The greater the truth, the greater the libel!"

In another case—that of a Persian newspaper, edited in Calcutta by one Hafiz Abdul Kadir—the insurrectionary views of the writer were undisguised. The licence was, of course, revoked; and the press and printing materials seized. It would have been madness to suffer such effusions as the following to go forth:—

"Now, when the drum of the power of the English is sounding so loudly, it is in every one's mouth that the state of Travancore also is to be annexed to the British dominions upon the ground of mal-administration. It is also said that the principality of Ulwar will be confiscated by government. But at present the progress of confiscation is arrested by the government of the Almighty Ruler.

"The government should first arrest the progress of the disturbances and disorders which are raging in all parts of the country, and then address itself to these confiscations again. I formed a design of going to Worms. But the 'worms'§ unexpectedly eat off my head. He (God) is Almighty. He does what he will. He makes a world desert in a breath.

"Everybody knows, and now perhaps it has become quite clear to the lords of annexation, what kind of mischief the confiscation of Lucknow has done, causing ruin to thousands of their own friends. . . . Come what may, in these degenerate days, the men of Delhi must be celebrated as sons of Rustum, and very Alexanders in strength. Oh! God destroy our enemies utterly, and assist and aid our sovereign (Sultan)."

With the above characteristic extract this section may fitly conclude, without any attempt to hazard conclusions on so difficult a subject as the degree of control necessary to be exercised for the maintenance of a despotic government, in a crisis so arduous and unprecedented as the present.

Persia, also signifies "worms." The conceit can thus be rendered into English. The whole tone of the article, in the original, is highly sarcastic.—*Goolshun Navbahar*, 27th June, 1857. Parl. Papers (Commons), 4th May, 1858; pp. 46, 47.

^{*} *Bengal Hurkaru*, 14th September, 1857.

[†] Parl. Papers (Commons), 4th May, 1858, p. 48.

[‡] All the italicised words are exactly rendered from the Persian by their English synonyms.

[§] Kirman, the name of a town and province in

*Currency.**—An ill-regulated and insufficient currency has long pressed heavily on the people, and has exercised a singular influence in the present crisis. Until recently there was only one public bank (that of Bengal) in all India: with much difficulty two others, also under the control of government, were established at Bombay and Madras; but the amount of notes issued by them is insufficient for the requirements of even these cities. Three or four joint-stock banks have been lately formed; but the government has continued, up to the present time, to rely on a bulky and indivisible coin, the silver rupee (worth about two shillings), for its standard circulating medium. The exclusive use, by the state, of metallic money, has occasioned the accumulation of treasure, amounting, sometimes, to fourteen millions sterling, in thirty or forty treasuries, scattered all over the country. Forty to fifty thousand sepoys have been annually employed in escorting money from one district to another, an employment properly belonging to a police force; which has occasioned much discontent, and tended to the relaxation of discipline, and general demoralisation of the soldiery. A paper currency would have answered every purpose of local taxation and payments to the troops: it would have been far more easily transmissible, and it would not have offered so tempting a bribe to native cupidity. In several instances, it is evident that the sepoys were stimulated to the commission of crime by the hope of plundering the local treasuries of much larger sums than were ever allowed to remain in them.

The *Times*† has recently published the following forcible remarks on the subject:—

“Regiments that held Company's paper were faithful until they had exchanged it for gold; regiments that had pay in arrear were faithful until the arrears were paid up. The Company's gold has never received credit for the part it played in the mutiny. Yet it had often been pressed upon the authorities at Calcutta, that a paper currency would be a boon to India. Those who wished for this, probably, thought little of the danger of carrying bullion in bullock-trunks or palkies through the jungle, or storing it in exposed places; their object was, in all probability, the extension of commerce and the development of the resources of the country. The policy of the Company was, is, and ever must

* The cash balances in the different Indian treasuries, varied from twelve to fourteen millions sterling. In 1856, the amount was £12,043,334: of this sum, there was in Bengal, £5,117,553; in the N. W. Provinces, £2,251,904 = £7,369,457. The Madras presidency had £2,311,365; and the Bom-

be, to discourage all independent enterprise within their territories, and they were consistent in refusing to listen to any such suggestions. Now, however, when we are commencing a new era—if, indeed, we are commencing, or are about to commence a new era—this subject must be reconsidered. There can be no good reason why India should not in monetary facilities be placed upon a level with England. There is excellent reason why the troops should be paid in paper money. The absence of the gold is the absence of a powerful temptation, and the bank-note is a guardian of the fidelity of the man in whose pocket it lies.”

The *Opium Monopoly*, with its concomitant grievances—the forced cultivation of the poppy, and the domiciliary right of search—ranks among the causes of popular disaffection. The Company obtain opium from the ryots at a very low price, by a system of advances, and sell it for the contraband China trade, at a very high one.‡ An official authority declares, that the peasants in the opium districts of Patna and Benares, are compelled to give up fixed portions of their lands for the production of the poppy. The forced cultivation of this poisonous drug brings on the wretched cultivators the persecuting surveillance of the police; the probability that they may be retaining some portion for private sale, exposing them to every sort of ingenuity which spies, authorised and unauthorised, can imagine, as the means of inflicting fines and extorting bribes.§ The deteriorating influence on the consumer cannot be doubted. In China we have notoriously returned evil for good; exporting ship-loads of their refreshing herb to combat our own spirit-craving propensities; and importing, in defiance of the laws of God and man, millions of pounds' worth of a stimulant which we know to be, when once resorted to, almost invariably persevered in, to the destruction of the body, and, it would seem, of the soul even, of its miserable victim. In India we found the debasing indulgence general among certain classes. Baber and his successors, with the exception of Aurungzebe, were all its habitual consumers; and the able historian of Rajast'han, Colonel Tod, attributes the loss of independence by the Rajpoots, their general deterioration, and the diminished productiveness of the country, chiefly to the same suicidal practice.

bay, £2,362,510.—(Parliamentary Papers, April 20th, 1858.)

† June, 1858.

‡ J. Passmore Edwards' *Evils of the Opium Trade*, p. 18.

§ See *Iniquities of the Opium Trade*; by Rev. A. A. Thelwell.

But though the East India Company did not originate the use or cultivation of opium in all their vast dominions, they have done so in some. It is argued, that the very taxation is itself a discouragement to the cultivation; and this would be the case in a free country; but is not true in India, where there are so many means of compelling the peasant to toil like a serf at any labour for a bare subsistence. That the Company have been voluntarily instrumental in increasing the production, stands on the face of their own records.

On the cession of Malwa by the Mahrattas, measures were taken to raise from that province a revenue similar to that obtained in the Bengal presidency. A powerful impulse was given to the growth of the poppy; but the cost of cultivation was found so far to exceed that of Bahar or Benares, and the transport was likewise so much more difficult, that the excessive production obtained in Central India, scarcely afforded sufficient nett profit to atone for the injury done to the Bengal monopoly. The utmost efforts were made to remedy this, and to prevent diminished cultivation in the old provinces. "Premiums and rewards," says a late chairman of the East India Company, "have been held out; new offices and establishments have been created; the revenue officers have been enlisted in the service; and the influence of that department has been brought into action to promote the production. * * * The supreme government of India, too, have condescended to supply the retail shops with opium, and have thus added a new feature to our fiscal policy. I believe that no one act of our government has appeared, in the eyes of respectable natives, both Mohammedan and Hindoo, more questionable than the establishment of the Abkarry, or tax on the sale of spirituous liquors and drugs. Nothing, I suspect, has tended so much to lower us in their regard. They see us derive a revenue from what they deem an impure source; and when they find the pollution of public-houses spreading around them, they cannot understand that our real object is to check the use of the noxious article which is sold, or to regulate those haunts of the vicious with a view to objects of police. And have we succeeded in pro-

moting these objects? Will any man be so hardy as to maintain, that the use of spirituous liquors and drugs has been diminished by the operation of the tax, or that it has not been everywhere extended?

* * * But even if we admit that these objects have been kept in view, or that it is becoming, in the present state of the country, to regulate the vend of spirits and drugs, was it becoming in a great government to exhibit itself as the purveyor of opium to publicans, or—in the words of the Regulation—"to establish shops, on the part of government, for the retail sale of the drug?" Is it desirable that we should bring it to the very door of the lower orders, who might never otherwise have found the article within their reach, and who are now tempted to adopt a habit alike injurious to health and to good morals?"*

Not content with stimulating to the utmost the production of opium in our own territories, we voluntarily extended the curse in the Mahratta districts of Central India, in the Afghan state of Bhopal, in Oodipoor, Kotah, Boondi, and other Rajpoot principalities, by negotiations and treaties, "such as are not, I believe (says Mr. Tucker), to be paralleled in the whole history of diplomacy;" whereby we have bound ourselves to the payment of large annual sums on account of opium. "We make it the interest of the chiefs to increase the growth of the poppy, to the exclusion, in some instances, of sugar-cane, cotton, and other products which constitute the riches of a country, and which ought to minister to the comforts of the people."

These statements are very important, coming from one whose official position, Indian experience, and personal character, give his opinions threefold weight. He adds a brief warning, which, read by the blaze of the incendiary fires of 1857, is pregnant with meaning. "The Rajpoot, with all his heroic bravery and other good qualities, requires very skilful management. The same may be said of the Afghan of Rohilcund, who is still more restless and impatient of control; and if there were not other and better reasons, I should say that it is not safe, with either race—Rajpoot or Afghan—to supply the means of habitual excitement, which must render them more turbulent and ungovernable."†

Sir Stamford Raffles, another acknowledged authority, indignantly denounced the conduct of the European government in

* *Memorials of Indian Government*; a selection from the papers of H. St. George Tucker; edited by Mr. Kaye: pp. 152—154.

† *Ibid.*, p. 156.

overlooking every consideration of policy and humanity, and allowing a paltry addition to their finances to outweigh all regard to the ultimate prosperity of the country. Unfortunately, the financial addition* is paltry only when viewed in connection with the amount of evil which it represents, and which has increased in proportion to the extended cultivation. An experienced authority† states, that wherever opium is grown it is eaten; and considers that "one-half of the crimes in the opium districts, murders, rapes, and affrays, have their origin in opium-eating." Major-general Alexander uses the most forcible language regarding the progressive and destructive course of intoxication by opium and ardent spirits throughout India, appealing to the returns of courts-martial and defaulters' books for testimony of the consequent deterioration of the sepoys; and to the returns of the courts and offices of judges, magistrates, and collectors, for that of the mass of the natives. Under this view of the case, and remembering also the example set by the notorious tendency to drunkenness which disgraces the British troops, there is something terribly significant in the fact, that the fiercest onslaughts and worst brutalities which our countrymen and countrywomen have endured, were committed under the influence of the hateful drugs by which we have gained so much gold, and inflicted so much misery.

The *Neglect of Public Works* must take its place among the indirect causes of revolt; for it has materially impeded the development of the resources of the country, and furnished the people with only too palpable reason for discontent. It was a subject which ought always to have had the special attention of the Anglo-Indian authorities. They should have remembered, that the people over whom they ruled were literally as children in their hands; and should have taken care to exercise a far-seeing, providential, and paternal despotism. Under Mohammedan and Hindoo governments, the princes and nobles have ever delighted in associating their names with some stately edifice, some great road or canal, some public work of more or less

utility. It was a fashion which those who made for themselves a fortune and a name, especially delighted in following; and the fact is so well known that it needs no illustration. Every book of travel affords fresh instances. Foreign adventurers have adopted the same beneficent custom: witness the Martinière college at Lucknow. Very few Englishmen, however, have thought of spending on, or in India, any considerable portion of the wealth they made there; the noble Sir Henry Lawrence and others, whose names are easily reckoned, forming the exceptions.

It would occupy too much space to offer anything like an enumeration of our shortcomings in this respect: able pens have already performed the ungracious task; and it needs but a few hours' attentive study of the admirably condensed exposition given by Lieutenant-colonel Cotton (chief engineer of Madras), and of the pamphlets published by Mr. Dickinson and other members of the Indian Reform Society, to be convinced how unjust and impolitic have been our omissions in this important branch of government.

Sir Charles Napier says, that "in India, economy means, laying out as little for the country and for noble and useful purposes as you can; and giving as large salaries as you can possibly squeeze out of the public to individuals, adding large 'establishments.'"‡ The force of this remark is painfully apparent, when the immense number of "collectors," and the extent and enormous expense of the revenue establishment, are compared with the number of engineers, and the cost of the department for public works. The contrast between what is taken from, and what is spent upon India, becomes still more glaring when the items of expenditure are examined, and a division made between the works undertaken on behalf of the government—such as court-houses, gaols, &c.—and those immediately intended for the benefit of the people, such as roads, canals, and tanks.

The injustice of this procedure is surpassed by its impolicy. Colonel Cotton says—

"Certainly, without any exaggeration, the most astonishing thing in the history of our rule in India is, that such innumerable volumes should have been written by thousands of the ablest men in the service on the mode of collecting the land revenue, while the question, of a thousand times more importance, how to enable the people to pay it, was literally never touched upon; and yet, even the

* See *Indian Empire*, vol. i., p. 582.

† Mr. Andrew Sym, who had charge of the Company's opium agency at Goruckpoor. See pamphlets on the *Opium Trade*; by Major-general Alexander and Mr. W. S. Fry.

‡ *Life*, vol. ii., p. 428.

question of the amount of taxation was utterly insignificant in comparison with that. While we have been labouring for a hundred years to discover how to get twenty lacs out of a district which is not able to pay it, not the least thought has been bestowed on the hundreds of lacs it was losing from the enormous cost of transit, which swallowed up all the value of the ryot produce, if they raised it. * * * If we take the whole loss to India, from want of communication, at only twenty-five million sterling, it is twelve times as great a burthen as the interest of the [Indian] debt. * * * Public works have been almost entirely neglected in India. The motto hitherto has been—'do nothing, have nothing done, let nobody do anything.' Bear any loss, let the people die of famine, let hundreds of lacs be lost in revenue for want of water, rather than *do* anything. * * * Who would believe, that without half-a-dozen miles of real turnpike-road, with communications generally in the state that they were in England two centuries ago—with periodical famines and a stagnant revenue—the stereotyped answer to any one who urges improvement is, 'He is too much in a hurry—he is too sanguine—we must go on by degrees,' and this, too, in the face of the fact that, almost without exception, money laid out upon public works in India, has yielded money returns of one hundred, two hundred, and three hundred per cent., besides innumerable other advantages to the community. * * * We have already all but lost one century, to the great damage of our finances and the greater injury of the people."†

It is terrible to think of the amount of suffering occasioned by the ignorant apathy of the nation to whom it has pleased Providence to entrust the government of India. "The neglect of public works" is a vague, unmeaning sound in British ears: no nation blessed with free institutions can appreciate its full intent; and no people under the despotism of a single tyrant, but would rise, and cut off the Pharaoh who demanded the tale of bricks, yet withheld the straw. Nothing but the complicated system of our absentee sovereignty, can account for such strange persistence in errors which have repeatedly brought the Company to the verge of bankruptcy, and inflicted on the mass of the people chronic poverty and periodical famine.

In England, we are occasionally horror-struck by some case of death from actual destitution; and we know, alas! that large portions of our working population, with difficulty obtain the necessaries of life; but we are also aware that public and individual benevolence is incessantly at work to diminish the sufferings inseparable, at least to some extent, from an over-populated

and money-worshipping country. When Ireland was scourged with famine, the whole British empire, even to its farthest colony, poured forth, unsolicited, its contributions in money or in food with eager haste. Is, then, human sympathy dependent on race or colour? No; or the West Indies would still be peopled with slaves and slave-drivers. The same springs of action which, once set in motion, worked incessantly for the accomplishment of negro emancipation, would, if now touched on behalf of the Hindoos, act as a lever to raise them from the deep wretchedness in which they are sunk. The manufacturers of Manchester and of Glasgow are surely blind to their own interests, or long ere this they would have taken up the subject of roads, canals, and tanks for India, if only to encourage the growth of cotton in the country in which it is an indigenous product, and to diminish their dangerous dependence on America. Had they done so, they would have had their reward. But the active and enterprising philanthropical class, which includes many "successful merchants" in its ranks, perhaps requires to be told, that the subject of public works for India is at once a great call for national justice and individual charity; that there is no conceivable means of fulfilling on so large a scale the unquestionable duty of giving bread to the hungry, as by initiating measures to rescue hundreds of thousands of British subjects from probable starvation. The frightful massacres of Meerut and Cawnpore have not banished from our minds the recollection of that terrible "Black Hole," where 123 persons perished, some from suffocation, and others in the maddening agonies of thirst; and this not from any purpose of fiend-like cruelty, but simply because the young Nawab, Surajah Dowlah, did not know the size of the prison-chamber of the English garrison in which he had directed his prisoners to be secured; and none of his officers cared to disturb his sleep, to procure a change of orders. When he awoke the door was opened, and the few weak, worn survivors, on whose frames some hours of agony had done the work of years, tottered forth, or were dragged out from amid the already putrefying corpses of their companions.‡

Surajah Dowlah paid, with his throne and life, the forfeit of his apathetic ignorance; and his people were happily delivered from that crowning curse—despotic inca-

* *Public Works in India*; by Lieutenant-colonel Cotton, 1854; p. 8.

† *Ibid.*, pp. 294, 295.

‡ *Indian Empire*, vol. i., p. 273.

capacity. His fate ought to have served as a warning of the effects of mere neglect. Has it done so; or has the evil been multiplied a thousand-fold under a Christian government? Can it, or can it not, be proved by public records, that, for every single Englishman who perished while the Indian nawab lay sleeping, many thousand natives have fallen victims to an apathy no less criminal, manifested by the representatives of the E. I. Company? This is the meaning, or at least a part of the meaning, of the "neglect of public works in India;" and the only excuse offered for it is the poverty of the government. It is asserted, that the drain consequent on perpetual wars, which directly enriched and often indirectly ennobled the individuals concerned, occasioned so wide a destruction of native property, created such an unceasing drain on the state revenues, and so increased and complicated the labours of the collectors, that the one-engrossing anxiety of the authorities, how to meet current expenses, unavoidably superseded every other consideration.

The peculiar system of the Company has likewise contributed to induce a selfish and short-sighted policy. The brief period of administration allotted to each governor-general, whatever its advantages, has had the great drawback of rarely sufficing for the initiation, organisation, and carrying through of any large measure of general benefit; and it is, of course, seldom that a new-comer, fresh from England, has the ability or the generosity to appreciate and cordially work out the plan of his predecessor. The consequence has been a lamentable want of any consistent policy for the development of the resources of India. Lord Dalhousie, it is true, exerted himself zealously and successfully in the furtherance of certain great undertakings, in connection with which his name may well be gratefully remembered. The Ganges canal, the Bengal railway, the electric telegraph, are works of undoubted utility; and the good service they have rendered to the supreme government in its hour of need, must be calculated in lives rather than in money. But a few great and costly achievements cannot excuse the general neglect manifested by the non-appropriation of a certain portion of the revenue of every district to meet its own peculiar and urgent requirements. From the absence of any adequate provision, the vast reservoirs, sometimes many miles square, constructed by native princes

centuries ago, have been allowed, to a considerable extent, to go to decay, and are now sources of disease instead of fertility, being covered with rank weeds.*

The East India Company have added the tax levied by their Mohammedan or Hindoo predecessors for annual repairs, to their general assessments, but have suffered many of the tanks to go to ruin; while, according to a recent writer (1858), "in many cases they still exact the same money-revenue from the cultivators, amounting, at the present day, to fifty, sixty, and seventy per cent. of the gross produce of the soil, as if the tanks were kept in perfect repair, and the cultivators received the quantity of water required to grow a full crop of produce."†

Water, water! is the primary want of the Indian farmer; yet, according to Colonel Cotton, it is undoubted that, in the worst year that ever occurred, enough has been allowed to flow into the sea to have irrigated ten times as much grain as would have supplied the whole population.‡ The case is put in the clearest light in an extract from a private letter, hastily written, and not meant for publication, addressed by "one of the most distinguished men in India," to Mr. Dickinson, and published by him, under the idea that it was better calculated than any laboured statement, to carry conviction to an unprejudiced mind. The writer, after declaring that the perpetual involvements of the Company had originated in their having omitted not only to initiate improvements, but even to keep in repair the old works upon which the revenue depended; adds—"But this is not the strongest point of the case. *They did not take the least pains to prevent famine.* To say nothing of the death of a quarter of a million of people in Guntoor, the public works' committee, in their report, calculate that the loss in money by the Guntoor famine, was more than two millions sterling. If they could find money to supply these losses, they could have found a hundredth part of the sum to prevent them.

"Lord — thinks it would be better not to blame the government; how can we possibly point out how improvement can be made without proving that there has been neglect before? * * * Lord — won-

* Macleod Wylie's *Bengal a Field of Missions*, p. 241.

† *Lectures on British India*; by John Malcolm Ludlow; vol. ii., p. 317.

‡ Quoted in the Madras Petition of 1852.

ders at my vehemence about public works: is he really so humble a man as to think no better of himself, than to suppose he could stand unmoved in a district where 250,000 people had perished miserably of famine through the neglect of our government, and see it exposed every year to a similar occurrence? If his lordship had been living in the midst of the district at the time, like one of our civilians, and had had every morning to clear the neighbourhood of his house of hundreds of dead bodies of poor creatures who had struggled to get near the European, in hopes that there perhaps they might find food, he would have realised things beyond what he has seen in his—shire park.*

What excuse, even of ignorance, can be offered for a government that turns a deaf ear to statements so appalling as these, made by their own servants? Such impenetrable apathy affords a confirmation of the often-repeated assertion, that nothing but the continual pressure of public opinion in England, will ensure anything being effected in India. Would that this power might be at once exerted! Even now, in the midst of battles, we ought to be doing something to avert the consequences of past neglect, or the scourge of war will be followed by the yet more fatal visitations of famine, and its twin-sister, pestilence.

We may not be able to do much, or anything, in some of the most disturbed districts; but in the great majority, where comparative quiet prevails, a vigorous effort ought at once to be made for the introduction of a better system; that is, one designed to benefit the mass of the people, instead of being exclusively framed to suit the convenience of the European officials. Had this been earlier attempted, we might have had fewer great works to talk about in parliament or at the India House (though that is hardly possible, considering that we are Anglo-Saxons of the nineteenth century): but certainly India would not now be so generally destitute of the means of cheap carriage; neither would it be necessary to urge "the clearing-out of this poisonous old tank; the repairing of that embankment; the metalling of this mud-track through the jungle; the piercing, by a cheap canal of irrigation, of that tongue of land, of a few miles, between two rivers;"†

* Dickinson's *India under a Bureaucracy*, pp. 87—90.

† Ludlow's *Lectures*, vol. ii., p. 320.

the preservation of bridges; and such-like cheap, homely, obscure labours, as are now urgently needed throughout the length and breadth of the peninsula.

Cheap transit by land and water is a point only secondary in importance to irrigation, as a means of preventing famine, by enabling one part of the country to help another in the event of the failure of local rains. Major-general Tremenheere, in his recent evidence before parliament (May, 1858), when adverting to the brief intervals which have elapsed between the years of scarcity in the present century, forcibly states the necessity for affording the greatest facilities for the transport of produce, as the true remedy for these oft-recurring famines.‡ The evidence of subsequent witnesses before the same committee, shows that, in a country where easy transit is essential to the preservation of life during periodical visitations of dearth, there exists the most remarkable deficiency of means of intercommunication ever heard of under a civilised government.

"There are no roads to connect even Calcutta with any of the great cities of the interior. No road to Moorshedabad; no road to Dacca; none to Patna; no such roads as parish roads in England, to connect villages and market-towns in the interior. Consequently, in the rainy season, every town is isolated from its neighbours, and from all the rest of the country. Besides roads, bridges are wanted: there are hardly any bridges at all in the country; their place is partially supplied by ferries. The grand trunk-road, within the Lower Provinces, is only partially bridged; and half the bridges, I believe, have been washed away from defects of construction."§

In Bengal, Bahar, and Orissa, the maintenance of good roads is a duty to which the government are alleged to be specially pledged; for, in making the decennial settlement (on which the permanent one was subsequently grounded), a separate tax for the purpose was inserted in the rent-roll, but was afterwards merged in the general assessment, and not applied to the roads. The native land-owners have remembered this breach of faith; and when urged, some years ago, to make fresh provision for the maintenance of highways, they objected, on the ground of the misappropriation of their actual yearly payments. Happily for them, their interests are closely allied with those of the British settlers. Both classes are equally without the pale of privilege and patronage, dignities and immunities,

‡ First Report of the Select Committee on the Colonization and Settlement of India, p. 6.

§ *Ibid.* Evidence of W. Theobald, Esq., p. 74.

with which the East India Company has fenced round its covenanted service; but the storm which has disturbed the immigrant planters in their peaceable avocations, has contributed to procure for them the opportunity of laying before a parliamentary committee, and consequently before the nation at large, the obstructions which impede all attempts to earn an honourable livelihood by developing the resources of India. 77-151

Several witnesses declare the want of internal communication to be peculiar to the administration of the East India Company, who have attempted nothing except for military or governmental purposes, and even then very imperfectly; while, under Hindoo and Mohammedan dynasties, the peninsula was intersected with roads, the remains of which are still traceable.* The planters, to some extent, make roads in their immediate vicinity, suitable to their own necessities; but these do not answer for purposes of general traffic, which requires continuous lines. The native land-owners understand road-making, but want the means, not the will, to carry it on extensively. Mr. Dalrymple, an indigo and sugar planter, and silk manufacturer, resident in India upwards of thirty years, adduces, as an instance of the feeling of the natives on this subject, that he has known one of them make a road for a hundred miles from a religious motive.†

For the neglect of many duties, and especially of this one, we are paying a severe penalty; and the hardships so long suffered by the natives, in having to carry their articles of produce or merchandise on their heads, along paths impassable for beasts of burden, now fall with tenfold weight on our heavily-laden soldiery. Individual suffering, great as that has been (including the long list of victims to "solar apoplexy," on marches which, by even good common roads or by canals, would have been short and comparatively innocuous), forms but the inevitable counterpart of the public distress, occasioned by the present insurmountable impediments to the rapid concentration of military force on a given point. Facilities for the movement of troops are important in every seat of war; but particularly so in India, where the

extent of country to be maintained exceeds beyond all proportion the number of European troops which can at any sacrifice be spared to garrison it.

The upholders of "a purely military despotism" have not been wise even in their generation, or they would have promoted, instead of opposing, the construction of railways between the chief cities, as a measure of absolute necessity. If only the few already projected had been completed, Delhi could hardly have fallen as it did—a rich, defenceless prize—into the hands of the mutineers, nor afforded them the means of establishing a rallying-point for the disaffected, and doing incalculable damage to European *prestige*, by setting an example of temporarily successful defiance. As it was, the contrast was most painful between the lightning-flash that brought the cry for help from stations surrounded by a seething mass of revolt, and the slow, tedious process by which alone the means of rescue could be afforded. Thus, the appeal of Sir Henry Lawrence for reinforcements for Cawnpore, received the gloomy response, that it was "impossible to place a wing of Europeans there in less time than twenty-five days." The bullock-tram could take a hundred men a-day, at the rate of thirty miles a-day;‡ this was all that could be done; and, with every effort, at an enormous cost of life and treasure, the troops arrived only to be maddened by the horrible evidences of the massacre they were too late to avert.

"Indophilus" views the railroad system as the basis of our military power in India; and considers it "so certain that railways are better than regiments, that it would be for the interest of England, even in a strictly economical point of view, to diminish the drain upon her working population, by lending her credit to raise money for the completion of Indian railways."§ The urgency of the requirement has become so evident as a measure of expediency, for the maintenance of our sovereignty, that it scarcely needs advocating: on the contrary, it seems necessary to deprecate the too exclusive appropriation of Indian revenue to railroads (especially costly ones, in which speed is apt to be made a primary requisite),|| to the neglect of the far cheaper means of transit which might be opened by single

* Second Report—Evidence of Mr. J. T. Mackenzie, p. 88.

† Second Report, p. 67.

‡ Telegram of the governor-general to Sir Henry

Lawrence, May 24th, 1857.—Parl. Papers on the Mutiny; Appendix, p. 315.

§ *Letters of Indophilus*, p. 12.

|| See Colonel Cotton's *Public Works*, p. 184.

rail, by tram-roads, by the formation of canals for steam navigation, and by the opening and improving of rivers. Measures of this kind must be taken, if we would enable the people to bear the expenses attendant on our system of government.* Labour thus wisely employed and directed, would produce capital; the now insuperable difficulty of raising a sufficient revenue without oppressing the masses, would be removed; and their rulers, relieved from pecuniary pressure, might dare to be just by renouncing opium smuggling, and to be humane by abandoning the less criminal but still obnoxious salt† monopoly, which, as at present conducted, acts as an irregular poll-tax—falling heaviest on those who have farthest to fetch it from the government depôts.

The *Repression of British Enterprise* is closely connected with the neglect of public works; for had European planters been allowed to settle in any considerable numbers, and to give free expression to their opinions, they would certainly have agitated the subject in a manner which no government could have wholly withstood.

The Company, from their earliest days, strove with unremitting care to guard their chartered privileges against the encroachments of their countrymen, and adopted a tone of lofty superiority which was scarcely consistent with their own position as “merchant adventurers.” Had there not been in America, the West Indies, and other colonies and dependencies of the British crown, abundant outlet for capital and enterprise, the Indian monopoly would probably have been soon broken through: as it was, the “interlopers” were comparatively few, and easily put down, if they proved in the least refractory, by the strong

measure of deportation. Gradually the exclusive system was greatly modified by the effects of the parliamentary discussions which accompanied each renewal of the Company’s charter, together with the disclosures of mismanagement involved in the perpetually recurring pecuniary embarrassments, from which they sought relief in the creation and augmentation of an Indian national debt. In 1813 their trade with India ceased entirely: it had long been carried on at an actual loss; the traffic with China, and the Indian territorial revenues, supplying the *deficit*. Yet, notwithstanding the opening up of the Indian trade to all British subjects (followed by a similar procedure with that of China in 1833), the Company were slow in abating their jealous hostility towards “adventurers,” and did their utmost to prevent European enterprise from gaining a footing in India. They do not seem to have recognised the change of policy incumbent on them when, ceasing to be traders, they became sovereigns of a vast empire, and were thereby bound to renounce class interests and prejudices, and merge all meaner considerations in the paramount obligation of promoting the general good.

Of course, colonization, in the ordinary sense of the term, is neither practicable nor desirable in a country already well and generally densely peopled, and where land is the most dearly prized of all possessions. Even in certain favoured localities, where outdoor employment can be best undertaken by Europeans, there is no product which they could cultivate on the spot, in which they would not be undersold by the natives. Indeed, it would be manifestly absurd to attempt to compete, as labourers, with men who can support themselves on wages ranging from $1\frac{1}{2}d.$ to $4\frac{1}{2}d.$ a-day.‡ It is as the pio-

* The salaries of Englishmen in India are all on a very high scale. The average annual salary received by civilians is estimated at £1,750.—(See article on “British India”—*Quarterly Review*, August, 1858; p. 237.) A Queen’s officer, directly he embarks for India, has double pay. The fees of the lawyers and solicitors at Calcutta, are more than double what they are in English courts. No tradesman in Calcutta would be satisfied with the English rate of profit; and, in fact, all European labour is much more highly remunerated in India than elsewhere.—(First Report of Colonization Committee. Evidence of Major-general Tremenhare; p. 36.) It was found necessary to raise the scale of salaries of English functionaries, as a means of preserving them from corruption; and, to a great extent, the measure has succeeded. Even-handed justice re-

quires, that the same experiment should be tried with the natives of the country from which the funds are levied, and it will then be seen whether improved efficiency and integrity may not equally be the result. “A native judge, who has any prospect of promotion, hardly ever is known to be corrupt.”—Raikes.

† The difference in the price of salt, between Calcutta and Benares, amounts to 100 per cent. Rice, which sells at a seaport at 2s. a bushel, is quoted at an average of 5s. 1d. per bushel in the Punjab, the Trans-Indus, and the Cis-Sutlej territories; the distance of these states from a seaport being from 800 to 1,200 miles.—Third Report of Colonization Committee, dated July 12th, 1858. Evidence of W. Balston, Esq.; p. 65.

‡ Evidence of R. Baikie, Esq.—First Report of Colonization Committee, 6th May, 1858; p. 52.

neers of skill and capital that Europeans must look to find remuneration and useful employment in India. In that sense the field is wide enough, and the need great indeed; for the native products and manufactures have, in many instances, actually diminished in extent and in value under the sway of the East India Company. Every child knows that calico takes its name from Calicut, whence it was first brought to England; yet domestic manufacture has been overwhelmed by the cheap, coarse fabrics of the Manchester steam-power looms; nor has the encouragement been given which might have opened for them a lucrative market in luxurious England for their own more delicate and durable productions. The Dacca muslin—the famous “woven wind,” which, when wet, lay on the grass like the night-dew—this, also, has become almost a thing of the past. Yet, if only a market were assured, the cotton could be grown as before, and the same exquisite manipulation would be as cheaply obtainable.

Much important information regarding the present state of affairs, has been laid before the select committee lately appointed to inquire into questions affecting the settlement of India. Well-informed persons declare, that labour is cheap and abundant almost everywhere throughout India;* that the natives are very tractable; and yet, despite their readiness to learn, and long intercourse with Europeans, the knowledge of agriculture is in about the same position as at the time of Alexander's invasion.† This is in itself a discreditable fact, considering the effects produced by the application of science to agriculture in Europe: and the apathy manifested in India is especially blamable and impolitic, on the part of a government which has virtually usurped the position of landlord over a large portion of the country, more than one-half of the revenues of which, that is to say, £15,500,000 out of £28,000,000, is derived by rents from the land; while four-fifths of the annual exports, namely, £17,500,000 out of £21,500,000, are the direct produce of the soil.‡

* Second Report of Select Committee on Colonization and Settlement of India, 10th June, 1858.—Evidence of Mr. J. P. Wise; p. 40.

† First Report, 6th May, 1858.—Evidence of Major-general Tréménheere; p. 29.

‡ Second Report.—Evidence of Major-general Tréménheere; pp. 28, 29.

§ *Ibid.*—Evidence of Mr. J. T. Mackenzie; p. 83.

|| Evidence of Captain J. Ouchterlony.—Third Re-

While the system pursued has not improved under the rule of the Company, the cultivators themselves have absolutely deteriorated; the better class of farmers are alleged to have become generally impoverished, and to live in less comfort than they used to do under the Hindoo and Mohammedan dynasties; while very many of the ryots are hopelessly in debt.§ Impaired fertility is the natural consequence of over-cropping, and the native tenant has no means of counteracting this; his poverty being so great, that he cannot afford to keep up a farming establishment of sufficient strength, especially as regards cattle, to admit of the due production of manure, or of those requirements which are considered indispensable, in England, to the cultivation of the commonest arable land.|| The native agriculturist, if he borrow from a native banker and capitalist, pays, it is alleged, from fifty to seventy-five per cent. interest.¶ Usury thrives by sucking the life-blood, already scanty, of tillage and manufacture, and rivets the fetters of that system of advances which is truly described as the curse of India.**

The existence of the prevailing wretchedness above indicated, goes far to prove that the Company, in opposing the settlement of their fellow-countrymen, have not been actuated by a disinterested solicitude for the welfare of the natives. In fact, the fear of an influx of Europeans was almost a monomania with the Court of Directors; and every measure which could in any manner, however indirectly, facilitate the anticipated irruption, met with opposition avowedly on that account. Thus, the chairman and deputy-chairman of the Company, when advocating the enforcement of rigid restrictions on the press in 1823, adverted especially to the possibility of its “affording amusement or occupation to a class of adventurers proceeding clandestinely to India, to encourage whom would be a departure from the policy hitherto observed.”††

Lord William Bentinck granted to Englishmen the privilege of holding lands in the interior of India, contrary to the in-

port, 12th July, 1858; p. 4. Another witness says, the charge for money advances is from fifty to a hundred per cent.; “but when the lenders advance in grain, they generally charge from one to two hundred per cent., because they have to be repaid in kind.”—Mr. Mackenzie. Second Report, p. 83.

¶ Evidence of Mr. J. P. Wise.—*Ibid.*, p. 41.

** Evidence of Mr. Fowler.—Third Report, p. 54.

†† Parl. Papers, 4th May, 1858; p. 19.

structions of the Company; and his reasons for so doing are recorded in the minutes in council, of the years 1829 and 1830. At this period the question of settlement in India excited a good deal of interest in England; and a clause was inserted in the East India Charter Act of 1833, giving permission to all British subjects by birth, to purchase land and reside in India; and an enactment, in conformity with this clause, was passed by the local legislature in 1837.

Sir Charles Metcalfe was one of the leading advocates for a change of policy, as indispensable to the continuance of the Anglo-Indian empire; but he held that this change could never be effected until the government of the Crown should be formally substituted for that of the Company. The opinion is remarkable as coming from one of the most distinguished servants of the latter body—one who, trained in the close preserve of the covenanted civil service, rose, under the fostering care of Lord Wellesley, from occupying a clerk's desk, through intermediate grades of office, to the highest place in the council-chamber, and exercised, in a most independent fashion, the supreme authority provisionally entrusted to his care in 1835. His views would lose much of their force if conveyed in terms less full and unequivocal than his own; but, in reading the following extracts, it is necessary to remember that the word colonization has here a very limited application, and that the immigration required is not general; but must, to be beneficial to either of the parties concerned—the natives or the immigrants—consist of the capitalist class; in fact, of precisely those who find in overstocked Europe no field for the development of their resources, and who are deterred from the colonies by the high rate of wages, which constitute their chief attraction to the labouring masses.

"It is impracticable, perhaps [he writes as early as 1814], to suggest a remedy for the general disaffection of our Indian subjects. Colonization seems to be the only system which could give us a chance of having any part of the population attached to our government from a sense of common interests. Colonization may have its attendant evils; but with reference to the consideration above-stated, it would promise to give us a hold in the country which we do not at present possess. We might now

* *Metcalfe Papers*, pp. 144; 150; 164; 171. It is, however, only fair to remind the reader, that Lord Metcalfe is declared by his biographer, Mr. Kaye, to have subsequently greatly modified his opinions. Seeing that government by the Crown

be swept away in a single whirlwind. We are without root. The best-affected natives could think of a change of government with indifference; and in the N.W. Provinces there is hardly a man who would not hope for benefit from a change. This disaffection, however, will most probably not break out in any general manner as long as we possess a predominant power." In 1820, he declares—"As to a general reform of our rule, that question has always appeared to me as hopeless. Our rulers at home, and councillors abroad, are so bigoted as to precedent, that I never dream of any change unless it be a gradual declension from worse to worse. Colonization, without being forced or injudiciously encouraged, should be admitted without restraint. * * * I would never agree to the present laws of exclusion with respect to Europeans, which are unnatural and horrible." In 1836, he says—"The Europeans settled in India, and not in the Company's service, and to these might be added, generally, the East Indians of mixed breed, will never be satisfied with the Company's government: well or ill-founded, they will always attach to it the notion of monopoly and exclusion; they will consider themselves comparatively discountenanced and unfavoured, and will always look with a desire to the substitution of a King's government. For the contentment of this class, which for the benefit of India and the security of our Indian empire ought greatly to increase in numbers and importance, the introduction of a King's government is undoubtedly desirable. * * * It must be doubted whether even the civil service will be able to retain its exclusive privileges after the extensive establishment of European settlers. * * * The necessity of employing unfit men in highly important offices, is peculiar to this service, and demands correction."*

The evidence laid before parliament, after an interval of twenty-five years, forms a singular counterpart to the above statements. The persons examined speak from long and intimate experience; and their testimony, though varying in detail, coincides for the most part in its general bearing. They denounce the obstructive policy pursued towards them; and the majority distinctly declare, that permission to settle has not been availed of, because the protection of life and property, common to every other part of the British empire, is not afforded in India to any but the actual servants of government; the interests of all other subjects, European and native, being habitually disregarded. One witness alleges, that, "at this present time" (May, 1858), there are fewer Englishmen settled in the interior of India than there were twenty years ago, government servants excepted.†

would be, in fact, government by a parliamentary majority; he said, if that were applied to India, our tenure would not be worth ten years' purchase.—*Papers*, p. 165.

† Mr. G. Macnair.—Second Report, p. 2.

Another gentleman gives a clear exposition of similar convictions; stating, that—

"The real serious impediment to the settlement of Englishmen in India, is to be found in the policy of the system under which our Indian possessions have been hitherto, and, unfortunately, up to the present day, are still governed;—that policy which, giving certain extensive and exclusive privileges to a corporation established for trading purposes, and gradually formed into a governing power, originally shut out the spirit of enterprise, by excluding from the country Englishmen not servants of the Company. Although the extreme severity of this original policy has been somewhat modified and gradually relaxed, its spirit has remained but little changed; and its effects have been to keep the people of this country very ignorant of the resources and great value of India, and of the character, condition, and wants of the natives. Moreover, it is a matter of notoriety, that there has been, and is at the present time, a constant antagonism between the official and non-official Anglo-Indian communities; and that exactly as the adventuresome Englishman, who is called an interloper, with difficulty obtained his admission in the country, so even now he maintains his position in a continuous but unequal struggle with the local government, which he, in turn, regards as an obstacle between himself and the Crown and constitution to which he owes allegiance, and looks for protection in his own country. Then again, the departments of administration, police, the judicial system, both civil and criminal, are notoriously so wretchedly inefficient, oppressive, and corrupt, that they deter the peaceful and industrious from living within their influence, or risking their lives and property under their operations. I believe that even the comparatively few gentlemen settled in the interior of the country, would willingly withdraw, if they could do so without a ruinous sacrifice of property; for little or no heed has been given to their complaints, nor indeed of the natives; while the evils which have been pointed out for many years past are greatly on the increase. The present constitution of the legislative council has made matters worse than they were before; and that body has certainly not the confidence either of Europeans or natives. With the exception of two judges taken from the Supreme Court of Calcutta, it is composed of salaried and government officials, who have been such from the age of twenty, who have really nothing at stake in the country, and who are not likely to live under the operation and influence of the laws which they pass; while those who are directly interested in the well-being of the country, both Europeans and natives, are entirely excluded from any voice in the laws by which they are to be ruled and governed. * * *

At present, you have in India a series of antagonisms which works most injuriously for all classes, and completely prevents that union amongst the governing people which appears to me to be essential to the well-being, not only of ourselves, but of the millions of people our subjects, taken under our care and protection avowedly for their own good, and enlightenment, and advancement in civilisation. At present there is an antagonism in the army, by

the distinction of two services; and a worse antagonism between the Queen's courts and the Company's courts; between the laws administered in the presidency towns and in the interior; between the covenanted service, who have a monopoly of the well-paid appointments, and the upper, or educated portion of the uncovenanted service, who think themselves most unjustly excluded from advancement: and, finally, between almost every Englishman (I speak of these as facts, not as matters of opinion) not in the service of the Company, and the local government and covenanted service, who not only represent but carry out the policy of the East India Company, so as to shut out the direct authority of the Crown, the intervention of parliament, and the salutary and most necessary influence of public opinion in England. You cannot disconnect the European and the native. If you legislate simply with the idea of what is suitable to the English, without referring to the native and redressing the grievances of the native, there will be that unhappy antagonism between them that will effectually bar Europeans from going out to India."*

The exorbitant rate of interest (from fifteen to eighteen per cent.) charged on advances of money made to an indigo-planter, silk producer, or any settler occupied in developing the resources of the country (though not to be compared with that exacted from the native borrower), is urged by "an English zemindar"† resident some twenty-five years in Bengal, as another proof of the insecurity of property in the mofussil, or country districts, compared with that situated within the Calcutta jurisdiction, where large sums can be readily raised at from six to seven per cent. interest.‡ He enumerates the grievances already set forth in preceding sections, and points to the successful cultivation extensively carried on by European settlers in Ceylon, as a consequence of the perfect security and encouragement to capitalists, afforded by the administration and regulations of that island.§

Another witness declares that, in some parts of India, the land-revenue system actually excludes European capitalists. He instances the Madras presidency, and some portions of that of Bombay, where the Ryotwarree settlement is in force, where the government is the immediate landlord, and is represented in its transactions with its wretched tenants by the revenue police, an ill-paid and rapacious army of some 60,000 men, whose character was pretty well exposed in the Madras Torture Report. The settlement makes no provision for the

* Evidence of Mr. J. G. Waller.—Second Report, pp. 169, 170.

† Evidence of Mr. John Freeman.—First Report, pp. 112; 119; 139.

‡ The fixed legal maximum of interest in Bengal is twelve per cent.; other commissions bring it up to eighteen per cent.—Evidence of Mr. J. P. Wise. Second Report, p. 54.

§ *Ibid.*, p. 113.

introduction of an intermediate class of landlords; and the pauperised labourers emigrate in tens of thousands, to the Mauritius and elsewhere, leaving their own waste lands, to obtain subsistence in better governed countries.

In Bengal, both European and native capital and skill find employment under the permanent settlement, the value of which the natives generally perfectly understand, and call the "Great Charter of Bengal." The same witness adds—"It is invaluable to them and to us too; for it has saved Bengal from insurrection."*

This one great advantage possessed by Bengal, cannot, however, compensate for its other drawbacks; among which, the British settlers especially dwell on the lamentable deficiency of commercial roads, and the contrast thereby offered to the beautiful pleasure-drives for civilians and their ladies, which surround the chief stations. A settler engaged in growing rice, sugar, tobacco, and vegetables, for the Calcutta market, on an estate situated only forty miles from the great English metropolis, describes the difficulty of transit as so great, that the men who come to take the sugar away are obliged to do so upon bullocks' backs, each animal carrying about two maunds (about $1\frac{1}{2}$ cwt. English), and treading warily along the lines separating one rice-field from another, which are generally about a foot in breadth, somewhat elevated above the field, acting also as ledges to keep the water in the fields: but, adds this witness, "some distance from there, where there is a little bit of road, they will take twenty or twenty-five maunds of produce with a cart and a couple of bullocks."†

Despite all discouragements, the British settlers claim to have done good service to their country and to India; and they affirm, "that wherever Europeans have been settled during the late convulsion, those parts have been less disturbed."‡ Their enterprise has been imitated by the

native merchants; and many in Calcutta have, during the last twenty years, become large shippers of produce, and send orders for manufactured goods direct to England.§

Articles of great importance have been principally discovered and worked by the "interlopers." The coal-beds found by them after years of research, now give beneficial employment to several associations, including the Bengal Company, which alone pays about £2,000 per month to the railway, for the transit of coal from Ranee-gunge to Calcutta. The supply furnished by them has proved invaluable to the government during the mutiny; and the fleets of inland steamers belonging to the General Steam Navigation and Ganges Companies, have rendered vital service in the conveyance of the British troops, the naval brigade, and military ammunition and stores. Their efficiency would have been much greater had the authorities heeded the arguments previously addressed to them regarding the want of a canal to Rajmahal, or kept open one of the Nuddea rivers from Nuddea to the Ganges.||

The British settlers were the first to establish direct steam communication between Calcutta and Suez: through their instrumentality the transit through Egypt was carried out, and the first steamer placed on the Nile: they introduced the river steam-tugs, used to facilitate the intricate and dangerous navigation between Calcutta and the pilot station; and they established the horse-carriages, by which Sir Colin Campbell and hundreds of officers and soldiers hastened to the seat of war. Silk, and other valuable and easily-transportable products, such as indigo, the hateful drug opium, together with jute, hemp, tobacco and linseed, have considerably increased in quantity, and improved in quality, under the influence of British capital and energy. The settlers succeeded in growing good tea before it was discovered to be indigenous in so many places

* Evidence of Mr. Theobald.—First Report, pp. 61, 62; 85.

† Evidence of Mr. J. Freeman.—First Report, p. 119. (See further testimony to the same effect—First Report, pp. 114; 157. Second Report, pp. 31; 40; 52; 108. Third Report, pp. 64, 65.)

‡ Evidence of Mr. J. P. Wise.—Second Report, p. 36.

§ Evidence of Mr. Freeman.—First Report, p. 114.

|| The "Nuddea Rivers" is the name given to the network of channels which traverse the country be-

tween the Ganges and the Hooghly. These channels are supplied partly from the Ganges and partly from the drainage of the country, and are sometimes all but dry. The general opinion is, that one of them might be kept open for the country-boats and for steamers all the year round, instead of five months, if proper engineering skill were applied to the task; by which means a circuitous and even dangerous route of five hundred miles would be avoided.—First Report. Evidence of Mr. W. Theobald, p. 75.

in the Himalayas; and were beginning the cultivation so successfully in Assam and Kumaon, that, in 1856, 700,000lbs. were exported to England. The Neilgherry coffee is alleged to have obtained an excellent name in the London market, as that of Tellicherry has done long ago. Beer has been brewed on the Neilgherries, and sold at 9d. per gallon, which the soldiers preferred to the ordinary description, retailed there at 1s. and 1s. 2d. per quart bottle.*

During the Russian war, there was an export of grains and oil seeds (forming, in 1856, a large item) from the interior of India to England; but it ended on the conclusion of peace, because war prices, or canal irrigation and carriage, were essential conditions of remuneration. The same thing occurred with wheat. At the commencement of the war there was a first export of twenty quarters, which rose to 90,963 quarters in 1856, and fell with declining prices to 30,429 quarters in 1857. Rice is exported largely under any circumstances, because it is produced in great abundance on the coast, and is not subject to the cost of inland carriage.† This, and much similar testimony, tends to corroborate the unqualified declaration previously made by Colonel Cotton, that "India can supply England fully, abundantly, cheaply with its two essentials, flour and cotton; and nothing whatever prevents its doing so but the want of public works."‡

The evidence of British settlers is very satisfactory regarding the possibility of cultivating cotton of good quality to an almost unlimited extent. One witness predicts, that the first three or four large canals (for irrigation as well as transit) made in India, would drive the American cotton entirely out of the market, from the much lower cost of production in India. American cotton costs 6d. per pound at the English ports: Indian, of equal quality, might, it is alleged, be delivered there from any part of India at a cost of 1½d. per pound.§

Even supposing this representation to be somewhat sanguine and highly-coloured, it is most desirable that a vigorous effort should be made to restore the ancient staple product of India, by making one grand experiment—whether slave labour may not be beaten out of the market by the cheapest

and most abundant supply of free labour which could possibly be desired. In the cultivation and manufacture of cotton, all the requirements of England and of India (national and individual) are combined: capital, skill, and careful superintendence, would find remunerative exercise on the one side; and, on the other, large masses of people, now half-starved, would be employed; and men, women, and even children could work together in families—an arrangement always much desired in India.

Neither is there any reason why the manufacture of the finer fabrics—of gold-wrought and embroidered muslins—should not be resumed as an article of export. They are quite peculiar to India, and must remain so. The temperature of the country; the delicate touch of the small supple native fingers; the exquisite, artistic tact in managing the gorgeous colouring: all these points combine in producing effects which have been strangely undervalued in England. The barbaric pearl and gold, the diamonds of Golconda, the emeralds and pearls, have led us to overlook the incomparable delicacy of Indian manufactures.

Shawls are almost the only exceptional article amid general neglect. The French, always discriminating in such matters, have shown more appreciation of the value of native manipulation. Several factories, called "filatures," have been for many years established in their settlement at Pondicherry, and where, properly organised and superintended by practical men, the profit yielded is stated at no less than thirty per cent. per annum on the capital invested. A parliamentary witness says, if three times the amount could have been spun, it would have found ready purchasers.¶ It is, however, asserted, that the assessments are not half as high in Pondicherry as in the neighbouring British territory.

The point long doubtful, whether the English constitution could ever bear permanent residence and active occupation in India, appears to be solved by the concurrent testimony of the planters, whose evidence before a committee of the House of Commons, has been so largely quoted. Their stalwart frames and healthy appearance, after twenty, and even thirty years' experience, went far to confirm their statements, that

* Evidence of Captain Ouchterlony.—Third Report, p. 4.

† Third Report.—Evidence of Mr. W. Balston, pp. 64; 98.

‡ *Public Works*, p. 29.

§ Evidence of Mr. W. Balston.—Third Report, p. 98.

¶ Evidence of Captain Ouchterlony.—Third Report, pp. 13; 37.

out-door employment in the more temperate localities, was, even in India, favourable rather than detrimental to health. It is still an open question, how far their children or grandchildren may thrive there; and to what extent early transplantation to schools in the sanatoria afforded by the Neilgherries and other hilly tracts, may operate in preventing physical deterioration.

The chief attractions to "merchant adventurers" in India, are as prominent now as in the days when good Queen Bess granted the first charter to her subjects; the field for capital and enterprise is quite as wide, and even more promising. Merchants, money-lenders, and government stipendiaries, are the only wealthy natives at present in India; and many of these—some by fair and highly creditable means, others by intrigue and usury—have become possessed of fortunes which would enable them to take rank with a London millionaire.

India is, in truth, a mine of wealth; and if we are permitted to see the sword of war permanently sheathed, it may be hoped that we shall take a new view of things; especially, that the leaders of our large manufacturing towns—Birmingham and Manchester, Glasgow and Belfast—will take up the question of good government for India, and convince themselves, by diligently comparing and sifting the evidence poured forth from many different sources, of the necessity for developing the resources and elevating the condition of their fellow-subjects in Hindoostan. Poverty, sheer poverty, is the reason why the consumption of our manufactures is so small; and its concomitants—the fear of extortion, and personal insecurity, induce that tendency to hoarding, which is alleged to operate in causing the annual disappearance of a considerable portion of the already insufficient silver currency.

This, and other minor evils, are effects, not causes; they are like the ailments which inherent weakness produces: strengthen the general frame, and they will disappear. The temptation of profitable and secure investments, such as urgently-required public works may be always made to offer by a wise government, would speedily bring forth the hoarded wealth (if there be such) of India, and would assuredly attract both European and native capital, which, thus employed, might be as seed sown. The British settlers, and some public-

spirited native merchants (such as the well-known Sir Jamsetjee Jeejeeboy, of Bombay, with others in each presidency), have shown what individual effort can accomplish. It is now for the government to follow their example, and prepare for a rich harvest of material and moral progress.

Annexation, and Infraction of the Indian Laws of Inheritance.—The system of subsidiary alliances, established by Lord Wellesley, in the teeth of many and varied difficulties, has, without doubt, been the means of quietly and effectively establishing the supremacy of England over the chief part of the Indian peninsula. It has likewise greatly conduced to the general tranquillity, by compelling the native governments to keep peace with one another. It might have done much more than this, had subsequent governors-general entered into the large and generous policy of its promoter, and viewed it as a protective measure calculated to prolong the existence of native states, and regulate the balance of power. Lord Wellesley had no passion for annexation; he did not even say with Clive, "to stop is dangerous, to recede is ruin:"* on the contrary, he believed that the time had arrived for building up a barrier against further extension; and for this very purpose he bent every energy of his mind to frame the system which has been perverted by his successors, and warped by circumstances, into a preliminary to absorption and extinction.

He desired to preserve the independence of the Rajpoot principalities; and thus, rather than by exterminating wars, to keep in check the then alarmingly turbulent and aggressive Mahratta powers. His plans were perfected, and fairly in operation when he quitted India. Unhappily, his whole policy was, for a little while, misrepresented and misunderstood. Its reversal was decreed, and unswerving "non-intervention" was to be substituted for protective and defensive alliances. In theory, this principle seemed just and practicable; in action, it involved positive breach of contract with the weaker states, with whom, in our hour of peril, we had formed treaties, and whom we were pledged to protect against their hereditary foes.

Mistaken notions of economy actuated the authorities in England; and, unfortunately, Sir George Barlow, on whom the

* *Metcalfe Papers*, p. 5.

charge of the supreme government devolved by the sudden death of Lord Cornwallis, was incapable of realising, much less of forcibly deprecating, the evil of the measures he was called upon to take. Lord Lake, the commander-in-chief, felt his honour so compromised by the public breach of faith involved in the repudiation of treaties which he had been mainly instrumental in obtaining, that he resigned, in disgust, the diplomatic powers entrusted to him.*

No less indignation was evinced by the band of rising statesmen, whose minds had been enlarged and strengthened by participation in the views of the "great little man," who, "from the fire of patriotism which blazed in his own breast, emitted sparks which animated the breasts of all who came within the reach of his notice."† One of these (Charles Metcalfe) drew up a paper on the policy of Sir George Barlow, of remarkable interest and ability. He says—

"The native powers of India understand the law of nations on a broad scale, though they may not adhere to it; but they are not acquainted with the nice quirks upon which our finished casuists would draw up a paper to establish political rights. Our name is high, but these acts must lower it; and a natural consequence is, that we shall not again be trusted with confidence.

"Sir George Barlow, in some of his despatches, distinctly states, that he contemplates, in the discord of the native powers, an additional source of strength; and, if I am not mistaken, some of his plans go directly, and are designed, to foment discord among those states. * * * Lord Wellesley's desire was to unite the tranquillity of all the powers of India with our own. How fair, how beautiful, how virtuous does this system seem; how tenfold fair, beautiful, and virtuous, when compared with the other ugly, nasty, abominable one."‡

All the members of the Wellesley school imbibed the same tone; and though they differed widely on many points, and subsequently became themselves distinctive leaders, yet Elphinstone and Malcolm, Adams and Jenkins, Tucker and Edmonstone, consistently maintained the rights of native states, and regarded any disposition to take advantage of their weakness or promote strife, as "ugly, nasty, and abominable."

When the non-intervention system proved absolutely impracticable, the authorities fell back on that of subsidiary alliances; but instead of proceeding on the broad basis laid down by Lord Wellesley, and organ-

ising such relations of mutual protection and subordination between the greater and the minor states, as might be necessary for the preservation of general tranquillity, a system of minute and harassing interference was introduced into the affairs of every petty state. "We established," writes Sir Charles Metcalfe in 1830, when a member of the supreme council, "a military police throughout Central India, with a view to maintain order in countries belonging to foreign potentates."§ The arrangements made were costly, clumsy, and inefficient; and, in the end, have worked badly for all parties.

The British contingents, which have now joined the rebel Bengal army, were, for the most part, forced on the native princes, and their general tendency has been to foster the inherent weakness, corruption, and extortion of the states in which they have been established. The benefit of exemption from external strife, has been dearly purchased by increased internal oppression; the arm of the despot being strengthened against his subjects by the same cause which paralysed it for foreign aggression. Then has arisen the difficult question—how far we, as the undoubted supreme power, were justified in upholding notoriously incapable and profligate dynasties, even while the cruel wrongs of the people were unceasingly reported by the British residents at the native courts? As is too frequently the case, the same question has been viewed from different points of view at different times, and, at each period, the decision arrived at has run the risk of being partial and prejudiced.

In the time of Warren Hastings, Sir John Shore, and Lord Wellesley, the increase of territory was deprecated by the East India Company and the British nation in general, as equally unjust in principle and mistaken in policy. The fact that many of the Hindoo, and nearly all the Mohammedan, rulers were usurpers of recent date, ruling over newly-founded states, was utterly ignored; and their treacherous and hostile proceedings against us, and each other, were treated as fictitious, or at least exaggerated. At length a powerful reaction took place; people grew accustomed to the rapid augmentation of our Anglo-Indian empire, and ceased to scrutinise the means by which it was accomplished. The rights of native princes, from being over-estimated, became as unduly disregarded.

* See *Indian Empire*, vol. i., p. 406.

† *Metcalfe Papers*, p. 10.

‡ *Ibid.*, pp. 6, 7.

§ *Ibid.*, p. 178.

The system of annexation recently pursued, which has set at nought the ancient Hindoo law regarding the succession of adopted sons and female representatives, is alleged to have been a special cause of the revolt.* From time immemorial, the adoption of heirs in default of natural and legitimate issue, has been the common custom of the Hindoos. If a man have no son, it is an imperative article in his religious belief that he should adopt one; because it is only through the ceremonies and offerings of a son, that the soul of the father can be released from *Put*—which seems to be the Brahminical term for purgatory. The adopted child succeeds to every hereditary right, and is treated in every respect as if lawfully begotten. Lord Metcalfe has expressed a very decided opinion on the subject. After pointing out the difference between sovereign princes and jagheerdars—between those in possession of hereditary sovereignties in their own right, and those who hold grants of land, or public revenue, by gift from a sovereign or paramount power—he adds, that Hindoo sovereign princes have a right to adopt a successor, to the exclusion of collateral heirs; and that the British government is bound to acknowledge the adoption, provided that it be regular, and not in violation of Hindoo law. “The supposed reversionary right of the paramount power,” Lord Metcalfe describes “as having no real existence, except in the case of the absolute want of heirs; and even then the right is only assumed in virtue of power; for it would probably be more consistent with right, that the people of the state so situated should elect a sovereign for themselves.”†

Many of our leading statesmen have concurred not only in deprecating the use of any measures of annexation which could possibly be construed as harsh or unjust, but also in viewing the end itself, namely, the absorption of native states, as a positive evil. Mountstuart Elphinstone, who has probably had more political intercourse with the highest class of natives than any other individual now living, has always continued to entertain the same views which he set forth as interpreter to Major-general Wellesley, in the memorable conferences held to negotiate the treaties of Surjee Anjen-

gaum and Deogaum, in 1803, with Sindia and the rajah of Berar;‡ when he described the British government as uniformly anxious to promote the prosperity of its adherents, the interests of such persons being regarded as identified with its own.

Many years later, Mr. Elphinstone wrote—“It appears to me to be our interest as well as our duty, to use every means to preserve the allied governments: it is also our interest to keep up the number of independent powers: their territories afford a refuge to all whose habits of war, intrigue, or depredation, make them incapable of remaining quiet in ours; and the contrast of our government has a favourable effect on our subjects, who, while they feel the evils they are actually exposed to, are apt to forget the greater ones from which they have been delivered.”

Colonel Wellesley, in 1800, declared, that the extension of our territory and influence had been greater than our means. “Wherever we spread ourselves,” he said, “we increase this evil. We throw out of employment and means of subsistence, all who have hitherto managed the revenue, commanded, or served in the armies, or have plundered the country. These people become additional enemies, at the same time that, by the extension of our territory, our means of supporting our government and of defending ourselves are proportionately decreased.”§

Marquis Wellesley, in 1842, wrote—“No further extension of our territory is ever desirable in India, even in the event of war for conquest, if that could be justified or were legal, as the law now wisely stands.”||

Lord Ellenborough (despite the annexation of Sind) advised, that even “what are called rightful occasions of appropriating the territories of native states,” should be avoided; because he considered, that the maintenance of those states, and “the conviction that they were considered permanent parts of the general government of India, would materially strengthen our authority. I feel satisfied, that I never stood so strong with my own army as when I was surrounded by native princes; they like to see respect shown to their native princes. These princes are sovereigns of one-third of the population of Hindoostan;

* *Vide Rebellion in India*; by John Bruce Norton.

† *Metcalfe Papers* (written in 1837); p. 318.

‡ *Supplementary Despatches of F. M. the Duke of Wellington*; edited by the present Duke: vol. iii.

§ *Wellington Despatches*. Letter to Major Munro, dated 20th August, 1800.

|| Letter from the Marquis Wellesley to Lord Ellenborough, 4th July, 1842.

and with reference to the future condition of the country, it becomes more important to give them confidence that no systematic attempt will be made to take advantage of the failures of heirs to confiscate their property, or to injure, in any respect, those sovereigns in the position they at present occupy."

Sir John Malcolm went further still, and declared; that "the tranquillity, not to say the security, of our vast Oriental dominions, was involved in the preservation of the native principalities, which are dependent upon us for protection. These are also so obviously at our mercy, so entirely within our grasp, that besides the other and great benefits which we derive from these alliances, their co-existence with our rule is, of itself, a source of political strength, the value of which will never be known till it is lost. * * * I am further convinced, that though our revenue may increase, the permanence of our power will be hazarded in proportion as the territories of native princes and chiefs fall under our direct rule."

Henry St. George Tucker likewise lifted up his voice in warning, declaring, that the annexation of a principality to our gigantic empire, might become the source of weakness, by impairing our moral influence over our native subjects.*

These opinions so far prevailed, that down to the viceroyalty of Lord Dalhousie, the Hindoo custom of adoption was not only sanctioned, but urged by the supreme government on native princes in the absence of natural heirs. The majority of Indian dynasties have been maintained in this manner. The famous Mahratta leaders, Dowlut Rao Sindia of Gwalior, and Mulhar Rao Holcar of Indore, both died childless: the latter adopted a son; the former left the choice of a successor to his favourite wife, who exercised the right, and herself filled the position of regent.†

On the death of the adopted prince, in 1843, his nearest relative, a boy of eight years of age, was proclaimed maharajah. The war which took place in the same year, and which terminated in the capture of the fortress of Gwalior by the British troops, on the 4th of January, 1844, did not lead

to the extinction of the principality, as it would unquestionably have done under the course of policy which subsequently prevailed. The young maharajah was confirmed in the position, for which, as he advanced in age, he showed himself well qualified; and his name, like that of his contemporary the rajah of Indore, now takes high rank amid the faithful allies of England.

Lord Ellenborough's opinions regarding the maintenance of native states, were not, however, shared by his zealous champion, Sir Charles Napier, who expressed himself on this point, as on most others, in very strong terms. "Were I emperor of India," he said, when his views were most matured, "no Indian prince should exist." He would dethrone the Nizam, he would seize Nepaul: in fact, he considered, that without the abolition of the native sovereignties no great good could be effected, and the Company's revenues must be always in difficulty.‡

Sir Charles was probably singular in his desire to extend the British frontier indefinitely, and "make Moscowa and Pekin shake;" but many persons, including Mr. Thoby Prinsep and other leading India House authorities, looked forward to the extinction of the subsidiary and protected states within our boundary as desirable, both in a political and financial point of view, especially in the latter.§

In India, the majority of the governing "caste," as Colonel Sykes called the civilians,|| were naturally disposed to favour extensions of territory which directly conduced to the benefit of their body, and for the indirect consequences of which they were in no manner held responsible. To them, the lapse of a native state was the opening of a new source of promotion, as it was to the directors in England of "patronage"—an advantage vague in sound, but very palpable and lucrative in operation. No wonder that the death of the "sick man" should have been often anticipated by his impatient heirs as a happy release, which it was excusable and decidedly expedient to hasten. It was but to place the sufferer or victim within reach of the devouring waves of the Ganges,

* Several of the above opinions, with others of similar tendency, will be found collected in a pamphlet entitled *The Native States of India*; published by Saunders and Stanford, 6, Charing-cross: 1853.

† *Indian Empire*, vol. i., p. 427.

‡ See review in the *Times*, May 25th, 1857, of Sir W. Napier's *Life of Sir C. Napier*.

§ See Mr. Prinsep's pamphlet on the *Indian Question* in 1853.

|| Third Report of Colonization Committee, 1858; p. 88.

and the result, according to Hindoo notions, is paradise to one party, and pecuniary advantage, or at least relief, to the other. The whirlpool of annexation has been lit upon as offering advantages of a similar kind; namely, complete regeneration to the native state subjected to its engulfing influence, and increased revenue to the paramount power. Bengal civilians began to study "annexation made easy," with the zeal of our American consins, and it was soon deemed indispensable to hasten the process by refusing to sanction further adoptions. The opinions quoted in preceding pages were treated as out of date, and the policy founded on them was reversed. The experience of the past showed, that from the days of Clive, all calculations founded on increase of territorial revenue, had been vitiated by more than proportionate increase of expenditure. It might have also taught, that the decay of native states needed no stimulating, and that even if their eventual extinction should be deemed desirable, it would at least be well to take care that the inclined plane by which we were hastening their descent, should not be placed at so sharp an angle as to bring them down, like an avalanche, on our own heads. These considerations were lost sight of in the general desire felt "to extinguish the native states which consume so large a portion of the revenue of the country;"* and few paused to consider the peculiar rights of native administrators, as such, or remembered that, in many cases, the profit derived from the subsidy paid for military contingents, was greater than any we were likely to obtain from the entire revenue. In fact, the entire revenue had repeatedly proved insufficient to cover the cost of our enormous governmental establishments, civil and military.

The expenditure consequent on the war with, and annexation of, Sindé,† was the subject of much parliamentary discussion, the immense booty obtained by the army being contrasted with the burden imposed upon the public treasury and highly-taxed people of India. Still the lesson prominently set forth therein was unheeded, or treated as applicable only to projects of foreign ag-

grandisement, and having no relation to questions of domestic policy.

The Marquis of Dalhousie expressed the general sentiments of the Court of Directors, as well as his own, in the following full and clear exposition of the principles which prompted the series of annexations made under his administration:—"There may be a conflict of opinion as to the advantage, or to the propriety, of extending our already vast possessions beyond their present limits. No man can more sincerely deprecate than I do any extension of the frontiers of our territories, which can be avoided, or which may not become indispensably necessary from considerations of our own safety, and of the maintenance of the tranquillity of our provinces. But I cannot conceive it possible for any one to dispute the policy of taking advantage of every just opportunity which presents itself for consolidating the territories that already belong to us, by taking possession of states which may lapse in the midst of them; for thus getting rid of these petty intervening principalities, which may be made a means of annoyance, but which can never, I venture to think, be a source of strength; for adding to the resources of the public treasury, and for extending the uniform application of our system of government to those whose best interests, we believe, will be promoted thereby."

Lord Dalhousie differed from Lord Metcalfe and others above quoted, not less with regard to the nature of the end in view, than as to the means by which that end might be lawfully obtained; and he has recorded his "strong and deliberate opinion," that "the British government is bound not to put aside or to neglect such rightful opportunities of acquiring territory or revenue, as may from time to time present themselves, whether they arise from the lapse of subordinate states by the failure of all heirs of every description whatsoever, or from the failure of heirs natural, when the succession can be sustained only by the sanction of government being given to the ceremony of adoption, according to Hindoo law."

It is not surprising that the process

* *Modern India*; by Mr. Campbell, a civilian of the Bengal service.

† Mr. St. George Tucker asserted, that the proceedings connected with the annexation of Sindé were reprobated by every member of the Court of Directors of the East India Company, "as character-

ised by acts of the grossest injustice, highly injurious to the national reputation;" and that the acquisition of that country was "more iniquitous than any which has ever stained the annals of our Indian administration."—*Memorials of Indian Government*, pp. 351, 352.

of absorption should have been rapid, when the viceroy, who held the above opinions, was essentially a practical man, gifted with an "aptitude for business, unflagging powers of labour, and clearness of intellect;" which even the most decided opponents of his policy have applauded. In reviewing the result of his eight years' administration, Lord Dalhousie dwells, apparently without the slightest misgiving, on the large increase of the British territories in the East during that period; four kingdoms, and various chiefships and separate tracts, having been brought under the sway of the Queen of England. Of these, *the Punjab* was the fruit of conquest.* *Pegu and Martaban* were likewise won by the sword in 1852; and a population of 570,180 souls, spread over an area of 32,250 square miles, was thereby brought under the dominion of the British Crown.†

The *Raj or Principality of Sattara*, was the first state annexed by Lord Dalhousie, to the exclusion of the claims of an adopted son. There was only one precedent—and that a partial one—for this measure: it occurred under the administration of Lord Auckland, in 1840, in the case of the little *state of Colaba*, founded by the pirate Angria, whose chief fort, Gheria, was taken by Watson and Clive in 1756.‡ Colaba was dependent on the government of the Peishwa at Poona; and, on the extinction of his power, the British entered into a treaty with Ragojee Angria, the existing chief, guaranteeing the transmission of his territories in their integrity to his "successors." With the sanction of the Bombay government, Ragojee adopted a boy, who died soon after him. Permission was asked for a fresh adoption, but refused; and the territory was treated as having escheated for want of heirs male, although, it is alleged, there were many members of the Angria family still in existence, legally capable of succeeding to the government.

Sattara was altogether a more important case, both on account of the extent and excellent government of the kingdom, and because its extinction involved a distinct repudiation of the practice of adoption previously sanctioned by the British authorities, and held by the Hindoos as invariably conferring on the adopted child

every privilege of natural and legitimate issue.§ The fact was so generally recognised, that there seems no reason to doubt that the native princes, in signing subsidiary or other treaties, considered that children by adoption were included, as a matter of course, under the head of legitimate heirs and successors. The exception, if intended, was sufficiently important to demand mention. But the conduct of the government, in repeated instances (such as those of the Gwalior and Indore principalities, of Kotah in 1828, Dutteah in 1840, Oorcha, Banswarra, and Oodipoor, in 1842, and, several years later, in Kerowlee),|| was calculated to remove all doubt by evidencing its liberal construction of the Hindoo law of succession.

Lord Auckland declared, in the case of Oorcha, that he could not for a moment admit the doctrine, that because the view of policy upon which we might have formed engagements with the native princes might have been by circumstances materially altered, we were therefore not to act scrupulously up to the terms and spirit of those engagements; and again, when discussing the question of the right of the widow of the rajah of Kishenghur to adopt a son without authority from her deceased husband, his lordship rejected any reference to the "supposed rights" which were suggested as devolving on the British government as the paramount power, declaring that such questions must be decided exclusively with reference to the terms and spirit of the treaties or engagements formed with the different states; and that no demand ought to be brought forward than such as, in regard to those engagements, should be scrupulously consistent with good faith.

By this declaration Lord Auckland publicly evinced his resolve to adhere to the principle laid down by high authority forty years before, under very critical circumstances. It was not an obedient dependency, but the fortified border-land of a warlike principality, that was at stake, when Arthur Wellesley urged the governor-general to abide by the strict rules of justice, however inconvenient and seemingly inexpedient. On other points of the question the brothers might take different views; on this they were sure to agree; for they

|| The social grounds on which the practice of adoption is based, are well set forth by General Briggs. See Ludlow's *Lectures*, vol. ii., p. 226; and *Native States*, pp. 21; 23.

* Norton's *Rebellion in India*, p. 65.

† *Indian Empire*, vol. i., p. 456.

‡ *Ibid.*, p. 458. Parl. Papers, 16th April, 1858.]

§ See *Indian Empire*, vol. i., p. 271.

were equally ready to "sacrifice Gwalior or every other frontier in India ten times over, in order to preserve our credit for scrupulous good faith."*

The recent mode of dealing with Sattara has not contributed to raise the British name either for generosity or unflinching integrity. The deposition of that most able ruler, Pertab Sing, on a charge of conspiracy against the supreme government,† was earnestly deprecated in England by many eminent men, and excited great indignation among his subjects. The secret and hurried manner in which his seizure and trial were conducted, increased the apparent hardship of his sentence; and an able writer asserts his conviction that, at the present time, not a native in India, nor five persons in the world, believe in his guilt.‡ He died in 1847, leaving an adopted son, around whom the affections of the people still cling.§ The remembrance of his misfortunes has not passed away; and one of the mutineers, hung at Sattara in 1857, addressed the surrounding natives while he was being pinioned, to the effect that, as the English had hurled the rajah from his throne, so they ought to be driven out of the country.|| The deposition of Pertab Sing was not, however, accompanied by any attempt at annexation of territory; the government, on the contrary, "having no views of advantage and aggrandisement," resolved, in the words of the new treaty (5th September, 1839), to invest the brother and next in succession to the rajah with the sovereignty. This brother (Appa Sahib) died in 1848. He, also, in default of natural issue, had adopted a son, whose recognition as rajah was strongly urged by Sir George Clerk, the governor of Bombay, on the ground that the terms of the treaty, "seemed to mean a sovereignty which should not lapse for want of heirs, so long as there was any one who could succeed, according to the usages of the people." "In a matter such as this question of resumption of territory, recovered by us, and restored to an ancient dynasty,"¶ he observes, "we are morally bound to give some consideration to the sense in which we induced or permitted the other party to understand the terms of a mutual agreement. Whatever we intend in favour of an ally in perpetuity,

when executing a treaty with him on that basis, by that we ought to abide in our relations with his successors, until he proves himself unworthy."

Sir G. Clerk further advocated the continuance of the independence of Sattara, on account of its happy and prosperous state. Mr. Frere, the British resident, said that no claimant would venture to put forward his own claim against the adopted sons of either of the late rajahs; but that there were many who might have asserted their claim but for the adoption, and who would "be able to establish a very good *primâ facie* claim in any court of justice in India." These arguments did not deter Lord Dalhousie from making Sattara the first example of his consolidation policy. "The territories," he said, "lie in the very heart of our own possessions. They are interposed between the two military stations in the presidency of Bombay, and are at least calculated, in the hands of an independent sovereign, to form an obstacle to safe communication and combined military movement. The district is fertile, and the revenues productive. The population, accustomed for some time to regular and peaceful government, are tranquil themselves, and are prepared for the regular government our possession of the territory would give." With regard to the terms of the treaty, he held that the words "heirs and successors" must be read in their ordinary sense, and could not be construed to secure to the rajahs of Sattara any other than the succession of heirs natural: and the prosperity of the state, he did not consider a reason for its continued independence, unless this prosperity could be shown to arise from fixed institutions, by which the disposition of the sovereign would always be guarded, or compelled into an observance of the rules of good government. (This, of course, could not be shown, such security being peculiar to countries blessed with free institutions, and utterly incompatible with any form of despotism.) In conclusion, the governor-general argued, that "we ought to regard the territory of Sattara as lapse, and should incorporate it at once with the British dominions in India."**

The Court of Directors were divided in opinion on the subject: nine of them agreed

* *Wellington Despatches*, 17th March, 1804.

† See *Indian Empire*, vol. i., p. 432.

‡ Ludlow's *Lectures*, vol. ii., p. 171.

§ *Ibid.*, p. 171.

|| *Bombay Telegraph*, 19th June, 1857.

¶ *Indian Empire*, vol. i., p. 419.

** Minute by Lord Dalhousie, 30th August, 1848.

with, and five differed from, Lord Dalhousie.* The dissentients were Messrs. Tucker, Shepherd, Melville, Major Oliphant, and General Caulfield. Regarding the precedent established in the case of Colaba, Mr. Tucker said—

"I remonstrated against the annexation (I am disposed to call it the confiscation) of Colaba, the ancient seat of the Angria family, to which the allusion has been made in the Bombay minutes; and far from having seen reason to modify or recall the opinion recorded by me on that proceeding, I have availed myself of every suitable occasion to enforce my conviction, that a more mischievous policy could not be pursued than that which would engross the whole territory of India, and annihilate the small remnant of the native aristocracy. There are persons who fancy that landed possessions in India cannot be successfully administered by native agency. In disproof of this notion I would point to the Ram-poor jaghire in Rohilcund, which was a perfect garden when I saw it long ago, and which still remains, I believe, in a state of the highest agricultural prosperity. Nay, I would point to the principality of Sattara, which appears to have been most successfully administered both by the ex-rajah, Per-tab Sing, and his brother and successor, Appa Sahib, who have done more for the improvement of the country than our government can pretend to have done in any part of its territory."†

This, and other energetic protests, are said to have produced so strong an impression, that a vote seemed likely to pass in the Court of Proprietors, repudiating the annexation of Sattara. The majority of the directors perceiving this, called for a ballot, and so procured the confirmation of the measure by the votes of some hundreds of ladies and gentlemen, for the most part utterly ignorant of the merits of the case.‡

The provision made by the supreme government for the widows and adopted son,§ was censured by the directors; and Lord Dalhousie writes, that although the Hon. Court had declared "their desire to provide liberally for the family, and their wish that the ladies should retain jewels, fur-

niture, and other personal property suitable to their rank, they still objected that the grant of so much property, which was fairly at the disposal of the government, was greatly in excess of what was required."||

The Kingdom of Nagpoor "became British territory by simple lapse, in the absence of all legal heirs;" for the government, says Lord Dalhousie, "refused to bestow the territory, in free gift, upon a stranger,¶ and wisely incorporated it with its own dominions."**

Absorption was becoming a very familiar process to the British functionaries, and the addition of a population of about 4,650,000, and an area of 76,432 square miles,†† appeared to excite little attention or interest. Parliamentary returns prove, however, that the kingdom was not extinguished without palpable signs of dissatisfaction, and even some attempt at resistance on the part of the native government. The ranees, or queens, on the death of the rajah in December, 1853, requested leave to take advantage of the Hindoo law, which vested in them, or at least in the chief of them—the right of adopting a son, and of exercising the powers of the regency. They offered to adopt, according to the pleasure of the supreme government, any one of the rightful heirs, who, they alleged, existed, and were entitled to succeed to the sovereignty; "both according to the customs of the family and the Hindoo law, and also agreeably to the practice in such cases pursued under the treaties." The reply was a formal intimation, that the orders issued by the government of India having been confirmed by the Hon. Court of Directors, the prayer of the ranees for the restitution of the raj to the family could not be granted. The maharanees, called the Banka Bye (a

* The question of the right of adoption, says Mr. Sullivan, was treated by all the authorities at home and abroad as if it had been an entirely new one, and was decided in the negative; whereas, it appeared, by records which were dragged forth after judgment was passed in the Sattara case, that the question had been formally raised, and as formally decided in favour of the right, twenty years before; and that this decision had been acted upon in no less than fifteen instances in the interval.—Pamphlet on the *Double Government*, published by India Reform Society; p. 24.

† Lieutenant-general Briggs, in his evidence before the Cotton Committee appointed in 1848, mentioned having superintended the construction of a road made entirely by natives for the rajah of Sattara, thirty-six miles long, and eighteen feet wide,

with drains and small bridges for the whole distance.

‡ Sullivan's *Double Government*, p. 26.

§ They were allowed to retain jewels, &c., to the value of sixteen lacs, and landed property worth 20,000 rupees a-year. Pensions were also granted (from the revenue) to the three ranees, of £45,000, £30,000, and £25,000 respectively.—Parl. Papers (Commons), 5th March, 1856; p. 10.

|| Parl. Papers, &c., p. 10.

¶ Lord Dalhousie, in a minute dated 10th June, 1854, admits that lineal members of the Bhonslay family existed; but adds, "they are all the progeny of daughters."—Parl. Papers (Commons), 16th June, 1856.

** Minute, dated 28th February, 1856; p. 8.

†† Parl. Papers (Commons), 16th April, 1858.

very aged woman, of remarkable ability, who had exercised the authority of regent during the minority of her grandson, the late rajah), and the younger ranees, were not entirely unsupported in their endeavours for the continuance of the state, or at least for the obtainment of some concessions from the paramount power. The commissioner, and former resident, Mr. Mansel, represented the disastrous effect which the annexation of Nagpoor was calculated to produce upon certain influential classes. The dependent chiefs, the agriculturists, and the small shopkeepers would, he considered, "if not harshly agitated by new measures," be easily reconciled to British rule; but—

"The officers of the army, the courtiers, the priesthood, the chief merchants and bankers who had dealings with the rajah's treasury and household—all the aristocracy, in fact, of the country, see in the operation of the system that British rule involves, the gradual diminution of their exclusive consequence, and the final extinction of their order."*

The extinction of the aristocracy was calculated to affect the mass of the population more directly than would at first seem probable. Mr. Mansel truly says—

"The Indian native looks up to a monarchical and aristocratic form of life; all his ideas and feelings are pervaded with respect for it. Its ceremonies and state are an object of amusement and interest to all, old and young; and all that part of the happiness of the world which is produced by the gratification of the senses, is largely maintained by the existence of a court, its pagantry, its expenditure, and communication with the people. Without such a source of patronage of merit, literary and personal, the action of life in native society as it is and must long be, would be tame and depressing. * * * It is the bitter cry on all sides, that our rule exhibits no sympathy, especially for the native of rank, and not even for other classes of natives. It is a just, but an ungenerous, unloveable system that we administer, and this tone is peculiarly felt in a newly-acquired country. It may be that we cannot re-create, but we may pause ere we destroy a form of society already existing, and not necessarily barren of many advantages. * * * The main energies of the public service in India are directed to, or absorbed in, the collection of revenue and the repressing of rural crime; and the measures applied to the education of the native people are of little influence; while many of our own measures—as in the absorption of a native state (if we sweep clean the family of the native prince and the nobility gradually from the land)—are deeply depressing on the national character and social system."†

* Parl. Papers (Commons)—Annexation of Berar: No. 82; March 5th, 1856; p. 4.

† *Ibid.*, p. 6.

‡ *Ibid.*, pp. 12, 13.

§ The mode of appropriating the personal and hereditary

He therefore recommended, with a view of reconciling the past with the future, in a change of government from Oriental to European hands, that the Nagpoor royal family should be permitted to exercise the right of adoption; to enjoy the privileges of titular chieftainship; and to retain possession of the palace in the city of Nagpoor, with a fixed income and a landed estate.

The reply to these recommendations was, that the governor-general in council could not conceal his surprise and dissatisfaction at the advocacy of a policy diametrically opposed to the declared views of the supreme authority. The grounds on which the British commissioner advocated the creation of a titular principality, were pronounced to be weak and untenable; while all experience was alleged to be opposed to the measure which he had "most inopportunately forced" on the consideration of government. The king of Delhi, the nawab of Bengal, and the nawab-nizam of the Carnatic, were cited as so many examples of its impolicy: but "in all these cases, however, some purpose of great temporary expediency was served, or believed to be served, when the arrangement was originally made; some actual difficulty was got over by the arrangement; and, above all, the chiefs in question were existing things [?] before the arrangement." In the present instance, however, the official despatch declares there was no object of even temporary expediency to serve; no actual difficulty of any sort to be got over; no one purpose, political or other, to be promoted by the proposed measure.‡

The provision suggested by Mr. Mansel as suitable for the ranees in the event of his proposition being rejected, was condemned as extravagantly high; the hereditary treasure of the rajah, the governor-general considered, in accordance with the decision of the Hon. Court in an analogous case (Satara), was "fairly at the disposal of the government, and ought not to be given up to be appropriated and squandered by the ranees."§

The money hoarded, having been accumulated, it was alleged, out of the public funds, was available to defray the arrears of the palace establishments—a reasonable

ditary treasure of the late rajah, suggested by the commissioner as likely to be approved by the ranees, was the building a bridge over the Kumaon river; and thus, in accordance with Hindoo custom, linking the family name to a great and useful work.

plea, which could not be urged in defence of the same seizure of personal savings in the case of Sattara.

This unqualified censure of the commissioner was followed by his removal, a proceeding directly calculated to inculcate the suppression not only of opinions, but even of facts, of an unpalatable kind. The half-measure which he had suggested might possibly have worked badly, as most half-measures do; but it was avowedly proposed as a compromise, and as a means of meeting difficulties, which the Calcutta authorities saw fit to ignore. No notice whatever was taken of Mr. Mansel's statement, that in arguing with the people at Nagpoor on the practice of putting the members of the family of a deceased chief on individual life pensions, upon the absorption of a state, they immediately (though not before unsubservient to the execution of orders from Calcutta for the extinction of sovereign powers) fell back upon the law and rights of the case, and contended that the treaty gave what was now being arbitrarily taken away.*

Nothing, indeed, could be more arbitrary than the whole proceeding. A military officer, Captain Elliot, was made officiating commissioner, and a large body of troops was placed at his disposal to overawe opposition, in the event of the royal family or their late subjects evincing any disposition to resist the fulfilment of the orders of the governor-general for the seizure of the treasure, hereditary jewels, and even the personal property and household effects of the deceased rajah, which were advertised to be sold by public auction, to provide a fund for the support of his family.

The ranees sent a vakeel, or ambassador, to Calcutta, to intreat that a stop should be put to the sale of effects held as private property for a century and a-half; "and, further, for the cessation of the unjust, oppressive, and humiliating treatment shown by the commissioner, under the alleged orders of government, towards the maharanees and the other heirs and members of the family of the late rajah, whose lives are embittered and rendered burdensome by the cruel conduct and indignities to which they have been obliged to submit."

Repeated memorials were sent in by the ranees, concerning "the disrespect and contumely" with which they were treated by the acting commissioner, and also

* Parl. Papers on Berar, p. 7.

regarding the manner in which the sales by auction were conducted, and property sacrificed; particularly cattle and horses: a pair of bullocks, for instance, estimated to be worth 200 rupees, being sold for twenty.

The official return of the proceeds of the rajah's live stock, tends to corroborate the statement of the ranees. A hundred camels only realised 3,138 rupees, and 182 bullocks only 2,018; elephants, horses, and ponies in large numbers, sold at equally low prices. The remonstrances of the ranees were treated with contemptuous indifference. The government refused to recognise their envoys, and would receive no communications except through the official whose refusal to forward their appeals was the express reason of their having endeavoured to reach the ear of the governor-general by some other channel.

The removal of the property from the palace was attended by considerable excitement. The native officer employed by the English government, was "hustled and beaten" in the outer courtyard of the palace. The sepoy on duty inside the square, are described by Captain Elliot in his rather singular account of the matter, "as not affording that protection and assistance they were bound to do; for, setting aside Jumal-oo-deen's [the native officer's] rank, position, and employment, he was married, and somewhat lame." There was great excitement in the city, as well as in and about the palace, and great crowds had assembled and were assembling. It was doubtful to what extent opposition might have been organised, for the aged maharanees was asserted to have sent a message to the British officer in command, that if the removal of property were attempted, she would set the palace on fire. This threat, if made, was never executed: reinforcements of troops were introduced into the city, and the orders of the government were quietly carried through. The governor-general considered that the "scandalous conduct" of the sepoy and rifle guards on duty, ought to have been punished by dismissal from the service; but it had been already passed over in silence, and so no martyrs were made to the cause, and the affair passed over as an ebullition of that "floating feeling of national regret," which Mr. Mansel had previously described as ready to discharge itself in dangerous force upon any objects within its range.

The maharanee denied having incited or approved the resistance offered by her people; but the Calcutta authorities persisted in considering that a plan of resistance had been organised by her during the night preceding the disturbances which took place in the morning of the 11th of October, 1854, and threatened to hold the ranees generally responsible, in the event of any repetition of such scenes as those which had already brought down upon them the displeasure of government.

The ladies were, no doubt, extremely alarmed by this intimation, which the officiating commissioner conveyed to them, he writes, in "most unmistakable language." The sale of the chief part of the jewels and heirlooms (estimated at from £500,000 to £750,000 in value)* was carried on unopposed in the public bazaars; a proceeding which the then free press did not fail to communicate to the general public, and to comment on severely.† Of the money hidden within the sacred precincts of the zenana, 136 bags of silver rupees had been surrendered; but there was a further store of gold mohurs, with the existence of which the Banka Bye had herself acquainted the British functionaries immediately after the death of her grandson, as a proof of her desire to conceal nothing from them. When urged, she expressed her readiness to surrender the treasure; but pleaded as a reason for delay, the extreme, and as it speedily proved, mortal sickness of Unpoora Bye, the chief widow, in whose apartments the treasure was hidden, and her great unwillingness to permit its removal. The commissioner appears to have treated this plea as a continuation of "the old system of delay and passive resistance to all one's instructions and wishes." Nevertheless, he deemed it objectionable "to use force;" and "was unwilling that Captain Crichton [the officer in command] should go upstairs on this occasion, or take any active part in this matter," it being "better to avoid a scene:" and, as an alternative, he advised "writing off the amount known to be buried, to the debit of the ranees, deducting the same from their annual allowance, and telling them the same was at their disposal and in their own possession."‡

* Parl. Papers (Annexation of Berar), p. 9.

† *Indian News*, 2nd April, 1855.

‡ Letter from officiating commissioner, Capt. Elliot, to government, 13th Dec., 1854.—Parl. Papers, p. 44.

The princesses would have been badly off had this arrangement been carried out, for the amount of hoarded treasure had been exaggerated, as it almost invariably is in such cases; and although no doubt is expressed that the formal surrender of 10,000 gold mohurs (made immediately after the delivery of the governor-general's threatening message) included the entire hoard, yet double that sum was expected; the other half having, it is alleged, been previously expended.

The maharanee excited the angry suspicions of the Calcutta government by a despairing effort for the maintenance of the state, with which she felt the honour of her house indissolubly allied. It appeared, that Major Ramsay, then resident at Nepal, had, when occupying the same position at the court of Nagpoor, been on very bad terms with the deceased rajah. The Banka Bye attributed the extinction of the raj to his representations, and sent a vakeel to him, in the hope of deprecating his opposition, and obtaining his favourable intervention. The errand of the vakeel was misunderstood, and attributed to a desire to communicate with the Nepaulesse sovereign on the subject of the annexation of Nagpoor. Under this impression, the governor-general in council declared, that the ranees had no right whatever to communicate with native courts; that it was impossible to put any other than an unfavourable construction on their attempt to do so: and the acting commissioner was officially desired to acquaint them, that the repetition of such an act would "certainly lead to substantial proof of the displeasure of government being manifested to them."

On the mistake being discovered, the following minute was recorded by the governor-general, and concurred in by the four members of council whose names have become lately familiar to the British public. Its curt tone contrasts forcibly with that adopted by the Marquis Wellesley, and his great brother, in their arrangements for the royal family of Mysoor: yet the dynasty of Hyder Ali had been founded on recent usurpation, and overthrown in open fight; while that of Berar represented a native power of 150 years' duration, and long in peaceful alliance with the Company as a protected state. The age and reputation of the Banka Bye, her former position as regent, the remarkable influence exercised by her during the late reign, and her

uniform adhesion to the British government,—these, together with the dying state of Unpoora Bye, the eldest of the rajah's widows, and the bereaved condition of them all, might well have dictated a more respectful consideration of their complaints and misapprehensions, than is apparent in the brief but comprehensive account given by the supreme government, of the groundless charge which had been brought against the princesses:—

"It now appears that the vakeel sent by the rances of Nagpoor to Nepaul, was intended, not for the durbar, but for Major Ramsay, the resident there. Major Ramsay, when officiating resident at Nagpoor, was compelled to bring the late rajah to order. The rajah complained of him to me, in 1848. The officiating resident was in the right, and, of course, was supported. It seems that these ladies now imagine that Major Ramsay's supposed hostility has influenced me, and that his intercession, if obtained, might personally move me. The folly of these notions need not to be noticed. The vakeel not having been sent to the durbar, nothing more need be said about the matter."*

The means used by Major Ramsay "to bring the rajah to order," had been previously called in question, owing to certain passages in the despatch which had occasioned the supersession of Mr. Mansel. These passages are given at length, in evidence of the entirely opposite manner in which successive British residents at Nagpoor exercised the extraordinary powers entrusted to them; interfering in everything, or being absolutely nonentities (except as a drain upon the finances of the state they were, barnacle-like, attached to), according to their temper of mind and habit of body.

"In my arguments," says Mr. Mansel, "with natives upon the subject of the expediency and propriety of the British government dealing with the Nagpoor case as a question of pure policy, I have put to them the position, that we had all of us at Nagpoor, for the last two years, found it impracticable to carry on the government decently. I remarked that Major Wilkinson, after a long struggle, succeeded in getting the rajah within his own influence, and, by his fine sagacity and perfect experience, had controlled him whenever he chose. Colonel Speirs, from decaying health, was latterly unable to put much check upon the rajah, though his perfect knowledge of affairs of the day here, and of Oriental courts in general, would otherwise have been most valuable. Major Ramsay† pursued a course of uncompromising interference, and, in a state of almost chronic disease, attempted a perfect restoration to health. Mr. Davidson, as his health grew worse, left the rajah to do as he liked; and under the argument, that it was better to work by personal influence than by fear, he left the rajah to do as he pleased, with something like the pretence of an invalid physician—that his patient would die with too much care, and required gentle treatment. During my incumbency, I found the rajah so much spoiled by the absolute indulgence of my predecessor, that I was gradually driven to adopt the radical reform of Major Ramsay, or the extreme conservatism of Mr. Davidson; and in the struggle which latterly ensued between myself and the rajah, his end was undoubtedly hastened by vexation at my insisting on his carrying out the reform in spirit as well as to the letter. * * * The argument of the natives, with whom I have frequently conferred on this subject, is, that the British residents at Nagpoor should participate in the blame charged to the rajah by myself; for if the same system of advice and check which was contemplated by the last treaty, had been carried out from first to last, the rajah would never have been tempted into the habits of indolence and avarice that latterly made him make his own court and the halls of justice a broker's shop, for the disposal of official favours and the sale of justice. The answer to this is, that the British government does its best; that it sends its highest servants to a residency; and if the principles or abilities of the different incumbents vary, it is only natural and incidental to any colonial system in the world. The result, however, is, that the management of the country gets into all kinds of embarrassment, of death, judicial corruption, and irresponsibility of ministers, when the readiest course is to resume those sovereign powers that were delegated on trust."‡

Surely the foregoing statements of the last "incumbent" of the Nagpoor residency, afford a clear exposition of the mischievous effects of establishing, at the courts of native princes, a powerful functionary, whose office combines the duties of a foreign ambassador with those of a domestic counsellor, or rather dictator. If the

* Minute, dated November, 1854. Parl. Papers (Annexation of Berar), p. 41. Signed—Dalhousie, J. Dorin, J. Low, J. P. Grant, B. Peacock.

† Major Ramsay denies this; and, while bearing testimony to the "high character" of Mr. Mansel, says, that the policy adopted by the latter was radically opposed to his own, for that he had pursued the most rigid system of non-interference with any of the details of the local government; whereas Mr. Mansel appointed, or caused the appointment of, several individuals to responsible offices in the

Nagpoor government, and set apart particular days in the week on which the heads of departments waited upon him at the residency, and submitted their reports and proceedings.—Letter of Major Ramsay to government, 5th February, 1855—Parl. Papers, pp. 46; 53.

‡ Letter of Commissioner Mansel, 29th April, 1854—Parl. Papers, p. 7. See *Indian Empire*, vol. i., p. 420, for an account of the circumstances under which the so-called delegation of sovereign powers was made in the case alluded to.

resident be an upright man, he can scarcely fail to be distracted by the conflicting interests of the paramount and dependent states—the two masters whom he is bound to serve; and if of a sensitive disposition, he cannot but feel the anomalous character of his situation at the elbow of a dependent sovereign, who must naturally regard him as something between a schoolmaster and a spy. No doubt there have been British residents whose influence has been markedly beneficial to native states; not only formerly, when their position was better defined, and, from circumstances, involved less temptation to, or necessity for, interference in the internal affairs of the state, but even of late years. The general effect, however, has been the deterioration and depression painted with half unconscious satire by Mr. Mansel, in the case of Nagpoor.

The circumstances attending the annexation of this state, have been dwelt on more on account of the incidental revelations which they involve of the practical working of a pernicious system, than from any special interest which attaches to the particular question so summarily decided by Lord Dalhousie. No connected statement of the case has been made public on behalf of the princesses, notwithstanding the spirited attempts made by the Banka Bye to obtain a fair hearing. When the governor-general refused to receive any communication through her envoys, she sent them to England, in the hope of obtaining a reversal of the decision pronounced at Calcutta. The vakeels complained of the treatment which the rances had met with, especially of the strict surveillance under which they were placed: their statements were published in the newspapers, and the new commissioner for Nagpoor (Mr. Plowden) took up the matter in resentment. Meantime, Unpoora Bye died (14th Nov., 1855), her end being embittered, and probably accelerated, by the same mental distress which is acknowledged to have hastened that of her husband. The aged maharanee abandoned further opposition, and wrote to London to dismiss her vakeels (2nd Dec., 1855), on the ground that, instead of obeying her orders, and laying her case before the authorities in a supplicating way, so that her "honour and humble dignity might be upheld," they had displayed a great deal of imprudence, and used calumnious expressions against the British officers. She informed them,

with significant brevity, of the death of Unpoora Bye; adding—"Well, what has happened, has happened." This letter, which is alike indicative of the character of the writer and of the dictation (direct or indirect) under which it was written, closes the series of papers, published by order of parliament, regarding the annexation of Berar.

The territory resumed from Ali Morad, one of the Amcers of Sindé, in 1852, comprised an area of 5,412 square miles. The reason of the resumption has been already stated.*

Odeipore is mentioned, in a Return (called for by the House of Commons in April, 1858) "of the Territories and Tributaries in India acquired since the 1st of May, 1851," as having been annexed in 1853. The area comprises 2,306 square miles, with a population of 133,748 persons. This place must not be confounded with the two Oodipoors (great and small) in Rajast'han, the absorption of which even Lord Dalhousie would scarcely have ventured on attempting.

The territory resumed from Toola Ram Senaputtee, in Cachar, in 1853, comprises 2,160 acres of land; but, unlike Odeipore, has only the disproportionate population of 5,015.†

Hyderabad.—In 1853, the Nizam concluded a new treaty with the Company, by which he transferred to them one-third of his country, to meet the expenses of the contingent maintained by him, but disciplined and commanded by British officers. The resident, Major-general Fraser, when the proposition for the cession of territory first came under consideration in 1851, recommended nothing less than the deposition of the Nizam, and the assumption of sovereign power by the Company for a definite number of years—a measure which he considered justified by the weak character of the Nizam, and the disorganised state of his administration. This proposition was at once rejected by Lord Dalhousie, who ably argued, that the transfer of the administration to the British government would never be consented to by the Nizam; that to impose it upon him without his consent, would be a violation of treaties; that the Nizam was neither cruel, nor ambitious, nor tyrannical; that his maladministration of his own kingdom did not materially affect the security of British territory, or the interests of British subjects; and that the

* See *Indian Empire*, vol. i., p. 452.

† Parl. Paper (Commons), 16th April, 1858.

British authorities were neither called on, nor at liberty, to set aside an independent native government because, in their opinion, that government exercised its authority in a manner injurious to its subjects.* "The debt," Lord Dalhousie says, "which burdens the Nizam has been produced by the contingent. The monthly subsidy for which the resident at Hyderabad maintains a perpetual wrestle with the dewan [native chancellor of the exchequer], and which transforms the representative of the British government, by turns, into an importunate creditor and a bailiff in execution, is the pay of the contingent." The governor-general proceeds to expose the misinterpretation of the article of the treaty of 1800; which provided that the British army should, in time of war, be reinforced by a body of 15,000 of the Nizam's troops; but which had "been made to justify our requiring the Nizam to uphold a force of about 5,000 infantry, 2,000 horse, and four field batteries, officered by British officers, controlled by the British resident, trained on the British system, not in war only, but permanently, at a very costly rate, and so as to be available for the use of the Nizam only when the representative of the British government has given his consent."†

The scale of expenditure on which the contingent was maintained, was inordinate. Lord Dalhousie, in a minute of the 25th of September, 1848, declared—"I agree with Colonel Low in thinking that we cause the contingent to become a much heavier burden on the Nizam's finances than it ought to be. The staff, in my humble judgment, is preposterously large. The pay and allowances, and charges of various kinds, are far higher than they ought to be." Still, nothing was done to reduce this ruinous waste of public funds; for in March, 1853, another minute, by the same ready pen, described the contingent as having no less than five brigadiers, with brigade-majors, attached to it, and a military secretary, who drew the same salary as the adjutant-

general of the Bengal army. By the rules of the force, the officers were promoted to superior grades, and to higher pay, earlier than they would have been in their own service; and, altogether, the expenses were "unusually and unnecessarily heavy."‡

The plan devised for compelling the payment, by the Nizam, of expenditure thus recklessly incurred in the maintenance of a contingent which no treaty bound him to support, and which had existed on sufferance from the time of the Mahratta war, without any formal sanction on the part of either government, is vaunted as extremely liberal, apparently because it fell short of total annexation.

The sum claimed was about seventy-five lacs,§ or £750,000 (including interest at six per cent.); to provide for the payment of which, the supreme government demanded the transfer of "districts to the value of not less than thirty-five lacs per annum, so as to provide for the payment of the principal of the debt within three years, and further to afford a margin, which should in each year be applicable to meet any partial deficiencies which might still occur in the supply of monthly pay for the troops of the contingent."¶ The resident pointed out, as the districts of which the British government might most fitly and advantageously demand possession, the Berar Payeen Ghaut, the border districts from thence down to Shorapoor,¶ and the territory of the dooab, between the Kistnah and the Toombuddra; which, together, comprised the whole frontier of the Nizam's kingdom along its northern and western boundaries, and along its southern boundary, as far as the junction of the above-named rivers.

"The Berar Payeen Ghaut (he adds) is, without exception, the richest and most fertile part of the Nizam's country, and the Raichore dooab is the next to it in this respect. These two districts hold out great prospect of improvement in regard to revenue and commerce, from an extended culture of the two articles of cotton and opium. . . . The quantity of opium now cultivated in Berar Payeen Ghaut,

sume, that when that district is given over to his charge, measures will be taken by the supreme government for keeping it, for some years at least, subject to the control of a British officer. It is at present in a favourable and improving state; but if given up to the young rajah's exclusive and uncontrolled authority, it will quickly revert to the same state of barbarism in which it was before."—Parl. Papers—*Ibid.*, p. 14. Shorapoor is inhabited by the Bedars, a warlike aboriginal tribe, whose chief claims a descent of more than thirty centuries.

* Parl. Papers, 26th July, 1854; p. 3.

† Minute by the governor-general, June, 1851.—Parl. Papers—*Ibid.*, p. 100.

‡ Parl. Papers—*Ibid.*, pp. 4; 103.

§ Minute by governor-general, 27th May, 1851.—Parl. Papers—*Ibid.*, p. 32.

¶ *Ibid.*, p. 34.

¶ The resident, Major-general Fraser, adds a remark on Shorapoor, which illustrates the systematic encroachment, manifested in so many ways, and excused by such various pretexts. The rajah of Shorapoor, he says, "is near his majority; but, I pre-

as well as of cotton, might be greatly increased, and the duty upon them would form, in itself, a very productive source of revenue."

Captain Meadows Taylor likewise gave an extremely tempting account of the same districts; he referred to the reported existence of very valuable anicuts, and described the Raichore district as well supplied with tanks.

Temporary occupation, for the liquidation of the outstanding debt, was all that was to be immediately demanded; but Lord Dalhousie avowedly anticipated the probability of being compelled to retain these districts permanently, for the regular payment of the contingent. Major-general Fraser entered more fully into the subject; and his statements show, in the clearest manner, the irremediable disorder into which the proposed step was calculated to plunge the finances of Hyderabad. He writes (4th February, 1851):—

"We are about to assume, in pursuance of a just right to do so, which cannot be denied, the temporary management of a tract of country yielding from thirty to forty lacs of rupees; and the Nizam, therefore, will have so much income less to meet those demands, to which his whole and undivided revenue has long been proved to be quite unequal. He has been unable, for the last five years, to pay the contingent, except by partial instalments only, although he considers this the first and most important payment incumbent on his government to make; and it cannot, therefore, be expected that he should be able to meet this essential claim upon him with his financial means diminished to the extent above mentioned. It is all but certain that he will not be able to pay the contingent [*brigadiers, brigademajors, military secretaries, and all*] for any further period than perhaps the next two months, and this, probably, but in small proportion only. The ultimate consequence, then, must be (and I see no reason why this argument should not be set before him in a plain and distinct light), that we should be under the necessity of retaining, permanently, in our possession the territory of which we are now about to assume the temporary charge."

The Nizam felt the iron pale which surrounded his kingdom closing in, and made an attempt at resistance which astonished the supreme authorities, and disconcerted, or at least delayed, the execution of their arrangements. Open resistance the governor-general was prepared to overwhelm by taking military possession of the specified districts. The Nizam was too prudent, or too powerless, to offer any. Suraj-ool-Moolk, the chief minister, appointed in compliance with Lord Dalhousie's suggestion, and pronounced by him to be the only man who seemed to possess the capacity to

grapple with the difficulties of the state, pointed out the certain ruin which the proposed cession would involve. The districts demanded, he said, afforded one-third of the entire revenue; another third would be required for the regular monthly payment of the contingent, &c.: and only one-third being left to carry on the entire administration, both the Nizam and his subjects would be reduced to distress for the means of existence.

Arguments of this nature had been anticipated, and would probably have made little impression, had they not been followed up by a distinct offer for the immediate liquidation of arrears. The resident had received no instructions how to act in so unexpected a case, and he therefore wrote word to Calcutta, that pending further orders, he had judged it his duty to consent to leave the question of the transfer of the districts in temporary abeyance, the Nizam having found means to take upon himself the entire and immediate payment of his debt, and to give "the best security that could be offered for the future regular payment of the contingent, short of the actual transfer, to us, of part of his country for this purpose."*

The first half of the debt was paid at once; the second proved more difficult to be raised in the precise manner required, although the Nizam contributed thirty lacs of rupees (£30,000) from his private funds. Suraj-ool-Moolk requested that a favourable rate of exchange might be allowed for the Nizam's bills, in consideration of the interest paid by him direct to the British government, of that exacted by usurers on sums borrowed on the same account, and especially because of the notorious embarrassments of the state. He asked that the existing average rate of exchange on the Company's bills should be applied to the Nizam's, and that these latter should be credited according to their dates. In support of his first request, he urged that it was the universal practice to pay a debt at the current rate of exchange, and not at the rate which prevailed when the loan was made; adding, that it ought to be borne in mind, that the present debt had accumulated, in the course of seven years, by comparatively small sums; and the whole of it was now required to be paid within four months. With regard to the

* Letter of Resident Fraser, 16th July, 1851.—*Parl. Papers (Nizam's Territory)*, p. 52.

second point, he said—"If instead of hoondees [bills], the Circar [state] paid the amount of the debt to you in cash, and you found it expedient to remit the money to the residencies, you would have to pay ready money to the soucars [bankers] for the hoondees you procured for this purpose; and as I send you hoondees so purchased, instead of the coin, I do not think I am unreasonable in requesting that credit may be given to this Circar [state] on the dates the hoondees are delivered to you."*

But the resident would hear of no allowance; no deductions in any way. The financial difficulties of the Nizam were a subject of regret; but it was not "equitable, that the loss of which Suraj-ool-Moolk complained, should be lessened at the expense of the British government."

The 31st of October—the time specified for the payment of the second and final instalment—arrived. The Nizam, though unable to raise the entire sum required, yet managed to furnish a considerable portion of it, and acted in such a manner as to convince the resident that he was really "exerting himself, in good faith, to liquidate the whole." The governor-general records this, in a minute dated 3rd January, 1852; yet, at the same time, he was occupied in framing a treaty which was to deprive the Nizam of the territory he had made so strenuous an effort to retain. Colonel Low was dispatched to Hyderabad to conduct the negotiations; "his judgment, firmness, and conciliatory demeanour" being relied on to bring about the issue desired by the supreme government. The task was neither an easy nor a pleasant one.

The proposals now made were, that the Nizam should cede the frontier districts in perpetuity, and receive, in return, a receipt in full for the portion of the instalment he had failed to pay in October, and likewise for the future subsistence of the contingent, which the Company proposed to reorganise in their own name, on a reduced scale, transforming it from the Nizam's force into one to be maintained for him by the government. There was, moreover, a subsidiary force, which the Company were bound to maintain in perpetuity by the treaty of 1800, within the state of

Hyderabad; the funds being provided by the cession of the Nizam's share of the territory acquired from Mysoor.† The government had need of these troops, and desired to obtain, by a new treaty, the right of employing the chief part of them elsewhere, on the plea of there being no necessity for them in Hyderabad; the danger of external foes which existed when the arrangement was first made, and when the Mahrattas were in the height of their power and turbulence, having long since passed away.

It was true that, by this particular part of the proposed arrangement, the Nizam would be no loser; because the contingent, and the large number of troops in his immediate service, alone exceeded the ordinary requirements of the state. Only, as Lord Dalhousie wanted the services of the subsidiary force elsewhere, and as the contingent force, to a great extent, performed its duties and supplied its place, it is evident that there could be no excuse for appropriating the services of the former body without contributing to the expenses of the latter, which amounted to £30,000 a month.‡

This was never even contemplated; and the state of Hyderabad having been made to furnish funds in perpetuity for a subsidiary force, was now to be compelled to cede territory for the support of another distinct but very similar body of troops, and to place the former at the service of the British government without receiving any compensation whatever.

It is true the Nizam was to be given the option of disbanding the contingent; but then the immediate ruin of the country was anticipated by the resident as so palpable and certain a consequence of such a measure, that the idea was viewed as one of the last the Nizam would entertain. Even in the event of his choosing this hazardous alternative, in a desperate endeavour to relieve his finances from the incubus with which they had been so long burdened, the transfer of territory was still to be insisted on, at least temporarily, for the payment of arrears, "and for covering the future expenses of the force during the time necessary for its absorption, in the gradual manner required by good faith to existing personal interests."§

* Letter from Sooraj-ool-Moolk, 14th August, 1851.—Parl. Papers (Nizam's Territory), p. 70.

† For the origin and establishment of the subsidiary force, see *Indian Empire*, vol. i., pp. 373; 378.

‡ Parl. Papers (Nizam's Territory), 26th July, 1854; p. 94.

§ Despatch from directors, 2nd November, 1853.—Parl. Papers—*Ibid.*, p. 8.

"Beneficial as these proposals are, especially to the Nizam," writes Lord Dalhousie, "it is anticipated that his highness will be reluctant to assent to them;" and, in the event of his reluctance amounting to a positive refusal to sign the new treaty, military possession was ordered to be taken of the coveted districts.

The Nizam was, as had been anticipated, incapable of appreciating the advantages offered him: he saw no occasion for any new treaty at all; earnestly craved for time to pay off the debt; and promised to meet the expenses of the contingent with regularity for the future—a promise which, however, there is reason to fear he lacked the means of performing. At first, he seems to have been inclined to stand at bay; and in the opening conference with Colonel Low, he took up the strong point of his case, and put it very clearly.

"In the time of my father," said the Nizam, "the Peishwa of Poona became hostile both to the Company's government and to this government, and Sir Henry Russell (the resident) organised this contingent, and sent it in different directions, along with the Company's troops, to fight the Mahratta people; and this was all very proper, and according to the treaty; for those Mahrattas were enemies of both states; and the Company's army and my father's army conquered the ruler of Poona, and you sent him off a prisoner to Hindoostan, and took the country of Poona.* After that, there was no longer any war; so why was the contingent kept up any longer than the war?"

Colonel Low was not prepared to meet an argument which went at once to the gist of the question; and he made, as an honest man could not help doing, a very lame reply, excusing himself on the plea, that thirty-six years had elapsed since the occurrence of the events alluded to by the Nizam; that he (the colonel) was not in Hyderabad at the time; but that he supposed the reigning prince had considered the maintenance of the contingent a good arrangement, and therefore consented to it. He proceeded to represent the necessity of retaining this force to overawe the Arabs, Rohillas, Seiks, and other plunderers, and to enable the Nizam to collect his revenues: adding, that the governor-general was so much disposed to act liberally in the matter, that he would probably aid in re-

ducing the expenses of the contingent, if that were desired. The Nizam here abruptly terminated the conference.

A draft treaty was sent in, providing for the required cession; and the Nizam was reminded, that he would thereby gain relief, in future, from the heavy interest he had been compelled to pay on money borrowed for the maintenance of the contingent. His reiterated reply was—"A change in a treaty, be it what it may, can never be an advantage to a sovereign who prefers, as I do, that there should not be any change at all." He reluctantly consented to discuss the subject again with the resident, and received him at the second interview with a flushed face and excited manner, which, at first sight, resembled the effects of wine or opium. This was not the case; for the Nizam had never shown himself more acute in argument, nor more fluent in conversation; but he was very angry, and had been sitting up nearly all night examining the treaty with his chief nobles. "Two acts," he said, "on the part of a sovereign prince are always reckoned disgraceful: one is, to give away, unnecessarily, any portion of his hereditary territories; and the other is, to disband troops who have been brave and faithful in his service. * * * Did I ever make war against the English government, or intrigue against it? or do anything but co-operate with it, and be obedient to its wishes, that I should be so disgraced?"† Again and again he asked to be allowed to pay the forty-six lacs of rupees then owing, and provide security for future regularity; but the resident reminded him that similar pledges had been repeatedly violated, and urged him to accept the governor-general's proposition, and apply the sum he spoke of in lessening the heavy arrears of his own troops and servants. The Nizam, in reply, made what impartial readers may consider a natural and sensible speech; but which the resident reported as illustrative of "his highness's peculiar and strange character."

"Gentlemen like you," he said, "who are sometimes in Europe, and at other times in India; sometimes employed in government business, at other times soldiers; sometimes sailors, and at other times even engaged in commerce (at least I have heard that some great men of your tribe have been merchants), you cannot understand the nature of my feelings in this matter. I am a sovereign prince, born to live and

* See *Indian Empire*, vol. i., p. 419.

† *Parl. Papers (Nizam's Territory)*, p. 119.

die in this kingdom, which has belonged to my family for seven generations. You think that I could be happy if I were to give up a portion of my kingdom to your government in perpetuity: it is totally impossible that I could be happy; I should feel that I was disgraced. I have heard that one gentleman of your tribe considered that I ought to be quite contented and happy if I were put upon the same footing as Mohammed Ghouse Khan [the Nawab of Arcot]; to have a pension paid to me like an old servant, and have nothing to do but to eat and sleep and say my prayers. Wah!"*

Other remarks followed; the Nizam went over all the most disputed portions of former negotiations, and said that the Company ought to give him territory instead of taking any away. He complained bitterly of the discreditable transactions connected with the firm of Palmer & Co., by which his father had sustained both territorial and pecuniary loss;† and adverted sarcastically to the high value the British power placed on money. The second interview terminated as unsatisfactorily as the first. A third followed, at which the Nizam received the resident with "something of sadness in his expression of countenance," yet "with due courtesy and politeness." But he soon grew excited, and said angrily, "Suppose I were to declare that I don't want the contingent at all?" In that case, he was told, some years might elapse before the men could be otherwise provided for, and the specified districts would still be required to provide for them in the interim.

The conversation came to a standstill, and the resident broke silence by asking a decided answer to the question—whether the Nizam would consent to form a new treaty? "I could answer in a moment," was the retort; "but what is the use of answering? If you are determined to take districts, you can take them without my either making a new treaty, or giving any answer at all."

Once more the discussion was adjourned. The government had resolved, in case of necessity, "to take possession of the districts by physical force;"‡ but a difficulty arose as to the troops to be employed. There were, indeed, more than sufficient for the purpose already stationed within the

limits of Hyderabad; but the employment of troops ostensibly organised for the Nizam's service, in direct opposition to his will, would, one of the members of government observed, be a measure of doubtful propriety in the case of the subsidiary force, but, beyond all doubt, wrong in the case of the contingent. The same minute shows how completely native contingents were viewed as identified with British interests, and how little anticipation was then entertained that a time was coming when the majority would mutiny, murder their officers, and fight to the death against the united power of their own princes and the British government: it also illustrates the anomalous condition of contingent troops in general, on whom such divided allegiance as is here described, must necessarily have sat lightly; and who were counted upon by the supreme government, as being ready, at any moment, to march against the person and the capital of their ostensible master, to whom they had sworn allegiance, and whose salt they ate.

"I am quite satisfied," writes Sir Frederick Currie, "that the troops of the contingent would, at the command of the resident and their officers, march against the other troops of the state, against Hyderabad, and against the person of the Nizam himself, if so ordered, as readily as against any other parties, so entirely have they been taught to consider themselves our soldiers; but we must not, on that account, lose sight of the fact, that they are *bound* to the Nizam's troops, enlisted (by British officers, it is true, but by British officers in the pay and service of the Nizam) in his name, sworn to allegiance to him, and obedience to his orders. It would be, to my mind, the very height of anarchy to order these troops to coerce their master in any way; but more especially so, to use them for the purpose of taking violent possession of a part of that master's territories in order to provide for their own pay."§

The government had therefore a special reason for desiring to procure the consent of the Nizam to their occupation of the frontier districts; beside which, the use of the subsidiary troops for their own purposes, could only be obtained by an article framed to supersede the rule by which they were "hampered"|| in the treaty of 1800; and further, it was desirable to secure a legal sanction for the continued maintenance of the contingent.

At length a modification of the draft treaty was agreed upon, chiefly through

* An Arabic exclamation, indicative of anger and surprise, and uttered with uncontrollable passion.—Parl. Papers (Nizam's Territory), p. 120.

† *Indian Empire*, vol. i., p. 421.

‡ Resident's Letter.—Parl. Papers—*Ibid.*, p. 129.

§ Minute by Sir F. Currie, 2nd April, 1853.

|| Minute by Mr. Dorin, 1st June, 1853.—Parl. Papers, p. 154.

the mediation of Shams-ool-Omrah, the uncle-in-law of the Nizam; who was described by the resident as having been famed, throughout a long life, for truthfulness and general respectability of character, and who evinced, at a very advanced age, remarkable manliness and good sense. The Nizam positively refused to sign away any of his territory in perpetuity; but he reluctantly consented to the temporary transfer of the districts to British management, on condition of regular accounts being rendered to him, and the surplus revenue being paid into his treasury, after the liquidation of the old debt, and the regular payment of the contingent, with some other items, should have been provided for.

The governor-general had previously declared, that "much consideration" was due to the Nizam on account of the unnecessary expense at which the contingent had been maintained; and had dwelt forcibly on the heavy pecuniary sacrifice the government was willing to make by cancelling the old debt. Why this benevolent intention was not carried out, does not clearly appear. The Nizam would have joyfully accepted the boon, if assured that it involved no latent responsibility; but it never seems to have been placed within his reach. Lord Dalhousie, in his long minute on the subject of the advantages procured by the treaty, says, "that in providing, beyond risk, the means of regularly paying the contingent, and of terminating all pecuniary transactions and consequent causes of dispute with the Nizam, the government of India secured an all-important object; to obtain which, it was prepared not merely to accept an assignment of districts only, but further to cancel the fifty lacs of rupees due to it." His lordship adds—"The government may well be content with a treaty which gives it what it sought without requiring the sacrifice it was ready and willing to make in return."

No doubt the new arrangement was an

extremely favourable one for the British government, when viewed in the light of temporary financial expediency. The benefit to be derived by the prince, whom Lord Dalhousie truly called our "old and staunch ally," is by no means equally apparent.* Yet it would seem to have been so to the Calcutta council; for, in sending home to the Court of Directors the documents from which the preceding account has been exclusively framed, and the precise words of which have been, as far as possible, adhered to, entire confidence is expressed in the irrefragable proofs contained therein, "that the conduct of the government of India towards the Nizam, in respect of the contingent and of all his other affairs, has been characterised by unvarying good faith, liberality, and forbearance; and by a sincere desire to maintain the stability of the state of Hyderabad, and to uphold the personal independence of his highness the Nizam."

The directors evidently sympathised with Lord Dalhousie's views of the course prompted by such laudable motives, including "a due regard for our own interests."† They rejoiced to find the Indian government relieved "from the unbecoming position of an importunate creditor;" and presented their "cordial thanks to the governor-general, and the officers employed by him, in negotiating so satisfactory a treaty."

The transfer was effected in 1853. Since then, the annexation of Hyderabad has been openly canvassed, and, probably, would have been ere now completed, only the turn of Oude came first, and then—the mutiny. Fortunately for us, the Nizam died in the interim; otherwise, "the mingled exasperation and humiliation," which Lord Dalhousie himself declares the proceedings of the governor-general *must* have produced in his mind, would perhaps have taken a tangible form; and, to our other difficulties, might have been added that of struggling with "one of the most dangerous and fanatical Mussulman districts in India."‡

feet." This sentence is not printed in the only letter from the governor-general to the Nizam in the Parl. Papers; which contains, however, the strange assertion, that the efficient maintenance of the contingent force was a duty imposed upon the government of Hyderabad, by the stipulations of existing treaties—a statement refuted by his lordship in repeated minutes. The Nizam is also threatened with the resentment of that great government "whose power can crush you at its will;" and an anticipation is expressed, of the pain and anxiety which must be caused to his highness by "the plain and peremptory

* Parl. Papers, p. 40.

† Minute and despatch by gov.-general, pp. 8, 9.

‡ See *Quarterly Review*, August, 1858; article on "British India," pp. 265, 266. The writer (believed to be Mr. Layard) refers to the "garbled" Blue Book from which the statement in the foregoing pages has been framed, as affording some insight into the manner in which Lord Dalhousie bullied the Nizam into a surrender of his three richest districts; and speaks of a letter full of unworthy invective and sarcasm, in which the latter is likened, by the former, "to the dust under his

The present Nizam was suffered to ascend his hereditary throne in peace, and will, it is to be hoped, reap the reward of his allegiance in the restoration of the assigned districts, which a recent authority has declared, "were filched from his father by a series of manœuvres as unjust and discreditable as any that may be found in the history of our administration of British India."*

The Principality of Jhansi (a name with which we have been of late painfully familiar), annexed in 1854, added to our dominions 2,532 square miles of territory, peopled by 200,000 souls. The attendant circumstances were peculiar. In 1804, a treaty was concluded with Sheo Rao Bhao, subahdar or viceroy of Jhansi, by Lord Lake, under what the government truly described as the "nominal" sanction of the Peishwa. The adhesion of this chief was then deemed of much importance, and his influence had effect in inducing many others to follow his example, and thus facilitated our operations in Bundelcund. In 1817, the Peishwa having ceded to us all his rights, feudal, territorial, and pecuniary, in that province, a new treaty was entered into, by which the governor-general, "in consideration of the very respectable character" borne by the lately deceased ruler, Sheo Rao Bhao, "and his uniform and faithful attachment to the British government, and in deference to his wish expressed before his death," consented to confirm the principality of Jhansi, in perpetuity, to his grandson Ram Chandra Rao, his heirs and successors.†

The administration of Ram Chandra was carried on so satisfactorily, that, in 1832, the title of maharajah was publicly conferred on him, in lieu of that of subahdar, by Lord William Bentinck, who was returning by Jhansi to Calcutta, from a tour of inspection in the Upper Provinces. The little state was then well ordered. Its ruler was a sensible, high-spirited young man; his aristocracy and army were composed of two or three thousand persons, chiefly of his own family and tribe; and his villages and people had as good an appearance as language" addressed to him. Mr. Bright quoted the sentence already given from the *Quarterly Review*, in his place in parliament (June 24th, 1858); adding—"Passages like these are left out of despatches when laid on the table of the House of Commons. It would not do for the parliament, or the Crown, or the people of England, to know that their officer addressed language like this to a native prince." It is further alleged, that when forced to

any in India. After the ceremony had been performed in the presence of all orders of his subjects, the maharajah approached the governor-general in the attitude of supplication, and craved yet another boon. His subjects watched with deep interest the bearing of their ruler, which, in their view, implied unqualified devotion and allegiance; but they noticed (according to a native writer) the smile of surprise and derision with which the ladies and officials in the viceregal suite regarded the scene. Lord William himself had a juster appreciation of native character, but he naturally feared some embarrassing request, and heard with relief, that the boon desired was simply permission to adopt the English ensign as the flag of Jhansi. A union-jack was at once placed in his hands, and forthwith hoisted, by his order, from the highest tower of his castle under a salute of one hundred guns. The significance of the act thus gracefully carried through, was beyond misapprehension; for the adoption of the flag of the supreme power by a dependent chieftain, was the expressive and well-known symbol of loyalty and identity of interest.‡

Upon the death of Ram Chandra in 1835, without male heirs, the succession was continued in the line of Sheo Rao. Gungadhur Rao, the son of Sheo, while yet a young man, was suddenly carried off by dysentery, on the 21st of November, 1853. The day before his death, the maharajah sent for the political agent of Bundelcund (Mr. Ellis), and the officer in command (Captain Martin), and delivered to them the following *khareeta*, or testament, which he caused to be read to them in his presence, before all his court.

"[After compliments.] The manner in which my ancestors were faithful to the British government, previous to the establishment of its authority [in Bundelcund], has become known even in Europe; and it is well known to the several agents here, that I also have always acted in obedience to the same authority.

"I am now very ill; and it is a source of great grief to me, that notwithstanding all my fidelity, and the favour conferred by make the transfer in question, the Nizam had a counter pecuniary claim, exceeding in demand that urged against him; which claim, though of old standing and repeatedly advanced, Lord Dalhousie refused to discuss, until the coveted districts should have been surrendered.

* *Quarterly Review*, p. 268.

† *Parl. Papers* (Jhansi), 27th July, 1855; pp. 1; 17.

‡ *Indophilus' Letters to the Times*, p. 11.

such a powerful government, the name of my fathers will end with me; and I have therefore, with reference to the second article of the treaty concluded with the British government, adopted Damoodhur Gungadhur Rao, commonly called Anund Rao, a boy of five years old, my grandson through my grandfather.* I still hope that, by the mercy of God, and the favour of your government, I may recover my health; and, as my age is not great, I may still have children; and should this be the case, I will adopt such steps as may appear necessary. Should I not survive, I trust that, in consideration of the fidelity I have evinced towards government, favour may be shown to this child, and that my widow, during her lifetime, may be considered the regent of the state (Malika) and mother of this child, and that she may not be molested in any way."

Lakshmi Bye addressed the governor-general in favour of the adoption. She argued, that the second article of the treaty was so peculiarly worded, as expressly to state the right of succession in perpetuity, either through *warrisan* (heirs of the body, or collateral heirs) or *joh nasheenan* (successors in general); which the widow interpreted as meaning, "that any party whom the rajah adopted as his son, to perform the funeral rites over his body necessary to ensure beatitude in a future world, would be acknowledged by the British government as his lawful heir, through whom the name and interests of the family might be preserved." She likewise pleaded, that the fidelity evinced by the Jhansi chiefs in past years, ought to be taken into consideration in coming to a final decision on the fate of the principality.†

Major Malcolm, the political agent for Gwalior, Bundelcund, and Rewah, in forwarding the above appeal, speaks of the first point as an open question for the decision of government; but with regard to the latter plea, he says—"The Bye (princess or lady) does not, I believe, in the slightest degree overrate the fidelity and loyalty all along evinced by the state of Jhansi, under circumstances of considerable temptation, before our power had arrived at the commanding position which it has since attained."‡ In a previous communication,

* This term is used to denominate cousins in the third and fourth degrees, tracing their descent in the male line to a common ancestor.—Jhansi Papers, p. 8.

† Letters from the Ranee.—Parl. Papers, pp. 14; 24.

the British agent wrote—"The widow of the late Gungadhur Rao, in whose hands he has expressed a wish that the government should be placed during her lifetime, is a woman highly respected and esteemed, and, I believe, fully capable of doing justice to such a charge." Major Ellis, the political assistant for Bundelcund, considered the particular question of the right of adoption in Jhansi as settled by the precedent established in the case of Oorcha; treaties of alliance and friendship existing with both states, and no difference being discernible in the terms, which could justify the withholding the privilege of adoption from the one after having allowed it to the other. Moreover, he considered that the general right of native states to make adoptions, had been clearly acknowledged and recorded by the directors.§

The governor-general, after having "carefully considered" the above statements, decided that Jhansi, having "lapsed to the British government, should be retained by it, in accordance equally with right and with sound policy." Measures were immediately taken for the transfer of the principality to the jurisdiction of the lieutenant-governor of the North-Western Provinces. The native institutions were demolished at a blow, all the establishments of the rajah's government were superseded, and the regular troops in the service of the state were immediately paid up and discharged.||

The Gwalior contingent, and the 12th Bengal native infantry, were the troops chiefly employed by the British government in carrying through these unpopular measures; but reinforcements were held in readiness to overawe opposition. Employment such as this, on repeated occasions, was not calculated to increase the attachment of the sepoys to the foreign masters whom they served as mercenaries, in what many of them considered the confiscation of the rights and property of native royalty. If they had any latent patriotism, or any capacity for feeling it, nothing could have been more calculated to arouse or implant it than this ruthless system of absorption. Their sympathies would naturally be enlisted in favour of Lakshmi Bye, who fierce, relentless tigress as she has since appeared,

‡ Jhansi Papers, pp. 14; 24, 25.

§ Major Ellis referred especially to a despatch from the Court of Directors, dated 27th March, 1839 (No. 9), for an explicit statement of their views on the subject of adoption.—Jhansi Papers, p. 16.

|| *Ibid.*, p. 31.

was then venerated as a marvel of youth, ability, and discretion. "This lady," said Major Malcolm, "bears a very high character, and is much respected by every one in Jhansi;" and he urged especially (in the event of the annexation of the state), "that in compliance with her husband's last request, all the state jewels and private funds, and any balance remaining in the public treasury, after closing the accounts of the state, should also be considered as her private property."*

The governor-general replied, in general terms, that the property of the rajah would belong by law to his adopted son; because, the adoption, if legally made, was good for the conveyance of private rights, though not for the transfer of the principality. Thus the ranees was not only deprived of the regency, but was held to be cut off from other claims by the very means her dying husband had taken to ensure her future position. The first part of her history ends here. We have no account of the manner in which she bore her disappointment; but we know that she rose at the first signal of the mutiny, and that her name is now inseparably connected with thoughts of massacre and war. Her subsequent career does not, however, belong to this introductory chapter. The supreme council were by no means unanimous regarding the seizure of Jhansi. Messrs. Low and Halliday, while professing themselves convinced by Lord Dalhousie's reasoning on the legality of the annexation, stated, that they would have preferred the pursuance of a similar course towards Jhansi to that lately taken with regard to Kerowlee.

Now Kerowlee was a Rajpoot principality, the annexation of which was only prevented by the interference of the home government, on a threatened motion of the House of Commons.†

Indophilus (whose opinion on the subject is especially interesting, on account of his tendency towards the annexation policy in particular, and generally in favour of the Company) says, that Kerowlee had neither been so well governed, nor had entered into such an interesting relation with us, as Jhansi: but its rajah was descended from the Moon (Chandrabunsee); and some thou-

sands of half-civilised relations and retainers were dependent for their social position and subsistence upon the continuance of the little state. He also died without children; but the native institutions of the state were suffered to continue, and the ruling chief has remained faithful to us during the insurrection. The larger Rajpoot states of Jeypoor, Joudpoor, Bikaner, and others, have been also on our side. "The case of their Brother of the Moon was justly regarded by them as a test of our intentions towards them, and they were in some degree reassured by the result. There can be no doubt (adds Indophilus) that these small national states, which must be dependent upon the central government, and cannot, if treated with common fairness, combine against it, are an important element of the Indian system."

The Nawab of the Carnatic died in 1855, leaving no son. The claims of his paternal uncle, Azim Jah (who had been regent), were urged as entitling him, by Mohammedan law, to succeed to the musnud; but the decision was given against him, and the title of nawab placed "in abeyance," on the ground that the treaty by which the musnud of the Carnatic had been conferred on the nawab's predecessor, had been purely a personal one, and that both he and his family had disreputably abused the dignity of their position, and the large share of the public revenue which had been allotted to them.‡

Mr. Norton, an English barrister of the Madras bar, who had been present at the installation of the deceased nawab, and had resided at Madras throughout the whole of his occupation of the musnud, says, he was neither of bad parts nor of bad disposition; and had he been only moderately educated, his presence at Madras might have entailed great benefits upon the people, especially the Mussulman population. The nawab had been under the tutelage of the Company from his earliest infancy; and instead of superintending his moral and intellectual training, they gave him over "to the offices of panders and parasites, and left him to sink, from sheer neglect, into the life of sensuality and extravagance common to Eastern princes." He died suddenly, while still young; and Mr. Norton argues, that

* Letter of political agent (Malcolm), 16th March, 1854.—Parl. Papers on Jhansi, p. 28.

† *Quarterly Review*, July, 1858; article on "British India," p. 269.

‡ *Letters of Indophilus*, p. 11. Minute of Governor-general Dalhousie, 28th February, 1856. Return to order of House of Lords; printed 16th June, 1856; pp. 12, 13.

foolish and improvident as his conduct had been, he had committed no offences sufficiently heinous to justify the penalty inflicted on the family; adding, "we might just as reasonably have refused to allow the heirs of George IV. to succeed him, on account of his irregular habits and extravagance."

The same writer states, that Azim Jah, the rejected claimant of the musnud, had been on several occasions officially recognised, in writing, as the lawful heir.*

The titular Raj of Tanjore was abolished by alleged right of lapse on the death of its last rajah, Sevajee, in 1855. The resident, Mr. Forbes, pleaded strongly in behalf of the daughter of the deceased. He urged that Tanjore was not a conquered country; that its acquisition had not cost the life of a single soldier, nor the value of a single rupee; and that during fifty years' possession, a revenue of no less than twenty crores, or as many millions sterling, had been derived from it by the British government. After entreating favourable consideration for the daughter of a line of princes who, when their aid was needed, had always proved our firm allies—he sets forth another and very pertinent view of the case, declaring, that "it is impossible to doubt that the now prosperous condition of the country would be very greatly affected by the sudden withdrawal of a circulation amounting to about eleven lacs a-year. So great a diminution of the expenditure within the province, must certainly lead to a difficulty in realising the revenue: it is a small tract of land from which to raise fifty lacs a-year; and it cannot be a matter of indifference to the producers, whether more than a fifth of the revenue be spent among them or not."

Mr. Norton gives his personal testimony with regard to the unnecessary and impolitic harshness with which the extinction of the titular principality was accomplished. A company of sepoy was marched suddenly into the palace; the whole of the property, real and personal, was seized, and the Company's seals put upon all the jewels and other valuables. The soldiery were disarmed, and in the most offensive way. The private estate of the rajah's mother, of the estimated value of three lacs a-year, was sequestered, and has remained so. The occupier of every piece of land in the district, which had at any time belonged to a former rajah, was

turned out of his possession, and ordered to come before the commissioner to establish a title to his satisfaction. The whole of the people dependent upon the expenditure of the raj revenue among them, were panic-struck at the prospect of being thrown out of employ; and, in a week, Tanjore, from the most contented place in our dominions, was converted into a hotbed of sullen disaffection. The people venerated the raj, and were indignant at its suppression: the very sepoys refused to receive their pensions.

According to Mr. Norton, the terms of the treaty promised the succession to "heirs" in general, and not exclusively to heirs male; but he considers the prior claim to be that of the senior widow, in preference to the daughter; and quotes a precedent in the history of the Tanjore dynasty, and many others in Hindoo history, including that of Malcolm's favourite heroine, Ahalya By, the exemplary queen of Indore.†

Kamachi Bye, the senior widow, intends contesting her claims to the raj, in England. She has filed a bill in the Supreme Court, for the recovery of the personal private estate of her late husband, and has obtained an injunction against the Company, to restrain them from parting with the property.‡

Passing over some minor absorptions, we arrive at the last and greatest of Lord Dalhousie's annexations—one which, both from its importance and special character, requires to be entered into at some length.

Oude, or *Ayodha*, was famous in ancient Hindoo lore as the kingdom of Dasaratha, the father of Rama, the hero of the famous epic the *Ramayana*. With the details of its fall as a Hindoo kingdom, and its history as a province of the Mogul empire, we are almost entirely unacquainted; but we know that it has retained its institutions to the present day, and that, in all respects, the Hindoo element largely predominates throughout Oude. The question of immediate interest is its connection by treaties with the East India Company, and the proceedings of its Mussulman rulers.

It has already been shown that their independence was founded on simple usurpation, having been obtained by taking advantage of the weakness of their rightful sovereigns, the Moguls of Delhi.§

Sadut Khan, nick-named the "Persian pedlar," the founder of the dynasty, was a

* Norton's *Rebellion in India*, pp. 98—107.

† *Indian Empire*, vol. i., p. 392.

‡ Norton's *Rebellion in India*, pp. 107—118.

§ *Indian Empire*, vol. i., p. 159.

merchant of Khorasan, who, by dint of ability and intrigue, eventually procured for himself the position of governor (or soubah, or nawab) of the province of Oude, together with that of vizier, which he held when Nadir Shah invaded India in 1738-’9.

The reigning emperor, Mohammed Shah, was powerless in the hands of his ambitious servants; their plots and peculations facilitated the progress of the invader; and their private quarrels incited the pillage and massacre which desolated Delhi. Sadut Khan was perpetually intriguing against his wily rival, the Nizam-ool-Moolk (or regulator of the state), “the old Deccani baboon,” as the young courtiers called him; from whom the Nizams of the Deccan (Hyderabad) descended.

The death of Sadut Khan is said to have been indirectly caused by the Nizam.* It occurred before Nadir Shah quitted Delhi.† His son and successor, Sufdur Jung, was likewise able and unprincipled. The third of the dynasty was Shuja Dowlah,‡ who succeeded, in 1756, to the nawabship, which the weakness, not the will, of the Moguls of Delhi had suffered to become hereditary. The unfortunate emperor, Shah Alum, had indeed no worse enemy than his nominal servant, but really pitiless and grasping gaoler, the nawab-vizier of Oude.§ It was Shuja Dowlah who was conquered by the British troops in the battle of Buxar, in 1764; and with whom, in 1773, Warren Hastings concluded the infamous treaty of Benares, whereby the districts of Allahabad and Corah were, in defiance of the rights of Shah Alum, sold to the nawab-vizier; and British forces were hired out to the same rebellious subject, for the express purpose of enabling him to “annex” Rohilcund, and “exterminate”|| the Rohilla chiefs, with whom we had no shadow of quarrel.

Immediately after the defeat and massacre of the Rohillas on the bloody field of Bareilly in 1774, Shuja Dowlah was seized with mortal sickness, and died after many

* *Indian Empire*, vol. i., p. 166. † *Ibid.*, p. 173.

‡ A memorandum on the Oude dynasty, drawn up by Fletcher Hayes, assistant-resident at Lucknow, is inserted in the Oude Blue Book of 1856. Shuja Dowlah is there described “as the infamous son of a still more infamous Persian pedlar,” and as enjoying “the extensive province of Oude as a reward for a service of uncommon villainies.” This and other statements are quoted on the authority of Ferishta, the famous Mohammedan annalist; but Mr. Hayes overlooks the fact, that Ferishta (or Mahomed Kasim) was born about the year 1570

months of agony. The cause was said to have been a wound inflicted by the daughter of Hafiz Rehmet, the principal Rohilla chief, who perished, sword in hand, at Bareilly. The unhappy girl had been captured; and when the nawab strove to add to the murder of the father the dishonour of his child, she stabbed him, and was immediately seized, and put to death. The wound inflicted by the unhappy girl was slight; but the dagger’s point had been dipped in poison, which slowly and surely did its work.¶

The next nawab, Asuf-ad-Dowlah, was a weak and sensual youth, who had no strength of character to enable him to resist the evil counsels of unworthy favourites. The subsidiary troops at first obtained from the English for purposes of the most direct aggression, became a heavy drain on the resources of the misgoverned country. Warren Hastings saw, in his indolent neighbour, an instrument for increasing the dominions of the Company, and refilling their treasury; and then followed new treaties, new loans, new cementing of eternal friendships, and, lastly, the shameless plunder of the begums of Oude, which inflicted indelible disgrace alike on the nawab and the governor-general.**

The Marquis Cornwallis, in this as in other cases, took a very different view to that acted on by his predecessor. He saw the increasing disorganisation of Oude, and remonstrated forcibly with its ruler; who urged, in extenuation, the exactions of the Company, amounting, within a period of little more than nine years, to £2,300,000 sterling.†† The annual subsidy settled by treaty, had been raised, on one pretext or another, until it averaged eighty-four lacs per annum; and Warren Hastings himself acknowledged the “intolerable burden” which was inflicted upon the revenue and authority of the nawab-vizier, by the number, influence, and enormous amount of the salaries, pensions, and emoluments of the Company’s service, civil and military; which called forth the envy and resentment of the whole

during the reign of the emperor Akber, and was the cotemporary of the French traveller Bernier. It is therefore not the *Annals of Ferishta* which Mr. Hayes quotes from, but the continuation of them, known as Dow’s *History of Hindoostan*, a work which, though honestly and ably written, occasionally records rumours of the day as historical facts.

§ *Indian Empire*, vol. i., p. 299.

|| The word used in the treaty of Benares.—*Vide Indian Empire*, vol. i., p. 329.

¶ *Indian Empire*, vol. i., p. 330. ** *Ibid.*, p. 363.

†† Despatch of directors, 8th April, 1789.

country, by excluding the native servants and adherents of the vizier from the rewards of their services and attachment.*

Lord Cornwallis reduced the amount of tribute to fifty lacs; checked the interference, and curtailed the salaries and perquisites, of officials; and insisted on the disbandment of the temporary brigade, which had been subsidized by the vizier for so long a time only as he should require its services, but from the costly maintenance of which he had afterwards in vain sought relief.

The measures of the governor-general in favour of the Oude government were, unhappily, not attended by any corresponding internal reforms. Profligacy, incapacity, and corruption at court; tyranny, extortion, and strife among the semi-independent Hindoo chiefs; neglect and abject wretchedness among the mass, continued to prevail up to the death of Asuf-ad-Dowlah in 1797.

The succession was disputed between his brother Sadut Ali, and his son Vizier Ali, a youth of seventeen, of a disposition violent even to madness. The Calcutta government (of which Sir John Shore was then at the head) at first decided in favour of Vizier Ali; but clear proof of his illegitimacy, and consequent unfitness to succeed according to Mussulman law, being adduced, the decision was reversed in favour of Sadut Ali, who entered into a new treaty with the Company; by which he consented to surrender the fortress of Allahabad, to increase the annual subsidy, and to receive into his service the additional troops deemed necessary for the protection of Oude.

The Marquis Wellesley (then Lord Mornington) became governor-general in 1798; and his attention was at once drawn to the notorious misgovernment of Oude. The three brothers—the Marquis, Colonel Wellesley (the future duke), and Henry Wellesley (afterwards Lord Cowley)—discussed the subject publicly and privately; and the colonel drew up a memorandum on the subject, which, in fact, anticipates all that has since been said on the evils of subsidiary troops.

“By the first treaty with the nabobs of Oude, the Company were bound to assist the nabob with their troops, on the condition of receiving payment for their expenses. The adoption of this system of

alliance is always to be attributed to the weakness of the state which receives the assistance, and the remedy generally aggravates the evil. It was usually attended by a stipulation that the subsidy should be paid in equal monthly instalments; and as this subsidy was generally the whole, or nearly the whole, disposable resource of the state, it was not easy to produce it at the moments at which it was stipulated. The tributary government was then reduced to borrow at usurious interest, to grant tuncaws upon the land for repayment, to take advances from aumildars, to sell the office of aumildar, and to adopt all the measures which it might be supposed distress on the one hand, and avarice and extortion on the other, could invent to procure the money necessary to provide for the payment of the stipulated subsidies.

“As soon as this alliance has been formed, it has invariably been discovered that the whole strength of the tributary government consisted in the aid afforded by its more powerful ally, or rather protector; and from that moment the respect, duty, and loyalty of its subjects have been weakened, and it has become more difficult to realise the resources of the state. To this evil must be added those of the same kind arising from oppression by aumildars, who have paid largely for their situations, and must remunerate themselves in the course of one year for what they have advanced from those holding tuncaws, and other claimants upon the soil on account of loans to government; and the result is, an increasing deficiency in the regular resources of the state.

“But these financial difficulties, created by weakness and increased by oppression, and which are attended by a long train of disorders throughout the country, must attract the attention of the protecting government, and then these last are obliged to interfere in the internal administration, in order to save the resources of the state, and to preclude the necessity of employing the troops in quelling internal rebellion and disorder, which were intended to resist the foreign enemy.”†

Lord Wellesley was ambitious, and certainly desirous of augmenting, by all honourable means, the resources and extent of the dominion committed to his charge. He had, however, no shade of avarice in his composition, for himself or for the Company he served: all his plans were on a large scale—all his tendencies were magnificent and munificent. He saw that the Company, by their ostensible system of non-interference in the internal affairs of the nawab's government, and by the actual and almost inevitable exercise of authority therein for the restraint of intolerable acts of oppression and disorder, had created a double government, which was giving rise to the greatest extortion and confusion.

Successive governors-general had borne testimony to the absence of law, order, and justice throughout Oude, and had endeavoured to introduce remedial measures; which, however, had all produced a directly contrary effect to that for which they were

* Quoted in *Dacoitees in Exceelsis*; or, *the Spoliation of Oude*, p. 28. London: Taylor.

† Memorandum on Oude.—*Wellington Supplementary Despatches*; edited by the present Duke. London: Murray, 1858.

designed, by complicating the involvements of the state, and increasing the extortions practised on the people by the aumildars and licentious native soldiery. These latter had become so perfectly mutinous and ungovernable, that Sadut Ali required the presence of British troops to secure him against the anticipated treachery of his own; and declared that, in the day of battle, he could not tell whether they would fight for or against him.

The consideration of these circumstances induced Lord Wellesley to frame a treaty, concluded in 1801, by which the nawab ceded one-half of his territories to the Company (including the districts now forming part of the North-Western Provinces, under the names of Rohilcund, Allahabad, Furruckabad, Mynpoorie, Etawa, Goruckpoor, Azimghur, Cawnpoor, and Futtehpoor), in return for a release from all arrears of subsidy, and for all expenses to be hereafter incurred in the protection of his country, which the Company bound themselves to defend in future, alike against foreign and domestic foes. They distinctly promised that no demand whatever should be made upon his territory, whether on account of military establishments; in the assembling of forces to repel the attack of a foreign enemy; on account of the detachment attached to the nawab's person; on account of troops which might be occasionally furnished for suppressing rebellions or disorders in his territories; nor on account of failures in the resources of the Ceded Districts, arising from unfavourable seasons, the calamities of war, or any other cause whatever.

The Company guaranteed to Sadut Ali, his heirs and successors, the possession of the reserved territories, together with the exercise of authority therein; and the nawab engaged to establish therein such a system of administration (to be carried into effect by his own officers) as should be conducive to the prosperity of his subjects, and calculated to secure their lives and property. He likewise bound himself to disband the chief part of the native troops; which he immediately did by reducing them from 80,000 to 30,000. The treaty of 1801 gave the nawab a certainty for an uncertainty; and restored to the remaining portion of Oude something of the vigour of an independent state. It would probably have done much more than this, had the Company confirmed the appointment of Henry

Wellesley, by the governor-general, to superintend the working of the new arrangements, and assist in initiating and carrying out useful reforms. The ability, tact, and courtesy which he had manifested in the previous negotiations, had won the confidence of Sadut Ali; and, as the brother of the governor-general, Henry Wellesley might have exercised an influence beneficial to both parties, similar to that which contributed so largely to the tranquil settlement of Mysoor, under the auspices of Colonel Wellesley. But the directors would not sanction such a breach of the privileges of the covenanted service, and the appointment was cancelled. The papers of the late Lord Cowley, and the Wellesley MSS. in the British Museum, abound with evidence of judicious reformatory measures projected for Oude, but neutralised or set aside by the home government. While Sadut Ali lived the treaty worked well, although the manner in which he availed himself of the stipulated services of British troops, repeatedly made the Calcutta government sensible of the responsibility they had assumed, and the difficulty of reconciling the fulfilment of their engagements to the ruler, with a due regard to the rights and interests of his subjects.

The nawab conducted his affairs with much discretion and economy; and, on his death in 1814, he left fourteen millions sterling in a treasury which was empty when he entered on the government.

The partition of Oude was not, however, accomplished without bloodshed. The Hindoo landowners in the ceded country—who were, for the most part, feudal chieftains of far older standing than any Mussulman in India—resisted the proposed change, and were with difficulty subdued.* The fact was significant; and it would have been well had the subsequent annexators of Oude remembered, that the danger to be apprehended lay with the feudal and semi-independent chiefs, rather than with their sensual and effete suzerain.

Sadut Ali was succeeded by Ghazi-oo-deen, who is described by one authority as “indolent and debauched;”† and, by another, as bearing some resemblance to our James I.‡ He lent the Company two millions of the treasure accumulated by his predecessor, to assist them in carrying on their wars with

* *Indian Empire*, vol. i., p. 386.

† *Sleeman's Journey through Oude*, vol. ii., p. 192.

‡ *Heber's Journal*.

Burmah and Nepaul; and they gave him, in return, a share of their conquests; namely, the Turace*—a fertile, richly-wooded, but unhealthy tract, which extends along the foot of the Himalayas; and sanctioned his assumption of regal dignity.

The acceptance of a loan, under the circumstances, was unworthy of a great government; and the confirmation of Ghazi-oo-deen's sovereignty was of doubtful policy. Complaints of misgovernment were rife, and appear to have been supported by forcible evidence. Bishop Heber, who travelled through Oude in 1824-'5, gave a more favourable account than other witnesses of the condition of the country; but his observations were necessarily cursory. He reasoned with Ghazi-oo-deen on the duty of attending to the condition of the people; and "the reply was, that he was powerless, having lent to the British government all the money which would have enabled him to ease his subjects of their burdens." Had the money remained in the Oude treasury, it is highly improbable that it would have benefited the people, except, indeed, indirectly, through the reckless expenditure of an unscrupulous minister, and a most unworthy set of favourites. Still, it is painful to learn that English governors should have exposed themselves to such a reproach, or should have acknowledged a loan from a dependent prince, in such a strain of fulsome and profane flattery as that in which Lord Amherst invokes the blessing of the Almighty on "the Mine of Munificence;" and declares, that "the benefits and fruits of our amity, which have existed from days of yore, are impressed upon the heart of every Englishman, both here and in Europe, as indelibly as if they had been engraven on adamant; nor will lapse of time, or change of circumstance, efface from the British nation so irrefragable a proof, so irresistible an argument, of the fraternal sentiments of your majesty."†

Nevertheless, the internal management of the "Mine of Munificence" was far from satisfactory, and the resident was officially reminded (July 22nd, 1825), that "by the treaty of 1801, the British government is clearly entitled, as well as morally obliged, to satisfy itself by whatever means it may

deem necessary; that the aid of its troops is required in support of right and justice, and not to effectuate injustice and oppression." In conformity with these instructions, the resident, and the officers commanding troops employed in the king's service, exercised a scrutiny which became extremely distasteful; and the treaty was violated by the increase of the native force (which was available, unchallenged, for any purpose, and afforded emolument and patronage to the native ministers and favourites), until, within the last few years of the reign of Ghazi-oo-deen, it comprised about sixty thousand men.

Nuseer-oo-deen, the son of Ghazi, succeeded him on the musnud in 1827. This is the "Eastern king" whose private life has been gibbeted to deserved infamy, in a sort of biographical romance‡ written by a European adventurer, for some time member of the royal household (as librarian or portrait-painter.) Recollecting the scandalous scenes revealed by contemporary diaries and memoirs regarding our nominally Christian kings—the Merry Monarch, and Nuseer's contemporary, the Fourth George—we need not be too much surprised by the mad vagaries and drunken cruelties of the Moslem despot, who prided himself on his adoption of certain English habits and customs§—such as wearing broad-cloth and a beaver hat under the burning sun of Oude; and usually terminated his daily drinking bouts with his boon companions, under the table, after the most approved English fashion. The favourite, shortly before the death of Nuseer, was a barber from Calcutta, who had come out to India in the capacity of a cabin-boy, and from that became a river trader. Hair-dressing, however, continued to be a lucrative resource to him: the natural curls of the governor-general were widely imitated; and when the barber went on his other affairs to Lucknow, he was employed in his old vocation by the resident. The king, delighted with the change produced in the appearance of this powerful English functionary, tried a similar experiment on his own lank locks, and was so gratified by the result, that he appointed the lucky *coiffeur* to a permanent post in his house-

* *Indian Empire*, vol. i., p. 413.

† Letters of Lord Amherst to the King of Oude, October 14th, 1825; and June 23rd, 1826. Quoted in *Ducottee in Excelsis; or, the Spoilation of Oude*: pp. 68—70.

‡ *Private Life of an Eastern King*; by a member of the household of his late majesty, Nuseer-oo-deen, King of Oude. London, 1855.

§ Nuseer substituted a chair of gold and ivory for the musnud, or cushion, of his ancestors.

hold, with the style of Sofraz Khan (the illustrious chief), and gave him a seat at his table. The barber had a fund of low humour: he amused the king by pandering to his vitiated taste; and soon made himself indispensable. The existence of Nuseer-oo-deen was embittered by a well-grounded suspicion of treachery among his own family and household: the fear of poison was continually present with him; and he would touch no wine but that placed before him by his new favourite, who consequently added the office of wine-merchant to his other lucrative monopolies.

The European papers learned something of what was passing at the palace of Lucknow, despite the care which the European adventurers installed there, naturally took to keep things quiet. The *Calcutta Review*, and *Agra Ukbar*, published squibs and pasquinades upon the "low menial" who had ingratiated himself with the King of Oude; but the object of their jeers set them at naught, and continued to accumulate wealth, and to retain his influence at court by ever-new inventions of buffoonery and indecency, until the European members of the household threw up their appointments in uncontrollable disgust; and such scenes of open debauchery disgraced the streets of Lucknow at mid-day, that the resident, Colonel Low, was compelled to interfere, and at length succeeded in procuring the dismissal of the barber.*

These and other statements of the anonymous memoir-writer, are quite compatible, and, indeed, frequently correspond with the entries in the journal of Sir William Sleeman, of accounts furnished by natives of the character and habits of Nuseer-oo-deen.

Both writers dwell much on the repeated declaration of the king that he should be poisoned; and Sir William states, that for some time before his death, Nuseer wore constantly round his neck a chain, to which was attached the key of a small covered well in the palace, whence he drew water. His death was very sudden. It occurred shortly after a glass of sherbet had been administered to him by one of the women of his harem, in the night of the 7th of July, 1837.

The question of succession was stormily contested. The king had had several wives,

whose history forms a not very edifying episode in Sir William Sleeman's journal. The most reputable one was a grand-daughter of the King of Delhi—a very beautiful young woman, of exemplary character; who, unable to endure the profligacy of the court, quitted it soon after her marriage, and retired into private life, on a small stipend granted by her profligate husband. Then there was Mokuddera Ouleea, originally a Miss Walters, the illegitimate daughter of a half-pay officer of one of the regiments of British dragoons, by a Mrs. Whearty, a woman of notoriously bad character, although the daughter of one English merchant, and the widow of another. She was married to the king in 1827, and was seen by Mrs. Park, in her visit to the zenana in 1828, sitting silently on the same couch with her successful rival, the beautiful Taj Mahal.†

Mulika Zamanee (Queen of the Age) entered the palace of Lucknow while Nuseer-oo-deen was only heir-apparent, in the capacity of wet-nurse to his infant son, Moonna Jan (by another wife called Afzul-Mahal); and so fascinated the father, that, to the astonishment of the whole court (in whose eyes the new-comer appeared very plain and very vulgar), he never rested until she became his acknowledged wife. Her former husband (a groom in the service of one of the king's troopers, to whom she had previously been faithless) presumed to approach the palace, and was immediately thrown into prison; but was eventually released, and died soon after the accession of Nuseer. Her two children, a boy and girl, were adopted by Nuseer; who, when he became king, declared the boy, Kywan Jah, to be his own son, and publicly treated him as such.

When Viscount Combermere visited Lucknow in 1827, in the course of his tour of inspection as commander-in-chief, Kywan Jah was sent, as heir-apparent, with a large retinue and a military escort, to meet his lordship and attend him from Cawnpore. The king was, no doubt, desirous to propitiate his guest. He came outside the city to welcome him, invited him to share the royal howdah on the state elephant, and escorted him to the palace in full procession, flinging, meantime, handfuls of coin among the multitude who accompanied the cavalcade.

The Orientals dearly love pageantry; it would seem as if it reconciled them to des-

* The barber carried off £240,000.—*Private Life of an Eastern King*, p. 330.

† Mrs. Park's *Wanderings*, vol. i., p. 87.

potism: and the present occasion must have been an interesting one; for the externals of royalty sat gracefully on the handsome person of the sensual and extravagant Nuseer-oo-deen; and the British general, besides being in the zenith of his fame as the conqueror of Bhurtpoor (which had successfully resisted the British troops under Lord Lake), had a manly bearing, and a rare gift of skilful horsemanship—befitting the soldier pronounced by the great Duke the best cavalry officer in the service—united to an easy, genial courtesy of manner, calculated to gain popularity everywhere, but especially in India.

Lord Combermere occupied the residency for a week, during which time, a succession of hunts, sports, and *fêtes* took place, which formed an era in the annals of Lucknow. Nuseer-oo-deen was, in turn, sumptuously entertained by the commander-in-chief; to whom, on parting, he gave his own portrait, set in magnificent diamonds. The Company appropriated the diamonds; but the picture remains in the possession of Lord Combermere, and is an interesting relic of the fallen dynasty of Oude.

Nuseer-oo-deen subsequently demanded from the resident the formal recognition of Kywan Jah, as his heir-apparent, by the British government. The resident demurred, on the plea that the universal belief at Lucknow was, that Kywan Jah was three years of age when his mother was first introduced to his majesty. But this had no effect: Nuseer-oo-deen persisted in his demand; and, to remove the anticipated obstacle, he repudiated Moonna Jan publicly and repeatedly.* The consequence of his duplicity was, that he was held to have left no legitimate son. According to Sir William Sleeman (who, during his situation as resident, had abundant means of authentic information), the general impression at Lucknow and all over Oude was, that the British government would take upon itself the management of the country on the death of the king, who himself "seemed rather pleased than otherwise" at the thought of being the last of his dynasty. He had repudiated his own son, and was unwilling that any other member of the family should fill his place. The ministers, and the other public officers and court favourites, who had made large fortunes, were favourable to the anticipated measure; as it was understood by some, that thereby they would be secured from

all scrutiny into their accounts, and enabled to retain all their accumulations.†

The reader—recollecting the custom in Mussulman kingdoms, of a complete change of officials at every accession, generally accompanied by the spoliation of the old ones—will understand this was likely to prove no inconsiderable advantage. Lord Auckland, the governor-general, had, however, no desire for the absorption of Oude, but only that measures should be taken for its better government. He decided that the eldest uncle of the late king should ascend the musnud, and that a new treaty should be formed with him.

On the death of Nuseer-oo-deen, a British detachment was sent to escort the chosen successor from his private dwelling to the palace. He was an old man, had led a secluded life, and was weakened by recent illness. On arriving at his destination, he was left to repose for a few hours in a small secluded room, previous to the tedious formalities of enthronement. But the succession was not destined to be carried without opposition. The Padshah Begum (the chief queen of Ghazi-oo-deen, and the adoptive mother of Nuseer, with whom she had been long at variance) asserted the claims of her grandson, the disowned child but rightful heir of the late ruler. She made her way to the palace in the middle of the night, on the plea of desiring to see the dead body of the king—forced the gates with her elephants, and carried in with her the youth Moonna Jan, whom she succeeded in literally seating on the musnud; while she herself took up her position in a covered palanquin at the foot of the throne. Amid the confusion, the sovereign selected by the Company remained unnoticed, and apparently unknown. His sons, grandsons, and attendants were, however, discovered, and very roughly treated; nor did the resident (Colonel Low) escape severe handling. On learning what had occurred, he proceeded to the palace with his assistants, and remonstrated with the begum on the folly of her procedure; but his arguments were stopped by the turbulence of her adherents, who seized him by the neckcloth, dragged him to the throne on which the boy sat, and commanded him to present a complimentary offering on pain of death. This he positively refused; and the begum's vakeel, Mirza Ali, seeing the dangerous excitement of her rabble followers, and dreading the

* Sleeman's *Oude*, vol. ii., p. 40.

† Sleeman's *Oude*, vol. ii., p. 152.

sure vengeance of the Company if the lives of their servants were thus sacrificed, laid hold of the resident and his companions, and shouted out, that by the command of the begum they were to be conducted from her presence. The resident and his party, with difficulty and danger, made their way to the south garden, where Colonel Monteath had just brought in, and drawn up, five companies in line. The temper of the troops, generally, seemed doubtful. At this crisis Colonel Roberts, who commanded a brigade in the Oude service, went in, and presented to Moonna Jan his offering of gold mohurs; and then absconded, being seen no more until the contest was decided. Captain Magness drew up his men and guns on the left of Colonel Monteath's, and was ordered to prepare for action. He told the resident that he did not feel quite sure of his men; and a line of British sepoy was made to cover his rear.*

Meanwhile the begum began to think the game in her own hands. The palace and *baraduree*, or summer-house, were filled with a motley crowd; nautch-girls danced and sang at one end of the long hall, in front of the throne; and the populace within and without enjoyed the tumult, and shouted acclamation: every man who had a sword or spear, a musket or matchlock, flourished it in the air, amid a thousand torches. Everything portended a popular insurrection. The begum saw this, and desired to gain time, in the hope that the British troops in the garden would be surrounded and overwhelmed by the armed masses which had begun to pour forth from the city. Had this catastrophe occurred, the British authorities would have borne the blame for the deficiency of the subsidized British troops, and for having indiscreetly omitted to watch the proceedings of the Padshah Begum, whose character was well known. The fault, in the latter case, is attributed to the negligence of the native minister.

The resident was anxious to avoid a collision; yet convinced of the necessity for prompt action: therefore, on receiving a message from the begum, desiring him to return to her presence, he refused, and bade her and the boy surrender themselves immediately; promising, in the event of compliance, and of the evacuation of the palace and city by her followers, that the past

should be forgiven, and that the pension of 15,000 rupees a-month, accorded by the late king, should be secured to her for life. But in vain: the begum had no thought of surrendering herself; the tumult rapidly increased; the rabble began to plunder the palace; several houses in the city had already been pillaged; and the British officer in command urged the resident to action, lest his men should no longer have room to use their arms.

The native commanders of the state troops manifestly leant towards the begum. One of them declared that "he was the servant of the throne; that the young king was actually seated on it; and that he would support him there:" whereupon he also presented his offering of gold mohurs. The armed crowds grew momentarily more menacing: a ringleader attempted to seize a British sepoy by the whiskers; and an affray was with difficulty prevented. The resident, taking out his watch, declared, that unless the begum consented to his offer within one quarter of an hour, the guns should open on the throne-room. She persisted in her purpose, encouraged by the increasing numbers of her followers. The stated time elapsed; the threat of the resident was fulfilled; and, after a few rounds of grape, a party of the 35th regiment, under Major Marshall, stormed the halls.

As soon as the guns opened, the begum was carried by her attendants into an adjoining room; and Moonna Jan concealed himself in a recess under the throne. They were, however, both captured, and carried off to the residency. None of the British troops were killed; but one officer and two or three sepoy were wounded. Many of the insurgents perished; from forty to fifty men being left killed and wounded, when their companions fled from the palace. The loss would probably have been much greater, had not the soldiers of the 35th, on rushing through the narrow covered passage, and up the steep flight of steps by which they entered the throne-room, seen, on emerging from the dim light, a body of sepoy with fixed bayonets and muskets, drawn up (as they imagined) behind the throne. At these they fired; a smash of glass followed, and proved their first volley to have been spent, on their own reflection, in an immense mirror. This happy mistake saved a needless waste of blood. No further resistance was attempted; order was gradually restored; and the sovereign selected

* Sleeman's *Oude*, vol. ii., p. 162.

by the Company was publicly crowned in the course of the morning.

Strangely enough, the innocent and ill-used Delhi princess, after years of seclusion, was involved in the tumult, but escaped injury by the zeal and presence of mind of her female attendants. The begum, on her way from her own residence to the palace, had passed that of the princess, whom she summoned to accompany her. Perhaps awed by her imperious mother-in-law—perhaps desirous of looking once again on the face of the man whose conduct had doomed her to long years of widowhood, the princess obeyed, and appears to have been a silent witness of the whole affair. When the firing began, her two female bearers carried her in her litter to a small side-room. One attendant had her arm shattered by grapeshot; but the other tied some clothes together, and let her mistress and her wounded companion safely down, from a height of about twenty-four feet, into a courtyard, where some of the retinue of the princess found and conveyed them all three safely home.

The claim of Moonna Jan appears to have been a rightful one, despite the formal declaration of the late king, that he had ceased to cohabit with the boy's mother for two years before his birth. The decision arrived at by the British government cannot, however, be regretted; for Moonna Jan was said, even by the members of his own family who asserted his legitimacy, to be of ungovernable temper, and the worst possible dispositions.* Both he and the begum† were sent to the fort of Chunar, where they ended their days as state prisoners.

The new king, Mohammed Ali Shah, succeeded to an empty treasury and a disorganised government: he had the infirmities of age to contend with; nevertheless, he displayed an amount of energy and shrewdness very rare in his family.

A new treaty with Oude was alleged to be necessary, because no penalty had been attached, in that of 1801, to the infraction of the stipulation for reforms to be made in the government. Another article had

been violated by the increase of the native army greatly beyond the stated limit. Of this latter infraction the British government were well disposed to take advantage, having, in fact, themselves violated the spirit, if not the letter, of the treaty, by keeping Oude very ill supplied with troops. Thus, at the time of the death of Nuseer-oo-deen (previous to the arrival of the five companies under Colonel Monteath), the whole of the British force in charge of Lucknow and its million inhabitants, consisted of two companies and a-half of sepoy under native officers. One of the companies was stationed at the treasury of the resident; another constituted his honorary guard; and the remaining half company were in charge of the gaol. All the sepoy stood nobly to their posts during the long and trying scene; but no attempt was made to concentrate them for the purpose of arresting the tumultuous advance of the begum's forces: collectively, they would have been too few for the purpose; and it was, moreover, deemed unsafe to remove them from their respective posts at such a time.‡

Something more than tacit consent had probably been given to the increase of the native force of Oude; which, in 1837, numbered about 68,000 men. By the new treaty, Mohammed Ali was authorised to increase his military establishment indefinitely; but bound to organise, as a part of it, an auxiliary British force, and to provide a yearly sum of sixteen lacs (£160,000) for the maintenance of the same. The concluding articles stipulated, that the king, in concert with the resident, should take into immediate and earnest consideration the best means of remedying the existing defects in the police, and in the judicial and revenue administration of his dominions; and set forth, that "if gross and systematic oppression, anarchy, and misrule should hereafter at any time prevail within the Oude dominions, such as seriously to endanger the public tranquillity, the British government reserves to itself the right of appointing its own officers to the management of whatsoever portions of the Oude

* Sleeman's *Oude*, vol. ii., p. 170.

† The previous history of the begum appears to have been very remarkable. Ghazi-oo-deen had conceived a strong dislike to his son Nuseer, and considered him utterly unfit to mount the throne. The begum stanchly and successfully asserted his rights, as her husband's lawful heir. When he, in turn, conceived a violent aversion to his own child Moonna Jan, she took her grandson under her pro-

tection, armed her retainers, and, after a contest in which many lives were lost, succeeded in maintaining her ground until the resident interfered, and satisfied her by guaranteeing the personal safety of the boy, for whose sake she eventually sacrificed the independence of her latter years, and died a prisoner of state.—*Private Life of an Eastern King*, p. 205.

‡ Sleeman's *Oude*, vol. ii., p. 168.

territory—either to a small or to a great extent—in which such misrule as that above alluded to may have occurred, for so long a period as it may deem necessary; the surplus receipts in such case, after defraying all charges, to be paid into the king's treasury, and a true and faithful account rendered to his majesty of the receipts and expenditure of the territory so assumed.* In the event of the above measure becoming necessary, a pledge was given for the maintenance, as far as possible, of the native institutions and forms of administration within the assumed territories, so as to facilitate the restoration of those territories to the sovereign of Oude when the proper period for such restoration should arrive.*

The above treaty was executed at Lucknow on the 11th of September, 1837, and was ratified on the 18th of the same month by the governor-general. It is necessary that the manner in which the compliance of Mohammed Shah was ensured, should be clearly understood. The death of Nuseer occurred at midnight, and the resident, as has been stated, instantly sent off one of his assistants to the house of Mohammed Shah, with orders to conduct him to the palace, after having secured his signature to a paper promising consent "to any new treaty that the governor-general might dictate." This was obtained.

Lord Auckland was rather shocked by such undisguised dictation; and declared, "he should have been better pleased if the resident had not, in this moment of exigency, *accepted* the unconditional engagement of submissiveness which the new king had signed. This document may be liable to misconstruction; and it was not warranted by anything contained in the instructions issued to Colonel Low."†

If Lord Auckland was startled by the means taken to ensure the consent of the king to any terms which might be required from him, the resident was not less painfully surprised by the draft treaty framed by the governor-general in council. Colonel Low wrote, that the concessions so unexpectedly demanded, were "of a nature that would be very grating to any native sovereign of respectable character;" especially to the present king, "who, to the best of my belief at least, knows by experience how to manage a country properly, and really wishes to govern

with moderation and justice." The resident especially deprecated the requisition for the payment of a very large annual sum for the maintenance of an army, which was not to be under the command of the king, or even at his own disposal—"a heavy payment, in fact, which he must clearly perceive is more for our own purposes and interests than for his, or for the direct advantage of his subjects." Colonel Low requested a reconsideration of the unfavourable opinion which had been expressed regarding the preliminary pledge he had exacted from Mohammed Ali, declaring, that so far from its being superfluous, it was indispensable; otherwise, the "desired objects of the Indian government could never have been gained without some forcible and most unpleasant exercise of our power." In a significant postscript, he asked whether, in the event of the present king's death before the ratification of the treaty, he ought to take any, and, if so, what, agreement from the next heir? adding, that the residency surgeon lately in attendance on Mohammed Shah, was decidedly of opinion, that "any unusual excitement, or vexation of mind, would be likely to bring on apoplexy."‡ All this the resident stated in a public letter; but he wrote another in the secret department, in which he earnestly advised a revision of the treaty; urging, that the formation of the proposed auxiliary force would create great discontent in Oude, and inflict a burden which would necessarily be felt by all classes; and that it would be considered "as distinctly breaking our national faith and recorded stipulations in the former treaty."§

Lord Auckland persisted in his policy: the resident was told that he had "misapprehended" the spirit of the treaty, which the king was compelled to sign, literally at the hazard of his life; for, on being made acquainted with its terms, "the idea of such new rights being ordered in his time, so hurt the old man's feelings, that it had an immediate effect on his disease;" producing an attack of spasms, from which he did not entirely recover for twenty-four hours.||

The authorities in England, to their honour be it spoken, refused to sanction such a shameless breach of faith as this repudiation of the terms on which half Oude had been annexed in 1801. They unanimously de-

* Treaty between E. I. Company and King of Oude: printed in Parl. Papers relating to Oude (Commons), 20th July, 1837; pp. 31—33.

† Parl. Papers, p. 13.

‡ *Ibid.*, pp. 14, 15.

§ *Ibid.*, p. 17.

|| Letter of Resident, July 30, 1837.—Parl. Papers.

creed the abrogation of the recent treaty, and desired that the king should be exonerated from the obligations to which his assent had been so reluctantly given. Nothing could be more thoroughly straightforward than the view taken by the directors. They declared, that it would have been better to have given the king a fair trial, without any new treaty; and condemned the preliminary engagement as having been "extorted from a prince from whom we had no right to demand any condition on coming to his lawful throne." The proposed auxiliary force was pronounced inadmissible, on the ground that the payment "would constitute a demand upon the resources of Oude that we are not entitled to make; for we are already bound, by the treaty of 1801, to defend at our own expense, that country against internal and external enemies; and a large cession of territory was made to us for that express purpose."

The sentiments expressed on this occasion are directly opposed to those which animated the annexation policy, subsequently adopted. The directors conclude their despatch with the following explicit opinion:—"The preservation of the existing states in India is a duty imposed upon us by the obligations of public faith, as well as the dictates of interest; for we agree in the opinion expressed by Lieutenant-colonel Low, in his letter of the 26th of September, 1836, that the continued existence of such states will afford the means of employment to respectable natives, which they cannot at present obtain in our service; and, until such means could be provided in our own provinces, the downfall of any of the native states under our protection might, by depriving numerous influential natives of their accustomed employment, be attended with consequences most injurious to our interests. Our policy should be to preserve, as long as may be practicable, the existing native dynasties; and should the fall of them, or of any one of them, from circumstances beyond our control, become inevitable, then to introduce such a system of government as may interfere in the least possible way with the institutions of the people, and with the employment of natives of rank under proper superintendence, in the administration of the country."*

* Despatch, 10th April, 1838, from Secret Committee; p. 38. Signed by J. R. Carnac and J. L. Lushington.

† Minute by Governor-general Auckland, dated

The directors left the governor-general in council to choose the manner in which to convey to the King of Oude the welcome tidings of the annulment of a compact which, they truly observed, he regarded as inflicting not only a pecuniary penalty upon his subjects, but a disgrace upon his crown and personal dignity. They advised, however, that it should rather proceed as an act of grace from his lordship in council, "than as the consequence of the receipt of a public and unconditional instruction from England."

Lord Auckland thereupon declared, that the directors, like the resident, had much misunderstood his measure;† and his council agreed with him in the hope that, by a relaxation of the terms of the treaty, the authorities in England might be reconciled to a measure which could not be cancelled without the most serious inconvenience, and even danger:‡ and when they found that the Company were pledged to the British parliament for the annulment of the treaty, they persisted in urging the inexpediency of making any communication to the King of Oude on the subject. On the 15th of April, 1839, the directors reiterated their previous orders, and desired that no delay should take place in announcing, in such manner as the governor-general might think fit, to the King of Oude, the disallowance of the treaty of 11th of September, 1837, and the restoration of our relations with the state of Oude to the footing on which they previously stood.

On the 11th of July, 1839, they simply reverted to their previous instructions, and required their complete fulfilment.§ Yet, on the 8th of the same month, the governor-general acquainted the King of Oude that, after some months' correspondence with the Court of Directors upon the subject of the treaty, he was empowered to relieve his majesty from the payment of the annual sixteen lacs. His lordship expressed his cordial sympathy with the liberal feelings which dictated this renunciation of a sum, the raising of which he had "sometimes feared" might lead to "heavier exactions on the people of Oude than they were well able, in the present state of the country, to bear."

Then followed an exordium on the lightening of taxation, and the extension of

"Umritsir, 13th December, 1838."—Parl. Papers, pp. 43—52.

† Minutes by Messrs. Morison and Bird, 28th January, 1839; pp. 52; 57. § Parl. Papers, pp. 57—60.

useful public works, which might be effected with the aforesaid sixteen lacs; and a complacent reference to the fresh proof thus afforded, "of the friendship with which your majesty is regarded by me and by the British nation." Not one word, not the most distant hint of the abrogation of the treaty; nay, more—the newly-appointed resident, Colonel Caulfield, was specially desired "to abstain from encouraging discussion as to the treaty of 1837," except as regarded the reasons above quoted from the letter of the governor-general, for releasing the king from the pecuniary obligation of maintaining an auxiliary force.*

The above statements are taken from the returns laid before parliament on the motion of Sir Fitzroy Kelly; but it is confidently alleged that the papers therein published are, as in the case of the Nizam, fragmentary and garbled; especially that the important letter written by Lord Auckland to the King of Oude is not a correct translation of the original, but a version adapted to meet the ideas of the British public.†

No such aggravation is needed to enhance the effect of the duplicity exhibited by the Indian government, in their sifted and carefully prepared records laid before parliament, of the mode in which the king was led to believe that the treaty which the Court of Directors had disavowed, because it was essentially unjust and had been obtained by unfair means, was really in force, the pressure being temporarily mitigated by the generous intervention and paternal solicitude of the governor-general.

This is a painful specimen of Anglo-Indian diplomacy. Still more painful is it to find such a man as Lord Dalhousie characterising the deliberate concealment practised by his predecessor, as "an inadvertence." The treaty was never disallowed in India—never even suppressed. The discussion regarding its public disallowance

seems to have fallen to the ground; the directors, engrossed by the cares and excitements of that monstrous compound of injustice, folly, and disaster—the Afghan war—probably taking it for granted that their reiterated injunctions regarding Oude had been obeyed by Lord Auckland and his council.

Mohammed Ali Shah died in 1842, in the full belief that the treaty which so galled and grieved him was in operative existence. His son and successor, Amjud Ali, had no reason for doubt on the subject: the British functionaries around him spoke and wrote of it as an accepted fact; and, in 1845, it was included in a volume of treaties, published in India by the authority of government. No important change, for good or for evil, appears to have taken place during the five years' sway of Amjud Ali, who died in February, 1847, and was succeeded by Wajid Ali, the last of his dynasty. The new king was not deficient in natural ability. He had considerable poetical and musical gifts; but these, precociously developed under the enervating influences of the zenana, had been fostered to the exclusion of the sterner qualities indispensable to the wielder of a despotic sceptre.

Notwithstanding the acknowledged and often sharply-exercised supremacy of the British government, the dynasty of Oude still preserved, by virtue of Lord Wellesley's treaty of 1801 (that is to say, by the portions of it not cancelled by that of 1837), a degree of independence, and of exemption from internal interference; which, rightly used by an upright, humane, and judicious sovereign, might yet have raised fertile, beautiful Oude to a state of prosperity which, by affording incontestable proofs of its efficient government, should leave no plea for its annexation. Public works, efficient courts of justice, reduced rates of assessment—these things can never be wholly misrepresented

* Deputy Secretary of Government to the Resident, 8th July, 1839.—Parl. Papers, p. 61.

† The letter published in the Parl. Papers, and the Persian and English versions sent to the king: all three differed on important points. In *Dacoitee in Excelsis* (written, according to the editor of Slemman's *Oude*, by Major Bird), a literal translation of the Persian letter actually sent to the King of Oude is given, which differs widely and essentially from that above quoted from the Parl. Papers. In the latter there is no sentence which could fairly be rendered thus:—"From the period you ascended the throne, your majesty has, in comparison with times past, greatly improved the kingdom; and I have, in consequence, been authorised by the

Court of Directors to inform you, that, if I think it advisable, for the present, I may relieve your majesty from part of the clause of the treaty alluded to, by which clause expense is laid upon your majesty." The writer of *Dacoitee in Excelsis*, says that the italicised words bear a different sense in the autograph English letter, in which they run thus:—"I am directed to relieve you." The king pointed out the non-agreement of the two documents, and the governor-general forthwith issued an order, directing that the old custom of sending the original English letter as well as the Persian version, should be discontinued.—(p. 92.) See also *Oude, its Princes and its Government Vindicated*: by Moulvee Mussehoo-deen Khan Bahadour; p. 75.

or overlooked; but such reforms were little likely to be effected while Wajid Ali sat at the helm.

In November, 1847, the governor-general, Lord Hardinge, visited Lucknow, held a conference with the king, and caused a memorandum, previously drawn up, to be specially read and explained to him. In this memorandum, Wajid Ali was enjoined "to take timely measures for the reformation of abuses," and for "the rescue of his people from their present miserable condition." Failing this, the governor-general stated, he would have no option but to act in the manner specified by the treaty of 1837; which not only gave the British government a right to interfere, but rendered it obligatory on them to do so whenever such interference should be needful to secure the lives and property of the people of Oude from oppression and flagrant neglect. If the king, within the following two years, should fail in "checking and eradicating the worst abuses," then the governor-general would avail himself of the powers vested in him by the aforesaid treaty.*

Two years and more passed, but the king evinced undiminished aversion for the duties of his position. His time and attention were devoted entirely to the pursuit of personal gratifications, and he associated with none but such as contributed to his pleasures—women, singers, fiddlers, and eunuchs; and could, in fact, submit to the restraints of no other society. He ceased to receive the members of the royal family, or the aristocracy; would read no reports from his local officers, civil or military—from presidents of his fiscal and judicial courts, or functionaries of any kind; and appeared to take no interest whatever in public affairs.

A change was made about this time in the mode of collecting the land revenue (from the *ijara*, or contract system, to the *amanee*, or trust-management system) in many districts; but no favourable result was produced—the same rack-rent being exacted under one as under the other; the same

uncertainty continuing to exist in the rate of the government demand; and the same exactions and peculations on the part of the native officials.

Colonel (afterwards Sir William) Sleeman received the appointment of resident in 1849, and was authorised by Lord Dalhousie to make a tour throughout Oude, and report upon the general condition of the people. The letter which communicates the information of the appointment, shows that the governor-general was bent on the assumption of sovereign power over Oude, and the reconstruction of the internal administration of that "great, rich, and oppressed country."† The mission of Colonel Sleeman was evidently designed to collect a mass of evidence which should convince the home authorities of the necessity for the "great changes" which their representative had resolved upon initiating; and in this sense the new resident has been truly called "the emissary of a foregone conclusion."‡ Still, though not unprejudiced, Colonel Sleeman was an honest and earnest man, well calculated by character and long training to extract truth, and experienced in framing a plain, unvarnished statement of facts. Forty years of active Indian service had afforded him opportunities of intercourse with the natives, of which he had taken abundant advantage. Active, methodical, and rigidly abstemious, he had been invaluable in the very departments where his countrymen have usually proved least able to grapple with the enervating influences of climate, routine, and red tape.§ His successful efforts in bringing to justice, and almost eradicating the murderous fraternity of the Thugs,|| by dispersing the horrible obscurity in which their midnight deeds of assassination and theft had been so long shrouded, breaking up their gangs, and tracking them out in detail, was altogether most masterly, and conferred an incalculable amount of benefit on the peaceable and industrious, but helpless portion of the population. Colonel Sleeman's character and career, however,

he was at Lucknow; General Pollock did all he could, but it was not much; and Colonel Richmond does nothing. There the Buduk dacoits, Thugs and poisoners, remain without sentences, and will do so till Richmond goes, unless you give him a fillip.

* * * Davidson was prevented from doing any thing by technical difficulties; so that out of four residents we have not got four days' work.—*Journey through the Kingdom of Oude* (Introduction), vol. i., p. xxviii.

|| See *Indian Empire*, vol. i., p. 429; for an account of the Thugs, or Phansi-gars.

* Sleeman's *Oude*, vol. ii., pp. 201—215.

† Letter from Lord Dalhousie to Colonel Sleeman.—*Journey through the Kingdom of Oude* (Introduction), vol. i., p. xviii.

‡ *Dacoitee in Excelsis*, p. 109.

§ Writing to Mr. Elliot, secretary to government in 1848, regarding the difficulty of getting dacoit prisoners tried, Colonel Sleeman said that political officers had little encouragement to undertake such duties; adding—"It is only a few choice spirits that have entered upon the duty *con amore*. General Nott prided himself upon doing nothing while

naturally tended to render him a severe censor of incapacity, sensuality, and indolence—the besetting sins of the King of Oude. Consequently, his correspondence manifests a contemptuous aversion for the habits and associates of Wajid Ali, scarcely compatible with the diplomatic courtesy expected in the intercourse of a British functionary with a national ally. Personal acquaintance might have mitigated this feeling; but Colonel Sleeman does not seem to have attempted to employ the influence which his age, position, and knowledge of the world might have given him with the king, who was then a young man of about five-and-twenty. “I have not,” he says, “urged his majesty to see and converse with me, because I am persuaded that nothing that I could say would induce him to alter his mode of life, or to associate and commune with any others than those who now exclusively form his society.”*

The tour of inspection was made during three months of the cold season of 1850, in defiance of the tacit opposition of the native government, on whom the expenses, amounting to £30,000, were charged.† The mode of proceeding adopted to procure evidence against the King of Oude, and the complete setting aside of the authority of the native government therein involved, may be excused by circumstances, but cannot be justified. A similar proceeding in any Anglo-Indian province would unquestionably have revealed a mass of crime and suffering, of neglect and unredressed wrongs, of which no conception could have been previously formed. Under our system, however, the evils from which the people labour, lie deep, and resemble the complicated sufferings which affect the physical frame in a high state of civilisation. Under native despotism, the diseases of the body politic are comparatively few in number, and easily discernible, analogous to those common to man in a more natural state. The employment of torture, for instance, as a means of extorting revenue, is a barbarism which seems general among Asiatic governments;

* Parl. Papers relative to Oude.—Blue Book, 1856; p. 158.

† In the *Reply to the Charges against the King of Oude*, published in the name of Wajid Ali Shah himself, the following passage occurs:—“When Colonel Sleeman had, under pretence of change of air for the benefit of his health, expressed a wish to make a tour through the Oude dominion, although such a tour was quite unusual, I provided him with tents and bullock-trains, and ordered my officers to furnish him with men for clearing the road, provi-

and it has been, if indeed it be not still, practised by our own native underlings, in consequence of imperfect supervision and excessive taxation. In Oude, this favourite engine of despotism and oppression was, as might have been expected, in full operation. It ought, long years before, to have been not simply inveighed against by residents in communications to their own government, but enacted against in treaties; for, clearly, when the British government guaranteed to a despotic ruler the means of crushing domestic rebellion, they became responsible that their troops should not be instrumental in perpetuating the infliction, on the innocent, of cruelties which the laws of England would not suffer to be perpetrated on the person of the vilest criminal.

The supreme government are accused of having contented themselves with inculcating rules of justice and mercy by vague generalities, without any attempt to take advantage of opportunities for initiating reforms. Major Bird, formerly assistant-resident at Lucknow, affirms that he has now in his custody proposals framed by the native government, with the assistance of the resident, Colonel Richmond, in 1848, for the introduction of the British system of administration in the king's dominions, to be tried in the first instance in such portions of them as adjoined the British territories. The scheme was submitted to Mr. Thomason, the lieutenant-governor of the North-Western Provinces, for correction, and was then forwarded to the governor-general, by whom it was rejected; the secretary to government stating, that “if his majesty the King of Oude would give up the whole of his dominions, the East India government would think of it; but that it was not worth while to take so much trouble about a portion.”‡

Such a rebuff as this is quite indefensible. Although the worthless ministers and favourites by whom the king was surrounded, might have eventually neutralised any good results from the proposed experiment, yet, had the Calcutta authorities really felt the

sions and all other necessities; and although this cost me lacs of rupees, still I never murmured nor raised any objections.” In Colonel Sleeman's very first halt, he is described as having received petitions, and wrote letters thereon to the native government, in defiance alike of treaties, of the express orders of the Court of Directors, and of the rule of neutrality previously observed by successive residents.—(Pp. 8; 13.)

‡ *Dacoitee in Eccelsis; or, the Spoliation of Oude*, p. 102. Taylor: London.

earnest solicitude expressed by them for the people of Oude, they would have encouraged any scheme calculated to lessen the disorganisation of which they so loudly complained, instead of waiting, as they appear to have done, to take advantage of their own neglect.

It is not easy to decide how far the British government deserves to share the disgrace which rests on the profligate and indolent dynasty, of which Wajid Ali was the last representative, for the wretched condition of Oude. Of the fact of its misgovernment there seems no doubt; for Colonel Sleeman was a truthful and able man; and the entries in his Diary depict a state of the most barbarous anarchy. The people are described as equally oppressed by the exactions of the king's troops and collectors, and by the gangs of robbers and lawless chieftains who infested the whole territory, rendering tenure so doubtful that no good dwellings could be erected, and preventing more than a very partial cultivation of the land, besides perpetrating individual cruelties, torturings, and murders almost beyond belief.

No immediate result followed the report of the resident; for the Burmese war of 1851-'2 occupied the attention of government, and gave Wajid Ali Shah a respite, of which he was too reckless or too ill-advised to take advantage. Colonel Sleeman, writing to Lord Dalhousie in September, 1852, declared—

"The longer the king reigns the more unfit he becomes to reign, and the more the administration and the country deteriorates. The state must have become bankrupt long ere this; but the king, and the knaves by whom he is governed, have discontinued paying the stipends of all the members of the royal family, save those of his own father's family, for the last three years; and many of them are reduced to extreme distress, without the hope of ever getting their stipends again, unless our government interferes. The females of the palaces of former sovereigns ventured to clamour for their subsistence, and they were, without shame or mercy, driven into the streets to starve, beg, or earn their bread by their labour. * * * The king is surrounded by eunuchs, fiddlers, and poetasters worse than either; and the minister and his creatures, who are worse than all. They appropriate at least one-half the revenues of the country to themselves, and employ nothing [sic] but knaves of the very worst kind in all the branches of the administration. * * * The fiddlers have control over the administration of civil justice; the eunuchs over that of criminal justice, public buildings, &c; the minister has the land revenue: and all are making large fortunes."

In the beginning of 1853, the resident

* Sleeman's *Oude*, vol. ii., p. 369.

† *Ibid.* (Introduction), vol. i., p. xxii.

‡ *Ibid.*, vol. ii., p. 388.

writes to Sir James Weir Hogg, that the King of Oude was becoming more and more imbecile and crazy; and had, on several occasions during some recent religious ceremonies, gone along the streets beating a drum tied round his neck, to the great scandal of his family, and the amusement of his people. The minister, Ali Nukkee Khan, is described as one of the cleverest, most intriguing, and most unscrupulous villains in India;† who had obtained influence over his master by entire subservience to his vices and follies, and by praising all he did, however degrading to him as a man and a sovereign.

Notwithstanding the king's utter inattention to public affairs, and devotion to drumming, dancing, and versifying, he believed himself quite fit to reign; and Colonel Sleeman considered that nothing would ever induce Wajid Ali to abdicate, even in favour of his own son, much less consent to make over the conduct of the administration, in perpetuity, to our government. The conclusion at which the resident arrives is important:—

"If, therefore, our government does interfere, it must be in the exercise of a right arising out of the existing relations between the two states, or out of our position as the paramount power in India. These relations, under the treaty of 1837, give our government the right to take upon itself the administration under present circumstances; and, indeed, imposes upon our government the duty of taking it: but, as I have already stated, neither these relations, nor our position as the paramount power, give us any right to annex or to confiscate the territory of Oude. We may have a right to take territory from the Nizam of Hyderabad, in payment for the money he owes us; but Oude owes us no money, and we have no right to take territory from her. We have only the right to secure for the suffering people that better government which their sovereign pledged himself to secure for them, but has failed to secure."

The entire reliance manifested in the above extracts, on the validity of the treaty of 1837, is equally conspicuous in other letters. It is repeatedly mentioned as giving the government ample authority to assume the whole administration; but it is added—"If we do this, we must, in order to stand well with the rest of India, honestly and distinctly disclaim all interested motives, and appropriate the whole of the revenues for the benefit of the people and royal family of Oude;" for, "were we to take advantage of the occasion to annex or confiscate Oude, or any part of it, our good name in India would inevitably suffer; and

that good name is more valuable to us than a dozen Oudes."

On the annexation policy in general, the resident commented in terms of severe censure. "There is a school in India," he says, "characterised by impatience at the existence of any native states, and by strong and often insane advocacy of their absorption—by honest means if possible; but still their absorption. There is no pretext, however weak, that is not sufficient, in their estimation, for the purpose; and no war, however cruel, that is not justifiable, if it has only this object in view." Such views he denounced as dangerous to our rule; for the people of India, seeing that annexations and confiscations went on, and that rewards and honorary distinctions were given for them, and for the victories which led to them, and for little else, were too apt to infer that they were systematic, and encouraged and prescribed from home. The native states he compared to breakwaters, which, when swept away, would leave us to the mercy of our native army, which might not always be under our control.*

With such opinions, he watched with deep anxiety the progress of the aggressive and absorbing policy favoured by Lord Dalhousie and his council, which, he considered, was tending to crush all the higher and middle classes connected with the land, and to excite general alarm in the native mind. He began to fear the adoption of some course towards Oude which would involve a breach of faith; but he does not seem to have suspected the possibility of any right of annexation being grounded on the repudiation by the Calcutta government, at the eleventh hour, of the treaty of 1837.

In a private letter (the latest of his correspondence), he writes—"Lord Dalhousie and I, have different views, I fear. If he wishes anything ~~done~~ that I do not think right and honest, I resign, and leave it to be done by others. I desire a strict adherence to solemn engagements with white faces or black. We have no right to annex or confiscate Oude; but we have a right, under the treaty of 1837, to take the management of it, but not to appropriate its revenues to ourselves. To confiscate would be dis-

honest and dishonourable. To annex would be to give the people a government almost as bad as their own, if we put our screw upon them."†

The last admission is a strange one from the narrator of the *Tour through Oude*. He was not spared to remonstrate, as he certainly would have done, against the adoption of measures he had denounced by anticipation; but he was spared the too probable pain of remonstrating in vain. In the summer of 1854 his health began to fail. He went to the hills in the hope of recruiting his strength and resuming his labours. At last, warned by indications of approaching paralysis, he resigned his office, and embarked for England, but died on his passage, on the 10th of February, 1856, at the age of sixty-seven. Four days before, his services had been recognised by his nomination as a K.C.B., at the express request of Lord Dalhousie, who, despite their difference in opinion, fully appreciated the qualities of his able subordinate. The mark of royal favour came in all respects too late: it would have been better bestowed at the time when it had been richly earned by the measures for the suppression of Thuggee and Dacoitee, instead of being connected with the ill-omened *Tour* which preceded the annexation of Oude.

General Outram (Napier's old opponent) was sent as officiating resident to Lucknow, in December, 1854, and desired to furnish a report with a view to determine whether public affairs continued in the state described from time to time by his predecessor. This he did, at considerable length, in February, 1855;‡ and his conclusion was, that matters were as bad, if not worse, than Colonel Sleeman had described them; and that "the very culpable apathy and gross misrule of the sovereign and his durbar," rendered it incumbent on the supreme government to have recourse to the "extreme measures" necessary for the welfare of the five millions of people who were now oppressed by an effete and incapable dynasty.

Major-general Outram added, that in the absence of any personal experience in the country, he was dependent for information on the residency records, and on the channels which supplied his predecessor. It would seem that he (like Colonel Caulfield) had been instructed to refrain from any mention of the treaty of 1837; for his report refers exclusively to that concluded in 1801: but in a paper drawn up by Captain

* Sleeman's *Oude*, vol. ii., p. 392.

† Written in 1854-'5. Published in the *Times*, November, 1857.

‡ See *Oude Blue Book* for 1856; pp. 12-46.

Fletcher Hayes (assistant-resident), on the "history of our connection with the Oude government," the Calcutta authorities are reminded, that in the absence of any intimation of the annulment of the treaty of 1837, all its articles (except that of maintaining an auxiliary force, from which the king had been relieved as an act of grace) were considered by the court of Lucknow as binding on the contracting powers.*

The supreme authorities had placed themselves in a difficult position: they had pertinaciously stood between the Court of Directors and the government of Oude, and had taken upon themselves the responsibility of maintaining the treaty repudiated by the directors as unjust and extortionate. But in 1855, the rapid march of the annexation policy had left the landmarks of 1837 so far behind, that it had become desirable to set the contract of that date aside, because its exactions and its penalties, once denounced as unfair to the king, would now, if enforced, limit and cripple the plans of the governor-general. The very instrument, obtained and retained for aggressive purposes, in defiance of the orders of the home authorities, was likely to prove a weapon of defence in the hands of the King of Oude, and to be rested upon as the charter of the rights of the dynasty and state. But the Red treaty palmed off on Omichund, with the forged signature of Admiral Watson, was not more easily set aside by Clive† than the treaty with Oude by the governor-general in council. In each case, the right of the stronger prevailed without a struggle, and left the weaker party no power of appeal. Still the authorities, in discussing the affairs of Oude, abstained, as far as possible, from any mention of the treaty of 1837, and evidently thought the less said on the subject the better. Thus, the governor-general, in his minute on the measures to be adopted for the future administration of Oude (extending over forty-three folio pages), adverts to the treaty of 1837, only in one short paragraph, in which he states that the instrument by which the mutual relations of the British and Oude governments were defined, was the treaty of 1801. "A very general im-

pression prevails that a subsequent re-adjustment of those relations was made by the treaty concluded by Lord Auckland in 1837. But that treaty is null and void. It was wholly disallowed by the Hon. Court of Directors as soon as they received it."

In other paragraphs, repeated reference is made to the warnings given by Lord Hardinge to Wajid Ali, in 1847, of the determination of the supreme government, in the event of continued neglect, to interfere for the protection of the people of Oude; but the important fact is suppressed, that the right of interference was explicitly stated to rest, wholly and solely, "on the treaty ratified in the year 1837."‡

"It is to the treaty of 1801," said Lord Dalhousie, "that we must exclusively look;"§ and, accordingly, it was looked to, for the express purpose of proving that it had been violated by the King of Oude, and might, therefore, be likewise declared null and void. Yet Lord Dalhousie hesitated at "resorting to so extreme a measure as the annexation of the territory, and the abolition of the throne." The rulers of Oude, he admitted, had been unwavering in their adherence to the British power, and had "aided us as best they could in our hour of utmost need;" he therefore recommended that the king should be suffered to retain his title and rank, but should be required to transfer the whole civil and military administration into the hands of the E. I. Company, in perpetuity, by whom the surplus revenues were to be appropriated, a liberal stipend being allowed for the maintenance of the royal family. "The king's consent," he added, "is indispensable to the transfer of the whole, or of any part, of his sovereign power to the government of the East India Company. It would not be expedient or right to extract this consent by means of menace or compulsion." Lord Dalhousie, therefore, advised that the king should be requested to sign a treaty based on the foregoing terms, and warned that, in the event of refusal, the treaty of 1801 would be declared at an end, and the British subsidiary force entirely withdrawn. The proposal appears to have been made under the idea that the very existence of the throne of Oude depended so entirely on the presence

* *Oude Blue Book*, p. 81.

† *Indian Empire*, vol. i., pp. 276—278.

‡ Minute by Lord Dalhousie, June 18th, 1855.—*Oude Blue Book*, p. 149.

§ Any reader who doubts the illegality of Lord

Dalhousie's conclusion, would do well to peruse the able opinion of Dr. Travers Twiss, dated 24th February, 1857, on the infraction of the law of nations, committed by setting aside the treaty of 1837: quoted in *Dacottee in Ecclesiis*, pp. 192—199.

of a British force, that the king would accede to any conditions required from him. But the other members of council unanimously deprecated the offering of the proposed alternative, on the ground of the terrible crisis of anarchy which would be the probable consequence; and it was suggested that, "if there should be in the king's council but one person of courage and genius, though it should be but a dancing-girl (such as Indian annals show many), the king might be led to elect disconnection rather than abdication.*"

Mr. Dorin minuted in favour of the entire incorporation of Oude, and objected to continuing "to the most unkingly monarch of Oude any portion of the royal position and dignity which, by nature and inclination, he is incapable of sustaining;" yet he foresaw that the king would never surrender his kingdom except on compulsion. All Mr. Dorin's sympathies were, he declared, with the people of Oude, the "fine, manly race," from whom we drew "almost the flower of the Bengal army."

Mr. Grant agreed generally with Mr. Dorin, but thought that the king might be suffered to retain his title for his lifetime. Mr. Grant took strong views of the rights and responsibilities of the British government, both in its own right, and as having "succeeded to the empire of the Mogul;" and he denied that the Oude rulers had ever stood in the position of sovereign princes. Major-general Low (who had held the position of resident at Lucknow for eleven years) minuted in favour of annexation, but desired to see more liberal provision made for the present king and his successors than the other members of council deemed necessary. He urged that the well-known habits of Mohammedans of rank afforded a guarantee for their income being expended among the people from whom it was levied, and not hoarded up, and sent off to a distant country, according to the practice of most European gentlemen on reaching the highest offices in the Indian service. The character of the last five princes of Oude, all of whom he had known personally, had, he said, been much misrepresented: they had sadly mismanaged their own affairs, but they had constantly proved active and

useful allies, having again and again forwarded large supplies of grain and cattle to our armies with an alacrity that could not be exceeded by our own British chiefs of provinces, and having lent us large sums of money when we were extremely in want of it, and could not procure it elsewhere. As individual princes, their intercourse with our public functionaries had been regular, attentive, courteous, and friendly.†

Mr. Peacock minuted in favour of the assumption of sovereign power over Oude, but desired that the surplus revenue might be disposed of entirely for the benefit of the people, and no pecuniary benefit be derived by the East India Company. The suggestion deserved more notice than it appears to have received, seeing that "the benefit of the people" is declared by the directors to have been "the sole motive, as well as the sole justification," of the annexation.‡

Not one of the four members of council (not even Mr. Peacock, though an eminent lawyer) took the slightest notice of the treaty of 1837, or alluded to the frequent references concerning it made by their delegates at the court of Lucknow. They spoke freely enough of treaties in general, discussed the law of nations, and quoted Vattel; but the latest contract was tabooed as dangerous ground. The governor-general, in forwarding to the Court of Directors the minutes and other papers above quoted, alluded to his own approaching departure, but offered to remain and carry out the proposed measures regarding Oude, if the directors considered that the experience of eight years would enable him to do so with greater authority than a newly-appointed governor might probably command. The task, he added, would impose upon him very heavy additional labour and anxiety; the ripened fruit would be gathered only by those who might come after him.§ The simile is an unfortunate one, if the fruit we are now gathering in Oude is to be viewed as evidencing the character of the tree which produced it.

The Court of Directors, in announcing their decision on the subject, imitated the reserve of their representatives; and having the fear of Blue Book revelations, and India Reform Society philippics before

* Minute by Mr. Grant.—*Oude Blue Book*, p. 218.

† This last portion of Major-general Low's minute certainly does not accord with the account given by Colonel Sleeman of his intercourse with Wajid Ali; but the colonel, though just and honourable

in deed, was not conciliatory in manner; and his official communication with the king would be naturally affected by this circumstance.

‡ *Oude Blue Book*, p. 234.

§ Despatch dated July 3rd, 1855.—*Ibid.*, p. 1.

their eyes (but not of mutiny and insurrection), they ignored the chief difficulty, and accepted Lord Dalhousie's offer in the most complimentary terms, leaving him unfettered by any special instructions. They suggested, however, that the officiating resident (Outram) should be instructed to ascertain whether the prospect of declaring our connection with the Oude government at an end, would be so alarming to the king as to render his acceptance of the proposed treaty a matter of virtual necessity. If this could be relied on, the alternative was to be offered; if not, the directors authorised and enjoined the attainment of the "indispensable result," in such manner as the governor-general in council should see fit. Concerning the appropriation of the surplus revenue, they made no remark whatever.*

The idea of offering the king the withdrawal of the subsidiary force as the alternative of abdication, was abandoned, and measures were taken for the assumption of the government of Oude, by issuing orders for the assembling of such a military force at Cawnpore as, added to the troops cantoned at that station, and to those already in Oude, was considered sufficient to meet every immediate contingency. The additional troops numbered about 13,000 men, and were placed under the divisional command of (the late) Major-general Penny; but constituted a distinct field force under (the late) Colonel Wheeler, as brigadier. In the meantime, the disorganisation of Oude was clearly on the increase, and one of its marked features was a rising spirit of Moslem fanaticism. It happened that a Mohammedan fast fell on the same day as a Hindoo feast; and Ameer Ali, a moolvee, or priest, of high repute, took advantage of the circumstance to incite his co-religionists to a fierce onslaught on the Hindoos. Troops were ordered out to quell the disturbances; but Ameer Ali seized and confined two of the officers, assembled 3,000 men, and declared his intention of destroying a certain Hindoo temple, and erecting a mosque in its stead. At length the British subsidiary force was employed by the king against the moolvee. An affray ensued, in

which a body of Patans fought with the recklessness of fanaticism, and were cut down, standing shoulder to shoulder round their guns, by a party of Hindoo zemindars and their retainers. In all, 200 Hindoos and 300 Patans perished. This occurred in November, 1855. About the same time the Oude government became aware that some great change was in agitation. They asked the reason for the assembling of so large a force at Cawnpore; and were, it is alleged, solemnly assured that it was intended to keep in check the Nepaulese, who were supposed to be meditating a descent towards the district of Nanparah.†

The veil, however, was soon withdrawn. On the 30th of January, 1856, General Outram requested the attendance of Ali Nukki Khan at the residency, and after informing him of the contemplated changes, "mentioned that, in order to prevent the chance of a disturbance on the part of evil-disposed persons, a strong brigade of troops was directed to cross the Ganges, and march on the capital."‡

Having impressed the minister with the futility of resistance, the resident proceeded to seek, or rather to insist upon, an interview with the king. Remembering the discussions which had taken place between the Nizam of Hyderabad and Colonel Low, the governor-general was anxious that General Outram should not be surprised into indiscreet admissions; and warned him, that it was "very probable" that the king would refer to the treaty negotiated with his predecessor in the year 1837, of the entire abrogation of which the court of Lucknow had never been informed. "The effect of this reserve, and want of full communication, is felt to be embarrassing to-day. It is the more embarrassing that the cancelled instrument was still included in a volume of treaties which was published in 1845, by the authority of government. There is no better way of encountering this difficulty than by meeting it full in the face." This was to be done by informing the king that the communication had been inadvertently neglected; and the resident was authorised to state the regret felt by the governor-general in council, that "any such neglect should have taken place even inadvertently." Should the king observe, that although the treaty of 1837 was annulled, a similar measure, less stringent than that now proposed, might be adopted, he was to be told, that all subsequent experience had

* Despatch from the Court of Directors, dated November 21st, 1855. Signed—E. Macnaghten, W. H. Sykes, &c., &c., &c.—*Oude Blue Book*, pp. 233—236.

† *Dacottee in Excelsis*, p. 140.

‡ *Oude Blue Book*, p. 280.

shown that the remedy then provided would be wholly inadequate to remove the evils and abuses which had long marked the condition of Oude.*

Such were the arguments put by the supreme government of India, into the mouth of General Outram. They must have been extremely unpalatable to a man whose friendly feeling towards Indian princes had been strengthened by personal and friendly intercourse, and not frozen by viceregal state, or neutralised by exclusive attention to the immediate interests and absorbing pecuniary anxieties of the East India Company. But the resident had swallowed a more bitter pill than this when negotiating with the unfortunate Ameers of Sind, whom, in his own words, he had had to warn against resistance to our requisitions, as a measure that would bring down upon them utter and merited destruction; while he firmly believed, that every life lost in consequence of our aggressions, would be chargeable upon us as a murder.†

In the present instance he was spared the task of adding insult to injury. Neither the king nor his minister attempted to stand upon any abstract theory of justice, or fought the ground, inch by inch, as Mahratta diplomatists would have done—throwing away no chance, but, amid defeat and humiliation, making the best possible terms for themselves. Wajid Ali Shah, on the contrary, “unkingly” as he had been described to be, and unfit to reign as he certainly was, did not stoop to discussions which he knew would avail him nothing, but acted on the imperial axiom, “*aut Cæsar aut nullus*.”

When the resident proceeded, as pre-arranged, to present to the king the draft treaty now proposed, accompanied by a letter from the governor-general urging its acceptance, he found the palace courts nearly deserted, and the guns which protected the inner gates dismounted from their carriages. The guard of honour were drawn up unarmed, and saluted him with their hands only. The mere official report of the interview is very interesting. The king received the treaty with the deepest emotion, and gave it to a confidential servant, Sahib-oo-Dowlah, to read aloud; but the latter, overcome by his feelings, was unable to

proceed beyond the first few lines; on which the king took the treaty into his own hands, and silently read the document, in which he was called upon to admit that he and his predecessors had, by continual maladministration, violated the treaty of 1801; and to make over the entire government of Oude to the East India Company in perpetuity, together with the free and exclusive right to “the revenues thereof.” In return for signing this humiliating abdication, Wajid Ali was to retain and bequeath “to the heirs male of his body born in lawful wedlock” (not his heirs generally, according to Mohammedan law), the style of a sovereign prince, and a stipend of twelve lacs per annum.

After carefully perusing every article, the king exclaimed, in a passionate burst of grief—“Treaties are necessary between equals only; who am I now, that the British government should enter into treaties with me?” Uncovering himself (the deepest token of humiliation which a Mohammedan can give),‡ he placed his turban in the hands of the resident, declaring that, now his titles, rank, and position were all gone, he would not trouble government for any maintenance, but would seek, in Europe, for that redress which it was vain to look for in India.

General Outram begged the king to reflect, that if he persisted in withholding his signature, “he would have no security whatever for his future maintenance, or for that of his family; that the very liberal provision devised by the British government would inevitably be reconsidered and reduced; that his majesty would have no guarantee for his future provision, and would have no claim whatever on the generosity of the government.” The prime minister warmly supported the resident; but the king’s brother exclaimed, that there was no occasion for a treaty, as his majesty was no longer in a position to be one of the contracting powers. The king reiterated his unalterable resolve not to sign the treaty: the resident intimated that no further delay than three days could be permitted; and then, with the usual ceremonies and honours, took his leave.

The government, in their anxiety to obtain the king’s signature, had empowered

* Letter from secretary of government to Major-general Outram, January 23rd, 1856.—*Oude Blue Book*, p. 243.

† Outram’s *Commentary on Napier’s Conquest of*

Sind, p. 439. See also *Indian Empire*, vol. i., p. 451.

‡ May your father’s head be uncovered! is one of the most bitter curses of the Mohammedans.

the resident to increase the proffered stipend of twelve lacs (£120,000) to fifteen, if their object could be thus attained. But the demeanour of Wajid Ali convinced General Outram that the promise of double that sum, or of any amount of money, would have no effect; and he therefore considered it unworthy of the government he represented, to make any offer to raise the proposed allowance by a lac or two per annum.

An attempt was made to gain the king's consent through his mother, a lady remarkable for good sense and intelligence,* who exercised great influence over her son; and a yearly stipend of a lac of rupees was offered her as the reward of success. The reply of the queen-mother is not stated in General Outram's account of the conference, and the circumstance itself is only incidentally mentioned; but it is evident that she rejected it, and ceased not to protest against the proposed treaty, and to beg that a further period might be allowed, during which the king might be enabled to show to the world, by the adoption of vigorous reforms, how anxious and eager he was to follow out the plans of the British government.

The three days allowed for consideration elapsed: the king persisted in his resolve; and the resident carried out his instructions by issuing a proclamation, previously prepared at Calcutta, notifying the assumption of the exclusive and permanent administration of the territories of Oude by the Hon. East India Company.

The king offered no opposition whatever to the measures adopted by the British government; but, in what the resident called "a fit of petulance," he ordered all his troops at the capital to be immediately paid-up and dismissed. General Outram thereupon informed the king, that it was incumbent on him to retain the soldiery until the arrangements of the new administration should be completed; adding, that should any disturbance take place, his majesty would be held responsible, and made answerable for the same. Upon the receipt of this threat, Wajid Ali Shah, having resolved to give no pretext for a quarrel, issued proclamations, desiring all his people, civil and military, to obey the orders issued by the British government; to become its faithful subjects; and on no account to resort to resistance or rebellion.

* "Note of a Conference with the queen-mother, by General Outram."—*Oude Blue Book*, p. 286.

He expressed his determination of proceeding at once to Calcutta, to bring his case to the notice of the governor-general, and thence to England, to intercede with the Queen; but he specially commanded that his subjects should not attempt to follow him. General Outram desired that this last paragraph should be omitted. It originated, he said, in the absurd idea impressed upon the king by his flatterers, that a general exodus of his people would follow his departure; or else was introduced with the intention of exciting sympathy in Europe. "Another manoeuvre," he added, "has been had recourse to, with the same object doubtless. For two days past, a written declaration of satisfaction with his majesty's rule has been circulated for signature in the city, where it may probably meet with considerable success. Of course, most classes at Lucknow will suffer, more or less, from the deprivation of the national plunder which is squandered at the capital."†

There is reason to believe that very general dismay was caused at Lucknow by the annexation of the kingdom. The breaking up of a native government is always a terrible crisis to the metropolis. In the present instance, the amount of immediate and individual suffering was unusually large. The suddenness of the king's deposition, and his refusal to sign the treaty, aggravated the distress which the change from native to European hands must have occasioned, even had it happened as a so-called lapse to the paramount power, in the event of the sovereign's death without heirs. As it was, the personal rights of the deposed monarch were dealt with as summarily as the inherited ones of the royal family of Nagpoor had been. No official account has been published of these proceedings; but in the statement of the case of the King of Oude, attributed to Major Bird, the following assertions are made:—

"Since the confiscation of the Oude territory, the royal palaces, parks, gardens, menageries, plate, jewellery, household furniture, stores, wardrobes, carriages, rarities, and articles of *virtu*, together with the royal museum and library, containing 200,000 volumes of rare books, and manuscripts of immense value, have been sequestered. The king's most valuable stud of Arabian, Persian, and English horses, his fighting, riding, and baggage elephants, his camels, dogs and cattle, have all been sold by public auction at nominal prices. His majesty's armoury, including the most rare and beautifully worked arms of every description, has also

† Major-general Outram to secretary of government, February 7th, 1856.—*Oude Blue Book*, p. 292.

been seized, and its contents disposed of by sale or otherwise. . . . The ladies of the royal household were, on the 23rd of August, 1856, forcibly ejected from the royal palace of the Chuttar Munzul, by officers who neither respected their persons nor their property, and who threw their effects into the street.*

It is to be hoped that the above statement is exaggerated; and if so, it is especially to be regretted that the British public, or their representatives, are not furnished with authentic information on so interesting and important a point as the manner in which the deposition of Wajid Ali Shah was accomplished, and in what respects it was calculated to raise or allay the ferment of the mass of the aristocratic and manufacturing classes, the interests of the latter being closely associated with the former. In the *Reply to the Charges against the King of Oude* (already quoted), Wajid Ali Shah asserts, that the usurpation of his dominion would tend to destroy the trade in embroidered silk and cotton cloths. "It is notorious, that three-fourths of the rich embroidered cloths of Benares are imported to Oude; the remainder, one-fourth, being sent to other countries. In Bengal and other provinces, people very seldom use these costly dresses." The reason implied, rather than declared, by the king is probably the true one; namely, that his subjects could afford to clothe themselves in luxurious apparel, whereas those of the East India Company could not; and he adds—"My territories have not been strictly measured with chains so as to render it impossible for the agriculturist to derive a profit, nor have I resumed the allowances of any class of people."†

The testimony of the king regarding the probable results of his deposition, is, in part, corroborated by that of an eye-witness, who will hardly be accused of exaggerating the case; and who, in speaking of the many innocent sufferers from the change of government, includes in his list, "thousands of citizens who had previously found employ in providing for the ordinary wants of the court and nobility. There were several hundreds of manufacturers of hookah snakes. The embroiderers in gold and silver thread were also reckoned by hundreds. The makers of rich dresses, fine turbans, highly ornamental shoes, and many other subordinate trades, suffered severely from the cessa-

tion of the demand for the articles which they manufactured."‡

Oude was taken possession of, very much more as if it had been obtained by force of arms than by diplomacy. Annexation on a large scale, is in either case a hazardous operation, requiring the greatest circumspection. Let any one turn to the Wellesley and Wellington despatches, or to the Indian annals of that eventful period, and see the extreme care which was taken in the settlement of Mysoor—the forethought in preparing conciliatory measures, and meeting national prejudices; the liberal consideration for individual interests—and then peruse, in the parliamentary papers, the summary manner in which the native institutions in Oude, without the least consideration or examination, were to be rooted up and superseded by a cut-and-dried system, to be administered in the higher departments exclusively by Europeans. After such a comparison of preliminary measures, the different results, in the case of Oude and Mysoor, will be deemed amply accounted for. It has been truly said of Lord Wellesley, in a leading Indian journal, that "whatever he was suffered to carry out to his premeditated conclusion, fell into its place with as few disadvantages to the political and social state of Indian society, as a radical operation could well be attended with." In the settlement of Mysoor, it is asserted, "every difficulty was foreseen, and every exigency met; and the dynasty of Tippoo was plucked up, flung aside, and replaced by a new arrangement, which fitted into its place as if it had been there, untouched, from the days of Vishnu." Regarding the occupation of Oude, a very different picture is drawn by the writer, who asserts, that its annexation was carried out in the most reckless manner, and that most important circumstances connected with it were entirely overlooked. "In Lord Dalhousie's opinion, all that was necessary was simply to march a small body of troops to Lucknow, and issue the fiat of annexation. This done, everything, it was supposed, would go on in an easy, plain-sailing manner. The inhabitants might not be satisfied; the zemindars might grumble a little in their forts; the budmashes might frown and swagger in the bazaar; but what of that? The power of the British was invincible."§

* *Dacoitee in Excelsis*, p. 145.

† *Reply to Charges, &c.*, p. 43.

‡ *Mutinies in Oude*; by Martin Richard Gub-

bins, of the Bengal civil service, financial commissioner for Oude. London: Bentley, 1858; p. 70.

§ *Bombay Athenæum*.

The minutes of the supreme council certainly tend to corroborate the foregoing opinion, by showing that the difficulties and dangers attendant on the annexation of Oude were very imperfectly appreciated. The refusal of the king to sign the proffered treaty (though previously deprecated by the governor-general as an insurmountable obstacle to direct absorption), seems to have been welcomed when it actually occurred, as an escape from an onerous engagement; and the submission of all classes—hereditary chiefs, discarded officials, unemployed tradespeople, and disbanded soldiery—was looked for as a matter of course; any concessions made by the annexators being vouchsafed as a matter of free grace, to be received with gratitude, whether it regarded the confirmation of an hereditary chieftdom, or a year's salary on dismissal from office.

The king, Lord Dalhousie considered, by refusing to enter into any new engagement with the British government, had placed himself in entire dependence upon its pleasure; and although it was desirable that "all deference and respect, and every royal honour, should be paid to his majesty Wajid Ali Shah," during his lifetime, together with a stipend of twelve lacs per annum, yet no promise ought now to be given of the continuance of the title, or of the payment of the same amount of money to his heirs. Messrs. Dorin, Grant, and Peacock concurred in this opinion; but Major-general Low minuted against "the salary of the heirs" of Wajid Ali being left to the decision of a future government, the members of which would very probably not sufficiently bear in mind the claims of the Oude family on the British government for comfortable income at least. The minute proceeded to state, that though, for many reasons, it was to be regretted that the king had not signed the treaty, yet, in a pecuniary point of view, his refusal was advantageous. To himself the loss had been great; and, as he had issued all the orders and proclamations that could be desired, and had done his utmost to prevent all risk of strife at the capital, by dismounting his artillery, guns, &c., it would be harsh, and not creditable to a great paramount state, which would "gain immense profit from the possession of the Oude territories," if, in addition to the punishment inflicted on the king, the income intended for his direct male heirs should also be curtailed.

Major-general Low was in a minority of
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one, as Mr. Peacock had been regarding the appropriation of the surplus revenue; and their opinions, in neither case, appear to have met with any consideration. The claims of the various classes of the population were treated in as summary and arbitrary a manner as those of their sovereign; and, owing to the peculiar constitution of Oude, the experiment was a much more dangerous one in their case than in his. The administration was to be conducted, as nearly as possible, in accordance with the system which the experience of nearly seven years had proved to be eminently successful in the provinces beyond the Sutlej; that is to say, the measures which had been matured, and gradually carried through, in the conquered Punjab, by the co-operation of some of the most earnest and philanthropic men whom India has ever seen, was now to be thrust upon Oude, without any preliminary inquiry into its adaptation. In the Punjab, the Lawrences and their staff acted as a band of pacificators on an errand of love and mercy, rather than in the usual form of a locust-cloud of collectors. Such men, invested with considerable discretionary power, could scarcely fail of success; yet one at least of them shrunk from enforcing the orders of government, and left the Punjab, because he could not bear to see the fallen state of the old officials and nobility.*

In Oude, the newly-created offices, rather than the men who were to fill them, occupy the foreground of the picture. General Outram was appointed chief commissioner, with two special military assistants, a judicial and financial commissioner, four commissioners of divisions, twelve deputy-commissioners of districts, eighteen assistant-commissioners, and eighteen extra assistants, to begin with. An inspector of gaols was to be appointed as soon as the new administration should be fairly established; and a promise was held out for the organisation of a department of public works, to aid in developing the resources of the country.

The pay of the new functionaries was to range from 3,500 rupees to 250 rupees a month (say from £4,200 to £300 a-year.) The number of native officials to be retained was, as usual, miserably small, and their remuneration proportionately low. As a body, they were of course great losers by the revolution.

* Arthur Cocks, chief assistant to the resident.—*Raikes' Revolt in the North-West Provinces*, p. 25.

The king urged, as a special ground of complaint, the manner in which "writers, clerks, and other *attachés*" of departments had been supplanted by strangers. "Is it," he asks, "consistent with justice to deprive people of the soil of situations of this nature, and bestow them on foreigners? Foreigners have no claim to support from the government of Oude, while natives of the soil are left without means of procuring their livelihood."*

Mr. Gubbins, the financial commissioner for Oude, who was sent there at the period of the annexation, speaks of the sufferings of the nobility as having been aggravated by the neglect of the British functionaries. "The nobles had received large pensions from the native government, the payment of which, never regular, ceased with the introduction of our rule. Government had made liberal provision for their support; but before this could be obtained, it was necessary to prepare careful lists of the grantees, and to investigate their claims. It must be admitted, that in effecting this there was undue delay; and that, for want of common means of support, the gentry and nobility of the city were brought to great straits and suffering. We were informed that families which had never before been outside the *zunana*, used to go out at night and beg their bread."†

When Sir Henry Lawrence came to Lucknow, towards the close of March, 1857, we are told that he applied himself to cause the dispatch of the necessary documents, and gave the sufferers assurance of early payment and kind consideration. But nearly fourteen months had dragged slowly away before his arrival; and a smouldering mass of disaffection had meanwhile accumulated, which no single functionary, however good and gifted, could keep from bursting into a flame.

The discharged soldiery of the native government, amounting to about 60,000 men, naturally regarded the new administration with aversion and hostility. Service was given to about 15,000 of them in newly-formed local regiments, and some found employment in the civil departments. The large proportion, for whom no permanent provision could be made, received small pensions or gratuities: for instance, those who had served from twenty-five to thirty years, received one-fourth of their emoluments as pension; and those who had served

from seven to fifteen years, received three months' pay as a gratuity. Under seven years' service, no gratuity whatever appears to have been given to the unfortunates suddenly turned adrift for no fault of their own. It was further decreed, that no person whatever should be recommended for pension or gratuity, who should decline employment offered to him under the British government.‡ Of the late king's servants, civil and military, many remained without any permanent provision; and not a few refused employ—some because they hoped that the native kingdom would be restored; but the majority of the soldiery, on account of the severity of the British discipline.§

By far the greatest difficulties in which the new government became involved, regarded the settlement of titles to land. Considering the long series of years during which at least the temporary assumption of the powers of administration had been contemplated by the British government, it is not a little surprising to find the governor-general in council avowedly unprovided with "any information as to the extent and value of rent-free holdings in Oude, or as to the practice which may have prevailed under the native government in respect of these grants." Without waiting for any enlightenment on the subject, rules are laid down "for the adjudication of claims of the class under consideration;" and, as might have been reasonably expected, these rules worked badly for all parties.

The despatch above quoted is very able, but exceedingly bureaucratic throughout: its arbitrary provisions and minute details remind one of the constitutions which the Abbé Sièyès kept in the pigeon-holes of his writing-table, ready for any emergency. No consideration was evinced therein for the peculiar state of society in Oude, or even for the prominent features portrayed by Colonel Sleeman in his honest but cursory investigation. The fact was, that Oude, instead of the exclusively Mohammedan kingdom, or the British dependency, which it was represented to be, was really a Hindoo confederacy, presided over by a foreign dynasty. The most powerful class were Rajpoot chiefs, claiming descent from the sun and the moon; who laughed to scorn the mushroom dynasty of Wajid Ali, and regarded, with especial contempt, his assumption of the kingly title. These men,

* *Reply to Charges*, p. 43.

† Gubbins' *Mutinies in Oudh*, p. 70.

‡ *Oude Blue Book* for 1856, p. 278.

§ Gubbins' *Mutinies in Oudh*, p. 69.

united, might at any moment have compelled the Mohammedan ruler to abdicate or govern on just principles, had not co-operation for such an object been rendered impracticable by their own intestine strife. The state of things among them resembled that which brought and kept the Rajpoot princes under partial subjection: the faggots bound up together could not have been broken; but it was easy to deal with them one by one. Thus the suzerainty of the Mogul emperor was established over Rajast'han; and thus, though somewhat more firmly, because on a smaller scale, the power of the usurping governors was fixed in Oude. But the great jungle barons were overawed rather than subjugated; and, in the time of Colonel Sleeman, the officers of the native government could not examine into their rent-rolls, or measure their lands, or make any inquiry into the value of the estates, except at the risk of open rebellion. They had always a number of armed and brave retainers, ready to support them in any enterprise; and the amount was easily increased; for in India there is seldom any lack of loose characters, ready to fight for the sake of plunder alone.*

The talookdars were mostly the hereditary representatives of Rajpoot clans; but some were the heads of new families (Hindoo or Mohammedan), sprung from government officials, whose local authority had enabled them to acquire a holding of this description. The term "talookdar" means holder of a talook, or collection of villages, and, like that of zemindar (as used in Bengal), implied no right of property in the villages on behalf of which the talookdar engaged to pay the state a certain sum, and from which he realised a somewhat larger one, which constituted his remuneration. In fact, the property in the soil was actually vested in the village communities; who "are," says Mr. Gubbins, "the only proprietors of the soil; and they value this right of property in the land above all earthly treasure."†

Over these talookdars there were government officers (with whom they have often been confounded), and who, under the title of Nazims or Chukladars, annually farmed from government the revenues of large tracts of country for a certain fixed payment; all that they could squeeze out in

excess being their own profit. "These men, from the necessities of their position, were," says Carre Tucker, "the greatest tyrants and oppressors imaginable. Backed by artillery, and the armed force of government, it was their business to rack-rent the country, extracting, within the year of their lease, all that they possibly could; whilst landholders resisted their exactions by force of arms. A constant war was thus carried on, and the revenue payments varied according to the relative strength of the nazim and the landowners. To avoid such contests, and obtain the privilege of paying a fixed sum direct into the government treasury, many of the talookdars would bid for the farm of their own part of the country. Such men, while acting as lord-lieutenants, would of course use their delegated authority to consolidate their influence over their own clan and tenantry, and also to usurp rights over independent village communities." This system led to the most cruel oppression; but it was supported by the ministers and courtiers of the king at Lucknow, as leading to an annual repetition of presents and bribes, without which no candidate could hope to obtain investiture as nazim or chukladar.‡

The government, not content with abolishing this manifest evil, attempted to revolutionise, at a stroke, the whole state of society, by sweeping aside the entire class of chiefs and barons, with the incidents of their feudal tenure, and making the revenue settlement with the village communities and smaller holders. Hereditary rights, unquestioned during successive generations, were confounded with those exercised by the revenue farmers *ex officio*, and the settlement officers were desired to deal with the proprietary coparcenaries which were believed to exist in Oude, and not to suffer the interposition of middlemen, such as talookdars, farmers of the revenue, and such like. The claims of these, if they had any tenable ones, might be, it was added, more conveniently considered at a future period.

Nothing could be more disheartening to the great landowners than this indefinite adjournment of any consideration of their claims; which, in effect, acted like a decree of confiscation, with a distant and very slight chance of ultimate restitution. It was quite evident that the motive of the measure was expediency, and that the government had, as stated by the *Times*,

* Sleeman's *Oude*, vol. ii., pp. 1, 2.

† Gubbins' *Mutines in Oudh*, p. 61.

‡ *Letter on Oudh and its Talookdars*, p. 2.

"a natural leaning in favour of the peasant cultivators, to the detriment of the warlike and turbulent chiefs," whom it was thought politic to put down; and the plan of ignoring their ancient possessions had the additional advantage of bringing their manorial dues, averaging from ten to twenty per cent. on the village assessment, into the public exchequer.

The summary settlement in Oude too far resembled that which had been previously carried through, with a high hand, in the North-West Provinces, concerning which much evidence has recently been made public. Mr. H. S. Boulderson, a Bengal civilian, engaged in establishing the revenue settlement of 1844, declares, that whether the talookdars in Oude experienced, or only anticipated, the same dealings from our government which the talookdars in the North-West Provinces received, they must have had a strong motive to dread our rule. "The 'confiscation' which has been proclaimed against them—whether it really means confiscation, or something else—could not be more effectually destructive to whatever rights they possessed, than the disgraceful injustice by which the talookdars of the North-West Provinces were extinguished." He asserts, that the settlement involved an utter inversion of the rights of property; and that the commissioners, in dealing with what they termed "the patent right of talookdaree," and which even they acknowledged to be an hereditary right which had descended for centuries, treated it as a privilege dependent on the pleasure of government, and assumed the authority of distributing at pleasure the profits arising out of the limitation of their own demand.*

The opinion of Sir William Sleeman has been already quoted concerning the treatment which the landed proprietors had received in the half of Oude annexed by the British government in 1801, and now included in the North-West Provinces. By his testimony, the measures, and the men who enforced them, were equally obnoxious to the native chiefs and talookdars; being resolved on favouring the village communities, to the exclusion of every kind of vested interest between them and the state treasury. Sir William states—

"In the matter of discourtesy to the native

gentry, I can only say that Robert Martin Bird insulted them whenever he had the opportunity of doing so; and that Mr. Thomason was too apt to imitate him in this, as in other things. Of course their example was followed by too many of their followers and admirers. * * * It has always struck me that Mr. Thomason, in his system, did all he could to discourage the growth of a middle and upper class on the land—the only kind of property on which a good upper and middle class could be sustained in the present state of society in India. His village republics, and the ryotwar system of Sir Thomas Munro at Madras, had precisely the same tendency to subdivide minutely property in land, and reduce all landholders to the common level of impoverishment. * * * Mr. Thomason would have forced his village republics upon any new country or jungle that came under his charge, and thereby rendered improvement impossible. He would have put the whole under our judicial courts, and have thereby created a class of pettifogging attorneys, to swallow up all the surplus produce of the land. * * * Mr. Thomason, I am told, systematically set aside all the landed aristocracy of the country as a set of *middlemen*, superfluous and mischievous. The only part of India in which I have seen a middle and higher class maintained upon the land, is the moderately settled districts of the Saugor and Nerbudda territories; and there is no part of India where our government and character are so much beloved and respected."†

Mr. Gubbins makes some very important admissions regarding the revenue system pursued in the North-West Provinces, and that subsequently attempted in Oude. "The pressure of the government demand is, in many districts, greatly too high. It is too high in Alighur, in Mynpoorie, in Boolundshuhur, and throughout the greater part of Rohilcund. The principle on which that settlement was made, was to claim, as the share of government, two-thirds of the nett rental. But the fraud and chicanery opposed to our revenue officers, caused them unwittingly to fix the demand at more than this share. In Oude, after repeated and most careful examination, I came unhesitatingly to the conclusion, that the government collector appropriated, if possible, the entire rent, and never professed to relinquish any part of it."‡ Of course, under a system which grasped at the *entire rent* of the soil, there could be no landlord class: a very short period of time would suffice for their extinction; and any so-called proprietary rights must, in due course, have also been annihilated.

No arguments in favour of the village system (excellent as this was in its place and degree), could justify the suppression of

* Minute on the Talookdaree cases, recorded on 2nd of April, 1844. Printed for private circulation in June, 1858; p. 19.

† Sleeman's *Oude*, vol. ii., p. 413. Letter to Mr. Colvin, dated "Lucknow, 28th December, 1853."

‡ Gubbins' *Mutinies in Oudh*. p. 73.

every other co-existing institution. But the projected change, even had it been unexceptionable in its tendency, was altogether too sudden: the village communities were not strong enough to feel safe in occupying the vantage-ground on which they were so unexpectedly placed; and many of them considered the rough-and-ready patriarchal sway of their chiefs but ill-exchanged for our harsh and unbending revenue system, and tedious and expensive law processes. Government erred grievously "in following supposed political and financial expediency, instead of ascertaining and maintaining existing rights in possession; and in supposing, that in the course of a very hurried assessment of revenue by officers, many of whom were inexperienced, it was possible to adjudicate properly difficult claims to former rights.* Lord Dalhousie's successor admits it to be too true, "that unjust decisions were come to by some of our local officers, in investigating and judging the titles of the landholders."† The natural consequence was, as stated by General Outram, that the landholders, having been "most unjustly treated under our settlement operations," and "smarting, as they were, under the loss of their lands," with hardly a dozen exceptions, sided against us, when they saw that "our rule was virtually at an end, the whole country overrun, and the capital in the hands of the rebel soldiery."‡ The yeomanry, whom we had prematurely attempted to raise to independence, followed the lead of their natural chiefs. All this might, it is alleged, have been prevented, had a fair and moderate assessment been made with the talookdar, wherever he had had clear possession for the legal limit of twelve years, together with a sub-settlement for the protection of the village communities and cultivators.§

Very contradictory opinions are entertained regarding the manner in which the British sepoy were affected by the annexation of Oude.

Mr. Gubbins admits, that when the mutinies commenced in the Bengal army, the talookdars in Oude were discontented and agrieved; numbers of discharged soldiers were brooding over the recollection of their former license; and the inhabitants of the cities

generally were impoverished and distressed; but the sepoy, he says, had benefited by the change of government, and were rejoicing in the encouragement given to the village communities at the expense of the talookdars. Thousands of sepoy families laid complaints of usurpation before the revenue officers, and "many hundreds of villages at once passed into their hands from those of the talooqdars! Whatever the talooqdar lost, the sepoy gained. No one had so great cause for gratulation as he."

The sepoy, although an exceptional class, had their own grievance, besides sharing in the general distrust and aversion entertained by the whole people at the idea of being brought under the jurisdiction of our civil courts; as well as at the introduction of the Company's opium monopoly, and the abkarce, or excise, on the retail sale of all spirituous liquors and intoxicating drugs, the consumption of which was very large throughout Oude, and especially among the soldiery.

Under the native government, the British sepoy enjoyed special and preferential advantages, their complaints being brought to its notice by the intervention of the resident. Each family made a point of having some connection in the British army, and, through him, laid their case before his commanding officer. The sepoy's petition was countersigned by the English colonel, and forwarded to the resident, by whom it was submitted to the king.|| This privilege was not recognised or named in any treaty or other engagement with the sovereign of Oude, nor could its origin be traced in any document recorded in the resident's office;¶ but it was in full operation at the time of our occupation of Oude; and had been, for a long term of years, the subject of continued discussion between successive residents and the native durbar.

Mr. Gubbins considers that the termination of this custom could not have produced disaffection among the sepoy, because but little redress was thereby procured by them. "Some trifling alleviation of the injury complained of, might be obtained; but that was all. That a sepoy plaintiff ever succeeded in wresting his village from the grasp of the oppressor, by aid of the British

* *Letter on Oudh and its Talookdars*; by H. Carre Tucker: p. 5.

† Despatch dated 31st March, 1858.—Parl. Papers on Oude (Commons), 20th May, 1858; p. 4.

‡ Despatch dated 8th March, 1858.—Parl. Papers, p. 1.

§ Carre Tucker's *Letter*, p. 7.

|| Gubbins' *Mutinies in Oudh*, p. 64.

¶ Sleeman's *Oude*, vol. i., p. 289.

resident, I never heard; if it ever occurred, the cases must have been isolated and extraordinary."*

The evidence of Sir W. Sleeman (whose authority is very high on this subject, in his double character of officer and resident) is directly opposed to that above cited. He thought the privilege very important; but desired its abolition because it had been greatly abused, and caused intolerable annoyance to the native government. The military authorities, he said, desired its continuance; for though the honest and hard-working sepoys usually cared nothing about it, a large class of the idle and unscrupulous considered it as a lottery, in which they might sometimes draw a prize, or obtain leave of absence, as the same sepoy has been known to do repeatedly for ten months at a time, on the pretext of having a case pending in Oude. Consequently, they endeavoured to impress their superiors with the idea, "that the fidelity of the whole native army" depended upon the maintenance and extension of this right of appeal. And the privilege was gradually extended, until it included all the regular, irregular, and local corps paid by the British government, with the native officers and sepoys of contingents employed in, and paid by, native states, who were drafted into them from the regular corps of our army up to a certain time—the total number amounting to between 50,000 and 60,000. At one period, the special right of the sepoys to the resident's intervention extended to their most distant relatives; but at the earnest entreaty of the native administration, it was restricted to their wives, fathers, mothers, brothers, and sisters. "In consequence, it became a common custom with them to lend or sell their names to more remote relations, or to persons not related to them at all. A great many bad characters have, in this way, deprived men of lands which their ancestors had held in undisputed right of property for many generations or centuries; for the court, to save themselves from the importunity of the residency, has often given orders for the claimant being put in possession of the lands without due inquiry, or any inquiry at all."†

The use or abuse of the privilege depended chiefly on the character of the resi-

dent; and that it was occasionally shamefully abused, is a fact established, we are told, by the residency records.

"If the resident happens to be an impatient, overbearing man, he will often frighten the durbar and its courts, or local officers, into a hasty decision, by which the rights of others are sacrificed for the native officers and sepoys; and if he be at the same time an unscrupulous man, he will sometimes direct that the sepoy shall be put in possession of what he claims, in order to relieve himself from his importunity, or from that of his commanding officer, without taking the trouble to inform himself of the grounds on which the claim is founded. Of all such errors there are, unhappily, too many instances recorded in the resident's office."‡

Sir W. Sleeman adduces repeated instances of sepoys being put in possession of landed estates, to which they had no rightful claim, by the British government, at the cost of many lives; and quotes, as an illustration of the notorious partiality with which sepoy claims were treated, the case of a shopkeeper at Lucknow, who purchased a cavalry uniform, and by pretending to be an invalid British trooper, procured the signature of the brigadier commanding the troops in Oude, to numerous petitions, which were sent for adjustment to the durbar through the resident. This procedure he continued for fifteen years; and, to crown all, succeeded in obtaining, by the aid of government, forcible possession of a landed estate, to which he had no manner of right. Soon after, he sent in a petition stating that he had been in turn ejected, and four of his relations killed by the dispossessed proprietor. Thereupon an inquiry took place, and the whole truth came out. The King of Oude truly observed, with regard to this affair:—"If a person known to thousands in the city of Lucknow is able, for fifteen years, to carry on such a trade successfully, how much more easy must it be for people in the country, not known to any in the city, to carry it on!"§

On one occasion, no less than thirty lives were lost in attempting to enforce an award in favour of a British sepoy. On another, a sepoy came to the assistant-resident (Captain Shakespear), clamouring for justice, and complaining that no notice of his petition had been taken by the native government. On being questioned, he admitted that no less than forty persons had been seized, and were in prison, on his requisition.

§ Letter of the King of Oude to the resident; 16th June, 1836.—Sleeman's *Journey through Oude*, vol. i., p. 286.

* Gubbins' *Mutinies in Oudh*, p. 65.

† Sleeman's *Oude*, vol. i., pp. 288—292.

‡ *Ibid.*, p. 289.

As to punishing the sepoy for preferring fraudulent claims, that was next to impossible, both on account of the endless trouble which it involved, and the difficulty, if not impossibility, of procuring a conviction from a court-martial composed of native officers; the only alternative being, to lay the case before the governor-general. The natural consequence was, that the sepoy became most importunate, untruthful, and unscrupulous in stating the circumstances of their claims, or the grounds of their complaints.*

It is impossible to read the revelations of Colonel Sleeman on this subject, without feeling that the British authorities themselves aggravated the disorganisation in the native administration, which was the sole plea for annexation. At the same time, it is no less clear, that the injustice perpetrated on behalf of the sepoy, was calculated to exercise a most injurious effect on their morals and discipline. The unmerited success often obtained by fraud and collusion, was both a bad example and a cause of disgust to the honest and scrupulous, on whom the burthen of duties fell, while their comrades were enjoying themselves in their homes, on leave of absence, obtained for the purpose of prosecuting unreasonable or false claims. Of the honest petitioners, few obtained what they believed to be full justice; and where one was satisfied, four became discontented. Another cause of disaffection arose when it was found necessary to check the growing evil, by decreeing that the privilege of urging claims through the resident should cease when native officers and sepoy were transferred from active service to the invalid establishment.

Altogether, the result of making the sepoy a privileged class (in this, as in so many other ways), was equally disastrous to their native and European superiors. Colonel Sleeman says, that the British recruits were procured chiefly from the Byswara and Banoda divisions of Oude, whose inhabitants vaunt the quality of the water for *tempering* soldiers, as we talk of the water of Damascus for tempering sword-blades. "The air and water of Malwa," it is popularly said, "may produce as good trees and crops as those of Oude, but cannot produce as good soldiers." They are de-

scribed as never appearing so happy as when fighting in earnest with swords, spears, and matchlocks, and consequently are not much calculated for peaceful citizens; but the British sepoy who came home on furlough to their families (as they were freely permitted to do in time of peace, not only to petition the native government, but also ostensibly to visit their families, on reduced pay and allowances), were the terror, even in the midst of this warlike population, of their non-privileged neighbours and co-sharers in the land.

The partiality shown them did not prevent "the diminished attachment felt by the sepoy for their European officers" from becoming an established fact; and officers, when passing through Oude in their travels or sporting excursions, have of late years generally complained, that they received less civility from villages in which British invalids or furlough sepoy were located, than from any others; and that if anywhere treated with actual disrespect, such sepoy were generally found to be either the perpetrators or instigators.†

The evidence collected in preceding pages, seems to place beyond dispute, that the annexation of Oude, if it did not help to light the flames of mutiny, has fanned and fed them by furnishing the mutineers with refuge and co-operation in the territories which were ever in close alliance with us when they formed an independent kingdom; but which we, by assuming dominion over them on the sole plea of rescuing the inhabitants from gross misgovernment, have changed into a turbulent and insurrectionary province.

The metamorphosis was not accomplished by the deposition of the dynasty of Wajid Ali Shah. Indian princes generally, might, and naturally would, view with alarm so flagrant a violation of treaties, and of the first principles of the law of nations; but the Hindoos of Oude could have felt little regret for the downfall of a government essentially sectarian and unjust. The kings of Oude, unlike the majority of Mohammedans in India, were Sheiahs;‡ and so bigoted and exclusive, that no Sheiah could be sentenced to death at Lucknow for the murder even of a Sonnite, much less for that of a Hindoo. According to Colonel Sleeman, it was not only the law, but the everyday practice, that if a Hindoo murdered a Hindoo, and consented to become a Mussulman, he could not be executed for

* Sleeman's *Journey through Oude*, vol. i., p. 292.

† *Ibid.*, vol. i., p. 289.

‡ See *Indian Empire*, vol. i., p. 62.

the crime, even though convicted and sentenced.*

Under such a condition of things, it is at least highly probable, that a rigidly impartial and tolerant administration would have been a welcome change to the Hindoo population. That it has proved the very reverse, is accounted for by the aggressive measures initiated by the new government, and the inefficient means by which their enforcement was attempted.

The latter evil was, to a certain extent, unavoidable. The Russian war deprived India of the European troops, which Lord Dalhousie deemed needful for the annexation of Oude: but this does not account for the grave mistake made in raising a contingent of 12,000 men, for the maintenance of the newly-annexed country, almost entirely from the disbanded native army. These levies, with half-a-dozen regular corps, formed the whole army of occupation.

Sir Henry Lawrence foresaw the danger; and in September, 1856, seven months before the commencement of the mutiny, he urged, that some portion of the Oude levies should change places with certain of the Punjab regiments then stationed on the Indus. Oude, he said, had long been the Alsatia of India—the resort of the dissipated and disaffected of every other state, and especially of deserters from the British ranks. It had been pronounced hazardous to employ the Sikhs in the Punjab in 1849; and the reason assigned for the different policy now pursued in Oude was, that the former kingdom had been conquered, and the latter “fell in peace.” Sir Henry pointed out the fallacy of this argument, and the materials for mischief which still remained in Oude, which he described as containing “246 forts, besides innumerable smaller strongholds, many of them sheltered within thick jungles. In these forts are 476 guns. Forts and guns should all be in the hands of government, or the forts should be razed. Many a foolish fellow has been urged on to his own ruin by the possession of a paltry fort, and many a paltry mud fort has repulsed British troops.”†

The warning was unheeded. The government, though right in their desire to

protect and elevate the village communities, were unjust in the sweeping and indiscriminating measures which they adopted in favour of the villagers, and for the increase in the public revenue, anticipated from the setting aside of the feudal claims of the so-called middlemen. Before attempting to revolutionise the face of society, it would have been only politic to provide unquestionable means of overawing the opposition which might naturally be expected from so warlike, not to say turbulent, a class as the Rajpoot chiefs.

Had men of the Lawrence school been sent to superintend the “absorption” of Oude, it is probable they might have seen the danger, and suggested measures of conciliation; but, on the contrary, it is asserted, that the European officials employed were almost all young and inexperienced men, and that their extreme opinions, and the corruption of their native subordinates, aggravated the unpopularity of the system they came to administer. Personal quarrels arose between the leading officers; and the result was a want of vigour and co-operation in their public proceedings.‡

Meantime, the obtainment of Oude was a matter of high-flown congratulation between the home and Indian authorities. The Company have changed their opinion since;§ but, at the time, they accepted the measure as lawful, expedient, and very cleverly carried out. Far from being disappointed at the want of enthusiasm evinced by the people in not welcoming their new rulers as deliverers, their passive submission (in accordance with the proclamations of Wajid Ali Shah) called forth, from the Court of Directors, an expression of “lively emotions of thankfulness and pleasure,” at the peaceable manner in which “an expanse of territory embracing an area of nearly 25,000 square miles, and containing 5,000,000 inhabitants, has passed from its native prince to the Queen of England, without the expenditure of a drop of blood, and almost without a murmur.”||

Upon the assumption of the government of Oude, a branch electric telegraph was commenced to connect Cawnpoor and Lucknow. In eighteen working days it was completed, including the laying of a cable,

* Sleeman's *Oude*, vol. i., p. 135.

† Article on “Army Reform,” by Sir H. Lawrence.—*Calcutta Review* for September, 1856.

‡ See Letter signed “Index,” dated “Calcutta, December 9th, 1857.”—*Times*, January 15th, 1858.

§ See Despatch of the Secret Committee of the Court of Directors, 19th April, 1858.—*Parl. Papers*, 7th May, 1858; p. 4.

|| Despatch dated December, 1856.—*Oude Blue Book* for 1856; p. 288.

6,000 feet in length, across the Ganges. On the morning of the 1st of March, Lord Dalhousie (who on that day resigned his office) put to General Outram the significant question—"Is all quiet in Oude?" The reply, "All is quiet in Oude," greeted Lord Canning on his arrival in Calcutta.

On the previous day, a farewell letter had been written to the King of Oude by the retiring governor-general, expressing his satisfaction that the friendship which had so long existed between the Hon. East India Company and the dynasty of Wajid Ali Shah, should have daily become more firmly established. "There is no doubt," he adds, "that Lord Canning will, in the same manner as I have done, strengthening and confirming this friendship, bear in mind and give due consideration to the treaties and engagements which are to exist for ever."*

It is difficult to understand what diplomatic purpose was to be served by this reference to the eternal duration of treaties which had been declared null and void, and engagements proffered by one party, which the other had at all hazards persisted in rejecting; or why Lord Dalhousie, so clear, practical, and upright in his general character, should seem to have acted so unlike himself in all matters connected with what may be termed his foreign policy.

It must not, however, be forgotten, that that policy, in all its circumstances, was sanctioned and approved, accepted and rewarded, by the East India Company. Lord Dalhousie's measures were consistent throughout; and he enjoyed the confidence and support of the directors during the whole eight years of his administration, in a degree to which few, if any, of his predecessors ever attained. It was the unqualified approval of the home authorities that rendered the annexation policy the prominent feature of a system which the people of India, of every creed, clime, and tongue, looked upon as framed for the express purpose of extinguishing all native sovereignty and rank. And, in fact, the measures lately pursued are scarcely explicable on any other ground. The democratic element is, no doubt, greatly on the increase in England; yet our institutions and our prejudices are monarchical and aristocratic:

and nothing surprises our Eastern fellow-subjects more, than the deference and courtesy paid by all ranks in the United Kingdom, to rajahs and nawabs, who, in their hereditary principalities, had met—as many of them aver—with little civility, and less justice, at the hands of the representatives of the East India Company.

Yet, it was not so much a system as a want of system, which mainly conduced to bring about the existing state of things. The constant preponderance of expenditure above income, and an ever-present sense of precariousness, have been probably the chief reasons why the energies of the Anglo-Indian government have been, of late years, most mischievously directed to degrading kings, chiefs, nobles, gentry, priests, and landowners of various degrees, to one dead level of poverty—little above pauperism. We have rolled, by sheer brute force, an iron grinder over the face of Hindoo society—crushed every lineament into a disfigured mass—squeezed from it every rupee that even torture could extract; and lavished the money, thus obtained, on a small white oligarchy and an immense army of mercenary troops, who were believed to be ready, at any moment, to spread fire and the sword wherever any opposition should be offered to the will of the paramount power, whose salt they ate.

We thought the sepoys would always keep down the native chiefs, and, when they were destroyed, the people; and we did not anticipate the swift approach of a time when we should cry to the chiefs and people to help us to extinguish the incendiary flames of our own camp, and to wrench the sword from the hands in which we had so vauntingly placed it.

In our moment of peril, the defection of the upper classes of Hindoostan was "almost universal." But surely it is no wonder that they should have shown so little attachment to our rule, when it is admitted, even by the covenanted civil service, that they "have not much to thank us for."

Throughout British India, several native departments are declared to have been "grossly underpaid," particularly the police service, into which it has been found difficult to get natives of good family to enter at all. In revenue offices, they were formerly better paid than at present. The general result of our proceedings has been, that at the time of the mutiny, "the native

* Letter, vouched for as a true translation by Robert Wilberforce Bird, and printed in a pamphlet entitled *Case of the King of Oude*; by Mr. John Davenport: August 27th, 1856.

gentry were daily becoming more reduced, were pinched by want of means, and were therefore discontented.”*

It is difficult to realise the full hardship of their position. Here were men who would have occupied, or at least have had the chance of occupying, the highest positions of the state under a native government, and who were accustomed to look to the service of the sovereign as the chief source of honourable and lucrative employment, left, frequently with no alternative but starvation or the acceptance of a position and a salary under foreign masters, that their fathers would have thought suitable only for their poorest retainers. Not one of them, however ancient his lineage, however high his attainments, could hope to be admitted within the charmed circle of the covenanted civil service, as the equal of the youngest writer, or even in the army, to take rank with a new-fledged ensign.

The expenses of an Asiatic noble are enormous. Polygamy is costly in its incidentals; and the head of a great family is looked to, not only for the maintenance of his own wives and children, in a style proportionate to their birth, but also of those of his predecessors. The misery which the levelling policy produced, was severely felt by the pensioners and dependents of the fallen aristocracy, by the aged and the sick, by women and children. And this latter fact explains a marked feature in the present rebellion; namely, the number of women who have played a leading part in the insurrection. The Rance of Jhansi, and her sister, with other Hindoo princesses of less note, have evinced an amount of ability and resolve far beyond that of their countrymen; and the cause of disaffection with almost all of these, has been the setting aside of their hereditary rights of succession and of adoption. They have viewed the sudden refusal of the British government to sanction what they had previously encouraged, as a most faithless and arbitrary procedure; and many chiefs, whose hostility is otherwise unaccountable, will probably, like the chief of Nargoond, prove to have been incited to join the mutineers chiefly, if not exclusively, by this particular grievance.

* Gubbins' *Mutinies in Oudh*, pp. 56, 57.

† Regulation xxxi., of 1803.

‡ For instance, in the alienation of a part of the revenues of the post-office, and other public departments; enacted in the case of certain noble families.

A branch of the annexation question, in which the violation of rights of succession is also a prominent feature, yet remains to be noticed—namely, the

Resumption of Rent-free Lands; whereby serious disaffection has been produced in the minds of a large class of dispossessed proprietors. All rightful tenure of this kind is described, in the regulations of the East India Company, as based upon a well-known provision “of the ancient law of India, by which the ruling power is entitled to a certain proportion of the annual produce of every beegah (acre) of land, excepting in cases in which that power shall have made a temporary or permanent alienation of its right to such proportion of the produce, or shall have agreed to receive, instead of that proportion, a specific sum annually, or for a term of years, or in perpetuity.”†

Both Hindoo and Mohammedan sovereigns frequently made over part, or the whole, of the public revenue of a village, or even of a district, to one of their officers; they often assigned it in jaghire for the maintenance of a certain number of troops, or gratuitously for life, as a reward for service done; and sometimes in perpetuity. In the latter case, the alienation was more complete than that practised in the United Kingdom;‡ for here titles and estate escheat to the state on the death of the last legal representative of a family; but, among the Hindoos, such lapse never, or most rarely occurs, since all the males marry, in childhood generally, several wives; and their law vests rights of succession and adoption in the widows of the deceased. These rights were acknowledged equally by Hindoo and Moslem rulers—by the Peishwa of Poona, and the Nawab-vizier of Oude; the only difference being, that in the event of adoption, a larger nuzzurana, or tributary offering, was expected on accession, than if the heir had been a son by birth: in other words, the legacy duty was higher in the one case than the other.

“Enam,” or “gift,” is the term commonly given to all gratuitous grants, whether temporary or in perpetuity—whether to individuals, or for religious, charitable, or educational purposes: but it is more strictly applicable to endowments of the latter description; in which case, the amount of state-tribute transferred was frequently very considerable, and always in perpetuity. “A large proportion of the grants to individuals,” Mountstuart Elphinstone writes,

"are also in perpetuity, and are regarded as among the most secure forms of private property; but the gradual increase of such instances of liberality, combined with the frequency of forged deeds of gift, sometimes induces the ruler to resume the grants of his predecessors, and to burden them with heavy taxes. When these are laid on transfers by sales, or even by succession, they are not thought unjust; but total resumption, or the permanent levy of a fixed rate, is regarded as oppressive."*

During the early years of the Company's rule, the perpetual enam tenures were sedulously respected; but as the supreme government grew richer in sovereignty, and poorer in purse (for the increase of expenditure always distanced that of revenue), the collectors began to look with a covetous eye on the freeholders. They argued, truly enough, that a great many of the titles to land were fraudulent, or had been fraudulently obtained; and in such cases, where grounds of suspicion existed, any government would have been in duty bound to make inquiry into the circumstances of the original acquisition.

But instead of investigating certain cases, a general inquiry was instituted into the whole of them; the principle of which was, to cast on every enamdar the burthen of proving his right—a demand which, of course, many of the ancient holders must have found it impossible to fulfil. The lapse of centuries, war, fire, or negligence might, doubtless, have occasioned the destruction of the deeds. Some of the oldest were, we know, engraven on stone and copper, in long-forgotten characters; and few of the commissioners could question the witnesses in the modern Bengalee or Hindoostani, much less decipher Pali or Sanscrit.

A commission of inquiry was instituted in Bengal in 1836, "to ascertain the grounds on which claims to exemption from the payment of revenue were founded, to confirm those for which valid titles were produced, and to bring under assessment those which were held without authority."† In theory, this sounds moderate, if not just; in practice, it is said to have proved the very reverse, and to have cast a blight over the whole of Lower Bengal. The expense of

the commission was, of course, enormous; and even in a pecuniary sense, the profit reaped by government could not compensate for the ruin and distress caused by proceedings which are asserted to have been so notoriously unjust, that "some distinguished civil servants" refused to take any part in them.‡

Mr. Edmonstone, Mr. Tucker, and a few of the ablest directors at the East India House, protested, but in vain, against the resumption laws, which were acted upon for many years. The venerable Marquess Wellesley, a few weeks before his decease (July 30th, 1842), wrote earnestly to the Earl of Ellenborough (then governor-general), as follows:—

"I am concerned to hear that some inquiry has been commenced respecting the validity of some of the tenures under the permanent settlement of the land revenue. This is a most vexatious, and, surely, not a prudent measure. Here the maxim of sound ancient wisdom applies most forcibly—'*Quicquid non movere.*' We ancient English settlers in Ireland have felt too severely the hand of Strafford, in a similar act of oppression, not to dread any similar proceeding."

Strafford, however, never attempted anything in Ireland that could be compared with the sweeping confiscation which is described as having been carried on in Bengal, where "little respect was paid to the principles of law, either as recognised in England or in India;" and where, "it is said, one commissioner dispossessed, in a single morning, no less than two hundred proprietors."§

In the Chittagong district, an insurrection was nearly caused by "the wholesale sweeping away of the rights of the whole population;" and in the Dacca district, the commission likewise operated very injuriously.||

The general alarm and disaffection excited by these proceedings, so materially affected the public tranquillity, that the Court of Directors was at length compelled to interfere, and the labours of the Bengal commission were fortunately brought to a close some years before the mutiny.¶

The enam commission appointed for the Deccan, was no less harsh and summary in

* Quoted in evidence before Colonization Committee of House of Commons, of 1858.—Fourth Report, published 28th July, 1858; p. 36.

† Statement of the East India Company.

‡ Fourth Report of Colonization Committee, p. 47.

§ *Quarterly Review*, 1858.—Article on "British India," attributed to Mr. Layard: p. 257.

|| See Second Report of Colonization Committee of 1838; p. 60.

¶ *Quarterly Review*, 1858; p. 257.

its proceedings, the results of which are now stated to afford the people their "first and gravest cause of complaint against the government."*

Due investigation ought to have been made in 1818, when the dominions of the Peishwa first became British territory, into the nature of the grants, whether hereditary or for life; and also to discover whether, as was highly probable, many fraudulent claims might not have been established under the weak and corrupt administration of the last native ruler, Bajee Rao. All this might have been done in perfect conformity with the assurance given by the tranquilliser of the Deccan (Mountstuart Elphinstone), that "all wuttuns and enams (birthrights and rent-free lands), annual stipends, religious and charitable establishments, would be protected. The proprietors were, however, warned that they would be called upon to show their sunnuds (deeds of grant), or otherwise prove their title."†

Instead of doing this, the government suffered thirty years to elapse—thus giving the proprietors something of a prescriptive right to their holdings, however acquired; and the Court of Directors, as late as September, 1846, expressly declared, that the principle on which they acted, was to allow enams (or perpetual alienations of public revenue, as contradistinguished from surinjams, or temporary ones) to pass to heirs, as of right, without need of the assent of the paramount power, provided the adoption were regular according to Hindoo law.‡

The rights of widows were likewise distinctly recognised, until the "absorption" policy came into operation; and then investigations into certain tenures were instituted, which paved the way for a general enam commission for the whole Bombay presidency; by which all enamdars were compelled to prove possession for a hundred years, as an indispensable preliminary to being confirmed in the right to transmit their estates to lineal descendants—the future claims of widows and adopted sons being quietly ignored.

The commission was composed, not of judicial officers, but of youths of the civil service, and of captains and subalterns taken from their regiments, and selected princi-

pally on account of their knowledge of the Mahratta languages; while, at the head of the commission, was placed a captain of native infantry, thirty-five years of age.§

These inexperienced youths were, besides, naturally prejudiced in deciding upon cases in which they represented at once the plaintiff and the judge. The greater the ingenuity they displayed in upsetting claims, the greater their chance of future advancement. Every title disallowed, was so much revenue gained. Powers of search, such as were exercised by the French revolutionary committees, and by few others, were entrusted to them; and their agents, accompanied by the police, might at any time of the night or day, enter the houses of persons in the receipt of alienated revenue, or examine and seize documents, without giving either a receipt or list of those taken. The decisions of previous authorities were freely reversed; and titles admitted by Mr. Brown in 1847, were re-inquired into, and disallowed by Captain Cowper in 1855.||

An appeal against a resumptive decree might be laid before the privy council in London; and the rajah of Burdwan succeeded in obtaining the restoration of his lands by this means.¶ But to the poorer class of ousted proprietors, a revised verdict was unattainable. Few could afford to risk from five to ten thousand pounds in litigation against the East India Company. But, whatever their resources, it was making the evils of absentee sovereignty most severely and unwisely felt, to require persons, whose families had occupied Indian estates fifty to a hundred years and upwards, to produce their title-deeds in England; and to make little or no allowance for the various kinds of proof, which, duly weighed, were really more trustworthy, because less easily counterfeited, than any written documents.

The commissioners on whom so onerous a duty as the inquiry into rent-free tenures was imposed, ought at least to have been tried and approved men of high public character, who would neither hurry over cases by the score, nor suffer them to linger on in needless and most harassing delays; as the actual functionaries are accused of

* *Quarterly Review*, p. 259.

† Proclamation of Mr. Elphinstone; and instructions issued to collectors in 1818.

‡ Fourth Report of Colonization Committee, p. 35.

§ *Ibid.*

|| *Quarterly Review*, p. 258. Stated on the authority of "Correspondence relating to the Scrutiny of the revised Surinjam and Pension Lists." Printed for government. Bombay, 1856.

¶ Second Report of Colonization Committee, p. 9.

having done, according to their peculiar propensities. Perhaps it would have been better to have acted on altogether a different system, and acknowledged the claim established by many years of that undisturbed possession which is everywhere popularly looked upon as nine-tenths of the law; and, while recognising all in the positions in which we found them on the assumption of sovereignty, to have claimed from all, either a yearly subsidy or (in pursuance of the practice of native sovereigns) a succession duty. At least, we should thereby have avoided the expense and odium incurred by the institution of a tribunal, to which Lieutenant-governor Halliday's description of our criminal jurisdiction would seem to apply—viz., that it was "a lottery, in which, however, the best chances were with the criminal." On the outbreak of the rebellion, the resumption commission was brought suddenly to a close; its introduction into Guzerat (which had been previously contemplated) was entirely abandoned, and some of the confiscated estates were restored. But the distrust inspired by past proceedings will not easily be removed, especially as the feeling of ill-usage is aggravated by the fact, that in border villages belonging jointly to the Company and to Indian princes, the rent-free lands, on the side belonging to the former, have been resumed, while those on the latter remain intact.*

In the North-West Provinces, the government avoided incurring the stigma of allowing a prescriptive right of possession and transmission to take root through their neglect, by immediately making a very summary settlement. The writings of Sleeman, Raikes, Gubbins and others, together with the evidence brought before the colonization committee, tend to prove the now scarcely disputed fact, that the attempted revenue settlement of the North-West Provinces, and the sweeping away of the proprietary class as middlemen, has proved a failure. With few exceptions, the ancient proprietors, dispossessed of their estates by the revenue collectors, or by sales under decrees of civil courts, have taken advantage of the recent troubles to return, and have been suffered, and even encouraged, to do so by the ryots and small tenants, to whom their dispossession would have appeared most advantageous.†

A number of cases of alleged individual injustice towards the rajahs and talookdars, were collected, and stated, in circumstantial detail, in a minute laid before Mr. Thomason (the lieutenant-governor of Agra in 1844), by Mr. Boulderson, a member of the Board of Revenue; who eventually resigned his position, sooner than be associated in proceedings which he believed to be essentially unjust. His chief ground of complaint was, that the board, instead of instituting a preliminary inquiry into what the rights of talookdars and other proprietors really were, acted upon *à priori* arguments of what they must be; and never, in any one of the many hundred resumptions made at their recommendation, deemed the proofs on which the proceedings rested, worthy of a moment's inquiry.

After reciting numerous instances of dispossession of proprietors who had held estates for many years, and laid out a large amount of capital in their improvement, the writer adds:—

"I have in vain endeavoured, hitherto, to rouse the attention of my colleague and government to this virtual abolition of all law. . . . The respect of the native public I know to have been shaken to an inexpressible degree: they can see facts; and are not blinded by the fallacious reasonings and misrepresentations with which the board have clothed these subjects; and they wonder with amazement at the motives which can prompt the British government to allow their own laws—all laws which give security to property—to be thus belied and set aside. All confidence in property or its rights is shaken; and the villany which has been taught the people they will execute, and reward the government tenfold into their own bosom."‡

In a Preface, dated "London, 8th June, 1858," Mr. Boulderson states, that his minute "produced no effect in modifying or staying the proceedings" of the revenue board; and if "forwarded to England, as in due official course it should have been, it must have had as little effect upon the Hon. Court of Directors."

Even in the Punjab, the system pursued was a levelling one. Notwithstanding all that the Lawrences and their disciples did to mitigate its severity, and especially to conciliate the more powerful and aggrieved chiefs, the result is asserted to have been, to a great extent, the same there as in the Deccan: "the aristocracy and landed gentry who have escaped destruction by the settlement, have been ruined by the resumption of alienated land."§

Thus annexation and resumption, confiscation and absorption, have gone hand-in-

* *Quarterly Review*, p. 259.

† *Ibid.*, p. 251.

‡ Minute on Talookdaree cases; by Mr. Boulderson.

§ *Quarterly Review* (July, 1858), p. 260.

hand, with a rapidity which would have been dangerous even had the end in view and the means of attainment been both unexceptionable. However justly acquired, the entire reorganisation of extensive, widely scattered, and, above all, densely populated territories, must always present difficulties which abstract rules arbitrarily enforced can never satisfactorily overcome.

The fifteen million inhabitants brought by Lord Dalhousie under the immediate government of the British Crown, were to be, from the moment of annexation, ruled on a totally different system: native institutions and native administrators were expected to give place, without a murmur, to the British commissioner and his subordinates; and the newly absorbed territory, whatever its history, the character of its population, its languages and customs, was to be "settled," without any references to these important antecedents, on the theory which found favour with the Calcutta council for the time being.

Many able officials, with much ready money, and a thoroughly efficient army to support them, were indispensable to carry through such a system. In the Punjab, these requisites were obtained at the expense of other provinces; and the picked men sent there, were even then so few in number and so overworked, that they scarcely had time for sleep or food. Their private purse often supplied a public want. Thus, James Abbott was sent by Sir Henry Lawrence to settle the Huzara district, which he did most effectually; going from valley to valley, gaining the confidence of all the tribes, and administering justice in the open air under the trees—looking, with his long grey beard on his breast, and his grey locks far down his shoulders, much more like an ancient patriarch than a deputy-commissioner. "Kākā," or "Uncle" Abbott, as the children called him (in return for the sweetmeats which he carried in readiness for them), took leave of the people in a very characteristic fashion, by inviting the entire population to a feast on the Nara hill, which lasted three nights and days; and he left Huzara with only a month's pay in his pocket, "having literally spent all his substance on the people." His successor, John Becher, ably fills his place, "living in a house with twelve doors, and

all open to the people. * * * The result is, that the Huzara district, once famous for turbulence, is now about the quietest, happiest, and most loyal in the Punjab."* Of course, Kākā Abbott and his successor, much less their lamented head (Sir Henry Lawrence), cannot be taken as average specimens of their class. Such self-devotion is the exception, not the rule: it would be asking too much of human nature, to expect the entire civil service to adopt what Colonel Herbert Edwardes calls the Bahaduree (summer-house) system of administration, and keep their cutcherries open, not "from ten till four" by the regulation clock, but all day, and at any hour of the night that anybody chooses.† Neither can chief commissioners be expected, or even wished, to sacrifice their health as Sir Henry Lawrence did in the Punjab, where, amid all his anxieties for the welfare of the mass, he preserved his peculiar character of being pre-eminently the friend of the man that was down; battling with government for better terms for the deposed officials and depressed aristocracy, and caring even for thieves and convicts. He originated gaol reform; abolished the "night-chain," and other abominations; introduced in-door labour; and himself superintended the new measures—going from gaol to gaol, and rising even at midnight to visit the prisoners' barracks.‡

The manner in which the Punjab was settled is altogether exceptional: the men employed certainly were; so also was the large discretionary power entrusted to them. Elsewhere matters went on very differently. The civil service could not furnish an efficient magistracy for the old provinces, much less for the new; the public treasury could not satisfy the urgent and long reiterated demand for public works, canals to irrigate the land, roads to convey produce, and avert the scourge of famine, even from Bengal: how, then, could it spare ready money to build court-houses and gaols in its new possessions?

Like Aurungzebe, in the Deccan, we swept away existing institutions without being prepared to replace them, and thereby became the occasion of sufferings which we had assumed the responsibility of preventing. Thus, in territories under British government, the want of proper places of

* See the graphic description given by Colonel Herbert Edwardes, of Sir Henry Lawrence's old staff in the Punjab, previous to annexation.—

Quoted in Raikes' *Revolt in the North-West Provinces*, p. 25.

† *Ibid.*, p. 29.

‡ *Ibid.*, p. 34.

confinement is alleged to be so great, that "prisoners of all classes are crammed together into a dungeon so small, that, when the sun goes down, they fight for the little space upon which only a few can lie during the weary night. Within one month, forty die of disease, produced by neglect, want of air, and filth. The rest, driven to despair, attempt an escape; twenty are shot down dead. Such is a picture—and not an imaginary picture—of the results of one of the most recent cases of annexation!"*

Even supposing the above to be an extreme, and, in its degree, an isolated case, yet one such narrative, circulated among the rebel ranks, would serve as a reason for a general breaking open of gaols, and as an incitement and excuse for any excesses on the part of the convicts, to whom, it will be remembered, some of the worst atrocities committed during the rebellion are now generally attributed.

In fact, the increase of territory, of late years, has been (as the Duke of Wellington predicted it would be) greatly in excess of our resources. Annex we might, govern we could not; for, in the words of Prince Metternich, we had not "the material."† That is, we had not the material on which alone we choose to rely. Native agency we cannot indeed dispense with: we could not hold India, or even Calcutta, a week without it; but we keep it down on the lowest steps of the ladder so effectually, that men of birth, talent, or susceptibility, will serve us only when constrained by absolute poverty. They shun the hopeless dead-level which the service of their country is now made to offer them,

Our predecessors in power acted upon a totally different principle. Their title was avowedly that of the sword; yet they delegated authority to the conquered race, with a generosity which puts to shame our exclusiveness and distrust; the more so because it does not appear that their confidence was ever betrayed.

Many of the ablest and most faithful servants of the Great Moguls were Hindoos. The Moslem knew the *prestige* of ancient lineage, and the value of native ability and acquaintance with the resources of the country too well, to let even bigotry stand in the way of their employment.

The command of the imperial armies was repeatedly intrusted to Rajpoot generals; and the dewans (chancellors of the exchequer) were usually Brahmins: the famous territorial arrangements of Akber are inseparably associated with the name of Rajah Todar Mul; and probably, if we had availed ourselves of the aid of native financiers, and made it worth their while to serve us well, our revenue settlements might have been ere now satisfactorily arranged. If Hindoos were found faithful to a Moslem government, why should they not be so to a Christian one, which has the peculiar advantage of being able to balance the two great antagonistic races, by employing each, so as to keep the other in check? Of late, we seem to have been trying to unite them, by giving them a common cause of complaint, and by marking the subordinate position of native officials more offensively than ever. They are accused of corruption—so were the Europeans: let the remedy employed in the latter case be tried in the former, and the result will be probably the same. The need of increased salary is much greater in the case of the native official. Let the government give him the means of supporting himself and his family, and add a prospect of promotion: it will then be well served.

By the present system we proscribe the higher class, and miserably underpay the lower. The result is unsatisfactory to all parties, even to the government; which, though it has become aware of the necessity of paying Europeans with liberality, still withholds from the native "the fair day's wage for the fair day's work." Latterly, the Europeans may have been in some cases overpaid; but the general error seems to have lain, in expecting too much from them; the amount of writing required by the Company's system, being a heavy addition to their labours, especially in the newly annexed territories. The natural consequence has been, that while a certain portion of the civilians, with the late governor-general at their head, lived most laboriously, and devoted themselves wholly to the duties before them; others, less zealous, or less capable, shrunk back in alarm at the prospect before them, and, yielding to the influences of climate and of luxury, fell into the hands of interested subordinates—signed the papers presented by their clerks, and, in the words of their severest censor, "amused

* *Quarterly Review* (July, 1858), p. 273.

† Quoted by Mr. Layard, in a Lecture delivered at St. James's Hall, Piccadilly, on his return from India, May 11th, 1858.

themselves, and kept a servant to wash each separate toe.”*

Under cover of their names, corruption and extortion has been practised to an almost incredible extent. Witness the exposure of the proceedings of provincial courts, published in 1849, by a Bengal civilian, of twenty-one years' standing, under the title of *Revelations of an Orderly*.

An attempt has been made to remedy the insufficient number of civilians, by taking military men from their regiments, and employing them in diplomatic and administrative positions; that is to say, the Indian authorities have tried the Irishman's plan of lengthening the blanket, by cutting off one end and adding it to the other.

The injurious effect which this practice is said to have exercised on the army, is noticed in the succeeding section.

The State of the Indian Army, and the alleged Causes of the Disorganisation and Disaffection of the Bengal Sepoys, remain to be considered. The origin of the native army, and the various phases of its progress, have been described in the earlier chapters of this work. We have seen how the restless Frenchman, Dupleix, raised native levies, and disciplined them in the European fashion at Pondicherry;† and how these were called sepoy (from *sipahi*, Portuguese for soldier), in contradistinction to the *topasses* (or hat-wearers); that is to say, to the natives of Portuguese descent, and the Eurasians, or half-castes, of whom small numbers, disciplined and dressed in the European style, were entertained by the East India Company, to guard their factories. Up to this period, the policy of the Merchant Adventurers had been essentially commercial and defensive; but the French early manifested a political and aggressive spirit. Dupleix read with remarkable accuracy the signs of the times, and understood the opportunity for the aggrandisement of his nation, offered by the rapidly increasing disorganisation of the Mogul empire, and the intestine strife which attended the assertion of independence by usurping governors and tributary princes. He began to take part in the quarrels of neighbouring potentates; and the English levied a native soldiery, and followed his example.

The first engagement of note in which the

British sepoy took part, was at the capture of Devicotta, in 1748, when they made an orderly advance with a platoon of Europeans, as a storming party, under Robert Clive. Three years later, under the same leader, a force of 200 Europeans and 300 sepoy, marched on, regardless of the superstitions of their countrymen, amid thunder and lightning, to besiege Arcot; and having succeeded in taking the place, they gallantly and successfully defended it against an almost overwhelming native force, supported by French auxiliaries.

The augmentation in the number of the sepoy became very rapid in proportion to that of the European troops. The expedition with which Clive and Watson sailed from Madras in 1756, to recapture Calcutta from Surajah Dowlah, consisted of 900 Europeans and 1,500 natives.

The total military force maintained by the English and French on the Madras coast was at this time nearly equal, each comprising about 2,000 Europeans and 10,000 natives. The British European force was composed of H. M.'s 39th foot, with a small detail of Royal Artillery attached to serve the regimental field-pieces; the Madras European regiment, and a strong company of artillery. The sepoy were supplied with arms and ammunition from the public stores, but were clothed in the native fashion, commanded by native officers, and very rudely disciplined.

At the commencement of the year 1757, Clive organised a battalion of sepoy, consisting of some three or four hundred men, carefully selected; and he not only furnished them with arms and ammunition, but clothed, drilled, and disciplined them like the Europeans, appointing a European officer to command, and non-commissioned officers to instruct them. Such was the origin of the first regiment of Bengal native infantry, called, from its equipment, the “Lall Pultun,” or “Red regiment” (pultun being a corruption of the English term “platoon,” which latter is derived from the French word “peloton.”) It was placed under the direction of Lieutenant Knox, who proved a most admirable sepoy leader. There was no difficulty in raising men for this and other corps; for during the perpetually-recurring warfare which marked the Mussulman occupation of Bengal, adventurers had been accustomed to flock thither from Bahar, Oude, the Doab, Rohilcund, and even from beyond the Indus;

* Sir Charles Napier.—*Life and Opinions*.

† See *Indian Empire*, vol. i., pp. 114; 258; 304; 533.

engaging themselves for particular services, and being dismissed when these were performed. It was from such men and their immediate descendants that the British ranks were filled. The majority were Mussulmans; but Patans, Rohillas, a few Jats, some Rajpoots, and even Brahmins were to be found in the early corps raised in and about Calcutta.*

The Madras sepoy, and the newly-raised Bengal battalion, amounting together to 2,100, formed two-thirds of the force with which Clive took the field against Surajah Dowlah at Plassy, in June, 1757. Of these, six Europeans and sixteen Natives perished in the so-called battle, against an army estimated by the lowest calculation at 58,000 men.† Of course, not even Clive, "the daring in war," would have been so mad as to risk an engagement which he might have safely avoided, with such an overwhelming force; but he acted in reliance on the contract previously made with the nawab's ambitious relative and commander-in-chief, Meer Jaffier, who had promised to desert to the British with all the troops under his orders at the commencement of the action, on condition of being recognised as Nawab of Bengal. The compact was fulfilled; and Meer Jaffier's treachery was rewarded by his elevation to the musnud, which the East India Company allowed him to occupy for some years. Meanwhile, the cessions obtained through him having greatly increased their territorial and pecuniary resources, they began to form a standing army for each of the three presidencies, organising the natives into a regular force, on the plan introduced by Clive.

The first instance on record of a Native court-martial occurred in July, 1757. A sepoy was accused of having connived at the attempted escape of a Swiss who had deserted the British ranks, and acted as a spy in the service of the French. The Swiss was hanged. The sepoy was tried by a court composed of the subahdars and jemadars (Native captains and lieutenants) of his detachment, found guilty, and sentenced to receive 500 lashes, and be dismissed from the service—which was accordingly done.

The hostilities carried on against the French, subjected the East India Company's troops to great hardships. The Europeans had

been much injured in health and discipline by repeated accessions of prize-money, and by the habits of drinking and debauchery into which they had fallen. Numbers died; and the remainder had neither ability nor inclination to endure long marches and exposure to the climate. During an expedition in pursuit of a detachment under M. Law, they positively refused to proceed beyond Patna: Major Eyre Coote declared that he would advance with the sepoy alone; which, they rejoined, was "the most desirable event that could happen to them." Major Coote marched on with the sepoy only; but the French succeeded in effecting their escape. The recreants got drunk, and behaved in a very disorderly manner; whereupon thirty of the worst of them were brought before a court-martial, and, by its decree, publicly flogged for mutiny and insubordination.

The sentence was pronounced and executed on the 28th of July, 1757. On the following day, the sepoy, undeterred by the penalty exacted from their European comrades, laid down their arms in a body, and refused to proceed farther. The Madrassees especially complained, that although they had embarked only for service in Calcutta, they had been taken on to Chandernagore, Moorshedabad, and Patna; and that now they were again required to advance, to remove still farther from their families, and endure additional fatigues and privations. They alleged that their pay was in arrears, and that they had not received the amount to which they were entitled. Major Coote warned them of the danger which would accrue from the want of unanimity and discipline among a small force surrounded with enemies, and the hazard to which, by laying down their arms, they exposed the savings they had already accumulated, and the large amount of prize-money then due to them. These considerations prevailed; the men resumed their arms, and marched at once with the artillery to Bankipoor, the European infantry proceeding thither by water.

When Clive first left India, in 1760, the Bengal force consisted of one European battalion of infantry and two companies of artillery (1,000 men in all), and five Native battalions (1,000 men in each.) The number of European officers was at the same time increased: one captain as commandant, one lieutenant and one ensign as staff, with four sergeants, being allowed to each Native

* *Rise and Progress of the Bengal Army*; by Captain Arthur Broome, Bengal Artillery; 1850: vol. i., p. 93.

† See *Indian Empire*, "Table of Battles," vol. i., pp. 460, 461.

battalion. There was likewise a Native commandant, who took post in front with the captain, and a Native adjutant, who remained in the rear with the subalterns.

In 1764, very general disaffection was manifested throughout the army, in consequence of the non-payment of a gratuity promised by the nawab, Meer Jaffier. The European battalion, which was, unfortunately, chiefly composed of foreigners (Dutch, Germans, Hessians, and French), when assembled under arms for a parade on the 30th of January, refused to obey the word of command, declaring, that until the promised donation should be given, they would not perform any further service. The battalion marched off under the leadership of an Englishman named Straw, declaring their intention of joining their comrades then stationed on the Caramnassa, and with them proceeding to Calcutta, and compelling the governor and council to do them justice. This appears to have been really the design of the English mutineers; but the foreigners, who were double their number, secretly intended to join Shuja Dowlah, the nawab-vizier of Oude; and went off with that intention.

The sepoys were at first inclined to follow the example of the Europeans, whose cause of complaint they shared; but the officers succeeded in keeping them quiet in their lines, until the Mogul horse (two troops of which had been recently raised) spread themselves among the Native battalions, and induced about 600 sepoys to accompany the treacherous foreigners.

The European officers rode after the mutineers, and induced their leader Straw, and the greater part of them, to return. Probably they would have done so in a body but for the influence exercised over them by a sergeant named Delamarr, who had been distinguished by intelligence and good conduct in the previous campaign, but who had a private grievance to avenge, having, as he alleged, been promised a commission on leaving the King's and entering the Company's service; which promise had been broken to him, though kept to others similarly circumstanced. This man was born in England of French parents, and spoke both languages with equal facility; on which account he was employed by the officers as a medium of communication with the foreign troops. As long as any of the officers remained with the mutineers, he affected fidelity; but when the last officer, Lieutenant

Eyre, was compelled to relinquish the hope of reclaiming his men, by their threatening to carry him off by force, Delamarr put himself at the head of the party, and gave out an order that any one who should attempt to turn back, should be hanged on the first tree. The order appears to have had a contrary effect to that which it was intended to produce; for the Germans thought the French were carrying the matter too far; and they, with all but three of the few remaining English, returned on the following day, to the number of seventy, accompanied by several sepoys.

Thus the original deserters were diminished to little more than 250, of whom 157 were of the European battalion (almost all Frenchmen), sixteen were of the European cavalry, and about 100 were Natives, including some of the Mogul horse. They proceeded to join the army of Shuja Dowlah of Oude; and some of them entered his service, and that of other Indian potentates; but the majority enlisted in Sumroo's brigade.*

On the 12th of February (the day following the mutiny), a dividend of the nawab's donation was declared as about to be paid to the army, in the proportion of forty rupees to each European soldier, and six to each sepoy. The sepoys were extremely indignant at the rate of allotment: they unanimously refused to receive the proffered sum, and assembled under arms on the 13th of February, at nine in the forenoon. The Europeans were very much excited; and it became difficult "to restrain their violence, and prevent their falling upon the sepoys, for presuming to follow the example they themselves had afforded."†

Suddenly the sepoys set up a shout, and rushed down, in an irregular body, towards the Europeans, who had been drawn up in separate companies across the parade, with the park of artillery on their left, and two 6-pounders on their right.

Captain Jennings, the officer in command, perceiving that the sepoys were moving with shouldered arms, directed that they should be suffered to pass through the intervals of the battalion, if they would do so quietly. Several officers urged resistance; but Captain Jennings felt that the discharge of a single musket would be the signal for a fearful struggle, which must end either in the extermination of the Europeans, or in the total dissolution of the

* *Indian Empire*, vol. i., p. 297.

† Broome's *Benaul Army*, vol. i. n. 420.

Native force, on which the government were deeply dependent. He rode along the ranks, urging the men to be quiet; and arrived at the right of the line just in time to snatch the match out of the hand of a subaltern of artillery, as he was putting it to a 6-pounder, loaded with grape.

The result justified his decision. Two corps (the late 2nd grenadiers and 8th Native infantry) went off towards the Camrassa river. The other two Native battalions present (the late 1st and 3rd Native infantry), remained behind—the one perfectly steady, the other clamorous and excited. The remaining three detached battalions all exhibited signs of disaffection. Captain Jennings, with the officers of the mutinous corps, followed them, and induced every man of them to return, by consenting to their own stipulation, that their share of the donation should be raised to half that of the corresponding ranks of the European battalion. This concession being made generally known, tranquillity was at once re-established.

The question of the better adaptation of the natives of India to serve as regular or irregular cavalry, was discussed. The council considered that a body of regular Native cavalry might be raised on the European system, under English officers. Major Carnac objected on the following grounds:—"The Moguls," he said, "who are the only good horsemen in the country, can never be brought to submit to the ill-treatment they receive from gentlemen wholly unacquainted with their language and customs. We clearly see the ill effects of this among our sepoys, and it will be much more so among horsemen, who deem themselves of a far superior class; nor have we a sufficiency of officers for the purpose: I am sorry to say, not a single one qualified to afford a prospect of success to such a project." These arguments prevailed. The Mogul horse was increased, during the year (1764), to 1,200 men each risallah (or troop) under Native officers, with a few Europeans to the whole.

The number of the Native infantry was also rapidly on the increase; but their position and rights remained on a very indefinite footing, when Major Hector Munro succeeded to the command of the Bengal army in August, 1764. In the following month a serious outbreak occurred. The oldest corps in the service, then known as the 9th, or Captain Galliez' battalion, but afterwards the 1st Native infantry, while stationed at

Manjee (near Chupra), instigated by some of their Native officers, assembled on parade, and declared themselves resolved to serve no longer, as certain promises made to them (apparently regarding the remainder of the donation money) had been broken. They retained their arms, and imprisoned their European officers for a night; but released them on the following morning.

There did not then exist, nor has there since been framed, any law decreeing gradations of punishment in a case which clearly admits of many gradations of crime. It has been left to the discretion of the military authorities for the time being, to punish what Sir Charles Napier calls "passive, respectful mutinies," with sweeping severity, or to let attempted desertion to the enemy, and sanguinary treachery, escape almost unpunished.

The present proceeding resembled the outbreak of spoilt children, rather than of concerted mutiny.* No intention to desert was shown, much less to join the enemy. Such conduct had been before met with perhaps undue concessions. Major Munro now resolved to attempt stopping it by measures of extreme severity. Accordingly he held a general court-martial; and on receiving its verdict for the execution of twenty-four of the sepoys, he ordered it to be carried out immediately. The sentence was, "to be blown away from the guns"—the horrible mode of inflicting capital punishment so extensively practised of late.

Four grenadiers claimed the privilege of being fastened to the right-hand guns. They had always occupied the post of honour in the field, they said; and Major Munro admitted the force of the argument by granting their request. The whole army were much affected by the bearing of the doomed men. "I am sure," says Captain Williams, who then belonged to the Royal Marines employed in Bengal, and who was an eye-witness of this touching episode, "there was not a dry eye among the Marines, although they had been long accustomed to hard service, and two of them had actually been on the execution party which shot Admiral Byng, in the year 1757."† Yet Major Munro gave the signal, and the explosion followed. When the loathsome results became apparent—the mangled limbs scattered far and wide, the strange burning

* Broome's *Bengal Army*, vol. i., p. 459.

† Captain Williams' *Bengal Native Infantry*, p. 170.

smell, the fragments of human flesh, the trickling streams of blood, constituted a scene almost intolerable to those who witnessed it for the first time. The officers commanding the sepoy battalions came forward, and represented that their men would not suffer any further executions; but Major Munro persevered. The other convicted mutineers attempted no appeal to their comrades, but met their deaths with the utmost composure.

This was the first example, on a large scale, of the infliction of the penalty of death for mutiny. Heretofore there had been no plan, and no bloodshed in the numerous outbreaks. Subsequently they assumed an increasingly systematic and sanguinary character.

On the return of Clive to India in 1765 (as Lord Clive, Baron of Plassey), the Bengal army was reorganised, and divided into three brigades—respectively stationed at Monghyr, Allahabad, and Bankipoor. Each brigade consisted of one company of artillery, one regiment of European infantry, one risallah, or troop, of Native cavalry, and seven battalions of sepoys.

Each regiment of European infantry was constituted of the following strength:—

1 Colonel commanding the whole Brigade.	
1 Lieutenant-colonel commanding the Regiment.	
1 Major.	36 Sergeants.
6 Captains.	36 Corporals.
1 Captain Lieutenant.	27 Drummers.
9 Lieutenants.	630 Privates.
18 Ensigns.	

The artillery comprised four companies, each of which contained—

1 Captain.	4 Corporals.
1 Captain Lieutenant.	2 Drummers.
1 First Lieutenant.	2 Fifers.
1 Second Lieutenant.	10 Bombardiers.
3 Lieut. Fireworkers.	20 Gunners.
4 Sergeants.	60 Matrosses.

Each risallah of Native cavalry consisted of—

1 European Subaltern in command.	
1 Sergeant-major.	3 Jemadars.
4 Sergeants.	2 Naggars.
1 Risaldar.	6 Duffadars.
	100 Privates.

A Native battalion consisted of—

1 Captain.	30 Jemadars.
2 Lieutenants.	1 Native Adjutant.
2 Ensigns.	10 Trumpeters.
3 Sergeants.	30 Tom-toms.*
3 Drummers.	80 Havildars.
1 Native Commandant.	50 Naiks.
10 Native Subadars.	690 Sepoys.

* That is, Tom-tom (native drum) players.

† Broome's *Bengal Army*, vol. i., p. 540.

Captain Broome, from whom the above details are derived, remarks, "that the proportion of officers, except to the sepoy battalions, was very much more liberal than in the present day; and it is most important to remember, that every officer on the list was effective—all officers on other than regimental employ, being immediately struck off the roll of the corps; although, as there was but one roster for promotion in the whole infantry, no loss in that respect was sustained thereby. The artillery and engineers rose in a separate body, and were frequently transferred from one to the other."†

The pay of the sepoy was early fixed at seven rupees per month in all stationary situations, and eight rupees and a-half when marching, or in the field; exclusive of half a rupee per month, allotted to the off-reckoning fund, for which they received one coat, and nothing more, annually. From that allowance they not only fed and clothed themselves, but also erected cantonments in all stationary situations, at their own expense, and remitted to their wives and families, often to aged parents and more distant relatives, a considerable proportion of their pay; in fact, so considerable, that the authorities have been obliged to interfere to check their extreme self-denial.‡

In 1766, the mass of the British officers of the Bengal army entered into a very formidable confederacy against the government, on account of the withdrawal of certain extra allowances, known as "double batta." The manner in which Lord Clive then used the sepoys to coerce the Europeans, has been already narrated.§

The first epoch in the history of the Bengal army may be said to end with the final departure of Clive (its founder) from India, in 1767. Up to this time, no question of caste appears to have been mooted, as interfering with the requirements of military duty, whether ordinary or incidental; but as the numbers of the sepoys increased, and the proportion of Hindoos began to exceed that of Mussulmans, a gradual change took place. A sea voyage is a forbidden thing to a Brahminist; it is a violation of his religious code, under any circumstances: he must neglect the frequent ablutions which his creed enjoins, and to which he has been accustomed from childhood; and if he do not irrecoverably forfeit his caste, it must be by enduring severe privations in regard to food

† Williams' *Bengal Native Infantry*, p. 263.

§ See *Indian Empire*, vol. i., p. 305.

while on board ship. The influence of the officers, however, generally sufficed to overcome the scruples of the men; and, in 1769, three Bengal battalions prepared to return by sea from the Madras presidency to Bengal. Two grenadier companies embarked for the purpose, and are supposed to have perished; for the ship which they entered was never heard of afterwards. This event made a deep impression on the minds of the Hindoos, confirmed their superstitious dread of the sea, and aggravated the mingled fear and loathing, which few Englishmen, except when actually rounding the "Cape of Storms," or becalmed in a crowded vessel in the Red Sea, can understand sufficiently to make allowance for.

In 1782, a mutiny occurred at Barrackpoor, in consequence of the troops stationed there being ordered to prepare for foreign service, which it was rumoured would entail a sea voyage. No violence was attempted; no turbulence was evinced; the men quietly combined, under their Native officers, in refusing to obey the orders, which the government had no means of enforcing. After the lapse of several weeks, a general court-martial was held. Two Native officers, and one or two sepoys, were blown from the guns. The whole of the four corps concerned (then known as the 4th, 15th, 17th, and 31st) were broken up, and the men drafted into other battalions.

In 1787, Lord Cornwallis arrived in India, as governor-general and commander-in-chief. He earnestly desired to dissipate, by gentle means, the prejudices which marred the efficiency of the Native army; and he offered a bounty of ten rupees per man, with other advantages, to such as would volunteer for service on an expedition to Sumatra. The required four companies were obtained; the promised bounty was paid previous to embarkation; every care was taken to ensure abundant supplies of food and water for sustenance and ablution; the detachment was conveyed on board a regular Indiaman at the end of February; and was recalled in the following October. Unfortunately the return voyage was tedious and boisterous: the resolute abstinence of the Hindoos from all nutriment save dry peas and rice, and the exposure consequent on the refusal of the majority to quit the deck night or day, on account of the number of sick below, occasioned many to be afflicted with *nyctalopia*, or night-blindness; and deaths were numerous. Notwithstand-

ing this, the care and tact of the officers, and the praise and gratuities which awaited the volunteers on relanding, appear to have done much to reconcile them to the past trial, and even to its repetition if need were.

The government thought the difficulty overcome, and were confirmed in their opinion by the offers of proceeding by sea made during the Mysoor war. In 1795, it became desirable to send an expedition to Malacca, whereupon a proposition was made to the 15th battalion (a corps of very high character), through its commanding officer, Captain Ludovick Grant, to volunteer for the purpose. The influence of the officers apparently prevailed; the men were reported as willing to embark; but, at the last moment, a determined mutiny broke out, and the 29th battalion was called out, with its field-pieces, to disperse the mutineers. The colours of the 15th were burnt; and the number ordered to be left a blank in the list of Native corps.* Warned by this occurrence, the government proceeded to raise a "Marine battalion,"† consisting of twelve companies of a hundred privates each; and it became generally understood, if not indeed officially stated, that the ordinary Bengal troops were not to be sent on sea voyages.

A corps of Native militia was raised for Calcutta and the adjacent districts, and placed, in the first instance, under the town major. It consisted of eighty companies of ninety privates; but was subsequently augmented to sixteen or more companies of one hundred privates each. Captain Williams, writing in 1816, says—"It is now commanded by an officer of any rank, who may be favoured with the patronage of the governor-general, with one other European officer, who performs the duty of adjutant to the corps."‡ Several local corps were formed about the same time.

Some important changes were made in the constitution of the Bengal army in 1796; one effect of which was to diminish the authority and influence of the Native officers. The staff appointment of Native adjutants was abolished, and a European adjutant was appointed to each battalion. The principle of regimental rank and promotion (to the rank of major, inclusive), was

* A regiment was raised in Bahar, in 1798, and numbered the 15th.

† Formed into the 20th, or Marine regiment, in 1801.

‡ *Bengal Native Infantry*, p. 243.

adopted throughout the E. I. Company's forces; and, contrary to the former arrangement, the whole of the staff of the government and of the army, inclusive of a heavy commissariat, with the numerous officers on furlough in Europe, and those employed with local corps, and even in diplomatic situations, were thenceforth borne on the strength as component parts of companies and corps. Thus, even at this early period, the complaint (so frequently reiterated since) is made by Captain Williams, that the charge of companies often devolved on subalterns utterly unqualified, by professional or local acquirements, for a situation of such authority over men to whose character, language, and habits they are strangers.*

The rise, and gradual increase, of the armies of the Madras and Bombay presidencies, did not essentially differ from that of the Bengal troops, excepting that the total number of the former was much smaller, and the proportion of Mohammedans and high-caste Brahmins considerably lower than in the latter. The three armies were kept separate, each under its own commander-in-chief. Many inconveniences attend this division of the forces of one ruling power. It has been a barrier to the centralisation which the bureaucratic spirit of the Supreme government of Calcutta has habitually fostered; and attempts have been made, more or less directly, for an amalgamation of the three armies. The Duke of Wellington thoroughly understood the bearing of the question, and his decided opinion probably contributed largely to the maintenance of the chief of the barriers which have prevented the contagion of Bengal mutiny from extending to Bombay and Madras, and hindered the fraternisation which we may reasonably suspect would otherwise have been general, at least among the Hindoos. The more united the British are, the better, no doubt; but the more distinct nationalities are kept up in India, the safer for us: every ancient landmark we remove, renders the danger of combination against us more imminent.

The Madras and Bombay sepoy, throughout their career, have had, like those of Bengal, occasional outbreaks of mutiny, the usual cause being an attempt to send them on expeditions which necessitated a sea voyage.

* Williams' *Bengal Native Infantry*, p. 253.

† Parliamentary evidence of Sir J. Malcolm in 1832.

‡ *Ibid.*

Thus, in 1779, or 1780, a mutiny occurred in the 9th Madras battalion when ordered to embark for Bombay; which, however, was quelled by the presence of mind and decision of the commandant, Captain Kelly. A fatal result followed the issue of a similar order for the embarkation of some companies of a corps in the Northern Circars. The men, on arriving at Vizagapatam (the port where they were to take shipping), rose upon their European officers, and shot all save one or two, who escaped to the ship.†

One motive was strong enough to overcome this rooted dislike to the sea; and that was, affection for the person, and confidence in the skill and fortune, of their commanding officer. Throughout the Native forces, the fact was ever manifest, that their discipline or insubordination, their fidelity or faithlessness, depended materially on the influence exercised by their European leaders. Sir John Malcolm, in his various writings, affords much evidence to this effect. Among many other instances, he cites that of a battalion of the 22nd Madras regiment, then distinguished for the high state of discipline to which they had been brought by their commanding officer, Lieutenant-colonel James Oram. In 1797, he proposed to his corps, on parade, to volunteer for an expedition then preparing against Manila. "Will he go with us?" was the question which went through the ranks. "Yes!" "Will he stay with us?" Again, "yes!" and the whole corps exclaimed, "To Europe, to Europe!" They were ready to follow Colonel Oram anywhere—to the shores of the Atlantic as cheerfully as to an island of the Eastern Ocean. Such was the contagion of their enthusiasm, that several sepoy, who were missing from one of the battalions in garrison at Madras, were found to have deserted to join the expedition.‡

The personal character of Lord Lake contributed greatly to the good service rendered by the Bengal sepoy (both Hindoo and Mohammedan) in the arduous Mahratta war of 1803-'4. He humoured their prejudices, flattered their pride, and praised their valour; and they repaid him by unbounded attachment to his person, and the zealous fulfilment of their public duty. Victorious or defeated, the sepoy knew their efforts were equally sure of appreciation by the commander-in-chief. His conduct to the shattered corps of Colonel Monson's detachment, after their

gallant but disastrous retreat before Holcar,* was very remarkable. He formed them into a reserve, and promised them every opportunity of signalling themselves. No confidence was ever more merited. Throughout the service that ensued, these corps were uniformly distinguished.

The pay of the forces in the last century was frequently heavily in arrears, and both Europeans and Natives were driven, by actual want, to the verge of mutiny. The Bombay troops, in the early wars with Mysoor, suffered greatly from this cause; and yet none ever showed warmer devotion to the English. When, on the capture of Bednore, General Matthews and his whole force surrendered to Tippoo, every inducement was offered to tempt the sepoys to enter the sultan's service; but in vain. During the march, they were carefully separated from the European prisoners at each place of encampment, by a tank or other obstacle, supposed to be insurmountable. It did not prove so, however; for one of the captive officers subsequently declared, that not a night elapsed but some of the sepoys contrived to elude the vigilance of the guards by swimming the tanks (frequently some miles in circumference), or eluding the sentries; bringing with them such small sums as they could save from the pittance allowed by the sultan, for their own support, in return for hard daily labour, to eke out the scanty food of the Europeans. "We can live upon anything," they said; "but you require mutton and beef." At the peace of 1783, 1,500 of the released captives marched 500 miles to Madras, and there embarked on a voyage of six or eight weeks, to rejoin the army to which they belonged at Bombay.†

Similar manifestations of attachment were given by the various Native troops of the three presidencies; their number, and proportion to the Europeans, increasing with the extension of the Anglo-Indian empire. In 1800, the total force comprised 22,832 Europeans, and 115,300 Natives of all denominations; the Europeans being chiefly Royal troops belonging to the regular cavalry and infantry regiments, which were sent to India for periods varying from twelve to twenty years. As the requirements of government augmented with every addition of territory, the restrictions of caste became daily more

obnoxious; and attempts, for the most part very ill-judged, were made to break through them. Certain regulations, trivial in themselves, excited the angry suspicions of the sepoys, as to the latent intentions of government; and the sons of Tippoo Sultan (then state-prisoners at Vellore), through their partisans, fomented the disaffection, which issued in the mutiny of 1806, in which thirteen European officers and eighty-two privates were killed, and ninety-two wounded.‡

In 1809, another serious outbreak occurred in the Madras presidency, in which the Native troops played only a secondary part, standing by their officers against the government. The injudicious manner in which Sir George Barlow had suppressed an allowance known as "tent-contract," previously made to Europeans in command of Native regiments, spread disaffection throughout the Madras force. Auber, the annalist of the East India Company, gives very few particulars of this unsatisfactory and discreditable affair; but he mentions the remarkable fidelity displayed by Purneah, the Dewan of Mysoor (chosen, and earnestly supported, by Colonel Wellesley, after the conquest of that country.) The field-officer in charge of the fortress of Seringapatam, tried to corrupt Purneah, and even held out a threat regarding his property, and that belonging to the boy-rajah in the fort. The dignified rejoinder was, that the British government was the protector of the rajah and his minister; and that, let what would happen, he (Purneah) would always remain faithful to his engagements.§

A skirmish actually took place between the mutineers and the king's troops. Lord Minto (the governor-general) hastened to Madras, and, by a mixture of firmness and conciliation, restored order, having first obtained the unconditional submission of all concerned in the late proceedings; that is to say, the great majority of the Madras officers in the Company's service.

The refusal of the 47th Bengal regiment to march from Barrackpore in 1825, on the expedition to Burmah, is fully accounted for by the repugnance of the sepoys to embarkation having been aggravated by the insufficient arrangements made for them by the commissariat department. The authorities punished, in a most sanguinary man-

* *Indian Empire*, vol. i., p. 400.

† Sir John Malcolm's *Government of India*. London: John Murray, 1833; p. 210.

‡ See *Indian Empire*, vol. i., p. 407.

§ Auber's *British Power in India*, vol. ii., pp. 476, 477.

ner, conduct which their own negligence had provoked.*

An important change was introduced into the Native army, under the administration of Lord William Bentinck (who was appointed commander-in-chief as well as governor-general in 1833), by the abolition of flogging, which had previously been inflicted with extreme frequency and severity. Sir Charles Napier subsequently complained of this measure, on the ground of its leaving no punishment available when the army was before the enemy. The limited authority vested in the officers, increased the difficulty of maintaining discipline, by making expulsion from the service the sole punishment of offenders who deserved perhaps a day's hard labour. Sir Charles adds—"But I have been in situations where I could not turn them out, for they would either starve or have their throats cut; so I did all my work by the provost-marshal." His favourite pupil, "the war-bred Sir Colin Campbell," appears to have been driven to the same alternative to check looting.

The change which has come over the habits of both military men and civilians during the present century, has been already shown. Europeans have gradually ceased to take either wives or concubines from among the natives: they have become, in all points, more exclusive; and as their own number has increased, so also has their regard for conventionalities, which, while yet strangers in the land—few and feeble—they had been content to leave in abeyance. The effect on Indian society, and especially on the army, is evident. The intercourse between the European and Native officers has become yearly less frequent and less cordial. The acquisition of Native languages is neglected; or striven for, not as a means of obtaining the confidence of the sepoys, but simply as a stepping-stone to distinction in the numerous civil positions which the rapid extension of territory, the paucity of the civil service, and the rejection of Native agency, has thrown open to their ambition. There is, inevitably, a great deal of sheer drudgery in the ordinary routine of regimental duty; but it surely was not wise to aggravate the distaste which its

performance is calculated to produce, by adopting a system which makes long continuance in a regiment a mark of incapacity.

The military and civil line of promotion is, to a great extent, the same. An Indian military man is always supposed to be fit for anything that offers. He can be "an inspector of schools, an examiner in political economy, an engineer, a surveyor, an architect, an auditor, a commissary, a resident, or a governor."† Political, judicial, and scientific appointments are all open to him; and the result, no doubt, is, that Indian officers, in many instances, show a versatility of talent unknown elsewhere.

But through teaching officers to look to staff appointments and civil employ for advancement, the military profession is described as having fallen into a state of disparagement. Officers who have not acquitted themselves well in the civil service are "remanded to their regiments," as if they were penal corps; and those who remain with their regiments, suffer under a sense of disappointment and wounded self-esteem, which makes it impossible for them to have their heart in the work.‡

The employment of the army to do the civil work, was declared by Napier to be "the great military evil of India;" the officers occupying various diplomatic situations, the sepoys acting as policemen, gaolers, and being incessantly employed in detachments for the escort of treasure from the local treasuries, to the manifest injury of their discipline. "Sir Thomas Munro," he adds, "thought three officers were sufficient for regiments. This is high authority; yet I confess to thinking him wrong; or else, which is very possible, the state of the army and the style of the officer have changed, not altogether better nor altogether worse, but become different."

There is, probably, much truth in this suggestion. The character of the Native officers and sepoys, as well as that of the Europeans, had changed since the days of Munro. The Bengal army had grown, with the Bengal presidency, into an exclusively high-caste institution. The men were chiefly Brahmins and Rajpoots, or Mussulmans—handsome, stately men, higher by the head and shoulders than the Madrassees or Mahrattas; immeasurably higher in caste. Great care was taken to avoid low-caste recruits; still more, outcasts and Christians. In this respect, most exaggerated deference was paid to religious prejudices which, in

* *Indian Empire*, vol. i., p. 424. Thornton's *India*, vol. iv., p. 113.

† *Times*, 15th July, 1857. Letter from Bombay correspondent.

‡ *Indophilus' Letters to the Times*, p. 15.

other points, were recklessly infringed. In Bombay and Madras, no such distinctions were made. Recruits were enlisted without regard to caste; and the result was, a mixture much less adapted to combine for the removal of common grievances. A Native army, under foreign rule, can hardly have been without these: but so flattering a description was given of the Indian troops, that, until their rejection of our service, and subsequent deadly hostility, raised suspicions of "a long-continued course of mismanagement,"* little attention was paid to those who suggested the necessity of radical reforms.

Yet Sir John Malcolm pointed out, as early as 1799, the injustice of a system which allowed no Native soldier the most distant prospect of rising to rank, distinction, or affluence; and this "extraordinary fact" he believed to be "a subject of daily comment among the Native troops."†

The evil felt while the Indian army was comparatively small, could not but increase in severity in proportion to the augmentation of the sepoys, who, in 1851, amounted to 240,121, out of 289,529 men; the remainder being Europeans. Meanwhile, the extinction of Indian states and of national armies had been rapidly progressing. The disbanded privates (at least such of them as entered the British ranks) may have benefited by the change; regular pay and a retiring pension compensating them for the possibility of promotion and the certainty of laxer discipline, with license in the way of loot (plunder.) But the officers were heavy losers by the change. In treating of the causes of the mutiny, Mr. Martin Gubbins says, that in the Punjab, "the father may have received 1,000 rupees per mensem, as commandant of cavalry, under Runjeet Sing; the son draws a pay of eighty rupees as sub-commander, in the service of the British government. The difference is probably thought by themselves to be too great." In support of this guarded admission, he proceeds to adduce evidence of the existence of the feeling suggested by him as probable, by citing the reproachful exclamation of a Seik risaldar, conspicuous for good conduct during the insurrection—"My father used to receive 500 rupees a-month in command of a party of Runjeet Sing's horse; I receive but fifty."‡

* Speech of Lord Ellenborough: Indian debate, July 13th, 1857. The Duke of Argyll, and others, said, that "there could be no doubt there had been some mismanagement."—*Ibid.*, July 27th, 1858.

Sir Charles Napier returned to India, as commander-in-chief of the Anglo-Indian armies, on the 6th of May, 1849. He was sent out for the express purpose of carrying on the war in the Punjab; but it had been successfully terminated before his arrival. He made a tour of inspection, and furnished reports to government on the condition of the troops; which contained statements calculated to excite grave anxiety, and prophecies of evil which have been since fulfilled.

He pointed out excessive luxury among the officers, and alienation from the Native soldiery, as fostering the disaffection occasioned among the latter by sudden reductions of pay, accompanied by the increased burthen of civil duties, consequent on the rapid extension of territory.

It was, however, not until after positive mutiny had been developed, that he recognised the full extent of the evils, which he then searched out, and found to be sapping the very foundation of the Indian army.

Writing to General Caulfield (one of his few friends in the East India direction) in November, 1849, he calls the sepoy "a glorious soldier, not to be corrupted by gold, or appalled by danger;" and he adds—"I would not be afraid to go into action with Native troops, and without Europeans, provided I had the training of them first."§

In a report addressed to the governor-general in the same month, the following passage occurs:—

"I have heard that Lord Hardinge objected to the assembling of the Indian troops, for fear they should conspire. I confess I cannot see the weight of such an opinion. I have never met with an Indian officer who held it, and I certainly do not hold it myself; and few men have had more opportunities of judging of the armies of all three presidencies than I have. Lord Hardinge saw but the Bengal army, and that only as governor-general, and for a short time; I have studied them for nearly eight years, constantly at the head of Bengal and Bombay sepoys, and I can see nothing to fear from them, *except when ill-used*; and even then they are less dangerous than British troops would be in similar circumstances. I see no danger in their being massed, and very great danger in their being spread over a country as they now are: on the contrary, I believe that, by concentrating the Indian army as I propose, its spirit, its devotion, and its powers will all be increased."||

The above extract tends to confirm the general belief, that the private opinion of Lord Hardinge, regarding the condition of

† Kaye's *Life of Malcolm*, vol. i., p. 96.

‡ Gubbins' *Mutinies in Oudh*, p. 98.

§ Sir Charles Napier's *Life*, vol. iv., pp. 212, 213.

|| Parl. Paper (Commons), 30th July, 1857.

the army, was less satisfactory than he chose to avow in public. Lord Melville has given conclusive evidence on the subject by stating, from his personal acquaintance with the ex-commander-in-chief, that—"Entertaining the worst opinion privately, Lord Hardinge never would express it publicly, trying thereby to bolster up a bad system, on the ground of the impolicy of making public the slight thread by which we held our tenure of that empire."* Napier, who never kept back or qualified his views, soon saw reason to declare, that "we were sitting on a mine, and nobody could tell when it might explode."† The circumstances which led him to this unsatisfactory conclusion were these. After the annexation of the Punjab, the extra allowance formerly given to the troops on service there, was summarily withdrawn, on the ground that the country was no longer a foreign one. The 22nd Native infantry stationed at Rawul Pindie refused the reduced pay. The 13th regiment followed the example; and an active correspondence took place between these corps, and doubtless extended through the Bengal army; for there are news-writers in every regiment, who communicate all intelligence to their comrades at headquarters.‡

Colonel Benson, of the military board, proposed to Lord Dalhousie to disband the two regiments; but the commander-in-chief opposed the measure, as harsh and impolitic. Many other regiments were, he said, certainly involved: the government could not disband an army; it was, therefore, best to treat the cases as isolated ones, while that was possible; for, he added, "if we attempt to bully large bodies, they will do the same by us, and a fight must ensue."§ The governor-general concurred in this opinion. The insubordination at Rawul Pindie was repressed without bloodshed, by the officer in command, Sir Colin Campbell; and the matter was treated as one of accidental restricted criminality, not affecting the mass.

Sir Charles Napier visited Delhi, which he considered the proper place for our great magazines, and well fitted, from its central position, to be the head-quarters of the

artillery—the best point from whence to send forth troops and reinforcements. Here, too, the spirit of mutiny manifested itself; the 41st Native infantry refusing to enter the Punjab without additional allowances as heretofore; and twenty-four other regiments, then under orders for the same province, were rumoured to be in league with the 41st. The latter regiment was, however, tranquillised, and induced to march, by what Sir William Napier terms "dexterous management, and the obtaining of furloughs, which had been unfairly and recklessly withheld."

At Vizierabad the sepoys were very sullen, and were heard to say they only waited the arrival of the relieving regiments, and would then act together. Soon after this, the 66th, a relief regiment on the march from Lucknow (800 miles from Vizierabad), broke into open mutiny near Amritsir, insulted their officers, and attempted to seize the strong fortress of Govindghur, which then contained about £100,000 in specie. The 1st Native cavalry were fortunately on the spot; and being on their return to India, were not interested in the extra-allowance question. They took part with the Europeans; and, dismounting, seized the gates, which the strength and daring of a single officer (Captain M'Donald) had alone prevented from being closed, and which the mutineers, with fixed bayonets, vainly sought to hold. This occurred in February, 1850. Lord Dalhousie was not taken by surprise. Writing to Sir Charles Napier, he had declared himself "prepared for discontent among the Native troops, on coming into the Punjab under diminished allowances; and well satisfied to have got so far through without violence." "The sepoy," he added, "has been over-petted and overpaid of late, and has been led on, by the government itself, into the entertainment of an expectation, and the manifestation of a feeling, which he never held in former times."||

This was written before the affair at Govindghur; and in the meantime, Sir Charles had seen "strong ground to suppose the mutinous spirit general in the Bengal army."¶ He believed that the Brahmans

* Letter to General Sir William Gomm, July 15th, 1857.—*Times*, July 21st, 1857. † *Ibid.*

‡ Evidence of Colonel Greenhill.—Parl. Committee, 1832-'3.

§ Sir Charles Napier's *Life*, vol. iv., p. 227.

|| *Ibid.*, pp. 216; 269; 427.

¶ Two great explosions of ammunition have been mentioned in connexion with the mutinous feeling of the period; one at Benares, of 3,000 barrels of powder, in no less than thirty boats, which killed upwards of 1,200 people: by the other, of 1,800 barrels, no life was lost.

were exerting their influence over the Hindoos most injuriously; and learned, with alarm, a significant circumstance which had occurred during the Seik war. Major Neville Chamberlaine, hearing some sepoy's grumbling about a temporary hardship, exclaimed, "Were I the general, I would disband you all." A Brahmin havildar replied, "If you did, we would all go to our villages, and you should not get any more to replace us." Napier viewed this remark as the distinct promulgation of a principle upon which the sepoy's were even then prepared to act. The Brahmins he believed to be secretly nourishing the spirit of insubordination; and unless a counterpoise could be found to their influence, it would be hazardous in the extreme to disband the 66th regiment, at the risk of inciting other corps to declare, "They are martyrs for us; we, too, will refuse;" and of producing a bayonet struggle with caste for mastery. "Nor was the stake for which the sepoy contended a small one—exclusive of the principle of an army dictating to the government: they struck for twelve rupees instead of seven—nearly double! When those in the Punjab got twelve by meeting, those in India Proper would not long have served on seven."*

The remedy adopted by Napier, was to replace the mutinous 66th with one of the irregular Goorka battalions;† and he expressed his intention of extensively following up this plan, in the event of the disbandment of further regiments becoming necessary. "I would if I could," he says, "have 25,000 of them; which, added to our own Europeans, would form an army of 50,000 men, and, well handled, would neutralise any combination amongst the sepoy's."

The Goorkas themselves he describes as of small stature, with huge limbs, resembling Attila's Huns; "brave as men can be, but horrid little savages, accustomed to use a weapon called a *kookery*, like a straightened reaping-hook, with which they made three cuts—one across the shoulders, the next across the forehead, the third a ripping-up one."

The Nusseeree battalion, chosen to replace the 66th, welcomed, with frantic shouts of joy, the proposal of entering the regular army, and receiving seven rupees a

month, instead of four rupees eight annas; which sum, according to their commanding officer, had been actually insufficient for their support. What the European officers of the 66th thought of the substitution does not appear; but Lord Dalhousie, while approving the disbandment of the mutineers, disapproved of the introduction of the Goorkas. The commander-in-chief was at the same time reprimanded for having, in January, 1850 (pending a reference to the Supreme government), suspended the operation of a regulation regarding compensation for rations; which he considered, in the critical state of affairs, likely to produce mutiny. This regulation, says Sir W. Napier, "affected the usual allowance to the sepoy's for purchasing their food, according to the market prices of the countries in which they served: it was recent; was but partially known; was in itself unjust; and became suddenly applicable at Vizierabad, where it was entirely unknown." General Hearsey, commander at Vizierabad, and Generals Gilbert and Colin Campbell, deprecated its enforcement as most impolitic, and calculated, in the sullen temper of the sepoy's, to produce a mutiny; and, in fact, only twelve days elapsed before the Govindghur outbreak occurred. The amount of money involved in the temporary suspension was only £10; but even had it been much greater, if a commander-in-chief could not, in what he believed to be a crisis, and what there is little doubt really was one, be allowed to use his discretion on a subject so immediately within his cognizance, he had, indeed, a heavy weight of responsibility to bear, without any commensurate authority. A less impetuous spirit than that of the "fiery Napier," would have felt no better than a "huge adjutant-general," when informed that he "would not again be permitted, *under any circumstances*, to issue orders which should change the pay and allowances of the troops in India, and thus practically to exercise an authority which had been reserved, and most properly reserved, for the Supreme government alone."‡

The general at once sent in his resignation (May 22nd, 1850) through Lord Fitzroy Somerset; stating the rebuke he had received, and probably hoping that the

* Sir C. Napier's *Life and Correspondence*, vol. iv., pp. 261, 262.

† See *Indian Empire*, vol. i., p. 445.

‡ After Sir Charles left India, a minute was drawn up by the Supreme Council, which stated,

"that the ration and mutiny question, which led to Sir Charles Napier's resignation, was not the real cause for the reprimand; but the style of the commander-in-chief's correspondence had become offensive."—*Life*, vol. iv., p. 411.

British commander-in-chief, the Duke of Wellington, would urge its withdrawal. The Duke, on the contrary, decided, after examining the statements sent home by the Calcutta authorities (which, judging by subsequent events, were founded on a mistaken view of the temper of the troops), that no sufficient reason had existed for the suspension of the regulation, and that the governor-general in council was right in expressing his disapprobation of the act. The resignation was consequently accepted; and Sir Charles's statements regarding the condition of the army, were treated as the prejudiced views of a disappointed man.

Yet the report addressed by him to the Duke in June, while ignorant, and probably not expectant, of the acceptance of his resignation, contains assertions which ought then to have been investigated, and which are now of primary importance as regards the causes of our sudden calamity, and the system to be adopted for the prevention of its recurrence.

"The Bengal Native army," Sir Charles writes, "is said to have much fallen off from what it was in former days. Of this I am not a judge; but I must say that it is a very noble army, and with very few defects. The greatest, as far as I am capable of judging, is a deficiency of discipline among the European officers, especially those of the higher ranks. I will give your grace an instance.

"The important order issued by the governor-general and the commander-in-chief, to prepare the sepoy for a reduction in their pay, I ordered to be read, and explained with care to every regiment. With the exception of three or four commanders of regiments, none obeyed the order; some gave it to pay-sergeants to read, and others altogether neglected to do so—such is the slackness of discipline among officers of high rank, and on an occasion of such vast importance. This want of discipline arises from more than one cause: a little sharpness with officers who disobey orders will soon correct much of this; but much of it originates in the great demand made upon the troops for civil duties, which so breaks up whole regiments, that their commanding officers lose that zeal for the service which they ought to feel, and so do the younger officers. The demand also made for guards is immense. * * * I cannot believe that the discipline of the Bengal army will be restored till it is relieved from civil duties, and those duties performed by police battalions, as was intended by Lord Ellenborough.

"The next evil which I see in the Native army is, that so many of the senior officers of regiments are placed on the staff or in civil situations; and very old, worn-out officers command regiments: these carry on their duties with the adjutant and some favoured Native officer. Not above one or two captains are with the regiment; and the subalterns being all young, form a society among themselves, and neglect the Native officers altogether. Nothing is therefore known as to what is passing in a Native regiment. * * * The last, and most

important thing which I reckon injurious to the Indian army, is the immense influence given to "caste;" instead of being discouraged, it has been encouraged in the Bengal army. In the Bombay army it is discouraged, and that army is in better order than the Bengal army. In this latter the Brahmins have been leaders in every mutiny."*

The manner in which courts-martial were conducted, excited his indignation throughout his Indian career. Drunkenness and gambling were, in his eyes, unsoldierly and ungentlemanly vices, and he drew no distinction between the officer and the private. "Indian courts-martial are my plagues," he writes; "they are farces. If a private is to be tried, the courts are sharp enough; but an officer is quite another thing." He mentions a case of notorious drunkenness, in which the accused was "honourably acquitted;" and he adds—"Discipline is so rapidly decaying, that in a few years my belief is, no commander-in-chief will dare to bring an officer to trial: the press will put an end to all trials, except in law courts. In courts-martial now, all is quibbling and disputes about what is legal; the members being all profoundly ignorant on the subject: those who judge fairly, in a military spirit, are afraid of being brought up afterwards, and the trials end by an acquittal in the face of all evidence!" This state of things was not one in which he was likely to acquiesce; and in six months he had to decide forty-six cases of courts-martial on officers (some for gambling, some for drunkenness), in which only two were honourably acquitted, and not less than fourteen cashiered. In the celebrated address in which he took leave of the officers of the Indian army (9th December, 1850), he blamed them severely for getting into debt, and having to be brought before the Court of Requests. "A vulgar man," he wrote, "who enjoys a champagne tiffin [luncheon], and swindles his servants, may be a pleasant companion to those who do not hold him in contempt as a vulgar knave; but he is not a gentleman: his commission makes him an officer, but he is not a gentleman."

The luxury of the Indian system was, as might be expected, severely criticised by a warrior who is popularly said to have entered on a campaign with a piece of soap and a couple of towels, and dined off a hunch of bread and a cup of water. Previous commanders-in-chief, when moving on

* Sir C. Napier to the Duke of Wellington, 15th June, 1850.—Parl. Paper, August 6th, 1857.

"OLD INDIANS," "MARTINETTS," AND "FAST REGIMENTS"—1850. 109

a military inspection, used, at the public expense, eighty or ninety elephants, three or four hundred camels, and nearly as many bullocks, with all their attendants: they had also 332 tent-pitchers, including fifty men solely employed to carry glass doors for a pavilion. This enormous establishment was reduced by Napier to thirty elephants, 334 camels, 222 tent-pitchers; by which a saving was effected for the treasury of £750 a-month. "Canvas palaces," he said, "were not necessary for a general on military inspection, even admitting the favourite idea of some 'old Indians'—that pomp and show produce respect with Indian people. But there is no truth in that notion: the respect is paid to military strength; and the astute natives secretly deride the ostentation of temporary authority."*

"Among the modern military changes," he says, "there is one which has been gradually introduced in a number of regiments by gentlemen who are usually called 'martinets'—not soldiers, only martinets. No soldier can now go up to his officer without a non-commissioned officer gives him leave, and accompanies him! . . . This is a very dangerous innovation: it is digging a ditch between the officers and their men! How are Company's officers to study men's characters, when no man dare address them but in full dress, and in presence of a non-commissioned officer?"†

Sir Charles deplored "the caste and luxury which pervaded the army," as calculated to diminish their influence equally over European soldiers and Indian sepoy.

"His [the soldier's] captain is no longer his friend and chief: he receives him with upstart condescension; is very dignified, and very insolent, nine [times?] out of ten; and as often the private goes away with disgust or contempt, instead of good, respectful, comrade feelings. Then the soldier goes daily to school, or to his library, now always at hand; while his dignified officer goes to the billiard-room or the smoking-room; or, strutting about with

a forage-cap on the side of an empty pate, and clothed in a shooting-jacket, or other deformity of dress, fancies himself a great character, because he is fast, and belongs to a fast regiment—i. e., a regiment unfit for service, commanded by the adjutant, and having a mess in debt!"‡

It is, of course, exclusively to the sepoy that Sir Charles refers in the following passages, in which he upholds the necessity for discipline and kindly intercourse being maintained by the European officers:—

"They are admirable soldiers, and only give way when badly led by brave but idle officers, who let discipline and drill grow slack, and do not mix with them: being ignorant themselves, they cannot teach the sepoy. . . . I could do anything I like with these natives. Our officers generally do not know how to deal with them. They have not, with some exceptions, the natural turn and soldierlike feelings necessary to deal with them. Well, it matters little to me; India and I will soon be separate: I see the system will not last fifty years. The moment these brave and able natives learn how to combine, they will rush on us simultaneously, and the game will be up. A bad commander-in-chief and a bad governor-general will clench the business. . . . I am disposed to believe, that we might, with advantage, appoint natives to cadetships, discharge all our Native officers on the pensions of their present rank, and so give the natives common chance of command with ourselves—before they take it!

"Every European boy, aye, even sergeants, now command all Native officers! When the native saw the English ensign live with him and cherish him, and by daily communication was made aware of his superior energy, strength, daring, and mental acquirements, all went smooth. Now things have changed. The young cadet learns nothing: he drinks, he lives exclusively with his own countrymen; the older officers are on the staff, or on civil employ, which they ought not to be; and high-caste—that is to say, mutiny—is encouraged. I have just gotten this army through a very dangerous one; and the Company had better take care what they are at, or some great mischief will yet happen!

"I think that Native ensigns, lieutenants, and captains, aye, and commanders of corps too, will assimilate with our officers, and, in course of time,

* *Life*, vol. iv., p. 206. The ostentatious parade with which the progresses of Indian functionaries, both civil and military, was usually attended, not only aggravated, by contrast, the hardships endured by their inferiors, but inflicted most cruel sufferings on the natives of the countries through which they passed, thousands being pressed for palanquin or dooly (litter) bearers, and for porters of luggage, and paid very poorly, and often very irregularly. "The coolies," says Sir C. Napier, "who are summoned to carry the governor-general's baggage when he moves, are assembled at, or rather driven by force to, Simla from immense distances, and are paid about twopence a-day, under circumstances of great cruelty. Now, I happen to know, that from the delays of offices, and without, perhaps, any tangible act of knavery in any especial officer or individual, some 8,000 or 10,000 coolies employed to take Lord — down into the plains when he left India, were not paid this miserable pittance for three

years!" It is scarcely possible to believe that Englishmen could be either so ungenerous or so short-sighted as wantonly to outrage the feelings of the natives; but, on this point, the testimony of various authorities is corroborated by the special correspondent of the *Times*, whose sympathies naturally lay with his countrymen, and who would not, without strong evidence, venture to bring such a heavy charge against them. Seeing a native badly wounded on a charpoy (movable bed), with a woman sitting beside him in deep affliction, he asked for an explanation, and was told that an officer "had been licking two of his bearers, and had nearly murdered them." Mr. Russell probably did not disguise his disgust on this or other occasions; for he was often told, "Oh, wait till you are another month in India, and you'll think nothing of licking a nigger."—*The Times*, June 17th, 1858.

† *Life and Correspondence*, vol. iv., p. 325.

‡ *Ibid.*, vol. iv., pp. 306; 326. § *Ibid.*, pp. 185; 212.

gradually throw caste to the dogs, and be like ourselves in all but colour. I have no belief in the power of caste resisting the Christian faith for any great length of time, because reason is too strong for nonsense in the long run; and I believe if the Indians were made officers, on the same footing as ourselves, they would be perfectly faithful, and in time become Christians: not that I want to convert them; but so it will be.*

So far from any idea being entertained of elevating the Native officers according to the plan propounded by the commander-in-chief, their absolute extinction was discussed in public journals and periodicals; a fact which supplies a very clear reason for general disaffection.

Sir Charles Napier, in the year in which he died (1853), writes to his brother, Sir William:—

"The Edinburgh article you mentioned says, that if the Native officers were gradually gotten rid of, the operation would be safe, though not economical or generous. But however gradually it might be done, 300,000 armed men would at once see that all their hopes of rising to be lieutenants, captains, and majors, and when no longer able to serve, the getting pensions, would, for those ranks, be blasted for ever. The writer would soon find his plan unsafe; it would end all Indian questions at once. There is no sepoy in that great army but expects to retire, in age, with a major's pension, as certainly as every ensign expects to become a major or a colonel in our army. There is but one thing to be done: give the Native officers rank with our own, reducing the number of ours. This may endanger; but it will not do so more than the present system does; and my own opinion is pretty well made up, that our power there is crumbling very fast."†

The above statements have been given at length, not simply because they were formed by the commander-in-chief of the Indian army, but because they are the grounds on which he based his assertion, that the mutiny of the sepoys was "the most formidable danger menacing our Indian empire." Certainly Sir William Napier has done good service in his unreserved exposition of his brother's opinions; and though many individuals of high position and character, may, with justice, complain of the language applied to them, yet the sarcasms

of the testy old general lose half their bitterness when viewed as the ebullitions of an irascible temper, aggravated by extreme and almost constant bodily pain. When he descends to personalities, his own comparison describes him best—"a hedgehog fighting about nothing:" but his criticisms on the discipline of the Indian army, its commissariat, ordnance, and transport departments, bear witness of an extraordinary amount of judgment and shrewdness. If, as "Indophilus" asserts, "Sir Charles Napier had not the gift of foresight beyond other men," it is the more to be regretted that other men, and especially Indian statesmen, should have allowed his assertions to remain on record, neither confirmed nor refuted, until the mutinies of 1857 brought them into general notice.

Sir Charles Napier was not quite alone in his condemnation of the lax discipline of the Bengal army. Viscount Melville, who commanded the Punjab division of the Bombay forces at the time of the mutiny of the two Bengal regiments under Sir Colin Campbell, in 1849, was astonished at the irregularity which he witnessed in the Bengal army. When questioned concerning its condition, on his return to England in 1850, he did not disguise his strong disapprobation; upon which he was told that, however true his opinion might be, it would be imprudent to express it.‡

Sir Colin Campbell kept silence on the same principle; but now says, that if he had uttered his feelings regarding the sepoys ten years ago, he would have been shot.§

Major John Jacob wrote a pamphlet|| in 1854, in which he pointed out various defects in the system; but the home authorities were evidently unwilling to listen to any unpleasant information. The reports of the commander-in-chief who succeeded Sir Charles Napier, and of the governor-general, were both exceedingly favourable; but then the efforts of both Sir William Gomm¶ and of Lord Dalhousie, seem to have been directed exclusively to the furtherance of very necessary measures for the welfare of the European troops. Indeed, in his lordship's own summary of his administration, the condition of the immense mass of the Indian army, amounting to nearly 300,000 men, is

* Letter written May 31st, 1850; published by Lieutenant-general Sir William Napier, in the *Times* of August 17th, 1857.

† *Life and Opinions*, vol. iv., p. 383.

‡ Speech in the House of Lords, July 15th, 1857.

§ *Times*, 15th January, 1858.

|| *Native Troops of the Indian Army*.

¶ *Indian Empire*, vol. i., p. 537.

dismissed in the following brief, and, if accurate, very satisfactory sentence:—

"The position of the Native soldier in India has long been such as to leave hardly any circumstance of his position in need of improvement."*

This statement is hardly consistent with that made by the chairman of the East India Company (Mr. R. D. Mangles) to the cadets at Addiscombe, in June, 1857. He adverted to the "marked alteration in the tone and bearing of the younger officers of the Indian army, towards the natives of all ranks," as a fact which "all joined in lamenting;" and he added, that if the "estrangement of officers from men, and especially of English from Native officers, was allowed to continue and grow, it was impossible to calculate the fatal consequences that might ensue."†

Here, at least, was one point in which the treatment of the Native soldiery was susceptible of improvement. But there were others in which the peculiar advantages they had once enjoyed had sensibly diminished: their work had increased; their pay, at least in the matter of extra allowances, had decreased. Sindé, for instance, was just as unhealthy—just as far from the homes of the sepoys; under British as under Native government; yet the premium previously given for foreign service was withdrawn on annexation. So also in the Punjab, and elsewhere.

The orders for distant service came round more rapidly as territory increased. The sepoys became involved in debt by change of station, and the Madras troops could ill afford the travelling expenses of their families, from whom they never willingly separate, and whose presence has probably been a chief cause of their fidelity during the crisis. One regiment, for instance, has had, within the last few years, to build houses and huts at three different stations; and on their late return from Burmah, the men had to pay sixty rupees per cart, to bring their wives and children from Burhampoor to Vellore, a distance of 700 miles. This is said to be a fair average specimen of what is going on everywhere. "The result is, that the men are deeply embarrassed. A sepoy on seven

rupees a-month, who has to pay fifty or sixty rupees for his wife's cart once in every two or three years, is unavoidably plunged in debt. He must borrow at exorbitant interest from the money-lender; and before he can reclaim the past, the 'route' comes for a fresh march to far-distant cantonments, and hurries him into fresh difficulties."‡

The Bengal sepoys do not carry their families with them on a campaign, but leave them in their native villages, visiting them every year. The furloughs granted for this purpose, have been diminished in consequence of the growing necessities of the service; and another infringement of a prerogative, which their separation from their wives and children rendered very valuable, was committed by the withdrawal of their privilege of franking letters to their homes. Several late regulations regarding the payment of pensions, and increasing strictness on the part of the general invaliding committee, are asserted to have been viewed by the sepoys as involving breach of faith on the part of the government. They are said to have felt with the old Scotchwoman, "I ken ye're cheating me, but I dinna ken exactly hoo."§ Any alteration in the rules of the retiring pension-list, was watched by the sepoy with jealous care. The terms which secured to him a fixed monthly stipend in the event of becoming incapacitated for further duty after a service of fifteen years, and which, if he died in battle, or from sickness while on foreign service, made some provision for his family, could not of course be altered, even slightly, without exciting alarm as to what further changes might follow. The Bengal sepoys were largely drawn from Oude; and not from Oude generally, but from certain limited districts. Naturally there existed among them the feeling observable in British soldiers born in the same county, when associated in a regiment on foreign service; and possibly it was clanship, quite as much as caste, which bound them together: but whatever it was, a strong tie of union, and consequent power of combination, existed among them, which rendered them efficient for good or evil. Sir John Malcolm had given a memorable warning regarding them. Neither the Hindoo nor the Mohammedan soldier were, he said, revengeful, but both were prone to acts of extreme violence in points where they deemed their honour slighted. The absence of any fear of death was common to them all. Such an instru-

* Minute, dated 28th February, 1856; p. 41.

† See *Daily News*, July 13th, 1857, p.p. 26, 27.

‡ Norton's *Rebellion in India*.

§ Letter signed "Caulbee."—*Daily News*, July 17th, 1857.

ment as an army constituted of men like these afforded, had need be managed with care and wisdom, or our strength would become our danger. The minds of the sepoys were alive to every impulse, and would all vibrate to the same touch. Kindness, liberality, and justice would preserve their attachment: besides this, Malcolm adds, "we must attend to the most trifling of their prejudices, and avoid rash innovations; but, above all, those that are calculated to convey to their minds the most distant alarm in points connected with their usages or religion."* This policy found little favour among the Europeans in 1856.

The exclusive payment of the troops in such an inconveniently heavy coin as the silver rupee (two-shilling) piece, obliges them to resort frequently to money-changers; and thus to lose a per-centage on their small stipend. Unfortunately, the governor-general, whose practical ability might have been so beneficially exercised in this and other matters, appears to have listened to only one set of statements regarding the Native army, and to have acted upon the principle that the sepoy had been "over-petted," and required sterner discipline.

General Anson, who succeeded Sir William Gomm in command of the army, took the same view of the case, only a more exaggerated one. When the cartridge agitation first commenced, he set at nought the feelings of the sepoys, by declaring that "he would never give in to their beastly prejudices." This speech sufficiently reveals the character of the commander-in-chief to whom it could be even attributed with any show of probability; and it certainly deserves a place among the immediate causes of the mutiny.† The European officers appear to have too generally adopted the same tone, especially as regarded the Bengalees; and it was commonly said, that whereas the leading feeling with the Bombay and Madras sepoys was the honour of their regiment, that of the Bengal sepoy was the pride of caste. But, in fact, all the Hindoos, except the outcasts, maintain more or less strongly, certain religious prejudices which interfere with their efficiency as soldiers; especially their invariable dislike to sea voyages, and to passing certain recognised boundaries.

* Malcolm on the Government of India, p. 219.

† Cooper's *Crisis in the Punjab*, p. 37.

‡ Sleeman's *Journey through Oude*, vol. ii., p. 95.

The Afghan war was very unpopular for this reason; and the calamities and sore discomfiture endured there, deepened the unfavourable impression which it made upon the whole Native army, and generally upon the people of India. An insurrection in the Saugor and Nerbudda districts broke out in 1842. The wild barons of the hills and jungles swept down over the valleys and cultivated plains; yet the pillaged inhabitants yielded little support to the officers of the government, and would furnish no information with regard to the movements of the insurrectionists. Colonel Sleeman was sent by Lord Ellenborough to inquire into the cause of this inconsistency. He assembled a party of about fifty of the lowlanders in his tent; and there, seated on the carpet, each man freely spoke his mind. Umrao Sing, a sturdy, honest farmer, spoke of the conduct of the chiefs as quite natural. The sudden withdrawal of the troops for objects of distant conquest, and the tidings of disaster and defeat, awakened their hopes of regaining their former position, for they thought the British raj at an end. Colonel Sleeman said, that the farmers and cultivators of the disturbed districts, having been more favoured, in regard to life and property, than in any other part of India, ought to have been staunch to their protectors: "but," he added, "there are some men who never can be satisfied; give them what you will, they will always be craving after more." "True, sir," replied Umrao Sing, with the utmost gravity, "there are some people who can never be satisfied, give them what you will; give them the whole of Hindoostan, and they will go off to Cabool to take more."‡

Hedayut Ali, a subahdar of the Bengal Seik battalion, a man of excellent character, whose father and grandfather had occupied the highest positions attainable to natives in the British service, has furnished some important evidence on the causes of disaffection among the sepoys. He lays much stress on the sufferings endured by the sepoys in Afghanistan in 1838-'9, and the violations of caste which they were compelled to commit by the extreme cold, especially in the matter of eating without first bathing, and of wearing sheepskin jackets; whereas no Hindoo, except of the lowest caste, likes to touch the skin of a dead animal.

The annexation of Oude is cited by this witness as having, in addition to other real

or imaginary grievances, caused universal disaffection throughout the army, which from that time determined upon mutinying. The grounds upon which this opinion is based, are very clearly stated. On the 14th of March, 1856, the King of Oude reached Cawnpoor, on his way to Calcutta. Hedayut Ali reached that city on the same day. He remained there six days, and had frequent interviews with the king's vakeels, courtiers, and servants; as did also the principal people of Cawnpoor, and many of the Native officers and scpoys of the regiments stationed there; all of whom were indignant at the king's dispossession. The vakeel of Nana Sahib was among the visitors, and took pains to increase the excitement, by saying how displeased and grieved his master was by the conduct of the English. Shortly after, Hedayut Ali proceeded to join his corps at Lahore, and marched thence to Bengal. On the way, he learnt that the Native infantry at Barrackpoor were showing symptoms of mutiny; and this, with other intelligence, he, from time to time, communicated to his commanding officer.

The King of Oude again visited Cawnpoor in December, 1856, and stayed about a fortnight; during which time much mischief is said to have been concocted. Meanwhile the commander-in-chief and the governor-general were initiating measures very displeasing to various classes of natives. The Madras sepoy had shown, at Vellore, how dangerous it was to interfere with the marks on their foreheads, or the fashion of their turbans. The Seiks and Mohammedans are scarcely less susceptible on the subject of their beards and moustachios. Consequently, in the extensive enlistments of these races, carried on after the annexation of the Punjab, a pledge was given that no interference should be attempted in the matter of hair-dressing. General Anson, however, issued an order, directing the Mohammedans to cut their beards after a prescribed fashion. They refused, pleading the condition of their enlistment. The general insisted on their obeying the order, or quitting the service; and many of them, sooner than suffer what, in their view, was a disgrace, took their discharge, and went to their homes. Sir Charles Napier understood the native character far too well to have so needlessly played the martinet, independently of the sympathy which he would naturally have felt for the recusants, by reason of having himself "a beard like a

Cashmere goat." The discharged sepoy "bitterly complained of the commanding officers having broken faith with them; and several of them, who afterwards re-enlisted in the same regiment as Hedayut Ali, frequently spoke of the manner in which they had been deprived of the benefit of several years' service. But the crowning act of innovation enacted by Lord Canning and General Anson, was the general service order of 1856, by which all recruits were to be compelled to swear that they would go, by sea or land, wherever their services were required. The refusal of the 38th Bengal infantry to march to Burmah, was severely punished by Lord Dalhousie's sending the regiment by land to Dacca, where the cantonments were very bad, and the loss of life among the troops extremely heavy.* He did not, however, attempt to strike such a blow as that now aimed at caste; for the unqualified aversion to the sea entertained by the Bengal sepoy, would, it was well known, prevent many from bringing up their children to a profession which they had learned to look upon as an hereditary means of obtaining an honourable maintenance. They feared also for themselves. Hedayut Ali says—"When the old sepoy heard of this order, they were much frightened and displeased. 'Up to this day, those men who went to Afghanistan have not been readmitted to their caste; how are we to know where the English may force us to go? They will be ordering us next to go to London.' Any new order is looked upon with much suspicion by the Native army, and is much canvassed in every regiment."

This latter remark is unquestionably a just one; the intercourse maintained throughout the Bengal army, and the rapid and correct transmission of intelligence, having been one of the most marked features of the mutinies. The following observations are also painfully correct:—

"Of late years the sepoy has not confided in their officers. . . . A native of Hindoostan seldom opens his mind to his officer; he only says what he thinks would please his officer. The sepoy reserve their real opinion until they return to their lines and to their comrades. . . . The government must be aware, that when a soldier has once or twice shown a disposition to mutiny, he is useless as a soldier: one mutinous sepoy infects a whole company; and gradually, one man after another, from fear or sympathy, joins the mutineers.

"Many commanding officers, to my knowledge, reported that regiments were all right, when they

* Norton's *Rebellion in India*, p. 21.

knew that there were discontent and bad feeling in the ranks; and, to my belief, for the sake of the name of their respective regiments, concealed the real state of their regiments, until at length the sepoys took to murdering their officers. * * *

Another reason (and, in my opinion, a very serious one) why the army became mutinous and disaffected is this. Promotion all went by seniority, and not, as it ought, according to merit and proficiency. All the old men, from length of service worth nothing as commissioned or non-commissioned officers, received promotion; while younger men, in every way fit, languished in their lines: saying, 'What use is there in us exerting ourselves; we cannot get promotion until our turn comes, and that time can't come until our heads are gray and our mouths toothless.' For this reason, the sepoys for the most part drew their pay, and were careless with regard to their duty. The higher ranks of the Native army, from old age alone, were quite incapacitated from doing their duty, even had they the will to do it. I state confidently, that the generality of Native officers were an encumbrance to the state: instead of commanding sepoys, the sepoys commanded them; and instead of the commissioned and non-commissioned ranks preventing the men from mutinying, they rather persuaded them to do so."*

The above opinion of a Native officer on the effect of the Bengal military system upon his countrymen, reads like the echo of that of Indophilus, regarding its operation on the Europeans. The arguments urged in the two cases are so nearly identical, that it may well be asked whether justice and common sense do not prompt to the same course of general legislation.

"Under a pure seniority system, an officer's promotion goes on precisely in the same manner whether he exerts himself or takes his ease; and as few love exertion for its own sake, the majority take their ease. Under a system of selection according to qualification and service, promotion is dependent upon exertion, and the majority consequently exert themselves. Those only who know the Bengal army can form some estimate of the amount of idleness and bad habit engendered by the seniority system co-operating with the enervating influences of the climate, which would be converted into active interest in professional duty, by the substitution of a well-considered system of promotion according to qualification and good service."†

Lord Melville‡ had also urged, so far as he was allowed to do, the evils of the seniority system. Other authorities, more or less directly, assert, that it was the defective character, rather than the insufficient number, of the officers left to do regimental duty as "the refuse of the army," which weakened their

* Translated by Captain T. Rattray, from the original Oordoo; and published in the *Times*, April 1st, 1858.

† *Letters of Indophilus*, p. 18.

‡ The directors are said to defend themselves for neglecting Lord Melville's representations, on the ground that his "evidence was contradicted most

hold on their men. Brigadier-general Jacob remarks, that "qualifications, not numbers, are necessary for the leaders of the native Indian soldiers;" and his opinion is corroborated by the fact, that the irregular and local force, which was officered entirely by a few but picked men, was—allowing for discrepancies of pay and dates of enlistment—generally held to be in an equally, if not more, efficient condition than the regular regiments.

A well-informed, but not unprejudiced witness says, that the conduct of irregular regiments, which possess only three European officers, has always contrasted so favourably with that of line regiments, with their fourteen or fifteen, that the natural conclusion one would arrive at is, that the latter are over-officered. He also deprecates the seniority system, by which a sepoy who may enter the service at the age of sixteen, cannot count on finding himself a naik (corporal) before he attains the age of thirty-six; a havildar (sergeant) before forty-five; a jemadar (lieutenant) before fifty-four; or a subahdar (captain) before sixty; while, "after fifty, most natives are utterly useless."§

The full complement of European officers to each regular regiment is twenty-six; but of these half are generally absent, either on service or on furlough. The commander is usually a lieutenant-colonel; then there is an adjutant, to superintend the drill; a quartermaster, whose duty it is to look after the clothing of the men; and, lastly, an interpreter. The necessity for this last functionary lies at the root of our late sudden calamity; for the officers, if they had been able and willing to hold close intercourse with their men, and explain to them the reasons for the various unpopular orders recently issued, would, if they could not remove disaffection, at least have become acquainted with its existence. An infantry regiment on the Bengal establishment comprises ten companies, each containing a hundred privates, two native commissioned, and twelve non-commissioned officers.

The great increase of the irregular regiments has been in itself a source of jealousy and heartburning to the regular troops, who strongly, in every particular, by that of Sir Patrick Grant, who assured us, that the Bengal army (of which he had been long adjutant-general) was all that it should be.—Letter, signed "H. C."—*Daily News*, July 25th, 1857.

§ *Mutiny of the Bengal Army* by one who has served under Sir Charles Napier; pp. 1; 7.

expected that their numbers would be largely augmented on the recent annexations, and that extensive promotions would take place. This expectation was wholly disappointed. The enormous expenses of the army rendered the comparative cheapness of irregular troops an irresistible advantage. According to the Army List for 1857, the irregular and local force of Bengal numbered forty-two infantry, and twenty-seven cavalry regiments; and the so-called contingents of Native States, comprised sixteen of cavalry and nineteen of infantry: in all, ninety-four regiments; the whole officered by picked men from the twenty-four regiments of the regular army. The relative numbers of the three armies need not be given here, as their proportions and distribution are immediately connected with the history about to be entered on. The question of the greased cartridges has been already noticed under the head of "Caste;" and will frequently recur in the ensuing narrative.

A Mohammedan Conspiracy, widely ramified and deeply rooted, is urged by some authorities as in itself the great motive power of the late political convulsion; others, on the contrary, deny its existence, on the ground of no sufficient evidence having been adduced thereof.

Dr. Alexander Duff, the eloquent Presbyterian preacher of Calcutta, writing in August, 1857, says—"It is a long-connected Mohammedan conspiracy now come to a head. The main object is the destruction of British power, and the reascendancy of Mohammedan. Even the cartridge affair was only a casual incident, of which the conspirators adroitly took advantage."*

In his published *Letters on the Indian Rebellion*, the Doctor throughout insists on Mussulman intrigues as being continually developed and exposed; but he wrote in a season of excitement, when rumours abounded of dangers and atrocities, many of which have happily proved unfounded, but which naturally served to confirm his preconceived opinion. The truth is terrible enough; and for the sake of our national honour, for the sake of human nature, and, above all, for the sake of truth itself, we

should strive to strip this fearful episode of the obscurity in which conflicting exaggerations have wrapped its origin and progress. Beyond question, the Mohammedan princes of India have strong reason for combining to restore the green flag of Islam to its former supremacy in Hindoostan. If an opportunity offered, it is at least highly probable that the orthodox Sonnites of Delhi, and the heterodox Sheiahs of Oude, would be content to forget for a time the rival claims of Caliphs and Imaums to apostolic succession, and make common cause against the power which treats both with indifference.

The whole Mussulman body would of necessity be drawn closer together by the danger which threatened all alike. They had still something to lose; that is, something to fight for. Submission had not succeeded in preserving the independence of Oude; and even Hyderabad, much more the titular principality of Delhi, seemed tottering to a close. Still the Mohammedans were as a handful amid a heap; and the chief point to solve was, whether the recent innovations had sufficiently disgusted the leading Hindoos to render them willing to forget past usurpations, and join with their former subjugators in attempting the overthrow of the British raj.

Tippoo Sultan had made an effort of the kind, but without success; and it now appears, by his own proclamation, that Prince Mirza Feroze Shah, on his return from a pilgrimage to Mecca, "persuaded many at Delhi to raise a religious war;" being incited thereto by observing that "the English were in a bad and precarious state."†

Great anxiety had been felt at Delhi, throughout the period of Lord Dalhousie's administration, regarding the manner in which his annexation policy would be brought to bear upon the family who, fallen as they were, still represented, in the minds of the Indian people, the mighty Mogul emperors of old, and whose restoration to power had been prayed for daily in the mosques throughout India for nearly a hundred years.‡

In 1849, the heir-apparent died, and the Indian government recommended the Court of Directors to "terminate the dynasty of Timour whenever the reigning king should die." The court consented; but so reluctantly, that the governor-general did not care to avail himself of their permission, and therefore recognised the grandson of

* Speech of the Hon. A. Kinnaid, 11th June, 1857: second edition; p. 35.

† Proclamation issued by Prince Mirza Mohammed Feroze Shah, 17th February, 1858.

‡ See *Times*, September 1st, 1857.

the king as heir-apparent; "but only on condition that he should quit the palace in Delhi, in order to reside in the palace at the Kootub; and that he should, as king, receive the governor-general of India, at all times, on terms of perfect equality."

These conditions show that something of external pomp and circumstance still lingered around Delhi, of which the representatives of the East India Company were anxious to be rid, and the royal family as anxious to retain. True, the power had long vanished; but even the tarnished pageantry was clung to, naturally enough, by those who had no other birthright, and no prospect of being able to win their way to wealth and honour as warriors; the profession of arms being the only one in which a Mohammedan prince of the blood could engage without forfeiting caste. The sultaneen (plural for sultan)—as the various branches of the family are termed—are probably a very idle and dissolute race. It is in the nature of things that they should have become so. Certainly we never did anything to hinder their debasement; and have, while acting as their political and pecuniary trustees, been lamentably indifferent to their moral and physical welfare. We never evinced the slightest interest in them; and have no right to wonder at their degradation.

With the downfall of the dynasty we had no concern. In dealing generously with Shah Alum, we acted with sound policy. All India respected us for it. Even in Leadenhall-street, sufficient memory of the bygone feelings and events lingered in 1849, to make the application of the new absorption laws seem peculiarly harsh in the case of Delhi. The scruples of the Court of Directors induced Lord Dalhousie to draw back his hand, at least as far as the titular sovereignty was concerned; but his proposal for its extinction having been once mooted, and even sanctioned, it may be considered that the sentence was rather deferred than reversed. This, at least, was the public opinion. It is a singular fact, that the same accounts from India, which have been already quoted as describing the unbroken tranquillity of the entire peninsula at the close of 1856, state that the palace of Delhi was "in a ferment," owing to the recent death of the heir-apparent from cholera, and the renewed discussion regarding the succession. "We have" (it is added) no treaty, agreement, or

stipulation with Delhi. The king's privileges and pension were all granted as of free grace; and the former will probably be withdrawn. The palace is a sink of iniquity; and the family, on the death of its present head, will probably be compelled to move."*

The same paper contains the announcement that the anticipated declaration of war against Persia had appeared in a proclamation published at Calcutta on the 1st of November, 1856. The *casus belli* was the breach of the treaty of 1853, by which the Persian government promised to abstain from all interference with Herat; the independence of that city, under its brave chief, Esa Khan, being deemed essential to the security of the British frontier. On the pretence that Dost Mohammed had been instigated to seize Candahar and advance upon Herat, a Persian army crossed into the Herat territory (which was declared to be Persian soil), and laid siege to the city. Under instructions from the home government, a force was assembled at Bombay for service in the Persian Gulf. The *Times'* correspondent describes the departure of the force, in three divisions, as taking place in the middle of November. The first, consisting of H.M.'s 64th regiment and the 20th Native infantry, embarked from Vingorla in two steamers, each with its transport in tow. The second, comprising a European regiment, the 2nd Belooch cavalry, and two squadrons of the 3rd cavalry, sailed from Poorbunder and Kurrachee. The third embarked from Kurrachee a few days later, and consisted of the 4th Rifles (a very strong and well-appointed regiment), two troops of the Poona horse, a field battery, a troop of horse artillery, a third-class siege-train, and two companies of sappers and miners. The rendezvous was fixed at Bunder Abbas, a place near the entrance of the gulf, in the occupation of our Arab ally, the Imaum of Muscat.†

At the time the above facts were recorded, no idea appears to have been entertained of any connection existing between the Persian war and the ferment in the palace of Delhi. The declaration of war had been long expected; and, according to the *Times'* correspondent, created little excitement at Bombay. The Persians, who are numerous there, as also in other large Indian cities, relied on the promise of protection given them, and remained quiescent. "Even

* Calcutta correspondent, November 8th, 1856.—*Times*, December 9th, 1856.

† Bombay correspondent, November 17th, 1856.—*Times*, December 9th, 1856.



the Mussulman population, who sympathise with Persia," he adds, "sympathise still more with Afghanistan;* and the fact that we are fighting with, and not against, Dost Mohammed, is thoroughly understood. The European public accepts the war with a feeling of quiet resignation. The idea that it is our destiny to advance—that we cannot help ourselves, has obtained a control over the public mind; and every war breaks the monotony of Indian life, which is the curse of India, as of all aristocratic life."

It seems probable that the Persian war materially, though indirectly, contributed to break up the aristocratic monotony of high-caste European life, by denuding India of her most reliable troops. The number sent, of men of all arms, to the Persian Gulf, in November, 1856, amounted to 5,820, of whom 2,270 were Europeans. In the following February a still larger force was dispatched, under Brigadier-general Havelock, consisting of 5,340 men, of whom about 1,770 were Europeans; and 800 cavalry were subsequently dispatched at an enormous cost. Thus the "army of Persia" deprived India of about 12,000 men, of whom one-third were Europeans. Lord Canning considered this force quite sufficient for any operations which Major-general Outram could undertake before the hot season; but, he adds, "it is certain that very large reinforcements will be needed before a second campaign, commencing with the autumn of 1857, can be entered upon."

Man proposes—God disposes. Long before the autumn set in, an Indian campaign had commenced, which, whether the Persians had or had not withdrawn their claims on Herat, must have equally relieved the governor-general from the task of providing a third armament for the Persian Gulf, "to include not less than six European regiments of infantry and one of cavalry." The Persians were overcome, and the independence of Herat was secured, at a cost to Britain of about £500,000 in money.† Meanwhile, intimations of Persian intrigues were given to the authorities by various persons, but set at nought as idle

* This assertion may be reasonably questioned, since the Sheikhs of Oude looked up to the Shah of Persia as the head of their sect. Mr. Ludlow says that the Persian war caused great excitement in Northern India, where many of the Moslems were of the Sheikah sect; and he adds, that one of his relatives had himself, within the last two or three years, read placards on the walls of Delhi, calling true

rumours. The trial of the King of Delhi furnishes evidence that inducements to revolt were held forth by the Shah of Persia, who promised money and troops. His proclamation to that effect was posted over the mosque gate, and was taken down by order of Sir Theophilus Metcalfe, who, moreover, was informed by John Everett, a Christian risaldar very popular with the natives, that he had been warned to fly, as the Persians were coming, and the Mussulmans were greatly excited. Sir T. Metcalfe thought the information of no importance.‡ A statement of a Mohammedan plot was laid before Mr. Colvin; but he also suffered the warning to pass unheeded, and did not even report it to government.

At this very time Delhi was absolutely devoid of European troops, yet strongly fortified, and stored with the munitions of war. Its palace-fort was still tenanted by the representative of the *rois sainéants* of the East, whose persons had formerly been fought for by opposing factions as a tower of strength; their compulsory signature being used notoriously to legitimatise usurpation, and influence the populace.

Extreme insalubrity is given by Lord Ellenborough as the reason why no European regiment had ever yet been stationed there, sickness prevailing to such an extent, that, after the rains, two-thirds of the strength even of the Native troops were in hospital.§ Sanitary measures would probably have prevented, or greatly mitigated this evil (as at Seringapatam); nor does it appear that any cause but neglect existed to render Delhi less habitable than of old.

Sir Charles Napier's prediction was one which any chance traveller might have reasonably made; and there is, therefore, the less excuse for the absence of obviously necessary precautions. "Men," he said, "of all parts of Asia meet in Delhi; and, some day or other, much mischief will be hatched within those city walls, and no European troops at hand."|| He knew also, and officially urged upon the governor-general, "that the powder-magazine was defended only by a guard of fifty natives, and the gates so weak that a mob could push them

believers to the holy war in the name of the Shah of Persia.—*Lectures on British India*, vol. ii., p. 219.

† Speech of Lord Claude Hamilton: Indian debate, July 20th, 1857.

‡ Calcutta correspondent.—*Times*, March 29, 1858.

§ Indian debate, July 13th, 1857.

|| Letter to a lieutenant-colonel in the Bengal artillery: published in the *Times*, 20th August, 1857.

in; whereas the place ought to be garrisoned by 12,000 picked men."*

The absence of a European garrison in Delhi is the most unpardonable of our blunders; and—what does not always follow—it is the one for which we have most dearly paid, not in money only, but in the life-blood of our best and bravest soldiers. One cannot think of Nicholson and his gallant companions without bitterly denouncing the neglect which suffered Delhi to fall defenceless at the feet of a few rebels, put at once a sword and shield into their hands, and gave them the ancient Mussulman metropolis of India as a nucleus for every aggrieved chief, every disaffected soldier, every reckless adventurer, escaped convict, pindarree, thug, dacoit, to rally round, for the destruction of the British raj—at least for a long carnival of war and loot. The very heroism of the troops who regained Delhi embitters the recollection of the neglect by which it was lost. *Dulce et decorum est pro patria mori!* as one of them (Captain Battye) said when mortally wounded; but, to their country, their very devotion only renders it more painful that the necessity for such sacrifices should have been so culpably occasioned. This is, however, anticipating events, the progress of which will best evidence how far Persian intrigues may have been connected with the mutiny. At present, many assertions are made, the truth of which yet remains in dispute. It would seem, however, that the efforts of the King of Persia had been chiefly directed to Delhi; and that if communications were entered into with leading Mohammedans in other parts of India, these had not had time to ripen; and, consequently, when the mutinies broke forth, heralded by incendiary fires in every British camp, the conspirators must have been

taken by surprise almost as much as the Europeans themselves.†

Shett Nowmull, "a native merchant of Kurrachee, for many years favourably known to government on account of his great intelligence, his extensive influence and connexions throughout the countries on our western frontier, and his true attachment to the British government," communicated, to Mr. Freere, commissioner of Sind, in June, 1857, his reasons for believing that "Persian influence was at the bottom of the mutiny." He declared that cossids (messengers), under different disguises, with letters secreted in the soles of their shoes or otherwise, had, for the last two years, been regularly passing between Delhi and the Persian court, *via* Candahar; that a great spread of the Sheiah tenets of Islamism had been observable during the same period; and also that a very perceptible decrease had taken place in the rancour usually existing between the Sheiahs and Sonnites. The new cartridges had been used "through the same influence," to excite the feelings of the Hindoo portion of the army, and lead them to mutiny. Dost Mohammed, he said, thought more of Persia than of England, for a very pertinent reason—"Persia is on the Dost's head; Peshawur is under his feet."‡ in other words, a man placed between two fires, would especially dread the more immediate one.

Prophecies of various kinds were current—always are current, in India; but when the mutiny broke out, more heed was given to them by the natives; and the Europeans also lent an ear, knowing that a pretended prophecy might disguise an actual plot, and, in more ways than one, work out its own fulfilment. The alleged prediction which limited the duration of the British raj to a hundred years, was repeated far and wide;§

* *Memoir on the Defence of India*: addressed by Sir C. Napier to Lord Dalhousie. See Indian debate of 23rd July, 1857.

† In the captured tent of the Shahzada commander, after the rout of the Persians at Mohumrah, there was found a royal proclamation addressed "to all the people of Heran;" but which also called on "the Afghan tribes, and the inhabitants of that country who are co-religionists of the Persians, and who possess the same Koran and Kebla, and laws of the prophet, to take part in the *Jahād*." It expressly invited the followers of Islam in India and Sind to unite and wreak vengeance on the British for all the injuries which the holy faith had suffered from them, and not to withhold any sacrifice in the holy cause. "The old and the young, the small and the great, the wise and the ignorant, the ryot and the sepoy,

all without exception," are summoned by the Shah-in-Shah to arise in defence of the orthodox faith of the prophet; and having girt up the waist of valour, adorn their persons with arms and weapons; and let the Ulema and preachers call on the people in the mosques and public assemblies, and in the pulpits, to join in a *Jahād*, in the cause of God; and thus shall the Ghazis in the cause of faith have a just title to the promises contained in the words of the prophet, "Verily we are of those who fought in the cause of God."—Blackwood's *Edinburgh Magazine* for 1857: article entitled "The Poorbeah Mutiny."

‡ Letter from H. B. B. Freere, commissioner of Sind, to Lord Elphinstone, governor of Bombay, 11th June, 1857.—Parl. Papers (253), 4th May, 1858; p. 48.

§ Dr. A. Duff's *Letters*: London, 1858; p. 26.

and the Europeans in Calcutta and many of the leading cities, watched the approach of the centenary of Plassy with a feverish anxiety bordering on panic.

But prophecies such as these, are usually the consequence or the sign, rather than the cause, of popular tumults. In health we can smile at language which, in sickness, excites a fevered imagination to frenzy. For years the natives had been allowed to speculate on the future destiny, and comment on the present policy, of their rulers, without any restraint whatever; now, every third word seemed treason. Such of the English functionaries as understood Indian languages, began to examine the literature of the day; and were exceedingly puzzled to decide what was, and what was not, written with a sinister intent.

A Persian paper, for instance, was brought to Mr. Freere about the commencement of hostilities, which described the signs preceding the day of judgment, in language strikingly applicable to existing circumstances, and calculated to unsettle and excite men's minds, and prepare them for some sudden disturbance; but it read so like a free translation of a sermon by a popular English preacher on the same subject, as to render it difficult to decide how to act with regard to it.*

The struggle which has taken place between the Christians and the Mussulmans, in various distinct parts of Europe as well as Asia, and which has been contemporaneous with the Indian mutiny, is viewed as indicating a desire on the part of the present representatives of Islam to regain something of their former dominancy. The Indo-Mohammedans are, however, very unlike their co-religionists in other countries, and the anti-idolatrous doctrines of their founder have been so corrupted by intermixture of the superstitious practices of modern Brahminism, that it is not possible to judge their feelings by any test applicable to Mohammedans in general.

The English naturally viewed, with great alarm, the fanatical outbreaks at Jaffa, Marash, and Belgrade, and still more so the alarming one at Jeddah; but the government have wisely striven to repress the suspicious distrust and aversion manifested by the Europeans to the Mohammedans as a class, fearing to see them driven to revolt by conduct equally unjust and impolitic.†

* Letter from H. B. B. Freere.—Parl. Papers (253), 4th May, 1858; p. 48.

This possible source of mutiny has been as yet but very partially explored, and the present heat of prejudice and excitement must be allowed to subside before any satisfactory conclusion can be formed on the subject.

Foreign intrigues are alleged to have been practised against us, and attempts made to undermine our position in India, in various ways, by a Christian as well as by a Mohammedan power; by Russia as well as Persia. It is difficult to say how far the vague expectation of Russian invasion (which certainly exists in India) has been occasioned by exaggerated rumours, and perverted reports gleaned from European journals, and circulated by the native press during the period of the Crimean war, or how much of it may be attributed to the deliberate machinations of Russia.

In England, both sources of danger were equally disregarded; and, amid the miserable inconsistencies which marked the war from beginning to end, not the least was the fact, that one of the arguments used to reconcile the people to heavy additional taxation, was the necessity of maintaining and restoring effete and incapable Mohammedan Turkey, as a means of checking the inordinate increase of the power of Russia, and making the battle-field in the Crimea, rather than on the frontier of our Indian empire. The Russian government intimated, that to roll back their European boundary would but lead them to advance their Asiatic one; and some years before the campaign of 1853, their organ at St. Petersburg declared that, in the event of war, the czar would dictate the terms of peace at Calcutta. In the teeth of this defiant warning, the British ministry, accustomed to treat India as a sort of peculiarly circumstanced colony, and to neglect colonies as a matter of course, paid no heed whatever to the strange excitement manifested throughout India at the first tidings of the Crimean conflict. No pains were taken to ascertain the tone adopted by the natives, or to guard against rumours circulated and schemes set afoot by foreign emissaries, in a country where a passport system would have been a common measure of prudence. Ministers concentrated all their energies on the conduct of the European struggle (though not with any very satisfactory result), and acted as if on the understanding that, "during the Russian war, the

† See letter of Lord Hobart.—*Times*, December 3rd, 1857.

government had too much to do, to be expected to attend to India.”*

The ill effects which the tidings of the Russian and Persian wars were calculated to produce in India, were aggravated by the drain of European troops thereby occasioned. The government demand for two regiments of infantry for the Crimean war, was earnestly deprecated by Lord Dalhousie.

“Although the war with Russia,” observes his lordship, “does not directly affect our Indian dominions, yet it is unquestionably exercising at this moment a most material influence upon the minds of the people over whom we rule, and upon the feelings of the nations by which we are surrounded; and thus it is tending indirectly to affect the strength and the stability of our power.

“The authorities in England cannot, I think, be aware of the exaggerated estimate of the power of Russia which has been formed by the people of India. I was myself unaware of it until the events of the past year have forced it upon my convictions. Letters from various parts of India have shown me, that the present contest is regarded by them with the deepest interest, and that its issue is by no means considered so certain as we might desire. However mortifying to our pride it may be to know it, and however unaccountable such a belief may appear in people living amidst the visible evidences of our might, it is an unquestionable fact, that it is widely believed in India, that Russia is pressing us hard, and that she will be more than a match for us at last.

“We know by our correspondence in the East, that the King of Ava has declaredly been acting on this feeling; and that, influenced by it, he has been delaying the dispatch of the mission which many months ago he spoke of sending to Calcutta. . . .

“India is now in perfect tranquillity from end to end. I entertain no apprehension whatever of danger or disturbance. We are perfectly secure so long as we are strong, and are believed to be so: but if European troops shall be now withdrawn from India to Europe; if countenance shall thus be given to the belief already prevalent, that we have grappled with an antagonist whose strength will prove equal to overpower us; if, by consenting to withdrawal, we shall weaken that essential element of our military strength, which has already been declared to be no more than adequate for ordinary times; and if, further, we should be called upon to dispatch an army to the Persian Gulf—an event which, unlooked-for now, may any day be brought about by the thralldom in which Persia is held, and by the feeble and fickle character of the Shah; then, indeed, I shall no longer feel, and can no longer express the same confidence as before, that the security and stability of our position in the East will remain unassailed. . . .

In a country where the entire English community is but a handful of scattered strangers, I feel it to be a public duty to record, that in my deliberate judgment, the European infantry force in India, ought in no case to be weakened by a single man, so long as Eng-

land shall be engaged in her present struggle with Russia.”†

The regiments were nevertheless withdrawn, and were not even returned at the close of the Russian war. Then came the Persian war, and the requisition upon Lord Canning, who complied less reluctantly than Lord Dalhousie had done; but still under protest. Lord Canning reminded the home authorities, that, for all Indian purposes, the strength of the army would be equally reduced, whether the regiments were sent to Persia or to the Crimea. He spoke of the excitement which even a distant war raised in the minds of the natives, and insisted on the necessity of an increase of European troops, as necessary to the safety of India during the continuance of hostile operations against Persia.‡

It is at least possible that the Russian government should have retaliated on us our invasion of its territory, by striving to sow discord in India. The course of the rebellion has afforded many incidents calculated to produce a conviction of their having done so: for instance, the assertion of one of the Delhi princes, that when the mutineers marched on that city, the royal family believed them to be the advanced guard of the Russian army. Another far more significant fact, which was communicated to me on the authority of a naval officer in a high position on the Indus, was the extraordinary amount of silver roubles seen in the bazaars in the North-West Provinces, immediately before the mutiny, and supposed to have passed to the tables of the money-changers from the notoriously well-filled pockets of Russian spies. The extent and mode in which this agency may have been employed, will probably never be revealed; but it can hardly be doubted that it is an active and recognised mode of obtaining the accurate and comprehensive information possessed by the government of St. Petersburg, regarding the condition of the domestic and foreign affairs of every other nation. Spies, in time of peace, may easily become political incendiaries in time of war, in countries hostile to the authority which they serve. As to detecting them, that is next to impossible: a charge of this nature is always difficult to prove; but, to an Englishman, the difficulty is insur-

* Speeches of Mr. Disraeli and Mr. Vernon Smith, president of the India Board.—Indian debate, July 26th, 1857.

† Minute by the governor-general: 13th Septem-

ber, 1854.—Parl Papers, 12th February, 1858; pp. 7; 9.

‡ Minutes dated 7th and 8th February, 1857.—Parl. Papers, 20th July, 1857; pp. 8, 9.

mountable. Clever thieves, clever forgers, England has produced in abundance: unscrupulous politicians are not quite unknown among us; but our secret service department has, on the whole, been singularly free from subterranean and systematised "dirty work." The secret opening of a letter is scouted at, in a political functionary, as listening at a keyhole would be in a private individual; and, even while quite uncertain as to the extent of the mutiny in 1849, Sir Charles Napier would not entertain the idea of examining the correspondence of the sepoys, then passing to an unusual extent through the government post-offices. The Russian language has probably many words which, like the French one *fin*, *finesse*, and others, have no equivalent in English; nor has America—sharp, shrewd, and slick as some of her children are—annexed to the mother-tongue any words which serve as fit exponents for that peculiar branch of continental diplomacy which renders trained spies a regular governmental department. We have no political detectives among us. Our aristocracy, whether of rank or letters, may indeed be occasionally annoyed by the indiscretion of caterers for the public press, in the shape of newspaper reporters and gossiping memoir writers; but, at our tables, the host speaks his mind in the plainest terms regarding the most powerful personages of the moment, without fearing that one of his servants may be taking notes behind his chair, which may procure his exile or imprisonment; and the hostess is equally certain that none of her guests will drive from her roof to lodge information of some enthusiastic ebullition which has escaped her lips, and for which neither youth nor beauty, character nor station, would save her from personal chastisement under the orders of a Russian Usher of the Black Rod. What we call grumbling in Great Britain, folks abroad call treason; and that is an offence for which Britons have so little temptation, that they are slow to note its existence, or provide against it even when themselves exercising those despotic powers which, if men dare not openly oppose, they secretly strive against. To what extent Russian emissaries have fomented Indian disaffection, will probably never be proved: the natives can, perhaps, give information on the subject, if they will; and if that evidence be obtained, and thoroughly sifted, by men possessing intimate acquaintance with the

Indian languages and character, united to sound judgment, some light may yet be thrown on a subject every branch of which is most interesting as regards the past, most important as regards the future.

No Englishman, except under very peculiar circumstances, would ever detect spies amid a multitude of foreigners. I speak strongly on this point, because, in China, several Russians were pointed out to me by the experienced Dr. Gutzlaff; dressed in the costume of the country, speaking the language, adopting the habits of the people, and appearing, to the casual observer, to all intents native born.

It is notorious that a Captain Vikovitch played a conspicuous part in inciting the unjust and disastrous expedition to Afghanistan against Dost Mohammed. This and many other instances, leave little doubt that Russia maintains, in Central Asia, agents to watch and, if possible, influence the proceedings of England, and probably receives from some of the Greek or Armenian merchants settled at Calcutta or Bombay, accounts about the state finances, the army, and affairs in general; but, besides this, disclosures are said to have been made which prove that Russian emissaries, under various guises, have been successfully at work in inflaming the bigotry of the Mussulman, and the prejudices of the high-caste Hindoo.* It is possible, however, that information on this subject obtained by the government, may, for obvious reasons, be withheld from the public.

This introductory chapter has extended to a greater length than the writer anticipated at its commencement. His design was simply to state the alleged causes of the mutiny, as far as practicable, in the words of those who were their chief exponents, and to refrain from mingling therewith his own views. But the future welfare of India and of England is so manifestly connected with the policy now evolving from the crucible of heated and conflicting public and party feeling, that it is barely possible for any one really interested in the result, to look on, and describe the struggle, without revealing his own convictions on points where right and wrong, truth and fallacy, justice and oppression, are clearly at issue.

In the foregoing summary, some alleged causes are noted which appear to be scarcely compatible with one another. The incom-

* Dr. Duff's *Indian Rebellion*, p. 93.

patibility is perhaps less real than apparent. What we call BRITISH INDIA, is, in fact, a congeries of nations, differing in language, creed, and customs, as do European states, and with even less points of union, excepting only their involuntary association under a foreign government.

It follows, that in striving to trace the origin of wide-spread disaffection, and the connection between seemingly distinct insurrectionary movements, we must be prepared to find great variety of motive—general, local, and temporary—affecting scattered masses, and manifesting itself sometimes in active hostility, sometimes in sullen discontent.

Under a despotic government, with an enormous army of native mercenaries, the outbreak of rebellion would naturally occur among the soldiery. While they were contented, the people would almost necessarily remain in complete subjection; but if the soldiery had grievances, however slight compared with those of the people, the two classes would coalesce; the separate discontent of each party reacting upon the other, the army would initiate rebellion, the people would maintain it. According to Mr. Disraeli, this has actually been the case; the conduct of the Bengal troops, in revolting, having been that of men "who were not so much the avengers of professional grievances, as the exponents of general discontent."*

It is difficult to understand what the reason can have been for keeping up such an enormous Native army as a peace establishment. Soldiers were used to perform police duties in the older provinces, where war had been unknown for years, simply because there were not policemen to do them; and this confounding of civil and military duties lies at the bottom of much misgovernment, extortion, and unnecessary expense. The troops so variously engaged were trained only for arms, yet employed mainly in duties which officers and men looked upon as derogatory to them as soldiers, and which, in fact, they had no business with at all. It was at once deteriorating

their efficiency, and putting power unnecessarily in their hands, to employ them in functions which should have been, as a mere matter of policy, kept perfectly distinct.

There is much justice in Lord John Russell's remark, that we have had altogether too large an army, and that 50,000 Europeans, with 100,000 Natives, would be a much better security, as far as force is concerned, than a Native army of 300,000.†

At this moment, the total amount of troops in our service is scarcely less than before the mutiny, so rapidly have new corps replaced the old ones, and new sources of supply become available to meet an urgent demand.‡

There is need of care, lest our new auxiliaries prove equally, if not more dangerous than the old ones. There is more need than ever of moderation, or rather of justice and charity, being urged by the British public on their countrymen in India, lest we lose for ever our hold on the confidence of its vast population.

It is most true that "the time is really come for the people of England and for the government of the country to meet the manifestations of a spirit which would render our rule in India not only a crime but an impossibility, by an active and resolute policy. Outrages on natives must be punished, unless we would willingly and knowingly accept the hostility of India, and, with our eyes open, justify the assertions of the intriguers, who tell the people that nothing will content us but their utter extermination."

The growing alienation of the Europeans from the natives has been already noticed as a cause of disaffection; but since that section was written, the free, fearless, graphic representations of Mr. Russell have thrown new light on the subject, and shown but too plainly a sufficient reason for "the rift, bottomless and apparently causeless, which, even before the mutiny, was observed as separating the European from the native, and increasing in breadth every day."§

Unhappily, it is no new thing to be told

* Debate (Commons), July 28th, 1857.

† *Ibid.*

‡ The new recruits are, however, very different men from the tall, well-formed Brahmin or Rajpoot sepoy of the old Bengal army. These were six feet in height, and forty inches round the chest; docile, polite, doing credit to their officers on parade, smart at drill, neat and clean on duty. Already the reaction has commenced; and Indian officers in general appear disposed to recollect (what the best and

wisest of them have never forgotten), that "Pandy, until he went mad in 1857, was a good orderly soldier." "For myself," an officer writes in a recent Indian journal, "I would rather serve with them than with the dirty, unworthy, ungentelemanly (Pandy was a gentleman) set of strange bedfellows with whom misfortune has made us acquainted."—Mr. Russell—*Times*, Nov. 8th, 1858.

§ *Ibid.*, October 20th, 1858.

that Englishmen in India are arrogant and exclusive. In the last century, West Indian proprietors and East Indian nabobs were chosen by essayists, novelists, and playwrights, as representing a peculiar class of domestic tyrants, wealthy and assumptious; whose presence, Lord Macaulay said, raised the price of everything in their neighbourhood, from a rotten borough to a rotten egg. The habits they had acquired indicated the life they had led; and all who knew India, and had the intelligence to form, and the moral courage to express, an opinion on the subject, sorrowfully agreed with Bishop Heber in deprecating the "foolish, surly, national pride," of which he daily saw but too many instances, and which he was convinced did us much harm in India. "We are not guilty," he said, "of wilful injustice or oppression; but we shut out the natives from our society, and a bullying, insolent manner is continually assumed in speaking to them."

Some went still further than this, and echoed Lord Byron's emphatic warning,* of the sure retribution that would attend us, if, instead of striving to elevate India, by safe and sure degrees, to our own height of freedom, we tried, with selfish blindness, to get and keep her down beneath the iron heel of despotism, using the energy our own dear-bought freedom sustains in us, not to loosen, but to rivet the chains of a feebler race, for whose welfare we have made ourselves responsible before God and man.

Nothing can be more incompatible with the dignity of our position, than the "vulgar balaudering" which disgusted Sir Charles Napier in 1850. It appeared then as if Mr. Thackeray's lash were needed to keep within bounds the vagaries of the Anglo-Indian variety of the *genus* "Snob." Now the evil seems to have passed dealing with by such means; it is the provost-marshal or the police-magistrate, not the accomplished satirist, who can alone cope with men whose insolent cruelty needs corporeal rather than mental discipline.

The Duke of Wellington always listened with impatience to commendations of the mere courage of officers. "Brave!" he would say, "of course they are; all Englishmen are brave; but it is the spirit of the

gentleman that makes a British officer." Yet, at this very time, when Englishmen and Englishwomen have passed all former traditions of valour and steadfastness in extremest peril, when once again India has proved, in Canning's words, "fertile in heroes"—a class, it would appear not inconsiderable in number, are acting in such a manner as to disgrace the British army, and even the British nation, in the eyes of Europe, and to render the restoration of peace in India as difficult as they possibly can.

The excessive timidity of the Hindoos (of which their reckless daring, or passive submission when hopeless, is the natural counterpart) encourages, in coarse natures, the very arrogance it disarms in higher ones. The wretched manner in which our law-courts are conducted, and the shilling necessary to procure the stamped paper on which to draw up a petition to the court,† operate, in the extreme poverty and depression of the sufferers, in deterring them from bringing any formal complaint, even to obtain justice for a ferocious assault; and so the "sahibs" (European gentlemen) ride through the bazaars (markets), and lay open the heads of natives with the butt of their whips, just to clear the way; or, when summoned to court for debt, lay the lash across the shoulders of the presumptuous summonser in the open street, as an expression of opinion. A young gentleman in his cups shoots one of his servants with his revolver; an officer kicks a servant downstairs because he has entered without leaving his shoes outside the door; and now, daily at the mess-tables, "every man of the mute white-turbaned file, who with crossed hands, glistening eyes, and quick ears, stand motionless in attendance," hears the word "nigger" used every time a native is named, and knows well that it is an expression of contempt. In India, the ears of Europeans become familiarised with the term, which soon ceases to excite surprise or disgust. In England, it is felt to be painfully significant of the state of opinion among those who use it, and cannot be disassociated with the idea of slaves and slave-drivers. It seems the very last word whereby British officers (even in the "griffin" stage) would

* "Look to the East, where Ganges' swarthy race
Shall shake your tyrant empire to the base;
Lo! there rebellion rears her ghastly head,
And glares the Nemesis of native dead;
Till Indus rolls a deep purpureal flood,
And claims his long arrear of Northern blood;

So may ye perish! Pallas, when she gave
Your free-born rights, forbade ye to enslave."

The Curse of Minerva.

† The number of petitions rejected because not written on stamped paper, is said to be enormous. The fact has been repeatedly alluded to in parliament.

choose to denote the men they commanded, or even the people among whom they lived, and who, whatever their colour, are not the less British subjects. But what is to be said for the example given to the European soldiery* by British officers, of Christian parentage and education, one of whom "takes his syce (native groom), because he has put a wrong saddle on his horse, and fastens him on a pole placed out in the full sun of May?"—or by another, who "fastens down his syce in the sun by heel-ropes and foot-ropes, as if he were a horse, and spreads grain before him in mockery?" These instances Mr. Russell gives publicly. Privately, he offers to send the editor of the *Times* evidence of still greater significance.

It is a mockery to talk of equal laws, and yet suffer such outrages as these to pass unpunished. It is difficult to understand why the senior regimental officers do not bring the offenders to justice, unless, indeed, the courts-martial are becoming, as Sir Charles Napier prophesied, mere forms, and the most undoubted offenders certain of "honourable acquittal." Some of the old officers are said to watch the state of affairs with great dissatisfaction; and Sir Frederick Currie (the late chairman of the Court of Directors), with Colonel Sykes and some other leading men, have expressed their opinions with a plainness which has exposed them to the invectives of a certain portion of the Anglo-Indian press.†

The plain speaking of Mr. Russell himself, is of the first importance to the best interests of England and of India. Nothing but the strongest and most genuine love of justice and hatred of oppression, could give him courage to write as he does, circumstanced as he is. Among the deeds of heroism he so eloquently chronicles, none can surpass that which he is himself enacting, in pleading even now for the rights of the wretched and despised native population, while living in the midst of the class to whom that very wretchedness furnishes food for cruel tyranny, or idle, heartless, senseless jests. On this point, as indeed some other leading features of the rebellion, the public journals, with the *Times*

* The European soldiery are unhappily not slow to follow the example. It is alleged, that very recently a convoy, under a party of the 97th and 20th regiments, were on their way to Lucknow. Darkness fell upon them; there were confusion and delay on the road; probably there were apathy, neglect, and laziness on the part of the garrewans, or native drivers, who are usually a most harmless, inoffen-

sive, and honest race. Some ruffians among the soldiery took advantage of the obscurity to wreak their brutal ferocity on the drivers, and pricked them with their bayonets so severely that one man died of his wound almost immediately, and the others were removed to the hospital in litters.—*Times*, Nov. 8th, 1858. † *Ibid.*, Oct. 20th, 1858. ‡ *Ibid.*, November 8th, 1858.

at their head, and the fragmentary but deeply interesting accounts of individual sufferers, are almost the exclusive sources of information. The government have, it is true, furnished the House of Commons with reams of Blue Books and other parliamentary papers; but not one of these contains anything approaching a connected statement of the view taken by the home or Indian authorities of the cause, origin, or progress of the mutiny, which has now lasted fully eighteen months. Each department appears to have sent in its own papers, duly sifted, weeded, and garbled; but no person appears to have revised them as a whole. The omissions of one set are partially supplied by the admissions of another; decided assertions made in ignorance by one functionary, are qualified in the next page by the statement of a colleague. This is the case throughout the whole series yet published, beginning with the various and contradictory allegations made regarding the greased cartridges. To enter into discussion on each point would be endless; and therefore, in subsequent pages, facts, so far as they can be ascertained, will be simply stated, with the authority on which they rest; the counter-statements being left unnoticed, unless they happen to be of peculiar importance or interest.

"That most vindictive, unchristian, and cruel spirit which the dreadful contest and the crimes of the mutineers have evoked," is not, however, confined to the army and the press; it extends to the counting-house, and even to the pulpit. "One reverend divine has written a book, in which, forgetting that the heart of man is deceitful and desperately wicked, he takes the cheerful view that the Oriental nature is utterly diabolical and hopelessly depraved, as contradistinguished from his own nature and that of his fellows. * * * An excellent clergyman at Simla, recently took occasion, in his sermon, to rebuke the disposition on the part of certain of his hearers to ill-use the natives; but generally, the voice from the pulpit has been mute on this matter, or it has called aloud, 'Go forth and spare not.'"[‡]

sive, and honest race. Some ruffians among the soldiery took advantage of the obscurity to wreak their brutal ferocity on the drivers, and pricked them with their bayonets so severely that one man died of his wound almost immediately, and the others were removed to the hospital in litters.—*Times*, Nov. 8th, 1858. † *Ibid.*, Oct. 20th, 1858. ‡ *Ibid.*, November 8th, 1858.

NORTH INDIA




BY APPOINTMENT TO HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN



SCALE

BRITISH POSSESSIONS



REFERENCE
British Possessions
States under British Protection
Independent States

Longitude East from Greenwich

Scale of Miles

CHAPTER II.

JANUARY TO MAY, 1857.

At the commencement of 1857, the Indian army, exclusive of the contingents of Native states, stood thus:—

Presidency.	Europeans.	Natives.	Total.
Bengal . . .	24,366	135,767	160,133
Madras . . .	10,726	51,244	61,970
Bombay . . .	10,430	45,213	55,069
Grand Total . . .	45,522	232,224	277,172

The royal European troops included four cavalry and twenty-two infantry regiments, containing, in all, 24,263 men. The Europeans in the service of the Company, consisted of five horse brigades of artillery, twelve battalions of foot, and nine cavalry regiments. The Native cavalry was composed of twenty-one regular, and thirty-three irregular regiments; the Native infantry, of 155 regular, and forty-five irregular regiments.*

The whole expense of the Indian army, which, including the Native contingents officered by us, mustered 315,520 men, was returned at £9,802,235, of which £5,668,100 was calculated to be the cost of the 51,316 European soldiers, leaving £4,134,135 as the sum total required for 263,204 natives.

The number of European troops was actually less in 1857 than in 1835, whereas the Native army had increased by 100,000 men. The disproportion was greatest in the Bengal presidency. In Bombay, the relative strength of European to Native infantry was as 1 to 9½; in Madras, as 1 to 16½; and in Bengal, as 1 to 24½.†

The preponderance of Brahmins in the Bengal army was very great, and the government had directed the enlistment of 200 Seiks in each regiment. But this order had been only very partially obeyed. A large proportion of the Madras troops are low-caste Hindoos. In the Bombay regiments a third are Brahmins, from one to two hundred men are Mussulmans, and the remainder low-caste Hindoos, with a few Jews.

The number and strength of the Bengal

army (European and Native) in January, 1857, are thus shown:—

Description of Troops.	European Officers.	European Non-Com. and Rank and File.	Native Commiss., Non-Com. and Rank and File.
Queen's Troops:—			
2 Regts. of Dragoons . . .	56	1,310	—
15 ditto of Infantry . . .	473	13,956	—
	529	15,266	—
Company's Troops:—			
Engineers and Sappers . . .	120	88	1,289
Artillery—Horse . . .	63	999	793
" Foot(Euro.) . . .	102	1,899	1,531
" " (Nat.) . . .	76	27	2,302
Cavalry—Regular . . .	106	28	5,002
" Irregular . . .	91	—	14,061
Infantry—Europeans . . .	114	2,460	—
" * Native Regt. . .	1,276	136	83,103
" " Irreg. . .	126	56	27,355
Veterans . . .	85	186	—
Medical Establish- ment and Warrant Officers . . .	370	163	326
Total . . .	3,058	21,308	135,767

Grand Total 160,133

The distribution of the above force was as follows:—

Distribution of Bengal Army.	Europeans.	Natives.	Total.
Presidency Division, includ- ing the garrison of Fort William . . .	1,221	14,639	15,860
Sonthal District . . .	41	3,366	3,407
Dinapore Division . . .	1,174	12,251	13,425
Cawnpore ditto . . .	314	16,048	16,362
Oude Field Force . . .	1,034	3,661	4,695
Saugor District . . .	257	5,864	6,121
Meerut Division . . .	3,098	17,248	20,346
Station of Sirdarpoor . . .	1	656	657
" of Rewah . . .	6	762	768
" of Kherwarrah . . .	6	1,034	1,040
Sirhind Division . . .	4,930	12,849	17,779
Lahore ditto . . .	4,198	15,964	20,162
Peshawar ditto, including Sind Sagur District . . .	4,794	20,129	24,923
Punjab Irregular Force . . .	58	9,049	9,107
Troops in Pegu . . .	1,817	2,121	3,938†

The Native regiments in India are never quartered in barracks, but in thatched huts; each of the ten companies which form a regiment having its own line, in front of which is a small circular building called

* Parl. Papers, April 16th, 1856; pp. 4. 5.

† Parl. Papers on the Mutinies, 1857 (No. 1), p. 9.

‡ The above statements were kindly furnished by Captain Eastwick, deputy-chairman of the East India Company.

"the Bells," in which the arms and accoutrements are placed after having been cleaned—the key being usually held by the havildar (sergeant) on duty. The officers reside in bungalows (also thatched, and very inflammable), each situated in its own compound; and the powder-magazines and depôts of stores are, or rather were, exposed without protection in the open plain. Each cantonment resembled an extensive camp; and the principal stations (such as Meerut and Cawnpore) covered so large an area, that they required almost as strong a force to defend them as to occupy them; and a long time might elapse before what was done in one part of them was known in other parts.* The idea of combination to mutiny, on any ground whatever, was evidently the last thing the European officers suspected; and the construction of the cantonments was on a par with the blind security which marked the general arrangements of the period.

In 1856, the authorities desired to place an improved description of musket in the hands of the sepoys; that is to say, to substitute the Minié rifle for the old "Brown Bess." Considering the nature of our position in India, and the peaceful character of the duties which the Native army was then fulfilling, and which alone it seemed likely to be required for, the policy of this measure may be doubted; but of the suicidal folly with which it was carried out, there can scarcely be a second opinion.

In 1853, some rifle ammunition was sent from England to India, and experiments were directed to be tried, which induced Major-general Tucker (then adjutant-general) to recommend earnestly to government, that "in the greasing composition nothing should be used which could possibly offend the caste or religious prejudices of the natives."†

This warning did not prevent the authorities, three years later, from committing the double error of greasing cartridges in the Dum Dum arsenal, eight miles from Calcutta, after the English receipt, with a compound chiefly made from tallow; and of issuing to the Native troops similarly prepared cartridges, sent out direct from England, but which ought, of course, only to have been given to the European troops. Not a single person connected with the

store department cared to remember, that to order the sepoys to tear with their teeth paper smeared with tallow made of mixed animal fat (a filthy composition, whether the animal were clean or unclean, and especially to men who never touch animal food), would naturally excite the distrustful suspicions of the Native soldiery—Mohammedan, Hindoo, and even Seik; for the Seik also considers the cow a sacred animal.

Such suspicions were unquestionably excited; and though much latent disaffection might have existed, it is clear that the cartridge affair was a grievance which gave the more daring a pretext for rebellion, and a rallying-cry, to which they well knew the multitude would respond.‡

The first persons who noticed the obnoxious means used in preparing the ball cartridges, were the Native workmen employed in the arsenal. A Clashie, or Classic, attached to the rifle depôt, asked a sepoy of the 2nd grenadiers for water from his lotah (or brass drinking-vessel.) The sepoy refused, observing, he was not aware of what caste the man was; whereupon the Clashie rejoined, "You will soon lose your caste, as, ere long, you will have to bite cartridges covered with the fat of pigs and cows." Lieutenant Wright, the officer to whom this circumstance was reported, understood the feelings of the Hindoos too well to neglect the warning. He entered into conversation with the men; and they told him that the rumour of their intended degradation had spread throughout India, and that when they went home on furlough, their friends would not eat with them. Lieutenant Wright, "believing it to be the case," assured them that the grease used was composed of mutton fat and wax: to which they replied, "It may be so, but our friends will not believe it; let us obtain the ingredients from the bazaar, and make it up ourselves; we shall then know what is used, and be able to assure our fellow-soldiers and others that there is nothing in it prohibited by our caste." Lieutenant Wright urged the adoption of the measure suggested by the men.

Major Bontein, the officer in command at Dum Dum, on receiving the above statement, assembled all the Native portion of the depôt, and asked if they had any complaint to make. At least two-thirds of the

* *Indophilus' Letters to the Times*, p. 12.

† Letter of Major-general Tucker to the *Times*, 1857.

‡ A good summary of the official proceeding regarding the cartridges, is given in a pamphlet by George Crawshaw, Esq., mayor of Gateshead.

detachment, including all the Native commissioned officers, immediately stepped to the front, and very respectfully, but distinctly, repeated their previous complaint and request. Major Bontein thought the matter so serious, that he took immediate steps to bring it before the commander-in-chief.

Major-general Hearsey, the head of the presidency division, in a letter dated "Barrackpoor,* January 23rd, 1857," represented to government the extreme difficulty of eradicating the notion which had taken hold on the mind of the Native soldiery; and urged, as the only remedy, that, despite the trouble and inconvenience with which the arrangement would be attended, the sepoy should be allowed to obtain from the bazaars the ingredients necessary to prepare the bullet-patches.

On the 29th, Colonel Abbott, the inspector-general of ordnance, being desired to inquire into the nature of the composition used at the arsenal, found that it was supplied by a contractor, and that "no extraordinary precautions had been taken to insure the absence of any objectionable fat." He adds—"It is certainly to be regretted that ammunition was not prepared expressly for the practice dépôt without any grease at all; but the subject did not occur to me, and I merely gave orders for the requisite number of rounds."†

Of course, after this admission, no officer, with any regard for truth, could state to his men, that contaminating substances had not been used in the preparation of the cartridges. Instead of withdrawing the cause of contention at once and entirely, the government resolved that the sepoy at the dépôts should be allowed to use any mixture they might think fit; but that the question of the state in which cartridges should be issued under other circumstances, and especially for service in the field, must remain open for further consideration. The concession was both tardy and insufficient. It was not communicated to the sepoy at Dum Dum and Barrackpoor until the 28th. In the meantime, several fires occurred simultaneously at Barrackpoor and Raneegunge, where a detachment from Barrackpoor were stationed. The electric tele-

* *Barrackpoor* (or *barrack-town*) is situated on the Hooghly, sixteen miles from Calcutta. The governor-general has a residence here, commenced on a magnificent scale by Lord Wellesley, and only partially finished, but standing in a park of about 250 acres in extent, laid out with great taste and

graph bungalow at the latter place was burned; and Ensign Chamier, of the 34th regiment, snatched an arrow, with a lighted match attached thereto, from the thatch of his own bungalow, and thus saved, or at least postponed, its destruction. The arrow was one such as the Sonthals use, and suspicion fell on the men of the 2nd grenadiers, who had recently been serving in the Sonthal districts. A thousand rupees were offered for the conviction of the offenders, but without result. On the 27th, the men had been assembled on parade, and asked if they had any grievance to complain of; upon which a Native officer of the 34th stepped forward, and asked Colonel Wheeler whether any orders had yet been received regarding the new cartridges. The answer was, of course, in the negative. To add to the difficulties of the military authorities at the dépôts, the officer in command of a wing of her majesty's 53rd, stationed at Dum Dum, received directions from Fort William (Calcutta), to be ready to turn out at any moment, and to distribute to his men ten rounds of balled ammunition, as a mutiny had broken out at Barrackpoor among the sepoy. General Hearsey represented the ill-feeling which such rash precipitancy was calculated to produce. He also pointed out the influence which was probably exercised by a Brahminical association, called the *Dhurma Sobha*, formed at Calcutta for the advocacy of ancient Hindoo customs, against European innovations (especially the recent abolition of the laws enforcing perpetual widowhood.) This association he thought had been instrumental in tampering with the sepoy; and had circulated, if not initiated, the idea, that the new ammunition was in some way or other connected with a general design of government for the destruction of the caste of the whole Bengal army. Everything connected with the cartridges was viewed with suspicion; and it was soon noticed that, although served out ungreased, they had a greasy look; consequently, by obeying the military regulation, "to bring the cartridge to the mouth, holding it between the forefinger and thumb, with the ball in the hand, and bite off the top elbow close to the body,"‡ they might still incur the forfeiture of caste, in consequence of some polluting care. Job Charnock is said to have built a bungalow here in 1689, before the site of Calcutta was decided upon. Barrackpoor has been called the *Montpelier of Bengal*.

† Appendix to *Parl. Papers on Mutinies, 1857*; p. 7.

‡ *Ibid.*, p. 37.

ingredient in the paper itself. The new cartridges were, in fact, made from paper sent from England—much more highly glazed than that previously used, and altogether thinner and tougher; for the bore of the new rifle being far smaller than that of the former musket, the old thick paper would not contain the amount of powder necessary to throw the bullet to its utmost range, without being inconveniently long.

The officers vainly reasoned with the men: the paper, they said, tore like waxed cloth; and, when thrown in the fire, fizzed, so that there must be grease in it; in short, General Hearsey declared (February 8th), that "their suspicions having been fairly roused on the subject of cow and pig fat, it would be quite impossible to allay them."*

The excitement continued to increase, and information was privately given to the officers, of meetings held at night in the sepoy lines, where plans of resistance to the new cartridges, amounting to open and violent mutiny, were discussed. The four regiments then at Barrackpore were the 2nd grenadiers, the 34th Native infantry, the 43rd light infantry, and the 70th Native infantry. By information which has subsequently transpired, the incipient mutiny appears to have been at this time confined to the two former regiments. They thought to induce their comrades to make common cause with them, and then to rise against the officers, burn or plunder the bungalows, and proceed to Calcutta and seize Fort William; or, failing that, take possession of the treasury. The man who communicated this intelligence could not be induced to divulge the names of the ringleaders, nor could any proof of the truth of his assertions be obtained.

General Hearsey understood the native character well, and spoke the language with rare facility. He caused the entire brigade to be paraded on the 9th of February, and reasoned with them on the folly of supposing the British government inclined to attempt their forcible conversion. "Christians of the Book (Protestants)," he said, "admitted no proselytes, and baptized none, who did not fully understand and believe in the tenets therein inculcated." His arguments proved successful in tranquillising the troops for the moment; but the brigadier knew

well that the lull was likely to be of brief duration, and he wrote to government on the 11th, urging that his previous proposal of changing the cartridge paper, might at once either be confirmed or rejected; that no further time should be lost in coming to some decision; for, he adds, "we are dwelling on a mine ready for explosion."

On the 21st of February, Lieutenant-colonel Hogge wrote from Meerut, to propose that the biting of the cartridge should be altogether abolished, and that the men should be instructed to twist off the end with the right hand—a plan which would "remove all objections from that class of Hindoos who never touch animal food." On the 2nd of March, Major Bontein wrote from Dum Dum to the same effect; but he adds, that by his suggestion he did not "in the least intend to consult the caprice of the Native soldiers," and had no other motive than increased efficiency.

Apparently this was the right way of putting the case in the sight of the authorities; for the governor-general in council, with all due form, and without any undignified haste, informed the commander-in-chief, at Simla, of the proposed alteration; suggesting, that if his excellency approved, new instructions should be given for the rifle practice, in which no allusion should be made to the biting of the cartridge, laid down in previous regulations. Pending the answer of General Anson, private instructions were sent to Dum Dum, to let the musketry practice there stop short of actually loading the rifle.

While the European authorities discussed matters among themselves, the sepoys did the same, but arrived more rapidly at more important conclusions. It is not probable that they viewed the cartridge as a solitary indication of the feeling of government towards them: the general service order of 1856; the affront put on the Mohammedans in the Punjab by General Anson in the same year, by expelling them the service for refusing to allow their beards to be cut; the total withdrawal, when the penny postage came into operation, of the privilege of having their letters franked† by their commanding officers; the alterations in the invaliding regulations;—these and other recent innovations were probably rankling in their minds. The regiments understood one another; a certain power of combination existed, ready to be called into action; and by reason of constant correspon-

* Appendix to Parl. Papers on Mutinies, 1857; p. 20.

† The franking by the European officers, was in itself calculated to impose some check on the transmission of treasonable correspondence.

dence, the whole of the Bengal troops were engaged in an incipient conspiracy before they well knew what they were conspiring about. We left the poison full time to work. The filthy cartridges prepared for them did, we cannot now doubt, actually contain the forbidden substance, which prisoners starving in a dungeon, and sepoys on board ship, will perish sooner than touch; and yet, instead of manfully owning the error, and atoning for it by changing the paper, and, once for all, removing every shadow of suspicion, we persisted in holding it over their heads like a drawn sword, to be let fall at any moment. So late as the 5th of March (the government respite not having then arrived), the sepoys at Dum Dum were, notwithstanding their remonstrances, employed in making cartridges of the new, and as they believed greased, paper; and Major Bontein was preparing to enforce the regulations, and considering how to deal with the prisoners he expected to be obliged to make for disobedience of orders.*

The first mutiny was not, however, destined to occur at Dum Dum: it broke out at Burhampoor on the Ganges, about 120 miles from Calcutta. The only troops then at the station were the 19th Native infantry, a detachment of Native cavalry, and a battery of Native artillery. The 19th and 34th had been stationed together at Lucknow for two years; and the men were of course personally acquainted. During the latter part of the month of February, two sepoy parties of the 34th regiment were sent from Calcutta to Burhampoor. The second came as the escort of some sick Europeans on the 25th, and their communications regarding the proceedings at Barrackpoor, so alarmed the 19th, that the whole corps, Hindoos, Seiks, and Mohammedians, resolved upon a general fast; and for three days, beginning with the 26th, took only bhang, and other exciting drugs. Of this excitement, their commanding officer, Colonel Mitchell, was entirely ignorant. The new muskets had arrived shortly before, and he had explained to the sepoys that the necessary grease would be prepared before them by the pay havildars. On the 26th of February, orders were given for the

firing of fifteen rounds of blank cartridge per man. The cartridges were then sent to the bells of arms, and examined by the men. They had previously been in the habit of making all they used. Those now served out were of two kinds; one like the paper they had been accustomed to, the other whiter and thinner. The sepoys compared them in all ways; they burnt the paper, and laid other portions in water. Still they saw, or fancied they saw, a marked difference. They felt convinced that they were greased, and refused to take the percussion-caps served out for the intended practice; saying, "Why should we take the caps, as we won't take the cartridges until the doubt about them is cleared up?"† This occurred at about four o'clock in the afternoon. The incidents which followed are best told in the words of the petition subsequently laid before government by the 19th regiment, and which the governor-general in council has pronounced to be, "upon the whole, a fair account of what took place on the occasion of the outbreak; the main points being borne out by the evidence at the court of inquiry."‡

"At half-past seven o'clock," the petitioners state, "the colonel, accompanied by the adjutant, came on parade, and very angrily gave orders to us, saying, 'If you will not take the cartridges I will take you to Burmah, or to China,§ where, through hardship, you will all die. These cartridges were left behind by the 7th Native infantry, and I will serve them out to-morrow morning by the hands of the officers commanding companies.' He gave this order so angrily, that we were convinced that the cartridges were greased, otherwise he would not have spoken so."||

Colonel Mitchell sent an order to the cavalry and artillery (whose lines were about three miles from those of the infantry), to assemble on parade, for the purpose of compelling the sepoys to use the cartridges. It would appear that the sepoys were right in believing that the cartridges were to be bitten, not torn. The news soon got wind; and the same night, about a quarter to eleven, shouts were heard in the lines; some persons cried fire, others that they were surrounded by Europeans—that the guns

* Appendix to Parl. Papers on Mutinies, p. 38.

† *Ibid.*, p. 273.

‡ Minute of March 27th, 1857.—Appendix, p. 50.

§ This threat was denied by Colonel Mitchell, but established on European as well as Native testi-

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mony. It might easily have been uttered in the excitement of so critical a moment, and forgotten by the utterer, but not by those whose interests were immediately affected by it.—Appendix, &c., p. 290.

|| Appendix to Parl. Papers, pp. 278, 279.

and cavalry had arrived. In the midst of the din the alarm was sounded; and the sepoy, mad with fear, rushed to the bells and seized their arms.

It is manifest they had no plan, and no intention of attempting violence, or they would not have refused to receive the percussion-caps offered them that afternoon, nor have remained passive while the 11th irregular cavalry and guns were fetched to the parade, which they reached by torchlight between twelve and one. The armed sepoy then ran out of their lines to the parade in the greatest alarm. The colonel was much excited, and said, that he and the officers were prepared to do their duty, should the men not yield obedience; they (the officers) were ready to die, and would die there. The Native officers represented that the sepoy really believed that the matter affected their religion, and begged the colonel to send away the cavalry and guns; which was accordingly done.* The sepoy lodged their arms quietly, and returned to their lines. The whole regiment appeared on parade the next morning; and, on the 28th, there was another parade. The cartridges which the men had refused to fire, were publicly inspected; and the two kinds were put up by Colonel Mitchell, and forwarded for the inspection of government, with an account of what had taken place. Daily parades took place, and the 19th again became as steady and orderly as any men could be.†

Tranquillity was restored, and might have been maintained, had the government been sufficiently generous or discreet to deal gently with an offence which their own indiscretion had provoked. The disbandment of the regiment was summarily decided on, without any correspondence with the commander-in-chief, whose concurrence it appeared was necessary to the simple alteration of a clumsy mode of loading, which was goading the troops to mutiny, but was not necessary to the enactment of a decree which suddenly reduced a thousand men, whose fault must have varied very considerably in its circumstances, to the same utter poverty. Their appeal made to government, through Colonel Mitchell, was very touching. They said it was hard, after so many years' service, to lose their bread. Since the unfortunate

night of the 26th of February, all their duties had been carefully carried on, and (they add) "so shall be; as long as we live we will faithfully obey all orders; wherever, in the field of battle, we are ordered to go, there shall we be found; therefore, with every respect, we now petition, that since this is a religious question from which arose our dread, and as religion is, by the order of God, the first thing, we petition that, as we have done formerly, we may be also allowed to make up our own cartridges, and we will obey whatever orders may be given to us, and we will ever pray for you."

There is no mistaking the earnestness with which the 19th, even in the moment of reaction and reflection, dwell on the immediate cause of their outbreak. The government, in acquainting the Court of Directors with the whole transaction, give the same version, by saying that the regiment had refused to take the cartridges, "in consequence of the reports in circulation, that the paper of which they were made was greased with the fat of cows and pigs."

This despatch is dated 8th April, 1857. On the same day, the directors were inditing one expressive of their gratification at learning that the matter had been fully explained to the men at Barrackpore and Dum Dum, and that they appeared perfectly satisfied that no intention existed of interfering with their caste. Of course by this time it was pretty evident that the sepoy generally were convinced of the direct opposite, and viewed the 19th as a body of victims and martyrs.

The penalty of disbandment found little favour with any party. The ultra-disciplinarians pronounced the punishment insufficient, for what the governor-general thought fit to term "open and defiant mutiny;" and moderate men considered it would have been wiser to have accepted the offer of the corps, and make it a general service regiment, rather than send a thousand men to their homes, to beg or plunder food for the support of themselves and their families, and to sow the seed of distrust and disaffection wherever they went. Besides, evidence was adduced which proved beyond a doubt that the 19th had been instigated to mutiny by the representations of the 34th, who had

* It is highly improbable that, in the absence of European soldiers, the Native corps would have fired on their countrymen in such a case as this; yet the mode in which "the coercing force was withdrawn," was pronounced by the 'governor in

council as a special reason for declaring Colonel Mitchell unfit for the command of a regiment.—Appendix to Parl. Papers, p. 297.

† Letter of Lieutenant-colonel Mitchell, March 3rd, 1857.—Appendix, p. 267.

been long on the verge of an outbreak, and were only kept back by the influence of their officers. The government, knowing this, resolved on making the 19th the scape-goat for the 34th and other regiments, whose disaffection had been proved by incendiarism and sullen murmurings, and ordered the disbandment to take place at Barrackpoor.

The Calcutta authorities were not quite insensible to the danger pointed out by Napier, of "attempting to bully large masses of men." The sentence resolved on against the 19th was not made public until H.M.'s 84th regiment had been brought from Rangoon. The 84th arrived at Calcutta on the 20th of March, and were immediately conveyed to Chinsurah—a station about eight miles from Barrackpoor, whither the 19th were ordered to proceed. The arrival of the Europeans increased the excitement among the Native troops at Barrackpoor, which was evidently the centre of disaffection. Two of the 2nd Native grenadiers were taken up on a charge of endeavouring to excite mutiny on the 11th of March, found guilty, and sentenced to fourteen years' hard labour. The sentence is memorable, since General Anson thought fit to write a minute on it from his far-distant residence in the Himalayas—a mark of interest which the disbanding of entire regiments had not elicited. Death would, he considered, have been the proper penalty; but fourteen years of disgraceful labour might be to some worse than death; therefore he would not call for a revision of the sentence. "The miserable fate which the prisoners had brought upon themselves, would," he added, "excite no pity in the breast of any true soldier."*

Avowedly, in consequence of communications sent them by the 34th regiment, three companies of the 63rd regiment at Sooree refused to accept their furloughs, saying, "If our brethren at Barrackpoor go, we will go; but we hear they are not going." Afterwards they expressed contrition for their conduct, and were allowed to enjoy their furloughs. The refusal occurred on the 28th of March. On the afternoon of Sunday, the 29th, the Native officers of the 34th regiment at Barrackpoor reported that the men were in a very excited state. Sergeant-major Hewson proceeded to the lines, and found a sepoy walking up and down in front of the quarter-guard, and calling out to the men of the brigade to join him in defending and

* Appendix to Parl. Papers, p. 86. † *Ibid.*, p. 147.

dying for their religion and their caste. This was Mungul Pandey, a man of previously excellent character, who had been above seven years in the service, but had lately taken to the use of intoxicating preparations of opium and blang. Whether he had resorted to these stimulants, as the Indian soldiery are in the habit of doing, to nerve himself for this special purpose, or whether the habit itself had rendered him reckless of consequences, does not appear; but General Hearsey speaks of the actuating motive as "religious frenzy." "The Europeans," Mungul Pandey said, alluding to a wing of her majesty's 53rd, detached from Dum Dum, "had come to slaughter the sepoy, or else force them to bite the cartridges, and become apostates;" and when the English sergeant attempted to seize him, he called out to the men who were thronging the lines, in their undress and unarmed, to come and support him. "You incited me to this," he cried; "and now, poltroons, you will not join me." Taking aim at Sergeant Hewson, he fired, but missed; upon which the sergeant retreated, and called to the guard to fall-in and load. Adjutant Baugh, of the 34th, next rode up, calling out, "Where is he? where is he?" Mungul Pandey fired at the adjutant, and his horse fell wounded. The adjutant drew a pistol from his holster and took aim, but failed; upon which he and the sergeant rushed on Mungul Pandey, who wounded both with his tulwar, or native sword. The other sepoy began to hustle and surround the two Europeans, but their lives were saved by the courage and devotion of a Mohammedan sepoy, named Sheik Phultoo, who rushed forward unarmed, and intercepted a blow directed at the adjutant; and, flinging his right arm round Mungul Pandey (the left being severely wounded), enabled the Europeans to escape. A shot from the direction of the quarter-guard was fired at them, but without effect. There were about 400 men in the lines, looking on; and Adjutant Baugh, as he passed them maimed and bleeding, said, "You cowardly set of rascals! You see an officer cut down before your eyes, and not a man of you advances to assist him." They made no reply; but all turned their backs on the speaker, and moved slowly and sullenly away. The unpopularity of the adjutant† is alleged to have influenced the sepoy; and, after he had left, they compelled Sheik Phultoo to let Mungul Pandey go.

Lieutenant-colonel Wheeler, the officer in command of the regiment, came on parade soon after, and ordered the quarter-guard to secure the mutineer. The jemadar who ought to have led them, sided with Mungul Pandey; and, coming up to the colonel, told him that the men refused to obey the order. A native standing by said, that the offender being a Brahmin, nobody would hurt him. Colonel Wheeler "considered it quite useless, and a useless sacrifice of life, to order a European officer with the guard to seize him, as he would no doubt have picked off the European officer, without receiving any assistance from the guard itself." The colonel therefore left the spot, and reported the matter to the brigadier. On learning what had occurred, General Hearsay, with his two sons and Major Ross, rode to the quarter-guard house, where about ten or twelve men had turned out. Mungul Pandey watched their approach, and Captain Hearsay called out to his father to be on his guard, for the mutineer was taking aim at him. The general replied, "If I fall, John, rush upon him, and put him to death." In a moment Mungul Pandey dropped on his knee, turned the muzzle of his musket to his own breast, and pulled the trigger with his foot. The bullet made a deep graze, ripping up the muscles of the chest, shoulder, and neck. He fell prostrate, with his clothes on fire, was picked up shivering, convulsed, and apparently dying, and was handcuffed and conveyed to the hospital; none of the sepoy's attempting further interference.

General Hearsay rode amongst the 43rd and 34th Native regiments, and, while blaming the latter for their conduct (which appears to have been most outrageous), he assured them that no person should be permitted to interfere with their religious and caste prejudices while he commanded them. No attempt was made to arrest the jemadar or the sepoy's of the quarter-guard, probably because General Hearsay feared to precipitate a struggle for which he was not yet prepared. The culprits must have known the rules of British discipline too well to expect to escape with impunity the consequences of their mutinous and dastardly conduct. That night, in the lines, a plan of action was concocted; and the 19th regiment, on their arrival at Baraset (eight miles from Barrackpore) on the following morning, found messengers waiting for them from the 34th, who proposed to them to

rise that evening, kill their officers, and march to Barrackpore, where they would find the 2nd and 34th in readiness to co-operate with them in overpowering the European force, and proceeding to surprise and sack Calcutta.

The unfortunate 19th had already suffered deeply for listening to suggestions from Barrackpore. They rejected the proposals decidedly and at once; but they did not betray their tempters, who returned safely, their errand unsuspected.

The disbandment took place on the following morning at Barrackpore, in presence of the available troops of all arms within two days' march of that station. The government order having been read, the arms were piled, and the colours deposited by the sepoy's, who evinced much sadness, but no sullenness. The number of the regiment was not to be effaced from the army list; and there were other slight concessions, of which General Hearsay made the most in addressing the men. They knew he pitied them; and as they left the ground, disgraced and impoverished, they cheered him cordially, and wished him long life—a wish which he as cordially returned. Perhaps no regiment in the Bengal army was more sound at the core than the 19th. Lieutenant-colonel Macgregor, who had been stationed with them at Burhampore for some months, declared that he had never met with a quieter or better-behaved regiment, and described them as appearing very sorry for the outbreak of the 26th of February. They felt that they had been misled by the 34th; and when their request to be suffered to re-enlist was refused, they are said to have begged, before leaving the ground, to be allowed to resume their arms for one half-hour, and brought face to face with the 34th, on whom they promised to avenge the quarrel of the government and their own.

Some alarm, says Mr. Mead, was entertained lest they should plunder the villages on their way up country, but they seem to have conducted themselves peaceably. Many got employment as durwans (or gate-keepers), and a few were entertained by magistrates, for whom they have since done efficient service in the capture of fugitive mutineers. Hundreds died of cholera by the way-side, and a large proportion went into the service of the Nawab of Moorshedabad. It has not been proved that any of them entered the ranks of the rebel army.*

* Mead's *Sepoy Revolt*, p. 62.

The order for the disbandment of the 19th was read on parade to every regiment throughout India. If the change from biting to tearing the cartridges had been simultaneously announced, the army might have been tranquillised, and accepted the fate of the 19th as a vicarious sacrifice for the general benefit. Instead of this the order of disbandment was read alone; and no mention whatever being made of the cartridges, the natural conclusion was, that the sepoys would be compelled to bite them or be turned on the world after long years of faithful service. The General Orders certainly contained an assertion, that "it had been the unvarying rule of the government of India to treat the religious feelings of all its servants, of every creed, with careful respect;" but, as it was notorious that a flagrant breach of this rule had been recently committed, and was, so far as the sepoys could tell, to be determinedly persevered in, it followed that the assurance, intended to tranquillise them, utterly failed in its effect; and the only part of the address which really impressed them, was the declared intention of government never to cease exacting the unhesitating obedience the men had sworn to give.

The 19th being disposed of, the next question was, how to deal with the 34th. Never was prompt action more evidently needed; yet five weeks were allowed to elapse, during which tokens of mutiny were multiplying throughout India, without any decision being arrived at regarding the dastardly quarter-guard. Mungul Pandey was tried, condemned, and hung, on the 7th of April, in the presence of all the troops then at Barrackpore. He was much debilitated by his wound (which would probably have proved mortal); but he met his death with perfect composure, and refused to make any statement which could implicate his comrades. The jemadar, who commanded the guard of the 34th, was also tried and condemned to death, but the execution of the sentence was delayed until the 21st of April, owing to the time lost in corresponding with the commander-in-chief at Simla; who

first declined, and then consented, to empower General Hearsey to confirm the sentences of court-martials on Native commissioned officers.*

It seemed as if government had resolved to drop proceedings here. The remarks appended to General Anson's confirmation of the jemadar's sentence, were very like an act of amnesty to the Barrackpore troops in general, and the 34th in particular. He stated his trust that the crime of which Mungul Pandey and the jemadar had been guilty, would be viewed with horror by every man in the army; and he added, in evident allusion to the guard, that if there were any "who had looked on with apathy or passive encouragement," he hoped the fate of their guilty comrades would "have a beneficial effect upon their future conduct."†

The Mohammedan orderly who had saved the life of the adjutant and sergeant, was promoted to the rank of havildar by General Hearsey, and given an Order of Merit for his conduct. The divisional order to this effect was issued on the 5th of April. The general was reproved by the governor-general in council, for having exceeded his authority by this act, and also for having described Mungul Pandey as stimulated by "religious frenzy."‡ Lord Canning, in his own minute, speaks of Mungul Pandey as "that fanatic;" but considered, that "however probable it may be that religious feelings influenced him," it would have been better to have left this feature of the case unnoticed.§

Early in April, a Native court-martial sentenced a jemadar, of the 70th Native infantry, to dismissal from the army (in which he had served thirty-three years), in consequence of his having incited other Native officers to mutiny, as the only means of avoiding the pollution of biting the new cartridges. The commander-in-chief desired that the sentence should be revised, as too lenient; but the Native officers persisted in their decision, which was eventually confirmed.

An event took place at the same time, which showed that the temper of the distant troops was mutinous and disaffected. The 48th infantry, a corps reputed to be one of the

20th, General Anson changed his mind, and sent the desired warrant.—(See Appendix to Parl. Papers on the Mutinies, 1857; pp. 104—107.)

† *Ibid.*, p. 124. A sepoy was identified as having struck the sergeant-major (when cut down by Mungul Pandey) with the butt of his musket; but he escaped punishment by desertion.—(p. 158.)

‡ Divisional order, April 6th, 1857; p. 68.

§ Appendix to Parl. Papers on Mutinies, p. 63.

* A telegram was transmitted to Simla, on the 14th of April, strongly urging General Anson to issue a special warrant to General Hearsey, for the purpose of at once carrying out the sentence in which the trial then pending was expected to issue. On the 17th, the following telegram was sent to General Hearsey, from Calcutta:—"The commander-in-chief refuses to empower you to confirm sentences of courts-martial on commissioned officers." On the

finest in the service, long commanded by Sir H. M. Wheeler, the general in charge of Cawnpore, was at this time stationed at Lucknow, under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Palmer. Dr. Wells, the surgeon of the regiment, having occasion to visit the medicine store at the hospital, and being at the time indisposed, drank a portion of a carminative from a bottle containing a quantity, after which no high-caste Hindoo could partake of the remainder without pollution. The Native apothecary in attendance, saw and reported the act to the sick sepoy, upon which they all refused to touch any of the medicines prescribed for them. Colonel Palmer assembled the Native officers, and, in their presence, rebuked the surgeon for his heedlessness, and destroyed the bottle which he had put to his mouth. The men took their medicines as before; but a few nights after, the bungalow (thatched house) in which Dr. Wells resided was fired, and most of his property destroyed. It was notorious that the incendiaries belonged to the 48th Native infantry; but their comrades shielded them, and no proof could be obtained against the individuals.

Not long after, the Native officers of the regiment were reported to be intriguing with Rookan-oo-Dowlah and Mustapha Ali, relatives of the King of Oude, residing in Lucknow. The most absurd rumours were circulated and believed in the city. While the cartridges were to be used as the means of compelling the sepoy to lose caste, other measures were, it was reported, being taken to rob the non-military class of their. Government was said to have sent up cart-loads and boat-loads of bone-dust, to mix with the otta (prepared flour) and sweetmeats sold in the bazaars; and the authorities vainly strove to disabuse the public mind, which was kept in a perpetually-recurring panic. Money was repeatedly given, with directions to purchase some of the adulterated otta; but though the parties always returned with the money in their hands, stating their inability to find the shops where it was sold, it was evident that

they were silenced, but not convinced of its non-existence. Sir Henry Lawrence listened with patient attention to all these rumours, and did what probably few other men could have done to extract their venom. But the yet unwithdrawn order for biting the cartridges, afforded to the earnest a reason, and to the intriguing a pretext, for distrusting the government; and the four first months of 1857 had given time for the growth of seed, which could not afterwards be prevented from producing baneful fruit. There was a Hindoo subahdar of one of the Oude local artillery batteries, named Dabee Sing, an old and tried soldier. Mr. Gubbins speaks of Sir Henry Lawrence as having been closeted for hours at a time with this man, who told him all the wild projects attributed to the British government for the purpose of procuring the annihilation of the religious and territorial rights of the people of India. Among other things which Dabee Sing gravely related, without expressing his own opinion one way or the other, was a plan for transporting to India the numerous widows of the Europeans who had perished in the Crimean campaign. The principal zemindars of the country were to be compelled to marry them; and their children, who would of course not be Hindoos, were to be declared the heirs to the estates. Thus the Hindoo proprietors of land were to be supplanted!*

How far such reports as these might really gain credence, or how far they might be adopted as a means of expressing the discontent excited by the recent annexation and resumption measures, does not appear; but throughout the Bengal army, the cartridges continued to be the rallying-cry for discontent up to and beyond the end of April. At Agra incendiary fires had been frequent, and the sepoy had refused their aid to subdue the flames: at Sealkote, letters had been discovered from the Barrackpore sepoy, inciting their brethren at that distant station to revolt: at Umballah, the discontent and distrust excited by the new fire-arms, had been most marked.† The

* Gubbins' *Mutinies in Oudh*, pp. 86; 88. A singular instance of the extent of the gulf which separates us from the aboriginal tribes, and the small respect they feel for European civilisation, was witnessed by Mr. Gubbins several years ago. A report got abroad among the hill-men of the sanitarium at Simla, that orders had arrived from the governor-general for the preparation of a certain quantity of human fat, to be sent down to Calcutta; and that, for this purpose, the local authorities were

engaged in entrapping the hill-men, killing and boiling them down. Numbers of these men were at this time employed in carrying the ladies' litters, and in a variety of domestic duties which brought them in daily contact with the Europeans. Yet the panic spread, until numbers fled from the station; nor were they, Mr. Gubbins believes, ever thoroughly convinced of the falsehood of the report.—(p. 87.)

† *Mutiny of the Bengal Army*: by one who has served under Sir Charles Napier; p. 28.

Calcutta authorities were, nevertheless, so blind to the imminence of the peril, that the *Oriental*, which was supposed to be lying at Madras, was twice telegraphed for to convey the 84th back to Burmah; and but for the accident that sent her across to Rangoon, the month of May would have found Calcutta left as before, with only the wing of a European regiment. Nothing was decided upon with regard to the 34th, or the Barrackpoor division in general, despite Brigadier Hearsey's warning (given two months before, and confirmed by the very unsatisfactory evidence adduced before the court-martial) regarding the condition of the troops stationed there. It has since transpired, that an order, and a most needful one, for the disbandment of the 34th, was actually drafted immediately after the attack on Lieutenant Baugh; but it was withheld until new outbreaks in various directions heralded the shock for which the government were forewarned, but not forearmed.

The home authorities shield themselves from the charge of negligence, on the ground that up to May, 1857, not "the slightest indication of any disaffection among the troops had been sent home."* "*Indophilus*," who has means of information peculiar to a man whose position enables him to search the government records, and examine the original papers unpublished and ungarbled, says, that it cannot be ascertained, by the most careful inquiry, that General Anson ever made a single representation to the directors,† or to any member of her majesty's government, on the subject; but that, on the contrary, assurances were given of the satisfactory state of the Bengal army, and especially of its continued fidelity, which might well lull suspicion to sleep. "It is hard," he adds, "to expect a government to see better than with its own eyes."‡ The government might, perhaps, save the nation many disasters, and themselves much discredit, by condescending to look through the eyes of those bystanders who proverbially see more of the game than the players. But in this instance they did not heed the warnings of even their own servants.

* Speech of Mr. Vernon Smith.—India debate, July 27th, 1857.

† The chairman of the East India Company likewise declared in parliament, that not a single word of notice had been received from General Anson on the subject.—(India debate, July 15th, 1857.)

‡ *Letters of Indophilus*, p. 25.

§ See *ante*, p. 120.

|| *Napier's Life*, vol. iv., p. 414.

Sir Charles Napier, Lord Melville, Sir John Lawrence, and Colonel Jacob, all lifted up their voices in vain; nay, Lord Dalhousie himself remonstrated against the removal of Europeans, in a manner which proved his mistrust of the tone and temper of the Native army.§ The Duke of Wellington always watched Indian proceedings with an anxious eye. His decision against Napier was possibly prompted even less by the partial statements laid before him, than by the feeling that if the spirit of mutiny had been roused in the Bengal army, it would need all the influence of united authority for its extinction. No commander-in-chief could effect it except with the full support and cordial co-operation of the governor-general. Such a state of things was impossible between Lord Dalhousie and General Napier. "The suppression of mutiny," the Duke wrote, in his memorandum on the proffered resignation of Sir Charles Napier, "particularly if at all general or extended to numbers, and the restoration of order and subordination to authority and discipline among troops who have mutinied, is the most arduous and delicate duty upon which an officer can be employed, and which requires, in the person who undertakes it, all the highest qualifications of an officer, and moral qualities; and he who should undertake to perform the duty, should enjoy, in a high degree, the respect and confidence of the troops and of the government."|| Sir William Gomm, the successor to Napier appointed by the Duke (an active, kind-hearted, and thoroughly gentlemanly man), appears to have been popular both with the government and the army, European and Native, and mutiny certainly made no head under him. It does not appear that General Anson enjoyed this advantage, either with regard to the government¶ or the Native troops; but, with the latter, decidedly the reverse. His appointment was a notorious instance of the principle of "taking care of Dowb," at the expense of the best interests of the country. It is true, that in the civil position of "Clerk of the Ordnance," he had been both active and efficient; and to

¶ Great difference of opinion is alleged to have existed between Lord Canning and General Anson; and the conduct of the latter, together with the tone of the very few and brief communications published, as having passed between Simla and Calcutta even in the height of the crisis, tends to confirm this allegation. Mr. Smith blamed Mr. Disraeli for alluding to it; but acknowledged the prevalence of the assertion "in private circles."—*Times*, June 30th, 1857.

a reputation for practical business habits, he united that of a popular "man about town;" was a high authority on racing matters, and a first-rate card-player; but he had never commanded a regiment, and would certainly not have been selected, at sixty years of age, to take charge of the Indian army, had he not been a member, not only of an honoured and really honourable, but also of a very influential family. In fact, he was a person to be handsomely provided for. By acts of commission and omission, he largely contributed to bring the mutiny to a head; yet, strangely enough, those who have been most lavish of censure regarding Lord Canning and his colleagues, have for the most part passed over, in complete silence, the notorious fact that General Anson remained quietly in the Himalayas, in the healthiest season of the year for Calcutta, without taking the slightest share in the anxious deliberations of the Supreme Council; yet, nevertheless, drew £6,000 a-year for being a member thereof, in addition to his salary of £10,000 as commander-in-chief. For instance, "One who has served under Sir Charles Napier," says—"The men who ruled India in 1857, knew little of Asiatic character. The two civilians [Messrs. Dorin and Grant] had seen only that specimen of it of which the educated Bengalee is a type: the legal member [Mr. Peacock] and Lord Canning had seen no more; and General Low was a Madras officer:" but the very name of General Anson is significantly omitted. The manner in which the council treated the crisis through which they were passing, proved, he adds, that they did not comprehend it.* This was conspicuous in the reproaches directed against Colonel Wheeler for conversing with the sepoys, as well as the natives generally, on the subject of Christianity, and disseminating tracts among them. No single complaint was ever uttered by the sepoys on this head. They were quite capable of distinguishing the zeal of an individual from the supposed forcible and fraudulent measure of the greased cartridges, by which they believed the government desired to compel them to become apostates *en masse*. It was not change of creed, but loss of caste they dreaded; not tracts and arguments, but greased cartridges, backed by the penalty of disbandment courts-martial, and a park of

artillery. "Already, in their eyes, we were on a par with their lowest caste: a Christian was one who drank brandy and ate pork and beef. Was not the idea that we wished to reduce them, by trick, to the same degrading position, sufficient to excite every deep-seated prejudice against us?"† The military writer of the above sentence, does not add that Lord Canning and his council really sought to conciliate the sepoys by every measure short of the compromise of dignity, which they unhappily considered to be involved in withdrawing the cartridges (as they ought to have done in January), and publicly denouncing and punishing what the Supreme Council did not hesitate to call, among themselves, "the very culpable conduct of the Ordnance department, which had caused all this excitement."‡ It is, however, highly improbable that, had the council proposed such a measure, General Anson would, at any time during the first four months of 1857, have sanctioned such a concession to what he termed the "beastly prejudices," which, ever since he came to India, he had been labouring to destroy; forgetting that the Bengal army, whether wisely or foolishly, had been established and maintained on the basis of toleration of caste observances, and that that basis could not be touched with impunity. He had been for a short time in command at Madras, previous to his appointment as commander-in-chief of the three Indian armies; and it was probably what he learned there, that gave rise to his strong anti-caste opinions. The sepoys had enjoyed perfect toleration for nearly a hundred years; but General Anson's policy, from the first, indicated a resolve, which the Anglo-Indian press earnestly supported, to abandon the old policy. The Bengal force had been, from its commencement, an enormous local militia, enlisted for service in India, and in India only; special regiments (of which there were six), or volunteer corps, being employed on foreign service, and rewarded by extra allowances. In 1856, government declared its intention of radically altering the constitution of the army, and issued an order that every recruit should be enlisted for general service wherever the state might require. There can be no doubt, says Mr. Gubbins, speaking of the General Service Order, "that the vast change which it must of necessity make in the position of the Bengal soldier, was not duly weighed; or, if weighed, provision was certainly not made to meet the consequences

* *Mutiny of Bengal Army*, p. 59.

† *Ibid.*, p. 58.

‡ Appendix to Papers on Mutinies, p. 212.

of the dissatisfaction which it would produce."*

Nearly at the same time another order was published, which affected not merely the prospects of recruits, but also the dearest privilege of the existing Native troops. Under the old regulations the sepoy might become invalided after fifteen years' service, and retire to his home on a monthly pension of four rupees. The Bengallee, it must be remembered, was never accompanied by his family when on service, like the Madrassee; and so earnestly was the power of returning home coveted, that men starved themselves for months, and became weak and emaciated for the sake of retiring on this scanty pittance. In former times, the evil had been met by holding out inducements to longer service; an extra rupee per month being granted after fifteen, and two rupees after twenty years' service. A further allowance, called hutting-money, was granted to them by Lord Hardinge; and an honourable distinction, accompanied by a valuable increase of pay, was opened to the Native officers, by the establishment of the "Order of British India." Still the love of home proved too strong; and in pursuance of the new policy, it was decided that a sepoy who was declared unfit for foreign service, should no longer be permitted to retire to his home on an invalid pension, but should be retained with the colours, and employed in ordinary cantonment duty. This order was, as usual, read out to each regiment on parade, and it excited a murmur of general dissatisfaction throughout the ranks. By these two measures the retired sepoy was transformed into a local militiaman, and the former militia became general service soldiers.† The first measure was a direct blow at caste; the second was a manifest breach of the terms of enlistment. There were also other circumstances, indicative of a policy very different to the genial kindly consideration of old times. "General Anson," says the late adjutant-general of the Bombay army

(Major-general Tucker), "anxiously desired to innovate; his predecessor had been harshly charged with supineness and apathy; his own he designed should be a reign of a very different description, and he attempted to commence it with a curtailment of the leave or furlough annually granted to the sepoys—a very hasty and injudicious beginning—and apparently so considered by more than myself; for it was then negatived, though I have since heard, that at a later period, it was successfully advocated."‡

The above circumstances tend to account for the disbelief evidenced by the sepoys in the protestations of government, and the excitement created by the unprecedented order to bite cartridges made in the arsenal, instead of by themselves, as heretofore. Brigadier Hearsey must have been well acquainted with the general feeling, when he urged in January, the immediate and total withdrawal of the new cartridges; the idea of forcible conversion in connection with them, being so rooted in the minds of the sepoys, that it would be both "idle and unwise to attempt its removal."

This idle and unwise attempt was, as we have seen, continued through the months of February, March, and April; and in spite of the mutiny of the 34th, and the disbandment of the 19th, the experiment of explanatory words, and deeds of severe and increasing coercion, was continued, until the vigorous measures taken in May, issued not in the disbandment, but in the revolt of the entire Bengal army.

One feature connected with the preliminary stage of the mutinies remains to be noticed; namely, the circulation in February of chupatties (small unleavened cakes) through certain districts of the North-West Provinces, and especially of the Saugor territory. Major Erskine, the commissioner for Saugor, made some enquiry regarding the purport of this strange proceeding; but could discover nothing, "beyond the fact of the spread of the cakes, and the general

younger men were passed over their heads, instead of being pensioned and suffered to retire and enjoy their latter years in the bosom of their families. "In my own regiment," a British officer writes to the *Times*, "we have havildars (sergeants), of forty years' service; and the last muster roll I signed, the strength of my company bore upon it, I think, five full privates of twenty years' service."—*Times*, July 2nd, 1857. Letter signed Sookhn Sunj.

‡ Major-general Tucker's Letter to the *Times*, dated July 19th, 1857.

* *Mutinies in Oudh*, p. 94.

† The authority here relied on is Mr. Gubbins. But it appears, that before the alterations in the invaliding regulations referred to by him, as nearly simultaneous with the general service order, stringent rules had been given to the medical committees, which as early as 1854 had proved "a fruitful source of discontent and disgust;" native officers of excellent character being refused promotion, because "lame, worn-out, and unfit for further service;" yet kept for cantonment duty, while

belief that such distribution, passed on from village to village, will prevent hail falling, and keep away sickness. I also understand," the major adds, "that this practice is adopted by dyers, when their dye will not clear properly; and the impression is, that these cakes originally came from Scindia's, or the Bhopal states."*

Certainly, there was no attempt at secrecy; the Native officials themselves brought the chupatties to the European magistrates for inspection; but either could not, or would not, give any satisfactory account of the meaning of the transaction. It appears, that each recipient of two cakes was to make ten others, and transmit them in couples to the chokeydars (constables) of the nearest villages. It is asserted, that the cakes were circulated among the heads of villages not concerned in the mutiny, and did not pass at all among the sepoys.†

Still, the circumstance was a suspicious one, especially if there be any truth in the allegation, that sugar was used as a signal at the time of the Vellore mutiny.‡ The notion of thus conveying a warning to be in readiness for a preconcerted rising, is one which would naturally present itself to any people; and we are told that, in China, the "Feast of the Moon Loaves" is still held, in commemoration of a similar device in the conspiracy by which the Mongol dynasty was overthrown 500 years ago.§ At all events, it would have been only prudent in the government to endeavour to trace out the source of the movement, and the intent of its originators.

It is difficult to frame a succinct narrative of the events which occurred during the first few days of May. The various accounts laid before parliament are not only fragmentary, but consist in great part of telegrams founded on current rumours; and those narratives of individuals, published in the public journals, are, for the most part, from the nature of the subject, trustworthy only as regards transactions which occurred in the immediate locality of the writers. The official documents, however, disconnected and unsatisfactory as they are, furnish a clue to the inconsistency, indecision, and delay, which characterised the proceedings of the authorities; namely, that the objects and instructions of the commander-in-chief, were

diametrically opposed to those of the governor-general in council. They appear to have acted, the one on an avowedly innovating and coercive, the other on a professedly conservative plan; each issuing orders which puzzled the Europeans, and aggravated the distrust of the natives. The officers were placed in a most painful position; they could not tell which was to prevail, the Calcutta or the Simla policy; and, meanwhile, they did not know what tone to adopt towards their men. In a circular issued in May, by the governor-general in council, their incertitude is specially noticed in a paragraph, which states that, "from communications lately received by the government, it seems that misapprehension regarding the cartridges is not confined to the Native troops," but shared in by "some officers." The communications referred to would probably throw light on this critical period; and a handful of papers, uninteresting or needlessly given in duplicate, might have been left out of the Blue Books to make room for them. But they might involve unpleasant revelations, and are probably purposely withheld. As it is, the series of papers published on the subject, when carefully analysed, produce a painful conviction, not only that the attitude assumed by both civil and military authorities, was calculated to alarm the natives generally, and the Bengal army in particular; but also that the authorities themselves being aware of this, have concurred in withholding from the directors of the East India Company and from parliament, the evidences of their own disunion, vacillation, and inconsistency. Otherwise, surely they would have felt it necessary, and found it easy, to furnish the British nation with a connected statement of their measures and policy attested by the needful documents, instead of sending home a heterogeneous mass of papers, which, except in the case of those specially moved for by resolute members of parliament, resemble a heap of chaff in which some grains of wheat have been left by mistake.

One of these grains is an official communication, dated Simla, 4th of May, in which General Anson, with an infatuation which would be incredible except on his own showing, takes the success of his system for granted, and informs the Supreme government, as a matter for congratulation, that the practice of the Enfield rifle has been commenced at the several mus-

* Letter, March 5th, 1857.—Parl. Papers.

† *Edinburgh Review*, October, 1857. ‡ *Ibid.*

§ Gabet and Huc's *Travels in Tartary* in 1844, chap. iii.

ketry dépôts, and that "the men of all grades have unhesitatingly and cheerfully used the new cartridges."* In the commander-in-chief's private circle "teaching the sepoys to fire with the Enfield rifle" was, however, spoken of as an "expensive amusement"† to government, on account of the incendiary fires by which the sepoys gave vent to their feelings. In a circular issued in the middle of May, the governor-general in council affirms, that "no cartridges for the new musket, and no cartridges made of a new kind of paper, have at any time been issued to any regiment of the army."‡ The substitution of tearing for biting, is referred to in the same paper as having been generally carried out; but this was not the case; for unquestionably, the first mutiny which occurred in Oude was directly caused by an attempt to compel a body of men, for the first time in their lives, to bite suspected cartridges.

Oude. 7th N. Infantry disarmed.—On the 1st of May, there were about 2,200 Native troops in Oude, and some 900 Europeans. The entire force consisted of—H. M.'s 32nd regiment; a troop of horse artillery; 7th light cavalry; seven regiments of Native infantry; three field batteries of the Oude irregular force; three regiments of Oude irregular infantry: and three regiments of Oude police.

Sir Henry Lawrence was, as has been shown (page 88), fully aware of the dangerous character of the force provided by government for the maintenance of British power in Oude. His endeavours to conciliate the talookdars by redressing some of the most notorious cases of oppression, had not been ineffectual; and the reductions made from the original rates of assessment in certain districts, had afforded some measure of relief from our revenue screw. In short, things seemed settling down quietly, or at least the authorities thought so; and they welcomed the rapidity with which the

district treasuries were filled on the commencement of the month, as a very favourable indication of the temper of the people. The troops were far from being in a satisfactory condition; but the care with which Sir Henry watched, met, and explained away rumours calculated to incite them to mutiny, preserved, and might have continued to preserve, at least their outward allegiance, but for the suicidal folly committed in issuing an order to the 7th infantry, which the men could not obey without being, in the words of General Low, "guilty of a heinous sin." They therefore refused, "not from any feeling of disloyalty or disaffection towards the government or their officers, but from an unfeigned and sincere dread, owing to their belief in the late rumours about the construction of these cartridges, that the act of biting them would involve a serious injury to their caste and to their future respectability of character."§

The commanding officer, Captain Graydon, was absent in the hills, on sick leave; and Lieutenant Watson was in charge, when, on the 2nd of May, according to the brief official account,|| the 7th N. infantry, stationed seven miles from the Lucknow cantonments, "refused to bite the cartridge when ordered by its own officers; and, subsequently, by the brigadier,"¶ on the ground of a current rumour that the cartridges had been tampered with.** In the afternoon of the following day, Brigadier Gray reported to Sir Henry Lawrence, at Lucknow, that the regiment was in a very mutinous and excited state. About the same time a letter was placed in the hands of Sir Henry, in which the men of the 7th infantry sought the advice and co-operation of their "superiors" or "elders" of the 48th, in the matter of the cartridges, and promised to follow their instructions for either active or passive resistance. This letter was originally delivered to a Brahmin sepoy of the 48th, who com-

the musketry dépôt obnoxious to the incendiaries."

—May 7th, 1857. Further Papers (Parl.), p. 24.

† Appendix to Parl. Papers on Mutinies; p. 340.

§ Minute by Major-general Low.—*Ibid.*, p. 211.

|| The dates given above are taken from the official letter written by the secretary of the chief commissioner (Sir H. Lawrence,) to the secretary to government at Calcutta, on the 4th of May, 1857. Mr. Gubbins, in his interesting account of the affair, places it a week later; that is, dates the émeute on Sunday, the 10th, instead of the 3rd of May; and other consecutive events accordingly.

¶ Appendix to Parl. Papers on Mutinies, p. 209.

** Gubbins' *Mutinies in Oudh*, p. 10.

* Appendix to Parl. Papers on Mutinies, p. 370.

† An officer of rank, writing a semi-official letter from Simla on the 28th of April, 1857, by command of General Anson, says, "It is an expensive amusement teaching the sepoys to fire with the Enfield rifle, at least as far as it has turned out at Umballa. It has cost, I believe, the government by two fires alone some 32,700 rupees, and I take the liberty of doubting whether the old musket in the hands of the sepoy was not quite as efficient an arm as the new one is ever likely to prove." From March 26th to May 1st, fires occurred on fifteen different evenings. "The 'new cartridges' were pointed out by Commissioner Barnes as the sole cause which rendered

municated its contents to two Native officers, and the three laid it before the chief commissioner.*

Sir Henry Lawrence ordered the brigadier to parade the regiment, make every possible explanation, and induce the sepoys to bite the cartridge. One Native officer was nearly prevailed on to obey the obnoxious orders; but several of the men called out to him that, even if he did so, they would not. A wing of H.M.'s 32nd regiment, and a strong body of Native infantry and cavalry, selected from various corps, were ordered out by Sir Henry, and arrived at the lines of the mutineers about nine o'clock in the evening of the 3rd of May, the second Sunday—memorable for panic and strife. But the climax was not yet reached. The cup was not yet full to overflowing.

Two officers (Captain Boileau and Lieutenant Hardinge) unconnected with the regiment,† and whose extraordinary and most creditable influence is not accounted for, succeeded, before the arrival of the coercing force, in restoring order; and, what was quite unparalleled, in inducing the 7th to deliver up the writers of the treasonable letter before named, and to promise the surrender of forty other ringleaders. The approach of Sir Henry Lawrence and his staff, with the European troops, renewed the excitement which had nearly subsided. The terrified sepoys watched the position taken up by the European artillery and infantry. It was bright moonlight, when an artillery sergeant, by some mistake, lighted a port-fire. The 7th thought an order for their extermination had been given. About 120 men stood firm, but the great mass of the regiment flung down their arms and fled. A squadron of light cavalry (native) was sent off to intercept the fugitives, and many of them were brought back. Sir Henry rode up to the remaining men, spoke calmly to them, and bade them place on the ground their muskets and accoutrements. The order was unhesitatingly obeyed. The sepoys laid down their pieces, and took off their cross-belts with subdued exclamations of good-will to the service, resting satisfied with Sir Henry's assurance, that though government would be asked to disband the corps, those found guiltless might be re-enlisted.‡ The disarmed men were directed to recall the runaways, which they did; and

by about noon on the following day (the 4th), the entire regiment had returned and reoccupied its lines.

The views taken of the matter by the members of the Supreme Council differed materially; nevertheless, they all agreed with the governor-general in censuring the re-enlistment proposed by Sir Henry Lawrence, and in seeing "no reason, in the tardy contrition of the regiment, for hesitating to confirm the punishment of all who were guilty."

Mr. Dorin wrote a minute on the subject; which must suffice to exempt him, as senior member of council, from any portion of the censure heaped on Lord Canning for undue "moderation." He pronounced disbandment an insufficient punishment; adding—"The sooner this epidemic of mutiny is put a stop to, the better." (The conclusion is indisputable; but it was formed some months too late to be acted on.) "Mild measures won't do it. A severe example is wanted. * * * I would try the whole of the men concerned, for mutiny, and punish them with the utmost rigour of military law. * * * My theory is, that no corps mutinies that is well commanded. If it should turn out that the officers of the 7th have been negligent in their duty, I would remand every one of them to their own regiments." This is a pretty compliment to regimental officers in general; perhaps some of them had their theory also, and held that no people rebel who are well governed. If so, they might reasonably inquire whether there were no means of "remanding" a civilian of sixty years of age, described as being "in all his habits a very Sybarite;" who "in no other country but India, and in no other service but the civil service, would have attained any but the most subordinate position;"§ but who, nevertheless, in the event of any casualty occurring to Lord Canning, would become, by rule of seniority, the actual and despotic sovereign of the Anglo-Indian empire. To return to the case in point. Mr. Dorin concluded his minute by declaring, that the biting of the cartridge could only have been an excuse for mutiny; an assertion which corroborates the opinion expressed by the writer above quoted—that despite Mr. Dorin's thirty-three years' service in Calcutta (and he had never been fifty miles beyond it), he was "practically ignorant of

* *Mutiny of the Bengal Army*: by one who has served under Sir Charles Napier; p. 30.

† Appendix to Parl. Papers on Mutinies, p. 211.

‡ Appendix to Parl. Papers on Mutinies, p. 210.

§ *Mutiny in the Bengal Army*: by one who has served under Sir Charles Napier; p. 13.

the manners, and customs, and peculiar requirements of the people of India."* General Low, whose experience of native character was second to that of no man in India, frankly pointed out the order to bite the cartridge as the cause, not the pretext, of mutiny. Had the energy of the general been equal to his judgment and integrity, a much wiser course would probably have long before been adopted by the council: but fifty-seven years' service in India can hardly be expected to leave a man the physical strength needful to the lucid exposition of his views, and to the maintenance and vindication of his own ripened convictions in antagonism to the prejudices of younger colleagues.

Mr. Grant, a civilian, of thirty years' standing, and a man of unquestioned talent, agreed with General Low in attributing the conduct of the men to an "unfeigned dread of losing caste, engendered by the stories regarding cartridges, which have been running like wildfire through the country lately." Sepoys are, he added, very much like children; and "acts which, on the part of European soldiers, would be proof of the blackest disloyalty, may have a very different signification when done by these credulous and inconsiderate, but generally not ill-disposed beings." He concurred with Mr. Dorin in censuring the officers; and considered that the mere fact of making cartridge-biting a point, after it had been purposely dropped from the authorised system of drill, merely for "rifle practice, was a presumption for any imaginable degree of perverse management." Lord Canning also seems to have been puzzled on this point; for he remarks, that "it appears that the revised instructions for the platoon exercise, by which the biting of the cartridge is dispensed with, had not come into operation at Lucknow." The mischief would have been prevented had the government publicly and entirely withdrawn, instead of privately and partially "dropped," the obnoxious practice: but even as the case stands, it is unaccountable that a subaltern, left in charge of a regiment, should, on his own responsibility, have issued an order manifestly provocative of mutiny, without any apparent object whatever. In the absence of any evidence to the contrary

it is much more probable that he acted on orders emanating from Simla.

Whatever the cause of the *émeute*, Mr. Grant (who has been satirically described as belonging "to a family distinguished for obstructive ability")† advised that the same "calm, just, considerate, and dignified course" which had been adopted in each of the cases of the 19th and 34th Native infantry, should be followed now; and he suggested "the dismissal of the bad men, with the trial, by court-martial, of a few of the worst men a month hence."‡

Fortunately for the lives of every European in India (not excepting that of Mr. Grant), Sir Henry Lawrence was not the man to stand with folded arms, watching the progress of a devouring flame, and waiting orders regarding the most calm and dignified course to be adopted for its extinction "a month hence." He poured water on at once, and quenched the flames so effectively, that Oude, the very centre of combustion, did not again catch fire until long after the "severe example," desired by Mr. Dorin, had taken place in Meerut, and set all India in a blaze.

The conduct of Sir Henry was so utterly opposed to that of a model official, that there can be little doubt he would have received something worse than the "severe wiggings"§ given to General Hearsey, for his prompt reward of native fidelity, had not one of those crises been at hand, which, while they last, secure unchecked authority to the men who have nerve and skill to weather the storm. While the council were deliberating, Sir Henry was acting. He forthwith appointed a court of inquiry, to investigate the cause, and attendant circumstances, of the so-called mutiny; and then, instead of disbanding the regiment, according to his first impulse, he dismissed all the Native officers (with one or two exceptions) and about fifteen sepoy, and forgave the rest; re-arming about 200 (probably those who stood firm, or were first to return to their duty), and awaiting the orders of government with regard to the others. He promoted several whose good conduct had been conspicuous. The Native officers and sepoy who brought him the treasonable letter from the 7th, were made the objects of special favour; as was also a sepoy of the

* *Mutiny of the Bengal Army*; by one who has served under Sir Charles Napier; p. 13.

† *Mead's Sepoy Revolt*, p. 21.

‡ Appendix to Parl. Papers on Mutinies, p. 213.

§ *Mutiny of the Bengal Army*; by one who has served under Sir Charles Napier; p. 25. See also *ante*, p. 133; and Lord Derby's speeches in the India debates of December 3rd and 7th, 1857.

13th Native infantry, whose loyalty had been evidenced by the surrender of two Lucknow citizens, who had endeavoured to stir up mutiny in the cantonments. A grand durbar, or state reception, was held at the chief commissioner's residence, in the Muriaon cantonments (whither Sir Henry had removed from the Lucknow residency, on account of the heat). All the chief civilians and military men were present, and chairs were provided for the Native officers of the troops in the cantonments, as also for the leading people of Lucknow. Sir Henry spoke ably and emphatically on the religious toleration of the British government, and appealed to the history of an entire century, for evidence of the improbability of any interference being now attempted. He reminded his hearers that Mussulman rulers at Delhi had persecuted Hindoos; and Hindoo rulers, at Lahore, had persecuted Mussulmans; but that the British had equally protected both parties. Some evil-disposed persons seeing only a few Europeans here and there, imagined that, by circulating false reports, the government might be easily overthrown; but the power which had sent 50,000 Europeans to fight against Russia, could, in the space of three months, land twice that number in India. Then calling forth the natives who had given proof of fidelity, he bestowed on them khelats or dresses of honour, swords, and purses of money; and cordially shaking hands with the recipients, wished them long life to enjoy the honours they had richly deserved. The tone taken by Sir Henry was adopted by the other Europeans. They mixed freely with the Native officers; and such as could understand one another conversed together in groups, on the momentous affairs of the period. Sir Henry Lawrence gained time by this judicious policy, and used it wisely in preparing for the struggle which he had delayed, but could not avert.

Disbandment of 34th at Barrackpoor.—It is now necessary to notice the course adopted by the governor-general in council, with regard to the 34th regiment—a course which Mr. Grant, in a minute dated as late as the 7th of May, applauded in the highest terms, as having been "neither too hasty

nor too dilatory;" adding, "it appears to me, to have had the best effects, and to have been generally approved by sensible men."* There were, however, not a few leading men in India who took a very different view of the case, and quoted the long-deferred decision regarding the 34th, in illustration of the assertion of an Indian journal (*Calcutta Englishman*), that of two stamps in the Calcutta post-office, respectively marked "insufficient," and "too late," one or both ought to have been impressed upon every act of the Supreme government.

Some five weeks after the memorable Sunday afternoon on which 400 men of the 34th Native infantry witnessed, with more than tacit approval, a murderous attack on two of their European officers, the government resolved† on disbanding the seven companies of that regiment present at the time. The remaining three companies, stationed at Chittagong, were in no way implicated; but had, on the contrary, proffered assurances of continued allegiance, and of regret for the misconduct of their comrades.‡ On the 6th of May, at five in the morning, in presence of all the troops within two marches of the station, the seven companies were paraded, and commanded to pile their arms and strip off the uniform they had disgraced. They obeyed; the payment of arrears was then commenced; and in about two hours the men, no longer soldiers, were marched off to Pulta ghaut for conveyance to Chinsurah. General Hearsey, who gave so interesting an account of the disbandment of the 19th, abstained from furnishing any particulars in the case of the 34th; but his very silence is significant, and lends weight to a circumstance quoted by a military author, in evidence of the bitter feelings of the latter corps. The sepoys wore Kilmarnock caps, which, having paid for themselves, they were allowed to keep. Before crossing the river, many of them were seen to take off their caps, dash them on the ground, and trample them in the mud,§ as if in angry defiance of their late masters. The order for their disbandment was directed to be read on parade, at the head of every regiment in

of the 7th irregular infantry could become publicly known at Barrackpoor. Lord Derby commented on the want of foresight and vigour evidenced by Lord Canning's advisers in these proceedings.—*Times*, Dec. 4th, 1857.

‡ Appendix to Parl. Papers on Mutinies, p. 147.
§ *Mutiny of the Bengal Army*, p. 33.

* Appendix to Parl. Papers on Mutinies, p. 213.

† This resolve, tardy as it was, is said to have been hastened by telegraphic tidings of the *émeute* in Oude on the 3rd. The government order was dated the 4th of May; the punishment of the 34th being of imperative necessity before the disaffection

India, still unaccompanied by any assurance of the withdrawal of the abhorred cartridges. Either for this or some other reason, Sir Henry Lawrence would not allow the order to be read to the troops in Oude, fearing that it would hasten rather than repress an outbreak.*

We have now reached the end of the "passive, respectful mutinies," which our own blind inconsistencies provoked and fostered. The name of Meerut stands at the head of a new series, the history of which might be fitly written in characters of blood.

CHAPTER III.

MEERUT—23RD APRIL TO 11TH MAY, 1858.

THE cantonment of Meerut, two miles distant from the town, was divided into two parts by a branch of the Calce Nuddee river, and was chiefly remarkable for its great extent, five miles long by two broad, and for a fine parade-ground, four miles long by one broad. It had a very large bazaar, abounding in "budmashes" (literally, men of bad livelihood), near which stood a gaol crowded with convicts. The road to Delhi (thirty-two miles distant) lay close to the Native lines. The troops stationed here consisted of H.M.'s 6th dragoon guards (carabineers); H.M.'s 60th rifles (one battalion); a light field battery; a party of horse artillery; 3rd Native light cavalry; 11th and 20th Native infantry; some sappers and miners. The European troops (exclusive of the sappers and miners), amounted to 1,863 including 132 commissioned officers. The Natives numbered 2,912, including only 52 commissioned officers.†

The chief purpose of stationing an unusually large proportion of Europeans here, was to keep in check the Native garrison of Delhi; but this very proportion seems to have rendered the authorities more than commonly indifferent to the feelings of the sepoys, and to the dissatisfaction which manifested itself in the form of determined disobedience to orders as early as the 24th of April. The cause and pretext (cause with the credulous, pretext with the designing) was of course the cartridge, which had by this time become the recognised *bête noir* of the whole Bengal army.

* *Mutiny of the Bengal Army*: by one who has served under Sir Charles Napier; p. 34.

† Parl. Paper.—(Commons), 9th February, 1858; p. 3.

‡ According to the *East India Register and Army List* the colonel of the regiment, Colonel H. Thomson was absent "on furlough." The *East*

The 3rd Native cavalry was a leading regiment. It had been greatly valued by Lord Lake, for service rendered at Delhi, Laswarce, Deig, and Bhurtpoor; since then Afghanistan, Ghuznee, Aliwal, and Sobraon, had been added to its list of battles. It contained a large proportion of men of good family and high-caste. The general weapon was the sword; but fifteen in each troop were taught to use fire-arms, and distinguished as carabineers or skirmishers. There were a few bad characters among the carabineers, but the majority were the flower of a remarkably fine corps. To these men their commanding officer‡ suddenly resolved to teach the mode of tearing instead of biting the cartridges, in anticipation of the new kind coming out; and on the afternoon of the 23rd, he issued an order for a parade of all the skirmishers on the following morning. The order created great excitement; and an old Hindoo havildar, named Heerah Sing, waited on Captain Craigie, the captain of his troop, and, in the name of his comrades, besought that the skirmishers might be excused from parade, because the name of the regiment would suffer in the estimation of other corps, if they were to use the cartridges during the present excitement on the subject. They did not threaten to refuse to fire them, but only sued for delay. Captain Craigie reasoned with Heerah Sing on the absurdity of being influenced by groundless rumours; but he knew that the feeling was real, however unreasonable the cause; and

India Register dates his first appointment at 1798; and, therefore, after sixty years' service the veteran officer may be supposed to have been warranted in retiring from active service for the remainder of his life. In the *Army List* the name of the officer in command is given as Colonel G. M. C. Smyth, and the date of his first commission as 1819.

it being then nearly ten o'clock, he wrote a private note to the adjutant of the regiment, stating the request which had been made to him, and urging compliance with it, as, "if disregarded, the regiment might immediately be in a state of mutiny." Other officers had meanwhile reported on the distress of the regiment, and the colonel seemed inclined to put off the parade, when the adjutant unluckily suggested, that if he did so the men would say that he was afraid of them. The fear of being accused of fear decided the colonel on leaving his order uncanceled. In the course of the evening, the house of the orderly (the hated favourite of the colonel) was set on fire; also an empty horse hospital; and the men kept aloof, in evident disaffection.

Next morning, at daybreak, the skirmishers appeared on parade, and the fated cartridges were brought forward in bundles. The colonel harangued the men in bad Hindustani, and endeavoured to explain to them that the cartridges were to be used by tearing, not biting; and assured the troopers that if they obeyed, he would report them to head-quarters, and make them famous. But "there was no confidence towards him in their hearts, and his words only mystified them." Heerah Sing, and four other troopers, took the cartridges; the other eighty-five refused them. The colonel then dismissed the parade, and reported what had occurred to General Hewitt. A court of inquiry was held, and the disobedient skirmishers were put off duty, and directed to remain in the lines till further orders. The European officers of the 3rd anxiously waited instructions from the commander-in-chief on the subject, anticipating, as an extreme sentence, that, "the skirmishers

might be dismissed without defence; in which case, it was whispered that the whole corps would mutiny, and be joined by the other Native troops in the station." The letter from which the above circumstances are quoted, was written on the 30th of April. The writer adds—"We are strongly garrisoned by European troops here; but what a horrible idea that they should be required to defend us!"

The 3rd of May came, and brought no word from head-quarters, and the alarm began to subside: but between the 3rd and the 6th, orders on the subject must have been sent; for a despatch was written from Simla on the latter day (from the adjutant-general to the secretary of government), informing the authorities at Calcutta that General Anson had directed the trial, by a general court-martial, of eighty-five men of the 3rd cavalry, who had refused to receive the cartridges tendered to them. It further stated, that a squad of artillery recruits (seventeen in number) having in like manner refused "the carbine cartridges ordered to be served out to them for use at the drill," had been at once summarily dismissed by the officer commanding the artillery at the station—a punishment which the commander-in-chief censured as incommensurate to the offence.* No report of the general court-martial has been made public up to the present time (December, 1858.)†

In previous instances, the commander-in-chief had vainly endeavoured to compel Native courts-martial to adjudge penalties commensurate with his notions of the heinousness of sepoy offences: it is therefore necessary that some explanation should be given for the unaccountable severity of the present sentence. In the first place, did

* Despatch, May 6th.—Appendix to the first series of Parl. Papers on the Mutinies, p. 373. This is the only parliamentary document yet published which contains any reference to the events preceding the 9th of May. The above account is based on the graphic and succinct narrative, evidently written, though not signed, by the wife of Captain Craigie, dated April 30th, and published in the *Daily News* of 29th July, 1857. Mrs. Craigie adds—"General (Hewitt), commanding here, was extremely angry on learning the crisis which Colonel (Smyth) had brought on, bitterly blaming his having ordered that parade. . . . Of course, ordering the parade at all, under the present excitement, was a lamentable piece of indiscretion; but even when that had been done, the colonel might have extricated himself without humiliation. Henry feels convinced that he could have got the men to fire, or the parade might have been turned into an explanation of the new cartridge, without any firing being proposed.

Henry, as a troop captain, had nothing to do beyond his own troop; but thither he rode at day-break on that fatal morning, and remained for hours among his men, enjoining them to keep steady, and withstand any impulse to join others in excitement; bidding them do nothing without consulting him, and assuring them that, though differing from them in faith, he was one of them—their friend and protector, as long as they were true to their duty; and the men felt that he spoke the truth. They would have fired for him: they told him they would, though unwillingly."

† It was held on the 6th, 7th, and 8th of May, and the court was composed of six Mohammedan and nine Native officers, and presided over by the deputy-judge-advocate-general. For the latter piece of information, I am indebted to the courtesy of Sir Archdale Wilson, and for the former portion of the paragraph to that of Mr. Philip Melville, late head of the military department of the East India House.

the Native officers actually decree the entire sentence of hard labour *in irons*?* and if so, under what amount of direct or indirect coercion was it pronounced? Had the court received any private intimation of the decision at which they were expected to arrive? In what terms did the judge sum up the proceedings, and dictate or suggest the sentence; and had it or had it not been previously suggested to him? Sufficient evidence has oozed out to prove that the commander-in-chief gave very decided instructions on the conduct of the trial: the British public have a clear right to know precisely what they were, in order to ascertain what degree of general mismanagement, of individual crotchets in the governors, affecting the deepest religious convictions of the governed, and of petty tyranny, may be indulged in by future commanders-in-chief, without driving an Indian army too near the dizzy verge of mutiny. It appears, that some days before the assemblage of the court-martial, the European authorities knew the decision which would be arrived at, and anticipated its most natural result; for Mr. Greathed, the commissioner of Meerut, being called away to Alighur on political business, returned to his post on the 9th (a day earlier than he had at first intended),

* Since the above statement was written, some additional information has been published by government on the Meerut proceedings, under the title of *Further Papers relative to the Insurrection (not mutiny, as heretofore styled by the authorities) in the East Indies*. The papers only occupy six pages, and contain the usual amount of repetition and extraneous official matter. The proceedings of the court of inquiry and of the three days' court-martial are still withheld, and the only new light on the subject is afforded in a "Memorandum drawn up by the judge-advocate-general of the army, of the circumstances which apparently led to the mutiny of the Native army being precipitated." It is therein stated, that "by the votes of fourteen out of the fifteen Native officers who composed the court-martial, the whole of the accused were convicted and sentenced to imprisonment with hard labour for ten years each. But the court solicited favourable consideration for the prisoners, on account of the good character which they had hitherto borne, as testified to by their commanding officer; and on account of their having been misled by vague reports regarding the cartridges." Major-general Hewitt, however, declared he could find nothing in the conduct of the prisoners to warrant him in attending to the recommendation of the court. "Their former good conduct has been blasted by present misbehaviour, and their having allowed themselves to be influenced by vague reports, instead of attending to the advice, and obeying the orders of their European superiors, is the gist of the offence for which they have been condemned. * * * Some of them even had the insolence to desire that firing parades might be

because "he knew that imprisonment would follow the trial, and that an attempt to force the gaol and to liberate the prisoners might be expected."†

A private letter from Meerut says, it was understood that General Hewitt had been desired to treat the skirmishers with the "utmost severity." The trial was conducted accordingly. "The prisoners were charged with disobedience, which was undeniable, and which certainly demanded punishment. A few tried to plead, with little skill but considerable truth; but the principle adopted towards them seemed indifference to whatever they might have to say, and the men felt themselves condemned already in the minds of their court." They were all found guilty, and sentenced to imprisonment in gaol and hard labour—eighty for ten and five for six years, the very noteworthy circumstance in the latter case being, that the favoured five had served under instead of above three years. Many of the former must have been able to plead a long term of faithful service; but that, it seems, was regarded as an aggravation, not an extenuation, of their fault.

General Hewitt had received orders to carry out the sentence of the court-martial, without waiting its confirmation by the deferred till the agitation about cartridges among the Native troops had come to a close. * * * Even now, they attempt to justify so gross an outrage upon discipline, by alleging that they had doubts of the cartridges; there has been no acknowledgment of error, no expression of regret, no pleading for mercy." This latter hinted aggravation is explained away by the testimony already quoted regarding the conviction entertained by the men, that nothing they could say would shake the foregone conclusion of the court. They persevered in asserting their belief that, by using the "new greased cartridges" urged upon them, they would forfeit caste. Major-general Hewitt declared, that to the majority of the prisoners no portion of the sentence would be remitted; but that some of them being very young, those who had not been above five years in the service, would be set free at the expiration of five instead of ten years. Not only was there no remission of the sentence, but a very cruel degradation was superadded, by the painful and ignominious fettering. Even General Anson, when informed of the prisoners having been "put in irons on parade-ground in the presence of their regiment, expressed his regret at this unusual procedure." Notwithstanding this qualification, it is evident that General Hewitt acted in accordance with the spirit, if not the letter, of his instructions. In the newly published papers, there is much in confirmation, and nothing in contradiction, of Mrs. Craigie's statement.

† *Letters written during the Siege of Delhi*; by H. H. Greathed, Esq., late of the Bengal civil service, and political agent of Delhi. Edited by his widow. Longman, 1858.—Introduction, p. xv.

commander-in-chief, and arrangements were made for its execution on the following morning, in the presence of all the troops at the station. A guard of European dragoons and rifles was ordered to keep watch over the prisoners during the night, and some difficulty was experienced in calming the excitement which the presence of the Europeans created in the Native lines. At day-break on the 9th of May, the troops assembled for this most memorable punishment parade. The "sunless and stormy" atmosphere, described by an eye-witness, bore but too close an analogy to the temper of the sepoys. The scene must have distressed the British officers of the 3rd; who, if not absolutely blinded by prejudice, must have felt for and with their men: but they were compelled to refrain from offering the slightest or most private and respectful warning, at this fearful crisis, by the "severe reprimand"* bestowed by the commander-in-chief on Captain Craigie, for his timely but neglected suggestions, given on the night before the parade of the 24th of April. After such a lesson, the subordinate officers could only watch, in silent amazement, the incendiary proceedings of their superiors. The uniform of the mutineers was stripped off, and the armourers' and smiths' departments of the horse artillery being in readiness, each man was heavily ironed and shackled, preparatory to being worked, for the allotted term of years, in gangs on the roads. These ill-omened proceedings occupied three long hours. The victims to our inconsistent policy showed the deepest sense of the degradation inflicted on them. But resistance would have been madness; the slightest attempt would have produced an exterminating fire from the guns manned by the Europeans, and pointed at them. Some clasped their hands together, and appealed to General Hewitt for mercy; their comrades stood looking on in gloomy silence, an order having been given that their offi-

cers only should attend on horseback. When the fettering had been at length accomplished, the men were marched off the field. As they passed the ranks of the 3rd they shouted blessings on Captain Craigie, and curses on their colonel,† and hurled reproaches at the dismounted troopers, for having suffered them to be thus degraded.‡ At length, when the military authorities had done their work, they coolly delivered over the mutineers to the civil magistrate, to be lodged in the common gaol, in company with some 1,200 convicts; the whole to be left under the sole guard of native burkandauz, or matchlockmen.

The sepoys returned to their lines apparently completely cowed. The Europeans were left masters of the situation; and the affair having gone off so quietly, the majority were probably disposed to view more favourably than ever, General Anson's resolve to trample under foot the caste scruples of the sepoys, and "never give in to their beastly prejudices."§ The phrase, not a very attractive one, has been quoted before; but it is necessary to repeat it, as the best explanation of the commander-in-chief's proceedings. Those about his person could, it is said, furnish other traits, equally striking and characteristic.

The mutineers were, as we have seen, marched off to prison; the men returned to their lines, and the Europeans to their bungalows, to take a siesta or a drive, to smoke or play billiards, till dinner-time. The officers of the 3rd had, however, a painful task assigned them—that of visiting the mutineers in prison to inquire about their debts, and arrange their affairs. The anxiety of the captives about their destitute families was most touching, and three of the officers resolved to set on foot a subscription to provide for the support of these innocent sufferers. But nothing transpired within the prison to give the visitors any idea of an intended revolt, or to lend weight to the rumours abroad. This same evening, Colonel

* The above fact is taken from a short unpublished paper, printed for private circulation, and entitled, *A Brief Account of the Mutiny of the 3rd Light Cavalry*; by Colonel Smyth. It appears that the colonel had, in the early part of April, received intelligence from a friend, regarding the feelings of a party of sepoys with whom he "had fallen in." They spoke strongly in favour of the disbanded 19th, and expressed themselves ready to join in a general mutiny. This information Colonel Smyth forwarded to General Anson about the middle of April; and, on the 23rd, he (Colonel Smyth) ordered a parade, intending to teach the men

to load without biting their cartridges, which he thought they would be pleased to learn. The cartridges were to be distributed over-night. The men refused to take them; and Colonel Smyth adds—"One of my officers (Captain Craigie) wrote to the adjutant in the strongest terms, urging me to put off the parade, for which he received a severe reprimand from the commander-in-chief."

† Testimony of an eye-witness.

‡ *Mutiny of the Bengal Army*: by one who has served under Sir C. Napier; p. 35. See, also, letter of correspondent to *Calcutta Englishman*.

§ Cooper's *Crisis in the Punjab*; p. 37.

Finuis, of the 11th Native infantry, was seated at Colonel Custine's dinner table, when a lady remarked that placards were said to have been seen about the city, calling upon all true Mussulmans to rise and slaughter the English. "The threat," says Mrs. Greathed, "was treated by us all with indignant disbelief."*

If any of the party could have heard what was then passing in the widely scattered Native lines, it might have spoiled their sleep that night. As it was, no one—not even the commissioner, who had foreseen the probability of an attack on the gaol—seems to have manifested any anxiety regarding the temper of the Native soldiery, or inquired the workings of their mind upon an act calculated to fill them with shame and sorrow for their comrades, and with terror for themselves. The penalty of disbandment for refusing to use the abhorred cartridges, was changed, by the act of that morning, into the degrading punishment of a common felon: the recusants were doomed to labour for years, perhaps for life, in irons, for the profit of their foreign masters, while their wives and children were left to starve! Was there no alternative for them except the cruel one of forfeiture of caste, of virtual excommunication, with all its wretched consequences, its civil and religious disabilities? Both Mohammedans and Hindoos had, as has been shown, recent grievances rankling in their breasts: the present measure looked like part of a system to prostrate them in the dust, if not to wholly crush them; and when the humbled 3rd looked at the empty huts of their comrades, and thought of the crowded gaol (which the excessive cleanliness associated with high-caste renders specially disgusting) and of their forlorn families, no wonder their hearts sank within them. Beneath the general depression, there were, doubtless, under-currents; and the suggestions of the bolder or more intriguing, would naturally gain ready hearing. There must have been decided dissatisfaction; but there is no evidence to show that any plot was formed on the night of the 9th; it rather appears, that until late in the afternoon of Sunday, the 10th, the troops remained, as it were, paralysed, but ready to

be thrown into a state of panic by the most trifling occurrence. In fact, their excessive fear verged on despair: no report regarding the hostile intentions of the government was too absurd to be believed; and fancying themselves driven into a corner, they drugged themselves with bhang, and, to the amazement of the Europeans, suddenly changed their attitude of humble deprecation, for one of reckless, pitiless, unreasoning ferocity.

The best authority on the subject (General Hewitt) considers, that "the outbreak was not premeditated; but the result of a rumour that a party was parading to seize their arms; which was strengthened by the fact of the 60th rifles parading for evening service."†

The conclusion is evidently a just one; for had there been any combination, however secret, or however superficial, the sepoys would have waited till the Europeans were either in church, or in their beds. They had no superiority of numbers to presume upon; and the majority acted, beyond all doubt, on an ungovernable influence of rage and desperation. Shortly before six o'clock P.M., a body of the 3rd cavalry flung themselves on their horses, and galloped off to the gaol, where they released their comrades, and the other prisoners, amounting in number to 1,200. Of course, many of these latter played a leading part in the outrages of that terrible night; but some were so terrified by the madness of their new associates, that they came and voluntarily gave themselves up to the magistrates as soon as the first tumult had subsided. The rescued "eighty-five" were brought back in triumph to the Native lines. They had had enough of prison discipline to rouse, not quench, their fiercest passions. The degradation was fresh; their limbs were yet bruised and raw with the fetters. They proceeded to the compound of Captain Galloway, of the 3rd light cavalry, and compelled his blacksmith to remove their chains.‡ Then they went among their comrades, calling aloud for vengeance. The whole of the 3rd, except Captain Craigie's troop of fifty men, joined the mutineers: so did the 20th N. I.; but the 11th N. I. hung back, defended their officers, and such of them as were stationed on guard, remained at their posts.

The mass of the troops had now crossed the Rubicon, and knew that to recede or hesitate would be to ensure the death of

* Greathed's *Letters*; Introduction, p. xiv.

† Major-general Hewitt to adjutant-general of the army, May 11th, 1857.—Further Papers on Mutinies (Commons), No. 3; p. 9.

‡ Letter of the Rev. J. C. Smyth, one of the chaplains at Meerut.—*Times*, June 30th, 1857.

rebels, or the life of galley-slaves. The inflammable bungalows, mostly thatched with straw, were soon set on fire, including General Hewitt's. Dense clouds of smoke filled the hot night air, and volumes of flame were seen shooting up in columns to heaven, or rolling in billows along the ground. The bugle sounded the alarm; irregular discharges of musketry were heard on every side. The sepoy seemed to have turned in a moment from obedient children to infuriated madmen. The madness, too, was fearfully contagious; the impetus was irresistible. The 11th held out long, and stood by their officers, while their colonel reasoned with the mutineers. But, alas! the time was past for arguing the matter, save with swords and guns. A sepoy of the 20th Native infantry took aim at Colonel Finnis: the example was instantly followed; and the good and gallant officer fell dead from his horse, amid a shower of bullets. On this the 20th fired into the 11th; and the latter corps being no longer able to remain neutral,* reluctantly joined their countrymen, after having first placed their officers in safety. Then incendiarism, practised in detail at the musketry depôts ever since the hated cartridges were distributed, reached its height, the mutineers being "assisted by the population of the bazaar, the city, and the neighbouring villages." It was mutiny coupled with insurrection. The sepoys had, however, no leaders, and their movements were, to the last degree, irregular and disconnected. Kill, kill! was the cry of a few desperate fanatics maddened with bhang; booty, booty! was the all-comprehensive object of the bumshashes of the city, and of the scum of the vast following which ever attends a large Indian cantonment, and which was now suddenly let loose on the affrighted European families. The scene was terrible; but it resembled rather the raid of insurgent villagers than the revolt of trained troops: there was, in fact, no fighting at all, properly so called; for the incensed 3rd cavalry mutineers (who, it must be remembered, were Mohammedans of high family) were anxious to reach Delhi, where they felt sure of the sympathy of their co-religionists; while the mass of the sepoys had joined the mutiny because they could not remain neutral; and the first flush of excitement passed, their great desire was to get out of the reach of the European guns. Eight women

* General Hewitt's letter.

and seven or eight children perished; and there were instances in which the dead bodies were horribly slashed and cut by the infuriated mob; but the highest official account of European lives lost, including officers and soldiers, does not reach forty.

The only considerable body of sepoys who remained thoroughly staunch during the night was Captain Craigie's troop of cavalry; but it required not merely his remarkable influence over his men, but consummate tact in using it, to prevent their being carried away by the torrent. Never was there a more conspicuous instance of the value of that "faculty for managing natives," spoken of by the Calcutta correspondent of the *Times* as a "sixth sense, which can neither be communicated nor learnt."† Mrs. Craigie's account of the affair bears strong internal evidence of truthfulness, and is corroborated by contemporary official and private statements. She was driving to church with another lady, when, passing the mess of the 3rd regiment, they saw the servants leaning over the walls of the compound, all looking towards the road from the Native infantry lines. Several voices called out to the ladies to return, for there was a mutiny of the Native infantry, and a fight in the bazaar. Crowds of armed men were now seen hurrying towards the carriage. Its occupants drove back in great alarm; but soon overtaking an English private running for his life from several men (not sepoys) armed with lathes (long sticks), they stopped the carriage, and drew in the fugitive, his assailants continuing to strike at him; but the heroines held out their arms and pleaded for him, and were suffered to drive off in safety with the rescued soldier. On reaching her own bungalow, Mrs. Craigie found her husband in entire ignorance of what was occurring. He started off to the lines of the 3rd, and found that the three first troops had disappeared; but his own (the 4th), with the 5th and 6th, were still there. Another of the troop captains, whose name does not appear, but who was senior in rank to Captain Craigie, now joined him, and the two officers asked the men if they could rely on them. The answer was an eager declaration of fidelity. The men said they had heard there was fighting at the gaol to release the prisoners; and clustering round Captain Craigie, professed themselves ready to do whatever he might order. The officers

† *Times*, June 15th, 1857.

directed the troops to mount and follow them. Meanwhile, a gentleman, whose name is not stated, came up, and was asked if he had any orders from the colonel. The reply was, that "the colonel was flying for his life, and had given no orders."* The officers rode on with the three troops. Captain Craigie, anxiously occupied with his own men, discovered, after riding some distance, that he was alone with the 4th troop. He soon afterwards met the released cavalry mutineers with their irons broken. They were on their way to Delhi, and were mounted and in uniform, their comrades having given them their own equipments. The fugitives recognised Captain Craigie, shouted to him that they were free, and poured forth blessings on him. "He was," says his wife, "indeed their friend; and had he been listened to, these horrors might never have happened." Captain Craigie, seeing that it was too late to preserve the gaol, turned back, to try and save the standards of the 3rd from the lines. The roads were thronged with infantry mutineers and bazaar men, armed and firing. A lady† was driving by in a carriage, when a trooper came up with her and stabbed her. Captain Craigie cut the assassin down with his sword, but the victim was already dead. Soon after this, a ball whizzed by his own ear; and looking round, he saw a trooper out of uniform, with his head muffled, fire at him again. "Was that meant for me?" he shouted. "Yes!" said the trooper, "I will have your blood."

Captain Craigie's presence of mind did not desert him; he believed the men might mutiny from him if he fired; and turning to them, he asked if they would see him shot. They vociferated "No!" and forced the mutineer back again and again; but would neither kill nor seize him. A Christian trumpeter urged the captain to save himself by riding faster, and he dashed on to the lines; but passing his own house by the way, he asked who would go and defend

* "This statement is partially incorrect, for the colonel had directed Adjutant Clarke to order the men to stand to their horses, to be ready to mount if required." The order did not reach the men, and would evidently have exercised very little effect if it had; but the former portion of the quotation in question, is corroborated by Colonel Smyth's own words. "Six officers," he states, "came into my compound chased by infantry sepoy, and concealed themselves in my house. I then went to inform the general (Hewitt) of what was going on. I took my own orderly and the field officers with me. I told them to draw swords, as the road was getting crowded, and

his wife. The whole troop (at least all with him) raised their hands. He said he only wanted four men. "I, I, I," cried every one; so he sent the first four, and rode on with the others to the lines, where he found Major Richardson and two European officers, with a few remaining men of the other troops. The Native infantry were flying across the parade-ground, pursued by the European artillery. The officers, bidding their men follow, galloped into the open country, with three of the four regimental standards; and, on seeing them safe, Captain Craigie, by the permission of Major Richardson, returned to provide for the safety of his wife. She, poor lady! had endured an interval of terrible anxiety; but, like her husband, had retained perfect self-possession. The rescued European was one of the carabinieri—a guard of whom had been placed over the mutineers, and had thereby become the objects of especial hatred with the mob. She dressed him in her husband's clothes, and then she and her female companion watched the progress of the incendiary crew, and seeing bungalow after bungalow blazing round them, expected that the lines of fire would close them in. At length the mob reached the next compound, and set light to the stables. The groans of the horses were fearful; but soon the more terrible utterance of human agony was heard through the din; and Mrs. Craigie, looking from the upper part of her own dwelling, saw a lady (Mrs. Chambers) in the verandah of the next house. At her entreaty, the servants ran to try and bring their unfortunate neighbour over the low separating wall. But it was too late; the poor victim (who had but newly arrived in India, and was on the eve of her confinement) had been already killed, and cut horribly. This was fearful news for Mrs. Craigie and her companions; they soon saw men bringing a burning log from the next compound, and thought their own ordeal was at hand. Crowds gathered round; but the name of immediately galloped off as fast as I could, the bazaar people striking at me with swords and sticks, and shouting after me, which Mr. Rose, of the barrack department, witnessed. I went first to Mr. Greathed's, the gate of whose compound was open; but a man ran to it to shut it, I suppose; but I got in and rode up to the house, and gave the information to the servants, as I was informed Mr. Greathed was out. I then went on to the general's, and heard he had just left the house in his carriage."—Colonel Smyth's *Narrative*.

† Mrs. Courtenay, wife of the hotel keeper at Meerut.

Captain Craigie was frequently shouted in deprecation of any assault on his dwelling; and a few of the Hindoo servants who remained faithful, especially one Buctour, a tent lascar, ran to and fro, trying to clear the compound, and declaring that his master was "the people's friend," and no one should burn his house.

At this crisis the ladies saw the four troopers sent to guard them riding in, and, recognising the well-known uniform, though not the wearers, hailed them at once as deliverers. The troopers dismounted, and rushed eagerly upstairs; Mrs. Craigie strove to take their hands in her's, but they prostrated themselves before her, and touching her feet with their foreheads, swore to protect her at the hazard of their lives; which they actually did. They implored her to keep within shelter, and not expose herself on the verandah. But anxiety for her husband overpowered every other consideration, and she could not be restrained from gazing forth on the blazing cantonment in an agony of suspense, which prevented her from heeding the blinding, suffocating smoke, the parching heat, or even the shots fired at herself, until at length the brother of her young friend arrived in safety, and was soon followed by Captain Craigie, who having nobly performed his public duty, now came to rescue his heroic wife. Fearing that the house would be surrounded, the officers wrapped dark stable-blankets round the light muslin dresses of the ladies, to hide them from the glare of the flaming station, and lessen the risk of fire, and concealed them in a little thick-walled, single-doored temple, which stood on the grounds. There they remained several hours; during which time, a band of armed thieves broke into the house; but two of them were shot (one by Buctour), and the others fled. Cavalry troopers continued to join the party, including one of the condemned eighty-five, who offered to stay and defend the Europeans; but Captain Craigie said he must surrender him if he did; and, "after a time, the boy disappeared." The other troopers, to the number of about thirty, entreated Captain Craigie not to take his wife away, as they would protect her with their lives; but he dared not run the risk;* and when the roads became quieter, he put to the horses (all the stable-servants having

fled), and hurried the ladies off to the artillery lines, first allowing them to collect together a few clothes and their trinkets. The plate they could not get, the khitmutgar (Mohammedan steward) having run off with the keys. He had, however, buried the property in the first moments of alarm, and he subsequently brought the whole intact to his master. The troopers, gallantly as they had behaved, "looked very blank" at the idea of proceeding to the European lines. Instead of confidently expecting reward, they "feared being made prisoners;" and it was with the utmost difficulty that they were induced to venture within reach of the unreasoning fury of the British force. It is needful to remember this; for probably the excessive dread inspired by our policy, has been, with the vast majority of the Bengal army, the inciting cause of mutiny. Our very inconsistencies and vacillations have been ascribed by them to some hidden motive. At the outset, the only body of sepoys who kept together and obeyed orders during this terrible night, evidenced the most entire disbelief in the gratitude or justice of the military authorities, and ventured to remain in allegiance, wholly in dependence on the individual character of their captain. But for him, they too would have joined the mutineers.

During the night, many Europeans were saved by the fidelity and daring of native servants, at the risk of their own lives. The commissioner (Mr. Greathed) and his wife are among the number. On seeing the mob approach their house, they took shelter with two English ladies on the terrace roof; but the wood-work was soon set on fire, and no alternative apparently remained but to descend and surrender themselves, when Gholab Khan, their head gardener, succeeded in inciting the crowd to pillage a large storehouse at some distance, he affecting to share in the plunder.† Ladders were then placed against the opposite wall by others of the establishment, every member continuing faithful, and the whole party escaped off the roof (which, some few minutes later, fell in with a fearful crash), and took refuge in the garden. When day broke, the rioters having left the place, Gholab Khan brought a buggy, wherein the commissioner and his three companions proceeded in safety to the artillery school of instruction, whither, on the morning of the 11th, all the ladies of the cantonment, with their children and servants, were taken by

* Captain Craigie's house, and another, were the only ones left standing in the 3rd cavalry lines.

† Greathed's *Letters*, p. 291.

their husbands without any military escort. The school was a large, easily defensible enclosure, with lines of barracks; and here all the civilians and such of the staff as were not required outside took refuge, there being no fort at Meerut. Captain and Mrs. Macdonald (20th regiment) were both slain; but their ayah (nurse) seized the children, and conveyed them to a place of safety.

The following is the official list of the Europeans killed at Meerut, not already named. *3rd Light Cavalry*—Lieutenant McNabb (a youth of much promise, who had only just joined his regiment, and was returning home unharmed from the artillery mess); Veterinary Surgeons Phillips* and Dawson, Mrs. Dawson and children. *60th Rifles*—one corporal. *20th Native Infantry*—Captain Taylor, Lieutenant Henderson, Ensign Pattle, Mr. Tregear (inspector in the educational department). A gunner, two Chelsea pensioners, a five-major of the 11th Native infantry, four children, five men, and two women (whose names were unknown), were all killed by the released convicts or bazaar people.†

There was, as has been before stated, no organised resistance; and the general opinion, pronounced almost without a dissentient voice by the press of England and of India, is, that the deficiency of the rebels in leaders was more than counterbalanced by the incapacity of the British authorities. After making all reasonable allowance for the suddenness of the shock, and the unpreparedness of the officers in command (although that is, in fact, rather an aggravation than an extenuation of their conduct), it is not possible to account satisfactorily either for the space of time occupied in getting the troops, especially the dragoons, under arms, or for the neglect of any attempt to forestal the mutineers in their undisguised plan of proceeding to Delhi, which everybody knew was strongly fortified, richly stored, and weakly garrisoned by Native troops; and the care of which was,

in fact, the one great reason for the maintenance of the costly and extensive Meerut cantonment. To begin with the first count, the 60th rifles were parading for evening service when the tumult began. They, therefore, ought to have been ready to act at once against the gathering crowds; while the European dragoons, if too late in mounting to save the gaol, should have been sent off either to intercept the fugitives or preoccupy the city.‡ Captain Craigie, who had acted on his own responsibility in proceeding with his troop to try and preserve the gaol, met several of the released prisoners, already on the road to Delhi, at that early hour of the evening. Even the 3rd cavalry do not appear to have gone off together in any large body, but rather in straggling parties; and it appears that they might have been cut off, or at least dispersed in detail. The effort ought to have been made at all hazards. There was no fort in Meerut; but the women and children might surely have been gathered together in the artillery school, under the escort of European soldiers, at the first outbreak of the mutiny, while the 11th—who long held back, and to the last protected the families of their officers—were yet obedient; and while one portion of the force remained to protect the cantonment, the cavalry and guns might have overtaken the fugitives, the greater number of whom were on foot.

Major-general Hewitt's own account of the affair is the best proof of the utter absence of any solicitude on his part, or, it would appear, of any suggestion on the part of those around him, for the preservation of Delhi. In acquainting the adjutant-general, in a letter dated May the 11th, with the events of the preceding night, he never even alludes to any plan of proceeding against the mutineers, or anticipates any other employment for the 1,863 European soldiers stationed at Meerut, than to take care of the half-burned cantonments, and mount guard over their wives and families, until reinforcements should arrive to help them

* This gentleman had calmly looked on during the punishment parade of the previous day, and had advocated the adoption of the sternest measures to compel the entire corps to use the new cartridges. He was shot while driving his buggy, and, it is said, mutilated by five troopers.—Letter of the Rev. J. C. Smyth, chaplain at Meerut.—*Times*. The governor of the gaol is said to have owed his life entirely to the gratitude of certain of the mutineers, to whom he had spoken kindly while under his charge.

† *Supplement to Gazette*, May 6th, 1858; p. 2262.

‡ The last witness on the subject is Mr. Russell, who, in October, 1858, examined Meerut in company with Colonel Johnson of the artillery, an officer present at the mutiny. Mr. Russell satisfied himself that there was indeed just ground, admitting the difficulty of the situation, and many embarrassing circumstances, "to deplore the want of energy of those who had ample means in their hands to punish the murderers on the spot, and to, in all probability, arrest or delay considerably the massacre and revolt at Delhi."—*Times*, 29th Nov., 1858.

hold their own, and assist in carrying out drum-head courts-martial for the punishment of the insurgent villagers and bazaar budmashes; as to the civil law and civil courts, they were swept away by the first breath of the storm.

Many a gallant spirit must have chafed and raged that night, asking, in bitterness of spirit, the question generally uppermost in the minds of British soldiers—"What will they say of us in England?" But then—and it is not the least strange point of the case—we hear of no single soldier or civilian offering to lead a party, or go, if need were, alone, to Delhi, if only to warn the defenceless families assembled there, of the danger by which they were menaced.

The ride was nothing; some thirty-six miles on a moonlight midsummer night: the bullet of a mutineer might bring it to a speedy close; but was that enough to deter soldiers from endeavouring to perform their duty to the state of which they were sworn defenders, or Englishmen from endeavouring to save a multitude of their countrywomen from evils more terrible than death? As individuals even, they might surely have done something, though perhaps not much, clogged as they were in a peculiar manner by the working of a system which, amid other defects, makes a general of fifty-five a phenomenon in India.* The commanding officer at Meerut was not a Napier or a Campbell, gifted beyond his fellows with immunity from the physical and mental inertia which threescore years and ten usually bring in their train. If General Hewitt had been ever characterised by vigour and decision, at least these qualities were not evidenced at Meerut. It is painful to animadvert on even the public conduct of a brave old officer; the more so, because the despatch which evidences what he failed to do, is particularly straightforward and manly. He states, without preface or apology, that "as soon as the alarm was given, the artillery, carabiniers, and 60th rifles were got under arms; but by the time we reached the Native infantry parade-ground, it was too dark to act with efficiency in that direction; consequently the troops retired to the north of the nullah" (small stream before alluded to), "so as to cover the barracks and officers' lines of the artillery, carabiniers, and 60th rifles, which were, with the exception of

one house, preserved, though the insurgents—for I believe the mutineers had at that time retired by the Alighur and Delhi roads—burnt the vacant sapper and miner lines. At break of day the force was divided: one-half on guard, and the other taken to patrol the Native lines." Then follows a statement of certain small parties of the 11th and 20th Native infantry who remained faithful, and of the fifty men of the 3rd cavalry; and the general adds—"Efficient measures are being taken to secure the treasure, ammunition, and barracks, and to place the females and European inhabitants in the greatest security obtainable. Nearly the whole of the cantonment and Zillah police have deserted."†

The delay which took place in bringing the 6th dragoons into action is quite unaccounted for. A medical officer, writing from Meerut on the 12th of May, says, that between five and six o'clock on the evening of the previous day, while preparing for a ride with Colonel Finnis, he heard a buzzing, murmuring noise, such as was common in case of fire; and shortly after, while putting on his uniform, the havildar-major of the 11th rushed into the room, exclaiming, "Fly! sahib, the regiments are in open mutiny; Colonel Finnis has just been shot in my arms. Ride to the European cavalry lines and give the alarm." The doctor did so; galloped off to the house of the colonel of the dragoon guards, which he had just left, and then on to the barrack lines, where Colonel Jones was engaged in ordering the men to saddle, arm, and mount forthwith. The remaining movements of the dragoons are best told in the words of this eyewitness, whose account is the only circumstantial one which has been made public, regarding the proceedings of a corps which, rightly used, might have saved Delhi, and thousands of lives.

"It took us a long time, in my opinion, to get ready, and it was dark before the dragoons were ready to start in a body; while by this time flames began to ascend in all directions from the lines, and the officers' bungalows of the 3rd cavalry and the 11th and 20th Native infantry; from public buildings, mess-houses, private residences, and, in fact, every structure or thing that came within the reach of the torch, and the fury of the mutineers and of the bazaar *canaille*. . . . When the carabiniers were mounted we rode off at a brisk trot, through clouds of suffocating dust and darkness, in an easterly direction, and along a narrow road; not advancing in the direction of the conflagration, but, on the contrary, leaving it behind on our right rear. In this way we proceeded for some two or

* *Times*.—Calcutta correspondent, June 15th, 1858.

† *Parl. Papers on Mutinies* (No. 3), 1857; p. 9.

three miles, to my no small surprise, when suddenly the 'halt' was sounded, and we faced about, and, retracing our steps and verging off to our left, debouched on the left rear of the Native infantry lines, which were all in a blaze. Skirting along behind these lines we turned them at the western end, and wheeling to the left, came upon the 11th parade-ground, where, at a little distance, we found the horse artillery and H.M.'s 60th rifles. It appears that the three regiments of mutineers had by this time commenced dropping off to the eastward and to the Delhi-road; for here some firing took place between them and the rifles; and presently the horse artillery coming to the front and unlimbering, opened upon a copse or wood in which they had apparently found cover, with heavy discharges of grape and canister, which tore and rattled among the trees, and all was silent again. The horse artillery now limbered up and wheeled round, and here I joined them, having lost the dragoons in the darkness. By this time, however, the moon arose; 'we blessed her useful light' [so did the mutineers, no doubt]; and the horse artillery column, with rifles at its head, moving across the parade-ground, we entered the long street, turning from the southward behind the light cavalry lines. It was by this time past ten o'clock, and having made the entire circuit of the lines, we passed up to the eastward of them, and, joined by the dragoons and rifles, bivouacked for the night."

At daybreak the doctor proceeded to visit the almost deserted hospital, where a few patients, prostrate with small-pox, alone remained. On his way he met a dhooly, and, stopping the bearers, inquired what they carried. They answered, "The colonel sahib." It was the body of poor Finnis (with whom the inquirer had been preparing to ride scarce twelve hours before) which had just been found where he fell, and was being carried towards the churchyard. No search had been made for him or for any other of the fallen Europeans, who, if not wholly killed by the insurgents, must have perished in needless misery. Colonel Smyth, on the following morning, saw ten or twelve European dead bodies on the Delhi-road, near the old gaol.†

The mutineers had abundant leisure to initiate, with a success they could never have anticipated, their first great step of systematic hostility. They were not, however, unanimous in their views. Many of the 20th Native infantry were still loyal at heart, and 120 of them turned back, and presented themselves at Meerut, where the influence of the officers and families whom they had protected, procured them a favour-

able reception. Several of the 3rd cavalry also appear to have returned and surrendered themselves, and many of them were met with, wandering about the country, longing, but not daring, to return to their homes. Meanwhile, the mass of the mutineers, counselled by a few more daring spirits, took care to cut off the telegraph communication between Meerut and Delhi, and to post a guard of a hundred troopers at a narrow suspension-bridge over the Hindun, one of the two rivers between them and Delhi; but which then, in the height of the hot season, was easily fordable. They knew that there was no other obstacle, the country being smooth as a bowling-green; and they took full advantage of the apathy of the British, by bivouacking for a brief rest, within six miles of the scene of their outrages; after which, they rose up and pursued their way without the slightest interruption. Their arrival at Delhi will be narrated in the following chapter. The Meerut catastrophe is sufficiently important to deserve what Nelson wished for—a gazette to itself.

The general opinion of the Indian press and public, declared it "certain that the severe sentences on the mutineers of the 3rd cavalry was the immediate cause of the Meerut massacre."‡ In England, the same conclusion was naturally and almost unavoidably arrived at. Colonel Sykes, ex-chairman of the East India Company, and also a high authority on the score of individual character and experience, declared in the most emphatic language, his "thorough conviction, that but for the fatal punishment of the eighty-five troopers at Meerut to ten years' confinement in irons, with hard labour as felons, for resisting the compulsory use of the suspected cartridges, the first instance in a hundred years, in Bengal, of sepoys in combination imbruing their hands in the blood of their officers, would not have occurred. In short, had the policy adopted by Colonel Montresor in the contingent force at Hyderabad in 1806, in abrogating a dangerous order upon his own responsibility, been adopted at Meerut, we might still have had a loyal Bengal army, as we still have a loyal Madras army, although the latter had, fifty-one years ago, revolted upon religious grounds."§

Again, in his place in the House of Commons, Colonel Sykes said, that at the moment of ironing the troopers on parade, "an electric shock of sympathy went through

* *Times*, June 29th, 1857.

† *Brief Account of the Mutiny*, p. 6.

‡ Letter from an eye-witness of the seizure of Delhi by the mutineers.—*Times*, July 14th, 1857.

§ Letter to the *Times*, October, 1857.

the whole army, and amongst their co-religionists in the contingents with native powers. Up to that time there had been doubts and alarms, but no common sympathy or understanding. Then, however, every sepoy in the Bengal army made the case of the condemned his own.*

Lord Ellenborough contrasted the promptitude manifested by Sir Henry Lawrence in Oude, with the shiftless incapacity displayed at Meerut. At the latter place, the mutineers, he said, rose at 6 P.M., and it was not until nightfall that H.M.'s carabiniers were able to move. "How did it happen that with a Queen's regiment of infantry, another of cavalry, and an overwhelming force of horse and foot artillery, the mutineers yet escaped without injury to Delhi, and made a march of thirty to forty miles?" Lord Ellenborough spoke forcibly on the power of individual character in influencing events in India; and, alluding to General Hewitt, he declared that no government was justified in placing in a most important position a man of whom the troops knew nothing, and with whose qualifications the government themselves were unacquainted. "Where," he added, "was the commander-in-chief upon this occasion? Why was not he in the midst of his troops? He must have been aware of all the difficulties which were growing up. He must have known the dangers by which he was beset. * * * He, however, went to the hills, leaving the dangers to which I refer behind him in the plain. Such is not the conduct which a man occupying the position of commander-in-chief ought to have pursued."†

The leading reviews and magazines took up the same tone; and the writer of an able and temperate article in one of them, gave a question and reply, which contain, in few words, the common-sense view of the matter. "Why was nothing done or attempted, before the insurgents reached Delhi, to arrest their murderous progress, and protect the unfortunate residents in that city? Why, but that our leaders were unequal to their duty, and that General Anson had rushed into a menacing display of authority, without troubling himself to consider the means or the persons by whom it was to be sustained."‡

In India, however, the Meerut authorities were not wholly without apologists, and even vindicators. Some intercepted sepoy

letters were said to show, that the entire Bengal army had resolved on a simultaneous rising on the 15th of May; consequently, the blundering cruelties practised at Meerut were supposed to have precipitated the insurrectionary movement, and prevented the intended co-operation of the widely dispersed troops. The evidence in favour of this supposition was little better than rumour; if there had been any of weight, the authorities would have been only too glad to publish it for the diminution of their own blame. But had such a plot existed, its development at Meerut would have been particularly unfortunate; for subsequent events showed, that in most other stations, the officers in command (whether soldiers or civilians) were ready to make public duty their paramount consideration; and proved, in many remarkable instances, no less conspicuous for the employment of their often slender resources for the public good, than the Meerut leaders had been for the misuse of their almost unparalleled advantages. The wantonly provoked catastrophe at Meerut was fitly followed by an access of stupefaction, which can alone account for the absence of any effort to save Delhi.

The following is an extract from a sermon preached on the occasion by Mr. Rotton, one of the chaplains of the Meerut station; who was subsequently attached to the besieging force sent against Delhi, where, according to Mr. Greathed, he was "well thought of," and "attentive to his duties."§ The tone indicates the view generally taken of the recent outbreak; for preaching of so very decided a character would, if not approved, scarcely be tolerated by any congregation.

"Think awhile of our past position and our brightening prospects. The mutiny came upon us most unexpectedly. The scene of its commencement was Meerut; and the circumstances which led to its outbreak here, were doubtless arranged by matchless wisdom and unbounded love. It seems, if report speaks truly, that a diabolical and deep-laid plot had been conceived, and was hourly maturing in detail, for the destruction of British supremacy in India." On this mere rumour, Mr. Rotton proceeded to ground a description of the "unparalleled skill" with which "the Mohammedan" had framed his alleged plot, and the

* Speech on proposed India Bill, Feb. 18th, 1858.

† India Debate.—*Times*, 30th June, 1857.

‡ Blackwood's *Edinburgh Magazine* for Sept., 1857.

§ Greathed's *Letters*, p. 188.

means adopted by Providence for its disclosure. "Hence, I say, He [the Almighty] arranged every incident connected with the mutiny of Native troops in this station [including, of course, the attempted enforcement of the polluting cartridges and the three hours' fettering]; and but for the solemn and sad warning which we received here, it is possible, yea, very probable, that the enemy's plans would have arrived at such maturity, that our destruction might have been certain and complete. Such are the convictions of men of experience and judgment in India. They look on the outbreak at Meerut as the salvation of India."

The above quotation is not a very encouraging one to lay before the religious portion of the British public, now earnestly striving, in an entirely opposite spirit, and with entirely different weapons, for the spiritual and temporal salvation of the people of India. But it is well that the zealous and self-denying supporters of missionary enterprise should fully recognise the dangers and difficulties, from within and without, which beset the progress of Christianity in India. Within the pale, an insidious spirit of formality, self-sufficiency, and belligerent intolerance is at work, which is diametrically opposed to the first principles of the gospel. The doctrine of a special Providence, for instance, as illustrated above, can happily do little harm to hearers accustomed from childhood to test human teaching by the standard of Holy Writ, and to rely on the assistance of Divine wisdom to enable them to arrive at a right judgment. "Christians of the Book," as General Hearsey aptly translated Protestants, may indeed well dispense with any other light than that reflected from their Bibles by the operation of the Holy Spirit; but if we send missionaries to India for the express purpose of expounding the Scriptures, we ought to be most careful that they be duly qualified for the work.

Such teachers should have, at least in measure, the zeal of Peter and the love of John united with the controversial power of Paul. It is no simple task to disentangle the subtle web of casuistry which modern Brahminism has woven round the great verities of their ancient faith, or to eradicate from the affections of the people the rank growth of impure idolatries, of superstitious and sensual customs founded on allegories originally more graceful and far more meta-

physical than those of Greece or Rome—and to graft in place of them simple faith in the Father of the spirits of all flesh, and in the One Mediator between God and man.

With the Mohammedans the difficulties are still greater. Their deep reverence for the great Head of our church would seem, at first sight, to facilitate their acceptance of Christianity; but it is not really so, for they view themselves as the objects of a further and fuller revelation than ours, which it is their duty to guard and propagate. Impressed with this conviction, they will not, like the Brahmins, engage in arguments, or view possible conversion to Christianity in any light than as a crime, which if not repented of, must be punished with death. Thus, and thus only, can the plague of apostasy be stayed among them.

There is no surer obstacle to Mohammedan conversion than an irreverent handling of the deepest mysteries of the Christian faith. Yet the more rash and incompetent the preacher, the more likely is he to "rush in where angels fear to tread." An example of this is quoted by Lord Hastings in the diary kept by him, when making a tour as governor-general in 1815. He went to church at Meerut, in the handsome and extensive structure, towards the recent erection of which the Begum Sumroo* (a Roman Catholic by profession) had been the chief contributor. "The tenor of the sermon was," he says, "to impress upon us a strict and defined repartition of functions between the different persons of the Trinity—a line which we were assured would be inviolably preserved from the indelicacy which each must feel would attend the transgressing of the prerogatives of another."†

The impediments to making proselytes in India will not, however, deter those from making the attempt who act in obedience to a Divine command, and in reliance on Divine aid. Still in this, as in all similar cases, we must do our utmost before venturing to expect a blessing on our labours. An inexperienced and slenderly-gifted man, who would preach to empty pews in England, is not likely to attract hearers among a people whom he addresses under all the drawbacks inseparable from the position of a stranger and a foreigner, who, unpractised in their language, and yet more so in their modes of thought, comes to tell his audience that they and their

* Her jaghire was included in what is now the Meerut district. See *Indian Empire*, vol. i., p. 373.

† *Private Journal of the Marquess of Hastings*: edited by the Marchioness of Bute; vol. ii., p. 329.

fathers, and their venerated priesthood, have long lain in ignorance and darkness. To a preacher thus situated, it must be no small advantage to be perfectly versed in the antecedents of his hearers: he can hardly know too much of their customs and prejudices, of their strength and their weakness: his store of information cannot be too great: he should, like Moses, be versed not only in Israelitish history, but in all the wisdom of the Egyptians. In fact, the preliminary course of study requisite for an Indian missionary is altogether an exceptional one. Controversy in Europe is usually exercised regarding minor points of form, doctrine, and discipline. In India, the first articles of our faith—the creation of the world according to the Book of Genesis, the incarnation of the Saviour, the very existence of the “Christ of his-

tory,” are controverted points, before admitting the truth of which the Hindoos must unlearn the lessons of a lifetime, and disown traditions cherished for centuries as Divine revelations. Alas! will it please God to raise up the meek, holy scholars who, to human judgment, seem alone capable of the task. But we must not despair: India has had already a Schwartz, Carey, and Martyn, a Middleton and Heber. She has just lost an excellent bishop (in Dr. Wilson, the late venerable diocesan of Calcutta); and there are probably many now living, clergymen and laymen, whose labours, though comparatively unknown, are working out greater results than we dream of. Only when we send labourers into the vineyard, let them be our very best—clear-headed, large-hearted, gentle, men: no bigots, no sectarians, no formalists, no shams.

CHAPTER IV.

DELHI—MAY 11TH.

It would be very easy to write a full and glowing account of the seizure of Delhi and its terrible consequences, on the plan of selecting the most probable and interesting portions of the statements yet published, and discarding the improbable and conflicting ones; but it is difficult to frame even a brief narrative, grounded on authentic data, while the trial of the King of Delhi, with all the important evidence taken thereon, remains, like the Meerut court-martial, a sealed book to the general public, and the most important points have to be searched for bit by bit, through masses of Blue-Book verbiage, or received on the testimony of individuals, more or less discriminating in testing the accuracy of the intelligence they communicated to their friends in England.

It is from private letters only that we derive our information of the state of feeling in Delhi immediately before the outbreak, and of the excitement occasioned by the cartridge question among its immense population, but especially among the three Native regiments by which it was garrisoned. The census of 1846 states the population of the city, exclusive of its suburbs, at 137,977; of these, 71,530 were Hindoos, 66,120 Mohammedans, and 327 Christians (chiefly

Eurasians). Nowhere else in India was the proportion of Mohammedans to be compared with this: and although the British government might view the ancient capital of the Moguls as the shrine of buried greatness, interesting only to the poet, the antiquarian, or the artist, many a poverty-stricken Moslem noble, many a half-starved Rajpoot chieftain or ousted zemindar, remembered that a Great Mogul yet lived within the marble palaces of his ancestors, surrounded by a numerous offspring. Brahmins and Rajpoots had fought for the Moguls, and had filled the highest offices of the state, from which Hindoos and Mohammedans were alike excluded by the ungenerous policy of their present rulers. Men suffering under existing grievances, rarely think much of those of their predecessors from opposite causes; and it is only natural to suppose that there were many malcontents in India, who beheld the raj of the Feringhee with intense bitterness, and were well content to unite on common ground as natives, for the expulsion of the hated foreigners, and then fight out their own quarrels by themselves. Of course, the great mass of the people, who earn a scanty subsistence literally in the sweat of their

brow—who depend on daily toil for daily food, and who die by hundreds when anything occurs to interrupt their monotonous, resourceless industry—neither make, nor willingly take part in revolutions; for it is certain that, whichever side prevails, a multitude of the lowest classes will be trodden under foot by the combatants. Thus it was in all cases; but especially at Delhi, where thousands of peaceful citizens, with helpless families, had as good a right to expect from the British the benefits of a wise and strong administration, and protection against the mutinous spirit abroad amid the Bengal army, as any member of the covenanted service. The Indian population, could they but find hearing, have a right to initiate rather than echo the indignant question of their fellow-subjects in England—why did government “make Delhi a strong fortress, surround it with new bastions, excavate a deep ditch out of the granite rock, leave within it a hundred thousand muskets, two parks of the heaviest artillery in India, and powder enough to blaze away at any enemy for a year, and then place the whole in the sole charge of three Native regiments?”* and leave it there, while incendiary fires, in different stations, were telling, week by week and month by month, the spread of disaffection. The circulation of the chupatties has been compared to the Fiery Cross transmitted by the Scottish Highlanders. The burning bungalows at the musketry depôts ought to have afforded a far more significant warning of what was going on, written, as the information was, in characters of fire, which they who ran might read.

Letters dated almost simultaneously with the execution of that fatal sentence on the Meerut troopers (which was, in truth, the death-warrant of every European massacred in the following week), prove that some at least of the Delhi officers were anxiously watching the signs of the times. The three Native regiments—the 38th, 54th, and 74th Native infantry—consisted of about 3,500 men; there was also a company of Native artillery, comprising about 160 men. The Europeans numbered, in all, only fifty-two; of whom three commissioned officers and two sergeants belonged to the artillery.† They occupied the hottest cantonments in

India; the low rocky ridge on which modern Delhi is built, reflecting the intense glare of the fierce Indian sun, under which many sank down in fever; while their comrades had additional work to perform by day, with volunteer duty as nurses by night. Still, so far from being blinded by languor or fatigue to the temper of the Native troops, they noted it well; and their correspondence tells of a degree of excitement unparalleled for many years; of the disbanding of the 19th (the poor 19th, as those who know its history still sorrowfully term it); and of the unremoved persuasion of the sepoys, “that ox fat and hogs’ lard had been imposed upon them in their cartridges.” Where the officers could speak the language well, they reasoned with their men for a time successfully; but where, as in the majority of cases, this free communication did not exist, and “where the best speakers of native languages had been called away by staff appointments or for civil service, leaving only dumb novices, or even dumb elders behind them,” there mutiny most surely flourished. So said these letters, written some forty-eight hours before the outbreak. Want of head and of moral union among the disaffected, was, it was added, the only chance of safety left to the Europeans: and so it proved.‡

These vague apprehensions had, however, no connection with Meerut. That station was the last in all India to which the idea of danger was attached, and it was the special *point d'appui* for the Europeans at Delhi. At what hour the telegraphic communication was cut off between these posts, does not appear; but it is probable that the absence of any intimation of the disturbances, which commenced at Meerut as early or earlier than five o'clock on Sunday, was occasioned by the same miserable incapacity which marked the whole conduct of the authorities. The communication with Agra was not cut off till nine o'clock; for at that hour, intimation of what was occurring was dispatched to that city, in the form of a private message, by the postmaster's sister, to prevent her aunt from starting for Meerut, according to a previous engagement.§ Unhappily, no private emergency induced the sending of a similar communication to Delhi.

* *Times* (leader), July 24th, 1857.

† The parliamentary return, from which these statements are taken, gives sixty-five as the total number of “sick of all ranks;” but whether this heading is intended to include Europeans, or, as is

most probable, only the native patients in hospital, does not appear.—Parl. Papers, February 9th, 1858; p. 3.

‡ See *Daily News*, July 28th, 1857.

§ Appendix to Parl. Papers on Mutinies, p. 175.

The mutineers, on their part, do not appear to have sent on messengers; and there is no ground for believing that, at daybreak on Monday, the 11th of May, any individual of the vast population of the Mohammedan capital and its suburbs had received the slightest warning of the impending calamity.

The troops were paraded, in the cool of the early morning, to hear the sentences of the Barrackpore courts-martial, which were read here as elsewhere, without any withdrawal of, or explanation regarding, the cartridges. After parade, the garrison guards were told-off, and the officers and men separated to perform their ordinary course of duty.

The first alarm appears to have been taken by Mr. Todd, of the telegraph office; who, finding the communication with Meerut interrupted, proceeded to the bridge of boats across the Jumna, near one of the seven gates of the city, and there met a party of the 3rd cavalry, and was murdered by them. His fate was not known until late in the day. The European authorities do not state the manner in which they first learned the arrival of the Meerut mutineers in Delhi; but it would seem that a few of the released troopers rode in at the river gate, as the forerunners of the disorganised bands then on the road. At about eight o'clock the resident, Sir Theophilus Metcalfe, proceeded to the Delhi magazine, for the purpose of ordering two guns to be placed on the bridge, to arrest the progress of the mutineers. He found Lieutenant Willoughby, and the other European and Native members of the establishment, at their post; and on alighting from his buggy, Sir Theophilus, with Lieutenants Willoughby and Forrest, proceeded to a small bastion on the river face, which commanded a full view of the bridge, and there saw but too distinctly that the time for preoccupation was over; the mutineers had already posted a body of cavalry on the Delhi side, and were marching on in open column.

The resident and the lieutenant immediately proceeded to ascertain whether the river gate had been closed against the mutineers: this had been done, but to no purpose, and Lieutenant Willoughby hurried back to place the guns and howitzers in the best possible positions for the defence of the magazine. The nine Europeans* then re-

mained in quiet expectation of the worst, which, when it came, they met with such wise valour.

Meanwhile, it may be reasonably asked, who was the chief officer? and what orders did he give? The chief officer was Brigadier Graves; and it would appear that after parade he, like the other officers, went home to breakfast. When he learned the approach of the mutineers does not appear; but the first authentic mention of his presence, describes him as having proceeded with his staff to a circular brick building of some strength, whence the daily gun was fired, situated on an eminence near the cantonment, and within a short distance of the Moree and Cashmere gates. To this building, called the Flagstaff tower, the European women and civilians flocked for safety on the first alarm, and found Brigadier Graves watching from thence the movements of the rebel force on the north and western faces of the city. "He had," one of the party† writes, "no one to advise him, apparently; and I do not think any one present envied him his post." In truth, it was no easy task to know what to do for the defence of a city seven miles in circumference, when mutiny without met mutiny within. Probably the brigadier was anxiously looking for reinforcements: indeed, one of the officers of the 38th, says—"What puzzled us was the non-appearance of Europeans from Meerut, in pursuit of the insurgents." An expectation of this kind alone explains the absence of any plan for the removal of the ladies and children to Kurnaul or Meerut, instead of suffering them to remain in the tower from morning till evening, although the obstacles against escape were multiplying every hour. The length of time occupied by the Delhi tragedy is not its least painful feature. The massacre was not a general one, but a series of murders, which might have been cut short at any moment by the arrival of a regiment, or even a troop of European cavalry; for the rebels made no attempt to seize the guns till nearly sunset; nor did any considerable body of the Delhi troops join the mutineers until after the disorderly flight of the European officers and their families. The total disorganisation was, perhaps, inevitable; but the accounts of many of the sufferers evidence the absence of any clear

* Lieutenants Willoughby, Forrest, and Raynor; Conductors Buckley, Shaw, Scully, and Acting Sub-Conductor Crow; Sergeants Edwards and Stewart.

† Mrs. Peile, the wife of a lieutenant in the 38th; who had been very ill, and was about leaving Delhi on sick leave.—*Times*, September 25th, 1857.



understanding between Brigadier Graves and the officers commanding Native corps.

To form a just idea of the events of this miserable day, they must be detailed, as far as possible, in the order of their occurrence. The next victim after Mr. Todd, was the commissioner, Mr. Fraser; and the only circumstantial account of his death yet published, is given by a native eye-witness, whose narrative, corroborated in various essential points by the official documents, serves to relieve what the *Journal des Débats* terms their "incomparable aridity."

Early in the morning of the 11th, a party of Hindoos, bound for a well-known place of Brahminical pilgrimage, started from Delhi for Mussoorie. Shortly after crossing the bridge of boats they met eighteen troopers, who inquired their business. "Pilgrims proceeding to Hurdwar," was the reply. The troopers ordered them to turn back on peril of their lives: they obeyed, and witnessed the mutineers enter the city by the Delhi gate, after killing a European (probably Mr. Todd) whom they met on the bridge. The cavalry cantered in, uttering protestations of good-will to the native inhabitants, but death to the Europeans. They appear to have found the gate open, and to have ridden through without opposition; but it was closed after them. The cutwal, or native magistrate, sent word to Mr. Fraser, who immediately ordered the records of his office to be removed from the palace; and getting into a buggy, with a double-barrelled gun loaded, with two mounted (native) orderlies, proceeded towards the mutineers. They saw and advanced to meet him, calling out to his escort—"Are you for the Feringhee (the foreigner), or for the faith?" "Deen, deen!" (the faith, the faith!) was the reply. Mr. Fraser heard the ominous Mohammedan war-cry once more raised in Delhi; and as the mutineers approached him, he fired twice, shooting one man through the head, and wounding the horse of another; then springing from his buggy, he rushed in at the Lahore gate of the palace, calling out to the subahdar on duty to close it as he passed, which was accordingly done.

A trooper now rode up, told the Meerut story, gained a hearing despite the efforts of Mr. Fraser and Captain Douglas (the commandant of the palace guards), and won over the subahdar and company of the 38th then on guard at the palace gate. The

subahdar, being reproached by the Europeans for treachery in holding a parley with the mutineers, turned angrily on his reprovers, and bade them seek safety in flight, at the same time opening the gate for the troopers. Mr. Fraser and Captain Douglas ran towards the interior of the palace, followed by the mutineers, one of whom fired a pistol after the fugitives, which took effect, for the commissioner staggered and leant against a wall; whereupon another trooper went up, and, with a sword, severed his head from his body at a stroke. Captain Douglas was slain at the same time; and the assassins proceeding to the king's hall of audience, found two other Europeans (one of whom was probably Mr. Nixon, Mr. Fraser's head-clerk), and killed them there. The Rev. M. J. Jennings and his daughter, who were living with Captain Douglas over the Lahore gate of the palace, are said to have perished at this time, as also their guest, a Miss Clifford. The mutineers attempted to open a negotiation with the king, who was, it must be remembered, with his family, wholly at their mercy, in that very palace where the eyes of his aged ancestor, Shah Alum, had been stabbed out by a Mohammedan freebooter. What could a pageant king, of above eighty years of age—surrounded by a progeny born and reared in an atmosphere of besotted sensuality, which we had never made one single effort to purify—do in such a case as this but temporise? So far as the tale has yet been told, the royal family, doubtless more from fear and interest than any affection for the British government, were extremely loth to countenance the insurgents, and cordially joined the Europeans in hoping for succour from Meerut. The king wrote a letter to Mr. Colvin, the lieutenant-governor at Agra, informing him that the town and fort of Delhi, and his own person, were in the hands of the rebel troops of the place, who, it was added, had opened the gates, and joined about 100 mutineers from Meerut. The fate of Mr. Fraser, of Captain Douglas, and of Miss Jennings, was also mentioned in this letter; and a telegram founded on it, was sent from Agra to Calcutta on the 14th.* The account thus given was one of the earliest received by the Supreme government.

The Delhi cantonment was two miles from the city. At about ten o'clock, tidings reached the lines of what had taken place at

* Appendix to Parl. Papers on Mutinies, p. 178.

the palace, and the 54th regiment were ordered down to the city. One of the junior officers (a youth of nineteen, who wrote his touching tale home to his sister) says—"Of course, at this time, we had not the slightest doubt as to its loyalty." Happily for him, his company and one other were left to wait for two guns, with which Major Paterson was to follow as quickly as possible, the rest of the regiment marching on at once. A lady already mentioned (Mrs. Peile), who was then living close to the lines, watched the 54th pass the house; and she writes, that seeing "their cheerful appearance, and yet determined look, we congratulated ourselves on having such a brave set of fellows, as we thought, to go forward and fight for us."*

Colonel Ripley, the commandant of the regiment, led his men into the city without letting them load, intending to charge the mutineers with the bayonet. The 54th met the rebels advancing towards the cantonment, in numbers nowhere stated on authority, and, in private accounts, very variously from twenty to 150. The original invaders had been probably, by this time, reinforced by straggling parties of their own mutinous comrades, as also by the rabble of Delhi, and by the lawless Goojurs of the neighbouring villages—a predatory and semi-barbarous tribe, whose marauding propensities were, even in peace, very imperfectly kept in check by our defective system of police; and who, in disturbed times, were the indiscriminating enemy of every one who had anything to lose, whether European, Hindoo, or Mohammedan. The insurgents came on, and met Colonel Ripley's force at the English church,† near the Cashmere gate. They advanced without hesitation, calling out to the 54th, that their quarrel was not with them, but with their officers. The 54th first delayed firing on the plea of not being loaded; and, when they had loaded, their shots whistled harmlessly over the heads of the troopers. These galloping up, took deliberate aim in the faces of the Europeans, all of whom were unarmed except Colonel Ripley, who shot two of his assailants before he fell—hit by their pistols,

and bayoneted by a sepoy of his own corps. The countenances of the troopers are described as wearing the expression of maniacs; one was a mere youth, rushing about and flourishing his sword, and displaying all the fury of a man under the influence of bhang.‡ Captains Smith and Burrowes, Lieutenants Edwards and Waterfield, were killed, and Lieutenant Butler wounded. The Quartermaster-sergeant also fell. Dr. Stewart, the garrison surgeon, had a very narrow escape: "he tripped on a stone, which saved him from a shot; dodged behind a wall, and reached cantonments."§

It was long before the guns to support the 54th were ready; for the Native artillerymen, though neither disrespectful nor disobedient, were manifestly unwilling to take part against their countrymen. At length Major Paterson, with the remaining two companies and two pieces of artillery, passed through the Cashmere gate into the city. The mutineers fled at once, in wild disorder, through the streets. Major Paterson then returned through the Cashmere gate, and took up his position at a small fortified bastion, called the Main-guard, where he remained all day in momentary expectation of being attacked. The slaughtered Europeans were lying at a little distance, and the sepoys who had remained faithful brought in the bodies. "It was a most heartrending sight," says the young officer before quoted, "to see all our poor chaps, whom we had seen and been with that very morning, talking and laughing together at our coffee-shop, lying dead, side by side, and some of them dreadfully mutilated." Colonel Ripley had been previously carried back to the cantonments, and was found by two ladies (the wife of Major Paterson and Mrs. Peile), lying on a rude bed at the bells of arms. He pointed to a frightful wound on his left shoulder, and said that the men of his own regiment had bayoneted him. The colonel implored the native doctor to give him a dose of opium to deaden his sufferings, which, after some persuasion, was done; and the ladies, anxious for the safety of their children, returned to

justice, and partly, as the marquis himself says, the fear of losing a most valuable public servant, by subjecting him to be placed under the orders of inexperienced European juniors.—Marquis of Hastings' *Private Journal*, vol. i., p. 285.

‡ Letter from an eye-witness.—*Delhi Gazette*, published at Agra (after the seizure of Delhi).

§ Private letter from an officer of the 38th.

* Letter.—*Times*, September 25th, 1857.

† The English church was erected at the cost of £10,000, by Lieutenant-colonel Skinner. This officer, one of the ablest commanders of irregular troops who ever served the E. I. Company, was a half-caste, and received an honorary lieutenant-colonelship from Lord Hastings in 1814, the motive being partly the governor-general's characteristic sense of

their homes. On their way, they met men and women-servants, wandering about in the greatest confusion and distress. The servants begged them not to remain in the lines, as it was understood that the bungalows would be burned at night. The two ladies, therefore, packed up such property as they could in boxes, directed the natives to hide it, and left the lines about two o'clock, under the care of Lieutenant Peile, who first sought out Colonel Ripley, placed him in a dhooly, and rode by his side to the Flagstaff tower, which the whole party reached without encountering any molestation.

The assembled Europeans were grievously disappointed by the non-arrival of succour from Meerut;* and Surgeon Batson, of the 7th Native infantry, offered to attempt the conveyance thither of a request for assistance. Brigadier Graves accordingly wrote a despatch to this effect; and Mr. Batson, leaving his wife and three daughters in the tower, proceeded to his own house, where he dyed his face, hands, and feet; and, assuming the garb of a fakir, went through the city, intending to cross the bridge of boats; but, finding the bridge broken, he returned towards the cantonment, and tried to pass the Jumna at a ferry near the powder-magazine. The sowars, or troopers of the 3rd cavalry, had, however, preceded him, attended by crowds of Goojurs, who were plundering and firing the houses. Mr. Batson despaired of being able to reach Meerut, and rushed across the parade-ground. Either the act betrayed him, or his disguise was seen through, for the sepoy fired at him; but he succeeded in getting as far as the garden near the canal, where he was seized by some villagers, and "deprived of every particle of clothing." In this forlorn condition he proceeded on the road to Kurnaul, in hopes of overtaking some officers and ladies who had fled in that direction. Thus the only effort to communicate with Meerut was frustrated; for no other appears to have been attempted, even by the more promising means of native agency.

Had it been successful, it is not probable that the Meerut authorities would have made any effort, or encountered any risk, to remedy the evils their torpor had occa-

sioned. A message that a few scattered handfuls of men, women, and children were in momentary danger of being murdered some thirty-five miles off, would not have startled them into compassion; for the calamity had been foreseen on the Sunday night. The Rev. Mr. Rotton describes himself and his wife as watching their children "reposing in profound security beneath the paternal roof" (a bungalow in the European lines); gazing upon the shining moon, "and anticipating what would befall our Christian brethren in Delhi on the coming morn, who, less happy than ourselves, had no faithful and friendly European battalions to shield them from the bloodthirsty rage of the sepoys."†

Up till a late hour on Monday, the mass of the Delhi sepoys remained ostensibly true to their salt. On the departure of the 54th from the cantonment, the 74th moved on to the artillery parade, where Captain de Teissier was posted with a portion of his battery: the 38th were marched towards the Flagstaff tower, and formed in line along the high road. When Major Paterson took up his position at the Mainguard, he directed Captain Wallace to proceed to cantonments to bring down the 74th Native infantry, with two more guns.

Major Abbott, the commanding officer of the 74th, had previously heard that the men of the 54th had refused to act, and that their officers were being murdered. The intelligence reached him about eleven o'clock. He says—"I instantly rode off to the lines of my regiment, and got as many as there were in the lines together. I fully explained to them that it was a time to show themselves honest; and that as I intended to go down to the Cashmere gate of the city, I required good, honest men to follow me, and called for volunteers. Every man present stepped to the front, and being ordered to load, they obeyed promptly, and marched down in a spirited manner. On arriving at the Cashmere gate, we took possession of the post, drawn up in readiness to receive any attack that might be made. Up to 3 p.m. no enemy appeared, nor could we, during that period, get any information of the insurgents."‡

The Meerut mutineers actually in Delhi at this time, were evidently but few: it is

* "It was so inexplicable to us why troops from Meerut did not arrive."—Lieutenant Gambier's Letter.—*Times*, August 6th, 1857.

† The Chaplain's *Narrative of Siege of Delhi*, p. 6.

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‡ Despatch from Major Abbott to government; dated "Meerut, May 13th, 1857."—Further Parliamentary Papers on the Mutiny, No. 3 (Commons), 1858; p. 10.

impossible to tell in what numbers, or to what extent, the 38th and 54th had as yet co-operated with them; but the dregs of the population of the city, suburbs, and villages, were thronging the streets, and especially around the magazine, the surrender of which was demanded by a party of the treacherous palace guards (the 38th), in the name of the king. No reply was given, whereupon the mutineers brought scaling-ladders from the palace, and placed them against the walls. The conduct of the native establishment had before this been suspicious; and a durwan, or doorkeeper, named Kurreem Buksh, appeared to be keeping up a communication with the enemy, greatly to the annoyance of Lieutenant Willoughby, who ordered Lieutenant Forrest to shoot him should he again approach the gate. The escalade from without was the signal for a similar movement from within; for the natives, having first hidden the priming-pouches, deserted the Europeans by climbing up the sloped sheds on the inside of the magazine, and descending the ladders on the outside. The insurgents then gathered in crowds on the walls; but the besieged kept up an incessant fire of grape, which told well as long as a single round remained. At length, Conductor Buckley—who had been loading and firing with the same steadiness as if on parade, although the enemy were then some hundreds in number, and kept up a continual fire of musketry on the Europeans within forty or fifty yards—received a ball in his arm; and Lieutenant Forrest, who had been assisting him, was at the same time struck by two balls in the left hand. Further defence was hopeless. The idea of betraying their trust by capitulation never seems to have been entertained by the gallant little band. Conductor Scully had volunteered to fire the trains which had been laid hours before, in readiness to blow up the magazine as soon as the last round from the howitzers should be expended. The moment had arrived. Lieutenant Willoughby gave the order; Conductor Buckley, according to previous arrangement, raised his hat from his head, and Conductor Scully instantly fired the trains, and perished in the explosion, as did also Sergeant Edwards. The other Europeans, though all hurt, escaped from beneath the smoking ruins, and retreated through the sally-port on the river face. It is probable that many of the leading mutineers perished

here. "Lieutenant Willoughby estimated the number killed to be little short of 1,000 men."* The Hurdwar pilgrims before referred to, fix the same amount; but a native news-writer, in relating the same event, speaks of about 500 persons being killed in the different streets; adding—"The bullets fell in the houses of people to such a degree, that some children picked up two pounds, and some four pounds, from the yards of their houses."†

The Europeans at the tower, and those on duty at the Mainguard, had listened to the heavy firing at the magazine with great anxiety. A little after three o'clock the explosion was heard; but it was not very loud, and they did not know whether it was the result of accident or design. The 38th Native infantry, on guard at the tower, seized their arms, crying out, "Deen, Deen!" The Europeans seeing this ominous movement, desired the sepoy to surrender their weapons, which they actually did, and the ladies assisted in passing the arms to the top of the tower. At four o'clock, the telegraphic communication to the northward being still uninterrupted, the brigadier dispatched the following message to Umballah, the second of three sent here from Delhi in the course of the day:—

"Telegram.—Cantonment in a state of siege. Mutineers from Meerut, 3rd light cavalry, numbers not known, said to be 150 men, cut off communication with Meerut; taken possession of the bridge of boats; 54th N. I. sent against them, but would not act. Several officers killed and wounded. City in a state of considerable excitement. Troops sent down, but nothing certain yet. Information will be forwarded."‡

The brigadier, so far from having yet resolved on evacuating Delhi, desired to defend the cantonments, and ordered Major Abbott to send back two guns. The major's reasons for not doing so, and the narrative of his subsequent conduct and escape to Meerut, may be best told in his own words. Interesting particulars, on official authority, regarding this memorable epoch, are extremely rare, and claim quotation *in extenso*, especially where, as in the present instance, the writer has occupied a responsible position in the affairs he describes.

"This order [for the return of the guns] I was on the point of carrying out, when

* Major Abbott's despatch.—Further Parl. Papers (No. 3), p. 10.

† *Lahore Chronicle*: republished in *Times*, September 18th, 1858.

‡ Further Papers, No. 3 (Commons), p. 5. The first telegram from Delhi is not given.

Major Paterson told me, if I did he would abandon the post, and entreated me not to go. He was supported by the civil officer, a deputy-collector, who had charge of the treasury, who said he had no confidence in the 54th men who were on guard at the treasury. Although I strongly objected to this act of, as it were, disobeying orders, yet as the deputy-collector begged for a delay of only a quarter of an hour, I acceded to his request. When the quarter of an hour was up, I made preparations for leaving the Mainguard, and was about to march out, when the two guns I had sent back to cantonments, under Second-lieutenant Aislabie, returned to the Mainguard with some men of the 38th light infantry. I inquired why they had come back, and was told, in reply, by the drivers, that the gunners had deserted the guns, therefore they could not go on. I inquired if any firing had taken place in cantonments. My orderly replied, he had heard several shots; and said, 'Sir, let us go up to cantonments immediately!' I then ordered the men to form sections. A jemadar said, 'Never mind sections, pray go on, sir.' My orderly havildar then called up, and said, 'Pray, sir, for God's sake leave this place—pray be quick!' I thought this referred to going up to the relief of cantonments, and accordingly gave the order to march. I had scarcely got a hundred paces beyond the gate, when I heard a brisk firing in the Mainguard. I said, 'What is that?' Some of the men replied, 'The 38th men are shooting the European officers.' I then ordered the men with me, about a hundred, to return to their assistance. The men said, 'Sir, it is useless; they are all killed by this time, and we shall not save any one. We have saved you, and we shall not allow you to go back and be murdered.' The men formed round me, and hurried me along the road on foot back to cantonments to our quarter-guard. I waited here for some time, and sent up to the saluting [Flagstaff] tower to make inquiries as to what was going on, and where the brigadier was; but got no reply."

To supply the hiatus in Major Abbott's story, as to what was going on at the tower, we must fall back on the statements of private persons.

At about five o'clock, a cart, drawn by bullocks, was seen approaching the building. An attempt had been made to hide its contents by throwing one or two woman's

gowns over them; but an arm hanging stiff and cold over the side of the cart, betrayed its use as the hearse of the officers who had been shot in the city. Happily, the ladies in the tower had little time, amid the momentarily increasing confusion, to dwell on this painful incident. One poor girl was anxiously enquiring of the officers who were now flocking in from various parts, if they knew anything of her step-brother, Captain Burrowes; but they shrank from her, knowing that all the while his corpse lay but a few hundred yards distant, at the gate under the window of the tower, covered over, like the bodies of his fallen comrades, with some article of feminine apparel. The men of Captain de Teissier's horse field battery were at length "persuaded to take part with the mutineers, but only when pressed round by them in overwhelming numbers, and unable to extricate themselves from their power."* The commandant had his horse shot under him; but he reached the tower in safety, and there found his wife, with her infant in her arms, watching in agony for him. The insurgents then took possession of two of the light guns. Major Paterson, and Ensign Elton of the 74th, came in about the same time from the quarter-guard, and said that the Europeans were being shot down. On receiving this intelligence, the brigadier† ordered a general retreat to Kurnaul, a distance of about seventy miles. Several ladies protested against quitting Delhi until they should be rejoined by their husbands, whom some of them had not seen since the morning. Alas! there was already at least one widow among their number.‡ But the night was closing in, and Captain Tytler, of the 38th, urged immediate departure, and went with Lieutenant Peile to get the men of that regiment together to accompany the Europeans. Carriages of all descriptions were in waiting at the foot of the tower; but, in some cases, the native servants had proved fearful or unfaithful; and the vehicles were insufficient for the fugitives, so that wounded men found themselves burdened with the charge of women and children, without any means of conveyance. Lieutenant Peile, having Dr. Wood of the 38th (who had been shot in the face), Mrs. Wood,

* Despatch from Lieutenant-governor Colvin, to the governor-general in council, May 22nd, 1857.—Appendix to Parl. Papers on Mutiny, p. 312.

† Account by Lieut. Gambier, of the 38th N. I.

‡ Account by Mrs. Peile. — *Times*, Sept. 25th, 1857.

and his own wife and child to take care of, and "not knowing how he was to get on," sought counsel of the brigade-major, Captain Nicoll: the answer he received was, "The best way you can."*

Another lady† describes the general departure from the tower as taking place at about six o'clock; and states—"We got into Captain Nicoll's carriage [apparently meaning herself, her husband and child], and put in as many others as we could, and drove one pair of horses for fifty miles." A large number of Europeans, including Brigadier Graves, started at the same time, and some branched off to Meerut; while the others pursued the Kurnaul road, and arrived safely at Kurnaul on the following morning. Here a fresh separation took place, half the party, or about ten persons, going on to Umballah at once, the remaining ten following more slowly. The natives were "so unwilling" to assist them, "that," says the lady above quoted, "it was with the greatest difficulty we managed to get on at all; L— [her husband] being obliged to threaten to shoot any one who refused to give us assistance." However, they did get on, and started from Thunessir, a dawk station on the Umballah road, at six o'clock P.M. on Wednesday, "in a cart drawn by coolies," reaching Umballah about eight o'clock on Thursday morning.‡

It would be unreasonable to criticise the measures of a man who saw the lives of his wife and infant in imminent peril. Only had the villagers been either cruel or vindictive, a few bullets or *lattees* would have quickly changed the aspect of affairs. The disinclination of the villagers to aid the Europeans, may possibly have some connection with the manner in which the English had recently assumed supremacy over the district of which Thunessir, or Thwanessur, is the chief town. That territory contains about a hundred villages, producing an annual revenue of £7,600 sterling. A moiety is said to have "csclated to the British government, by reason of the failure of heirs in 1833 and in 1851," and the remaining portions were soon afterwards confiscated, "in consequence of the failure of the chiefs in their allegiance."§

Very few of the fugitives had the chance

of carrying matters with such a high hand as "L." and his companions. So far from harnessing the natives to carts, Englishmen and Englishwomen, cold, naked, and hungry, were then in different villages, beseeching, even on their knees, for food, clothing, and shelter; literally begging—for they were penniless—a morsel of unleavened bread and a drop of water for their children, or a refuge from the night-dews, and the far more dreaded mutineers. The varied adventures of the scattered Europeans are deeply interesting and suggestive. Many an individual gained more experience of native character between Delhi and their haven of refuge in Umballah or Meerut, in that third week of May, 1857, than they would have obtained in a lifetime spent in the ordinary routine of Indian life, than which it is scarcely possible to conceive anything more superficial and conventional, or better calculated to foster arrogance and self-indulgence.

The next in order of flight to the brigade-major's party was Major Abbott, to whose narrative we return, as affording another link in the chain of events. After vainly attempting to get any orders from Brigadier Graves, his attention was directed to some carriages going up the Kurnaul road, among which he recognised his own, occupied by his wife and daughters. The men of his regiment, at the quarter-guard, assured him that the officers and their families were leaving the cantonment, and entreated him to do the same. The major states—"I yielded to their wishes, and told them, 'Very well, I am off to Meerut. Bring the colours, and let me see as many of you at Meerut as are not inclined to become traitors.' I then got up behind Captain Hawkey, on his horse, and rode to the guns, which were also proceeding in the direction the carriages had taken, and so rode on one of the waggons for about four miles, when the drivers refused to go any further, because, they said, 'we have left our families behind, and there are no artillerymen to serve the guns.' They then turned their horses, and went back towards cantonments. I was picked up by Captain Wallace, who also took Ensign Elton with him in the buggy.

* Account by Mrs. Peile.—*Times*, September 25th, 1857.

† Probably the wife of one of the law officers, Mr. L. Berkeley, the principal Sudder Ameen, who escaped to Kurnaul with his wife and infant. The

identification is of some interest, on account of an incident mentioned in the text.

‡ Letter published in the *Times*, July 17th, 1857.

§ Thornton's *Gazetteer*, on the authority of Indian Pol. Disp., 29th July, 1835; and 10th Sept., 1851.

"Ensign Elton informed me, that he and the rest of the officers of the 74th Native infantry were on the point of going to march out with a detachment, when he heard a shot, and, on looking round, saw Captain Gordon down dead; a second shot, almost simultaneously, laid Lieutenant Revelly low; he (Elton) then resolved to do something to save himself; and, making for the bastion of the fort, jumped over the parapet down into the ditch, ran up to the counterscarp, and made across the country to our lines, where he was received by our men, and there took the direction the rest had, mounted on a gun." The party with Major Abbott went up the Kurnaul road, until they came to the cross-road leading to Meerut, *via* the Bhagput Ghaut, which they took, and arrived at Meerut about eight o'clock in the evening of the 12th.*

Regarding the origin of the outbreak, Major Abbott says—

"From all I could glean, there is not the slightest doubt that this insurrection has been originated and matured in the palace of the King of Delhi, and that with his full knowledge and sanction, in the mad attempt to establish himself in the sovereignty of this country. It is well known that he has called on the neighbouring states to co-operate with him in thus trying to subvert the existing government. The method he adopted appears to be to gain the sympathy of the 38th light infantry, by spreading the lying reports now going through the country, of the government having it in contemplation to upset their religion, and have them all forcibly inducted to Christianity.

"The 38th light infantry, by insidious and false arguments, quietly gained over the 54th and 74th Native infantry, each being unacquainted with the other's real sentiments. I am perfectly persuaded that the 54th and 74th Native infantry were forced to join the combination by threats that, on the one hand, the 38th and 54th would annihilate the 74th Native infantry if they refused, and *vice versa*, the 38th taking the lead. I am almost convinced that had the 38th Native infantry men not been on guard at the Cashmere gate, the results would have been different. The men of the 74th Native infantry would have shot every man who had the temerity to assail the post.

"The post-office, electric telegraph, Delhi bank, the *Delhi Gazette* press, every house in cantonments and the lines, have been destroyed. Those who escaped the massacre fled with only what they had on their backs, unprovided with any provisions for the road, or money to purchase food. Every officer has lost all he possessed, and not one of us has even a change of clothes."

* Despatch dated May 13th, 1857.—Further Parl. Papers on the Mutiny (No. 3), p. 10.

† In the letter from which the above facts are taken, the writer says, "young Metcalfe had fled in the morning." This is a mistake, for he was still in Delhi, as will be shown in a subsequent page.

Major Abbott's opinion of the conduct of the King of Delhi, does not appear justified by any evidence yet published; and his censure of the 38th hardly accords with the fact, that not one of the officers of that corps were killed.

Lieutenant Gambier, writing from Meerut on the 29th of May, says—

"Meer Munder Ali, and Sahye Sing [Native officers from Delhi], who came over for court-martial on the mutineers, declare that nothing of this outbreak was known before it occurred, and that if we two [himself and Colonel Knyvett] went to Delhi, the men would flock to us. I also believe our lives would be safe among the 38th, but the rascals would not stand by us; and I make no doubt that the garrison duty men, influenced by the example of the 54th, would have committed any excess."

The fugitives who escaped in carriages or carts, whether dragged by natives or quadrupeds, had probably little conception of the sufferings endured by the footsore and weary wanderers who had no such help on their perilous journey. When the sepoy at the Mainguard turned against their officers, the latter strove to escape as Ensign Elton describes himself to have done, but were interrupted by the screams of some ladies in the officers' quarters. The Europeans ran back, and making a rope with their handkerchiefs, assisted their terrified countrywomen to jump from the rampart into the ditch, and then with great difficulty, and nearly half-an-hour's labour, succeeded in enabling them to scramble up the opposite side. During the whole time not a shot was fired at them by the sepoys, and the party succeeded in making their way to a house on the banks of the river, belonging to Sir T. Metcalfe, where they obtained some food from the servants, who had not seen their master since the morning.† Here they stayed until they beheld the whole of the three cantonments on fire, and saw "a regular battle raging in that direction."‡ they then, under cover of nightfall, ran to the river, and made their escape. The party then consisted of five officers and of five ladies—namely, Lieutenant Forrest, his wife, and three daughters; Lieutenant Procter, of the 38th; Lieutenant Vibart, of the 54th; Lieutenant Wilson, of the artillery; a Lieutenant Salkeld, of the engineers; and Mrs. Fraser, the wife of an

† This fact shows how far the sepoys were from acting on any plan, much less having any recognised leader; in which case, burning the cantonments and fighting among themselves, after getting rid of their European masters, would have been quite out of the question.

officer of the engineers, then absent on duty.* This poor lady, though shot through the shoulder at the time the Europeans were fired on in the Mainguard, bore up cheerfully, in the hope of finding her husband at Meerut. At an early period of their journey the party fell in with Major Knyvett and Lieutenant Gambier, to the latter of whom a peculiar interest attaches, because, after escaping from Delhi, he returned thither with the besieging force, and received his death wound at the hands of the mutineers. By his account, corroborated by other testimony, it seems that at the time of the evacuation of the Flagstaff tower, it was generally supposed that a considerable body, if not the greater portion, of the Native troops would accompany the fugitives to Meerut. They actually started for the purpose; but Lieutenant Gambier, who was in the rear, says the sepoys were soon seen streaming off by hundreds, till at length he and Colonel Knyvett found themselves alone with the colours of the 38th and about 150 men, who refused to proceed further, and, laying hold of the non-commissioned officers with the colours, went to their lines. The two Europeans followed them, sounded the "assembly," and implored them to fall in, but without effect; and the colonel, too grieved by the defection of his regiment to be heedful of personal danger, went in amongst them, and said, "If you wish to shoot me, here I am; you had better do it." The men vehemently denied any such intention, and then the two officers dismounted, not knowing what they ought to do. Lieutenant Gambier, who tells their adventures with the simplicity which characterises the highest class of bravery, adds—"I do not know whether we fully recognised the extent of the evil, but we then did not think of getting away. I had my bed sent down to the quarter-guard; and my kit [kitmutgar] went for some dinner." Wearied with fatigue and excitement he fell asleep, and it was night before he awoke. On looking round, he saw Lieutenants Peile and Addington (74th), and Mr. McWhirter, collector of Paniput (who was in ill-health, and had come on a visit to Delhi), with Mr. Marshall, an auctioneer and merchant, standing near him. The sepoys urgently pressed the officers to escape, offering shelter and concealment in their huts. Firing was now commencing in

the lines, and Peile and Gambier, each taking a colour, reached the door of the quarter-guard; but the sepoys thronged round and jerked the colours from the hands of the officers. Lieutenant Gambier, meeting Colonel Knyvett in the doorway, said, "We must be off." The colonel objected; but the lieutenant took him by the wrist, pulled him outside, and forced him away from the doomed regiment; on which the colonel looked back with something of the bitter yearning with which a sea-captain quits the sinking ship which has been for years his home, his pride, and his delight, the parting pang overpowering the sense of danger, even though a frail boat or a bare plank may offer the sole chance of escape from imminent personal peril. Neither the colonel nor his young companion had any ladies to protect, otherwise the feelings of husbands and fathers might naturally have neutralised the intense mortification and reluctance with which they turned their backs on Delhi. But though Mrs. Knyvett was safe at a distance, and the lieutenant was unmarried, yet the latter had his colonel to support and save. "We hurried on," he writes, "tripping and stumbling, till we reached a tree, under which we fell down exhausted. I feared I should get the colonel no further; he had touched nothing all day, and the sun had more or less affected him; but to remain was death; and after a few minutes' rest, we again started forward. So we passed all that dreadful night. The moon rose, and the blaze of cantonments on fire made it light as day, bringing out the colonel's scales and my scabbard and white clothing in most disadvantageous relief: as we lay, the colonel used to spread his blue pocket-handkerchief over my jacket, in order to conceal it as much as possible." The elder officer was unarmed and bareheaded; he was, besides, subject to the gout, an attack of which the distress of mind and bodily fatigue he was undergoing were well calculated to bring on. In the morning, some Brahmins coming to their work discovered the fugitives hiding in the long jungle grass, and after giving them some chupatties and milk, led them to a ford over a branch of the Jumna. They met on the road Mr. Marshall, with whom they had parted in the quarter-guard: he had wandered on alone; Mr. McWhirter having been, he believed, drowned in attempting to cross the canal cut at the back of the canton-

* Letter of officer of 54th (probably Lieutenant Vibart).—*Times*, July 23rd, 1857.

ments.* Soon afterwards the trio learned from a villager that there were other Europeans about a mile further on in the jungle. On proceeding thither, they came up with and joined Lieutenant Forrest's party, which raised their number to thirteen. The fording of the Jumna on the second night of their toilsome march, was the greatest obstacle they had to encounter. "The water was so deep, that whereas a tall man might just wade it, a short man must be drowned." The ladies, however, got over, supported by a native on one side, and a European on the other. Some of them lost their shoes in the river, and had to proceed barefoot over "a country composed exclusively of stubble-fields, thistles, and a low thorny bush." The treatment they met with was very varied: at one village they were given food, and suffered to rest awhile; then they were wilfully misled by their guides, because they had no means of paying them; and had nearly recrossed the Jumna in mistake for the Hindun, but were prevented by the presence of mind of Lieutenant Salkeld, in ascertaining the course of the stream by throwing some weeds into it. It was intensely cold on the river bank, and the wind seemed to pierce through the wet clothes of the fugitives into their very bones. They laid down side by side for a short time, silent, except for the noise of their chattering teeth; and then, after an hour or two's pause (for rest it could hardly be called), they resumed their weary journey. Next they encountered a party of Goojurs, who plundered and well-nigh stripped them; after which they fell in with some humane Brahmins, who brought them to a village called Bhekia or Khekra,† gave them charpoys to rest on, and chupatties and dhol (lentil pottage) to eat. Crowds gathered round the wanderers, "gaping in wonderment, and cracking coarse jokes" at their condition and chance of life. But the villagers, though rough and boorish in manner, were kind in act, until "a horrid hag" suddenly made her way to the Europeans, and flinging up her skinny arms, invoked the most fearful curses on them, tilted up their charpoys one by one,

and drove them away. A fakir proved more compassionate, and hid them in his dwelling; and here their number, though not their strength, was increased by two sergeants' wives and their babes. One of the latter was a cause of serious inconvenience and even danger; for at a time when the general safety depended on concealment, the poor child was incessantly on the point of compromising them, for it "roared all day, and howled all night." On the Thursday after leaving Delhi, a native volunteered to carry a letter to Meerut, and one (written in French) was accordingly entrusted to him. All Saturday they spent "grilling under some apologies for trees;" but towards evening a message arrived from a village named "Hurchundpoor," that one Francis Cohen, a European zemindar, would gladly receive and shelter them. With some difficulty they procured a hackery for the ladies, who were by this time completely crippled, and, escorted by about a dozen villagers, reached Hurchundpoor in safety, where they received the welcome greeting of "How d'ye do?—go inside—sit down." The speaker, Francis Cohen, though very like a native in appearance and habits, was a German, about eighty-five years of age, who had formerly served under the Begum Sumroo. He placed the upper story of his dwelling at the disposal of the fugitives, sent skirts and petticoats for the ladies, with pieces of stuff to cut into more, and provided the officers with various kinds of native attire; and once again they "ate off plates and sat on chairs." On Sunday, at sunset, while they were enjoying rest, after such a week's work as none of them had ever dreamed of enduring, the news came that a party of sowars (Native cavalry) were at the gate, sent by the King of Delhi to conduct the Europeans as prisoners to "the presence." The officers sprang up, and were hastily resuming the portions of their uniform which they still possessed, when two Europeans rode into the courtyard, announcing themselves as the leaders of thirty troopers from Meerut, come in answer to the letter sent thither by a native messenger.

Of course, troopers of the 3rd cavalry‡ ever, include Captain Craigie's entire troop. On his return to the parade-ground with his men, he found, as has been stated, Brevet-major Richardson with part of his troop, and Captain and Lieutenant Fairlie (brothers), with the remains of the 5th and 6th. Some hurried conversation ensued between the officers, which was interrupted by their being fired at. The mob of mutineers from the infantry

* Second Supplement to the *London Gazette*, May 6th, 1858; p. 2241.

† In the copies of this letter printed for private circulation, from one of which the above statements are taken, the name of the village is given as Khekra; in the abstract published in the *Times*, August 6th, 1857, it is Bhekia.

‡ The faithful remnant of the 3rd did not, how-

were the last persons looked to for deliverance: nevertheless, Lieutenant Gambier adds—"These fine fellows had ridden all day, first to Bhekia, and afterwards to Hurchundpoor, near forty miles, to our assistance." Under this escort, Colonel Knyvett and his companions succeeded in reaching Meerut at about 10 p.m.—the eighth night after leaving Delhi. The first question of Mrs. Fraser was for her husband. An officer, not knowing her, immediately communicated the fact of his death, the manner of which will be hereafter shown. The rest of the party were more fortunate, many friends coming in by degrees, who had been given up for lost.

All the officers of the 38th escaped; Lieutenant Peile and his wife encountered extreme peril, aggravated for a time by separation from each other, as well as from their child. The carriages had nearly all driven off from the Flagstaff tower, when a gentleman, seeing that Mrs. Peile had no conveyance, offered her a seat in his. She accepted his offer for her little boy, who reached Meerut some days before his parents, and while they were supposed to have perished. Then Mrs. Peile joined Dr. Wood and his wife. The doctor had been shot in the face, as is supposed by the men of his own regiment (the 38th), and his lower jaw was broken. The ladies with him were the last to leave Delhi; and they had scarcely started, when some natives came to them, and advised their turning back, declaring that the officers and others who had preceded them on the Kurnaul road had all been murdered. They returned accordingly to Delhi, and took refuge in the Company's gardens, where they found a gunner, who went to the hospital, at their request, to fetch a native doctor. Other natives brought a charpoy for the

wounded European to lie on; and in about an hour a coolie arrived with some lint and bandages from the hospital, accompanied by a message from the native doctors, that they would gladly have come, but that they were then starting in dhoolies by command of the King of Delhi, to attend on his wounded troops. A band of marauders discovered the trembling women and their helpless companion; carried off their horses, and broke up their carriages. Not daring to remain where they were, they started at midnight in search of a village near the artillery lines, where they were fed and concealed by the head man of the village—an aged Hindoo, who turned the cattle out of a cow-shed to make room for the distressed wayfarers. The next morning, the three started again on their travels; and after receiving great kindness at several villages, and narrowly escaping death at the hands of marauders, they at length reached a village inhabited by "the ranee of Balghur," probably a Rajpootni chieftainess, who received them in her house, bade her servants cook rice and milk for their dinner, and gave them leave to remain as long as they pleased. In the morning, however, she told them she could not protect them a second night, for her people would rise against her. This was on the 18th, and the fugitives were as yet only twenty-two miles from Delhi. Providentially, on that very day Major Paterson and Mr. Peile arrived separately at Balghur, from whence they all started together that evening. They met with some remarkable instances of kindness on the road. In one case, "the working men, seeing what difficulty we had in getting the doctor along, volunteered to carry him from village to village, where they could be relieved of their burden. This was a most kind offer,

lines were seen advancing, and the officers agreed to start with the standards for the European lines. Captain Craigie states, that owing to the deafening uproar, the intense excitement, and the bewildering confusion which prevailed, the advance sounded on the trumpet was scarcely audible, and the greater part of the still faithful troopers did not hear it, and were consequently left behind. A few men who were nearest the officers went with them to the European lines; and these, with some married troopers who had gone to place their wives in safety, with between twenty and thirty men of different troops who rallied round Captain Craigie, and assisted in defending his house and escorting him to the European lines, formed the remnant of the 3rd cavalry, which, with few exceptions, remained staunch during the mutiny, doing good ser-

vice on all occasions. They, and they only, of the Meerut sepoy were permitted to retain their arms; even the 160 faithful men of the 11th N. I. being disbanded, but taken into service by the magistrates. Major Smythe reported the state of the regiment, 31st of May, 1857, as follows:—

Remaining in camp	78
On furlough	83
On command	9
Dismissed the service	85
Invalided	7
Deserted	236

Total . . . 497

The infant child of Captain and Mrs. Fraser was separated from its parents, and perished from exposure on the Kurnaul road.—*London Gazette*.

and was most gladly accepted by us." At length, Mrs. Peile, who had been robbed of her bonnet and shawl at the onset of their flight, began to feel her head affected; but a wet cloth bound round her temples relieved her, and enabled her to prosecute the remainder of the journey, which terminated in a very different manner to its commencement; for our staunch ally, the rajah of Putteeala, on learning the vicinity of Europeans in distress, sent forty horsemen, well-mounted and gaily dressed, to escort them into Kurnaul, where they arrived on the 20th. Mrs. Paterson and her two children had previously reached Simla in safety.

Surgeon Batson likewise, after wandering twenty-five days among the topes (groves of trees) and villages, eventually succeeded in joining the force before Delhi. He was an excellent linguist; but he vainly strove to pass as a Cashmere fakir. "No, no," said the Hindoos, "your blue eyes betray you; you are surely a Feringhee." They were, however, kind to him; but the Mohammedans would have killed him, had he not uttered "the most profound praises in behalf of their prophet Mahomet," and begged they would spare his life, "if they believed that the Imaum Mendhee would come to judge the world." The adjuration was effective, and Surgeon Batson's term of life was extended a little, and only a little, longer. His wife and daughters were among the more fortunate fugitives.*

The adventures of Sir T. Metcalfe have not been circumstantially related beyond that after leaving Lieutenant Willoughby, he was attacked by the rabble; but escaped from them, when he concealed himself in the city; and, after remaining there for three days, eventually succeeded in making his way to Hansi. Lieutenant Willoughby was less fortunate. He is supposed to have perished near the Hindun river. Lieutenant Gambier states—"There escaped with Willoughby, Osborne, B——, H——, and A——. Osborne's wound necessitated his being left in a ditch: he ultimately reached this place; they have not." From the account given by a native, it is believed that Lieutenant

Willoughby shot a Brahmin, on which the villagers attacked and murdered him.†

Mr. Wagentreiber, of the *Delhi Gazette*, fled with his wife and daughter, in his buggy. They were attacked five times. Mrs. Wagentreiber received some severe blows from iron-bound lattes; as he did also, besides a sword-cut on the arm. But the ladies loaded, and he fired at their assailants with so much effect, as to kill four, and wound two others; after which, the fugitives succeeded in making good their way to Kurnaul.‡

Mrs. Leeson, the wife of the deputy-collector, made her escape from Delhi on the morning of the 19th, after losing three children in the massacre.§ Two faithful natives accompanied and protected her; one of them perished by the hands of the mutineers in attempting to pass the Ajmere gate; the other accompanied her in her wanderings, till they reached the European picket at Subzie Mundie. The poor lady, who had nothing but a dirty piece of cloth round her body, and another piece, folded turban-fashion, on her head, on finding herself again in safety, knelt down, and thanked heaven for her deliverance.||

In the midst of all these tales of strife and misery, it is well that an English official has placed on record the following statement of the humanity evinced by the villagers generally. Mr. Greathed, the commissioner, writing from Meerut, in the very height of the excitement, states—"All the Delhi fugitives have to tell of some kind acts of protection and rough hospitality; and yesterday a fakir came in with a European child he had picked up on the Jumna. He had been a good deal mauled on the way, but he made good his point. He refused any present, but expressed a hope that a well might be made in his name, to commemorate the act. I promised to attend to his wishes; and Humam Bhartee, of Dhunoura, will, I hope, long live in the memory of man. The parents have not been discovered, but there are plenty of good Samaritans."

The loyalty of the nawab of Kurnaul largely contributed to the safety of the

* Surgeon H. S. Batson's Letter.—*Times*, August 18th, 1857.

† Lieutenant Gambier's account. The mother of Lieutenant Willoughby being left a widow with four children, appealed to Sir Charles Napier, on his return to England after the conquest of Sind, to aid in providing for her sons; and he, though a perfect stranger, interested himself in the case, and ob-

tained Addiscombe cadetships for two of the young men. Sir Charles, had he lived to see the career of his protégés, would have been richly rewarded for his disinterested kindness.—*United Service Gazette*.

‡ Lieut. Gambier's account.—*Times*, July 14, 1857.

§ Second Supplement to the *London Gazette*, May 6th, 1858.

|| Ball's *Indian Mutiny*, pp. 100—107.

fugitive Europeans, who chose the road to Umballah instead of to Meerut. Mr. le Bas, the Delhi judge, had a very interesting interview with this chief. There was at the time no European force in the neighbourhood of Kurnaul, to counteract the effect of the unmolested retreat of the mutineers from the head-quarters of the British artillery at Meerut, followed by their unopposed occupation of Delhi. Moreover, European women and children were known to have been left to perish there; and cherished wives and mothers, on whom crowds of servants had waited from the moment they set foot in India, were now seen ragged, hungry, and footsore, begging their way to the nearest stations. The chiefs, country-people, and ryots doubted if they were awake or dreaming; but if awake, then surely the British raj had come to an end. At all events, the Great Mogul was in Delhi, and from Delhi the British had fled in the wildest disorder; whereupon a native journalist thought fit to raise the following *Io Pean*, which, like all similar effusions, whether indited by Europeans or Asiatics, is characterised by the most irreverent bigotry:—

"Oh! Lord! the English have now seen a specimen of Thy power!

"To-day they were in a state of high power; to-morrow they wrapped themselves in blood, and began to fly. Notwithstanding that their forces were about three lacs strong in India, they began to yield up life like cowards. Forgetting their palanquins and carriages, they fled to the jungles without either boots or hats. Leaving their houses, they asked shelter from the meanest of men; and, abandoning their power, they fell into the hands of marauders."*

The British cause was, in May, 1857, generally considered the losing one; and even those friendly to it, were for the most part anxious, in native phraseology, "to keep their feet in both stirrups." There were, however, many brilliant exceptions—but for which, the sceptre of Queen Victoria would hardly now have much authority in Northern India. The nawab of Kurnaul was one of the first to identify himself with the British in the hour of their deepest humiliation.

Soon after the arrival of Mr. le Bas, the nawab came to him and said, "I have spent

a sleepless night in meditating on the state of affairs. I have decided to throw in my lot with your's. My sword, my purse, and my followers are at your disposal." And he redeemed his promise in many ways; among others, by raising an efficient troop of 100 horse, which he armed and equipped on the model of the Punjab mounted police corps. Mr. le Bas subsequently presented the nawab with the favourite horse whose speed had saved his master's life.† It is to be hoped the British government will be similarly mindful of the service rendered by their faithful ally.

Many providential preservations have been related: the painful task remains of describing, as far as possible, the fate of the Europeans who were unable to effect their escape from Delhi. Among the victims was Colonel Ripley. His dhooly-bearers refused to carry him on with the first party of Europeans; and Lieutenant Peile, his former preserver, having left even his own wife and child to try and save the regimental colours, the wounded officer remained at the mercy of the native bearers, whose services are at the best of times little to be depended on; for, being frequently compulsory, they naturally take the first opportunity of escaping to their homes. They did not, however, give up the colonel to the mutineers, but hid him near the ice-pits at the cantonments. Here he remained for some days, until he was found and killed by a sepoy. This, at least, was the account given to Surgeon Batson, during his wanderings among the jungles.‡ Colonel Ripley's sufferings must have been fearful. His isolation, and the state of utter helplessness in which he awaited the violent death which at length terminated his protracted anguish, renders him the subject of a quite peculiar interest. The little that is narrated of him conveys the idea of a thoroughly brave man. He had need of all his natural courage, and of the far higher strength imparted from Above, to enable him to resist the temptation to suicide; to which, later in the rebellion, others yielded, under (so far as human judgment can decide) much less temptation.

The mutineers found it very difficult to convince the king, and probably still more so to convince themselves, that European troops were not already marching on Delhi. It is positively asserted, on European

* *Parsee Reformer*: quoted in *Bombay Telegraph*.
—See *Times*, August 3rd, 1857.

† *Raikes' Revolt in N.W. Provinces*, pp. 91, 92.
‡ *Times*, August 18th, 1857.

authority, that "the king sent a sowaree camel* down to the Meerut road, to report how near the British troops were to his city. When the messenger returned, saying there were certainly no European soldiers within twenty miles of Delhi, the spirit of mutiny could restrain itself no longer."†

A native, writing to the vakeel of one of the Rajpootana chiefs, says that it was at ten at night two pultuns (regiments) arrived from Meerut, and fired a royal salute of twenty-one guns; but he adds, that "it was not until the following day, about three in the afternoon, that the empire was proclaimed under the King of Delhi, and the imperial flag hoisted at the Cutwallee, or chief police-station." But the authority thus proclaimed, was at first at least almost entirely nominal; and later testimony tends to confirm the statement of the native eyewitness previously quoted; who, writing on the 13th of May, says—"There is now no ruler in the city, and no order. Everyone has to defend his house. An attack was made on the great banker, Mungnee Ram; but he had assembled so many defenders, that after much fighting, the attack was unsuccessful. Other bankers' establishments were pillaged; hundreds of wealthy men have become beggars; hundreds of vagabonds have become men of mark. When an heir to the city arises, then the public market will be reopened, and order be restored. For these two days thousands have remained fasting; such of the shops as are left unpillaged, being closed. * * * Hundreds of corpses are lying under the magazine. The burners of the dead wander about to recognise the looked-for faces, and give them funeral rites. * * * The mutineers roam about the city, sacking it on every side. The post is stopped. The electric wires have been cut. There is not a European face to be seen. Where have they gone, and how many have been killed?" This last question has been but imperfectly answered. The following statement is compiled from the report furnished by the magistrate of Delhi, and other government returns:—

List of the European victims (not before named) who perished on the 11th of May, or at some unknown date, in Delhi.

Mr. Hutchinson, officiating magistrate and collector, after going to cantonments for assistance,

* Meaning a trooper on a camel.

† Statement of Delhi deputy-collector.—*Robertson's Narrative of the Siege of Delhi*, p. 12.

rejoined Mr. Fraser, and is believed to have been killed at the Calcutta gate, on duty.

Mr. A. Gallowsay, joint magistrate and deputy-collector, perished at the Cutchery, on duty.

The Rev. A. Hubbard, missionary. *Mr. L. Sandys*, the head-master of the Delhi mission school, and *Mr. I. Cock*, or *Koche*, were killed at the school or at the bank.

Mr. F. Taylor, principal of the Delhi college, and *Mr. R. Stewart*, the second master, are thought to have been in the magazine until the explosion, and then to have taken refuge with Moolvee Bakir Ali, who gave them up to the mutineers.

Mr. J. McNally, second clerk in the commissioner's office, was killed on his way thither. *Messrs. Montreaux and Fleming*, fifth and sixth clerks, perished, but the particulars of their death are not known.

Mr. Beresford, the manager of the Delhi bank, would not quit his post, though warned by his servants; he was murdered there with his wife and three young children, and the money seized on by the mob. *Mr. Churcher*, the deputy-manager, likewise perished.

Mr. Dalton, inspector of post-offices, and *Mr. C. Bayley*, the deputy-postmaster, were cut down at their post.

Sergeant Edwards, of the ordnance department, perished at the magazine on duty; and *Sergeant Hoyle* is supposed to have been killed on his way thither.

Mr. T. Corbett, of the medical department, was on a visit to *Mr. McNally*; and he also perished on the 11th of May.

Mr. T. W. Collins fled to the Cutchery, and was killed there; his wife and three children were murdered in the college compound, but on what day is not known.

Mr. Staines, the head-clerk of the treasury office, and two youths of the same name, were killed, the former at the Cutchery, and the latter at Deriagunge.

Mr. E. Staines, draftsman, railway department, also fell in Delhi.

Mrs. Thompson, the widow of a Baptist missionary, with her two daughters, and a *Mrs. Hunt*, were killed in the city.

Mr. G. White, head-clerk of the political agency office, was murdered in Delhi, but on what day is not known.

Sergeant Dennis, of the canal department, with his wife, his son, and *Mrs. White*, were killed at his house on the canal banks.

Mr. J. Rennell, pensioner, his wife, two daughters and his son-in-law, and *Mr. G. Skinner*, were massacred in the city, but the date of the latter crime has not been ascertained.

Sergeant Foulan, of the public works' department, and *Mr. Thomas*, agent of the Inland Transit Company, and an Italian showman and his wife, named *Georselli*, engaged in exhibiting wax-work figures, were massacred near the Hindun river.

Three persons surnamed *George*—one a youth who had received pay from the King of Delhi for some service not known—were massacred in Delhi; as was also a Portuguese music-master, named *Perez*, and a *Mr. O'Brien*.

Father Zacharias, a Roman Catholic priest, was murdered in the city.

Mrs. (Major) Foster, and her sister, *Mrs. Fuller*, endeavoured to escape, and got "into the city ditch"

(probably near the Mainguard). *Mrs. Foster* was unable to proceed any further, and her sister would not leave her; they are supposed to have been found and murdered there. *Mrs. Hickie* (described as a half-servant, probably a half-caste), in attendance on *Mrs. Foster*, was killed in the city.

Chummun Lall, the native assistant-surgeon, was one of the earliest victims of the outbreak.

Mr. Phillips, a pensioner, was killed in Delhi, but on what day is not known. A *Mr. Clarke*, a pensioner, occupied a two-story house in the Cashmere bazaar, with his wife and child, in conjunction with a *Mr. and Mrs. Morley*, and their three children, and was murdered there on the 11th.

In a letter signed "James Morley," and published when the public excitement was at its height, the following horrible particulars were related concerning the murder of *Mr. Clarke* and his family. The *Gazette* makes no mention of the circumstances; but the statement is important, as one of the exceptional ones made by a European eyewitness, of massacre aggravated by wanton cruelty.

Mr. Morley states, that after the blowing up of the magazine, he crept from his hiding-place in the city, and went to his own house, near the door of which he found a faithful old Hindoo [a dhoby, or washerman], sitting and crying bitterly. The Hindoo said that a large crowd, armed with sticks, swords, and spears, had entered the compound, pushed past *Mr. Clarke*, and began to "loot" or break everything. At length one man went up to *Mrs. Clarke*, "and touched her face, and spoke bad words to her." The enraged husband called the wretch by the most opprobrious epithet which can be applied to a Mohammedan (you pig!), and shot him dead; then, after discharging the contents of the second barrel into the body of another of the insurgents, he began fighting with the butt-end of his gun. The old Hindoo, knowing that the doom of both husband and wife was now sealed, ran off in search of his own mistress and her children; but they were already in the hands of the mob, who drove off the dhoby with blows, and threatened to kill him if he did not keep away. *Morley* went into the house with his servant, and found *Mr. and Mrs. Clarke* (she far advanced in pregnancy) lying side by side, and their little boy pinned to the wall, with a pool of blood at his feet. Turning away from this sickening sight, *Morley* rushed on towards the bath-room, at the door of which the old man stood wringing his hands. The fear of seeing his own wife as he had seen *Mrs. Clarke*, deterred him, he says,

from ascertaining for himself the fate of *Mrs. Morley* and his children. When the first shock was over, he put on a petticoat and veil belonging to the wife of the Hindoo, and succeeded, accompanied by the latter, in reaching Kurnaul in six days. In the course of the journey, he states himself to have seen "the body of a European woman lying shockingly mutilated by the road-side; and it made me sick to see a vulture come flying along with a shrill cry. I saw another body of one of our countrymen. It was that of a lad about sixteen. He had been evidently killed with the blow of a stick. I buried him; but it was but a shallow grave I could give him. I heard, on the road, of a party of Europeans being some distance ahead of me, and tried to overtake them, but could not." It is rather strange that the parties who preceded *Mr. Morley*, should neither have seen nor heard of the murdered man and woman; and it is still more strange, that this one European should narrate horrors so far exceeding any which the other fugitives encountered, or heard of. Stories of mutilation, together with violation of the most abominable description, were certainly published in the Indian and English papers of 1857; but they were almost exclusively founded on bazaar reports, or, what is much the same thing, the accounts of the lowest class of natives, who knew quite well, that the more highly coloured the narrative, the more attention it was likely to excite. Perhaps reporters of a higher class were not uninfluenced by a similar desire to gratify the morbid curiosity of the moment; for the atrocities alleged to have been committed, were such as only the most practised imagination could conceive, or the most incarnate fiends have perpetrated. It should be remembered, that so far as indignities to Englishwomen were concerned, the least aggravated of the alleged offences would have cost the high-caste, or twice-born Hindoos, whether Brahmin or Rajpoot, the irremediable forfeiture of caste. Besides, the class of crime is one utterly opposed to their character and habits, and scarcely less so to that of the Goojurs, who, in fact, had no passion either of lust or revenge to indulge—nothing but an absorbing love of loot, which might tempt them to rob a lady of the cherished wedding-ring, but not to defile the purity of the sacred union it symbolised. With the Mohammedans the case may be different: but whatever we may think of

the unwarrantable license given by the Koran, it may be doubted whether the scenes recorded in the history of cities sacked in European warfare by nominally Christian conquerors, have not afforded sufficient evidence of lust and rapine to explain why we looked to hear of such things, almost as necessary incidents, in a calamity like that of Delhi. But happily for us, our foes were not a united body of soldiers; far from this, the great mass of the sepoys, and even of the escaped convicts, were a disorderly, panic-struck crew; and it was only the long interval of rest which elapsed while the authorities were making up their minds how to prepare for action, that taught the sepoys the value of the advantages which our superlative folly had given them, and the importance of their position in the eyes of their countrymen throughout India. At first their leading thought was, "let us eat and drink, for to-morrow we die;" and it was during this phase of their career that they broke open the gaol, and released some 500 convicts. Gradually a few of the more capable of the mutineers began to think that there was a chance for them, and that that chance lay in the extirpation of "the seed of the accursed Feringhee" from the land. Conscious of their own weakness, they naturally adopted a cowardly and merciless, but not vindictive or wantonly cruel policy. The Europeans slain on the 11th of May, or subsequently at an unknown date, have been enumerated. The following is the—

List of the Delhi victims killed on the 12th, 13th, and 16th of May.

Mr. T. Jones, of the collector's office, and Mr. T. Leonard, of the magistrate's office, with his wife, and two youths of the same, held out in the house which they occupied together near the Moree gate, until some time on the 12th, when they perished by the hands of the insurgents.

A much larger party defended themselves until the 13th, at Deriagunge, in a house belonging to the rajah of Bullubghur, but rented by a Mr. Aldwell. Here Mr. Nolan, one of the conductors of the ordnance department, was killed on the 12th by a grapeshot. On the 13th, a man named Azeezullah enticed the whole party from their retreat by saying that the king had sent him to fetch them safely to the palace. The Europeans, who were probably holding out in hopes of succour from Meerut, were deceived by the traitor, and were thus spared a longer period of sickening suspense, with despair as its climax. The official record states, that Mr. A. G. Aldwell, son of the gentleman who rented the house; Mr. F. Davies, third clerk of the commissioner's office; Mr. T. Davies, head-clerk of the agency office, and Miss J. Davies; Mr. J. B. Hanley, another agency clerk, with his wife and four of his family; Mr. Muckey, a Baptist mis-

sionary; Mrs. Wilson, and her son; Mrs. Nolan, and her six children; Mr. Settle, conductor of ordnance; Mrs. and Miss Settle; Mrs. Crowe, and her two daughters; Sergeants Connor, Hoyle, and Stewart, of the ordnance department, with a child belonging to the last; Mrs. Buckley, and her three children; Mrs. Prince; Mrs. Riley, and her son; Mrs. Ives, and Mrs. Foulun—were all slaughtered on the 13th, in a bullock-shed near the house.

After this horrible butchery, no Europeans were found in Delhi until the 16th; and on that day, a party who had taken refuge in the palace on the 11th, were now delivered up to the insurgents, and put to death. The native authority above quoted, describes the victims as having been tied to a tree and shot, after which the bodies were burned.

Mr. E. Roberts, head-master of the Delhi college, and his son, together with Mrs. S. S. Stewart, two Misses Stewart and their brother, are said to have been massacred "at the instigation of Zeenath Mahal." The two Misses Beresford; Mrs. Shaw, and her two children; Mrs. Glynn; Mrs. Scully; Mrs. Edwards, and her three children; Mrs. Molloy, the wife of the band-master of the 54th Native infantry, and her two sons; Mr. J. Smith, head-clerk of the Delhi magazine; Mrs. Corbett, and her child; Mrs. E. P. Staines; the two Misses Hunt, and their young brother; Mrs. Cochran; Mrs. and Miss Sheehan, government pensioners; Miss C. Staines, and Miss Louisa Ryley—are recorded as having been murdered, without any particulars being given of the attendant circumstances.*

The above statements are taken from the *Gazette*. A native gives the following somewhat different account of particulars which he describes himself as having actually witnessed:—"On the third day, the mutineers went back to the house [Mr. Aldwell's] near the mosque, where some Europeans had taken refuge. As they were without water, &c., for several days, they called for a subahdar and five others, and asked them to take their oaths that they would give them water and take them alive to the king; he might kill them if he liked. On this oath the Europeans came out: the mutineers placed water before them, and said, 'Lay down your arms, and then you get water.' They gave over two guns, all they had. The mutineers gave no water. They seized eleven children (among them infants), eight ladies, and eight gentlemen. They took them to the cattle-sheds. One lady, who seemed more self-possessed than the rest, observed that they were not taking them to the palace; they replied, they were taking them *via* Derya Gunje. Deponent says that he saw all this, and saw them placed in a row and shot. One woman entreated them to give her child water, though they might kill her. A sepoy took her child and dashed it on the ground. The people looked on in dismay, and feared for Delhi."†

An anonymous writer, who describes

* Second Supplement to the *London Gazette*, May 6th, 1858.

† Statement made to deputy-commissioner Farrington, of Jullundur, by three servants of Kaporthella rajah.—*Times*, August 3rd, 1857.

himself as having been in Delhi at the outbreak, but who does not state either the time or the manner of his own escape, writes—"Several Europeans, said to number forty-eight, were taken to the palace, or perhaps went there for protection. These were taken care of by the King of Delhi; but the sowars of the 3rd cavalry, whose thirst for European blood had not been quenched, rested not till they were all given up to them, when they murdered them one by one in cold blood." The narrator adds, that the troopers were said "to have pointed to their legs before they murdered their victims, and called attention to the marks of their manacles, asking if they were not justified in what they were doing."*

In a separate and evidently incorrect list, published in the same *Gazette* as that from which the above account has been framed, several names are given in addition to, or in mistake for, those already stated.† Among others, a "*Mrs. Morgan and her grand-child*" are said to have been among the victims of this most horrible butchery, in which maid and matron, the grandame and the babe, were alike mercilessly hewn down. It must, however, be remembered, that many put down in the official records as massacred at Delhi, were probably killed after escaping from the city.

We have not, and probably never shall have, any authentic statement of the number of Eurasians who perished at this period, nor of the amount of native life lost in the struggle between the citizens of Delhi and the ruthless insurgents. The mutineers, it is said, "asked the king either to give them two months' pay, or their daily rations. The king summoned all the shroffs and mahajuns (bankers and money-changers), telling them, if they did not meet the demand of the mutineers they would be murdered; on which the shroffs agreed to give them dhol rotce for twenty days; adding, they could not afford more. The mutineers replied—'We have determined to die; how can we eat dhol rotce for the few days we have to live in this world.'"[‡] The cavalry, consequently, received one rupee, and the infantry four annas a day. With every offensive weapon

Delhi was abundantly stocked. After the escape of Lieutenant Willoughby and his companions, the mutineers (according to a native news-writer previously quoted), "together with the low people of the city, entered the magazine compound and began to plunder weapons, accoutrements, gun-caps, &c. The 'loot' continued for three days; each sepoy took three or four muskets, and as many swords and bayonets as he could. The Classics filled their houses with fine blacksmiths' tools, weapons, and gun-caps, which they sell by degrees at the rate of two scers per rupee. In these successful days, the highest price of a musket was eight annas, or one shilling; however, the people feared to buy it: a fine English sword was dear for four annas, and one anna was too much for a good bayonet. Pouches and belts were so common, that the owners could not get anything for this booty of theirs."§ Lieutenant Willoughby and his companions had succeeded in destroying a portion of the stores in the Delhi arsenal; but abundance of shot and shell remained behind, and the cantonments afforded large stores of gunpowder. From native testimony we further learn, that "the Derya Gunje Bazaar was turned into an encampment for the mutineers. Shops were plundered in the Chandnee Chouk|| and Dierceba Bazaar. The shops were shut for five days. The king refused to go upon the throne. The mutineers assured him that a similar massacre had taken place up to Peshawur and down to Calcutta. He agreed, and commenced to give orders: went through the city, and told the people to open their shops. On the fifth day, notice was given that if any one concealed a European he would be destroyed. People disguised many, and sent them off; but many were killed that day, mostly by people of the city. A tailor concealed no less than five Europeans. * * * The mutineers say, when the army approaches they will fight, and that the Native troops with the army are sure to join them. Many mutineers who tried to get away with plunder were robbed; this has prevented many others from leaving."¶

This latter statement accords with a

* *Times*, July 14th, 1857.

† The same persons are given under different names: Koehe in one, is Cock in the other; Aldwell in one, is Aidwell in the other; with other mistakes of a similar character. Compare page 2220 with pages 2238 to 2241 of *Gazette*, May 6th, 1858.

‡ Statement of Hurdwar pilgrims, before quoted.

§ See *Times*, September 18th, 1857.

|| The principal street in Delhi.

¶ Statement made to deputy-commissioner Farrington, of Jullundur, by three servants of the rajah of Kaporthella.—*Times*, August 3rd, 1857.

prominent feature in the character of the Hindoos—namely, their strong attachment to their native village. All experienced magistrates know, that however great a crime a Hindoo may have committed, he will, sooner or later, risk even death for the sake of revisiting his early home. Their domestic affections are likewise very powerful; and, undoubtedly, the combination against us would have been far stronger, but for the temporarily successful attempts of many, and the unsuccessful attempts of many more, to escape to their wives and children from the vortex of destruction towards which they had been impelled. Hundreds, and probably thousands, remained in Delhi because their sole chance of life lay in combined resistance. The sepoys, as a body, felt that they would be held answerable for the slaughter at the "bullock-shed," and for atrocities which, there is every reason to believe, were never perpetrated by them; but which, in the words of an English officer, "were committed by the scum of the earth, that never comes forth but on such occasions of murder and rapine, whose existence most people are ignorant of."*

We know, however, that this scum exists even in England; the daily police reports give us occasional glimpses of it: those whose professional duties compel them to examine the records of our penal settlements (Norfolk Island for instance), see its most hideous aspect; while others who have witnessed the class which appears with the barricades in Paris, and disappears with them, can easily imagine the bloody vengeance a mass of released convicts would be likely to inflict on their foreign masters. Many of the sepoys, especially of the 3rd cavalry, would gladly have returned to their allegiance. Captain Craigie received earnest solicitations to this effect from men whom he knew to have been completely carried away by the current; but it was too late: they were taught to consider their doom sealed; there was for them no hope of escape, no mitigation of their sentence, the execution of which might tarry, but would never be voluntarily abandoned. A most horrible epoch of crime and suffering, pillage, destruction, bloodshed and starvation, had commenced for Delhi. The escaped Europeans shuddered as they thought of the probable fate of those they had left behind: but far more torturing were the apprehen-

sions of the natives who had accompanied the flight of their English mistresses and foster-children, not simply at the risk of their lives, but at the cost of forsaking their own husbands and families. So soon as they had seen the Europeans in safety, their natural yearnings became irresistible, and they persisted in returning to ascertain the fate of their relatives. A lady who arrived at Meerut on the evening of the 12th of May, with her husband and children, having, she writes, "come the whole distance with our own poor horses, only stopping day or night to bait for an hour or two here and there," and had since learned that her house had been burnt to the ground; adds—"Of all our poor servants we have not since been able to hear a word; four came with us; but of the rest we know nothing; and I have many fears as to what became of them, as, if all had been right, I feel sure that they would have followed us in some way, several of them having been with us ever since we came out. Our coachman and children's ayah (nurse) set off to Delhi three days ago, dressing themselves as beggars, in order to make some inquiries about their families. We begged them not to enter Delhi, and they promised not to do so. Should they do so they will be almost sure to be killed; they will return to us in a few days we hope."†

This melancholy chapter can hardly have a more soothing conclusion. The writer depicts herself lodged in the artillery school at Meerut, in a "centre strip" of a large arched building partitioned off with matting. It is night—her husband and children are in their beds, and the rain is pouring down "in plenty of places; but that is nothing." Afraid of being late for the post the next day, she sits writing to England; and it is after mentioning very briefly that she and her husband have "lost everything they had," that she expresses, at much greater length, her solicitude for the lives of her faithful household. The host of admirable letters written for home circles, but generously published to gratify the earnest longing of the British nation for Indian intelligence, do not furnish a more charming picture of the quiet courage and cheerfulness, under circumstances of peril and privation, which we proudly believe to characterise our countrywomen, than the one thus unconsciously afforded.

* *Diary of an Officer in Calcutta.*—*Times*, August 3rd, 1857.

† Letter from the wife of a Delhi officer.—*Times* September 3rd, 1857.

CHAPTER V.

UMBALLAH—KURNAUL—MEERUT—FEROZPOOR.—MAY, 1857.

UMBALLAH is a military station, fifty-five miles north of Kurnaul, 120 miles N.N.W. of Delhi, and 1,020 N.W. of Calcutta. The district known by this name was formerly in the possession of a Seik sirdar, but "has escheated to the East India Company in default of rightful heirs."* The large walled town of Umballah has a fort, under the walls of which lies the encamping-ground of the British troops. The actual force stationed here at the time of the outbreak, was as follows:—

Two troops of artillery. *Europeans*—12 commissioned officers, 19 sergeants, 207 rank and file. *Native*—2 havildars, 54 rank and file, and 15 sick of all ranks.

One regiment of H.M.'s dragoons, 9th lancers. *Europeans*—24 commissioned officers, 48 sergeants, 563 rank and file; 27 sick of all ranks.

One regiment of Native light cavalry. *Europeans*—14 commissioned officers, 2 sergeants. *Native*—11 commissioned officers, 25 havildars, 421 rank and file; 20 sick of all ranks.

The 5th and 60th regiments of Native infantry. 29 commissioned officers, 4 sergeants. *Native*—40 commissioned officers, 117 havildars, 2,116 rank and file; 43 sick of all ranks. Detachment of irregular cavalry. [No *European* officer.] *Native*—3 commissioned officers, 1 havildar, and 89 rank and file.†

Thus, at Umballah, there were, exclusive of the sick, about 2,290 Europeans to 2,819 Natives. Here, as at Meerut, the strength of the Europeans appears to have rendered them indifferent to the mutinous feeling exhibited in the conflagrations already noticed as occurring in March, April, and the opening days of May, 1857. The cause of the disaffection was notorious, and was nowhere more clearly evidenced than in the immediate circle of the commander-in-chief. The circumstances have not been made public; and, as they are of importance, they are given here in the words in which they were communicated to the author.

"In the commencement of 1857, each regiment of Native infantry received instructions to detach one smart officer, and a party of sepoy, to the school of instruction, for practice in the use of the Enfield rifle.

"The 36th Native infantry, at the time of

the issue of these instructions, composed part of the escort of the commander-in-chief. The quota furnished by this corps left General Anson's camp at Agra for the school of musketry at Umballah, commanded by a promising young officer, Lieutenant A. W. Craigie, since dead of wounds received in the encounter with the Joudpoor legion. The commander-in-chief continued his tour of inspection, and, after passing through Bareilly, arrived at Umballah in March. The detachment of the 36th came out to meet their regiment on its marching into the station; but were repulsed by their comrades, and by the Native officers of their regiment, and declared '*Hookah panee bund*' (excommunicated), in consequence of their having lost caste by the use of the polluted cartridges at the school. The men explained to their regiment that there was nothing polluting in the cartridges, and nothing which any Hindoo or Mussulman could object to. The regiment was deaf to their explanations, and treated them as outcasts. The unhappy men then repaired to their officer, Lieutenant Craigie, and informed him of the fact. Wringing their hands, and with tears in their eyes, they described their miserable state. They said that they were convinced of the purity of the cartridges, but that they were ruined for ever, as their families would refuse to receive them after what had happened in the regiment.

"The circumstances were brought to the notice of the officers commanding the dépôt, who communicated with the officer commanding the 36th Native infantry. This officer, assembling the Native officers, stated to them the facts, as reported to him, and censured them severely for permitting such unwarrantable treatment to the men. The Native officers replied, that there was no substance in the complaint, and that the refusal to eat, or smoke the hookah, with the men of the dépôt, had been simply a jest! Here, unfortunately, the matter was permitted to rest; and such was the prevailing conviction in the minds of the natives on

* Thornton's *Gazetteer*; and Prinsep's *Life of Runjeet Sing*, p. 215.

† Parl. Papers (Commons), 9th February, 1858; pp. 4, 5.

this question, that the unhappy detachment of the 36th Native infantry attending the school, were never acknowledged again by the regiment."

It was after this memorable warning, and in defiance of increasing incendiarism, that General Anson persisted in enforcing the use of the obnoxious cartridges. In fact, he fairly launched the sepoys on the stream of mutiny, and left them to drift on towards the engulfing vortex at their own time and discretion, while he went off "on a shooting excursion among the hills,"* no one knew exactly where; nor was the point of much importance until it became necessary to acquaint him of the massacres of Meerut and Delhi, and of the rapidity with which the Bengal army "was relieving itself of the benefit of his command."†

It appears that the Umballah regiments were with difficulty restrained from following out the course taken at Meerut. No official account has been published of the Umballah *émeute*; but private letters show that the authorities acted with considerable energy and discretion. An officer of the Lancers, writing on the 14th, gives the following description of the scenes in which he took part.

"Last Sunday, after we had returned from church and just finished our breakfast, at about 10 A.M., the alarm sounded for the regiment to turn out. The men were lying in the barracks undressed, and most of them asleep; but in an almost incredibly short time they were all on parade, mounted, and fully equipped; the artillery were ready nearly as soon. When on the parade-ground, we found that the 60th Native infantry had mutinied, and turned out with their arms; but we could not go down, because they had their officers prisoners, and threatened to shoot them if we came down; but that if we did not they would return quietly. If our men had had the chance to go in at them, they would have made short work of them, they are so enraged at having had so much night-work lately, in consequence of the fires, which are all attributed to the sepoys. They (*i.e.*, our men) only get about two nights a-week in bed. At twelve o'clock (noon) we were turned out again in consequence of the 6th Native infantry having turned out; but we were again disappointed. They appeared to think us too attentive, and returned to their barracks. For the last two nights the wives of married officers are sent down to the canteen for better security. An officer remains at the Mainguard all night, and an artillery officer with the guns, which are loaded; and ammunition is served out every hour. Two patrols go out every hour; and all is alert. Yesterday (May 13th), three companies of the 75th (H.M.) marched up from Kussowlee. They started at noon

on Tuesday, and arrived at about 2 P.M. on Wednesday. The distance is forty-eight miles—a wonderful march under an Indian sun, when the thermometer was 92° to 94° in the shade: there was not a single straggler."

A young civilian, attached to the Punjab district, who also witnessed the incipient mutiny at Umballah, and claims to have been the first to convey the tidings of the general revolt to the commander-in-chief, thus narrates what he saw and did:—

"On Monday we received the painful news of what was going on at Delhi. It was heartrending to know that our countrymen and countrywomen were actually being murdered at the very moment we received the intelligence. The news came in by electric telegraph. . . . Towards afternoon we received another message, mentioning the names of some of the unfortunates.

"On Tuesday came the news from Meerut, which took longer in coming, as it had to come by post instead of telegraph. But it was not a quiet night that we passed at Umballah. We had intelligence, which, thank God, turned out to be false, that on this night all the natives were to rise. Though three miles from cantonments, we were best off at the civil lines, as we had only our treasury guard of about fifty men of the 5th Native infantry to dread, while we had 200 faithful Sikhs to back us up. We patrolled the city all night, and the people in the cantonments kept a sharp look-out. All was quiet. But it seemed to us, in our excitement, a quiet of ill omen.

"On Monday, the commander-in-chief, who was up at Simla, about ninety miles from Umballah, was written to, to send down troops at once from the hills, where three regiments of Europeans are stationed.

"On Tuesday, the first of the Delhi fugitives came creeping in; and on Wednesday evening there came a letter from a small band of misérables, who were collected at Kurnaul (eighty miles from Delhi, whence they had escaped), asking for aid. This letter, and another calling for immediate assistance in Europeans, I volunteered to take up to the commander-in-chief at Simla, and, after a hot ride through the heat of the day, and the best part of the night, I reached the commander-in-chief at about half-past four in the morning of Thursday. I turned him out of bed; they held a council of war, and at half-past ten, we were all riding back again. On reaching the foot of the hills, I was knocked up—the sun, and want of sleep for two nights, added to a ride of 130 miles, having been too much for me. By this time the last European had left the hills, and on Sunday morning all were cantoned in Umballah. I reached Umballah myself on Saturday."‡

The first telegram referred to in the above letter, has been given in the preceding chapter; the second is undated, and appears to have been sent by the members of the telegraph establishment on their private responsibility, just before taking flight.

Second (or third) Telegram from Delhi (May 11th).

"We must leave office. All the bungalows are

* Mead's *Sepoy Revolt*, p. 73.

† *The Bengal Mutiny*. Blackwood's *Edinburgh Magazine*, 1858; p. 387.

‡ *Times*, September 18th, 1857.

burning down by the sepoys from Meerut. They came in this morning—we are off—dant—

"To-day Mr. C. Todd is dead, I think. He went out this morning, and has not returned yet. We heard that nine Europeans were killed. Good-bye."

This intelligence was promptly conveyed from the Umballah office to the neighbouring station at Dehra, and was sent on from thence by Major-general Sir Henry Barnard, the officer in command of the Sirhind division, to the adjutant-general at Simla, with the following comment thereon:—

"As Delhi has a large magazine, and only Native troops in cantonments there, the intelligence may be of importance. * * * Philloor, also, with a large magazine, has only Native troops, who have been in a state of disorganisation. As it is possible this may be a combined movement, I have sent private despatches to the officers in command in the hills, to hold their men ready (quietly) to move at the shortest notice. I have also sent on to Jullundur and Philloor; and should the officer in command at Philloor be under any apprehension, I have authorised him to apply to Jullundur by telegraph for assistance. * * * It may be possible that the message is greatly exaggerated; but coming at the present crisis, and from the authority of Europeans attached to the telegraph, I have deemed precaution desirable, and that his excellency should be made acquainted with the circumstances without delay. I send by my aide-de-camp, Captain Barnard."*

Whether Captain Barnard or the young civilian had the honour of first communicating the above intelligence to General Anson, does not appear; but the adjutant-general (Colonel Chester), on the 14th of May, forwarded it to the secretary to the government at Calcutta, with a very brief notice of the state of affairs at Umballah, and the measures initiated by the commander-in-chief.

After recapitulating the Meerut and Delhi intelligence, Colonel Chester adds—

"Circumstances have also taken place at Umballah which render it impossible to rely on the perfect fidelity of the 5th and 60th regiments of N. I. His excellency, therefore, has made the following arrangements to meet the existing state of affairs:—

"The 75th foot marched yesterday from Kusowlee for Umballah, which place they will reach

to-morrow morning. The 1st European fusiliers from Dughshale have been ordered to follow the 75th foot with all practicable expedition. The 2nd European fusiliers are held in readiness to move at the shortest notice. The Sirmoor battalion has been ordered from Dehra to Meerut. Two companies of the 8th foot from Jullundur have been ordered to proceed from Lahore to Govindghur. The officer commanding at Ferozepoor has been ordered to place a detachment of European troops in charge of the magazine.

"General Anson, I am to add, is anxiously looking for further intelligence, which will enable him to decide on the advisability of his at once moving down to Umballah."†

The above despatch took a long time in reaching its destination; for it is asserted that, for three weeks after the Meerut mutiny, no direct intelligence of the movements of the commander-in-chief was received at Calcutta.‡ Before those three weeks had elapsed, General Anson was dead. The interval preceding his demise must have been one of intense mental suffering. His fatal misconception of the temper of the Bengal army, ceased just at the moment when the policy founded on it was in full bearing. Sir John Lawrence,§ and Lieutenant-governor Colvin, addressed such cogent arguments to him on the subject, warning him that the irregulars would follow the example of the regular corps, that the commander-in-chief followed up the proclamation issued by him on the 14th of May (withdrawing the cartridges), with another and far stronger one; in which, after expressing his hope that the former order would have calmed the prevailing excitement, he confesses his mistake. The general order of the 19th contains the following singular admissions:—

"He [General Anson] still perceives that the very name of the new cartridges causes agitation; and he has been informed, that some of those sepoys who entertain the strongest attachment and loyalty to government, and are ready at any moment to obey its orders, would still be apprehensive that their families would not believe that they were not in some way or other contaminated by its use. * * * His excellency, therefore, has determined that the new cartridge shall be discontinued. He announces this to the Native army, in the full confidence that all will

* Further Papers on the Mutiny (No. 3), p. 6.

† *Ibid.*, p. 5.

‡ Mead's *Sepoy Revolt*, p. 73. This assertion is partially corroborated by a telegram dated "Calcutta, May 26th, 1857," in which the Supreme gov.

ernment asks, whether, "notwithstanding the failure of the hawk and telegraph, some means might not be devised of communicating with the commander-in-chief."—Appendix to Parl. Papers on Mutiny, p. 320.

§ Appendix to Parl. Papers on Mutiny, p. 373.

now perform their duty free from anxiety and care, and be prepared to stand and shed the last drop of their blood, as they have formerly done, by the side of the British troops, and in defence of their country."

This climax is simply absurd: the contest now unhappily commenced had none of the elements of defensive warfare in it, but involved the most revolting attributes of civil strife. Mohammedans and Hindoos, if true to their salt, were called on to fight, in support of Christian supremacy, against their co-religionists—it might be, against their own relatives. The general order, however, need not be discussed: before it could be promulgated, the process of dissolution of the Bengal army was well-nigh complete—the vitality, the coherence, quite extinct.

General Anson, grievously as he had erred, was both brave and energetic. His energy and his ignorance, together with his utter inexperience in military life, had combined in producing the present state of affairs. His fatal innovations were such as Generals Hewitt and Wilson would not have attempted; but had he been at Meerut on the 10th, the mutineers would probably never have reached Delhi: as it was, he no sooner learned the fate of the city, than he earnestly desired to press forward for its immediate recapture. He reached Umballah on the 15th of May. A council of war was held, composed of five members, none of whom lived to see the capture of Delhi. Generals Anson and Burnard, Brigadier Halifax, and Colonel Mowatt, died of cholera; Colonel Chester, the adjutant, was killed in action. Anson proposed to march on to Delhi at once, without waiting for reinforcements. "The guns might follow, he thought; but it was pointed out to him that there was no commissariat, no camels, not a day's allowance of provisions for troops in the field;" and, to crown the whole, not a single medicine-chest available.

"We cannot move at present," General Anson himself says, in an undated telegram addressed to the governor-general,

* Neither the date of the despatch nor of the receipt of this telegram is given in the Appendix to Parl. Papers on Mutiny, p. 372.

† Despatch to Major-general Hewitt.—Further Papers (No. 3), pp. 19, 20.

‡ *Times*, 25th September, 1857. It is worthy of remark, that on the 26th ult., the day previous to General Anson's death, and again on the following

"for want of tents and carriage; it would destroy Europeans to march without both, and we have no men to spare. I see the risk of going to Delhi with such small means as we have—perhaps 2,500 Europeans; for should they suffer any loss, it would be serious, having nothing more to depend upon in the North-West Provinces; but it must be done."*

On the 23rd, he writes from Umballah, that he proposes advancing towards Delhi from Kurnaul on the 1st of June, and hopes to be joined by reinforcements (including 120 artillerymen, to work the small siege-train already on the road from Loodiana) from Meerut, under General Hewitt, at Bhagput on the 5th. He adds—"It is reported here that a detachment of the mutineers, with two guns, are posted on the Meerut side of the river. They should be captured, and no mercy must be shown to the mutineers."†

At half-past two on the morning of the 27th, General Anson died of cholera at Kurnaul,‡ a few hours after his first seizure, and was buried that same evening at sunset. One of the Delhi fugitives who was at Kurnaul at the time, says, "I do not know why it was, but he was laid in his grave without a military honour." Lieutenant-governor Colvin, in the telegram reporting this intelligence to the Supreme government, mentions that a copy of the order withdrawing all new cartridges came by the same express. Mr. Colvin adds—"The issue of an immediate nomination to the command-in-chief of the army proceeding fast on Delhi, under General Anson's orders, is solicited. Indian ability and experience will be very valuable; but time is before all; every hour is precious."§

The government announcement of the death of the commander-in-chief, declares that, "in General Anson, the army has lost a commander than whom none was ever more earnest and indefatigable in labouring to improve the condition, extend the comforts, and increase the efficiency of every branch of the service committed to his charge."||

An official notice of the death of a leading personage generally follows the rule of

day, when the event took place, there was a report in the bazaars here that the general had died either by assassination or a stroke of the sun, according to different accounts. The notion had taken a strong hold of the natives, and was generally entertained by them.—*Bengal Hurkaru*, June 5th.

§ Appendix to Parl. Papers on Mutiny, p. 363.

|| Gen. Order, 5th June, 1857.—*London Gazette*.

tombstone inscriptions, and describes "not what he was, but what he should have been." Yet the praise, so far as the European branch of the service is concerned, was probably not undeserved; for, in reviewing the various regiments, he is described by the officers as having been keenly alive to their discipline; and even as giving the example of diligent application to the study of native languages—a mark of no small energy in a man who was some fifty-five years of age when he first set foot in India. Whatever progress he made in the native languages, it is certain he manifested a most lamentable ignorance of the native character; and there were probably few men in India in May, 1857, who, however well they individually liked the commander-in-chief, did not agree with Major-general Tucker, that "both the results of his (General Anson's) command and his antecedents, are in proof that a vast weight of responsibility rests upon those who appointed to this important command a general so utterly inexperienced in practical military affairs. * * * I venture to say," Major-general Tucker adds, "it will be found, on inquiry, that he was quite unequal to the occasion; and painful as it is to point to the weakness of one who was talented, amiable, and gentlemanly, it is yet due to the country, and to those whose sons and daughters, and kith and kin, are being sacrificed in India, to expose the favouritism which in high places has led to many such appointments."*

Major-general Tucker writes, it must be recollected, as one whose past position under General Anson, as adjutant-general, entitles his opinion to consideration. The Indian correspondence of the period confirms his observations; but gives further, and certainly exaggerated, views of the late commander-in-chief's notorious unfitness. One writer, apparently an Indian official of a certain rank, asserts—"General Anson's death saved him from assassination. He was hated by the troops, and they burnt his tents. He was quite unfitted for his post. Horses and gaming appear to have been his pursuits; and, as a gentleman said, 'No court pet flunky ought to come to India.' Every one gave a sigh of relief when they heard he was gone. Pat Grant is come over from Madras, to head the army till orders come from England. Henry Lawrence (also a brigadier-general) has been

named for the appointment, but he cannot be spared from Oude."†

The term "court pet flunky" is not fairly applicable to the officer in question; but it is quoted here because expressions such as these, emanating from one of the masters of India, exercise an influence in the native mind, the effect of which can hardly be over-estimated. Englishmen at the dinner-table are not famed for diplomatic reserve: it follows that, through the servants in attendance (as well as in many other ways), the quick-witted natives are enabled to form a pretty clear notion of the views of the *sahib logue* (literally *master-people*) regarding their chief functionaries. Thus we know, on the authority of Mr. Raikes, that in February, 1857, a native journal had the audacity to declare—"Now is the time for India to rise, with a governor-general who has had no experience of public affairs in this country, and a commander-in-chief who has had no experience of war in any country."‡

This is nearly correct. General Anson (son of the first Viscount Anson, and brother of the first Earl of Lichfield) had been a commissioned officer in the 3rd or Scots fusilier guards, with which regiment he served at the battle of Waterloo, in the baggage guard, being then eighteen years of age. Ten years later he was placed on half pay as a lieutenant-colonel by brevet.

The *Times* describes his election to parliament, as member for Great Yarmouth, in 1818, and his acceptance of the Chiltern Hundreds in 1853, on his departure for Madras. The local rank of general was conferred on him in 1855; and in December, 1856, he was nominated to the colonelcy of the 55th regiment of foot. His occupation as Clerk of the Ordnance (from 1846 to 1852) has been already adverted to; and he had previously filled the office of principal Storekeeper of the Ordnance, under the administration of Viscount Melbourne. "He was by hereditary descent, and by personal conviction, a liberal in politics, and invariably sided with the whig leaders." This sentence probably explains why her majesty's ministers considered Colonel Anson eligible for one of the most lucrative appointments in their gift, despite the manifest impropriety of confiding the charge of a large army to an officer who had never commanded a regiment; and the conclud-

* Letter of Major-general Tucker to the editor of the *Times*, July 19th, 1857.

† *Daily News*, August 5th, 1857.

‡ Raikes, p. 173.

ing statement of the obituary, that Colonel Anson "was a zealous patron of the turf,"* shows why the far-away appointment was eligible to a most popular man about town. Only, had Sir Charles Napier's words been deemed worth attention, the government would have felt that a character of an altogether different type was needed to influence, by precept and example, European officers in India, where gentlemanly vices (and especially gaming, and the pleasures of the table) are peculiarly seductive, as enlivening the monotony of military routine, in a most enervating climate, during a period of profound peace. As to the Native army, it is the less to be wondered at that utter inexperience was not deemed a disqualification for its command; because the authorities, if they thought of it at all, viewed it as a huge, clumsy, old-fashioned, but very safe machine, not quite fitted for the requirements of the times, but altogether too great an affair to be meddled with by persons entrusted with political powers of certainly very precarious, and possibly ephemeral, existence.

So the army was supplemented with "irregular" corps, which in many points resembled what the old regiments had been in, and long after, the days of Clive. These additions complicated the working of the original machine, the constructors of which had long ago died, and, it would seem, their plans with them; for when the whole concern was suddenly found to be dropping in pieces, the chief engineer proved utterly incapable of pointing out, much less of counteracting, the cause of the mischief.

The *Friend of India*, the best known of Indian journals, in a leader published on

* *Times*, July 14th, 1857.

† In the year 1857, the *Times*, in alluding to the manner in which this sum had been diverted from its original destination, remarked—"We should be glad if the widows and families of those persons who have distinguished themselves in war, in diplomacy, or in administration, could be provided for from some other fund; for certainly the sum of £1,200 a-year is no great amount for such a country as England to expend upon the relief of science and literature in distress." To the widow of Mr. Gilbert A'Beckett a pension of £100 per annum was allotted, "in consideration of the literary merits of her husband, also of the eminent public services rendered by him in his capacity of a police magistrate in the metropolis, and of the destitute circumstances in which his widow and their children are now placed."—(*Times*, July 9th, 1857). In this case, it would appear that a conjunction of reasons are deemed necessary to justify the pension of a single hundred a-year to the widow of a distinguished *littérateur*. A pension of £70 to the widow

the 14th of May, 1857 (while General Anson was yet alive), says—

"An army has often been likened to a machine; and we wish the comparison were thoroughly accepted. When your engine goes wrong, it is found needful to have at hand a man who understands every portion of it. Being able to place his hand on the defective spot, he knows exactly what is required in the way of reparation, and how to set about the work. But we never, except by chance, have a capable engineer in the person of the exalted official who has to guide the vast and powerful mechanism that holds the soil and collects the revenues of India. It is hard to divine in most cases the cause of his appointment—harder still to justify the fact of it. It is a miserable thing to say that the state gains by the idleness of a commander-in-chief; and yet, in most cases, all ranks of the community would join in wishing that he would fold his hands, and only open them to clutch what ought to be the recompense of zeal, intellect, and energy."

It is asserted, that immediately before his seizure, General Anson, finding that his utter inexperience in warfare disqualified him for conducting the attack on Delhi, had formally communicated to General Barnard, through the adjutant-general, the intention to resign the command of the army.

One other circumstance remains to be noticed, in illustration of the ill-advised "favouritism" which Major-general Tucker denounces as exercising so baneful an influence in India. About the same time, when the "good-service pension" of £100 a-year was meted out to the gallant Havelock, an intimation appeared that the widow of General Anson had, in addition to the pension on account of her late husband's rank in the service, been granted a stipend of £200 a-year out of the annual sum of £1,200 granted by parliament, and known as the "Literary Fund."†

of Hugh Millar, is likewise accorded on the double ground of his eminent literary services and her poverty. In 1858, a pension of £100 per annum was allotted from the same fund to the widow of Douglas Jerrold; £50 per annum to each of the two Miss Landers, "in consideration of the eminent services of their father, the late Mr. John Lander, who died from the effects of the climate while exploring the river Niger, and of the straitened circumstances in which they are placed at his decease;" £40 per annum to the daughter of James Hogg, the Ettrick Shepherd; and £50 to the aged widow of the late Dr. Dick, the author of the *Christian Philosopher* and other admirable works, "in consideration of the merits of her late husband as a moral and theological writer, and of the straitened circumstances in which she is now placed." Then follows—£200 per annum to the Hon. Isabella Elizabeth Annabella Anson, in consideration of the services of her husband, the late General the Hon. George Anson; and £200 per annum to Dame Isabella Letitia Barnard, in consideration of the services of her husband, the

It seems to be an inevitable necessity that, save in some rare cases, the rank of those who serve, rather than the value of the service rendered, is to be the rule of the reward. The East India Company have been accused of carrying this principle to an extreme, by their rigid adherence to the seniority system; but it would be hard to bring against them any more direct instance (so far as the Europeans are concerned) of robbing poor Peter to pay rich Paul than that above noticed.

The Indian crisis, however, for the moment, laid favouritism, patronage, and seniority together on the shelf, and the question was earnestly and eagerly discussed, "Who is the fittest man to command the forces?" The emergency was far greater than that which had previously issued in the sending out of General Napier; but the result was partially the same; for as the war was ended before Sir Charles reached the scene of action, so, in 1857, the news of the recapture of Delhi greeted Sir Colin Campbell on his arrival at Calcutta. The prediction of Lieutenant-governor Colvin had, in fact, been fulfilled—"John Lawrence and his Sikhs had saved India."*

Pending the decision of the Calcutta government regarding the vacant position of commander-in-chief, the command devolved on Major-general Barnard, who was himself summoned, by a telegraph, from a sick bed to receive the last instructions of General Anson regarding the intended march on Delhi. New delays are said to have arisen, in consequence of the detention of Brigadier Archdale Wilson, and the reinforcements expected from Meerut, by the orders of Mr. Greathed; so that General Barnard, disappointed of the artillery and gunners which were to have joined the Delhi column according to General Anson's arrangements, was compelled to send elephants to Meerut to bring on the troops from thence.† The authorities at that unfortunate cantonment had not yet recovered from the paralytic panic which had seized them on the 10th. In fact, they had had a new shock; for a fresh mutiny had broken out among a body of 600 Native sappers and miners, who had been sent

in from Roorkee to repair and strengthen the Meerut station. They arrived on the 15th of May. On the 16th about 400 of them rose in a body, and after murdering their commandant (Captain Fraser), they made off towards Delhi, but being pursued by two squadrons of the carabineers, were overtaken about six miles off, and forty-seven of them slain. The remainder continued their flight. One of the carabineers was killed, and two or three wounded, including Colonel Hogge, an active and energetic officer, who led the pursuit, and received a ball in his thigh, which unfortunately laid him up at a time when his services could be ill-spared. The remaining two companies were disarmed, and continued perfectly quiet.

Two days later, a sapper detachment, about 300 strong, mutinied at Roorkee. A company had been detached to join the commander-in-chief's column, and had got half-way to Seharunpore, when tidings reached it of the collision at Meerut, in which Captain Fraser lost his life. It would advance no farther, but marched back to the cantonment at Roorkee, bringing the European officers, and treating them personally with respect. When the men returned, Lieutenants Drummond, Bingham, and Fulford, had already left cantonments at the earnest request of the Native officers, and had been escorted to the college by them; and a body of old sepoy's resolutely resisted the attempts of a small party among the men, who urged the massacre of the Europeans.‡

On the 13th, intelligence reached Meerut that *Sirdhana*, formerly the chief place of the Begum Sumroo's jaghire, had been devastated by the villagers, and that the nuns and children of the convent there were actually in a state of siege. The postmaster at Meerut, having female relations at *Sirdhana*, asked for a small escort to go to their relief. The authorities replied, that not a single European soldier could be spared from the station, but that four Native troopers would be allowed to accompany him. Even these he could not get; but he armed three or four of his office people, started off at half-past four on the Thursday

late Major-general Sir H. W. Barnard, K.C.B. (*Times*, July 28th, 1858). In the two last-named cases, the allusion to "straitened circumstances" is omitted. Yet it is the only conceivable excuse for placing these two ladies on the Literary Fund. In the case of Mrs. Dick and others, it would surely have been more gracious to have accorded their slender pittance as a token of public respect

to the merits of the departed, and not as a charitable dole, their claim to which needed to be eked out by poverty.

* *Raikes' Revolt in the N. W. Provinces.*

† See *Memoir of General Barnard's Services*; by a near connexion.—*Times*, December 25th, 1857.

‡ Bombay correspondent: *Daily News*, July 16th, 1857.

evening, and returned a little after seven, with five females and girls. The nuns would not abandon the children, but had entreated him to try and send them some help. The Rev. Mr. Smythe, who was at Meerut at the time, says—"The postmaster tried all he could to get a guard to escort them to this station, but did not succeed; and yesterday morning (the 15th), having given up the idea of procuring a guard from the military authorities, he went round, and by speaking to some gentlemen, got about fifteen persons to volunteer their services to go and rescue the poor nuns and children from Sirdhana; and, I am happy to say, they succeeded in their charitable errand without any one having been injured."*

The authorities subsequently took care to publish the rescue of the defenceless women and children, but were discreetly silent as to the individual gallantry by which it had been accomplished. Neither did they mention an offer made, according to the Rev. Mr. Rotton, on the evening of the mutiny, by an officer of the carabineers, to pursue the fugitives, but "declined by the general commanding the Meerut division."†

Mr. Raikes also, in describing the course of events at Agra, records "the indignation with which, on Thursday evening, we learned that the mutineers, after firing the station, murdering our countrymen, women, and children, and breaking the gaol, had been permitted to retire quietly on Delhi, taking their barbers, water-carriers, bag and baggage, just as if they had been on an ordinary march:" and adds, "I now know that Major Rosser, of H.M.'s 6th carabineers, asked permission to follow them with cavalry and guns. If he had been allowed to do so, it is quite possible, and indeed probable, that the mutiny, for the present at least, might have been crushed."‡ The Calcutta government were not insensible of the supineness indulged in at Meerut; for the governor-

general in council, in a telegram dated June 1st, 1857, entreated Mr. Colvin to endeavour "to keep up communication with the south;" adding, "this, like everything else, has been culpably neglected at Meerut."§

Ferozpoor.—The next outbreak after that at Delhi, occurred at Ferozpoor, an important city, which long formed our frontier station in the north-west, and which, in May, 1857, contained an intrenched magazine of the largest class, filled with military stores scarcely inferior in amount to those in the arsenal of Fort William. Ferozpoor commands one high road from Lahore to Delhi, as Umritsir does the other.

The troops stationed there consisted of H.M.'s 61st foot, about 1,000 strong; two companies of artillery, composed of a nearly equal number of Europeans, about 300 in all; the 10th Native light cavalry, under 500 men; and the 45th and 57th Native infantry. Brigadier Innes|| assumed the command at Ferozpoor on the 11th of May; on the 12th, he learned the events which had occurred at Meerut; and, on the following morning, he ordered a general parade, with the view of ascertaining the temper of the troops; which, on reviewing them, he thought "haughty." At noon, information arrived of the occupation of Delhi (seventy-three miles distant) by the rebels. The intrenchments were at this time held by a company of the 57th Native infantry; but a detachment of H.M.'s 61st, under Major Redmond, was immediately dispatched thither. The brigadier likewise resolved "to move the Native troops out of cantonments;" and the European artillery, with twelve guns, was ordered down, "to overawe or destroy the two Native corps"—that is, of infantry; the cavalry being considered perfectly reliable, and entrusted with the care of the new arsenal, its magazine, and contents. The preliminary arrangements were completed by five o'clock; and

mit the greatest outrages in consequence of this simple fact."—(p. 4.) It is, however, alleged that General Hewitt cannot justly be held responsible for this tardiness, because although he was general of the Meerut division, Brigadier Wilson was in command of the station; and it is urged, that of the proceedings of the latter officer during the memorable night of the outbreak, not one word, good, bad, or indifferent, is on record.

‡ *Revolt in the N.W. Provinces*, p. 13.

§ Appendix to Papers on Mutiny, p. 355.

|| Printed "James" in Further Papers on Mutiny (No. 3, p. 8), by one of the unaccountable blunders with which the Indian and Colonial Blue Books abound.

* Letters of Rev. Mr. Smythe, dated 16th and 17th May, 1857.

† The Chaplain's *Narrative of the Siege of Delhi*, p. 7. Mr. Rotton (whose book is far more moderate in tone than might have been expected from the extract from his sermon given in Colonel Smythe's *Narrative*, and quoted at p. 154) says, that "in truth, our military authorities were paralysed. No one knew what was best to do, and nothing accordingly was done. The rebels had it all their own way." Mr Rotton also adverts to the "one thing which impressed every one—the delay in leading the troops from the grand parade-ground to the scene of mutiny and bloodshed. The native soldiery, and the fellows of baser sort in the bazars, had ample time to com-

the Native troops being assembled on the parade-ground at that hour, the brigadier formed them up in quarter-distance columns, addressed them, and ordered the two regiments to move off in contrary directions. Both obeyed without hesitation; but the road the 45th were directed to take to the place where they were to encamp, lay close to the intrenched camp; on reaching which, the men broke into open mutiny, loaded their muskets, and, heedless of the entreaties of their officers, ran to the north-west bastion of the magazine, and stood still, apparently hesitating what to do next. At this moment, scaling-ladders were thrown out to them by the company of the 57th, who had been left there to avoid raising the suspicions of their comrades before the parade. The 45th commenced climbing the parapet; and some 300 of them having succeeded in making their way over, attacked a company of the 61st, which was hurriedly drawn up to receive them. Major Redmond was wounded in repulsing the mutineers, who made a second attempt; but, being again defeated, broke up, and dispersed themselves through the bazaars and cantonments. A body of about 150 men continued to obey Colonel Liptrap and their other officers, and encamped in the place pointed out to them; the rest were deaf to threats and entreaties. Instead of acting on the offensive, and immediately following the mutineers, Brigadier Innes, according to his report, assumed an exclusively defensive attitude. He desired the Europeans to leave the cantonments, and come into the barracks; and suffered a portion of H.M.'s 61st to remain in their lines, while the mutineers, having carried their dead to the Mohammedan burying-ground, returned in small bodies to the cantonments, and burned the church, Roman Catholic chapel, two vacant hospitals, the mess-house of the 61st, and sixteen bungalows. Two merchants (Messrs. Coates and Hughes) positively refused to abandon their houses, and, collecting their servants, successfully defended themselves; Mr. Hughes' son, a mere boy, shooting one of the assailants. The fact of there being "20,000 barrels of gunpowder in the arsenal"* to care for, is alleged in excuse for the sacrifice of the buildings. The next measure

was still more extraordinary. Brigadier Innes states—

"On hearing from Colonel Liptrap that the 45th intended to seize their magazine on the morning of the 14th, I determined to blow up the magazines both of the 45th and 57th. . . . The blowing up of the magazines so enraged the 45th, that they immediately seized their colours, and marched off towards Furreed Kote. On Colonel Liptrap reporting this, I desired him to march in with those that stood faithful, and lay down their arms to the 61st; 133 of all ranks did so. Three troops of the 10th light cavalry, under Majors Beatson and Harvey, and two guns, I sent in pursuit of the mutineers.

"Major Marsden, deputy-commissioner, having volunteered his services, and from his knowledge of the country, I entrusted to him the command of the whole. He followed them for about twelve miles. They dispersed in all directions, throwing away their arms and colours into wells and other places. A few were made prisoners, and the country-people have since brought in several.

"The above occurrences took place on the 14th. In the early part of the day, I acquainted Colonel Darvall that I would receive such men of his regiment as would come in and lay down their arms: the light company, under Captain Salmon, and owing to his exertions, almost to a man did so. On laying down their arms, I permitted them to return to their lines. It was immediately reported that stragglers from the 45th had entered their lines and threatened them, on which a company of the 61st cleared their lines. Unfortunately, the 57th, seeing European troops in their lines, believed that their light company were being made prisoners, which caused a panic in the 57th, and prevented their coming in to lay down their arms, which Colonel Darvall reported they intended to have done. On regaining confidence, several parties came in under their officers; and in the evening Colonel Darvall brought in — of all ranks, with his colours, and I required them to lay down their arms, which they did without hesitation, but with a haughty air.

"I am unable to furnish present states, but I believe that, of the 57th, about 520 men are present, and about half that number of the 45th.

"It is gratifying to state that the 25th Native light cavalry have remained staunch, and have done good service. The greatest credit is due to Major M'Donnell and his officers for keeping his regiment together, for this corps must have the same ideas as the other portions of the Native army. . . . The 10th cavalry are constantly in the saddle."†

Such is the account given, by the leading authority, of an affair which occasioned his "summary removal from the list of brigadiers," and materially strengthened the rebel cause.

Mr. Cooper remarks that, "on the 28th of May, the remainder of the 45th were turned ingloriously out of cantonments, and escorted to the boundaries of the district. They probably combated with no diminished acrimony against us at Delhi, from having been allowed to reach it alive, without money and without food."‡

* Cooper's *Crisis in the Punjab*, p. 13.

† Brigadier Innes' despatch, May 16th, 1857.—Further Parl. Papers (No. 3), p. 7.

‡ *Crisis in the Punjab*, p. 13.

CHAPTER VI.

AGRA, ALIGHUR, MYNPOORIE, NEEMUCH, AND NUSSEERABAD.—MAY AND JUNE, 1857.

AGRA.—Nowhere could the tidings of the rebellion be more calculated to excite alarm than in the stately city of Agra—the rival of Delhi in the palmy days of the Mogul empire, and now the chief place in the division of the British dominions known as the N. W. Provinces. Agra is situated on the banks of the Jumna, 139 miles south-east of Delhi.

The troops in the station consisted of one company of artillery (chiefly Europeans), H.M.'s 3rd foot, the 44th and 67th regiments of Native infantry, and a detachment of irregular cavalry, consisting of thirty-seven men, commanded by two Native officers. Intelligence of the outbreak at Meerut was published in Agra on the morning of the 11th of May; but the newspaper announcement was accompanied by a remark, on the part of the editor, that, "in a station like Meerut, with the 6th dragoons, 60th rifles, and European artillery, it might be presumed that the mutineers had a very short race of it."* It was not until three days later that the Europeans at Agra became acquainted with the extent of the calamity.

Lieutenant-governor Colvin was, happily, a man of experience and discretion. While the cloud was as yet no bigger than a man's hand, he recognised the tempest it portended; and, slowly as the intelligence reached Agra, he was more ready for the worst than some who had had longer warning. On the 13th he dispatched a telegram to Calcutta, suggesting that "the force returning from the Persian gulf, or a considerable portion of it, should be summoned in straight to Calcutta, and thence sent up the country." On the 14th, he wrote urging that martial law should be proclaimed in the Meerut district; which, as we have seen, was done, and necessarily so, for our civil and criminal courts, always detested by the natives, were swept away by the first blast of the storm; and, a few days later, Lieutenant-governor Colvin reported that, "around Meerut, the state of license

in the villages, caused by the absence of all government, spread for about twenty or twenty-five miles south, and about the same limit, or somewhat more, north. Within this belt, unchecked license reigned from the Jumna to the Ganges. The absence of any light cavalry, or effective means of scouring the country in this severely hot weather, paralysed the attempts of the Meerut force to maintain any regularity or order beyond the immediate line of its pickets."†

The question of holding the various small stations scattered throughout the disturbed provinces, became early one of anxious interest. They could be retained only at imminent risk to the handful of Europeans who were placed there; nevertheless, the general good could scarcely be more effectively served, than by each man standing to his post at all hazards, sooner than seem to fly before the rebels. Every one who knew the Asiatic character, concurred in this opinion; and none stated it more clearly than Lieutenant-governor Colvin. His view of the conduct of the collector of Goorgaon—a district, the chief place of which (also named Goorgaon) is only eighteen miles from Delhi—shows how stern a sense he had of the duty of even civilians under new and trying circumstances. In describing the state of affairs in the North-Western Provinces, he writes:—

"On the evening of the 13th instant [May], Mr. Ford, and his assistant, Mr. W. Clifford, having no support beyond their police and a party of the contingent of the Jhujjur horse, whose tone and conduct became rapidly menacing, thought that no good object would be attained by their staying at Goorgaon. The lieutenant-governor regrets the determination to quit the station on Mr. Ford's part, because he does not doubt that the best mode, especially in India, of staying violent outbursts against authority of this kind, is to remain at the post to the last, even at the direct risk of life.

"Withdrawal from a post, except under immediate attack and irresistible compulsion, at once destroys all authority, which, in our civil administration, in its strength is respected, if exercised only by a Chupprassee; while in the event of any general resistance, accompanied by defection of our military force, it has in truth no solid foundation to rest upon: but the lieutenant-governor has not thought

* *Mofussulite (extra)*; May 11th, 1857.

† Despatch from Lieutenant-governor Colvin, May 22nd, 1857.—Appendix to Parl. Papers, p. 311.

it necessary on this account, after such alarmingly emergent circumstances as had occurred at Delhi, to censure Mr. Ford for the course which he adopted.

"The introduction of general disorder into the villages of the Goorgaon district, soon communicated itself to the northern portion of Muttra; and the isolated customs' patrol officers, whose duties render them necessarily unpopular, fell back from their posts with their men. This spread further the impression of a cessation of all government, and was having a very injurious effect up to the very walls of the important town of Muttra.

"This state of things has, however, greatly altered for the better by the advance of an effective portion of the Bhurtpoor troops, which has now taken up a position on the Muttra and Goorgaon frontier."

The Jhujjur and Bhurtpoor troops mentioned in the foregoing paragraph, consisted partly of a contingent or subsidiary force, furnished by the chiefs of those territories to the British government, and partly of their own immediate retainers, who, being a kind of feudal militia, were perfectly trustworthy; whereas the former, whether contingent or subsidiary, were essentially a portion of the Bengal army, drawn from the same sources, disciplined in the same manner, and officered by Europeans—having in all respects a fellow-feeling with the Delhi mutineers. At first, a degree of confidence was reposed in the fidelity of the native contingents, which was neither warranted by their antecedents, nor supported by their subsequent conduct; for they were false to us, in defiance of the strenuous endeavours of the native princes, on whom we had forced them under a mistaken view of our own interests. Sindia, Holcar, the rajah of Bhurtpoor, and other princes, never wavered in their opinion of the disaffection of the subsidiary troops, and gave conspicuous and self-sacrificing tokens of their personal fidelity, by placing their own retainers at the disposal of the British. As early as the 14th of May, Colvin received a message from Sindia, that his body-guard of 400 cavalry, and a battery of horse artillery, would be ready to start from Gwalior for Agra on the following evening. The offer was gladly accepted.

On the 15th, the lieutenant-governor reviewed the troops stationed at Agra, having previously ascertained, from undoubted authority, that a deep and genuine conviction had seized the mind of the sepoy army, that the government was steadily bent on causing a general forfeiture of caste by the compulsory handling of impure things. Privately, and on parade, the men assured the lieutenant-governor, that "all they wanted to be

certain of," was the non-existence of the suspected plot: he therefore addressed the Supreme government by telegraph, urging the immediate issue of a proclamation containing a simple and direct assurance that no attempt whatever would be made against the caste of the Native troops. He added—"An inducement, too, is wanted for not joining the mutineers, and for leaving them. I am in the thick of it, and know what is wanted. I earnestly beg this, to strengthen me."*

On the 16th, the governor-general in council sent a telegraphic reply, promising that the desired proclamation should be issued, and encouraging Colvin in the course he was pursuing, by the following cordial expression of approval:—"I thank you sincerely for all you have so admirably done, and for your stout heart."†

No proclamation, properly so called, appears to have been issued; but, according to the inaccurate and hasty summary of events sent to the Court of Directors from Calcutta, "a circular was issued on the 29th, explaining that none of the new cartridges had been issued to Native regiments." This statement was, as has been before stated, in complete opposition to that of General Anson, who had, some days before, formally withdrawn the identical cartridges which Lord Canning declared had never been issued. To complicate the matter still further, the same page of the Calcutta intelligence which contains the notice of the circular of the Supreme government, states, also, as the latest intelligence from Umritsir, that "the 59th N.I. do not object to the new cartridges."‡

The position of Colvin was most harassing. He never received any communication whatever from General Anson—the regular posts being stopped, and the general not fertile in expedients for the conveyance or obtainment of intelligence. A council of war was held at the Agra government-house on the 13th of May: and even at this early period, Mr. Raikes describes the lieutenant-governor as "exposed to that rush of alarm, advice, suggestion, expostulation, and threat, which went on increasing for nearly two months, until he was driven nearly broken-hearted into the fort." The officers naturally urged advice with especial earnestness on a civil governor, and "every

* Appendix to Parl. Papers on Mutiny, 1857; p. 181.

† *Ibid.*, p. 193.

‡ *Ibid.*, p. 301.

man was anxious to do his best, but to do it his own way."*

Long experience of native character, however, had given Mr. Colvin an insight into the causes of the mutiny, which convinced him of the paramount influence that panic, and the feeling of being irremediably compromised by the misconduct of others, had exercised, and were still exercising, in the minds of the sepoy. In the excitement of the crisis his policy was the subject of sweeping censure; but, eventually, measures of a similar tendency were resorted to, as the sole means of healing a breach which he strove to narrow and close at its commencement. With regard to the Europeans, the attitude he advised and adopted was most unflinching. The same feeling which induced him to blame the abandonment of Goorgaon, led him to declare, a week later, when the danger was fast increasing—

"It is a vitally useful lesson to be learnt from the experience of present events, that not one step should be yielded in retreat, on an outbreak in India, which can be avoided with any safety. Plunder and general license immediately commence, and all useful tenure of the country is annihilated. It is not by shutting ourselves in forts in India that our power can be upheld; and I will decidedly oppose myself to any proposal for throwing the European force into the fort except in the very last extremity."†

With regard to the Native army, he believed one measure, and only one, remained which might arrest the plague of mutiny by affording opportunity for repentance before war *à l'outrance* should be declared against the Europeans. Addressing the governor-general by telegraph on the 24th of May, he writes:—

"On the mode of dealing with the mutineers, I would strenuously oppose general severity towards all. Such a course would, as we are unanimously convinced by a knowledge of the feeling of the people, acquired among them from a variety of sources, estrange the remainder of the army. Hope, I am firmly convinced, should be held out to all those who were not ringleaders or actively concerned in murder and violence. Many are in the rebels' ranks because they could not get away; many certainly thought we were tricking them out of their caste; and this opinion is held, however unwisely, by the mass of the population, and even by some of the more intelligent classes. Never was delusion more wide or deep. Many of the best soldiers in the army—among others, of its most faithful section,

the irregular cavalry—show a marked reluctance to engage in a war against men whom they believe to have been misled on the point of religious honour. A tone of general menace would, I am persuaded, be wrong. The commander-in-chief should, in my view, be authorised to act upon the above line of policy; and when means of escape are thus open to those who can be admitted to mercy, the remnant will be considered obstinate traitors even by their own countrymen, who will have no hesitation in siding against them."

On the following day, Mr. Colvin reported to the governor-general that he had himself taken the decisive step:—

"Impressed by the knowledge of the feelings of the native population, as communicated in my message of yesterday, and supported by the unanimous opinion of all officers of experience here, that this mutiny is not one to be put down by high-handed authority; and thinking it essential at present to give a favourable turn to the feelings of the sepoys who have not yet entered against us, I have taken the grave responsibility of issuing, on my own authority, the following proclamation. A weighty reason with me has been the total dissolution of order, and the loss of every means of control in many districts. My latest letter from Meerut is now seven days old, and not a single letter has reached me from the commander-in-chief.

"PROCLAMATION.

"Soldiers engaged in the late disturbances, who are desirous of going to their own homes, and who give up their arms at the nearest government civil or military post, and retire quietly, shall be permitted to do so unmolested.

"Many faithful soldiers have been driven into resistance to government only because they were in the ranks and could not escape from them, and because they really thought their feelings of religion and honour injured by the measures of government. This feeling was wholly a mistake; but it acted on men's minds. A proclamation of the governor-general now issued is perfectly explicit, and will remove all doubts on these points.

"Every evil-minded instigator in the disturbance, and those guilty of heinous crimes against private persons, shall be punished. All those who appear in arms against the government after this notification is known shall be treated as open enemies."‡

The proclamation, according to Sir Charles Trevelyan, "was universally approved at Agra." He adds, that "its object was to apply a solvent to reduce the compact mass of rebellion to its elements, and to give to the well-disposed an opportunity of returning to their allegiance, leaving the guilty remainder to their well-deserved fate."§

The governor-general in council took a different view of the subject; and a telegram, dated May 26th, declared that the

Mutiny, p. 313; the third, omitted in the Blue Book, is given by "Indophilus" in his Letter to the *Times*, Dec. 25th, 1857.

‡ Appendix to Parl. Papers on Mutiny, 1857.

§ *Times*, December 25th, 1857.

* *Raikes' Revolt in the N.W. Provinces*, p. 10.

† Mr. Colvin to the governor-general, May 22nd, 1857.—The first two sentences of the quotation from Mr. Colvin's despatch to the governor-general, are quoted from the Appendix to Parl. Papers on

proclamation was disapproved, and that the embarrassment in which it would place the government and the commander-in-chief was very great. Everything was therefore to be done to stop its operation. Mr. Colvin protested against the repudiation of the proclamation, and denied the justice of the chief ground on which it was denounced by the governor-general in council—namely, that it offered means of escape to the men who murdered their officers. Lord Canning persisted in ordering its withdrawal, and directed that the following proclamation should be issued in its stead:—

“Every soldier of a regiment which, although it has deserted its post, has not committed outrages, will receive a free pardon and permission to proceed to his home, if he immediately delivers up his arms to the civil or military authority, and if no heinous crime is shown to have been perpetrated by himself personally.

“This offer of free and unconditional pardon cannot be extended to those regiments which have killed or wounded their officers or other persons, or which have been concerned in the commission of cruel outrages.

“The men of such regiments must submit themselves unconditionally to the authority and justice of the government of India.

“Any proclamations offering pardon to soldiers engaged in the late disturbances, which may have been issued by local authorities previously to the promulgation of the present proclamation, will thereupon cease to have effect; but all persons who may have availed themselves of the offer made in such proclamations, shall enjoy the benefit thereof.”

It was clearly impolitic to issue orders and counter-orders which, to the natives, would bear the semblance of vacillation of purpose, if not of double-dealing. But in the excitement of the period, it is probable that nothing short of an explicit offer of amnesty to all who could not be proved to have actually shed blood, or been notorious ringleaders, would have sufficed to arrest the course of mutiny. The government of India, true to the motto of their policy, “insufficient or too late,” could not yet understand the urgency of the case, and went so far as to blame the lieutenant-governor for having taken upon himself the responsibility of an important measure, “without necessity for any extreme haste.” And this to a man who heard the “crash of regiments” on every side.

Lord Elphinstone, the governor of Bombay, dispatched a telegram to Lord Canning on the 17th of May, proposing to send an officer in a fast steamer, to overtake the

mail, which had left Bombay four days previously. The governor-general rejected the offer as unnecessary, although it involved the saving of twenty-eight days in the appeal for reinforcements from England. About the same time, intelligence reached Agra that the treaty of peace was ratified with Persia, and that three European regiments, and a portion of the European artillery, were to return to India immediately. Mr. Colvin entreated that the troops, on arriving at Calcutta, might be immediately dispatched to the Upper Provinces; but the answer he received was, that many weeks must elapse before the force could reach India; in the meantime, a European regiment had been called for from Madras, and one from Pegu; but these were not expected at Calcutta under a fortnight, and not a single European could be spared until then. In the event of being severely pressed, Mr. Colvin was to apply to the rajah of Putteeala, or to the rajah of Jheend, for aid. The services of both these chiefs had already been volunteered, and immediately accepted and employed.

The rajah of Putteeala has been mentioned as sending cavalry to the rescue of the fugitives from Delhi. His name will recur frequently, in the course of the narrative, as that of “a constant, honourable, and invaluable ally.” His principality is one of the most important of those known as the Seik protected states; and its extent has been recently increased by grants from the British government, bestowed in reward of his fidelity during the war with Lahore, on condition of his making and maintaining in repair a military road, and abolishing Suttee, infanticide, and slave-dealing in his dominions.

The latest parliamentary return on the subject states the area of Putteeala at 4,448 miles, and the population at 662,752 persons. The territory is very fertile, and exports large quantities of grain across the Sutlej to Lahore and Umritsir. The chief place, also named Putteeala (twenty miles from Umballah), is a densely peopled and compact town, with a small citadel, in which the rajah, or, as he is more generally called, the maharajah, resides. He is described as “a man in the prime of life, of some thirty-three or thirty-four years of age, of commanding stature and fine presence, inclining to obesity; a handsome oval face, black flowing beard, moustache, and whiskers; Grecian nose, and large dark

* Appendix to Parl. Papers on Mutiny, 1857; pp. 334-5.

eyes of the almond shape, which is so much admired by the Asiatics. His court is the last which is left in the north-west of India, and is maintained with Oriental magnificence. As a governor he is absolute in his own dominions, which he rules vigorously and energetically with his own hands.*

The position of Putteeala, the resources and energy of its ruler, and the disaffection of many of his subjects towards British supremacy, rendered the question of his allegiance one of extreme importance. His decision was immediate and unqualified; and he assisted the British government, not only with troops and supplies of provision, but actually with a loan of money to the amount of £210,000.† The Umballah cantonment was in so disorganised a condition at the time of the general mutiny, that, according to Mr. Raikes, it could hardly have been preserved without the help of the Putteeala rajah. When summoned thither, he came clad in a suit of mail, driving his own elephant, and spared no exertion to prove his zeal.‡

Jheend is another, but much smaller, Cis-Sutlej state, part of which was annexed on the failure of direct heirs; but the remainder was suffered to pass into the possession of a collateral heir in 1837. Its limits were increased after the conclusion of the war with Lahore, on the same terms as those of Putteeala, and for the same reason—namely, the good service rendered by its rajah. Jheend comprises an area of 376 square miles, and a population of about 56,000 persons. The rajah had an early opportunity of manifesting his determined allegiance to the English. It is said, that a deputation from Delhi sought him while reviewing his troops in his chief place, and that, on learning their errand, he immediately ordered every man of the messengers to be cut down.§

These were the allies to whom Lord Canning bade Mr. Colvin turn for the help; and to them, among other benefits, we owe the aid of our first Sikh levies.||

As the month of May wore on, affairs in Agra began to assume a gloomier aspect. The detachments of the Gwalior contingent, sent as reinforcements, speedily betrayed their sympathy with the mutineers against

whom they were expected to act, by asking whether the flour supplied to their camp was from the government stores. If so, they would not touch it, having been informed that cows' bones had been pulverised and mixed with the atta sold in the bazaars.¶ These indications of disaffection were marked by the Europeans with great uneasiness, the general feeling being, that the Hindoos were completely under the influence of the Mussulmans, who "were all, or nearly all, thirsting for English blood." And, indeed, the feeling against them became so general and indiscriminating, that Mohammedan, in the North-West Provinces, was viewed as only "another word for a rebel."*** The news from out-stations gave additional cause for alarm and distrust.

Alighur lies between Delhi and Agra, about fifty-one miles to the north of the latter city. The position was very important, as it commanded the communications up and down the country. It was garrisoned by three or four companies of the 9th N.I., "the men of which behaved very steadily and well; and, in this manner, broke the shock of the insurrection for a few days."†† On the 19th of May, a religious mendicant appeared in the lanes, and endeavoured to incite the men to mutiny. Two of the sepoys whom he addressed, seized and carried him before the commanding officer, who ordered a court-martial to be instantly assembled. The Native officers found the prisoner guilty, and sentenced him to death. On the following morning the troops were assembled, and the offender brought out and hung, no opposition or displeasure being evinced at his fate; but before the men were marched off the ground, the rifle company, which had just been relieved from the outpost of Bolundshuhur, made their appearance; and a Brahmin sepoy, stepping out from the ranks, upbraided his comrades for having betrayed a holy man, who came to save them from disgrace in this world, and eternal perdition in the next.‡‡ The men listened, debated, wavered, and finally broke up with loud shouts, declaring their intention of joining their comrades at Delhi, which they actually did; for it is stated,

* *Times* (Mr. Russell), 29th November, 1858.

† *Ibid.*

¶ *Raikes' Revolt in the N. W. Provinces*, pp. 88, 89.

§ *Daily News*, June 29th, 1857

|| *Murray's Quarterly Review*, 1858; p. 226.

¶ *Raikes' Revolt in N. W. Provinces*, p. 14.

*** *Ibid.*, pp. 53; 173.

†† Lieutenant-governor Colvin to governor-general; May 22nd, 1857.—Appendix, p. 313.

‡‡ *Mead's Sepoy Revolt*, p. 148.

that the regimental number of the 9th was found on the bodies of some of the most daring opponents of the British army.* The officers, and Europeans generally, were neither injured nor insulted; but, on their departure, the treasury was seized, the gaol broken open, and the bungalows burned. The officials, both civil and military, retreated to Hatrass, a station about twenty miles distant; but some persons fled in different directions; and Mr. Raikes describes Lady Outram (the wife of General Sir James Outram) as reaching Agra on the 23rd, "foot-sore, from Alighur, having fled part of the way without her shoes."

The fall of Alighur, recounted with all imaginable exaggerations, became the immediate topic of conversation in Agra. The budmashes twisted their moustachios significantly in the bazaars, and the Englishmen handled their swords or revolvers. Mr. Raikes mentions a singular exception to the prevailing panic. The Church Missionary College, he writes, "was about the last to close, and the first to reopen, of all our public institutions at Agra during the period of the revolt. There Dr. French, the principal, sat calmly, hundreds of young natives at his feet, hanging on the lips which taught them the simple lessons of the Bible. The students at the government, and still more the missionary schools, kept steadily to their classes; and when others doubted or fled, they trusted implicitly to their teachers, and openly espoused the Christian cause."

Their exemplary conduct did not excite any special rancour against them on the part of the insurgents; on the contrary, it is asserted as "a curious fact, that at Agra, Alighur, Mynpoorie, Futtehghur, and other places, less danger was done to the churches than to the private dwellings of the English."† This was also the case at Meerut. Three companies of the 9th Native infantry, stationed at Mynpoorie, mutinied there on the 23rd of May. Mynpoorie is the chief town of a district of the same name, ceded by Dowlut Rao Sindia to the East India Company, in 1803. The population are chiefly Hindoos of high caste. One of the Meerut mutineers (a Rajpoot, named Rajnath Sing) escaped to his native village. The magistrate sent some police and a detachment of the 9th to apprehend their countryman and co-religionist; instead of which,

they, as might have been expected, enabled him to escape. The news of the mutiny at Alighur reached Mynpoorie on the evening of the 22nd, and created great excitement, which, being reported to the magistrate, he immediately made arrangements for sending the European females (sixteen in number), with their children, to Agra, seventy miles distant, which city they reached in safety.

Being thus relieved from the office of protecting a helpless crowd, the leading Europeans prepared to lay down their lives in defence of their public charge. Their presence of mind and moderation was crowned with extraordinary success. The particulars of the affair are thus narrated by Mr. J. Power, the magistrate of Mynpoorie. After the departure of the women, he writes—

"Mr. Cocks and I proceeded to the house of Lieutenant Crawford, commanding the station, and this officer agreed directly to take the detachment out of the station and march them to Bhowgaon. After leaving a small guard at the treasury and quarter-guard, which I visited with him, Lieutenant Crawford then left the station, and I then returned to my house, where I found Dr. Watson [surgeon], the Rev. Mr. Kellner, and Mr Cocks assembled.

"This was about four or five in the morning; and I had not retired to rest more than ten minutes, before Lieutenant Crawford galloped back to my house, and informed me that his men had broken out into open mutiny, and, after refusing to obey him, had fired at him with their muskets.

"Lieutenant Crawford stated he had then found it useless to attempt commanding his men, and that he had thought it best to hurry back to Mynpoorie to warn the station, and that he believed Lieutenant de Kantzow was killed. Mr. Cocks and the Rev. Mr. Kellner immediately decided on leaving, and the former tried to induce me to leave also: as I informed him that I did not desire to leave my post, he honoured me by terming my conduct 'romantic,' and immediately departed in company with the Rev. Mr. Kellner. I then left my house, which I had no means of defending, and which I was informed the sepoys meant to attack, and proceeded to the large bridge over the Eesun, on the grand trunk road. My brother determined on accompanying me, and to share my fate; and I shall not be accused of favouritism, I hope, when I state that his coolness and determination were of the greatest aid and comfort to me throughout this trying occasion.

"On proceeding to the bridge, I was joined by Dr. Watson, and shortly afterwards by Rao Bhowanee Sing, the first cousin of the rajah of Mynpoorie, with a small force of horse and foot; Sergeants Mitchell, Scott, and Montgomery, of the road and canal departments; and Mr. McGlone, clerk in the Mynpoorie magistrate's office, also joined me at the bridge.

"I was, at this time, most doubtful of the fate of Mr. de Kantzow, for I had not coincided in Lieutenant Crawford's opinion that he had been killed, Lieutenant Crawford not having seen him fall; and on this account I was unwilling to leave the position

* Mead's *Sepoy Revolt*, p. 148.

† Raikes' *Revolt in the N. W. Provinces*, pp. 15, 16; 94.

I had taken, though strongly urged to do so. The sepoys returned at this time to the station, having utterly thrown off all control, dragging (as I afterwards learnt) Lieutenant de Kantzow with them. They passed the dāk bungalow, and fired a volley into the house of Sergeant Montgomery (which was close by), the inmates of which had fortunately left, and they then searched the whole house over, with the view of finding money; they also fired at Dr. Watson's house, who had, as I have mentioned, joined me; and they then proceeded to the rear-guard, the magazine of which they broke open, plundering it completely of its contents.

"Lieutenant de Kantzow informed me that the rebels took the whole of the ammunition away, and being unable to carry it themselves, they procured two government camels for that purpose from the lines; each man must have supplied himself with some 300 rounds or more; and an immense quantity of other government stores was taken by them besides. Lieutenant de Kantzow informs me that his life stood in the greatest danger at the rear-guard at this time. The men fired at random, and muskets were levelled at him, but dashed aside by some better-disposed of the infuriated brutes, who remembered, perhaps, even in that moment of madness, the kind and generous disposition of their brave young officer. Lieutenant de Kantzow stood up before his men; he showed the utmost coolness and presence of mind; he urged them to reflect on the lawlessness of their acts, and evinced the utmost indifference of his own life in his zeal to make the sepoys return to their duty. The men turned from the rear-guard to the Cutchery, dragging the lieutenant with them. They were met at the treasury by my gaol guard, who were prepared to oppose them and fire on them; but Mr. de Kantzow prevented them from firing, and his order has certainly prevented an immense loss of life.

"A fearful scene here occurred; the sepoys tried to force open the iron gates of the treasury, and were opposed by the gaol guard and some of the gaol officials; the latter rallied round Mr. de Kantzow, and did their best to assist him; but they, though behaving excellently, were only a handful of twenty or thirty (if so many), and poorly armed, against the infuriated sepoys, who were well and completely armed and in full force.

"It is impossible to describe, accurately, the continuation of the scene of the disturbance at the treasury; left by his superior officer, unaided by the presence of any European, jostled with cruel and insulting violence, buffeted by the hands of men who had received innumerable kindnesses from him, and who had obeyed him but a few hours before with crawling servility, Lieutenant de Kantzow stood for three dreary hours against the rebels at the imminent peril of life.

"It was not till long after he had thus been situated at the treasury, that I learnt of his being there. I was anxious with all my heart to help him, but was deterred from going by the urgent advice of Rao Bhowanee Sing, who informed me that it was impossible to face the sepoys with the small force at my disposal; and I received at this time a brief note from Lieutenant de Kantzow himself, by a trustworthy emissary I sent to him, desiring me not to come to the treasury, as the sepoys were getting quieted, and that my presence would only make matters worse, as the beasts were yelling for my life. At this time, the most signal service was done

by Rao Bhowanee Sing, who went alone to the rebels, volunteering to use his own influence and persuasion to make them retire. It is unnecessary to lengthen the account; Rao Bhowanee Sing succeeded ably in his efforts, drew off, and then accompanied the rebels to the lines; where, after a space of time, they broke open and looted the bells of arms, the quarter-guard carrying off, it is supposed, 6,000 rupees in money, and all the arms, &c., they found of use to them.

"I had retired, and the Europeans with me, to the rajah of Mynpoorie's fort, on the departure of Rao Bhowanee Sing, according to his advice; and shortly after the sepoys left the treasury, Lieutenant de Kantzow joined me, and I again took possession of the Cutchery. I found, on my return, the whole of the Malkhana looted, the sepoys having helped themselves to swords, iron-bound sticks, &c., which had accumulated during ages past. The staples of the stout iron doors of the treasury had alone given way, but the coors themselves stood firm.

"My motives in taking up a position at the bridge were, first, that I might keep the high road open; second, to keep the sepoys from proceeding to the city, and the budmashes of the city from joining the sepoys. The effect of the victory (if I may use such a term) over the sepoys, trifling though it may appear, has been of incalculable benefit. It has restored confidence in the city and district, and among the panic-stricken inhabitants; and I hope the safety of the treasure, amounting to three lacs, will prove an advantage in these troubled times to government. * * * Rao Bhowanee Sing's conduct has been deserving in the extreme; I believe he has saved the station and our lives by his coolness and tact, and has supported the ancient character of his race for loyalty to the British government.

"During the insurrection of the sepoys, I was joined by Dumber Sing, Risaldar, of the 2nd irregulars—a fine old Rajpoot, who did me right good service; and by Pylad Sing, Duffadar, of the 8th irregulars. These men guarded the gaol, which the sepoys threatened to break into. Their conduct I beg to bring to the special notice of his honour the lieutenant-governor. These officers have since raised for me a most excellent body of horse, composed chiefly of irregulars, which I have placed under the care of the Risaldar."

The magistrate concluded by stating, that he and his companions had fortified the office, and could "easily stand a siege in it."*

Mr. Colvin was delighted by a spirit so congenial to his own, and hastened to lay the whole account before the governor-general; who, besides sending Lieutenant de Kantzow the thanks of government, wrote him a private note, declaring that he (Lord Canning) could not adequately describe the admiration and respect with which he had read the report of the magistrate of Mynpoorie, concerning the "noble example of courage, patience, good judgment, and temper, exhibited by the young officer."†

* Letter of magistrate of Mynpoorie, May 25th, 1857.—Appendix, pp. 54, 55.

† Lord Canning, June 7th, 1857.

Another detachment of the 9th Native infantry, stationed at Etawah, likewise mutinied and marched off to Delhi, after plundering the treasury and burning the bungalows. No blood was shed. Mr. Hume, the magistrate, escaped in the dress of a native woman. A chief, spoken of as the Etawah or Elah rajah, took part with the mutineers. The post between Agra and Allahabad was by this means interrupted; while the evacuation of Alighur broke off the communication between Meerut and Agra, and between the former place and Cawnpoor.

Immediately before the outbreak at Alighur, 233 of the irregular Gwalior cavalry were sent from Agra thither, under the command of Lieutenant Cockburn. They arrived just in time to assist in escorting the Europeans to Hattrass. After accomplishing this, eighty of the Gwalior horse broke into open mutiny, formed, and rode round the camp, entreating their comrades to join them by every plea of temporal and eternal interest; but finding their argument of no avail, they went off by themselves to Delhi. With a party now reduced to 123 men, and in a disturbed, if not absolutely hostile, country, Lieutenant Cockburn and his troopers contrived to do good service. Hearing that a party of 500 men had collected near Hattrass, and were plundering the neighbouring country, the lieutenant procured a curtained bullock-cart, such as coloured women travel in up the country; and having let down the curtains, and persuaded four of his troopers to enter it with loaded carbines, and go forward, he himself, with twenty men, followed at a distance, screened by the shade of some trees. The plot succeeded. The marauders, on seeing the cart, rushed forward to attack and plunder the women whom they believed to be concealed inside. The foremost of them was shot dead; and Lieutenant Cockburn's party, on hearing the report, advanced instantly on the insurgents, and rapidly dispersed them—killing forty-eight, wounding three, and taking ten prisoners; while others, in the extremity of their fear, flung themselves into wells, to avoid falling into the hands of their pursuers.*

A subsequent expedition, attempted for the purpose of attacking the Elah rajah, and reopening the Alighur road, had a very different termination. The expedition con-

sisted of 200 men of the 2nd irregular cavalry, under Captain Fletcher Hayes (military secretary to Sir H. Lawrence), who was accompanied by Captain Carey, of the 17th N.I., and two other Europeans, Adjutant Barber and Mr. Fayer. The detachment reached Bowgous on Saturday, May 30th; and Captains Hayes and Carey, leaving their men in charge of the adjutant, proceeded, on the same evening, to Mynpoorie, eight miles distant, to consult with the magistrate (Power) on their proposed movements, and remained there until the following Monday. In the meantime, the thanadar of Bowgous sent a message to Captain Hayes regarding the disaffection of the men; but he attributing it to annoyance at long and frequent marches, paid little heed to the warning, and started, according to his previous intention, on Monday morning, to join the men at the appointed place. The two officers—Hayes and Carey—"cantered along all merrily," writes the survivor, "and after riding about eleven miles, came in sight of the troopers going quietly along a parallel road." The officers crossed an intervening plain, to join the men, who faced round, and halted at their approach; but one or two of the Native officers rode forward, and said, in an under tone, "Fly, Sahibs, fly!" "Upon this," Captain Carey states, "poor Hayes said to me, as we wheeled round our horses, 'Well, we must now fly for our lives;' and away we went, with the two troops after us like demons yelling, and sending the bullets from their carbines flying all round us." Hayes was cut down from his saddle by one blow from a Native officer; his Arab horse dashed on riderless. Carey escaped unhurt. He was chased for about two miles by two horsemen; and after they had relinquished the pursuit, his own mare was unable to proceed further, and he was saved by meeting opportunely one of the troopers, who appears to have lagged behind his comrades, and who took the European up on his own horse till they overtook Captain Hayes' Arab, which Captain Carey mounted, and reached Mynpoorie in safety. An old Seik sirdar, with two followers, who had accompanied the expedition, and remained faithful to the British, said that Barber and Fayer had been murdered ten minutes before the arrival of the other two Europeans. A sowar (trooper) stole behind young Fayer as he was drinking at a well, and with one blow of his tulwar half severed the head

* *Friend of India*; quoted in *Times*, August 6th, 1857.

from the body of his victim. Barber fled up the road, several mutineers giving chase; he shot one horse and two of the troopers, when he was hit with a ball, and then cut down. The three bodies were brought in to the cantonment in the course of the evening: the head of poor Hayes was frightfully hacked about; his right hand cut off, and his left fearfully lacerated; his watch, ring, boots, all gone, and his clothes cut and torn to pieces. The murderers made off for Delhi.

The gallant band at Mynpoorie, undaunted by this terrible catastrophe, continued to maintain their position. The Cutchery, or court-house, was a large brick building, from the top of which they were prepared to make a good fight if no guns were brought by the enemy. Their force consisted of 100 of the Gwalior horse, under Major Raikes (the brother of the judge at Agra), who raised cavalry and infantry in all directions. At the commencement of June the recruits numbered about 100; and the total defence was completed by a few men of the 9th Native infantry, who had remained true to their salt.*

Troops could not be spared from Agra for the reoccupation of Alighur; but a party of volunteers, headed by Captain Watson, and accompanied by Mr. Cocks, of the civil service,† proceeded thither, and succeeded in making themselves literally "masters of the situation," and in reopening the road between them and Agra.

The extremely "irregular" character of the warfare carried on in the highways and byeways of the North-West Provinces, may be understood from the following extract from a private letter from the "Volunteers' Camp, Alighur," dated June 5th, 1857:—

"Some two nights ago we made a *dour* (a foray or raid) to the village of Khyr, where a Rao† had possessed himself of the place, and was defying British authority. We fell upon the village, after travelling all night, at about 8 A.M.; surrounded it, and one party entered and asked the Rao to surrender. He at first refused; but, on being threatened and told that his stronghold should be burst open, he opened the doors, and was immediately taken prisoner with thirteen of his adherents. The little army he had assembled had dispersed early in the morning, not expecting we should have been there so soon. We walked by the side of the prisoner from the place where he was taken, to a mango tope

out of the village, where he was tried. We reached it in half-an-hour, when he was tried and hung for rebellion.

"Last evening, again, we received information that some 150 Goojurs had assembled eight or ten miles from this to intercept the dawk. We were ordered out at once in pursuit, and came upon them about 5 P.M. They got sight of us at a distance, and took to their heels, and we after them. Several of them were shot or cut down. We were then ordered to fire their villages, which some of us did by dismounting and applying our cigars to what was combustible. We then returned to Alighur, and have not the slightest idea what will be our next move. The road is perfectly safe from Agra to this.‡

While the volunteers were hanging real or suspected rebels by drum-head courts-martial, and setting villages on fire by the aid of their cigars, Mr. Colvin was striving to check the insurrectionary spirit fast spreading through his government, by endeavouring to enlist the landholders on his side. The *Agra Gazette Extraordinary* contained a distinct pledge, the redemption of which is now anxiously looked for by those who have fulfilled the preliminary conditions. There is no mistaking language so distinct as this:—

"Whereas it has been ascertained that in the districts of Meerut, and in and immediately round Delhi, some short-sighted rebels have dared to raise resistance to the British government: it is hereby declared, that every talookdar, zemindar, or other owner of land, who may join in such resistance, will forfeit all rights in landed property, which will be confiscated, and transferred in perpetuity to the faithful talookdars and zemindars of the same quarter, who may show by their acts of obedience to the government, and exertions for the maintenance of tranquillity, that they deserve reward and favour from the state."||

The close of May arrived, and the Native troops at Agra (the 44th and 67th), although they had been restrained from open mutiny, had yet, by nightly fires and secret meetings, given indications of decided disaffection. A company of one of these regiments was sent from Agra to *Muttra*, a distance of thirty-five miles, to relieve another company on duty at that ancient and once wealthy Hindoo city. On the 30th, both companies, relieving and relieved,

and that the volunteers were led by Mr. Watson, magistrate of Alighur, and Lieutenant Greathed.—*Times*, July 15th, 1857.

§ *Times*, July 14th, 1857.

|| Quoted in *Times*, June 29th, 1857.

* Letter of Captain Carey, 17th Native infantry; dated, "Mynpoorie, June 2nd, 1857."

† Appendix to Parl. Papers on Mutiny, p. 298.

‡ The Bombay correspondent of the *Times* states that this chief was Rao Bhossah Sing, of Burtowlee,

threw off their allegiance, plundered the treasury, and marched to Delhi. This circumstance decided Mr. Colvin on the disarmament of the 44th and 67th, which was accomplished on the morning of the 31st, and the men were dismissed to their homes on two months' leave of absence.

Rajpootana, or Rajast'han.—While the events just recorded disturbed the peace of Agra and the N.W. Provinces from within, dangers were arising in the neighbouring territories of Rajpootana, or the Saugor District (as the revenue officers term that country), which threatened to bring an overwhelming number of mutineers to bear upon the scattered Europeans.

The stations of *Nusseerabad* (near Ajmeer) and *Neemuch*, usually garrisoned from Bombay, had been, at the beginning of the year, drained of the infantry and guns of the army of that presidency by the pressure of the Persian war. There remained a wing of the 1st Bombay light cavalry (Lancers) cantoned at Nusseerabad; but that station received for infantry the 15th Bengal Native regiment from Meerut, and the 30th from Agra; and for artillery, a company of the 7th Bengal battalion. To Neemuch, the 72nd Native infantry, and a troop of Native horse artillery, were sent from Agra, and a wing of the 1st Bengal light cavalry from Mhow. Great excitement had been caused at both stations by the tidings from Delhi and Meerut; and at half-past three in the afternoon of the 28th of May, the 15th Native infantry, at Nusseerabad, broke into open mutiny by seizing the guns of Captain Timbrell's battery, while the horses of the troop, with the men, had gone to water. Captain Hardy, and the other officers of the lancers, hastened to their lines, and, in a few minutes, the troopers were mounted, formed into open column, and led against the mutineers, who opened the guns upon their assailants. Captain Spottiswoode was killed at the head of his troop, after getting into the battery. Cornet Newberry was also shot while in the act of charging; and Captain Hardy was wounded, with several officers. Other charges were made, but without success, until Colonel Penny ordered the troops to desist, and form in readiness to act upon the mutineers, in case they should leave their lines and come into the plain. About five o'clock the officers of the 15th Native infantry took refuge in the lines of the Lancers, having been expelled by their own

men, but not injured, though they are reported to have been fired at. The 30th Native infantry remained neutral, neither obeying orders nor joining the mutineers. The aspect of affairs seemed so alarming, that the immediate evacuation of the station was resolved on, and the ladies and children were moved out while light remained. The party retreated towards Beawur, halting half-way at midnight, to rest and let stragglers assemble; and here the dead body of Colonel Penny was brought in. The colonel had been too ill on the previous night to give orders for the retreat, and had apparently fallen off his horse and died on the road from exhaustion. The other fugitives reached Beawur in safety. Eleven of the Lancers joined the rebels; the conduct of the remainder was most exemplary. "Cantoned with two mutinous regiments, the regiment has," Captain Hardy reports, "been nightly on duty for a fortnight past, and entirely responsible for the safety of the cantonment. They have been constantly assailed with abuse, with no other result than telling their officers. They turned out in the promptest way to attack the mutineers; and they marched out of camp, when ordered, as they stood, leaving their families and everything they had in the world behind them. They are now without tents in a hot plain, and without any possibility of being comfortable; but up to this time all has been most cheerfully borne, and all duty correctly performed."*

The governor-general directed that the Native officers who had most distinguished themselves at Nusseerabad should be promoted, and liberal compensation "awarded for the loss of property abandoned in the cantonment and subsequently destroyed, when the lancers, in obedience to orders, marched out to protect the families of the European officers, leaving their own unguarded in cantonments." At night the Nusseerabad lines were set on fire, and on the following morning the rebels started for the favourite rendezvous of Delhi.

The tidings of the revolt at Nusseerabad turned the scale at Neemuch, where the officers had been exerting themselves to the uttermost to check the evident tendency of the men, by affecting a confidence which they were far from feeling. Colonel Abbott slept every night in a tent in the lines of

* Despatch from Captain Hardy to the Major of Brigade, Rajpootana field force, May 30th, 1857.

his regiment, without a guard or sentry; and, latterly, all officers did the same even with their families. One wing of the 7th regiment Gwalior contingent held the fortified square and treasury; the other wing was encamped close to, but outside, the walls. Towards the close of May the utmost panic had prevailed in the Sudder Bazaar; and, among the current reports, was that of an intended attack on Neemuch by a British force, which was a perversion of a plan for the protection of Jawud (a walled town, about twelve miles from Neemuch), by the movement there of the Kotah force, under Major Burton.

On the morning of the 2nd of June, Colonel Abbott received information of the state of feeling in the Native lines, and warned Captain Lloyd, the superintendent, that the outbreak could not be delayed beyond a few hours. Captain Lloyd made arrangements for securing a few of the most valuable records, and for insuring a line of retreat for fugitives by the Oodipoor road, by means of a detachment of mounted police. Meanwhile, Colonel Abbott assembled the Native officers, and, after some discussion, induced them to swear (the Mohammedans on the Koran, the Brahmans on Ganges-water) that they now trusted each other (want of mutual confidence having been previously believed to exist), and would remain true to their salt. The commanding officer was requested to take an oath of faith in their good intentions, which he did; and the meeting was thus concluded, apparently to the satisfaction of all parties. That day, and the following one, passed quietly; but, on the second night, symptoms of mutiny were shown by the Native artillerymen; and at eleven o'clock several of them rushed to the guns, and, loading them, fired two off, evidently as a preconcerted signal. The cavalry rushed from their lines, and the 72nd followed the example. The wing of the 7th Gwalior regiment was marched inside on the report of the guns, and rewards of 100, 300, and 500 rupees each were offered to the sepoy, naiks, and havildars respectively, on condition of their successfully defending the fort and treasury. For nearly three hours the garrison remained firm, watching the mutineers thrusting lighted torches, fastened to long poles, into the thatch of the bungalows. At the expiration of that time two more guns were fired; when an old Rajpoot, of fifty years'

standing in the service, ordered his men to open the gates, desired the officers to save themselves, and eventually caused them to be escorted to a place of comparative safety. Captain Macdonald and his companions resisted, but were told, that if they did not hasten to escape, they would assuredly be massacred by the sepoy of other regiments, and those of their own would be unable to defend them. The manner of the flight which ensued was not unlike that from Delhi, only the number of the fugitives was far smaller, and the road shorter and less perilous. Mrs. Burton (the wife of the commanding officer of the Kotah force) states, that having timely notice of the mutiny, she quitted Neemuch immediately before the outbreak, and took refuge at the small fort of Jawud, which was under the charge of her eldest son. The next morning fifteen officers, three ladies, and three young children came to the gates, having escaped on foot from Neemuch. An hour later, Major Burton and two of his sons arrived, having preceded the force under his charge, consisting, according to Mrs. Burton's account, of 1,500 men, who had already marched "ninety miles in three days," and, being quite exhausted, were left to rest by their leader, while he proceeded to Jawud, to provide for the safety of his wife and other children. A report came that the rebels were advancing to attack Jawud, attended by a retinue of convicts released from the Neemuch gaol; and Major Burton, considering the fort utterly incapable of resisting guns, abandoned it, and marched off with the small garrison and the Europeans who had taken refuge there, to his own camp, sixteen miles distant. The next morning the major advanced against the mutineers; but they had learned his intention, and were gone with the guns in the direction of Agra.

The treasury had been sacked; every bungalow but one had been burned to the ground; and the native inhabitants had so completely shared the misfortunes of the Europeans, that Mrs. Burton writes—"The shopkeepers have lost everything, so that we have not the means of buying common clothes."*

It does not appear that any massacre took place, though this was at first asserted. The carriage of Mrs. Walker, the wife of an artillery officer, was fired into by mounted troopers, but neither she nor her

* Letter published in the *Times*, August 7th, 1857.

child are stated to have been injured. The rana of Oodipoor dispatched a force of his best troops against the mutineers, under Captain Showers, the political agent for Mewar; and behaved with princely generosity to the fugitives who took refuge in his dominions. He sent escorts to meet them; gave up a palace at Oodipoor for their reception; supplied them with food and clothing as long as they chose to stay; furnished them with escorts to the different stations they desired to reach; and even visited them in person—a very unusual compliment from the representative of a most ancient and haughty Hindoo dynasty. The chivalry of the Rajpoots was manifested equally in the villages as in the capital of Mewar. One of the fugitives, Dr. Murray, surgeon of the 72nd Native infantry, has given a graphic account of his escape with Dr. Gane to Kussaunda. It was a bright moonlight night, and the distance from Neemuch only five miles; but the ground was heavy; and beside being wearied with previous excitement, the two Europeans were parched with thirst. They therefore awakened the villagers, and asked to be taken to the head man, which was immediately done; and they found him in a small fort, with some half-dozen companions. He received the wanderers with great courtesy; had a place cleared for them in his own house; set milk, chupatties, dhol, rice, and mangoes before them; after partaking of which they lay down to rest. About nine o'clock next morning, a party of the 1st light cavalry, who were scouring the country, arrived, and shouting

"Death to the Feringhees!" insisted on their surrender. The two doctors thought their case hopeless; but the Rajpoots put them in a dilapidated shed on one of the bastions, saying—"You have eaten with us, and are our guests; and now, if you were our greatest enemy we would defend you." The troopers threatened to attack the village; but the Rajpoots replied—"Kussaunda belongs to the rana; we are his subjects; and if you molest us he will send 10,000 soldiers after you." On this, the troopers went away much enraged, threatening to return with the guns in the evening, and blow the little fort to pieces. The fugitives, fearing the rebels might keep their word, did not await their threatened return, but started afresh on their journey, escorted by several Rajpoots. At a Bheel village named Bheeliya Kogaon, situated in the heart of the jungle, great hospitality was evinced. On reaching Burra Sadree, on the 5th of June, the adventurers found the majority of the officers of the 7th Gwalior contingent of the 1st cavalry and artillery, assembled there in safety with their wives and children. The party moved from Burra Sadree to Doongla on the 7th, and, on the 9th, were joined by the Oodipoor force under Captain Showers, who was proceeding in pursuit of the mutineers. The officers (now "unattached" by the mutiny of their men) accompanied the expedition, except a few who went with the women and children to Oodipoor, where they remained, from the 12th to the 22nd of June, in perfect safety, until they were able to rejoin their countrymen.*

CHAPTER VII.

THE PUNJAB AND THE PESHAWUR VALLEY.—MAY, 1857.

LAHORE.—A telegraphic message reached the great political capital of the Punjab on the morning of the 12th of May, conveying an exaggerated account of the massacres which had taken place at Meerut and

Delhi; and declaring that, at the latter place, every man, woman, and child, having the appearance or dress of a Christian, had been massacred. The troops stationed at Lahore and at *Meeran-Meer* (the large

* The government return published on May 6th, 1858, of all Europeans killed during the rebellion, gives the wife and three children of Sergeant Supple as having been "burnt to death in boxes." They

appear to have been the only victims of the outbreak at Neemuch; and it is therefore probable that they had hidden themselves, and perished in the general conflagration.

military cantonment, five or six miles from the city), are thus stated in the government report:—

"H.M.'s 81st foot, 881 strong; and 54 in hospital. Two troops of horse artillery, comprising—Europeans, 215; Natives, 56; and 11 in hospital. Four companies of foot artillery—Europeans, 282; Natives, 143; 21 in hospital. The 8th light cavalry—Europeans, 16; Natives, 498; exclusive of five in hospital. The 16th (grenadiers), 26th (light), and 49th Native infantry regiments—European officers, 47; Natives, 3,176; exclusive of 121 in hospital. A detachment of 54 rank and file (Native infantry), with three Native officers, posted at Googaira; and of 93, with seven officers (one European and six Native), at Jutog."*

There do not appear to have been any indications of disaffection exhibited at Lahore, either by incendiary fires or night meetings; still the Europeans could not but anxiously question the degree to which the sepoys might be disposed to sympathise with the cause of revolt. The city itself had a population of 100,000 persons, of whom a large proportion were hereditary soldiers—Seiks and Mohammedans; from the former class the spirit of the *Sing Guru*, and "the Baptism of the Sword," had not wholly passed away; while many of the latter, subjected first by the Seiks, and subsequently by the British, would, it was believed, be only too ready to follow the example of insurrection. The Persian treaty had been scarcely ratified; and the inflammatory proclamation of the Shah, calling on all the faithful to free the land from the yoke of "the treacherous tribe of the British," was yet fresh in the public mind.†

Sir John Lawrence, the chief commissioner, was absent at Rawul Pindie; but it was "the essence of the Punjab administration to have good subordinate officers,"‡ energetic in action, and not afraid of responsibility.

Immediately on receipt of the telegraphic message of the 12th of May, Mr. Montgomery, the judicial commissioner, assembled in council the following gentlemen:—

Mr. D. McLeod, the Financial Commissioner; Colonel Macpherson, Military Secretary to the Chief Commissioner; Mr. A. Roberts, Commissioner of the Lahore Division; Colonel R. Lawrence, Commandant of the Punjab Police; Major Ommaney, Chief Engineer of the Punjab; Captain Hutchinson, Assistant Engineer.

All concurred in the necessity for prompt

titude; and Mr. Montgomery, accompanied by Colonel Macpherson, proceeded at once to Meean-Meer, to inform Brigadier Corbett of the telegraphic intelligence, and devise means of meeting the danger. His plan was, to deprive the Native troops of their ammunition and gun-caps, and to throw additional Europeans into the fort; but this intention was supplanted by the necessity for more decisive measures, consequent on the discovery made, during the day, by a Seik non-commissioned officer in the police corps, of a conspiracy formed by the Meean-Meer Native troops, "involving the safety of the Lahore fort, and the lives of all the European residents in the cantonment and the civil station of Anarkullee."

The statement of an actual conspiracy is distinctly made both by Mr. Cooper and by a gentleman writing from Lahore, whose narrative forms the staple of the following account.§ According to the former authority, "intercepted correspondence" was the channel by which the information recorded by him was obtained; but neither writer gives any exact data on the subject. It is possible, therefore, that the scheme which they speak of as digested and approved, amounted in reality to nothing beyond the crude suggestions of one or two discontented sepoys. In the absence, however, of officially recorded particulars, the anonymous narrative of one of the actors in the proceedings at Lahore, is very interesting.

The fort itself, situated within the city walls, was ordinarily garrisoned by one company, a European regiment, one of foot artillery, and a wing of one of the Native regiments from Meean-Meer; the chief object of this force being to keep a check on the city, and to guard the government treasury.

During the former half of May, the 26th Native infantry had furnished the wing on guard, which was, in due course, to be relieved, on the 15th of the month, by a wing of the 49th Native infantry. It was arranged by the conspirators, that while the wings of both regiments were in the fort together, in the act of relief, the united force, amounting to about 1,100 men (all detachments sent on guard being made up to their full strength), were to rush on their officers, seize the gates, and take possession

* Parl. Papers (Commons), February 9th, 1858, p. 4.

† *Crisis in the Punjab*; by Frederick Cooper, Esq., deputy-commissioner of Umrutair; p. xiii.

‡ Letter of *Times*' correspondent, dated "Lahore, May 28th."

§ Blackwood's *Edinburgh Magazine*, January, 1858: article entitled "Poorbeah Mutiny."

of the citadel, the magazine, and the treasury. The small body of Europeans, not above 150 in all, consisting of eighty of H.M.'s 81st, and seventy of the artillery, would, it was expected, be easily overwhelmed; and then an empty hospital close by, in the deserted lines at Anarkullee, was to be set on fire, as a signal to the rebels at Meean-Meer, of the success of the opening scene of the plot. The rise was expected to become general in the cantonments; the guns were to be seized, the central gaol forced, its 2,000 prisoners liberated; and the triumph was to terminate in a promiscuous massacre of Europeans.

Information subsequently obtained, is alleged to have shown that the plot extended much beyond Lahore, and included Ferozpoor, Phillour, Jullundur, and Umritsir.

The officers of the Native regiments were, in this, as in almost every instance, slow to believe the unwelcome tidings. Each one was disposed to repudiate, on behalf of his own men, the charge of complicity; yet the brigadier resolved on the bold and unprecedented step of disarming the whole of the Native troops in the station. The following morning was fixed for the time of the proposed *coup d'état*, and arrangements were made with anxious secrecy. That evening (the 12th) a ball was to be given by the station to the officers of H.M.'s 81st regiment. The fear of affording any cause of suspicion to the sepoys, prevented its being postponed. The Europeans assembled according to previous arrangements, and the dancing was carried on with more spirit than gaiety. The ladies could not but glance at the "piled arms" in the corners of the rooms. Their partners could not but watch the doors and windows in readiness to seize each one his ready weapon. But all continued quiet; and at two in the morning the party broke up; and after a few more anxious hours, the gentlemen assembled on the parade-ground.

Civilians and soldiers—all were there. The real point at issue was one on which the lives of themselves, their wives and children, depended; but even the avowed cause of the parade was an important and an anxious one. The Europeans had long viewed the sepoy army as the bulwark of British power in India; and its continued allegiance was confidently expected, as ensured by the mutual interest of the employers and the employed. Now that a new light

was thrown on the subject, the officers looked with strangely mingled feelings upon the men they had trained and disciplined, as they marched up and stood in order, to hear the general order for the disbandment of a portion of the Native infantry at Barrackpoor.

The order was read at the heads of the several Native regiments: then, as if to form a part of the brigade manœuvres of the day, the whole of the troops were counter-marched, so as to face inwards—on one side the Native regiments at quarter-column distance, and in front of them the 81st Queen's (only five companies) in line, with the guns along their rear. The crisis had arrived; and Lieutenant Mocatta, adjutant of the 26th Native infantry, stepped forward, and read an address to the sepoys, explaining how the mutinous spirit, which had been so unexpectedly found to pervade other regiments, had determined the brigadier to take prompt measures to prevent its spread among those under his control—his object being not so much the peace of the country, which the British could themselves maintain, but rather the preservation of the good name of regiments whose colours told of many glorious battle-fields. It was therefore desirable to prevent the men from involving themselves in a ruinous mutiny. The exordium was sufficiently significant. While it was being read, the 81st, according to a pre-arrangement, formed into subdivisions, and fell back between the guns; so that when the address ended with two short words—"Pile arms"—the 16th grenadiers (to whom the order was first given) found themselves confronted, not by a thin line of European soldiers, but by twelve guns loaded with grape, and portfires burning.

The 16th was no common regiment; its men had been numbered among General Nott's "noble sepoys" at Candahar and Ghuznee. They had served with distinction in Cabool, Maharajpoor, Moodkee, Ferozshuhur, Soobraon; and, in evidence of their earlier exploits, had an embroidered star on their colours, in memory of their presence at Seringapatam; and a royal tiger under a banian tree, for Mysore. A slight hesitation and delay were perceptible among their ranks; but the clear voice of Colonel Renny ordering his men to load, with the ringing response of each ramrod as it drove home its ball-cartridge, denounced, with irresistible force, the madness of resistance. The waverers sullenly piled arms, as did also the

49th Native infantry and a portion of the 26th light infantry. The 8th cavalry unbuckled and dropped their sabres. Thus, to the unspeakable relief of the 600 Europeans, the 2,500 soldiers stood disarmed, and were marched off to their lines comparatively harmless. The troops no longer to be trusted with arms, had been actively employed in the conquest of the country. The sepoy in the fort were dealt with in an equally summary manner. Major Spencer, who commanded the wing of the 26th light infantry in the fort, was privately informed that his men would be relieved on the morning of the 14th, instead of on the 15th, as before ordered. At daybreak on the 14th, three companies of the 81st, under Colonel Smith, entered the fort, to the utter dismay of the sepoys, who obeyed without demur the order to lay down their arms, and were speedily marched off to their own lines at Meean-Meer.

The immediate danger being thus averted, provision was made for the future in the same masterly manner. Very happy was Lahore, alike in its chief military and civil authority; and especially so in the cordial co-operation of the soldier and the "political." Brigadier Corbett is described as a man to whom seven-and-thirty years of Indian service had given ripe experience, yet robbed of none of the mental and physical vigour necessary to cope with unprecedented difficulties. Responsibility, the bugbear of so many Indian officials, had no terrors for him; and he devoted himself to the detail of the great military movements which were about to be made; while his coadjutor, Montgomery, acting for the absent chief commissioner, procured the stoppage of all sepoys' letters passing through the post-offices, and the removal of all treasure from the smaller civil stations to places of greater security; having it immediately taken out of the charge of Hindoostanee guards, and escorted by Punjabee police. Montgomery urged on the district officers (in a circular very like those issued by General Wellesley, while engaged in the pacification of Malabar in 1803), that "no signs of alarm or excitement should be exhibited, but that each functionary should be prepared to act, and careful to obtain the best information from every possible source." To Frederick Cooper, the deputy-commissioner at Umritsir, he wrote privately on the 12th of May, urging him to keep the strictest watch on the sepoys stationed there (the 59th Native infantry, and

a company of foot artillery), as also on the state of feeling among the population; and to take every possible precaution, "so as to be ready in case of a row."

Umritsir was the holy city of the Seiks. The adjacent fort of Govindghur was named after their great general, judge, and priest, Govind Sing. The *Koh-i-Noor* had been deposited here previous to its seizure by the British; and the possession of the fort, like that of the famous gem, was looked upon as a talismanic pledge of power. The question arose, whether the "Khalsa,"* shaken in their confidence in the "Ikbal" (luck or good fortune) of the English, might not be induced to co-operate even with the hated Mohammedan and despised Hindoo, for the expulsion of the foreigners who had equally humbled every native power? Mr. Cooper possessed much personal influence, which he used in controlling the Seik and Mohammedan leaders. Besides this, the harvest in the Punjab had been singularly abundant; and the Jat, or agricultural population, contented themselves, had no sympathy with the grievances of the "Poorbeahs," or East-Indians, as the Bengal sepoys were usually called in Western India, on account of their being raised chiefly from territory situated to the east of the Ganges. In the evening of the 14th, an express from Lahore brought warning of the rumoured intention of the disarmed regiments of Meean-Meer to fly somewhere—possibly in the direction of Ferozpoor; but more probably to attack Govindghur, in reliance on the fraternal feeling of the sepoy garrison.

Mr. Macnaghten, the assistant-commissioner, volunteered to go midway on the road to Lahore, and raise a band of villagers to intercept the expected rebels. The country-people responded with enthusiasm. About midnight, Mr. Macnaghten, hearing a great tramp, mustered his volunteers, and formed a barricade across the road. The villagers suggested that the oxen and bullocks should remain, because the Hindoos would not cut through them; but the experiment was not tried; for, happily, the new-comers proved to be about eighty of H.M.'s 81st, who had been sent off from Lahore, thirty miles distant, on the previous morning, in *ekkas*, or light native carts, drawn by ponies. The safety of *Phillour*, the chief place in the Jullundur or Trans-Sutlej division, was

* The Khalsa (literally, the elect or chosen), was the proud title assumed by the Seiks on conquering the Punjab.

obtained by stationing a strong European detachment within the fort, which had previously been wholly left in the hands of the natives; not a single European sleeping within its walls. The care of the civil lines, and the peace of the town, was the next important object; and the first consideration of the officer in charge (the deputy-commissioner, Captain Farrington) was, what course would be taken by Rajah Rundheer Sing, whose territory lay between Jullundur and the river Beas. The Kaporthella chief was one of the Seik sirdars whose estates were partly confiscated by the English on the annexation of the Jullundur Doab in 1846. The present rajah succeeded his father in 1853, and is described as a handsome young man of about six-and-twenty, who, "with the manly bearing and address of a Seik noble, combines a general intelligence far beyond his class, and a deep sympathy with English modes of life and thought." Captain Farrington immediately sent to Kaporthella for assistance. The rajah had been absent on a pilgrimage to Hurdwar, but was on his return home, and reached Phillour on the 11th of May, where his minister met him with tidings of the telegraphic intelligence, and appeal for aid. This was heartily given: the rajah marched straight into Jullundur, placed his escort at the disposal of the British, and furnished, besides, about 500 men and two guns, which force Captain Farrington distributed for the defence of the treasury, gaol, and other public buildings.

In the course of the first eventful week of the mutiny, it became evident that the Seiks and Jats of the Punjab, generally, had no intention of making common cause with the Bengal army. On the contrary, they had old scores of their own, which they hoped to have an opportunity of wiping off. It is said they were specially eager to aid in the capture of Delhi, in consequence of the existence of a prophecy, that they, in conjunction with the "topee wallahs" (hat wearers) who should come over the sea, would lay the head of the son of the Delhi sovereign on the very same spot where that of their Guru (spiritual chief) had been exposed 180 years before, by order of the emperor Aurungzebe; and this, as the course of the narrative will show, they actually accomplished.

The *Peshawur Valley* was a point the security of which was of extreme impor-

tance. The force stationed at Peshawur, Nowshera, Murdaun, and the frontier forts at the foot of the surrounding hills, comprised nearly 14,000 men of all arms, of whom less than a third were Europeans. The exact proportions of the Native troops in the Peshawur district have not been stated; but according to a valuable state paper recently published by the Punjab government, the total Native force then serving in the Punjab and Delhi territory, consisted of 24,000 Punjabees and 41,000 Hindoostances.*

Of the artillery, twenty-four light field guns were partially manned and driven by Hindoostanees, and the eight guns of the mountain-train battery entirely so.

Very early in the crisis, Rajah Sahib Dyal, an old and faithful adherent of government, asked Cooper, of Umritsir, "how matters looked at Peshawur?" The reply was satisfactory. "Otherwise——," said the questioner; and he took up the skirt of his muslin robe, and rolled it significantly up, as if preparing for flight.† Nor were his fears unreasonable.

The city of Peshawur is situated forty miles from the Indus, and ten from the mouth of the Khyber Pass, which is itself formed and guarded by the central and highest of the snow-capped mountains that surround the fertile horse-shoe valley of Peshawur. The predominating characteristics of the city are Indian; yet many indications exist there of Afghan life and manners—such as the trees planted throughout the streets; the western fruits exposed for sale; the strict seclusion of the women; above all, the prevalence of the stern aquiline Jewish physiognomy among the population. The cantonments resembled all other Indian ones, being only remarkable for extent. The parade-ground was sufficient for 6,000 soldiers. There were the same white houses, each in its own enclosure; the same straight lines of road; the same red brick barracks for the Europeans; the same mud huts for the Native troops.‡ Like Agra, Peshawur had a fanatical Mohammedan population; a crowded bazaar, with its reckless, ruthless mob; and an additional danger existed in the host of poor and plunder-loving tribes

* Quoted in *Overland Indian Mail*; January 8th, 1859.

† Cooper's *Crisis in the Punjab*, p. 57.

‡ Article on "Peshawur," in *Fraser's Magazine*; January, 1859.

who inhabited the surrounding hills, and, in the event of a struggle, would assuredly take part with the stronger. The wilds and hilly fastnesses, which extend north and south along our frontier for 800 miles, were in the hands of some thirty or more different tribes. The political management of these rested with Colonel Nicholson and Major Edwardes, under the supervision of Sir John Lawrence.

On the 13th of May, a court-martial met at Peshawur, consisting of General Reid, Brigadier Cotton, Brigadier Neville Chamberlain, Colonel Edwardes, and Colonel Nicholson, and resolved that the troops in the hills should be concentrated in Jhelum, the central point of the Punjab. In accordance with this resolution, H.M.'s 27th foot from the hills at Nowshera, H.M.'s 24th foot from Rawul Pindce, one European troop of horse artillery from Peshawur, the Guide corps from Murdaun, 16th irregular cavalry from Rawul Pindce, the native Kumaon battalion from the same place, the 1st Punjab infantry from Bunnoo, a wing of the 2nd Punjab cavalry from Kohat, and half a company of sappers from Attock, were ordered to concentrate at Jhelum, for the purpose of forming a movable column, in readiness to quell mutiny wherever it might appear.

The danger which menaced the Punjab was fully appreciated by Sir John Lawrence; but without waiting to test the temper of the Seiks, and even while considering (as he afterwards stated) that "no man could hope, much less foresee, that they would withstand the temptation of avenging the loss of their national independence,"* he nevertheless urged on the commander-in-chief, in the earliest days of the mutiny, the paramount necessity of wresting Delhi from the hands of the rebels, at any hazard and any sacrifice, before the example of successful resistance should become known in India—before reinforcements of mutineers should flock to the imperial city, and thus teach its present craven occupants the value of the *prestige* they had so undeservedly obtained, and of the advantages they at first evinced so little capacity of using.

General Anson, on relinquishing his idea of marching immediately on Delhi, seriously

discussed the advisability of fortifying Umballah; and asked the advice of Sir John Lawrence, whose reply, given in the language of the whist table—with which the commander-in-chief was notoriously more conversant than with that of war, offensive or defensive†—was simply this: "When in doubt, win the trick. Clubs are trumps; not spades."‡ To render his advice practicable, Sir John Lawrence strained every nerve in raising corps for reinforcements, and even parted with the famous Guide corps; sending it, the Kumaon battalion, and other portions of the movable column, to join the army moving on Delhi, and recruiting his own ranks as best he could.

The Peshawur residency, although deemed unsafe for habitation, was, at this critical period, richly stored. Twenty-five lacs of rupees, or £250,000, intended as a subsidy for Dost Mohammed, had been most opportunely deposited there; for, in the financial paralysis consequent on the crisis, this money proved of the greatest service in enabling the authorities to meet the heavy commissariat expenses.§ To retain it in the residency was, however, only to offer a strong temptation to the lowest classes of the population; and it was therefore sent for safety to the strong and famous old fort of *Attock*, which commands the passage of the Indus, whose waters wash its walls. The fort was garrisoned by a wing of H.M.'s 27th foot; provisioned for a siege, and its weak points strengthened. The communication between Attock and Peshawur (a distance of forty miles) was protected by sending the 55th Native infantry, and part of the 10th irregular cavalry, from Nowshera, on the Attock road, across the Cabool river to Murdaun, a station left vacant by the departure of the Guides. The men suspected that they had been sent there because their loyalty was distrusted; and taunted their colonel, Spottiswoode, with having brought them to a prison. The colonel, who firmly believed in the integrity of his regiment, assured them to the contrary, and promised to forward to head-quarters any petition they might draw up. They accordingly framed one; and the most prominent grievance of which they complained, was the breaking up in practice, though not in name, of the invalid establishment.||

* Letter from Sir J. Lawrence to Mr. Raikes. — *Revolt in the N. W. Provinces*, p. 75.

† General Anson is said to have been the author of a well-known Hand-book on Whist, by "Major A."

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‡ Cooper's *Crisis in the Punjab*, p. 45.

§ *Ibid.*, p. 61.

|| See Introductory Chapter to narrative of Mutiny, p. 111.

Meanwhile, the 24th and 27th Native infantry, at Peshawur, had held a midnight meeting; and the 51st Native infantry, and 5th light cavalry, had likewise given evidence of disaffection. The 27th had Nicholson for their colonel—the mighty man of war, to whom the native chiefs now applied the title once given to Runjeet Sing—the Lion of the Punjab. Nicholson earnestly recommended the disarming of the suspected regiments; but Brigadier Cotton hesitated, until Colonel Edwardes, arriving at the critical moment at Peshawur, from Calcutta, strenuously urged the adoption of the measure, which was successfully carried through on the morning of the 21st of May. The fidelity of the 21st Native infantry was deemed perfectly trustworthy; and subsequent events proved it so. Among the intercepted letters, there were none which in any way compromised this regiment: on the contrary, an old subahdar was found, in reply to some mutinous proposition, to have urged the sepoys to stand by their salt, as, though the mutineers might have their way for three months, after that the British would be supreme again. The tone of the other letters was different, though the sentiments of the writers were often veiled in allegorical expressions. "Pearls," or white-faces, were quoted as low in the market; "red wheat," or coloured faces, as looking up.

When intelligence reached Peshawur concerning the state of the 55th at Murdaun, a European detachment was sent off thither under Colonel Chute, who, on arriving there, found a body of the 55th Native infantry, consisting of about 120 men, drawn up to receive him. This was the faithful remnant of the 55th; the rest of the sepoys having broken up and taken to flight, without attempting to injure their officers. Colonel Spottiswoode, in the first bitterness of disappointment, committed suicide. Colonel Nicholson, with a troop of horse artillery, the 18th irregular cavalry, one hundred Punjab infantry, and forty of his personal escort, started off in pursuit of the mutineers, and captured 150 of them, with the colours, and upwards of 200 stand of arms. "Nicholson was in the saddle twenty hours, having gone over some seventy miles. The terror of his name spread throughout the valley, and gave additional emphasis to the moral effect of the disarming policy." The zemindars of Huzara, through which district the mutineers strove to escape to Hindoostan,

brought most of them in to the government, with their money all safe. The conduct of the Punjab infantry (the 5th) in this first encounter was very satisfactory; it seemed like a pledge of the fidelity of the whole Punjab force.

The 10th irregular cavalry had refused to act against the 55th. They were, consequently, disarmed and disbanded. The first person executed for mutiny at Peshawur was a subahdar-major of the 51st Native infantry, who was captured and hanged. He boasted that he had been a rebel for more than a year, and that the English rule was at an end. Twelve men of the same regiment were hanged two days afterwards, in a row, on full parade of all the troops; and, subsequently, the fearful penalty of blowing away from guns was inflicted upon forty of the 55th Native infantry.

The number of mutineers caught, and brought in by the hill tribes, must have been considerable; but no official statement has been published on the subject. The peculiar tenets and practice of the Seiks, were regarded as calculated to prevent coalition between them and the frontier Mohammedans. The two classes were therefore eliminated from the disarmed masses, and formed into a new corps. A Patan regiment was also raised. Ten men out of every European company were at once instructed in gun drill, and the Peshawur light horse sprang into existence, mounted on horses from the 5th light cavalry and the disbanded 10th irregulars.

Some of the officers employed in the laborious and responsible labour of assembling and drilling recruits, have become deservedly famous, and their names are now household words in the homes of England and her colonies. Others have been less fortunate, especially the members of the civil service, many of whom, with John Lawrence and Robert Montgomery for leaders, acted most zealously as recruiting sergeants. The "Letters" published since the death of Major Hodson, throw considerable light on the exploits of this officer and his gallant comrades. On the 19th of May he received orders to raise and command a new regiment, afterwards well known as Hodson's Horse; which he was well fitted to do, from the ability he had previously shown while connected with the Guides. "On the 20th of May, having been placed in charge of the Intelligence Department, he started

from Kurnaul at nine in the evening, with one led horse and an escort of Seik cavalry; arrived at Meerut about daybreak; delivered the commander-in-chief's despatches to General Wilson; had a bath, breakfast, and two hours' sleep, and then rode back the seventy-six miles, thirty miles of the distance lying through a hostile country."*

General van Cortlandt is another commander of irregular troops, whose name will

frequently appear in the course of the narrative. He was serving the British government in a civil capacity at the time of the outbreak, but was then called on to levy recruits. The nucleus of his force consisted of 300 Dogras (short built, sturdy men), belonging to Rajah Jowahir Sing, of Lahore. This number he increased to 1,000; and the Dogras did good service under their veteran leader.

CHAPTER VIII.

MARCH OF BRITISH FORCES, AND SIEGE OF DELHI.—MAY 27TH TO JUNE 24TH, 1857.

ADVANCE ON DELHI.—The terrible turning-point passed, and the fact proved that, in the hands of Sir John Lawrence and his lieutenants, the Punjab was not a source of danger, but a mine of strength, affairs at head-quarters assumed a new aspect: and the arrival of the Seik reinforcements was of invaluable assistance to the small band of Europeans on whom alone reliance could previously be placed, it having been found necessary to disarm the 5th Native infantry at Umballah on the morning of May 29th, the day before General Barnard, with the staff of the army, started from Kurnaul for Delhi. The 60th Native infantry were detached to Rohtuck, it being considered too great a trial of fidelity to employ this Hindoostanee corps in besieging their countrymen and co-religionists.

Encounter at the Hindun.—The small detachment of troops from Meerut, under Brigadier Wilson, marched thence on the 27th of May, to join the main body, and, on the morning of the 30th, encamped at Ghazi-u-deen Nuggur, a small but strongly fortified position on the river Hindun, about ten miles from Delhi. The troops were weary with night marches, and enfeebled by the intensity of the hot winds. No one entertained any suspicion of the vicinity of the enemy. At about four o'clock in the afternoon, when officers and men were for the most part asleep, a picket of

irregulars, stationed beyond the suspension-bridge, gave the alarm of an approaching foe. The bugles sounded, and the Rifles had scarcely formed before an 18-pounder shot burst into the British camp, and took one leg from each of two native palkee-bearers, who were sitting at the tent door of the Carabineers' hospital. The attacking force consisted of a strong detachment of mutineers from Delhi, who had succeeded in bringing their heavy guns to bear on the British camp before even their vicinity was suspected. Two 18-pounders were speedily opened to meet the hostile fire; the Rifles crossed the bridge, and were soon actively engaged in front; while the horse artillery, under Lieutenant-colonel Mackenzie, turned the left flank of the enemy, who thereupon commenced a retreat, leaving behind them five guns (two of large calibre),† and carts full of intrenching tools and sand-bags. The long delay of the British had evidently given time to the rebels to plan, but not to execute, the occupation of a fortified position on the Hindun. The numbers engaged are but vaguely stated. The chaplain who accompanied the expedition, speaks of 700 Englishmen attacking a force seven times their number.‡ The loss on the British side, in killed and wounded, did not exceed forty-four men; and was chiefly occasioned by the explosion of a cart-full of ammunition near the toll-bar, which a havildar of the 11th (a Meerut mutineer) fired into when the rout began. He was instantly bayoneted. Captain Andrews, of the Rifles, was killed

* *Twelve Years of a Soldier's Life in India*, p. 7.

† *Greathed's Letters*, p. 6.

‡ *The Chaplain's Narrative*, p. 26.

while cheering his men to the charge; and a young lieutenant of the same regiment, Napier by name, and of the true lion breed, was shot in the leg. Amputation was performed, and the sufferer sank slowly under its effects; exclaiming often, with bitter tears, "I shall never lead the Rifles again! I shall never lead the Rifles again!"

Captain Dickson had a narrow escape. His horse ran away during the pursuit, and carried him far ahead of his troop, into the midst of the fugitives; but he cut down two sepoys, and returned unhurt. The loss of life, on the part of the mutineers, must have been very heavy. Some took refuge in a village, which was burnt; many were destroyed by the Carabineers; and about fifty were found "concealed in a ditch, not one of whom was permitted to escape."*

The following day (Whit-Sunday) opened with the burial of the slain. At noon a second attack was made by the rebels, who were defeated, driven out of two villages, and forced to retire from ridge to ridge, until they disappeared in the distance, in full retreat to Delhi. They succeeded, however, in carrying off their cannon, consisting of two heavy pieces and five light guns, the remains of Captain de Teissier's battery; the excessive heat and want of water hindering the pursuit of the Rifles. The European loss, in killed and wounded, amounted to twenty-four: of those, ten were sun-struck.†

The conduct of the Goorkas was considered extremely satisfactory. A false alarm being given on the 3rd of June, they were so delighted at the chance of getting a fight, that "they threw somersaults and cut capers." Mr. Greathed adds—"We feel quite safe about the Goorkas; their grog-drinking propensities are a great bond with the British soldier."

Notwithstanding the resemblance between the two races in the point which of all other most mars the efficiency of the British army, very strong doubts had been entertained, previous to the march of the force, regarding the fidelity of the hardy little mountaineers. In fact, a general panic had been occasioned at Simla by a report that the Nusseeree battalion stationed at Jutog, seven miles off, were in open mutiny, and had refused to march when ordered down by the commander-in-chief.

* The Chaplain's *Narrative*, p. 27.

† Return, by Brigadier Wilson.—Further Parl. Papers, 1857; pp. 119 to 121.

Simla, very shortly after its original occupation, became, to the leading Calcutta functionaries, what the lovely valley of Cashmere had been to the Great Moguls. The civilians of highest rank in the East India Company's service, with their wives and families, resorted thither; several governors-general almost lived there; and officers on leave of absence helped to make up a population of a quite peculiar character. The feeling of security had been, up to May, 1857, general and uninterrupted; ladies had travelled from Calcutta to Simla, and, indeed, through all parts of India, under an exclusively native escort, without one thought of danger; but the news from Meerut and Delhi broke with startling force on the mind of a very weak and very wealthy community, and led the residents to regard with anxiety every indication of the temper of the troops. Simla was not a military station; and the neighbouring one of Jutog, seven miles distant, was held by the Nusseeree battalion, containing nearly 800 Goorkas and six European officers. The 1st European Bengal Fusiliers were cantoned at the sanitary station of Dugshai (in Sirmoor; a Rajpoot hill-state, adjoining Putteenala), sixteen miles south of Simla; and H.M.'s 75th foot at Kussowlie, another sanatorium, forty miles distant: but the frightened population had no reason to place confidence in any prompt measures being adopted for their protection in the event of an *émeute*, after the incapacity evinced at Meerut. The fidelity of the Goorkas was the uppermost question with them; and it was not without cause that they were at one moment convinced that the sword was suspended over their defenceless heads by something little stronger than a hair.

The Nusseeree battalion, says an authority who may be supposed to know the truth of what he affirms, "was distinctly disaffected on the cartridge question." The order for the entire battalion to march down into the plains, was an unprecedented one; a company having been, on all previous occasions, left to protect their families during their absence. The precautions adopted by the residents at Simla, were indignantly denounced by the Goorkas as evincing mistrust in them, especially the removal of the Goorka guard from the government treasury, and the measures adopted for its defence. They demanded, as an evidence of confidence, that they should be

put on guard over and in the bank, in which lay some 80,000 Company's rupees. "The critical state of affairs," Mr. Cooper states, "may be judged not only from the audacity of their demands, but the undisguised audacity of their bearing. They demanded to be shown the actual treasure; and their swarthy features lit up with glee unpleasant to the eye of the bystander, when they saw the shining pieces. One sepoy tossed back the flap of the coat of a gentleman present, and made a queer remark on the revolver he saw worn underneath."* At Kussowlie, just above Umballah, a party of Goorkas actually robbed the treasury, and the rest broke into open bloodshed. Captain Blackall was about to order a party of H.M.'s 75th to act against the Goorkas; when Mr. Taylor, the assistant-commissioner, represented to him, that the safety of the helpless community of Simla depended on the avoidance of an outbreak. Captain Blackall acknowledged the force of the argument, and contented himself with adopting purely defensive measures, although actually surrounded by the Goorkas, and taunted with such expressions as "Shot for shot!" "Life for life!" In fact, the wise counsel of Mr. Taylor, and the address and temper evinced by Captain Blackall, proved the means of preserving Simla from being the scene of "horrors, in which, in enormities, perhaps Cawnpore would have been outdone."† The wisdom of the conciliation policy practised at Kussowlie, was not at first appreciated at Simla; and the replacement of the government treasury under the charge of the Goorkas, was viewed, naturally enough, as a perilous confession of weakness. "The panic reached its climax, and general and precipitate flight commenced. Officers, in high employ, rushed into ladies' houses, shouting, 'Fly for your lives! the Goorkas are upon us!' Simla was in a state of consternation: shoals of half-crazed fugitives, timid ladies, hopeless invalids, sickly children hardly able to totter—whole families burst forth, and poured helter-skelter down on Dugshai and Kussowlie. Some ran down steep khuds [ravines] and places marked only by the footprints of the mountain herds, and remained all night. Never had those stately pines looked down upon, or those sullen glens and mossy retreats

echoed with, such a tumult and hubbub. Ladies, who are now placidly pursuing ordinary domestic duties, wrote off perhaps for the last time to their distracted husbands in the plains: then, snatching up their little ones, fled away, anywhere out of the Simla world. Extraordinary feats were performed; some walked thirty miles! Some, alas! died from the effects of exhaustion and fear." The Mohammedan servants exulted in the belief that the European raj was about to close; and among the many anecdotes current during the panic, was one of a little boy being jeeringly told that his mamma would soon be grinding gram for the King of Delhi!‡

The news reached the commander-in-chief (Anson) at the time when the scales had just fallen from his eyes, and when the massacres of Meerut and Delhi, and the remonstrances of Sir John Lawrence and Colvin, had convinced him of the miserable error of his past proceedings. The plan of coercing and disbanding regiments had worse than failed with the Poorboahs: it was not likely to succeed with the Goorkas. The Jutog troops were on the point, if not in the act, of mutiny; and, if not arrested, their example of defection or rebellion might be followed by the Kumaon and Sirmoor battalions, and the 66th (Napier's corps);§ and thus the resources of government would be lessened, and its difficulties greatly increased. In this strait, General Anson selected Captain Briggs, superintendent of roads, who possessed an intimate knowledge of the habits, customs, and feelings of the Goorkas, and desired him to hold communication with them, and secure their adherence even at the price of wholesale condonation of mutiny. This was actually done. A free pardon was given to the regiment generally, the only exception being a subahdar, named Chunderbun, described by Major Bagot as one of the best soldiers in the corps, and who had been absent at the time of the mutiny, but who had irretrievably offended his comrades by stating that they had no objection to use the new cartridges. Two men, "dismissed by order of court-martial" for taunting the school of musketry, "were restored to the service." These extraordinary concessions proved as successful as the opposite policy (commenced by the disbandment of the unfortunate 19th N. I.) had been disastrous. The advance on Delhi during the intense heat was as trying to the Goorkas as to the

* Cooper's *Crisis in the Punjab*, p. 103.

† *Ibid.*, p. 104.

‡ *Ibid.*, p. 99.

§ See page 107, *ante*.

Europeans. Yet they never showed any symptoms of disaffection. "The men," says Captain Chester, writing on the 17th of June, "have marched double marches; from their small numbers, every man, in addition, has been on daily duty. They have suffered severely from fever and cholera without a murmur." In fact, it was deemed politic to dwell exclusively on the bright side of the Goorka character. The Simla panic was talked of as if there had been no reasonable ground for any apprehension whatever; and the case being now changed, the "savage little demons," who had been conquered in a recent war by our "faithful Hindoostance sepoys," became recognised as the "gallant hardy mountaineers," whose inveterate hatred to the "treacherous Poorbahs" was alone a virtue calculated to counterbalance every less desirable characteristic. More unscrupulous auxiliaries in offensive warfare could scarcely have been found; no Pindarree of olden times ever loved pillage better than a modern Goorka, and probably none had so keen a zest for the work of destruction. No pen has traced, or perhaps ever can trace, even a sketch of the misery which must have been inflicted by the British army, and its hasty heterogeneous assemblage of irregular troops—with its terrible requirements of compulsory, and often unpaid, always ill-paid, labour from man and beast, and its other almost inevitable accompaniments of violence and pillage—on the helpless population of India. It is only an incidental remark here and there, which affords a glimpse of the working of what are termed military operations in a densely populated country. Mr. Greathed, for instance, mentions, that shortly after the second encounter at Ghazi-u-deen, while riding about the scene of action, he noticed that "a party of our people were destroying the village of Urthulla, to prevent the enemy from getting under cover in it in case of another attack. The elephants were engaged in pushing down the walls. The poor inhabitants are certainly to be pitied; but the destruction is a necessity: they were unluckily Jats, who are for the most part our friends."* No compensation appears to have been thought necessary in this case; if it had been, Mr. Greathed, as political agent specially attached to the field force, would hardly have left so important a point unnoticed. On the contrary, he speaks of the

"baggage people" being employed "in plundering the village of Urthulla" quite as a matter of course, not at all requiring the intervention of the provost-marshal, or the sharp correctives the mention of which are familiar to the readers of the Indian despatches of General Wellesley.

On the night of the 5th June, Brigadier Wilson and the Meerut force crossed the Jumna at Bhagput by a bridge of boats, "and slept like so many alligators on the sand till dawn."† On Sunday, the 7th, they joined the main body under Sir Henry Barnard at Alipoor, ten miles from Delhi. After the junction, the force in camp comprised about 600 cavalry, and 2,400 infantry, with twenty-two guns, besides the siege-train. The details were as follows:—

Sixteen horse artillery guns (Europeans); six horse battery guns (ditto); 9th Lancers; two squadrons Carabineers; six companies 60th Rifles; 75th foot; 1st Fusiliers; six companies 2nd Fusiliers; head-quarters Sirmoor battalion; and the portion of the sappers and miners which had not yet mutinied—about 150 in number. The siege-train consisted of eight 18-pounder guns, four 8-inch howitzers, four 8-inch mortars, and twelve 5½-inch mortars; and had attached to it a weak company of European artillery (4th of 6th battalion), and 100 European artillery recruits.

At 2 A.M. on the 8th of June, the troops marched from Alipoor to attack the enemy's advanced intrenched position at Badulce-ke-Serai, four miles from Delhi. The baggage was left behind until the result of the attack should be known, under the charge of a squadron of the Carabineers, a company of the Fusiliers, and the chief part of the contingent of the rajah of Jheend. The Serai (or open building for the reception of travellers) held by the mutineers, lay on the right of the Trunk road, and was defended by a sand-bag battery, erected on a small natural elevation. The main assault was made in front just as the day broke, and the lights in the enemy's camp became visible. The flank attack was delayed by the difficulty experienced by Brigadier Grant in getting his guns over some watercourses, and the fire of the enemy's heavy battery began to tell seriously on the main body; the men fell fast: and the staff offering a tempting mark, two officers, Colonel Chester (the adjutant-general) and Captain Russell, were mortally wounded by the same shot, and several horses were hit in the course of one or two minutes. When Colonel Chester fell, with his horse also mortally wounded under him, Captain Barnard, the son of the general,

* Greathed's *Letters*, p. 15.

† *Ibid.*, p. 24.

raised the head of the wounded man, and enabled him to see the nature of his injury; after which, knowing his case hopeless, he bade young Barnard leave him, and expired. The sufferings of Captain Russell were far more protracted: his leg had been shot off above the knee, and he lived for some hours in great bodily agony. But his mind was clear; and he died praying, in the words of the publican, "God be merciful to me a sinner."* After these officers were shot, the 75th were ordered to charge and take the heavy battery. The corps, led by Brigadier Showers and Colonel Herbert, accomplished this duty with the assistance of the 1st Fusiliers, and the insurgents fell back, abandoning their camp and several guns. The British pushed on in pursuit, clearing many gardens until they reached the cross-roads, one of which led to the city through the Subzee Mundee (or vegetable market) suburb, and the other to the cantonments. Here the troops divided into two columns, each of which marched on till they met on either side of a ridge, on which stood the Flagstaff tower, Hindoo Rao's house, and a mosque midway between these two afterwards famous positions. The insurgents had posted three guns at the Flagstaff tower, and from thence a cannonade was opened on the advancing force; but the guns were soon silenced by Sir Henry Barnard's column, which proceeded along the crest of the ridge, carrying all before it, until, on reaching Hindoo Rao's house, a junction was effected with Brigadier Wilson's column, which had come by the Subzee Mundee suburb, had been opposed on the way, and had captured an 18-pounder gun. The action terminated at about half-past nine.

The British camp was pitched on the parade-ground, having its rear protected by the canal, with the advantage of bridges on either extreme, which the enemy had previously attempted to destroy with only partial success. Several batteries were established on the ridge; but the nearest of them was 1,200 yards, or upwards, from the walls; deficiency in the number of troops, and character of ordnance, rendering it unsafe to approach nearer.† The main picket was at Hindoo Rao's house, a building which formerly belonged to a rich old Hindoo,

and had verandahs, outhouses, and every other accommodation on a most extensive scale. During the siege it is said to have afforded "a sort of protection to 800 troops, besides 200 or 300 coolies, servants, and camp-followers of all kinds;" and being built in the strong native fashion, it withstood, in the most surprising manner, the constant cannonading directed against it.‡ The picket was commanded from the very first by Major Reid, of the Sirmoor battalion; who never left his post even to come into camp, from the time he assumed command of it till the 14th of September, the day of the storming operations, when he was severely wounded.

The total loss on the side of the British, in the action of the 8th of June, was 51 killed, 132 wounded, and two missing. It has been asserted, that a thousand of the mutineers who came out never returned to Delhi. Their killed and wounded are supposed to have amounted to three or four hundred; and many took the opportunity of decamping to their homes after or during the battle. Thirteen guns were captured.

Major-general Reil, the provincial commander-in-chief, arrived at Alipoor, from Rawul Pindce, on the 8th of June, just as the troops were marching. Unwell and greatly fatigued by a rapid journey during intense heat, he took no part in the action, and never assumed command until after the death of Sir Henry Barnard, though his advice in matters of moment was freely sought and given.

On the morning of the 9th of June, the Guide corps—the first reinforcement sent from the Punjab by Lawrence—reached Delhi, under the command of Captain Daly. It consisted of three troops of cavalry and six companies of infantry, and had marched from Murdaun, on the Peshawur frontier, to Delhi, 580 miles in twenty-two of the hottest days in the year; and though the infantry were occasionally assisted with camels or ponies on the line of road, the march was a surprising one even for cavalry. The men showed extreme delight at finding their old commandant, Lieutenant Hodson, in camp; and, surrounding him with exclamations of "Burra scrai-wallah" (great in battle), they seized his bridle, dress, hands, and feet, and flung themselves down before his horse, frantic with joy. It seems that some unfortunate misunderstanding with the authorities, concerning the regimental accounts, had led to his removal from the

* The Chaplain's Narrative, p. 43.

† Campaign of the Delhi Army, by Major H. W. Norman, deputy adjutant-general; p. 12.

‡ Letter from Lieutenant Hawes, of the Guide corps.—Star, Sept. 18th, 1857.

corps two years before; and they rejoiced in his restoration to them, as much as he did in the prospect of again leading "the dear old Guides." He had not long to wait before hearing their well-known cheer as they followed him to battle, though under the immediate command of Captain Daly. That same afternoon the mutineers marched out of Delhi, and attacked the Hindoo Rao picket. The Guides moved up to support the position, and the insurgents were driven back into the city with considerable slaughter. Several lives were lost on the side of the British, including that of Quintin Battye, the youthful commandant of the Guides' cavalry—a popular and enthusiastic soldier, to whose amiable qualities Hodson bears full testimony; adding, "The brave boy died with a smile on his lip, and a Latin quotation on his tongue."*

No correct estimate could be formed of the strength of the force in Delhi. Besides the mutinous garrison, the Meerut rebels, and those who had flocked from Roorkee, Alighur, Boolundshuhur, Muttra, Ferozpoor, and Umballah, a strong reinforcement had immediately preceded the besieging army—namely, the Hurriana light infantry battalion, and the 4th irregular cavalry, which had mutinied at Hansi, Hissar, and Sirsa.

Hansi is a strong town, which, towards the close of the last century, was the chief place in the jaghire of the successful adventurer, George Thomas. It is situated eighty-nine miles north-west of Delhi. *Hissar* and *Sirsa* (two military stations of minor importance) lie fifteen and forty-five miles, respectively, further in the same direction. The circumstances of the outbreak have not been officially related; but, from private sources, it appears to have been sudden and unexpected. Mr. Taylor, the assistant in charge of the government cattle-farm at Hissar, was sitting playing chess at noon on the 30th of May, with another European in the civil service of the Company, when a servant rushed into the room, and announced the arrival of some sowars from Delhi. The Native troops and population seem to have risen immediately. The majority of the Europeans sought and found safety in flight. Mr. Taylor received several wounds, but succeeded in effecting his escape. Seven European men and seven women, with fifteen children and two Eurasian women, are stated to have perished in the return furnished by the officiating

commissioner of Hissar; but Mr. Taylor's list, likewise published by authority, and apparently grounded on more accurate data, gives the total number at fourteen. The magistrate, Mr. Wedderburn, and Lieutenant Barwell, adjutant of the Hurriana light cavalry, fell by the hands of the mutineers; while Mrs. Wedderburn, her child, and Mrs. Barwell, are thought to have been murdered by the customs' peons.†

The rajah of Putteela acted in the most noble manner towards the Hansi and Hissar fugitives. He sent out troops to search for them and cover their retreat; furnished them with every necessary, in the way of money, food, and clothing; and desired that whatever they might call for should be supplied gratis. The effect of this conduct was most beneficial to the British, and warrants the strong expression used by Mr. Douglas Forsyth, deputy-commissioner of the Umballah and adjacent districts—that "if it had not been for the rajah of Putteela, none of us in these Cis-Sutlej States would now be alive."

At Hissar several lives are also alleged to have been lost; but the official records are silent on the subject. The mutineers, after plundering the Hissar treasury, which contained about a lac of rupees (£10,000), marched off unopposed to Delhi. They arrived there, as has been stated, before General Barnard; but had it been otherwise, their entrance to the city could not have been prevented, at least not by means compatible with the rules adopted for the conduct of the campaign by the military commanders. Sir John, or Sir Henry Lawrence, or Nicholson, or any soldier or civilian acquainted with the native character, and alive to the paramount importance of wresting Delhi from the hands of the rebels in their first moment of weakness and utter incapacity, would probably, had they been entrusted with the direction of affairs, have marched on the city at all hazards, trusting to promptitude and energy, free pardons and liberal rewards, as the best mode of dealing with a frightened, excited, unreasoning multitude—without leaders, without a plan, and evidently without confidence in one another.

The distressing and humiliating position in which the British found themselves on sitting down before Delhi, was indeed calculated to teach "a terrible lesson on the

* See p. 118, *ante*.

† *London Gazette* (2nd supplement), May 6th, 1858.

evils of delay." Any advantage gained thereby was, as ought to have been foreseen, more than counterbalanced by the rapid growth of the enemy's resources.*

Before a siege-train could be procured, a marked change had taken place in the attitude of the mutineers. The name of Delhi in revolt offered to discontented adventurers throughout India, and especially to Mohammedans, an almost irresistible attraction; and while the British raised regiments of doubtful or dangerous character with toil, by dint of the most unremitting energy, and at an enormous cost, thousands flocked in at the open gates of the city, and seized the weapons and manned the guns left ready to their hand.

The long waited for siege-train, when it arrived, proved quite insufficient for the work required. "No one," as Mr. Greathed naïvely remarks, "seems to have thought that the guns at the disposal of the mutineers are 24-pounders, and that the 18-pounders we brought with us were not likely to silence them; and it is for this reason our approach to the town is rendered so difficult. There was certainly an entire miscalculation of the power of resistance afforded to the rebels by their command of the Delhi arsenal."†

In fact, the British troops, instead of the besiegers, became literally the besieged, and were thankful for the shelter offered by the ridge on which the advanced pickets stood, and which enabled them to say—"Here we are in camp, as secure against assaults as if we were in Delhi, and the mutineers outside."‡ Even this was not always the case; for at sunrise on the morning of the 12th of June, the most advanced picket, that at the Flagstaff tower, was fiercely attacked, and nearly carried by surprise, by a large body of mutineers who had contrived to approach unobserved under cover of night, and conceal themselves in the ravines in the compound or grounds attached to Sir T. Metcalfe's late house, situated between the Flagstaff tower and the river. The picket was hard pressed; the two artillery guns were nearly taken; Captain Knox, and several of the 75th foot, were killed: the enemy even descended the camp side of the ridge; and three of the rebels were killed in the sepoy lines, within a short distance of the tents, before rein-

forcements could be brought up to support the disputed position, and drive off the insurgents. To prevent the recurrence of a similar danger, a large picket was sent to occupy Metcalfe's house—a precaution which would have been taken earlier but for the difficulty of providing relief, and which threw up, as it were, a left flank to the British defences, and rendered it almost impossible for the enemy to pass round to attack the camp on that side. The attempt upon the Flagstaff tower had hardly been repulsed, when other bodies of insurgents advanced against Hindoo Rao's house, and through the Subzee Munde, into the gardens on the right flank of the camp. The first of these movements was inconsiderable; but supports of all arms had to be moved up to oppose the second. Major Jacob led the 1st Fusiliers against the rebels, and drove them out of the gardens with much slaughter.§

The manifest insufficiency of the British force to besiege, much less blockade, Delhi, led certain of the officers to desire to attempt its capture by a *coup-de-main*; and Sir Henry Barnard directed three engineer officers (Wilberforce Greathed, Chesney, and Maunsell), assisted by Hodson, to form a project of attack, of which, when laid before the general, he highly approved.|| Two gates of the city were to be blown in by powder-bags, by which means two columns of the attacking force (comprising some 1,700 or 1,800 infantry) were to effect an entrance. Early on the morning of the 13th of June, corps were formed in readiness; and the Rifles had actually got within 400 or 500 yards of the city wall, unperceived by the enemy, when they were recalled in consequence of "the mistake of a superior officer in delaying the withdrawal of the pickets, without which the infantry regiments were mere skeletons." The abandonment of the plan became inevitable, as daylight was fast approaching, and it was felt that success could not be anticipated except as the result of surprise. Major Norman pronounces the accident which hindered the attempt, an interposition of Providence on behalf of the British; and considers that defeat, or even partial success, would have been ruin; while complete success would not have achieved the results subsequently obtained.¶ Considerable difference of opinion, however, prevailed on the subject.

* Hodson's *Twelve Years in India*, p. 198.

† Greathed's *Letters*, p. 18.

‡ *Ibid.*, p. 50.

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§ Norman's *Campaign of the Delhi Army*, p. 13.

|| Hodson's *Twelve Years in India*, p. 203.

¶ *Ibid.*, p. 14.

Commissioner Greathed lamented the failure of the scheme, believing that an important opportunity had been lost through "the obtuseness of one individual."* It was, however, a plan which could not be revived after having once been abandoned; for the enemy, though not aware of the near approach of the European troops at the time, must, it was considered, have subsequently heard of it by some channel or other, and would be more on their guard for the future. Moreover, General Barnard probably repented of having sanctioned the attempt; for he is accused of having been induced, by his Crimean experience, to overestimate the amount of resistance to be expected within the walls, and to be "disposed to treat the Pandies as Russians."† From this period almost daily sallies were made from Delhi; the British troops were much harassed, and their losses bore "a sadly large proportion to their successes."‡ The rainy season was approaching; the hospitals were full; some cases of cholera had appeared in camp; and while crippled in all their operations by the deficiency in the calibre and number of their guns, and also of men to work them, the British had the mortification of seeing constant reinforcements arriving, like tributary streams, to feed the great reservoir of revolt. The 60th Native infantry regiment reached Delhi on the 13th of June, having mutinied at Rohtuck. Colonel Seaton and the officers, though fired on by their men, succeeded in gaining the British camp in safety after a ride of fifty miles. Three or four days later, the Nusseerabad brigade joined the rebel garrison, bringing in triumph the Jellalabad field battery, under the charge of the famous company of artillery which, by Lord Ellenborough's decree, was never to be separated from the guns it had once served so gallantly. On the 19th of June, those very guns, decorated (also by Lord Ellenborough's order) with a mural crown, were turned with fatal effect against

the Europeans. An hour before sunset, an attack was made by a strong body of the enemy, consisting chiefly of the Nusseerabad mutineers, on the rear of the British. The action continued some time after dark. The firing on both sides then gradually ceased, and the combatants quitted the field. Our loss was twenty killed, and seventy-seven wounded. Three officers fell, including Major Yule, of the 9th Lancers. His body was found covered with gashes, and four of his men lay dead beside him. Captain Daly, the gallant commandant of the Guide corps, was badly wounded, and Lieutenant Hodson was appointed to supply his place. Brigadier Hope Grant, who led the troops, had his horse shot under him, and was only saved by the devotion of two men of his own regiment, and two orderly sowars of the 4th irregular cavalry. A very serious accident occurred by reason of the darkness, our own guns firing into our own men.§

At a council of war held on the 17th, it had been formally resolved to wait for reinforcements, and, in the interim, to "do nothing but fire away long shots|| at the distance of a mile, and repel the enemy's attacks"—a mode of procedure which excited the intense disgust of the younger and more enterprising officers, who exclaimed with Hodson, "If only Sir Henry Lawrence were in camp!" Hodson adds—"The mismanagement of affairs is perfectly sickening. Nothing the rebels can do will equal the evils arising from incapacity and indecision."¶

The action of the 19th exercised a depressing influence on the British camp; and it was currently reported, "that the general conceived misgivings as to the wisdom of the force continuing before Delhi."** On the 22nd, reinforcements from the Punjab, amounting to about 850 men and five guns, reached the British camp; but the ranks of the mutinous garrison were also replenished by the arrival of bands of rebels

* Greathed's *Letters*, p. 44. The obtuse individual in question is not named; but it was probably the brigadier on duty, who refused to withdraw the pickets guarding the guns on the height on any authority less than a written command from General Barnard. Hodson speaks of him as "the man who first lost Delhi, and has now, by folly, prevented its being recaptured."—Rotton's *Narrative*, p. 72. Hodson's *Twelve Years in India*, p. 208.

† Greathed's *Letters*, p. 92.

‡ Hodson's *Twelve Years in India*, p. 217.

§ Rotton's *Narrative*, p. 92.

|| The round shot from the enemy's batteries occasionally did much damage to the advanced pickets. One, according to Mr. Rotton, was fired, on the 17th of June, into Hindoo Rao's house, which killed Ensign Wheatley, of the 54th N. I., as he lay asleep in his own apartment, and, in its course, struck down eight other men, of whom six died on the spot, and the other two were mortally wounded.—*Narrative of the Siege of Delhi*, p. 86.

¶ Hodson's *Twelve Years in India*, p. 216.

** Rotton's *Narrative*, p. 92.

from Jullundur and Phillour, composed of the 6th light cavalry, the 3rd, 36th, and 61st N.I., which regiments had mutinied during the first week of June.

The 23rd of June being the centenary of Plassy, was anxiously expected, both within and without the walls of Delhi, on account of an alleged prophecy of wide circulation, that the British raj was to expire after a hundred years' existence. The enemy issued forth in considerable force, occupied the Subzee Mundee suburb, and attacked the Hindoo Rao ridge. The contest lasted eleven hours (from 6 p.m. to 5 a.m.) before the rebels were finally compelled to retreat, Subzee Mundee being carried by the Rifles, Goorkas, and Guides. The British casualties were—one officer (Lieutenant Jackson, of the Fusiliers) and thirty-eight men killed, and 118 wounded. The mutineers were said to have lost 400 killed and 300 wounded. Among the incidents of the battle talked over that night in camp, the most popular was a grim practical joke, enacted while the rebels were being gradually driven out of the Subzee Mundee suburb. A Poorbeah, thinking all was over, put his head out of the window of one of the houses, in the shade of which a few Europeans and Goorkas were resting. Quick as thought, a Goorka sprang up, seized the rebel by his hair, and, with one sweep of his "kookery" (crooked sword), took off his head.* From this time an advanced picket was stationed in Subzee Mundee, and maintained during the rest of the siege; consisting of 180 Europeans, posted between a serai on one side, and a Hindoo temple on the other side of the Great Trunk road, both of which were strengthened and rendered defensible by the engineers.

The new adjutant-general, Colonel Chester's successor, reached the camp on the 24th of June, which the annalists of the siege mark as a red-letter day for that reason. Hodson writes—"Neville Chamberlain has arrived, and he ought to be worth a thousand men to us;" but the entry in his diary for that same day, records

the arrival of the following telegram from Agra:—"Heavy firing at Cawnpoor; result not known."†

It is strange now to look back on the deep gloom, the horrible uncertainty, which overshadowed the prospects of the Europeans in Northern India; and to contrast it with the easy matter-of-course manner in which the authorities in London received the startling intelligence of mutiny, massacre, and the occupation of Delhi. While Sir John Lawrence, the actual viceroy of Northern India, was using all means, and running all hazards, to increase the force before Delhi, and was urging the maintenance of the siege, not simply as the means of preserving the power, but of saving the lives of his widely-scattered countrymen—Mr. Vernon Smith, the president of the India Board, was assuring the House of Commons that it was "notorious that Delhi might be easily surrounded, so that the place could be reduced by famine, if not by force." For his own part, however, Mr. Smith entertained no doubt that it would be reduced by force immediately that a man of the well-known vigour of his gallant friend, General Anson, should appear before the walls. The mail had brought advices, that an "ample force" of infantry, cavalry, and artillery would shortly be before the town. "Unfortunately," Mr. Smith added, "I cannot therefore apprise the house that the fort of Delhi has been razed to the ground; but I hope that ample retribution has been by this time inflicted on the mutineers."‡

The next Indian mail brought tidings calculated to convince even the most ignorant or indifferent, that the capture, whether by storm or blockade, of a large, strong, well-fortified, and abundantly supplied city, with a river running beneath its walls, was not an easy matter: other news followed, which spread grief and fear throughout the United Kingdom; telling the rapid spread of mutiny, in its most terrible form, throughout the entire Bengal army.§

sepooy army is not in revolt; it does not even appear that it is discontented;" and this in utter contempt of the warning of General Hearsey, and of the vicinity to the seat of government of Barrackpoor, where the "greased cartridges" had already produced rampant mutiny, manifested in the act of Mungul Pandey—the first of the Pandies—and the more than tacit approval of his comrades.

* Hodson's *Twelve Years in India*, p. 215.

† *Ibid.*, p. 216.

‡ Indian debate, June 29th, 1857.

§ In the debate of June 23rd, Mr. Smith had informed the house that the 19th N.I. had been disbanded on account of its mutinous behaviour, but there was no intention of disbanning any other portion of the Native army. The Calcutta correspondent of the *Times* (June 24th) likewise stated, "The

CHAPTER IX.

ROHILCUND, BAREILLY, MORADABAD, SEHARUNPOOR, SHAHJEHANPOOR, BUDAON,
AND ALMORA.—MAY 21ST TO JUNE 3RD, 1857.

ROHILCUND lies between Oude and the Ganges, which river separates it from the Dooab. The five military stations of this province contained the following troops at the time of the outbreak :—

BAREILLY.—The 18th and 68th N.I.—*Europeans*, 28; *Natives*, 2,317. The 8th irregular cavalry—*Europeans*, 3; *Natives*, 547. The 6th company of Bengal Native artillery—4 *Europeans*, and 110 *Natives*. There were, besides, 52 of all ranks in hospital.

MORADABAD.—The 29th N.I.—*Europeans*, 16; *Natives*, 1,078. Sick of all ranks in hospital, 43. Detail of foot artillery—*European*, 1; *Natives*, 50.

SEHARUNPOOR.—Detachment of N. I.—*Europeans*, none; *Natives*, 82.

SHAHJEHANPOOR.—28th N. I.—*Europeans*, 16; *Natives*, 1,106. Sick of all ranks in hospital, 11. Detail of foot artillery—*Europeans*, none; *Natives*, 29.

BUDAON.—Detachment of N. I.—*Europeans*, none; *Natives*, 50.

The military arrangements for the Kumaon district, were under the charge of the same officer (Brigadier Sibbald) as those of Rohilcund; and both Kumaon and Rohilcund were included in the Meerut division. *Almora*, the chief place of Kumaon, was memorable for having been the scene of the decisive contest with the Goorkas in 1815.

ALMORA.—66th N. I. (Goorkas)—*Europeans*, 48; *Natives*, 680. Sick of all ranks, 22. Detachment of Sirmoor battalion—*Europeans*, none; *Natives*, 28. Company of artillery—*Europeans*, 2; *Natives*, 105.

The whole of the above troops, excepting the Goorkas, rebelled in the course of a few days.

Bareilly, the head-quarters of the Rohilcund division, is only 152 miles from Delhi; and the tidings of the assertion of Mohammedan supremacy in the imperial city, travelled fast, and created great excitement among the Rohillas generally. "A very bad and uneasy feeling" was considered, by Brigadier Sibbald, to be prevalent among the Bareilly soldiery; but he attributed its origin to distrust of the intentions of the British government; and on the 21st of May, he ordered a general parade of the troops in

the cantonments, and begged them to dismiss from their minds the causeless dread that prevailed among them. The sepoy appeared much relieved by his assurances, and said they "had commenced a new life." In a despatch dated May 23rd, the brigadier stated that the reports from Moradabad, Shahjehanpoor, and Almora, were most satisfactory, and that the conduct of the 8th irregular cavalry was "beyond praise."* This last point was remarkable, inasmuch as the regiment in question consisted chiefly of Patans taken from the neighbourhood of Delhi. With regard to Moradabad, it is evident that the brigadier thought it best to take a very lenient view of the outbreak which had occurred there. A party of the 29th N.I. had actually broken open the gaol, and released a great number of prisoners, including a notorious villain named Nujjoo Khan, who was under sentence of transportation for life (for having attempted to murder a European magistrate), and who subsequently became a rebel leader of some note.† The brigadier does not enter into particulars; but he urges, that "a free pardon from the highest authorities" should be extended to the troops in general; and he adds, that the 29th were "proving their repentance for the outbreak of bad men among them." The temper of the population was, however, far less promising: indeed, throughout Rohilcund, disorganisation in the civil government seems to have preceded mutiny in the cantonments. Mr. Edwards, the magistrate and collector of the Budaon district, says, that as early as the 19th of May, the infection had "spread from the tracts on the right bank of the Ganges, which were by that time in open rebellion. Bands of marauders sprang up, as it were, by magic, and commenced plundering on the roads, and sacking and plundering villages."‡ The officers and civilians became alarmed, and sent their wives and children to Nynsee Tal, a sanitary station, seventy miles distant, in the Kumaon district. The sepoy remonstrated against

Edwards, judge of Benares, and late magistrate and collector of Budaon, in Rohilcund; p. 3.

† *Ibid.*, p. 2.

* Further Parl. Papers, 1857; p. 64.

† *Personal Adventures during the Indian Rebellion in Rohilcund, Futteghur, and Oude*; by William

this evidence of distrust, but happily in vain. In the 8th irregular cavalry, however, such perfect reliance continued to be placed, that their commandant, Captain Mackenzie, was empowered to raise additional troops for permanent service; and the cavalry lines were appointed as the place of rendezvous in the event of an outbreak.

Nor was this confidence without foundation. The corps, it is true, succumbed; but it is evident the men had no systematic treachery in view, but were simply carried away by what to them must have been an irresistible impulse. At Bareilly there yet remained a lineal descendant of the brave but ill-fated Hafiz Rehmet, the Rohilla chief who fell when British bayonets were hired out by Warren Hastings, to enable Shujah Dowlah, of Oude, to "annex" a neighbouring country. Khan Bahadoor Khan was a venerable-looking man, of dignified manners, and considerable ability—much respected by both Europeans and natives. Being a pensioner of government in his double capacity as representative of the former ruler of the country, and also as a retired Principal Sudder Ameen (or native judge), the old man was considered, by the commissioner and collector, as identified with British interests; and he was daily closeted with them as a counsellor in their anxious discussions regarding the state of affairs.* From subsequent events, he is believed to have been instrumental in fomenting disaffection, rather than to have been carried away by the torrent; but no very conclusive evidence has yet appeared on the subject. On the 29th of May, some of the Native officers reported to Colonel Troup, the second in command, that whilst bathing in the river, the men of the 18th and 68th N.I. had sworn to rise in the middle of the day and massacre the Europeans. Notice was immediately given to Captain Mackenzie; under whom the irregular cavalry turned out with the utmost promptitude, and appeared quite resolved to stand by the Europeans.†

No outbreak occurred during this or the following day; but great numbers of the 45th mutineers, from Ferozpoor, passed through Bareilly on both these days, and spread alarm among the yet obedient troops,

by assuring them that a large European force, with artillery, had been concentrated in the vicinity of the station, and that the destruction of the whole of the Native regiments had been resolved on by the "*gora logue*" (white people). The Native lines were a scene of confusion throughout the night of Saturday the 30th; few of the men retired to their own huts; and the Europeans were in a state of extreme anxiety, having received warning of the determination at which the irregular cavalry had arrived—of remaining strictly neutral in the approaching struggle, and neither raising their hands against their countrymen nor the Europeans. The confidence of some of the officers in their men was unbroken to the last. For instance, at nine o'clock on the Sunday morning, Major Pearson, who was in command of the 18th, called on Colonel Troup, and assured him that his men were all right. Two hours later a gun was fired by the artillery, and immediately afterwards the sepoys began firing on the officers' bungalows. Brigadier Sibbald mounted his horse, and rode towards the cavalry lines, but was met by a party of infantry, who shot him in the chest: the brave old soldier rode on till he reached the appointed rendezvous, and then dropped dead from his horse. Ensign Tucker perished while endeavouring to save the life of the sergeant-major. The chief part of the Europeans, civil and military, reached the cavalry lines in safety, and agreed to retire on Nynsee Tal. The troopers were assembled in readiness to join in the retreat, when Captain Mackenzie came up, and asked Colonel Troup's permission to comply with the wishes of the men, who desired "to have a crack at the mutineers." They returned accordingly, and soon came in sight of the rebels. The result may be readily guessed. The sight of the green flag—the symbol of their faith—sufficed to turn the scale with the troopers; and when directed to charge upon their coreligionists, they halted, began to murmur, and ended by turning their horses' heads, and ranging themselves around the same banner. The officers (Captain Mackenzie and Lieutenant Becher), with a faithful remnant of their late regiment,‡ were compelled to rejoin the party proceeding to

three motherless boys, who were left in the lines of the mutineers. The old man grasped the hand of his commander, and, looking up to heaven with tears in his eyes, exclaimed, "No, I will go on with you,

* *Mutiny of the Bengal Army*, p. 198.

† Col. Troup's report.—Further Parl. Papers, p. 138.

‡ Mohammed Nizam, a Native officer, was told by Captain Mackenzie to go back and look after his

Nynee Tal. Mr. Alexander, the commissioner, had a very narrow escape. He was ill and in bed, when the gun, the signal for mutiny, was fired. His native servant rushed in, and begged him to fly. The commissioner declared himself unable to ride, but was lifted on to his saddle in an almost fainting state, by his attendant. The horse took fright at the firing, and ran away, happily taking the Nynee Tal road, and thus saving the life of its rider. The fate of those who did not succeed in effecting their escape has not been fully ascertained. Six officers—namely, Major Pearson, Captains Richardson and Hathorn, Lieutenant Stewart, and Ensign Dyson, at first believed to be concealed in a village seven miles from Delhi—are stated, in the *Gazette* of May 6th, 1858, as still missing, and supposed to have been killed by the villagers. Messrs. Robertson and Raikes, judges of Bareilly; Dr. Hay, son-in-law to the late Lieutenant-governor Thomason; Mr. Wyatt, the deputy-collector; and Dr. Carl Buch, principal of the Bareilly college, remained behind. They are alleged to have been formally tried by the mutineers, who omitted none of the usual forms, and made Khan Bahadoor Khan act as the judge. A jury was sworn, witnesses were examined, a conviction obtained, and sentence of death passed with affected solemnity on the unfortunate gentlemen, who were then publicly hanged in front of the gaol. To appreciate the force of this horrible sarcasm, it must be remembered that our administration of justice, both civil and criminal, was detested by the natives; and that a Rohilcund magistrate had been, for more than a year before the outbreak, representing "the great abuse of the power of the civil courts, and the reckless manner in which they decreed the sale of rights and interests connected with the soil, in satisfaction of petty debts, and the dangerous dislocation of society which was in consequence being produced."* Moreover, one of the victims, Mr. Wyatt, had himself published, anonymously, a book entitled *Revelations respecting the Police, Magistracy, and Criminal Courts*,† which sufficiently accounts for the deep-rooted animosity excited by our system, and which naturally extended to its administrators.

and do my duty." The children did not perish, but suffered much from poverty and neglect.—Raikes' *Revolt*, p. 155.

* Edwards' *Personal Adventures*, p. 14.

Dr. Hansbrow, the medical officer in charge of the gaol, ascended to the roof of that building, and attempted to resist the insurgents, but was overpowered and put to death. The prisoners, to the number of about 4,000, were released.‡ The treasury was plundered, the cantonments fired, and many lives were lost in the contest for booty, which ensued between the sepoy and the population.

At *Shahjehanpoor*, a mutiny occurred on the same Sunday, of which no official account has ever been furnished; for those whose duty it would have been to report the details to government, were themselves among the victims. The 28th N.I. rose *en masse* during the time of morning service, and some of the men entered the church, murdered the collector (Mr. Ricketts) and Dr. Bowling, and wounded Ensign Spens. Captain James, the officer in command of the regiment, was killed while endeavouring to recall his men to a sense of duty; Captain Salmon was wounded while running to the parade-ground; but he, with Ensign Spens and twenty-six other persons, including eight ladies and four children, made their escape to Mohumdee, a station in Oude, where their arrival caused great excitement among the Native troops, and accelerated the catastrophe in which they perished.

The account here given is derived from a letter written by the assistant-commissioner of Mohumdee, Captain Patrick Orr, to his brother at Lucknow.§ Circumstantial narratives of the Shahjehanpoor mutiny were published in various Indian journals; but they contradict one another in important particulars, and are probably all equally fictitious.

Budaon is about thirty miles from Bareilly. In the afternoon of Sunday, the 31st, intelligence was received that crowds of released convicts were thronging the Bareilly road, and were already within eight miles of Budaon; and further, that a detachment of the mutineers were in full march thither, in the assurance of being joined by the treasury guard in plundering and burning the station. The magistrate, Mr. Edwards, whose narrative has been already quoted, felt that the discontent of the population rendered it hopeless to attempt to oppose the insurgents. Mr. Phillips, the

† Ostensibly by "Orderly Panchkooree Khan."

‡ Further Parl. Papers, 1857; p. 2.

§ Gubbins' *Mutiny in Oudh*, p. 123; Rees' *Siege of Lucknow*, p. 48.



magistrate of Etah, was at this time at Budaon, having come thus far on his way to Bareilly, whither he was proceeding to procure military aid to put down disturbances in his own district. On learning what had occurred, he mounted his horse, and with an escort composed of a dozen horsemen (some belonging to different regiments of irregular horse, others common police sowars), dashed off at full gallop, in order to reach the Ghauts across the Ganges before the convicts or rebels could close the road, and prevent his return to Etah. Edwards was sorely tempted to make his escape also. His wife and child had previously found refuge at Nynce Tal; but he considered it his duty "to stick to the ship as long as she floated." He remained the only European officer in charge of a district, containing a lawless population of nearly 1,100 souls, with a Mohammedan deputy-collector for his sole assistant. "I went," he says, "into my room, and prayed earnestly that God would protect and guide me, and enable me to do my duty. I then summoned my kotwal, and arranged with him as best we could, for maintaining, as long as possible, the peace of the town." At ten at night, Mr. Donald, an indigo planter, and his son; Mr. Gibson, a patrol in the customs department, temporarily on duty in the district; and Mr. Stewart and his wife and family (Eurasians), sought protection in Mr. Edwards' house. By congregating together, however, they rather increased than diminished their mutual danger, by attracting attention, which was the more to be deprecated, "as some of the party were at feud with the people of the district, in consequence of having purchased estates, sold under harsh circumstances by decrees of our civil courts." This statement is followed by others, which deserve quotation in full, as illustrating the gulf that opened at the feet of the governing race the moment the Bengal mercenaries hoisted the standard of revolt.

"To the large number of these sales during the past twelve or fifteen years, and the operation of our revenue system, which has had the result of destroying the gentry of the country, and breaking up the village communities, I attribute solely the disorganisation of this and the neighbouring districts in these provinces. By fraud or chicanery, a vast number of the estates of families of rank and influence have been alienated, either wholly or in part, and have been purchased by new men, chiefly traders or government officials, without character or influence over their tenantry. * * * The very first people who came in to me, imploring aid, were of this new proprietary body, to whom I had a

right to look for vigorous and efficient efforts in the maintenance of order. On the other hand, those who really could control the vast masses of the rural population, were interested in bringing about a state of disturbance and general anarchy."

In adverting to the manufacture and distribution of the chupatties in the North-Western Provinces, Mr. Edwards says—"I truly believe that the rural population of all classes among whom these cakes spread, were as ignorant as I was myself of their real object; but it was clear they were a secret sign to be on the alert; and the minds of the people were, through them, kept watchful and excited. As soon as the disturbances broke out at Meerut and Delhi, the cakes explained themselves, and the people at once perceived what was expected from them. In Budaon, the mass of the population rose in a body, and the entire district became a scene of anarchy and confusion. The ancient proprietary body took the opportunity of murdering or expelling the auction purchasers, and resumed possession of their hereditary estates. * * * The rural classes would never have joined in rebelling with the sepoys, whom they hated, had not these causes of discontent already existed. They evinced no sympathy whatever about the cartridges, or flour said to be made of human bones, and could not have been acted on by any cry of their religion being in danger. It is questions involving their rights and interests in the soil, and hereditary holdings invariably termed by them 'jan se azeez' (*dearer than life*), which excite them to a dangerous degree."

At six o'clock on Monday afternoon, the company of the 68th N.I., on guard at the treasury, broke into open mutiny, released 300 prisoners confined in the gaol, and seized the money entrusted to their charge, amounting to about £15,000. The smallness of the sum was a great disappointment: they had expected to find £70,000 in the treasury; and would have done so, had not Mr. Edwards, anticipating the outbreak, refused to receive the customary payments of the zemindars. Directly after the rise of the guard, a party of the Bareilly mutineers entered the station, and the Native police threw away their badges and fraternised with the rebels. The released convicts issued from the gaol, and proceeded, hooting and yelling, to the magistrate's house. The Europeans heard the ominous sounds; and mounting the horses which had been standing saddled all the day, rode for their lives. Mr. Edwards and the two Donalds succeeded in forcing their way, revolver in hand, through the crowd; but Mr. Gibson was killed. The others were subsequently protected by Mooltan Khan—a "fine powerful Patan, between forty and fifty years of age," related to, and in the service of, a petty chief, known as the nawab of Shumsabad, a place

* Edwards' *Personal Adventures*, pp. 13—17.

near the Ganges. Mooltan Khan told the fugitives that their escape was impossible, on account of the state of the country; and he seemed inclined either to leave them to their fate, or to allow the half-a-dozen troopers appointed by the nawab to escort the Europeans on their way, to dispose of them summarily. Edwards saw that a crisis had arrived; and riding up to Mooltan Khan, he laid his hand on his shoulder, saying, "Have you a family, and little children?" The Patan nodded. "Are they not dependent on you for bread?" "Yes," was the answer. "Well," rejoined Edwards, "so have I; and I am confident you are not the man to take my life and destroy their means of support." Mooltan Khan hesitated a moment, and then said, "I will save your life if I can; follow me." He set off at a gallop, the three Europeans after him; and despite the remonstrances of the troopers, who desired the death of the fugitives, Mooltan Khan conveyed them by a circuitous cross-country route, avoiding the hostile villagers, and enabled them to reach a place of temporary safety; that is to say, a station not then submerged beneath the flood of mutiny. During Mr. Edwards' wanderings, he was attended with unwavering fidelity by an Afghan servant, and by a Seik named Wuzeer Sing, who had retired from the 29th regiment of N.I. in April, 1857, to join a small band of native Christians resident at Budaon, and had subsequently been employed as an orderly.

Moradabad.—News of the outbreak and massacre at Bareilly reached Moradabad on the 2nd of June, and a marked alteration took place in the demeanour of the 29th N.I., and in that of the population. The treasury, containing 75,000 rupees, was under the charge of the sepoy, who commenced plundering it on the 3rd of June. The sepoy, disappointed by the smallness of the booty, seized the treasurer, carried him up to the guns, and threatened to blow him away unless he disclosed where the supposed remainder was hidden. Mr. Saunders (the magistrate) and Mr. Wilson (the judge) succeeded in rescuing their countryman, but not without danger to themselves; for a few of the mutineers put the percussion-caps on their muskets, and took deliberate aim at the retreating Europeans. Some of the Native officers rushed forward, and reminding the men that they had taken an oath to refrain from bloodshedding, persuaded them to drop their weapons.

Mr. Wilson had great influence with the 29th N.I.; his knowledge of the language having enabled him both to harangue them publicly, and converse familiarly with them in their lines. To this cause, and the nerve and moderation evinced by both officers and civilians, may be attributed the absence of the tragic excesses committed in other stations. The regiment, and artillery detachment, proceeded quietly to appropriate the government treasure, the opium, and all the plate-chests, and other valuable property of private individuals, which had been sent for security to the government treasury. The Native police withdrew, and hid themselves; and the Europeans, with their wives and children, quitted the station; some proceeding to Meerut, others to Nynnee Tal. There were at Moradabad several Native officers on leave from their regiments, whose services had been previously placed at the disposal of the local authorities. They volunteered to escort the Europeans to Meerut; the offer was accepted, and the promise fulfilled.*

The various mutinous regiments of Rohilcund united, and marched to Delhi, where their co-operation was much desired, as we learn from the following characteristic epistle, intercepted at Haupper (near Meerut):—

"From the Officers of the Army at Delhi, to the Officers of the Bareilly and Moradabad Regiments.— If you are coming to help us, it is incumbent on you that if you eat your food there, you wash your hands here, for here the fight is going on with the English; and by the goodness of God, even one defeat to us is ten to them, and our troops are assembled here in large numbers. It is now necessary for you to come here; for large rewards will be conferred by the king of kings, the centre of prosperity, the King of Delhi. We are looking out most anxiously for you, like fasters watching for the call of the mezzin [the signal that the fast is ended].

*"Come, come for there is no rose
Without the spring of your presence.
The opening bud with drought
Is as an infant without milk."*†

On the 1st of July, the longing eyes of the rebel Delhi garrison were gladdened, and those of the besiegers mortified, by the sight of the Rohilcund mutineers, who were watched by friends and foes crossing the Jumna in boats (the bridge being broken), and marching into one of the seven gates of the city in military array, with infantry, cavalry, artillery, and some hundred cart-loads of treasure.

* Further Parl. Papers, pp. 9—11.

† *Daily News*, August 17th, 1857. Bombay Special Correspondent.

CHAPTER X.

OUDE, LUCKNOW, SEETAPOOR, MOHUMDEE, MULLAON, BAHRAETCH, GONDAH,
MULLAPOOR, FYZABAD, SALONE, AND DURIABAD.—MAY 16TH TO JULY 4TH, 1857.

OUDE.—The efforts of Sir Henry Lawrence were successful in preserving the tranquillity of Oude up to the end of May. In the meantime, he had taken precautions in anticipation of a calamity which he considered nothing short of the speedy recapture of Delhi could avert. On the 16th of May, he requested the Supreme government, by telegraph, to entrust him with plenary military power in Oude; which was immediately granted.* He was appointed brigadier-general, and he lost not a moment in entirely changing the disposition of the troops. Arrangements for Lucknow, he considered, might be satisfactorily made; but the unprotected condition of Allahabad, Benares, and especially of Cawnpoor, filled him with alarm; and he wrote urgently to the governor-general, entreating that no expense might be spared in sending Europeans to reinforce that place. At midnight on the 20th, an application for aid was dispatched from thence to Lucknow (fifty miles distant), and was answered by the immediate dispatch of fifty men of H.M.'s 32nd, and two squadrons of Native cavalry. The cavalry were not needed at Cawnpoor; and Captain Fletcher Hayes projected, and obtained leave to attempt, the expedition against the Etah rajah, the melancholy result of which has been already related.

Lucknow itself needed every precaution which Sir Henry Lawrence had the means of taking. It extended along the right bank of the Goomtee for four miles, and its buildings covered an area of seven miles. It contained, according to Mr. Raikes, 200,000 fighting-men, and as many more armed citizens. Sleeman estimated the total population at 1,000,000 persons;† others have placed it at 1,200,000: but no census had been attempted either by the Native or European government. The rising of the Lucknow people was anticipated by the resident Europeans as a very probable event, for the plain reason that, in the words of one of the annalists of the siege, "we

had done very little to merit their love, and much to merit their detestation;" and "the people in general, and especially the poor, were dissatisfied, because they were taxed directly and indirectly in every way."‡ The mutiny of the Native troops was still more confidently expected; and Sir Henry Lawrence was urged to prevent it by disarming them: but he considered that this measure, though practicable and even desirable had the capital only required to be cared for, might precipitate an outbreak at Cawnpoor and at the out-stations of Oude, and therefore ought not to be adopted except in the last extremity. In the distribution of the forces, the chief object had been to station the Europeans where they would suffer least from exposure to the climate; and the natives had been entrusted with the sole charge of several important positions. It became necessary to make a new arrangement, and likewise to reduce the number of stations, that, in the event of an outbreak, the Europeans might not be cut off in detail. "We had eight posts," writes Sir H. Lawrence to Sir Hugh Wheeler, on the 20th of May: "as Sir C. Napier would say, we were like chips in porridge. We have given up four posts, and greatly strengthened three."§

Of these three, the *Muchee Bhawn* was the one which was at the onset most relied on. This fort, which derives its name of *Muchee* (fish)|| from the device over the gateway, and *Bhawn* (Sanskrit for house), had the appearance of a formidable and secure stronghold, and was held by the natives to be almost impregnable. It occupied a commanding position with regard to the town; and advantage was taken of this by planting cannon on its walls; or where that could not be done, supplying the deficiency with "jingals," or immense blunderbusses moving on pivots. All the magazine stores, previously under the charge of sepoys, were removed into the *Muchee Bhawn*, and a company of Europeans placed on guard there; supplies of wheat, and all sorts of

* Appendix to Parl. Papers on Mutiny, p. 187.

† Raikes' *Revolt*, p. 104. Sleeman's *Oude*, vol. i., p. 136.

‡ Rees' *Siege of Lucknow*, p. 34.

§ Appendix to Parl. Papers on Mutiny, p. 311.

|| The order of the Fish was the highest and most coveted distinction in the Mogul empire.

provisions, were laid in, and also very largely into the Residency, which was the post next in strength. At the treasury, within the Residency compound, were stationed 130 Europeans, 200 Natives, and six guns: the sepoys were allowed to remain on guard at the treasury tent; but the guns were so disposed as to give the Europeans complete command over the tent, in the event of an attempt upon it.

A copy of the proclamation issued at Agra, promising immunity from punishment to all sepoys not concerned in the murderous attacks upon Europeans, now reached Lucknow. Sir Henry Lawrence followed the example of Mr. Colvin, by directing the judicial commissioner to prepare, and issue throughout Oude, a notification holding out still stronger assurances of clemency. This policy was generally approved at Lucknow, as it had been at Agra, on the ground that it was just possible the dreaded combination of the Native troops might be stopped by timely conciliation.*

While a semblance of order was maintained among the troops, some hope remained of averting the danger; and even after the outbreak, the necessity of stopping the process of coalition and combination among the rebels was so manifest, that, despite the fierce cry for vengeance which speedily arose, some voices were still raised in favour of a rule of action more befitting a Christian people, than the adoption of the Draconian principle, that death was to be the indiscriminating punishment of every grade of mutiny or insurrection. For instance, a letter written from Simla on the 23rd of June, descriptive of the tone of feeling prevalent there, states that "Lord William Hay, deputy-commissioner up here, and Mr. Campbell, say if the mutineers would now lay down their arms, and promise to go to their homes, we should be most thankful to grasp at the proposal."† If this opinion could be formed by a person of such sound judgment and intimate acquaintance with native character as Lord William Hay, at the latter end of June, much more might of course be urged in favour of the view taken by Sir Henry Lawrence before the explosion which took place at Lucknow at the close of May.

The Mohammedan festival of the "Eed," or "New Moon," fell on the 24th of May;

and considerable apprehension was felt during its celebration. On the preceding evening, a telegram from General Wheeler had stated it as almost certain that the troops would rise that night at Cawnpore; and it was believed that the example would be immediately followed at Lucknow. Incendiarism had everywhere marked the first movements of the mutineers at other stations; and, from the beginning of the month, had shown itself at Lucknow. Placards, inviting all true Hindoos and Mussulmans to exterminate the Feringhees, were posted up at night in several places. Reports that the 71st regiment was in actual mutiny, had more than once got about; and, on one occasion, Sir Henry Lawrence and the military staff had been called down to the lines in the middle of the day by an alarm of the kind.

The Eed, however, passed off without any disturbance. Still it was thought advisable that the ladies and children should leave cantonments, and take shelter in the Residency and adjacent houses comprehended within the intrenchments, afterwards so gallantly defended. Mr. Gubbins, the commissioner for Oude, had used all possible precautions against the anticipated siege. His house, solidly built of masonry, comprised two stories, and was exposed on three sides to the city. Masonry parapets, pierced with loopholes, were erected all around the roof; the verandahs and doorways were similarly protected with walls of masonry; and strong doors, cased with sheet-iron on the outside, were fixed upon the entrances on the ground floor. Mr. Gubbins commenced his fortifications at a time when few other Europeans in Lucknow seriously contemplated an attack on the Residency; and his preparations were not carried on without exciting the mirth of some of his neighbours;‡ while others imitated his example.

Throughout the whole month of May, Sir Henry Lawrence is described as having been "untiring in his exertions. He generally visited the Muchee Bhawn every morning, and any other post that called for his attention. From breakfast until dark he was consulting with his military subordinates, closeted with Native officers, or at work with his pen."§ He was the mainspring of the entire community. Military men and civilians, covenanted and uncovenanted;

* Gubbins' *Mutinies in Oudh*, p. 43.

† *Daily News*, August 23rd, 1857.

‡ Gubbins' *Mutinies in Oudh*, p. 27.

§ *Ibid.*, p. 45.

merchants, tradespeople, servants, the Eurasians, and all the loyal natives, vied with each other in loving and trusting Henry Lawrence. The uncovenanted assistants, comprising clerks, copyists, &c., were embodied as special constables, and cheerfully took night duty; each man feeling that his services, if well performed, however subordinate in character, would not pass unnoticed or unrewarded. Rees says, "the uncovenanted, particularly, had a kind friend in Sir Henry; and with the common soldier he was equally, if not even more popular."* The enthusiasm displayed when he removed the head-quarters of his office from cantonments into the Residency (31st May), was very striking. The sight of his attenuated but soldier-like form—the eyes already sunken with sleeplessness, the forehead furrowed with anxious thought, the soft hair cut short on the head, the long wavy beard descending to his breast—all the well-known features of probably the most generally beloved man in India—called forth a perfect storm of acclamation. Loud "hurrahs!" and shouts of "Long life to Sir Henry!" continued until he had passed out of sight into the Residency, where he was soon to receive his death-wound.

On the afternoon of Saturday, the 30th, he wrote a private letter to Mr. Raikes at Agra, by the last regular post that left Lucknow for nearly a year; in which he observes—"If the commander-in-chief delay much longer, he may have to recover Cawnpore, Lucknow, and Allahabad; indeed, all down to Calcutta. * * * While we are intrenching two posts in the city, we are virtually besieging four regiments (in a quiet way) with 300 Europeans. Not very pleasant diversion from my civil duties. I am daily in the town, four miles off, for some hours; but reside in the cantonments, guarded by the gentlemen we are besieging. * * * What I most fear are risings in the districts, and the irregulars getting tainted."†

Both these evils were manifesting themselves at the time when the above paragraph was written. The disorganised condition of the Doab districts was reacting on the Oude border. Up to the 25th of May, no overt act of insurrection occurred; but then several of the dispossessed talookdars began to resume possession of the

villages from whence they had been ejected; and the zemindars of Mulheeabad and its neighbourhood, distant about eighteen miles from Lucknow, evinced undisguised disaffection. These people were the descendants of Afreedees, who came from the Khyber mountains, and are described as "greedy, poor, and idle." They began assembling in their villages, and threatened the local treasury at Mulheeabad. To repress them, a party of police, under Captain Weston, was detached from Lucknow, with temporary good effect.

Another interesting letter reached Mr. Raikes by the same post, from his son-in-law, Mr. Christian, an able and experienced revenue officer, who expressed a hope that the eyes of government would now be opened to the effect of the levelling policy, by the state of affairs in the disturbed provinces, where they had hardly a single man of influence to look to for help, all being equal in their poverty. He added, however, as far as Lucknow was concerned—"Sir Henry Lawrence has arranged admirably; and, come what will, we are prepared."‡

That is to say, about 930 Europeans held themselves in readiness for the very possible contingency of a hand-to-hand struggle with above 4,000 of their own trained troops.

That same evening (30th May), the nine o'clock gun gave the signal for mutiny to a portion of the Native troops. A party of the 71st N.I. had been removed from the Muchee Bhawn a few days before, on account of their suspected disaffection, and were stationed in the city. It was not, however, these men, but those of another company of the same regiment in cantonments, who turned out and commenced firing, while a body of about forty made straight for the mess-house, ransacked, and set it on fire. The officers everywhere were on the alert, and left their messes upon the first shot being fired. Sir Henry rode at once to the European camp. Brigadier Handscomb, a fine old soldier, advanced on the lines of the 71st with a company of H.M.'s 32nd. The word to "fix bayonets" was given, and the Europeans could scarcely be restrained from charging without orders. The brigadier withheld them, saying, "You might kill friends." Then bidding them halt, he advanced alone, intending, despite the darkness and confusion, to address the mutineers; but was fired on, and fell from his horse dead. The sepoy of the 71st,

* Rees' *Siege of Lucknow*, p. 39.

† Raikes' *Revolt in the N. W. Provinces*, p. 22.

‡ *Ibid.*, p. 22.

becoming more bold, marched upon a body of H.M.'s 32nd foot and four guns, posted to the right of them in the European camp; but a volley of grape soon drove them back into their lines. Lieutenant Grant, of the 71st N.I., was killed while on picket duty at another part of the cantonments. The subahdar on guard had concealed him under a charpoy, or four-legged native bed, when some of the mutineers rushed in. The subahdar told them that the lieutenant had escaped; but a havildar of the same guard, merciless in his intense bigotry, pointed to the place of concealment,* and the unfortunate officer was immediately dragged forth, and pierced through by bayonets and musket-balls.

The 71st mutineers possessed themselves both of the colours and treasure of their regiment. The 13th N.I. were assembled on their own parade, and detained there for a considerable time by the exertions of Major Bruère. Many of the men, however, broke away and forced open the magazine. The adjutant, Lieutenant Chambers, tried to prevent the plunder of the ammunition, but was fired upon, and severely wounded in the leg. Finding his men deserting him, Major Bruère at length marched off a remnant of the 13th with the colours, and took post with about 200 men by the side of H.M.'s 32nd. The treasure was very gallantly saved by Lieutenant Loughnan, assisted by the Seiks of the regiment.

While Major Bruère was thus performing his public duty, his wife and children were exposed to extreme danger. Mrs. Bruère had returned to cantonments against orders, and was in her bungalow when the mutiny took place. Some faithful sepoys of her husband's regiment, saved her by putting her through a hole in the wall, which they made while the mutineers were calling for her. She and her little ones fled into the open country, and after passing the night in an open ditch, succeeded next morning in safely reaching the Residency.

The 48th N.I. likewise assembled on their parade, under Colonel Palmer, who proposed to march to the European camp; but this the men would not do; and when several of the officers proposed going thither themselves to ascertain the state of affairs,

the sepoys withheld them, saying that they were sure to be killed. It is stated by Mr. Gubbins, but without any explanation of so strange a fact, that after it had become evident that the 48th would not act against the mutineers, the magazine was opened, and ammunition served out to them. He adds, that while engaged in this duty, Lieutenant Ousely was struck down by one of his men with a bludgeon, and they then helped themselves. Finding that numbers were deserting, and that the corps would not face the mutineers, Colonel Palmer proposed to march to the Residency in the city; but by the time he reached the iron bridge, only fifty-seven men remained around the colours.

The lines of the 7th light cavalry were at Moodkeepoor, about three miles from the cantonments. Not above 150 troopers were there when the mutiny broke out. These were immediately called out by their officers; when some twenty-five† of them, before line could be formed, dashed off at full speed towards the cantonments; the rest patrolled during the night, and drew up, after daybreak, on the right of the 32nd regiment.

While these movements were going on, the bungalows in cantonments presented a scene of general uproar and devastation. Lieutenant Hardinge, with his irregular cavalry, patrolled along the main street of the cantonments, and was wounded in his unavailing efforts to stop the general plunder, which extended to the native bazaars. The Residency bungalow, and a few others, were the only ones in cantonments not fired.

After daybreak, the 7th cavalry were directed to move towards Moodkeepoor, where the officers' houses and the troopers' lines had been seized and fired by the mutineers. They found the post occupied by the enemy in force. A horseman rode from the rebel ranks and waved his sword before the yet loyal cavalry, on which forty of them, as if moved by an irresistible impulse, spurring their horses, galloped across, and ranged themselves on the side of the enemy. The rest appear to have remained firm until Sir Henry Lawrence arrived at Moodkeepoor, about 4 A.M., with four guns and two companies of H.M.'s 32nd. The mutineers amounted to about 1,000 men, chiefly infantry, assembled in disorderly masses. The guns opened upon them at the distance of a mile with round shot, and, after a few

* *Mutiny of Bengal Army*; by one who served under Sir Charles Napier; p. 77.

† Gubbins says forty (p. 105); Sir Henry Lawrence twenty-five, in his first telegraphic despatch of May 30th, 1857.—Appendix to Parl. Papers, p. 348.

discharges, they broke up and fled precipitately. The guns followed slowly with the infantry: the troopers might have overtaken the fugitive crowds; but they had evidently no desire to do so, notwithstanding the promise of 100 rupees for every mutineer captured or slain; and, after proceeding a few miles further, the pursuit was abandoned. Thirty prisoners were taken. The Europeans were at first surprised by seeing numbers of men and women running in all directions, with bundles on their heads; but they soon discovered that these were villagers and camp-followers making off with booty obtained in the cantonments during the preceding night. Some of the plunderers were seized by Commissioner Gubbins, who, with his own orderly and three of Fisher's horse, got detached from the rest of the cavalry; but what to do with his prisoners the commissioner knew not; for, he adds, "we had not yet learnt to kill in cold blood." Neither had the sepoys learned to expect it: they would have been more daring had they been more desperate. Gubbins and his four native followers came suddenly on six of the fugitives, and captured them in the following singular manner. "Coming up with them, they threw down their loaded muskets and drew their swords, of which several had two. Threatening them with our fire-arms, we called upon them to throw down their arms, which presently they did. One of them declared himself to be a havildar; and I made him pinion tightly his five comrades, using their turbans and waistbands for the purpose. One of the troopers then dismounted and tied the havildar's arms. Three of the men belonged to the 48th N.I., three to the 13th N.I., and one man was a Seik. One of the prisoners wore three English shirts over his native dress. The arms were collected and laden on a couple of peasants summoned from the village, and the six prisoners were sent back in charge of a single horseman." Mr. Gubbins rode on, and, in his own words, "gave chase" to two or three more fugitives, and had nearly overtaken them, when his orderly perceived a number of sepoy heads behind a low wall, at the entrance of a village they were about to enter. This changed the aspect of affairs; and, amid a shower of bullets, the commissioner turned his horse's head, and, with his three followers, rode back with all speed to the Residency bungalow in cantonments, where he arrived about eleven

o'clock, Sir Henry Lawrence and the artillery having returned an hour before.

The trooper entrusted with the prisoners brought them duly in, and he and his three companions received the promised reward of 600 rupees. While waiting for their money in the house of Mr. Gubbins, they talked with the servants on the state of affairs. The three who belonged to Fisher's horse, said, "We like our colonel [Fisher], and will not allow him to be harmed; but if the whole army turns, we must turn too!" The events of a few days showed the significance of these words: the authority of the "Fouj ki Bheera," or general will of the army, was to individuals, and even to regiments, almost irresistible.*

In the afternoon of the 31st, an insurrection took place in a quarter of the city called Hoseynabad, near the Dowlutkhana. An Indian "budmash" is little less turbulent than an Italian "bravo;" and the class may well be supposed to have abounded in a city where every man engaged in the ordinary business of life, wore his tulwar, or short bent sword, and the poorest idler in the streets swaggered along with his shield of buffalo-hide and his matchlock or pistols. It appeared that the city budmashes, to the number of 6,000 men, had crossed the river in the morning with the intention of joining the mutineers in the cantonments; but their plans had been disconcerted by the promptitude with which Sir Henry Lawrence had pursued and dispersed their intended allies. Finding the mutineers gone, the budmashes returned to the city, and commenced a disturbance, but were put down by the efforts of the police, assisted by a few faithful companies of irregular infantry. Many of the insurgents were killed, and several prisoners taken, and, together with those previously captured, were lodged in the Muchee Bhawn, to the number of forty. A court-martial was assembled for their trial, and the majority were executed by hanging, including the six sepoys seized by Commissioner Gubbins, the traitor who betrayed Lieutenant Grant's hiding-place, and the subahdar, who had a month before been raised to that rank, and presented with a dress of honour and a thousand rupees, as a reward for his fidelity. The sentences passed by the court were not, however, all confirmed by Sir Henry Lawrence, for "he inclined much to clemency."† The

* Gubbins' *Mutinies in Oudh*, p. 111. † *Ibid.*, p. 115.

executions took place near the upper gate of the Muchee Bhawn, at the crossing of the four roads, one of which led directly to the stone bridge. The gallows once erected, became in Lucknow, as in so many other British stations, a standing institution: the surrounding space was commanded by the guns of the fort; and more effectually to awe the people, an 18-pounder gun was removed to the road outside, kept constantly loaded with grape, and pointed down the principal thoroughfare.

The advisability of disarming the remainder of the Native troops, was warmly discussed at Lucknow. On the night of the 30th of May, less than 500 men had proved actively faithful; but in the course of a short time, about 1,200 had gathered round their colours, some of whom had crept quietly back to their lines; but the greater number consisted of the detached guards stationed at the Residency, and at different parts of the city: and these, although they had not taken part with the mutineers, were believed to have been withheld from doing so, rather by the fear of the European infantry and guns, than by any feeling of duty or attachment. But Sir Henry Lawrence persisted in considering the question as he had already done that of the holding of Lucknow itself, primarily as regarded the maintenance of British supremacy in Northern India. Every disbanded regiment helped to swell the tide of mutiny, to fill the ranks of the Delhi garrison, or, as might reasonably have been expected, to form an army, such as that which Sevajee and his successors had formed, and led against the Mogul emperors. The want of leaders—a deficiency which might at any moment have been supplied—saved us from this imminent danger until we had become strong enough to grapple with it. There was another reason against disarmament. It was a measure which could be taken only in stations which possessed a certain proportion of British troops and artillery. No such resource was available at the numerous outposts, where a few British officers were at the mercy of exclusively Native corps: and such a manifestation of distrust could scarcely fail to aggravate their disaffection, and tempt them to commit the very crime to which they were believed to be inclined. The position of the officers was everywhere exceedingly trying; for, according to a regulation which appears to have been gen-

eral, they were directed to sleep in the Native lines. The object was, of course, to prevent or check conspiracy, and show confidence in the sepoys; but it may be doubted whether this end was answered in a degree at all commensurate with the anxiety occasioned, and actual hazard incurred by the measure. An officer (Lieutenant Farquhar) of the 7th light cavalry, writing to his mother, gives a description of the state of feeling at the Lucknow camp, which is probably applicable to the majority of European officers under similar circumstances. "The officers of each regiment had to sleep together, armed to the teeth; and two of each regiment had to remain awake, taking two hours at a time to watch their own men. We kept these watches strictly; and, I believe, by these means saved our throats. Every officer here has slept in his clothes since the mutiny began."* At the gaol, also, Captain Adolphe Orr, and three other Europeans, slept nightly among the Native police.†

On the 9th of June, Sir Henry Lawrence became alarmingly ill, from sheer exhaustion, aggravated by the depressing effect of the rapid progress of mutiny throughout the province. Dr. Fayrer, the Residency surgeon, declared that at least forty-eight hours of complete rest were required to preserve his life; and a provisional council was formed, composed of Messrs. Gubbins and Ommamey, Major Banks, Colonel Inglis, and Major Anderson, the chief engineer. By their decree the Native troops were paraded, disarmed, and dispatched to their homes, on leave of absence, until November. The men demurred, and their commanders likewise opposed the measure; but the council persevered, and all the sepoys were sent away except 350, who had given recent evidence of fidelity, and many of whom were Sikhs. All the 7th light cavalry were sent away, except the Native officers. The horses were brought up, and picketed near the Residency; and the arms were brought in by hundreds, and stored in some of the Residency buildings.

The first ten days of June had sufficed to disorganise the whole of Oude. After that time, the British authority was confined to Lucknow and its immediate neighbourhood. The people had everywhere continued orderly until the troops rose; and when the successive mutinies had occurred, the

* Gubbins' *Mutinies in Oudh*, p. 442.

† Rees' *Siege of Lucknow*, p. 54.

"refugees had, with few exceptions, experienced at their hands kindness and good treatment."*

At *Seetapoor*, the head-quarters of the Khyrabad division, of which Mr. G. J. Christian was commissioner, the troops rose on the 3rd of June. They consisted of the 41st N.I. (1,067 men, with sixteen European officers), and a wing of irregular cavalry (250 Natives, with a single European officer). There were also the 9th and 10th regiments of Oude irregular infantry, and the 2nd regiment of military police. The commissioner distrusted the troops; and, anticipating an outbreak, collected the civilians and their families at his house, which he proposed to defend by the aid of a strong guard of the regiment of military police, then believed to be staunch. He advised his military friends to send their wives to him for safety. Only one of these came. This lady, Mrs. Stewart, with rare prudence, looked around her, and perceived that the small river Sureyan flowed on two sides of Mr. Christian's compound, and that there was no means of reaching the high road but through the military cantonment; whereupon she pronounced the position unsafe, returned to her home, and was one of the first party of refugees.

The officers generally did not distrust their men. Colonel Birch had such entire confidence in the 41st N.I., that when a cry arose in their lines that the 10th irregulars were plundering the treasury, he called out the two most suspected companies, and led them to the scene of the alleged disturbance. All there was found to be quiet, and the order was given to return, when a sepoy of the guard stepped out of the ranks, and took deliberate aim at the colonel, who fell from his horse dead. Lieutenant Smalley and the sergeant-major were then killed. The adjutant, Lieutenant Graves, escaped wounded. The irregulars were not long in following the example of mutiny; and in the massacre which ensued, Captain Gowan and his wife, Captain Dorin, Lieutenants Greene and Bax,† Surgeon Hill, and Lieutenant Snell, with his wife and child, perished. Mrs. Greene escaped, as did also Mrs. Dorin. The latter, after witnessing the murder

of her husband, fled in the dress of a native, in the company of Mr. Dudman (a clerk) and his family, with several other East Indians. The party were protected by a neighbouring zemindar for more than a fortnight, and then sent on in a native cart to Lucknow, escorted by a few villagers. Mrs. Dorin was received into the house of Commissioner Gubbins; where, on the 20th of July, she was shot through the head by a matchlock ball, which, entering by a window, traversed two sets of apartments before it reached that in which she was standing. The fate of the Seetapoor civilians is thus described by Mr. Gubbins, whose information was derived from the lips of the survivors.

"At the commencement of the outbreak, Mr. Christian proceeded outside his bungalow, to put in readiness the guard of military police, in whom he confided. The wretches immediately turned and fired upon him. Flying back into the house, he alarmed the assembled inmates, and the men, ladies, and children, fled out of the bungalow on the side which faced the river, pursued and fired upon by the miscreants of the military police, and of other regiments which now joined them. Some were shot down before they reached the stream: others were killed in it. A few perished on the opposite bank. Two or three only escaped—viz., Sir Mountstuart Jackson and his two sisters, and little Sophy Christian [a child three years of age], who was saved by Sergeant-major Morton. There fell Mr. and Mrs. Christian and child, Mr. and Mrs. Henry Thornhill and their children, and several others. Those who escaped broke into two parties. Lieutenant Burns, Sir Mountstuart and Miss Madeline Jackson, Sergeant-major Morton, and little Sophy Christian, found refuge, though an unwilling one, with Rajah Lonee Sing, at his fort of Mithowlee. Mrs. Greene, Miss Jackson, and Captain John Hearsey [of the military police, who had been saved by them], fled northward, and, after being joined by other refugees, found shelter at Mutheearree, with the rajah of Dhoreyrah."‡

Mr. Gubbins gives no enumeration of those who perished, nor of those (happily far more numerous) who escaped;§ neither is any such list included in the returns published in the *Gazette*.

The main body of the Seetapoor fugitives, consisting of twelve officers, six ladies, and as many children, with a number of the families of civilians (about fifty in all),|| escorted by thirty faithful sepoys of the 41st, managed to send news of their position to Lucknow on the morning of the 4th; and a party of volunteer and Seik cavalry, with every carriage,

his house, where they remained throughout the siege—(p. 119).

|| See account given in the *Times*, August 29th, 1857, on the authority of one of the party, an officer of the 41st N.I.

* Gubbins' *Mutinies in Oudh*, p. 143.

† Rees' *Siege of Lucknow*, p. 46.

‡ Gubbins' *Mutinies in Oudh*, p. 122.

§ Mr. Gubbins mentions receiving Mrs. Abthorp and three children, and Mrs. and Miss Birch, into

buggy, and available conveyance, was immediately sent out to bring them in. The sepoys were cordially received; yet within one fortnight, even these men could no longer be trusted. A Christian drummer overheard some mutinous discourse, and it was thought best to tender them the option of retiring to their homes. When this offer was made, it was accepted by all without exception; and not a man remained with Major Abthorp and the officers whose lives they had before saved.

Mohumdee, the second station in the Khyrabad division, was guarded by a company of the 9th Oude infantry. The arrival of the Shahjehanpoor refugees, on Monday, June 1st, caused great excitement among the sepoys; and when Captain Patrick Orr questioned them separately regarding their intentions, "each one said he could not answer for what some of the bad characters might do." The reply appeared so unsatisfactory, that the officer immediately sent off his wife to Rajah Lonee Sing, at Mithowlee. Still no outbreak took place until the Thursday morning, when a detachment of fifty men came in from Seetapoor, sent by Mr. Christian, as an escort for the Shahjehanpoor refugees. These men declared that a company of their regiment had been destroyed by the Europeans at Lucknow, and that they were resolved on taking vengeance. Captain Orr, seeing the state of things, assembled the Native officers, and desired to know what they intended doing. After some discussion, they decided on marching to Seetapoor, and proceeded to release the prisoners from the gaol and to plunder the treasury, in which they found about 110,000 rupees; but they took a solemn oath to spare the lives of the Europeans. In the course of the afternoon, Mr. Thomason and Captain Orr, with the Shahjehanpoor party, quitted Mohumdee in company with the mutineers. The names of the unfortunate Europeans were—

Captains Sneyd, Lysaght, and Salmon; Lieutenants Key, Robertson, Scott, Pitt, and Rutherford; Ensigns Spens, Johnston, and Scott; Quartermaster-sergeant Grant; band-master and one drummer; Lieutenant Sheils, veteran establishment; and Mr. Jenkins, of the civil service. *Ladies*—Mrs. Scott, Miss Scott, Mrs. Lysaght, Mrs. Key, Mrs. Bowling, Mrs. Sheils, Mrs. Grant, Mrs. Pereira, and her four children.

A buggy and some baggage carts were procured: the ladies were placed thereon;

and, after five hours' travelling, they reached Burwar, and there spent the night. Next morning they marched towards Aurungabad; but after proceeding in that direction for about four miles, a halt was sounded, and a trooper told the Europeans to go ahead wherever they pleased. They went on for some distance with all possible expedition, but were at length overtaken by a most bloodthirsty party of mutineers. Captain Orr writes—"When within a mile of Aurungabad, a sepoy rushed forward and snatched Key's gun from him, and shot down poor old Sheils, who was riding my horse. Then the most infernal carnage ever witnessed by man began. We all collected under a tree close by, and took the ladies down from the buggy. Shots were fired from various directions, amid the most hideous yells. The poor ladies all joined in prayer, coolly and undauntedly awaiting their fate. [The fourteen gentlemen were murdered one by one; the gentlewomen—they were truly such—assembled together in one body, and were shot down while kneeling and singing a hymn].* I stopped for about three minutes among them; but, thinking of my wife and child here, I endeavoured to save my life for their sakes. I rushed out towards the insurgents; and one of my men, Goordhun, of the 6th company, called out to me to throw down my pistol, and he would save me. I did so; when he put himself between me and the men, and several others followed his example. In about ten minutes more they completed their hellish work. I was 300 yards off at the utmost. Poor Lysaght was kneeling out in the open ground, with his arms folded across his chest; and though not using his fire-arms, the cowardly wretches would not go to the spot until they shot him; and then rushing up, they killed the wounded and children, butchering them in a most cruel way. With the exception of the drummer-boy, every one was killed of the above list; and, besides, poor good Thomason and one or two clerks."

Captain Orr was sent, under a guard, to Mithowlee, from whence he dispatched to Lucknow the letter from which the above particulars are extracted.† In a postscript dated the 9th of June, he mentions having

* Mr. Rees quotes this touching particular from the letter of Capt. Patrick to his brother Capt. Adolphe Orr, which was shown him by the latter officer.

† Gubbins' *Mutinies in Oudh*, p. 123.

heard of the vicinity of Sir M. Jackson and his companions; and Captain Orr and his wife appear to have joined them, and, with them, to have fallen into the hands of the mutineers, who detained them in protracted captivity, the issue of which belongs to a later period of the narrative.

At *Mullaon*, a party of the 41st N.I., and the 4th Oude irregular infantry, became so turbulent, that the deputy-commissioner (Mr. Capper), perceiving mutiny impending, rode away, and reached Lucknow in safety.

At *Secrora*—a military station in the Bahraetch division of Oude, of which Mr. Wingfield was commissioner—a mutiny broke out, and the treasury was rifled; but all the Europeans escaped safely to Lucknow, from whence a strong party of volunteer and Seik cavalry, with elephants and dhoolies, were sent to bring in the ladies and children, which was safely accomplished on the 9th of June.

At *Gondah*, where the milder course of mutiny and plunder without massacre was adopted, the commandant (Captain Miles), and other officers of the 3rd Oude irregulars stationed there, were obliged to fly, and were, with Mr. Wingfield, protected for several days by the rajah of Bulrampoor, and then escorted by his troops across the Oude frontier into the Goruckpoor district, where they were kindly received by the rajah of Bansie, and enabled to reach Goruckpoor.

At *Bahraetch* itself, two civil servants were stationed—Mr. Cunliffe, deputy-commissioner, and his assistant, Mr. Jordan, with two companies of the 3rd irregular infantry, under Lieutenant Longueville Clarke. When mutiny appeared, the three Europeans rode off to Nanpara, intending to rest there, and proceed thence to the hills; but, on reaching that place, they were refused admittance. The reason given was connected with the *be-duk-ilee*, or dispossession grievance, which had produced so much disaffection throughout Oude. According to the British view of the question as stated by Mr. Gubbins, the rajah of Nanpara, being a minor, had fallen under the tutelage of a kinsman who had mismanaged the estate and dissipated the property. He had accordingly been removed by the authorities, and a new agent appointed; but when the insurrection commenced, the old administrator killed the government nominee, and resumed his former position. No injury was done to the fugitives at Nanpara. They retraced their steps to Bahraetch,

and disguising themselves as natives, strove to reach Lucknow, where Mr. Cunliffe expected to meet his affianced bride. Unfortunately they rode to the chief ferry, that of Byram Ghaut, which was guarded by the Secrora mutineers, by whom the disguised Europeans were discovered and put to death. Such, at least, was the statement made by several native witnesses, and which, Mr. Gubbins affirms, was believed at Lucknow by all except the betrothed girl, who hoped against hope, throughout the weary siege, that her lover yet survived. She might well do so; for during that terrible time, many persons were asserted to be dead, and details of the most revolting description related regarding their sufferings, who afterwards were discovered to be alive and wholly uninjured, save by fear, fatigue, and exposure to the weather.

Mr. Rees, who was connected by marriage with poor Clarke, mentions three different statements of the fate of the Bahraetch fugitives. One was, that they were "tried by the rebels for the murder of Fuzil Ali, and shot." A military author, who is a very graphic describer, but who gives few and scanty references to his sources of information, narrates the catastrophe with much precision. Lieutenant Clarke had been especially active in the apprehension of Fuzil Ali, a rebel chief and notorious outlaw, well-known in the annals of Oude. The irregular infantry had assisted in the capture of the bandit, who was tried and executed for the murder of a Bengal civilian: but when they mutinied, they sent word to the 17th N.I. (which regiment was in their immediate vicinity), to know what should be done with the murderer of the chieftain? "Behead him," was the reply; and the unfortunate officer, and another European with him, were immediately executed.*

Mr. Rees states, that the sword and pistols of Lieutenant Clarke were taken to his father, a well-known barrister of the same name, at Calcutta, by an old native dependent, who transmitted them in obedience to the order of his late master.

At *Mullapoor*, the last station of the Bahraetch division, there were no troops to mutiny; but the complete disorganisation of the district, compelled the officers there, Mr. Gonne, of the civil service, and Captain Hastings, to leave the place, and take

* *Mutiny of Bengal Army*: by one who served under Sir Charles Napier; p. 82.

refuge in a fort called Mutheearce, belonging to the rajah of Dhoreyrah, a minor. Three fugitives from Seetapoor (Captain John Hearsey, Mrs. Greene, and Miss Jackson), with two gentlemen (Messrs. Brand and Carew), who had escaped at the time of the destruction of the large sugar factory at Rosa, near Shahjehanpoor, accompanied the Mullapoor officers; but the disaffection of the rajah's people, soon compelled the Europeans to quit Mutheearce. Mrs. Greene, Miss Jackson, and Mr. Carew, fell into the hands of the enemy, and no certain information was obtained of their fate;* the others escaped to Puddaha, in the Nepaul hills, where Koolraj Sing received them kindly, but could not shield them from the deadly climate of the Terai, under which all but Captain Hearsey sank; and he eventually joined Jung Bahadur's camp at Goruckpoor.

The Fyzabad division comprised the station of that name, and two others—Sultanpoor and Salone.

At *Fyzabad*, so much anxiety had been felt, that the commissioner, Colonel Goldney, whose head-quarters and family were at Sultanpoor, removed thence to the former place on account of the importance of that position, and the danger by which it was menaced. The troops consisted of the 22nd N.I., under Colonel Lennox; the 6th Oude irregular infantry, under Colonel O'Brien; and a Native light field battery, under Major Mill.

The cantonments were, as usual, at some distance from the town, which had been the seat of government for the nawabs of Oude previous to the accession of Asuf ad Dowlah, in 1775; who removed to Lucknow, then but a small village—the reason assigned by Sleeman being, that the new sovereign “disliked living near his mother.”† About three miles distant are the ruins of Ayodha, or Oude, the capital of the ancient Hindoo kingdom—a spot still resorted to as a place of pilgrimage from all parts of India.

Shahgunje, a town twelve miles from Fyzabad, with no fallen majesty or legendary fame to boast of, is, however, a name far more familiar to English ears. It is the chief place in the territories of Rajah Maun Sing, and is surrounded by a mud wall thirty feet high and forty feet thick, and a

ditch three miles round, containing some six or seven feet of water. The wall, built of the mud taken from the ditch, had twenty-four bastions for guns. Horrible tales were told of atrocities committed within the fortress. Sleeman records the current rumour regarding a disgraced court favourite, named Gholab Sing, in the time of Nuseer-oo-Deen; who, having displeased the wayward drunken monarch, was flogged, and made to suffer severe torments by hunger and thirst. The females of his family were likewise cruelly ill-treated; and the British resident was compelled, in common humanity, to interfere; whereupon the king, to rid himself of unwelcome importunities, and yet wreak his malice on his victim, gave the latter into the custody of his foe and rival, Rajah Dursun Sing, the father of Maun Sing, who took him in an iron cage to Shahgunje, and kept him there, with snakes and scorpions for his companions.

For the relief of the reader, it may be well to add, that the wretched captive survived his confinement despite all its aggravations, and, at the death of Nuseer-oo-Deen, was released on the payment of four lacs of rupees, and a promise of three lacs more if restored to office; which actually occurred. Gholab Sing was, in 1831, again appointed to a place of trust at court, and died peaceably at Lucknow in 1851, at eighty years of age.‡

This episode may be excused as an illustration of life in Oude, shortly before the British government took upon itself the task of total reformation. The parentage and personal antecedents of Maun Sing, have a direct bearing on the present state of Oude. In the introductory chapter, a description has been given of the two opposite classes included under the general name of talookdars: first, the ancient Rajpoot chiefs, the representatives of clans which had existed before Mohammed was born; and who had been forced, or intrigued, or persuaded into an acknowledgment of the Oude nawabs as their suzerains: secondly, the new men, who, as government officials, had contrived, generally by fraud and oppression, to become farmers of the revenue, and large landed proprietors.

The family of Maun Sing had risen to consequence by the latter process. Bukhtawar Sing, the founder of his family, was a trooper in the service of the East India Company in the beginning of the present

* Gubbins' *Mutinies in Oudh*, p. 132.

† Sleeman's *Journey through Oude*, p. 137.

‡ *Ibid.*, p. 155 to 162.

century. While still a very young man, remarkably tall and handsome, he came home on furlough, and attracted the attention of the nawab of Oude, Sadut Ali, whom he attended on a sporting excursion. He became one of the nawab's favourite orderlies; and having saved his sovereign's life from the sword of an assassin, was promoted to the command of a squadron. He sent for his three brothers to court, and they became orderlies one after the other, and rose to high civil and military rank. Being childless, he adopted Maun Sing, the son of his brother Dursun Sing, who, next to himself, was the most powerful subject in Oude, and by far the wealthier, having steadily followed the opportunities of adding field to field and lac to lac, at the command of a very clever revenue contractor; with powerful friends at court, and quite unfettered by any notions of honour or humanity. Sleeman, in his diary (December, 1849), describes Maun Sing as a small, slight man; but shrewd, active, energetic, and as unscrupulous as a man could be. "Indeed," he adds, "old Bukhtawar Sing himself is the only member of the family that was ever troubled with scruples of any kind whatever. All his brothers and nephews were bred up in the camp of an Oude revenue collector—a school specially adapted for training thoroughbred ruffians." He proceeds to adduce the most startling instances of treacherous rapacity, of murder committed, and torture applied, to wrest money or estates from the rightful proprietors. The worst of these outrages were committed in the name of the Oude government; for whenever the court found the barons in any district grow refractory under weak governors, they gave the contract of it to Dursun Sing, as the only officer who could reduce them to order; and thus he was enabled to carry out his private ends in the king's name. In 1842, under pretence of compelling the payment of arrears of revenue in the districts of Gondah and Bahraetch, he proceeded to seize and plunder the lands of the great proprietors one after the other, and put their estates under the management of his own officers.

The territory of the young rajah of Bulrampoor was seized in this manner during his absence, the garrison of his little stronghold being taken by surprise. The rajah fled to Nepaul, where the minister, his personal friend, gave him a small garden for an

asylum, near the village of Maharaj Gunje, in the Nepaulese dominions. Knowing the unscrupulous and enterprising character of his foe, the rajah took advantage of the rainy season to surround his abode with a deep ditch; and thus, when Dursun Sing marched against it, the rajah was enabled to make his escape; whereupon Dursun Sing's party took all the property they could find, and plundered Maharaj Gunje. The rajah (one of our few staunch friends in Oude in the late disasters) was a dashing sportsman, and in this capacity had won the liking of one of his new neighbours, a sturdy landholder, who, rallying his armed followers, sorely harassed the retreat of the invaders. The court of Nepaul took up the matter, and demanded the dismissal of Dursun Sing from office, and the payment of compensation in money. The governor-general (Lord Ellenborough) seconded the latter requisition, which was fulfilled; and the numerous enemies of the powerful chief had nearly succeeded in inducing the king to comply with the former also, the three queens especially advocating a measure which would involve the confiscation of the estates of the offender, and, consequently, much profit and patronage to themselves. Bukhtawar Sing pleaded for his brother; and the minister, Monowur ood Dowlah,* advised levying a heavy fine on Dursun Sing, and reinstating him in his former position; as, if he were crushed altogether, no means would remain for controlling the refractory and turbulent barons; the rest would all become unmanageable, and pay no revenue whatever to the exchequer. The British resident admitted the truth of the king's assertion, that Dursun Sing "was a notorious and terrible tyrant;" but supported the counsel of the minister. Dursun Sing was banished, and took refuge in the British district of Goruckpoor; but, before two months had expired, his recall was rendered necessary, by the refusal of the tenants and cultivators of his confiscated estates, to pay any other person but him; and the Oude government were too weak to coerce them.

Dursun Sing was recalled, presented to the king (May 30th, 1844), and made inspector-general of all Oude, with most comprehensive orders "to make a settlement of the land revenue at an increased rate; to

* The nobleman of whose loyalty and bravery Mr. Gubbins speaks so highly at the time of the investment of Lucknow.—*Oudh*, pp. vi., and 40.

cut down all the jungles, and bring all the waste lands into tillage; to seize all refractory barons, destroy all their forts, and seize and send into store all the cannon mounted upon them." Such duties, and others scarcely less onerous, could of course only be performed by a person entrusted with unlimited powers. Armed with these, Dursun Sing went heartily to work; but he soon fell ill, and retired to Fyzabad, where he died, August 20th, leaving the barons of Oude in possession of their forts, their cannon, and their jungles, and bequeathing to his three sons—Rama Deen, Rugbur Sing, and Maun Sing—an immense accumulation of lands and money to fight for. The determination which his dependents exhibited of standing by him during his exile, cannot be exclusively attributed to the fear he inspired. Sleeman states, that "Dursun Sing systematically plundered and kept down the great landholders throughout the districts under his charge, but protected the cultivators, and even the smaller landed proprietors, whose estates could not be conveniently added to his own."* In traversing the lands in the vicinity of Shahgunje, in 1850, the resident was particularly struck by the "richness of the cultivation, and the contented and prosperous appearance of the peasantry, who came out to him from numerous villages, in crowds, and expressed their satisfaction at the security and comfort they enjoyed under their present rulers." "Of the fraud and violence, abuse of power, and collusion with local authorities, by which Maun Sing and his father seized upon the lands of so many hundreds of old proprietors, there can be no doubt; but to attempt to make the family restore them now, under such a government [Wajid Ali was then king], would create great disorder, drive off all the better classes of cultivators, and desolate the face of the country which they have rendered so beautiful by an efficient system of administration."†

Such testimony as this ought to have had great weight with the gentlemen entrusted with the settlement of Oude after its forcible occupation by the British government. It appears, on the contrary, that the notoriously unfit and inexperienced revenue officers, nominated hap-hazard in the multiplication of civil appointments consequent on Lord Dalhousie's series of annexations, treated Maun Sing and his relatives

simply as usurping adventurers, without any regard to their position under the late dynasty, to the acknowledgment of that position by the British authorities, or to their characters as efficient administrators of territories, in the possession of which they had been legally, though not righteously confirmed. It was, indeed, easy to denounce Maun Sing as the oppressor of the Lady Sogura, the impoverished and imprisoned heiress of Munneapoor; and as the murderer of his fellow-usurper, Hurpaul Sing, whom he caused to be dispatched at an interview to which he had enticed him, by swearing by the holy Ganges, and the head of Mahadeo, that he should suffer no harm.‡ These and other such histories (more or less exaggerated, but, unfortunately, all possible and probable) might have been taken in proof of Maun Sing's unworthiness to retain the possessions he and his father had seized. Still, had these allegations been susceptible of proof, even-handed justice required that considerable allowance should be made by the new rulers for deeds of oppression and extortion which had been condoned, if not sanctioned, by the government under which they were committed. In the disorganised state of Oude, where strife and bloodshed seemed essential conditions of the life of the chieftains, there were few whose tenure of property was not complicated by the incidents and consequences of internecine hostility. There is no evidence to show that the newly-appointed revenue officials attempted to lay down any satisfactory principle on which to ground their decisions; on the contrary, they appear to have set about their work piece-meal, discussing such small points of detail as the native "omlah" chose to bewilder them with, and being far too ignorant of the history and customs of the new province, or of its actual condition, to be able to form a clear opinion on the cases before them. The "utter inversion of the rights of property," which is alleged to have been involved in the settlement of the North-West Provinces, in 1844,§ could scarcely fail to recur in Oude, where the settlement was made under the most unpropitious circumstances. The cry for revision and reconsideration became so urgent, and the injustice of the proceedings so flagrant, that, as we have seen, Sir Henry Lawrence was stopped on his way to England on sick leave, when

* Sleeman's *Journey through Oude*, vol. i., p. 58.

† *Ibid.*, pp. 150 and 186.

‡ Sleeman's *Journey through Oude*, vol. i., p. 145.

§ See p. 84, *ante*.

suffering under "a dozen different complaints," and sent to Oude. Unhappily, the opportunity for pacification there, had been worse than lost. The landed proprietary had been driven, by our revenue and judicial system, into union on the single point of hostility towards the British. Among the talookdars, there were many chiefs entirely opposed in character to Maun Sing; but few had suffered such spoliation as he had, inasmuch as few had so much to lose. The dealings of government with him have never been succinctly stated. Mr. Russell (whose authorities in India are, from the quite peculiar position in which his talents and honesty have placed him, of the very highest class) asserts that, in 1856, Maun Sing was chased out of his estates by a regiment of cavalry, for non-payment of head-rent, or assessment to government. When he fled, many original proprietors came forward to claim portions of his estates (comprising, in all, 761 villages), and received them from the British administrators.* From a passage in a despatch written by Commissioner Wingfield, it appears that Maun Sing was absolutely in distress for money, and unable to borrow any, having "lost every village at the summary settlement."†

A man so situated was not unlikely to turn rebel. The Supreme government and the Lucknow authorities received intelligence which they deemed conclusive; and in accordance with a telegram from Calcutta, Maun Sing was arrested at Fyzabad in May, and remained in confinement till the beginning of June, when he sent for Colonel Goldney, warned him that the troops would rise, and offered, if released, to give the Europeans shelter at Shahgunje. Colonel Goldney appears to have rightly appreciated the motives of his interlocutor, which were simply a desire to be on the stronger side—that of the British; to obtain from them the best possible terms; and, at the same time, not to render himself unnecessarily obnoxious to his countrymen. Maun Sing was neither the fiery Rajpoot of Rajast'han (so well and so truly portrayed by Todd), nor the mild Hindoo of Bengal; nor, happily for us, was he a vengeful Mahratta like Nana Sahib: he was a shrewd, wary man, "wise in his generation," and made

himself "master of the situation," in a very wriggling, serpent-like fashion. He had no particular temptation to join either party. The ancient barons of Oude detested him and his family, as adventurers and *parvenus* of the most unprincipled description, who had grown wealthy on their spoils; and Maun Sing, in accordance with the proverb, that "the injurer never forgives," probably entertained a deeper aversion and distrust towards them than towards the English, by whom he had himself been despoiled. The event justified the policy adopted by Colonel Goldney in releasing the chief, with permission to strengthen his fort (which was greatly out of repair), and raise levies: but these measures he had little time to adopt; for before many days had elapsed, the expected mutiny took place, and was conducted in a manner which proved that, in the present instance, the sepoys were acting on a settled plan. On the morning of the 8th of June, intelligence was received that a rebel force (the 17th N.I., with a body of irregular cavalry and two guns from Azimghur) were encamped at Begun Gunje, ten miles from Fyzabad, and intended marching into the station on the following morning. The Europeans now prepared for the worst. The civilians and the non-commissioned officers sent their families to Shahgunje; to which place, Captain J. Reid, Captain Alexander Orr, and Mr. Bradford, followed them. Colonel Goldney, though also filling a civil appointment, remained behind. He had every confidence in the 22nd N.I., which he had formerly commanded; and he maintained a most gallant bearing to the moment of his death. Mrs. Lennox and her daughter (Mrs. Morgan), with the wife and children of Major Mill, remained in cantonments, in reliance on the solemn oath of the Native officers of the 22nd, that no injury should be done them. The European officers went to their respective posts; but soon found themselves prisoners, not being allowed to move twelve paces without being followed by a guard with fixed bayonets.

A risaldar of cavalry took command of the mutineers, and proceeded to release a moolvée, who had been confined in the quarter-guard, and in whose honour they fired a salute. This man was a Moham-medan of good family, who had traversed a considerable part of Upper India, preaching sedition. He had been expelled from Agra

* Times, 17th January, 1859.

† Despatch to secretary to government, dated July 14th, 1857.—Parl. Papers on Mutinies (regarding Maun Sing), March 18th, 1858; p. 3.

—a measure which only helped to give him the notoriety he sought. In April, he appeared with several followers at Fyzabad, where he circulated seditious papers, and openly advocated a religious war. The police were ordered to arrest him; but he and his followers resisted with arms: the military were called in, and several lives were lost on the side of the moolvee, before his capture was effected. He was tried, and sentence of death would have been pronounced and executed upon him, but for some informality which delayed the proceedings.

Colonel Lennox remained in his bungalow all night with his wife and daughter, under a strong sepoy guard. Two officers strove to escape, but were fired at by the cavalry patrols, and brought back into the lines unhurt, where they were desired to remain quietly until daybreak, when they would be sent off, under an escort, to the place of embarkation, placed in boats, and dispatched down the Gogra river.*

The account, thus far, rests on official information. Private letters state that the mutineers held a council of war during the night, and that the irregular cavalry, who were nearly all Mussulmans, proposed to kill the officers; but the 22nd N.I. objected; and it was ultimately decided that the officers should be allowed to leave unharmed, and to carry away all their private arms and property, but no treasure, as that belonged to the King of Oude.

An officer who escaped, gives a different account of the language held to him by a subahdar of his own regiment: but both statements may possibly be true, as the sepoys may have been disposed in favour of the Delhi or of the Oude family, according to their birth and prejudices. The speech of the subahdar was very remarkable. Seeing his late superior about to depart, he said—"As you are going away for ever, I will tell you all about our plans. We halt at Fyzabad five days, and march through Duriabad upon Lucknow, where we expect to be joined by the people of the city." Proclamations, he added, had been received from the King of Delhi, announcing that he was again seated on the throne of his fathers, and desired the whole army to

join his standard. The subahdar declared that Rajah Maun Sing had been appointed commander-in-chief in Oude: and he concluded his communications by remarking—"You English have been a long time in India, but you know little of us. We have nothing to do with Wajid Ali, or any of his relations; the kings of Lucknow were made by you: the only ruler in India empowered to give sunnuds, is the King of Delhi; he never made a King of Oude: and it is from him only that we shall receive our orders."†

The officers were allowed to depart at daybreak on the morning of the 9th, and were escorted to the river side, and directed to enter four boats which had been provided by the insurgents, and proceed down the river. Whilst still at the ghaut, or landing-place, intelligence was brought to the escort, that their comrades in cantonments were plundering the treasure; whereupon the whole party immediately hurried off thither. The Europeans then entered the boats; and, there being no boatmen, proceeded to man them themselves. According to the testimony of a survivor, the four boats were filled in the following manner:—

First Boat.—Colonel Goldney; Lieutenants Currie, Cautley, Ritchie, Parsons; Sergeants Matthews, Edwards, Busher.

Second Boat.—Major Mill; Sergeant-major Hulme and his wife; Quartermaster-sergeant Russel; and Bugler Williamson.

Third Boat.—Colonel O'Brien; Captain Gordon; Lieutenants Anderson and Percivall; and Surgeon Collison.

Fourth Boat.—Lieutenants Thomas, Lindsay, and English.

While dropping down the river, the Europeans perceived a canoe following them. It contained a sepoy of the 22nd N.I., named Teg Ali Khan, who requested to be suffered to accompany his officers. He was taken in by Colonel Goldney; and, on approaching a village, he procured rowers for two of the boats, and proved himself, in the words of the credentials subsequently given him by Colonel Lennox, a "loyal and true man."‡

Boats one and two distanced the others, and passed Ayodha, where the third boat was seen to put in. After proceeding

regiments. Quoted by Bombay Correspondent of *Daily News*, August 17th, 1857.

† Long roll and certificate of character, dated July 1st, 1857.—Further Parl. Papers on the Mutinies (No. 4), p. 53.

* Despatch of Colonel Lennox, July 1st, 1857.—Further Parliamentary Papers on Mutinies (No. 4), p. 46. See also letter dated August 1st: published in *Times*, September 29th, 1857.

† Letter from an officer of one of the Fyzabad

about three miles further, Colonel Goldney and Major Mill waited, in hopes of being rejoined by their comrades; but spending two hours in vain, they resumed their voyage down stream, and at length reached a spot which they approached without any idea of danger, apparently not knowing that it was Begum Gunje, the place where the 17th N.I. were encamped, and beneath which the current of the Gogra swept past.* Here the fugitives observed natives running along the bank, and evidently giving notice of their approach. From the various accounts of the whole sad business, it seems that some of the more sanguinary and desperate of the Fyzabad mutineers, thwarted in their purpose of themselves slaying and plundering the Europeans by the determined opposition of the 22nd N.I., gave notice to the rebels at Begum Gunje to intercept the officers. Accordingly, just at the narrowest part of the stream, a body of infantry and cavalry were drawn up in readiness; and, as the boats approached, they were fired into, and Matthews, who was rowing, was killed. Colonel Goldney desired the officers to lay aside their arms, and try to come to terms with the mutineers, who entered some boats which lay along the shore, and pushing off into the middle of the stream, recommenced firing. Seeing this, Colonel Goldney urged all around him to jump into the water, and try to gain the opposite bank; he was, he said, "too old to run," and there was no other prospect of escape. His advice was followed. The gallant veteran and the dead sergeant remained alone; the other passengers, together with all those in the second boat, strove to swim to shore. Major Mill, Lieutenants Currie and Parsons, were drowned in the attempt.

The fortunes of the party in the first boat are described in a report by Sergeant Busher, who succeeded in effecting his escape, as did also Teg Ali Khan. In the course of Busher's wanderings, he met with the officers who had embarked in the fourth boat; but they escaped the rebel force only to perish by the hands of insurgent villagers.† Lieutenants Cantley,

Ritchie, and Bright, are thought to have met a similar fate.‡ The remainder of the Fyzabad fugitives, whose fate has not been mentioned, escaped, excepting Colonel Goldney, who was, it is alleged, brought to land, and led to the mutineer camp. "I am an old man," he said; "will you disgrace yourselves by my murder?" They shot him down.§

The gentlemen in the third boat put in shore, and obtained a large boat and some rowers. The natives were, however, so terrified, that they would have run away, had they not been compelled to embark "at the point of the sword." The Europeans exhausted with fatigue, fell asleep, and when they awoke the boatmen had disappeared. They had, however, by this time reached a village called Gola, near which a native prince and French indigo planter resided. The planter, "seeing the whole country up around him," started with the officers on the following morning for Dinapoor, whither the whole party arrived safely, under the escort of thirty armed men, sent with them by the rajah. Mr. Collison, on whose authority the above details are given, says, that the ladies from Fyzabad arrived at Dinapoor on June 29th, in a pitiful condition. They had been robbed of everything at Goruckpoor, whither they had been safely sent by Maun Sing, and only escaped with their lives. They had been imprisoned in a fort on the river for a week, and almost starved to death.|| In the official notice of the Fyzabad mutiny, it is expressly stated, that no acts of violence were committed by the troops on the occasion; on the contrary, the majority, it is said, conducted themselves respectfully towards their officers to the last; and even those requiring money for travelling expenses, were supplied with it by the mutineers.¶

The adventures of Colonel Lennox remain to be told. After the officers had left, the moulvee sent the native apothecary of the dispensary to say, that he was sorry that the colonel should be obliged to fly, as, through his kindness, he had been well cared-for while confined for three months in the quarter-guard, and had been allowed

mentions the colonel's name among the list of the missing, whose fate had not been ascertained.

¶ Letter from Assistant-surgeon Collison, dated "Dinapoor, June 30th."—*Times*, August 29th, 1857.

¶ Despatch from Major-general Lloyd, dated "Dinapoor, June 19, 1857."—Further Parl. Papers (not numbered), p. 35.

* Gubbins' *Mutinies in Oudh*, p. 135.

† Further Parl. Papers (No. 4), p. 48.

‡ *London Gazette* (second supplement), May 6th, 1858.

§ Mr. Gubbins, from whom the above statement regarding the fate of Col. Goldney is derived (p. 135), does not give his authority. The government *Gazette*

his hookah; and that if the colonel and his family would remain in cantonments for a few days, he would take care of them. The subahdar, Dhuleep Sing, on the contrary, advised their immediate flight before the arrival of the 17th N.I.; and as the sepoy on guard at the bungalow were becoming insolent and riotous, Colonel Lennox judged it best to quit Fyzabad immediately, which he did with his wife and daughter, starting during the intense heat of the afternoon. Two faithful sepoy accompanied them, and were happily on their guard against the danger to be expected at Begum Gunje. At Ayodha, however, they encountered an unexpected difficulty, the place being held by a rebel picket. They were twice compelled to stop, under threats of being fired upon; but after being questioned, were suffered to proceed. At half-past ten they passed the enemy's camp unseen; but on rounding a sand-bank, they came upon another picket. By the advice of the sepoy and boatmen, they went on shore, and crept along the side of the bank for two hours: at the expiration of that time they re-entered the boat, which the native boatmen had risked their lives to bring round. Colonel Lennox and the ladies crossed the river at midnight, and landed in the Goruckpoor district. At sunrise on the following morning, they started on foot for Goruckpoor, with their khitmutgar (steward or table attendant) and ayah (lady's maid), and had walked about six miles, when they reached a village, where, having procured a draught of milk, they prepared to rest during the mid-day heat; but were soon disturbed by a horseman, armed to the teeth, with a huge horse-pistol in his hand, which he cocked and held to the head of Colonel Lennox, desiring him to proceed with his wife and daughter to the camp of the 17th N.I., as he expected to get a reward of 500 rupees for each of their heads. The fugitives wearily retraced their steps; but had not gone above a mile when a lad met them, whom the horseman recognised, and whose appearance made him strive to compel the ladies to quicken their pace. The lad, however, prevailed on him to let them drink some water and rest awhile, near a village; and during the interval he contrived to

send a boy to call friends to their assistance. It appeared that a nazim, named Meer Mohammed Hussein Khan, and his nephew, Meer Mehndee, had a small fort less than a mile distant (in the Amorah district), from whence, on receiving intelligence of the danger of the Europeans, eight or ten men were dispatched to the rescue. The horseman was disarmed, and obliged to accompany his late captives to the residence of the nazim; but one of the party sent to save them, seemed by no means pleased with the task. He abused Colonel Lennox; and, "looking to his pistol and priming, swore he would shoot those Englishmen who had come to take away the caste of the natives and make them Christians."* Meer Mohammed was holding a council when the fugitives arrived. They were ushered into his presence, and he bade them rest and take some sherbet. One of his retainers hinted, that a stable close by would be a suitable abode for the dogs, who would be killed ere long. The nazim rebuked him, and told the Europeans not to fear, as they should be protected in the fort until the road to Goruckpoor was again open, so that the station could be reached in safety.

On the day after their arrival, their host, fearing that scouts of the 17th N.I. would obtain news of the locality of the refugees, desired them to assume native clothing; and dressing three of his own people in the discarded European garments, he sent them out at nine o'clock in the evening, under an escort, to deceive his outposts and the villagers. The disguised persons returned at midnight, in their own dresses; and all, except those in the secret, believed that the Europeans had been sent away, instead of being allowed to remain in a reed hut in rear of the zenana, treated very kindly and considerately, having plenty of food, and a daily visit from the nazim. Clothing for the ladies was supplied by the begum. On the 18th of June, an alarm was given that an enemy was approaching to attack the fort. The ladies were immediately concealed in the zenana, and Colonel Lennox hidden in a dark-wood "godown," or caravan for the transport of goods. The troopers proved to be a party sent by the collector of Goruckpoor for the refugees, who gratefully

* The adventures of Colonel Lennox and his family, are given, as nearly as possible, in the words of the interesting official statement, drawn up by the colonel himself, and dated July 1st, 1857.—

Further Parl. Papers (No. 4), pp. 46—48. See also the somewhat fuller account, also written by him, and published in the *London Times*, of September 29th, 1857.

took leave of "the considerate and noble nazim." They reached Goruckpoor in safety; and, on their way, met Sergeant Busher, who had been also saved by Meer Mehndee's adherents.

The nazim afterwards visited the mutineers at Fyzabad, to learn their plan, which was to march to the attack of Lucknow, and then proceed to Delhi. They enquired very minutely concerning certain Europeans he had harboured. The nazim declared he had only fed and rested three Europeans, and then sent them on. To this the mutineers replied—"It is well; we are glad you took care of the colonel and his family."

Colonel Lennox concludes his narrative by earnestly recommending the nazim and his nephew to the favour of the British government. He had refrained from any description of his own sufferings, or those of his companions; but he evidently could not acknowledge the gratitude due to a fellow-creature, without making reverent mention of the merciful Providence which had supported, and eventually carried him through, perils under which the majority of his fellow-officers had sunk, though they were mostly young, strong, and unencumbered by the care of weak and defenceless women. His party escaped without a hair of their heads being injured. There is something very impressive in the quiet dignity with which Colonel Lennox declares—"Throughout this severe trial, I have found the promise fulfilled to me and to my family, 'And as thy day, so shall thy strength be.'"^{*}

The last Europeans left at Fyzabad, were the wife and children of Major Mill. For some unexplained cause, Mrs. Mill had neither accompanied the civilians to Shahgunje, nor her husband to the boats. She is alleged to have lost the opportunity of leaving the station with Colonel Lennox, from unwillingness to expose her three young children to the sun; but she subsequently made her way alone with them, wandering about for a fortnight, from village to village, till she reached Goruckpoor, where one of her little ones died of fatigue; and where, after passing through an agony of doubt, she learned at length the certainty of her widowhood.[†]

Sultanpoor.—This station was under the

^{*} Further Parl. Papers (No. 4), p. 47.

[†] Gubbins' *Mutinies in Oudh*, p. 136.

[‡] *Ibid.*, p. 138.

command of Colonel Fisher, an officer whose genial nature and keen enjoyment of field sports, had rendered him popular alike with Europeans and Natives. His own regiment (the 15th irregular horse) was posted at Sultanpoor, together with the 8th Oude infantry, under Captain W. Smith, and the 1st regiment of military police, under Captain Bunbury. Individual popularity could not, however, counteract general disaffection; and, even to its possessor, it brought dangers as well as advantages; for while the sepoys of each regiment were solicitous for, and did actually preserve, the lives of many favourite officers at the risk of their own, the worst disposed of other corps were specially anxious to remove such commanders as might influence the more moderate to repentance, and, at the same time, to compromise the entire Bengal army by implication in the commission of crimes which the majority had in all probability never contemplated. Colonel Fisher was not taken by surprise. He anticipated the coming outbreak, and sent off the ladies and children, on the night of the 7th of June, towards Allahabad, under care of Dr. Corbyn and Lieutenant Jenkyns. Three of the ladies (Mrs. Goldney, Mrs. Block, and Mrs. Stroyan) became separated from the rest, and were taken to the neighbouring fort of Amethie, where they were protected by Rajah Bainie Madhoo Sing; by whom, the Oude commissioner states, "they were very kindly treated. Madhoo," he adds, "sent us in their letters to Lucknow; furnished them with such comforts as he could procure himself; took charge of the articles which we wished to send; and, after sheltering the ladies for some days, forwarded them in safety to Allahabad. The rest of the party, joined by Lieutenant Grant, assistant-commissioner, found refuge for some days with a neighbouring zemindar, and were by him escorted in safety to Allahabad."[‡] This testimony is very strongly in favour of a rajah, whose fort, after being the sanctuary of Englishwomen in their deepest need, was soon to be besieged by the British commander-in-chief in person, and its master driven into exile and outlawry. The cause of this change is alleged to have been one which those who have watched the working of the centralisation system in India, will find little difficulty in understanding. It is not only that the left hand does not know what the right hand is doing, but that the head,

called by courtesy the Supreme government, is generally ignorant of the movements of either, until its own initiative and veto, exercised in an equally despotic and vacillating manner by successive orders and counter-orders, have issued in the hopeless bewilderment of its own functionaries, and the rebellion of its unfortunate subjects. The history of Bainie Madhoo's hostility is thus given by Mr. Russell. "The rajah," he writes (in November, 1858, from the British camp then advancing against Amethie), "is a Rajpoot of ancient family and large possessions. At the annexation, or rather after it, when that most fatal and pernicious resettlement of Oude took place, in which our officers played with estates and titles as if they were footballs, we took from the rajah a very large portion of territory, and gave it to rival claimants. The rajah, no doubt, was incensed against us; but still, when the mutiny and revolt broke out, he received the English refugees from Salone, and sheltered and forwarded them, men, women, and children, in safety to Allahabad. While he was doing this, the government was busy confiscating his property.* If I am rightly informed, the authorities, without any proof, took it for granted that the rajah was a rebel, and seized upon several lacs of rupees which he had at Benares; and, to his applications for redress, he received, in reply, a summons to come in and surrender himself."†

Other causes were not wanting to aggravate the natural aversion of the chief towards the government by which he had been so ill-treated; and these will be mentioned in their due order. Meanwhile, many intermediate events require to be narrated. The troops at Sultanpore rose on the morning of the 9th of June, when Colonel Fisher, in returning from the lines of the military police, whom he had harangued and endeavoured to reduce to order, was shot in the back by one of that regiment, and died in the arms of Lieutenant C. Tucker. Captain Gibbings, the second in command, was attacked and killed by the troopers while on horseback beside the dhooly in which Fisher had been placed. The men then shouted to

Lieutenant Tucker to go; and he rode off, crossed the river, and found shelter in the fort of Roostum Sah, at Deyrah, on the banks of the Goomtee. Here he was joined by the remainder of the Sultanpore officers, and was, with them, safely escorted to Benares, by a party of natives sent from that city by the commissioner, Henry Carre Tucker.

Mr. Gubbins observes—"Roostum Sah is a fine specimen of the best kind of talooqdars in Oudh. Of old family, and long settled at Deyrah, he resides there in a fort very strongly situated in the ravines of the Goomtee, and surrounded by a thick jungle of large extent. It had never been taken by the troops of the native government, which had more than once been repulsed from before it. Roostum Sah deserves the more credit for his kind treatment of the refugees, as he had suffered unduly at the settlement, and had lost many villages which he should have been permitted to retain. I had seen him at Fyzabad in January, 1857; and, after discussing his case with the deputy-commissioner, Mr. W. A. Forbes, it had been settled that fresh inquiries should be made into the title of the villages which he had lost; and orders had been issued accordingly."‡

Whatever were the orders issued in January, they appear to have afforded no immediate relief to the ill-used talookdar; for, in the following June, when he received and sheltered the European fugitives, he was found to be supporting his family by the sale of the jewels of his female relatives.

Two young civilians§ were killed in endeavouring to escape. They took refuge with Yaseen Khan, zemindar of the town of Sultanpore. He is alleged to have received them into his house, and then turned them out and caused them to be shot down, thereby perpetrating the only instance of treachery attributed to a petty zemindar of Oude.||

Salone.—The mutiny here was conducted without tumult or bloodshed. There were no Europeans at this station, but only six companies of the 1st Oude infantry, under Captain Thompson. The cantonments were

* Out of 223 villages, 119 were taken from him on the second revision after annexation. (Russell). —*Times*, Jan. 17th, 1858.

† *Times*, December 21st, 1858.

‡ Gubbins' *Mutinies in Oudh*, p. 139.

§ Mr. A. Block, C.S., and Mr. S. Stroyan, who had been recently married to a girl of seventeen.

|| *Mutinies in Oudh*, p. 140. Mr. Gubbins does not give his authority for this statement regarding the conduct of Yaseen Khan.

at Pershadipoor. The conduct of the regiment is described by its commanding officer as continuing "most exemplary" up to June 9th, notwithstanding the trials to which the men had been subjected, by the false accounts of their friends and relatives in different disbanded and mutinous regiments. On the afternoon of that day, a sowar (trooper), who pretended to have escaped from a body of mutineers, galloped into the cantonments. In the night, he represented to the sepoy, that in the event of their remaining faithful, they would be overpowered by the revolted regiments; and his arguments, added to the impression already produced by the assertions of the 37th, 45th, and 57th N.I., that they had been first disarmed and then fired on by the Europeans, so wrought upon the minds of the Pershadipoor troops, that they resolved on throwing off their allegiance.*

The large sum known to be in the treasury, had probably its share in inciting them to mutiny, which they did on the morning of the 10th, by refusing to obey their officers, and warning them to depart. The Europeans knew that resistance was hopeless, and rode off, a few sepoy accompanying Captain Thompson, and remaining steadily with him; while some native subordinates attended the commissioner, Captain Barrow. As the party passed through the lines, several of the sepoy saluted them, but none uttered any threat. Outside the station, Lall Hunwunt Sing, talookdar of Dharoopoor, was found drawn up with his troopers, in accordance with a promise which he had given to be ready with aid in case of emergency. The whole of the refugees were received into his fort, and remained there nearly a fortnight, treated all the while with the greatest kindness. They were then conducted by their host and 500 of his followers to the ferry over the Ganges, opposite to Allahabad, and they reached the fort in safety. The refugees desired to give Hunwunt Sing some token of their gratitude; "but he would receive no present for his hospitality." The financial commissioner remarks—"The conduct of this man is the more deserving, as he had lost an undue number of villages; and his case, as well as that of Roostum Sah of Deyrah, was one that called for reconsideration."†

* Despatch of Captain Thompson to secretary of government, June 25th, 1857.—Further Parl. Papers, p. 70.

† Gubbins' *Mutinies in Oudh*, p. 141.

At *Duriabad*, a station and district of the Lucknow division, the 5th Oude infantry were quartered, under Captain Hawes. There was a considerable amount of treasure here (about three lacs), the removal of which had been attempted in May, but resisted by some of the sepoy. On the 9th of June, Captain Hawes renewed the attempt. The treasure was placed in carts, and the men marched off cheering; but before they had proceeded half a mile, a disturbance took place. The disaffected men refused to convey the treasure any further, fired on those who opposed them, and succeeded in taking back the loaded carts in triumph to the station. The European residents fled immediately. Captain Hawes, though repeatedly fired on, escaped unhurt, galloped off across the country, was kindly received by Ram Sing, zemindar of Suhee, and from thence escaped to Lucknow. Lieutenants Grant and Fullerton placed their wives and children in a covered cart, and were walking by the side of it, when they were overtaken by a party of mutineers, and obliged to turn back. On their way towards Duriabad, messengers from cantonments met them, with leave to go where they pleased, as the regiment had no wish to do them harm. A double rifle, which had been taken from Lieutenant Grant, was restored to him; and the party reached the hospitable abode of Ram Sing, and proceeded thence to Lucknow without further molestation. Mr. Benson (the deputy-commissioner) and his wife took refuge with the talookdar of Huraha; were hospitably treated, and enabled to reach Lucknow.

The mutiny of all the Oude stations has now been told, except those of Cawnpoor and Futteghur: they have a distinctive character; the massacre which followed them by far surpassing any outbreak of sepoy panic, ferocity, or fanaticism; and being, in fact, an episode formed by the ruthless, reckless vengeance of the wretch whose name is hateful to everybody possessed of common humanity, whether Christian, Mohammedan, or Hindoo.

Lucknow.—On the 11th of June, 1857, the capital of Oude, and Cawnpoor, were the only stations in the province still held by the British.

On the following day, Sir Henry Lawrence resumed his functions, and became as indefatigable as ever. He "seemed almost never to sleep. Often would he sally out in

disguise, and visit the most frequented parts of the native town, and make personal observations, and see how his orders were carried out. He several times had a thin bedding spread out near the guns at the Baillie Guard gate, and retired there among the artillerymen; not to sleep, but to plan and meditate undisturbed. He appeared to be ubiquitous, and to be seen everywhere.*

The 12th of June was further marked by the mutiny of the 3rd regiment of military police, which furnished the mail guard, and took most of the civil duties. The sepoys abandoned their several posts, and marched off on the road to Sultanpore, plundering several houses belonging to Europeans in their way. They were pursued by a force under Colonel Inglis. The police superintendent (Captain Weston) outstripped the other Europeans, and endeavoured to bring the natives back to obedience. They treated him civilly, but refused to listen to his arguments, unless permitted to do so by the chief they had elected. The permission was refused, and one of the mutineers levelled his musket at Captain Weston. A dozen arms were thrust forward to strike down the weapon. "Who," said they, "would kill such a brave man as this?" The English officer rode back unharmed.† When the Europeans came up with the mutineers, they turned and fought, killing two of the Sikh troopers, and wounding several other persons. Two Europeans died of apoplexy. The loss, on the side of the mutineers, was fifteen killed and fifteen captured. On the return of the pursuers, the deputy-commissioner, Mr. Martin, who had formed one of the volunteer cavalry, urged the execution of the prisoners; but the tacit pledge given by some of the captors, who had held out their open hand in token of quarter, was nobly redeemed by Sir Henry Lawrence, and the prisoners were released. Levies of horse, foot, artillery, and police, were now raised. About eighty pensioned sepoys were called in by Sir Henry from the surrounding districts, and no suspicion ever attached to any of them during the siege. One, named Ungud, a native of Oude, performed some remarkable feats as a messenger. The mingled justice and conciliation of Sir Henry Lawrence's policy was markedly instrumental in obtaining the native auxiliaries, but for whom, Lucknow might have

been as Cawnpore. A striking illustration of this fact, is afforded by the circumstance of some hundreds of Native artillerymen, formerly in the service of the King of Oude (who had refused to enter the service of the British government on the annexation of the country), now coming forward under their chief, Meer Fuzund Ali, as volunteers. A number of them were enlisted; and Mr. Gubbins, who had sixteen of them in his own fortified house, says they worked the guns, under European supervision, during the whole siege, in which several of them were killed. He adds, that "the mutineers no sooner learnt that Fuzund Ali was on our side, than they gutted his house, plundering it of a large amount of valuable property. Unless, therefore, some special compensation has been granted to him, Fuzund Ali will not have gained much by his loyalty."‡ It seems strange that the "financial commissioner for Oude," writing in June, 1858, should not have been able to speak with somewhat greater certainty on the subject.

Ramadeen, an old Brahmin, also a native of Oude, was another helpful auxiliary. He had been employed as an overseer of roads; and when the disturbed state of the districts interrupted his labours, he came in to Lucknow with six of his brethren: they worked as foot soldiers; and no men ever behaved better. By night they assisted in constructing batteries; by day they fought whenever the enemy attacked. Ramadeen and two of his men were killed; the others survived, and were pensioned by government. There was a native architect named Pirana, of whom Mr. Gubbins says—"He was an excellent workman; and, but for his aid and that of Ramadeen, we could never have completed the works which we put up. Pirana used to work steadily under fire; and I have seen a brick, which he was about to lay, knocked out of his hand by a bullet."§ Before the siege began, there was an excellent native smith, named Golab, working in the engineering department. Captain Fulton gave him his option to go or stay. He chose the latter; and manifested strong personal attachment to his chief, following him everywhere in the face of great danger, and rendering invaluable service. On the very day on which the relieving force entered the Residency, he was killed by a round shot.

Such are a few among a crowd of

* Rees' *Siege of Lucknow*, p. 39.

† *Ibid.*, p. 61.

‡ Gubbins' *Mutinies in Oude*, p. 166.

§ *Ibid.*, p. 167.

instances of fidelity even unto death; individual attachment being usually the actuating motive.

Strenuous efforts were now made to strengthen the Residency position, and to throw up defences capable of resisting the assault of artillery. The Residency itself occupied the highest point of an elevated and irregular plateau, sloping down sharply towards the river. On the north side, a strong battery for heavy guns, afterwards called the Redan, was commenced on the 18th of June, by Captain Fulton. The Cawnpore battery—so called from its position commanding the high road from that station—had been begun some days earlier by Lieutenant Anderson.

Among other precautions taken at this period, was the arrest of certain Mohammedians of high family, who it was supposed might be compelled or persuaded to join the rebel cause. One was Mustapha Ali Khan, the elder brother of the ex-king, who had been a state prisoner at the time of our occupation of Oude, and whose claims to the succession had been set aside on the plea of weak intellect. The other captives were two princes connected with the Delhi family—Nawab Rookun-ood-Dowlah, one of the surviving sons of the good old sovereign, Sadut Ali Khan; and the young rajah of Toolseepoor (in the Terai), a very turbulent character, who had previously been under surveillance, and was suspected of having caused the murder of his father.

On the 28th of June, Ali Reza Khan, who had formerly been kotwal of Lucknow under native rule, and had taken service under the British government, reported the existence of a large quantity of jewels in the late king's treasury, in the palace called the Kaiser Bagh; which, if not removed, would probably fall into the hands of the mutineers, or be plundered by some party or other. Major Banks was immediately dispatched with a military force to secure and bring in the treasure, which consisted of a richly ornamented throne, crowns thickly studded with gems, gold pieces from Venice and Spain, and a variety of necklaces, armlets, rings, and native ornaments, enclosed in cases so decayed with age, that they fell to pieces when touched; and the place was literally strewn with pearls and gold. The display was unfortunate; and during the subsequent siege, the receptacle in which these gewgaws were placed was more than once broken into, and "looted."

The men of the 32nd regiment were supposed to be the offenders. "Certainly they got hold of a large quantity of the jewels, and sold them freely to the natives of the garrison."* Deprat, a French merchant, who possessed some stores of wine, received offers of valuable gems in exchange for a dozen of brandy; and Mr. Gubbins writes—"I have myself seen diamonds and pearls which had been so bought." There were twenty-three lacs (£230,000) in the government treasury; and this sum was, in the middle of June, buried in front of the Residency, as the safest place of deposit.

The circulating medium had always been miserably insufficient for the wants of a teeming population; and the neglect of proper provision in that respect had been one of the leading defects of the Company's government. In Oude, early in the month of June, public securities fell to so low an ebb, that government promissory notes for a hundred rupees were offered for sale at half that sum. Confidence was partially restored by the authorities volunteering to buy as much as two lacs of paper at any rate under sixty per cent. The owners hesitated and wavered; and the only purchase actually made was effected by the financial commissioner, on Sir Henry Lawrence's private account, at seventy-five per cent. But during the last half of the month, the demand for gold increased rapidly. The mutinous sepoys at the out-stations had possessed themselves of large amounts of government treasure in silver, which was very bulky to carry about, and they exchanged it for gold at high rates, wherever the latter could be procured. At Lucknow all credit rapidly vanished. Not a native merchant could negotiate a "hoondie," or bill; the government treasury was vainly appealed to for aid; and as there was no longer any prospect of receiving money from the out-stations, it was ordered that the salaries of the government officials should cease to be paid in full, and that they should receive only such small present allowance as might suffice for necessary expenditure.

By this time the heat had become intense, and the rains were anxiously looked for. There had been several deaths from cholera in the Muchee Bhawn, and both cholera and small-pox had appeared in the Residency, where Sir Henry himself lived, in the midst of above a hundred ladies and

* Gubbins' *Mutinies in Oudh*, p. 178.

children. The Residency also contained the sick, and women and children, of H.M.'s 32nd. "There are," Mrs. Harris states, "as many as eight and nine ladies, with a dozen children, in one room; and the heat is awful."* A heavy fall of rain on the 28th of June was hailed as a great relief; but the comfort thus afforded was counterbalanced by tidings from Cawnpoor.

At the time of the capitulation of General Wheeler to the Nana Sahib, a large body of mutineers were known to be assembled at Nawabgunje, twenty miles from Lucknow, which city they immediately marched towards. On the 29th of June, an advance guard of 500 infantry and 100 horse, was reported to Sir Henry Lawrence as having arrived at Chinhut (a town on the Fyzabad road, within eight miles of the Residency), to collect supplies for the force which was expected there on the following day. A body of cavalry was sent out to reconnoitre the position and numbers of the enemy, but returned without having accomplished this object, hostile pickets having been posted at a considerable distance from the town. Our intelligence was, perhaps unavoidably, as defective as that of the enemy was accurate. On the night of the 29th of June (and not on the 30th, as the spies employed by Mr. Gubbins, who had charge of the intelligence department, had declared would be the case), the rebel army reached Chinhut. In utter ignorance of this fact, Sir Henry Lawrence planned the expedition which proved so disastrous.

Such, at least, is the statement made by Mr. Rees, whose authority carries weight, because he had access to, and permission to use, the journal kept by the wife of Brigadier Inglis, the second in command; and probably gained his information from the brigadier himself, as well as from other officers engaged in the undertaking. Mr. Gubbins' account is less circumstantial, and is naturally not unprejudiced, because, owing to the unfortunate differences which existed between him and the other leading authorities, he was not even aware of the expedition until its disastrous issue became apparent.

* Mrs. Harris's *Siege of Lucknow*, pp. 23; 54.

† Raikes' *Siege of Lucknow*, p. 67. Mr. Gubbins states, that upon his death-bed, Sir Henry referred to the disaster at Chinhut; and said, that he had acted against his own judgment from the fear of man, but did not mention the name of any individual adviser.—*Mutinies in Oudh*, p. 199.

The force moved out at 6 A.M. on the morning of the 30th, and consisted of about 350 Europeans, including a troop of volunteer cavalry, and about the same number of natives, with ten guns and an 8-inch howitzer. Brigadier Inglis, in his despatch, says that several reports had reached Sir Henry Lawrence, on the previous evening, that the rebel army, in no very considerable numbers, intended marching on Lucknow on the following morning; and Sir Henry therefore determined to make a strong *reconnaissance* in that direction, with a view, if possible, of meeting the enemy at a disadvantage, either at their entrance into the suburbs of the city, or at the bridge across the Kookrail—a small stream intersecting the Fyzabad road, about half-way between Lucknow and Chinhut. Thus far the road was metalled; but beyond it was a newly raised embankment, constructed of loose and sandy soil, in which, every now and then, gaps occurred, indicating the position of projected bridges. The troops halted at the bridge, and Sir Henry, it is said, proposed to draw up his little army in this position, and await the coming of the enemy; but he "unfortunately listened to the advisers who wished him to advance."† Raikes adds, there were rum-and-water and biscuits with the baggage; but no refreshment was served out to the soldiers, although the Europeans were suffering severely from the sun, which was shining right in their faces; and many of them had been drinking freely overnight.

Brigadier Inglis does not enter into particulars; but only states that the troops, misled by the reports of wayfarers (who asserted that there were few or no men between Lucknow and Chinhut),‡ proceeded somewhat further than had been intended, and suddenly fell in with the enemy, who had up to that time eluded the vigilance of the advanced guard by concealing themselves behind a long line of mango groves, in overwhelming numbers. Chinhut itself was a large village, situated in a plain, on the banks of a very extensive jheel, or lake, close to which stands a castle, formerly a favourite resort of the kings of Oude in their sporting excursions. The camp of the enemy lay to the left of Chinhut. The

† Another of the annalists of the siege, observes, that "Sir Henry was on the point of returning to the city; but, unfortunately, he was persuaded to advance, as it was said the enemy could not be in great number."—*Day by Day at Lucknow*; by the widow of Colonel Case, of H.M.'s 32nd; p. 49. London: Bentley, 1858.

village of Ishmaelpoor, where the action was really fought, lay to the left of the road by which the British were advancing, and was occupied by the enemy's sharpshooters. The howitzer was placed in the middle of the road, and fired with much effect; but the rebels, instead of retreating, only changed their tactics, and were soon seen advancing in two distinct masses of cavalry, infantry, and artillery, evidently intending to outflank the British on both sides. "The European force and the howitzer, with the Native infantry, held the foe in check for some time:—and had the six guns of the Oude artillery been faithful, and the Seik cavalry shown a better front, the day would have been won in spite of an immense disparity in numbers. But the Oude artillerymen and drivers were traitors."* They overturned the guns into ditches, cut the traces of their horses, and abandoned them, regardless of the remonstrances and exertions of their own officers, and of those of Sir Henry Lawrence's staff, headed by the brigadier-general in person, who himself drew his sword upon these rebels. The cavalry were now ordered to charge. The European volunteers, few of whom had ever seen a shot fired, instantly obeyed the order; but the Seiks (numbering eighty sabres) behaved shamefully. Only two of them charged with the Europeans; the rest turned their horses' heads and galloped back to Lucknow. From behind the loopholed walls of Ishmaelpoor, a deadly fire was poured forth on the British. The 300 men of H.M.'s 32nd were ordered to clear the village. They advanced boldly under their gallant leader, Colonel Case; but he was struck to the ground by a bullet; whereupon the men suddenly laid themselves down under the shelter of a small undulation in the field, but continued firing at the enemy as fast as they could load their pieces.

The order for retreat was now given. The European artillery limbered up and went to the rear, and Sir Henry Lawrence ordered Lieutenant Bonham to retire with the howitzer. But the elephant which was to have carried it was half maddened by the fire; and while the gunners were striving to attach the trail of the howitzer to its carriage, the mutineers were pressing on. A bullet struck Lieutenant Bonham, who

was carried off by his men, and put upon a limber. The howitzer was abandoned; the rebels seized it, and, in the course of some forty-eight hours, fired from it the shot that killed Sir Henry Lawrence. The retreat had become general, when Captain Bassano, of the 32nd foot, who had been searching for Colonel Case, discovered that officer lying wounded, and offered to bring some of the men back to carry him away. "Leave me to die here," was the reply; "I have no need of assistance. Your place is at the head of your company."† The enemy were at this time in rapid pursuit; the Europeans and the sepoy infantry kept up a brisk fire as they retreated, and many fell on both sides. Colonel Case was last seen lying on the roadside with his eyes wide open, and his sword firmly grasped, in the midst of the corpses of his brave companions in arms.‡ Lieutenant Brackenbury was shot next; and Thompson, the adjutant, was mortally wounded. Captain Bassano was hit in the foot, but succeeded in safely reaching the Residency, by the aid of a sepoy of the 18th N.I., who carried the wounded officer for a considerable distance on his back. Major Bruère, also hurt, was saved in a similar manner. There were no dhoolies (litters) for the wounded. At the very beginning of the action, several bearers had been killed; whereupon all the others fled in dismay, leaving the dhoolies in the hands of the enemy. The water-carriers also had run away; and the European infantry were so exhausted from thirst and fatigue, that they could scarcely drag themselves along; and only did so by the aid of the cavalry volunteers, each one of whom was encumbered with two, three, and even four foot soldiers, holding on by the hand of the officer, or by his stirrup, or by the crupper or tail of his horse. The infantry laboured, moreover, under another disadvantage. Their muskets had been kept long loaded, and had become so foul, that it was not possible to discharge them. During the retreat, one of their officers called upon a private by name, and desired him to turn round and fire upon the enemy. "I will do so, sir, if you wish," said the man; "but its no use. I have already snapped six caps, and the piece won't go off."§ Happily, the Native infantry were better able to endure the heat, and

* Despatch of Brigadier Inglis. The Oude artillerymen here mentioned, are not those recently levied (see p. 236), but an old corps, the loyalty of which, according to Rees, there had been pre-

vious ground for suspecting.—*Siege of Lucknow*, p. 53.

† Gubbins' *Mutinies in Oudh*, p. 187.

‡ Rees' *Siege*, p. 72. § Gubbins' *Mutinies*, p. 180.

their weapons were in good order. They are described as having "behaved, for the most part, in the kindest manner to the wounded Europeans; taking up great numbers of them, and leaving their own wounded uncared-for on the battle-field. They had been suspected of being also tainted with the general disaffection, and were, therefore, anxious to regain the esteem and confidence of their European officers. They gave, indeed, the most striking proofs of their fidelity and loyalty on that day, showering volleys of musketry and (native like) of abuse on their assailants."*

On nearing the Kookrail bridge, a new danger presented itself. The road in front was seen to be occupied by a body of the rebel cavalry.† The guns were unlimbered, with the intention of pouring in a few rounds of grape on the enemy; but it was ascertained that not a single round of ammunition remained. The preparatory movement, however, produced the desired effect; the enemy hesitated, and, when charged by Captain Rattray and the handful of volunteers under his command, abandoned their position, and, ceasing to obstruct the road, contented themselves with harassing the rear of the retreating troops, whom they pursued even to the iron bridge near the Residency. Sir Henry Lawrence was seen in the most exposed parts of the field, riding about, giving directions, or speaking words of encouragement amidst a terrific fire of grape, round shot, and musketry, which struck down men at every step. While riding by his side, Captain James was shot through the thigh. Sir Henry remained untouched; but he must have suffered as only so good a man could, in witnessing the scene around him. Forgetful of himself, conscious only of the danger and distress of the troops, at the moment of the crisis near the Kookrail bridge, when his little force appeared about to be overwhelmed by the dead weight of opposing numbers, he wrung his hands in agony, and exclaimed, "My God, my God! and I brought them to this!"

Perhaps that bitter cry was heard and

* Rees' *Siege of Lucknow*, p. 78.

† According to Mr. Rees, the masses of rebel cavalry by which the British were outflanked near the Kookrail bridge, were "apparently commanded by some European, who was seen waving his sword, and attempting to make his men follow him and dash at ours. He was a handsome-looking man, well-built, fair, about twenty-five years of age, with

answered, uttered as it was by the lips of one whose character for Christian excellence stood unequalled among public men in India. At least, the retreat of the exhausted force from the Kookrail bridge to Lucknow, under all the circumstances of the case, is one of the most marvellous incidents in the insurrection. On approaching the suburbs, the natives, men, women, and children, rich and poor, crowded round the weary and wounded fugitives, bringing water in cool porous vessels, which was thankfully accepted, and greedily swallowed.

The news of the disaster had reached the city as early as 9 A.M.; a number of the recreant Seik cavalry, and artillery drivers, having crossed the iron bridge at that hour, their horses covered with foam, and they themselves terrified, but not one of them wounded. The commissioner asked them reproachfully why they had fled. They replied only, that the enemy had surrounded them. Half-an-hour later, a messenger who had been sent to gain information, returned to Lucknow, bearing Sir Henry Lawrence's sword scabbard, and a message that he was unhurt. Shortly after the troops arrived; and then, as the wounded men lay faint and bleeding in the porch of the Residency, the horrors of war burst at once on the view of the British at Lucknow. The banqueting-hall was converted into an hospital; and instead of music and merriment, the wail of the widow, shrieks wrung from brave strong men by excruciating physical suffering, and the dull death-rattle, were heard on every side. The total loss, on the side of the British, consisted of—Europeans, 112 killed, and 44 wounded; Natives—nearly 200 killed and missing: only eleven wounded returned to the city. Besides the howitzer, we lost three field-pieces, with almost all the ammunition waggons of our native guns. No estimate could be formed of the loss of the enemy; but the total number engaged was calculated at 5,550 infantry, 800 cavalry, and 160 artillery.‡ These were the regiments which had mutinied at Fyzabad, Seetapoor, Sultanpoor, Secrora, Gondah,

light mustachios, wearing the undress uniform of a European cavalry officer, with a blue and gold-laced cap on his head." Mr. Rees suggests the possibility of this personage being "a Russian: one suspected to be such had been seized by the authorities, confined, and then released;"—or "a renegade Christian."—*Siege of Lucknow*, p. 76.

‡ Gubbins' *Mutinies in Oudh*, p. 189.

Salone, and Duriabad. The odds were fearful; and the cause for wonder is, not that half the British band should have perished, but that any portion of it should have escaped.

It is probable that Sir Henry Lawrence felt that the expedition had been a mistake, even independently of the fatal miscalculation of the strength of the enemy, which led him to advance to Chinhut. It had been undertaken without due preparation, without any settled plan of action; neither had any reserve been provided in the event of disaster. The European garrison, consisting of little above 900 men, was materially weakened by the result of the contest; and the easy victory gained by the rebels, emboldened them, and accelerated the besiegement of Lucknow.

The first effect of the return of the survivors was to produce a death-like silence throughout the city; but the stillness was of brief duration. The foe followed close on their heels, and the terrified ladies had scarcely time to welcome back their relatives, or, like poor Mrs. Case, to discover their bereavement, before the whistling of round shot was heard in the air. Mr. Gubbins went to search for Sir Henry Lawrence, and found him laying a howitzer at the Water gate (so called from its vicinity to the river Goomtee), to command the entrance to the Residency.

The siege of Lucknow had, in fact, commenced. The Europeans went on the terraces of their houses, and could see, through their telescopes, masses of the enemy crossing the Goomtee, at a considerable distance below the city (the guns on the Redan commanding the iron bridge); while troopers of the rebel cavalry were already galloping about the streets. The gaol, nearly opposite the Baillie Guard gate of the Residency, was left unwatched. The prisoners, some of whom on the previous day, and even on that very morning, had been working at the batteries, carrying beams and baskets of mud, were soon seen making their escape, holding-on by ropes (which they fastened on the barred windows), and swinging themselves down the high walls. In the course of the afternoon, Sir Henry Lawrence dispatched a messenger to Allahabad, with a brief notice of what had occurred. "We have been besieged," he states, "for four hours. Shall likely be surrounded to-night. Enemy very bold, and our Europeans very low. * * * We shall be obliged to concen-

trate if we are able. We shall have to abandon much supplies, and blow up much powder; unless we are relieved in fifteen or twenty days, we shall hardly be able to maintain our ground."*

At the opening of the siege, there was, besides the two main posts at the Residency and the Muchee Bhawn, a third at the Dowlutkhana, a spacious mausoleum built in honour of a former King of Oude. The 4th and 7th regiments of irregular infantry, and four companies of the 1st irregular infantry, had not accompanied the force to Chinhut, but had remained at their post, under Brigadier Gray. No reliance had been placed on the fidelity of these men, and the guns had been previously removed from their charge. No surprise was therefore expressed when, on witnessing the return of the defeated troops, the sepoy at the Dowlutkhana broke out into mutiny with loud shouts, and commenced plundering the property of their officers, whom, however, they did not attempt to injure, but suffered to retire quietly to the Muchee Bhawn.

The Imaumbara—a building appropriated by Mohammedans of the Sheiah sect to the yearly celebration of the Mohurram, a series of services commemorative of the sufferings of the Imaum Hussein—was at this time filled with native police, who soon followed the example set them by the irregulars in joining the mutiny. The kotwal fled, and hid himself; but being discovered by the enemy, was seized, and eventually put to death.

The investment at once prevented the continuance of communication by letter between the Residency and the Muchee Bhawn; at least the commissioner could find no means of conveying despatches from Sir Henry Lawrence to Colonel Palmer, the commanding officer at the latter position; but Colonel Palmer managed to send intelligence to the Residency, that he was ill supplied with food, and even gun ammunition, shot, and shell. The total force available for defence had, moreover, been so reduced by the Chinhut affair, that there was barely sufficient to garrison the extended Residency position, in which it was now resolved to concentrate the troops. Telegraphic communication had been previously established,

* Telegraphic despatch from commanding officer at Allahabad, to governor-general, July 10th, 1857. —Further Parl. Papers, 1857; p. 110.

by Sir Henry Lawrence, between the two posts; and, on the evening of the 1st of July, he took this means of ordering the evacuation of the Muchee Bhawn. Captain Fulton (of the engineers), another officer, and a civilian, Mr. G. H. Lawrence (nephew of Sir Henry), ascended to the roof to perform this hazardous service. The machine was out of order, and had to be taken down and repaired—the three Europeans being all the time a mark for the bullets of the enemy; and having no other shield than the ornamental balustrade, in the Italian style, which surrounded the roof. But they accomplished their work surely and safely, each letter of the telegram being signalled in return by Colonel Palmer. The words were few, but weighty. "Spike the guns well, blow up the fort, and retire at midnight."

Much anxiety was felt about the success of the movement by those who knew what was intended; and those who did not, were for the most part panic-struck by the suddenness of the calamity which had befallen them. The "omlah," or writers, who resided in the city; the chuprassies,* or civil orderlies, and the workpeople engaged in the yet unfinished batteries, took to flight; and everything outside the intrenchments fell into the hands of the enemy. On the first day of the siege, musketry alone was fired by the rebel army; but, on the second, they had succeeded in placing their cannon in position, and took aim with precision and effect.

The Residency was the chief point of attack, both from its high position and as the head-quarters of Sir Henry Lawrence. Events proved that the rebels were perfectly acquainted with all the different apartments, their occupants, and uses, and directed their fire accordingly. The building was very extensive, and solidly built, with lofty rooms, fine verandahs, and spacious porticoes. The tyekhana, or underground rooms, designed to shelter the families of British residents at Lucknow from the heat of the sun, now served to shield a helpless crowd of women and children from a more deadly fire. Skylights and cellar windows, contrived with all care, made these chambers the most commodious in the Residency, as well as

the only safe ones. Indeed, in every other part, no building could have been less calculated for purposes of defence. The numberless lofty windows in its two upper stories offered unopposed entrance to the missiles of the foe. Colonel Palmer's daughter, a girl of about seventeen, engaged in marriage to a young officer, was sitting in one of the higher rooms on the afternoon of the 1st, when a round shot struck her, and nearly carried off her leg. Amputation was immediately had recourse to; but, on the following day, the poor girl died, as did every other patient on whom a similar operation was performed during the entire siege.† Sir Henry Lawrence had a narrow escape at nearly the same time. He occupied a room on the first story of the most exposed angle of the Residency. While engaged writing with his secretary, Mr. Couper, an 8-inch shell fell and burst close to both gentlemen, but injured neither. The whole of the staff entreated Sir Henry to leave the Residency, or at least to choose a different chamber; but he refused, observing that another shell would certainly never be pitched into that small room. He then resumed his anxious round of duty, visiting every post, however exposed its position, however hot the fire directed against it;‡ and taking precautions to facilitate the evacuation of the Muchee Bhawn, on which fortress the enemy had already opened a cannonade. Towards night, however, the firing ceased; and the enemy, believing the ancient stronghold to be well-nigh impregnable, had no idea of the necessity of blockading its garrison. The *ruse* of Sir Henry, in directing the batteries of the Residency to open fire shortly after midnight, was therefore completely successful. The guns of the Redan cleared the iron bridge of all intruders. The arrangements for the march had been admirably made by Colonel Palmer, and were as ably carried through by the subordinate officers, who were furnished with written orders. The force, comprising (according to Mr. Gubbins) 225 Europeans,§ moved out noiselessly at midnight, carrying their treasure and two or more 9-pounder guns with them, and, in fifteen minutes, traversed the three-quarters of a mile which separated the Muchee Bhawn from the Residency, without

sages, and in general out-door work.—(Russell).

† *Memoir* of Rev. H. S. Polehampton; p. 337.

‡ Rees' *Siege of Lucknow*, p. 115.

§ Further Parl. Papers, p. 75.

* *Chuprassies*—so called from the chuprass or badge on their breasts, generally consisting of a broad plate of brass hanging from a handsome shoulder-belt. They are employed in carrying mes-

having had a shot fired at them.* The train for the destruction of the fort had been laid by Lieutenant Thomas, of the Madras artillery: by his calculations the explosion was to take place half-an-hour after the departure of the garrison. Sir Henry Lawrence and the officers stood waiting the event. At the appointed time a blaze of fire shot up to the sky, followed by a loud report, which announced the destruction of 240 barrels of gunpowder, and 6,000,000 ball cartridges, together with the complete dismantlement of the fortress.† Many lacs of percussion-caps, and 250 boxes of small-arm ammunition, were sacrificed at the same time, together with a considerable amount of public stores, and much private property.

Still the measure was, beyond all question, a wise one; and the spirits of the garrison rose immediately at the accession of strength gained by the safe arrival of their countrymen. Very different to this easy entrance to the Residency, was the "Strait of Fire" through which the next British reinforcement had to run the gauntlet. Meanwhile a heavy trial was at hand. After welcoming the troops from the Muchee Bhawn, Sir Henry retired to rest in the same small chamber he had been vainly entreated to leave. The next morning, at half-past eight, he was sitting on his bed, listening to some papers read aloud by Captain Wilson, the deputy assistant-commissary-general, when another 8-inch shell entered by the window, and, bursting in the room, a large piece slightly injured Captain Wilson, but struck Sir Henry with such force as nearly to separate his left leg from the thigh. He was immediately brought over to the house of Dr. Fayrer, the Residency surgeon;‡ which was less exposed to the enemy's fire: but the removal appeared to be speedily discovered by the lynx-eyed rebels, and Fayrer's house became the target for their marksmen. The nature of the wound, and

the attenuated condition of the sufferer, forbade any attempt at amputation; but it was necessary to stay the bleeding by applying the tourniquet; and the agony thus occasioned was fearful to behold. The chief persons of the garrison, civil and military, stood round their gallant chief. Heedless of the sound of the bullets striking against the verandah, and of their own imminent danger, they thought only of the scene before them; and, in the words of one of them, found it "impossible to avoid sobbing like a child."§

Notwithstanding his extreme pain, Sir Henry was perfectly sensible, and characteristically unselfish. He appointed Brigadier Inglis to succeed him in command of the troops, and Major Banks in the office of chief commissioner. He specially enjoined those around him to be careful of the ammunition; and often repeated, "Save the ladies." He earnestly entreated that the aid of government should be solicited for the Hill Asylums, established by him for the education of the children of soldiers, and to the support of which, he had, by the most systematic self-denial, contributed at least £1,000 a-year from his official income: he had no other. He bade farewell to the gentlemen round him, pointed out the worthlessness of human distinctions, and recommended all to fix their thoughts upon a better world. Then turning to his nephew, who, he said, had been as a son to him,|| he sent messages to his children, and to each of his brothers and sisters, and tenderly alluded to the beloved wife,¶ dead some four years before, who had so cordially seconded all his schemes of public and private usefulness. He lingered till eight o'clock in the morning of the 4th, and then his paroxysms of anguish terminated in a peaceful, painless death. His last request was, that the inscription upon his tomb should be simply this—"Here lies Henry Lawrence, who tried to

* One man, however, was left behind, dead drunk. He remained during the explosion—was thrown into the air—fell asleep again, and, on awaking next morning, found himself amid a heap of deserted ruins; whereupon he proceeded quietly to the Residency, taking with him a cart of ammunition, drawn by two bullocks, and astonished the soldiers by calling out, "Arrah! open your gates." Rees, who narrates this anecdote, quotes the French proverb, "Il y'a un Dieu pour les ivrognes;" and suggests, that the serious injury to the adjacent houses, and probable destruction of many of the rebels stationed near the Muchee Bhawn; may account for so extraordinary an escape.—*Siege of Lucknow*, p. 121.

† Brigadier Inglis's despatch, Sept. 26th, 1857. It is asserted, that the destruction thus occasioned was much overrated.

‡ Brother to the volunteer of the same name, killed with Captain Fletcher Hayes. See p. 193.

§ Gubbins' *Mutinies in Oudh*, p. 199.

|| Mrs. Harris's *Siege of Lucknow*, p. 77.

¶ "The late Lady Lawrence shared all his benevolence and all his genius. His article in the *Calcutta Review*, on 'Woman in India,' is descriptive of her character; and the large subscription that was raised for the Lawrence Asylum after her death, was the best tribute to her worth."—*Friend of India*, July, 1857.

do his duty. May the Lord have mercy on his soul!"*

The words are very touching, when considered as the utterance of the man who will go down to posterity as the pacificator of the Punjab,† and to whose prudence, energy, and foresight, despite the disaster at Chinhut, the gallant survivors of the Lucknow garrison consider their success mainly attributable.‡ Indeed (in the emphatic words of Brigadier Inglis), but for the foresight and precautions of Henry Lawrence, every European in Lucknow might have slept in a bloody shroud.

Half-an-hour before Sir Henry's death, his nephew was shot through the shoulder, in the verandah. Mrs. Harris, the wife of the Residency chaplain, writes in her diary—"I have been nursing him to-day, poor fellow! It was so sad to see him lying there in the room with his uncle's body; looking so pale, and suffering." In the course of a few hours it became necessary to remove the corpse; and one of the soldiers called in for the purpose, lifting the sheet from the face, bent over and kissed it reverently. No military honours marked the funeral. A hurried prayer was read amidst the booming of cannon and the fire of musketry; and the remains of the good and great man were lowered into a pit, with several other lowlier companions in arms.

The death of Sir Henry Lawrence was kept secret for many days: he was even

reported to be recovering; but, at last, the truth could no longer be concealed; and the tidings were "received throughout the garrison with feelings of consternation only second to the grief which was inspired in the hearts of all, by the loss of a public benefactor and a warm personal friend."§

A well-known Indian journal (the *Friend of India*) writes—"The commissioner of Oude died, not before he had breathed into his little garrison somewhat of his own heroic spirit. Great actions are contagious, and gladly would they have died for him; but it was not so to be; henceforth they will live only for vengeance." The English at Lucknow happily understood the spirit of their beloved chief much better. They had recognised in him a Christian, not an Homeric hero; and the pursuit of vengeance, "the real divinity of the *Iliad*," was, they well knew, utterly incompatible with the forgiving spirit which Sir Henry uniformly advocated as the very essence of vital Christianity. In fact, his true vocation was that of a lawgiver and an administrator, not a subjugator; his talent lay in preventing revolt, rather than in crushing it with the iron heel of the destroyer. Lord Canning|| showed considerable appreciation of Sir Henry Lawrence, when he dwelt on his loss as one which equally affected the Europeans and natives. This was true when it was written, in the very height of the struggle; but it is more striking now,

* See descriptive letterpress, by Mr. Couper (Sir Henry Lawrence's secretary), to Lieutenant Clifford H. Meacham's charming *Sketches of Lucknow*.

† "What the memory of Tod is in Rajast'han—what Macpherson was to the Khonds, Outram to the Bheels, Napier to the Beloochees—that, and more, was Henry Lawrence to the fierce and haughty Seiks."—*Westminster Review*, October, 1858.

‡ See Gubbins, Rees, Polchampton, Case, &c.

§ Brigadier Inglis's despatch, Sept. 26th, 1857.

|| There is not, I am sure, an Englishman in India who does not regard the loss of Sir Henry Lawrence, in the present circumstances of the country, as one of the heaviest of public calamities. There is not, I believe, a native of the provinces where he has held authority, who will not remember his name as that of a friend and generous benefactor to the races of India."—[Lord Canning to the Court of Directors, Sept. 8th, 1857]. Lord Stanley, too, has borne high testimony to the rare merits of Sir Henry Lawrence. At a meeting held to promote the endowment of the schools founded by him for the education of soldiers' children at Kussowhe and Mount Aboo—the "two elder daughters," whose permanent establishment had been one main reason for his prolonged abode in India—Lord Stanley said—"Sir Henry Lawrence rose to eminence step by step, not by favour of any man, certainly not

by subserviency either to ruling authorities or to popular ideas, but simply by the operation of that natural law which in troubled times brings the strongest mind, be it where it may, to the post of highest command. I knew Sir H. Lawrence six years ago. Travelling in the Punjab, I passed a month in his camp, and it then seemed to me, as it does now, that his personal character was far above his career, eminent as that career has been. If he had died a private and undistinguished person, the impress of his mind would still have been left on all those who came personally into contact with him. I thought him, as far as I could judge, sagacious and far-seeing in matters of policy; and I had daily opportunity of witnessing, even under all the disadvantages of a long and rapid journey, his constant assiduity in the dispatch of business. But it was not the intellectual qualities of the man which made upon me the deepest impression. There was in him a rare union of determined purpose, of moral as well as physical courage, with a singular frankness and a courtesy of demeanour which was something more than we call courtesy; for it belonged not to manners, but to mind—a courtesy shown equally to Europeans and natives. Once know him, and you could not imagine him giving utterance to any sentiment which was harsh, or petty, or self-seeking."—*Times*, Feb. 8th, 1858.

when every one capable of looking below the surface, feels that the worst effect of the mutiny is the breach which it has so fearfully widened between the two races. Avengers and subjugators have done their work: we want peace-makers now; but where can we look for such an one as Henry Lawrence?

CHAPTER XI.

CAWNPOOR.—MAY 16TH TO JUNE 27TH, 1857.

CAWNPOOR was selected by the East India Company, in 1775, as the station of the subsidiary troops, to be maintained for the use of the government of Oude. In 1801, the district and city of the same name, with other territory, amounting to half the kingdom, was ceded to the Company, under the circumstances already narrated.*

Caunpoor is not a place of ancient historic interest. The district had formerly an ill name, as the abode of Thugs and Phansigars, especially the western portion of it, where great numbers of murderous bands were said to have resided, ostensibly engaged in cultivating small spots of land, though, in fact, supported by the more lucrative profession of Thuggee.† These gangs had, however, been completely broken up, and the district freed from their hateful operations. The city appears to be of modern origin: there is no mention of it in the *Ayccn Akbery* (drawn up by Abul Fazil, towards the close of the 16th century); and its name—half Mohammedan, half Hindoo (*Cawn*, or *Khan*, lord; and *poor*, town),‡ speaks its mixed character. The native town contained, before the mutiny, about 59,000 inhabitants; and the population of the cantonments, exclusive of the military, is stated by Thornton at 49,975, giving a total of 108,975. The cantonments extend, in a semicircle, for nearly five miles along the right bank of the Ganges; the bungalows of the officers and residents being situated in richly-planted compounds or inclosures, and having the most productive gardens in India; grapes, peaches, mangoes, shaddocks, plantains, melons, oranges, limes, guavas, and custard apples, growing there in perfection, together with most

European vegetables. Assembly-rooms, a theatre, and a race-course were early erected by the Europeans; and, about eighteen years ago, a church was raised by the joint means of a private subscription and a government grant of money and land.

The most attractive feature in Cawnpoor is its ghaut, or landing-place, the traffic being very great. The Ganges, here a mile broad, is navigable down to the sea a distance of above 1,000 miles, and upwards to Sukertal, a distance of 300 miles. Numerous and strange descriptions of vessels are to be seen collected along the banks; and the craft, fastened to the shore, are so closely packed that they appear like one mass, and, from their thatched roofs and low entrances, might easily pass for a floating village.

Many an English lady, during the last half century, has stood at the ghaut, with her ayah and young children by her side, watching the ferry-boat plying across the stream, with its motley collection of passengers—travellers, merchants, and fakirs, camels, bullocks, and horses all crowded together; and may have turned away from the stately Ganges with a sigh, perhaps, for far-distant England, but still without so much as a passing doubt of personal safety in the luxurious abodes, where crowds of natives waited in readiness to minister to the comfort of the privileged “governing race.” The evidences of disaffection at Barrackpoor and elsewhere, appear to have had little or no effect in awakening a sense of danger; and at the time when the Meerut catastrophe became known at Cawnpoor, the latter station was unusually thronged with ladies, who had come thither for the

* See Introductory Chapter, page 60.

† Sherwood on Phansigars.—*Asiatic Researches*, vol. xiii., p. 290.

‡ Hamilton's *Gazetteer*. Thornton, however, states, on the authority of Tod, that Cawn is a corruption of Kanh, a name of Krishna.

purpose of being present at the balls given by the officers during the preceding month.

Tidings of the Meerut massacre were circulated at Cawnpoor on the 16th of May, and created a great sensation in the cantonments, where the greased cartridge question had already been discussed. The officer in command, Sir Hugh Massey Wheeler, was one of the most experienced and popular generals in the Company's service. He had spent nearly fifty-four years in India as a sepoy commander, and he had married an Indian lady. He had led Bengal troops, under Lord Lake, against their own countrymen; and they had followed him to Afghanistan, to oppose foreigners. In both the Seik campaigns, Wheeler and his sepoys had been conspicuous: in the second, he held a separate command. Lord Gough had esteemed him highly as an active and energetic officer, singularly fertile in resources. His despatches prove that he was fully alive to the probability of mutiny among the troops, and took his precautions accordingly; but he had not calculated on insurrection among the people, or on the defalcation, much less the treachery, of a neighbouring chief, in reliance on whose good faith he prepared to meet, and hoped to weather, the approaching storm. It has been affirmed, and not without cause, with respect to the proceedings at Cawnpoor, that "if the dispossessed princes and people of the land, farmers, villagers, and ryots, had not made common cause with the sepoys, there is every reason to believe that but a portion of the force would have revolted: the certainty exists, that not a single officer would have been injured."*

The troops at Cawnpoor, at the time of the outbreak at Meerut, consisted of—

The 1st, 53rd, and 56th N.I.—*Europeans*, 46; *Natives*, 2,924. The second light cavalry regiment—*Europeans*, 21; *Natives*, 526. Three companies of artillery—*Europeans*, 88; *Natives*, 162. A detachment of H.M. 84th foot (100 men), including those in hospital.†

On the 16th of May, an incendiary fire occurred in the lines of the 1st N.I., and the artillery were moved up to the European barracks. On the 18th, Sir Hugh Wheeler telegraphed to Calcutta that considerable excitement was visible at Cawnpoor.‡ The

next day he was desired, by the Supreme government, to begin immediately to make all preparations for the accommodation of a European force, and to let it be known that he was doing so.§ This message led General Wheeler to believe that considerable detachments were on their road from Calcutta; and finding the agitation around him rapidly increasing, he dispatched a requisition to Lucknow, for a company of H.M. 32nd to be stationed at Cawnpoor, pending the arrival of the promised reinforcement.

On the night of the 20th, the cavalry sent emissaries to the infantry lines, asking the three regiments to stand by them, and asserting that the Europeans were about to take away their horses and accoutrements; in fact, to disarm and disband them—a course which the Europeans had no immediate opportunity of adopting, being few in number, and heavily encumbered with women and children. A struggle seemed inevitable: uproar and confusion prevailed throughout the 21st of May; and General Wheeler placed the guns in position, and prepared for the worst. The men were addressed and reasoned with, through the medium of the Native officers. They listened, seemed convinced, and retired quietly to their lines at about half-past seven. A few hours later, fifty-five of H.M. 32nd, and 240 Oude troopers, arrived from Lucknow. General Wheeler, after acquainting the Supreme government with the above particulars, adds—"This morning (22nd) two guns, and about 300 men of all arms, were brought in by the Maharajah of Bithoor. Being Mahrattas, they are not likely to coalesce with the others. Once the Europeans from Calcutta arrived, I should hope that all would be beyond danger. I have the most cordial co-operation from Mr. Hillersdon, the magistrate. At present things appear quiet; but it is impossible to say what a moment may bring forth."||

The temper of the reinforcement of Oude irregulars was not deemed satisfactory; and after they had been some days at Cawnpoor, they were dispatched on the expedition which issued in their mutinying and murdering Captain Hayes and two other Europeans.¶ Lieutenant Ashe was sent by Sir Hugh Wheeler, a day or two

* *Mutiny of the Bengal Army*; by One who has served under Sir Charles Napier; p. 128.

† Parliamentary Return, February 9th, 1858, p. 3.
‡ Appendix to Parl. Papers on Mutiny (1857), p. 199.

§ *Ibid.*, p. 202.

|| Telegram, May 22nd.—Appendix, p. 310.

¶ Captain Hayes had a wife and five children at Lucknow. Mrs. Barbor, who had been three months married, was also there.—Polehampton's *Letters*, p. 274.

after the departure of the Oude irregulars, to join them with a half-battery of Oude horse artillery. A few marches from the station he met some Seiks of the irregulars, who had abandoned their mutinous comrades; and they marched to Cawnpoor with Lieutenant Ashe and the guns.*

The presence of the Mahrattas did not exercise any beneficial effect. Rumours were circulated that the polluting cartridges were to be served out on the 23rd, and that the artillery were to act against all who refused them. Much excitement was manifested; and, on the 24th of May (the Queen's birthday), it was deemed advisable to omit the usual salute.

On the 27th, General Wheeler writes—"All quiet; but I feel by no means confident it will continue so. The civil and military depending entirely upon me for advice and assistance just now, I regret I cannot find time at present to compile a detailed account of late occurrences in my division."†

On the 1st of June, he mentions that Enfield rifle ammunition had been detained in the Cawnpoor magazine, and would just do for the Madras Fusiliers.‡ This circumstance would not escape the distrustful and observant sepoy.

On the following day, two companies of H.M. 84th arrived from Allahabad; but, on the morning of the 3rd, General Wheeler, having heard of the uneasiness which prevailed at Lucknow, gave orders for one company of the 84th, made up to its full strength, together with the company of the 32nd, to march thither, retaining, for the defence of Cawnpoor, 204 Europeans—consisting of 60 men of the 84th regiment, 15 of the 1st Madras Fusiliers (armed with the Enfield rifle), 70 H.M. 32nd, invalids and sick, and 59 artillerymen, with six guns.§

The position now taken by Sir Hugh Wheeler can only be accounted for in one way. It is believed, that no officer of his known ability would have made the selection he did, except under the conviction that the Native troops, though they might desert, would not attack him.||

In this view of the case, it followed, that in looking round the overgrown cantonments for a place of shelter for the residents, convenient quarters for a temporary

refuge were desired, rather than such as would best stand a siege. Had the latter necessity been contemplated, the magazine would, in the absence of a fort, have been best qualified for defence, being a very large building, surrounded by a high masonry wall, and well supplied with every muniment of war. But then it was situated seven miles from the new native lines, close to the gaol, and on the Delhi road. To have concentrated the Europeans there, would have been to abandon all prospect of peaceable disarmament, which Sir Hugh Wheeler might have reasonably expected to accomplish by the aid of the European troops, whose arrival he anxiously expected, part of whom were stopped on the way by the mutiny at Allahabad, and the remainder are alleged to have been needlessly delayed at Calcutta by the tardy, shiftless proceedings of the Supreme government. He therefore fixed on two long barracks, standing in the centre of an extensive plain at the eastern end of the station; and, unhappily, commanded on all sides. The dépôt of the 32nd, consisting of the sick, invalids, women and children of the regiment, was already located in these two buildings, which were single-storied, and intended each for the accommodation of one hundred men. One of them was thatched, and both were surrounded by a flat-roofed arcade or verandah; the walls were of brick, an inch and a-half in thickness; a well and the usual out-offices were attached to the barracks.

The only defence attempted, or even practicable, in the time and under the circumstances of the stiffness of the soil from drought and the scarcity of labour, was to dig a trench, and throw up the earth on the outside so as to form a parapet, which might have been five feet high, but was not even bullet-proof at the crest. Open spaces were likewise left for the guns, which were thus entirely unprotected. It will be easily understood what slight cover an intrenchment of this kind would furnish either for the barracks or for men in the trenches; and there was plenty of cover both for musketry and guns within a short distance of the barracks, of which the mutineers soon availed themselves.

* These Seiks were immediately dismissed by General Wheeler.—Further Parl. Papers (No. 7), p. 130.

† Appendix to Parl. Papers on Mutiny, 1857; p. 326.

‡ *Ibid.*, p. 351.

§ *Narrative of the Mutiny at Cawnpoor*: forwarded by governor-general to Court of Directors, apparently as an official statement.—Further Parl. Papers (No. 7), 1857; p. 129.

|| Gubbins' *Mutinies in Oudh*, p. 177.

It is evident that the aid by which Sir Hugh and the English hoped to be enabled to tide over the expected crisis, was looked for from the chief, styled, in a foregoing despatch, the Maharajah of Bithoor. It is no small compliment to the native character, that, however little it may have been praised in words; in deeds, great reliance has been placed on allies, whose fidelity has been subjected to severe trials. In the present instance, implicit trust was evinced in the co-operation of one who notoriously considered himself an ill-used and aggrieved person, and who had lavished large sums of money in endeavouring to obtain, in England, the reversal of what he, and probably a large body of his countrymen, considered to be the unjust decision of the Indian government.

Dhoondia Rao Punt, commonly called the Nana Sahib (the son of a Brahmin), was adopted by the ex-Peishwa, Bajee Rao, in 1827, being then between two and three years of age. Bajee Rao died in January, 1851; and Nana Rao claimed from the British government the continuance of the pension of £80,000 a-year, granted as the condition of his adopted father's abdication of the sovereignty of Poona in 1818. The question here is not one of adoption; for had the Peishwa left issue of his own body, male and legitimate, the terms of the treaty of 1818 would not have warranted a demand, as of right, for the continuance of the stipend, of which a singular combination of circumstances had necessitated the concession. The treaty, framed by Sir John Malcolm, stipulated for the surrender of the person of Bajee Rao within twenty-four hours, and for the formal surrender of all political power to the British.

"The fourth article declares, that Bajee Rao shall, on his voluntarily agreeing to this arrangement, receive a liberal pension from the Company's government, for the support of himself and his family. The amount of this pension will be fixed by the governor-general; but Brigadier-general Malcolm takes upon himself to engage that it shall not be less than eight lacs of rupees per annum."*

Malcolm was much blamed for having named so large a sum as the minimum, and the Company most reluctantly redeemed the pledge he had given on their behalf:

but he maintained, that the stipend, "though princely for the support of Bajee Rao, his family, and numerous adherents, was nothing for purposes of ambition;" and that if "he had been reduced to a condition in point of allowances, respectability, and liberty, that degraded him in his own mind and that of others, he might have asked himself, 'Where can I be worse?'"†

Again, Malcolm asserts, that the Peishwa was neither destitute of the means of protracting the contest, nor disposed to throw himself unconditionally on the British government; and, after detailing his position and resources, he adds—"The article I purchased was worth the price I paid; I could not get it cheaper."‡ On various grounds he vindicates the policy of liberal dealing with the dethroned prince—namely, on account of "our own dignity, considerations for the feelings of Bajee Rao's adherents, and for the prejudices of the natives of India. We exist on impression; and, on occasions like this, where all are anxious spectators, we must play our part well, or we should be hissed."

In all the discussions regarding the stipend, it is evident that it was regarded simply as a life pension, and that the question of its continuance to the family was never entertained. But, nevertheless, the Indian authorities of that day—Lord Hastings, Adam, Elphinstone, and, most of all, Malcolm—would have been painfully surprised, could they have supposed that, on the death of the man known to them as the "first Hindoo prince in India," a governor-general would be found to declare that "the Peishwa's family have no claim upon the government, and that he would by no means consent to any portion of the public money being conferred on it." Yet this decision Lord Dalhousie pronounced without reference to the Court of Directors, who had, some years before, in answer to an application from the Peishwa on the subject of his family, simply deferred the consideration of the claim.

It is true that Bajee Rao had enjoyed his princely stipend much longer than could have been reasonably anticipated, considering that he was a man of feeble constitution and dissolute habits, far advanced in years at the time of his surrender. He made considerable savings, and actually assisted the government with the loan of six lacs, at the time of the

* Kaye's *Life of Malcolm*, vol. ii., p. 254.

† Letter to Mr. Adam—*Ibid.*, p. 258.

‡ Letter to Sir Thomas Munro—*Ibid.*, p. 257.

siege of Bhurtpoor, when the Cawnpoor treasury was totally devoid of assets, and the march of the troops was delayed in consequence. During his life he supported a multitude of adherents; and, at one time, had no less than 8,000 armed followers at Bithoor. Yet their conduct was so orderly, that the magistrate of Cawnpoor reported, that their presence had occasioned no perceptible increase of crime or disorder in his district. At the Peishwa's death, property said to amount to £160,000,* went to his adopted heir, and his wives and daughters were left in extreme distress; the Peishwa having confidently expected that some provision, more or less satisfactory, would be made for them, if only in deference to popular feeling. It was not, however, poverty only to which these ladies were reduced. The jaghire, or estate, granted to the Peishwa, was specially conceded to preserve the ex-royal family from coming under British jurisdiction: its sequestration at once rendered them liable to be dragged before our law courts—an indignity which natives of high rank have committed suicide to escape. "There was," it is alleged, "proof positive that their alarm on this head was no idle fear, as notices had already been served upon some of them to appear before the Supreme Court at Calcutta."† These grievances had not been borne in silence. The wealth of the Nana secured him plenty of counsellors and advocates. Among the best known of these was one Azim Oollah, who came to London; made himself extremely conspicuous in the parks and Belgravian drawing-rooms, and extremely troublesome at the public offices; lavished some thousands of his employer's money in presents, with a view to gain a favourable hearing in high quarters; and eventually returned to Bithoor, to pour into the Nana's ear his own exaggerated and malicious version of his costly failure in England.

Every guest who visited Bithoor heard the Nana's grievances; and if of any rank, was urged, on his or her return to England, to make an effort for their redress. Who could refuse so munificent a host as the Nana is represented to have been? and how many may have been tempted to overrate the very small influence they possessed,

and the efforts they were disposed to make in his behalf? The visitors' book bore the names of hundreds who had been sumptuously entertained at Bithoor for days, and even weeks. Since the tidings of the fearful crime with which his name has become inseparably associated, many descriptions of his person and abode have been published in the public journals. As to character, all who knew him at Cawnpoor agree in describing him as a person of decidedly second-rate ability, only remarkable for the consequence which his position as the representative of an honoured though fallen dynasty gave him with the natives, and his wealth and convivial disposition procured with the Europeans.

A writer in the *Illustrated Times*, who manifests considerable acquaintance with Indian politics and society, says—

"I knew Nana Sahib intimately, and always regarded him as one of the best and most hospitable natives in the Upper Provinces, and certainly one of the last men to have been guilty of the atrocities laid to his charge. As in the case with many natives of India, it may have been that Nana Sahib cultivated the acquaintance and friendship of the sahibs solely in the hope, that through their influence, direct and indirect, his grievances would be redressed. But the last time I saw Nana Sahib—it was in the cold weather of 1851; and he called upon me twice during my stay in Cawnpoor—he never once alluded to his grievances. His conversation at that time was directed to the Oude affair. The following questions, amongst others, I can remember he put to me:—'Why will not Lord Dalhousie pay a visit to the King of Oude? Lord Hardinge did so.' 'Do you think Colonel Sleeman will persuade Lord Dalhousie to seize the kingdom (of Oude)? He (Colonel Sleeman) has gone to the camp to do his best.'

"So far as I could glean, Nana Sahib wished for the annexation of Oude—albeit he expressed a very decided opinion that, in the event of that measure being resorted to, there would be a disturbance, and perhaps a war."

Another visitor, an English officer, gives an anecdote which is very characteristic of the barrier that obstructs the social intercourse of Europeans and natives. On the way to Bithoor, the visitor praised the equipage of his host, who rejoined—

"Not long ago, I had a carriage and horses very superior to these. They cost me 25,000 rupees; but I had to burn the carriage and kill the horses."—"Why so?"—"The child of a certain sahib in Cawnpoor was very sick, and the sahib and the mem-sahib were bringing the child to Bithoor for a change of air. I sent my big carriage for them.

the English law courts had stepped in as trustees for his interests. A full and authentic statement of the case of the Peishwa's family, ought, ere now, to have been published by government.

* *Homeward Mail*, November 30th, 1857.

† *Ibid.* The Nana had been involved in several unsuccessful law-suits; for the younger adopted son of the Peishwa (the Nana's nephew being a minor,

On the road the child died; and, of course, as a dead body had been in the carriage, and as the horses had drawn that dead body in that carriage, I could never use them again.' (The reader must understand that a native of any rank considers it a disgrace to sell property).—'But could you not have given the horses to some friend—a Christian or a Mussulman?'—'No; had I done so, it might have come to the knowledge of the sahib, and his feelings would have been hurt at having occasioned me such a loss.' Such was the maharajah, commonly known as Nana Sahib. He appeared to be not a man of ability, nor a fool."

In person, the Nana was well described by one of his attendants as a *tring admee* (tight man). Corpulent, and of the middle height, with a complexion scarcely darker than the olive-coloured Spaniard; with bright bead-like eyes, a round face, a straight, well-cut nose, and sensual mouth and chin; his appearance would probably have been attractive to an ordinary observer, but for the effect of the caste-mark on his forehead. He spoke little English; neither is there any reason to suppose the British government had ever made any effort to influence Bajee Rao in the education of his adopted son, though brought up under their auspices. The Nana knew but very little English; but Azim Oollah was fluent in that language; and could speak, it is said, some French and German.

In April, 1857, the Nana visited Lucknow, "on pretence of seeing the sights there," accompanied by a numerous retinue, of course including the notorious Azim Oollah. Sir Henry Lawrence received him kindly, and ordered the authorities of the city to show him every attention. The Nana departed very suddenly; and this circumstance, together with his arrogant and presuming demeanour, excited the suspicions of Mr. Gubbins, who, after consulting with Sir Henry Lawrence, wrote, with his sanction, to convey to Sir Hugh Wheeler their joint impressions of the Mahratta chief. But the warning appears to have been totally unheeded. It was then believed that the Nana had a large portion of his inherited wealth, amounting to £500,000, vested in government securities; and it was not known till his treachery was consummated, that ever since the annexation of Oude, he had been secretly and gradually changing the disposition of his property, till only £30,000 remained to be

sacrificed when he should think fit to throw off his allegiance. Being wholly unsuspected, his arrangements were never noticed; and despite his loudly trumpeted wrongs, he had so much to lose, that no one ever dreamt of his joining in revolt, even at the instigation of the Mephistopheles at his elbow. He continued to live at his castellated palace at Bithoor, a few miles N.W. of Cawnpoor; to keep six mounted guns, and as many followers as he chose. He gave sumptuous entertainments; made hunting parties for strangers of distinction; and was always ready to lend his elephants, and, as we have seen, his equipages also, for the use of the neighbouring "sahibs and mem-sahibs." In return, he was treated with much distinction, and styled the Maharajah—a title to which he had no rightful claim, and which he ought never to have been suffered to assume. Even that of the Nana Sahib* is a term too closely allied to Mahratta sovereignty, to have been a judicious designation for an avowed pretender to the inheritance of the last of the Peishwas. Nana is the Mahratta term for "maternal grandfather;" but recurs constantly in the annals of Mahrashtra, in a similar sense to that in which the designations of "Uncles of York," and "Cousins of Lancaster," are applied in our history.† To names and traditions the English have never been inclined to attach much importance; and the present generation have far surpassed their predecessors in contemptuous indifference to the influence which these things exercise on the minds of the natives of India.

Among those who were most completely deceived by the Nana's professions, was Mr. Hillersdon, the magistrate and collector; who, both in his public and private capacity, had many opportunities of knowing him. In one of the painfully interesting letters which describe the crisis at Cawnpoor (published, in deference to public feeling, by the parties to whom they were addressed), Mrs. Hillersdon writes:—

"There does not seem to be any immediate danger here; but should they mutiny, we should either go into cantonments, or to a place called Bithoor, about six miles from Cawnpoor, where the Peishwa's successor resides. He is a great friend of Charles's, and is a man of enormous wealth and influence; and

sound he distinctly articulated. The point has been already more discussed than it deserves. See *Daily News*, September 25th, 1857.

† See Grant Duff's *History of the Mahrattas*.

* He is asserted to have been addressed, in correspondence, as Maharajah Sree Nath Bahadur, and to have been called Nena Sahib, in accordance with the pet name given to him in the *seraglio*, being the first

he has assured Charles that we shall all be quite safe there. I myself would much prefer going to the cantonments, to be with the other ladies, but Charles thinks it would be better for me and our precious children to be at Bithoor.*

A proposition was also entertained, of sending other ladies there for safety;† but some reason, not specified, prevented its being carried into execution. On the 21st of May, a report was circulated that the Native troops would rise that night; whereupon Mr. and Mrs. Hillersdon, with their two children, abandoned their own compound, which was four miles from cantonments, and took refuge with Colonel Ewart, of the 1st N.I. The colonel went at night (as all the officers were subsequently directed to do) to sleep in the midst of his men, with the view of reassuring them by trusting his life with them, and also of aiding the well-disposed to hold the turbulent in check. At the same time, he declared that if his regiment mutinied, it might walk over his body, but he would never leave it.‡ Mr. Hillersdon was soon afterwards called away; and his wife and Mrs. Ewart, with their children and nurses, drove to the barracks, which had been assigned as a rendezvous in case of alarm.

For several days no change took place. In the morning the ladies went to their own houses; in the evening they returned to the "melancholy night quarters," graphically described by Mrs. Ewart, in the letters from whence the following passages are extracted:—

"Oh! such a scene! Men, officers, women and children, beds and chairs, all mingled together, inside and outside the barracks. Some talking, or even laughing; some frightened, some defiant, others despairing; three guns in front of our position, and three behind, and a trench in course of formation all round. . . . The general is busy now, and he has spiked the guns he could not use yesterday (26th May), and laid a train for blowing up the magazine, should any outbreak occur."

After alluding to the reported advance of the rebel force, Mrs. Ewart adds:—

"No outbreak is at present apprehended from any of the troops here; our danger lies now in what may come from outside. The appearance of successful insurgents amongst the regiments, would be the signal to rise; and all we could really depend upon for defence, is our position behind our guns, and the help of about 150 European soldiers, forty

railway people and merchants, and a few stragglers. There are two regiments of Oude irregulars; but I am not inclined to put faith in them. There are also some Mahrattas, with the rajah of Bithoor, who have come to our assistance; but I can scarcely feel a comfort at their presence either.

"For ourselves, I need only say, that even should our position be strong enough to hold out, there is the dreadful exposure to the heat of May and June, together with the privations and confinement of besieged sufferers, to render it very unlikely that we can survive the disasters which may fall upon us any day, any hour. My dear little child is looking very delicate; my prayer is that she may be spared much suffering. The bitterness of death has been tasted by us many, many times, during the last fortnight; and should the reality come, I hope we may find strength to meet it with a truly Christian courage. It is not hard to die oneself; but to see a dear child suffer and perish—that is the hard, the bitter trial, and the cup which I must drink, should God not deem it fit that it should pass from me. My companion, Mrs. Hillersdon, is delightful: poor young thing, she has such a gentle spirit, so uncomplaining, so desirous to meet the trial rightly, so unselfish and sweet in every way. Her husband is an excellent man, and of course very much exposed to danger, almost as much as mine. She has two children, and we feel that our duty to our little ones demands that we should exert ourselves to keep up health and spirits as much as possible. There is a reverse to this sad picture. Delhi may be retaken in a short time. Aid may come to us, and all may subside into tranquillity once more. . . . But it is useless to speculate upon what may happen. We can only take the present as it comes, and do its duties and meet its trials in the best spirit we can maintain. We are more cheerful, in spite of the great anxiety and suspense; our family party is really a charming one, and we feel better able to meet difficulties and dangers for being thus associated; at the worst we know that we are in God's hands, and He does not for an instant forsake us. He will be with us in the valley of the shadow of death also, and we need fear no evil. God bless you!"

The tone of Colonel Ewart is very similar to that of his admirable wife. He believed, that unless Delhi were speedily recaptured, little short of a miracle could keep the Native troops at Cawnpoor quiet, or prevent mutiny at other stations. General Wheeler he describes as "an excellent officer; very determined; self-possessed in the midst of danger; fearless of responsibility." He mentions that an attempt was to be made to bring the treasure, amounting to ten or twelve lacs of rupees (£100,000 or £120,000), into the intrenched camp on the following day (June 1st).

In concluding his last letter, Colonel Ewart specially recommends his wife and infant to the protection of his sister, who already had a boy of his under her care. "If the troops," he writes, "should break out here, it is not probable that I shall

* *Times*, October, 1857.

† Letter to the *Times*, written by Captain Mowbray Thomson: dated September 8th, 1858.

‡ Letter by Mrs. Ewart, dated May 27th, 1857.

survive it. My post, and that of my officers, being with the colours of the regiment, in the last extremity some or all of us must needs be killed. If that should be my fate, you and all my friends will know, I trust, that I die in the execution of my duty. But I do not think they will venture to attack the intrenched position, which is held by the European troops. So I hope in God that my wife and child may be saved."

It appears from the narrative of Lieutenant Delafosse, that the Nana did not proffer, but was asked for assistance; whereupon "he sent some 200 cavalry, 400 infantry, and two guns, which force had the guarding of the treasury."* The Nana either accompanied or followed his troops to Cawnpoor, and took up his residence in a house not far from that abandoned by the collector. Lieutenant Thomson remarks—"His visit was made at the request of the resident magistrate; and such was the confidence placed in this infernal traitor, that the whole of the treasure (upwards of £100,000) was placed under his protection."† It appears, however, that General Wheeler did make the attempt, mentioned by Colonel Ewart as intended, for the removal of the treasure, and that he failed on this and previous occasions, from the determined resolve of the troops not to submit to what they chose to call a mark of distrust.‡ A lac of rupees

was, however, obtained and carried away to the intrenchments, under the plea of meeting the salaries of the troops and other current expenses.§

On the morning of the 4th of June, Sir Hugh Wheeler received information regarding the 2nd cavalry and 1st and 56th N.I., which induced him to order the European officers thereof to discontinue sleeping in the lines; but the 53rd N.I. being considered loyal, the officers were to remain at night with that corps. By this time the trenches were finished, the guns in position, and provisions for 1,000 persons, for twenty-five days, were declared to be in store.

It appears, however, owing to carelessness or knavery, that the quantity actually supplied fell far short of the indents. At 2 A.M. on the 6th of June,|| the 2nd cavalry rose together with a great shout, mounted their horses, and set fire to the bungalow of their quartermaster. The main body then proceeded towards the commissariat cattle-yard, and took possession of the government elephants, thirty-six in number; at the same time setting fire to the cattle-sergeant's dwelling. A few of the ring-leaders went to the lines of the 1st N.I., and persuaded the men—who, it is said, "were mostly young recruits, the old hands being away on leave or on command"—¶—to join in the mutiny. Either Colonel Ewart

* *Times*, October 15th, 1857.

† Letter to the *Times*, dated September 8th, 1858.

‡ See Account of Nerput, opium gomashta, or broker.—Further Parl. Papers, p. 51.

§ Accounts of Nerput and of Mr. Shepherd.

|| See Further Parl. Papers (No. 7), p. 130. The various accounts of the Cawnpoor mutiny and massacre differ considerably, sometimes in material points. The weightiest authorities are of course the telegrams and despatches written by Sir Hugh Wheeler, and the officers serving under him, to the Calcutta and Lucknow governments. The next in value are the testimonies of Lieutenants (now Captains) Thomson and Delafosse, published in letters of various dates in the *Times*. Mrs. Murray, another survivor (the widow of the band-sergeant of the 56th N.I., who perished at Cawnpoor, as did also her brother and two sons), has given a very circumstantial version (see *Times*, September 3rd, 1858) of what she saw and heard, which was "put into shape" for her by a literary gentleman; and is, Mr. Russell declares, "fiction founded on fact." That it is not Mrs. Murray's own inditing, is evident from the stilted and highly coloured style. A sergeant's wife would hardly talk of "Tartaric barbarity," or remark that, on "the arrival of General Havelock, the cowardly miscreants of Cawnpoor disappeared like stars at dawn of day, and the Nana Sour [Nana the pig] disappeared like a comet." In this case, as in most others of mingled fact and fiction, the latter predominates so largely as to neutralise the former:

and even independently of the internal evidence of the account, the contradiction given by Lieutenant Thomson to several of Mrs. Murray's most positive assertions regarding matters which she speaks of in the character of an eye-witness, quite invalidates her authority. Then there is the clear and connected account of Mr. Shepherd, an uncovenanted servant of the Company, and probably an Eurasian. His testimony is of considerable value as regards what he actually witnessed; but the value of his statements is diminished by his failing to separate information which he has acquired from personal observation, from that which he has accepted on hearsay. (Further Parl. Papers, No. 4; pp. 174 to 185). The same remark applies to the story of Nerput, an opium gomashta, in the service of the E. I. Company, whose deposition was received by Colonel Neill, and forwarded by him to the Supreme government. (See Further Parl. Papers (not numbered), pp. 51 to 53). The diary of the "Nunna" nawab (a native of rank residing in Cawnpoor), is another document transmitted by the governor-general for the perusal of the home authorities (Further Parl. Papers, No. 7; pp. 133 to 138); together with a "Narrative of the Mutiny at Cawnpoor," drawn up apparently as an official summary, and already largely quoted. (*Ibid.*, pp. 129 to 133). An Eurasian girl, supposed at first to have perished, and one or two others, have likewise furnished some additional particulars.

¶ Mr. Shepherd's *Account of the Outbreak*.

and the other officers had persisted in sleeping in their lines, or else they had proceeded thither on the first sound of disturbance; for they were on the spot, and were earnest in their endeavours to preserve the allegiance of the regiment; but to no purpose: the men begged them to withdraw, and finally forced them into the intrenchment as the sole means of escape.*

The insurgents marched to the treasury and magazine, which the Nana's guards never even made a pretence of defending. They next entered the gaol, set the prisoners at liberty, and burnt all the adjacent public offices and records. Then they marched out to Kullianpoor, the first halting-place on the road to Delhi, where they were joined before noon by the men of the 53rd and 56th N.I.; but their own officers remained behind.

Mr. Shepherd says—

"The Native commissioned officers were then told to take their position in the artillery hospital barrack, opposite to us, on the east side, and to make an intrenchment for themselves there, and endeavour to draw back those of the sepoys and Native non-commissioned officers, who, they said, were not inclined to go, but were reluctantly compelled to join. These officers went away, with one or two exceptions, and we never heard any more about them; but I learnt afterwards that, fearing the resentment of the sepoys, they took the straight way to their homes, and never joined in the rebellion.

"Carts were sent at noon to bring in from the sepoy lines the muskets, &c., of the men on leave, and the baggage, &c., of the Christian drummers, who, with their families, had all come to seek protection in the intrenchment. The sick in hospital were also brought in, and the two barracks were very much crowded; so much so, that the drummers and their families, and native servants, had to remain in the open air at night, and under cover of the cook-house and other buildings during the heat of the day. At five o'clock in the evening, all the uncovenanted (myself and my brother included) were mustered, and directed to arm themselves with muskets, of which there was a great heap. This they did; and after receiving a sufficient quantity of ammunition, were told-off in different sections, under the command of several officers, who instructed us as to what we should have to do when occasion required it."

The Europeans breathed again; it seemed as if the crisis were over. Probably they considered that, in suffering the treasury to be robbed, the Mahratta guards had submitted to an overpowering force. Lieutenant Delafosse states only, that "next morning, the 7th of June, a letter was received from the rajah of Bithoor, who was

supposed to be on our side, saying he meant to attack us."

This was the first intimation of the hostility of the arch-traitor, who, it afterwards appeared, had taken advantage of the revolt to secure the lion's share of the government treasure, and had sent emissaries (probably the practised intriguer, Azim Oollah) to the camp of the rebels, urging them to return to Cawnpoor, destroy the garrison there, and thus perform a necessary act for their own security, and one which would procure them honour and reward from the King of Delhi. These arguments prevailed; the mutineers were lured back to the dastardly and murderous work of attacking their officers and families, with their veteran commander and his wife and children hemmed in, as they knew them to be, within that miserable earth-bank. These men were fitting followers for the shameless traitor who, on their return to Cawnpoor, placed himself at their head, saying—"I came in appearance to help the English; but am at heart their mortal enemy."†

Directions had been given by General Wheeler for the destruction of the magazine in the event of an outbreak, and a train had actually been laid for the purpose; but Nana Sahib's Mahrattas appear to have prevented the execution of this plan at the time of the mutiny; and after the troops had left the station, it is probable that its preservation was deemed advantageous. The Nana appreciated its value, and told the mutineers that the magazine was "well furnished with guns of all calibre, and ammunition enough to last a twelvemonth."‡

At ten o'clock A.M., June 7th, the siege commenced; the Nana having, with great speed, brought into position two of his own guns, and two heavy guns which he had procured from the magazine. Before many hours had elapsed, fourteen guns (three 24-pounders, two 18-pounders, seven 9-pounders, and two 6-pounders) were opened in a cannonade, which lasted twenty-two days; and the equal to which, Mowbray Thomson truly remarks, is hardly known in history.

At first the besieged replied briskly to the fire of the rebels, but without any signal success; for there were only eight 9-pounders in the intrenchments; and the dastardly foe did not approach within a thousand yards of the barracks. On the second day of the siege, the green flag was raised in the city (a proceeding in which Azim

* Mr. Shepherd's *Account of the Outbreak*, p. 175.

† Diary of Nerput, opium gomashtha.

‡ Statement of Lieutenant Thomson.

Oollah's handiwork is sufficiently evident), and all true Mussulmans were directed to rally round it; and those who hesitated were threatened, insulted, or fined. The Nana's force augmented daily. With ammunition and ordnance in abundance, a full treasury, and the city bazaar in his hands, he soon rendered the position of the Europeans next to hopeless. An incessant fire of musketry was poured into the intrenchment from the nearest cover; guns of large calibre, drawing gradually nearer and nearer, sent their shot and shell, without intermission, against the brick walls of the buildings. On the evening of June 9th, the enemy succeeded, by means of heated shells, in setting fire to the thatched building, in which numbers of sick women and wounded men were huddled together. Many of these were burned alive; and the remainder sought such shelter as could be afforded in the other previously crowded barrack. The hospital stores were almost totally destroyed; the sick and wounded perished in cruel agony; and, to crown the whole, the ammunition was found to be running low, and the besieged were compelled to slacken their fire before the attack had lasted four days. There was a nullah or ditch some distance in front of the intrenchment, from which the enemy pushed on a sap towards the barracks, and by this means poured in a near and deadly fire. On the west of the besieged, an entirely new range of barracks had been in the course of construction; and behind the unfinished walls the rebels posted their matchlockmen, who, however, were dislodged by repeated sallies; and at length two of the barracks were held by pickets from the garrison. But the strength of the besieged was insufficient to prevent the rebels from placing their sharpshooters on other sides. Communication between the barracks became difficult; no one could move out of cover for an instant without becoming a mark for a score of muskets. There was only one well in the intrenchments, which was at first protected by a parapet; but this was easily knocked down; and the enemy kept up such an incessant fire upon the spot, both day and night, that "soon, not a drop of water could be obtained save at the risk of almost certain destruction."* This terrible difficulty diminished after the third day, as the rebels made it a

* Statement sent by Supreme government to Court of Directors.—Further Parl. Papers (No. 7), p. 131.

practice to cease firing at dusk for about two hours; and at that time the crowd round the well was very great. There was no place to shelter the live cattle. Horses of private gentlemen, as also those of the 3rd Oude battery, were obliged to be let loose. A few sheep and goats, as well as the bullocks kept for commissariat purposes, were shot off, and in the course of five or six days no meat was procurable for the Europeans. They, however, occasionally managed to get hold of a stray bullock or cow near the intrenchment at night, which served for a change; otherwise, dhol and chupatties were the common food of all. Several hogsheads of rum and malt liquor were broken open by the enemy's cannon; but of these there was a large quantity, and the loss was not felt.†

The half-destroyed walls of the barracks, or a barricade formed by piling up tents and casks, was the precarious but only shelter that could be obtained; food could not be carried from post to post by day; and the dead were removed at night, and thrown into a dry well outside the intrenchment, near the new unfinished barracks. There was no time to think of coffins or winding-sheets, let the age, sex, or rank of the departed have been what it might. The present agony of the wounded and the dying, the imminent danger and utter wretchedness of all, absorbed every minor consideration. The dead bodies of young and old—of brave men, fair women, delicate children—were laid outside the verandah in the ruins, there to remain until the fatigue party came round at nightfall to collect the corpses. A corner comparatively safe from gunshot was too precious to the living to be spared for the senseless remains of those who, we humbly hope, had passed away to a better life, escaping immediate misery, and the yet more terrible evil to come, which was to crown the sufferings of that fearful siege. Relief, under Colonel Neill, was expected on the 14th of June, but none arrived; and, on the evening of that day, General Wheeler wrote to Lucknow, describing his position. "The whole Christian population is with us in a temporary intrenchment, and our defence has been noble and wonderful; our loss, heavy and cruel. We want aid, aid, aid! If we had 200 men, we could punish the scoundrels, and aid you."‡

It would have been most hazardous at

† Mr. Shepherd's *Account of the Outbreak*.

‡ Gubbins' *Mutinies in Cuddh*, p. 443.

that time to have spared 200 Europeans from Lucknow; but Sir Henry Lawrence, writing to Mr. Tucker at Benares (June 16th), says—"I would risk the absence of so large a portion of our small force, could I see the smallest prospect of its being able to succour Sir Hugh Wheeler. But no individual here cognizant of facts, except Mr. Gubbins, thinks that we could carry a single man across the river, as the enemy holds all the boats, and completely commands the river. May God Almighty defend Cawnpoor, for no help can we afford. * * * I have sent the pith of this to Colonel Neill, to urge him to relieve Cawnpoor, if in any way possible."*

On first learning news of the mutiny, Sir Henry had directed Captain Evans, the officer stationed at Onao (twelve miles from Cawnpoor), to secure all the boats he could. But the mutineers had forestalled us by breaking up the bridge at Cawnpoor, and securing the boats which had composed it, as well as those at other ferries on the further side of the stream. Captain Evans, with the aid of a Native officer, named Munsub Ali, and a party of mounted police, maintained his position till near the end of June, and patrolled the high road with unceasing energy, heedless of personal risk, as he well might be; for his wife and two children were within that shot-riddled earth-bank, hemmed in by thousands of pitiless foes.

On the 18th of June, Captain Moore, of H.M. 32nd foot, the officer second in command, dispatched to Lucknow the following official acknowledgment of the refusal of the entreaty for reinforcements:—

"Sir Hugh Wheeler regrets you cannot send him the 200 men, as he believes, with their assistance, we could drive the insurgents from Cawnpoor, and capture their guns.

"Our troops, officers, and volunteers, have acted most nobly; and on several occasions, a handful of men have driven hundreds before them. Our loss has been chiefly from the sun and their heavy guns. Our rations will last a fortnight, and we are still well supplied with ammunition. Our guns are serviceable. Report says that troops are advancing from Allahabad; and any assistance might save the garrison. We, of course, are prepared to hold out to the last. It is needless to mention the names of those who have been killed or died. We trust in God; and if our exertions here assist your safety, it will be a consolation to know that our friends appreciate our devotion. Any news of relief will cheer us."

There can be little doubt of the self-

* Further Parl. Papers, p. 66.

possession of an officer who could write so calmly under the circumstances in which he was placed. Captain Moore, young and energetic, was Sir Hugh's right hand. It was greatly owing to the determined attitude assumed by him, that the mutineers never ventured to attempt carrying by storm the frail barrier which interposed between them and their victims. Though himself severely wounded, he opposed the encroachment of the enemy with unceasing vigilance. Wherever the danger was the greatest, there was he, with his arm in a sling and a revolver in his belt, directing and heading the defence. Scouts, with eye-glasses, were stationed to watch every hostile movement, and, by their reports, the besieged directed an effective fire. The rebels had possession of the first of the three unfinished barracks; and from thence they often attempted to advance and overpower the British picket in the buildings nearest the intrenchment. On these occasions, Captain Moore, who was ever on the watch, would collect a number of volunteers from the intrenchment, and send them out, one at a time, to reinforce their comrades; the space which each man had to traverse being partly protected by carriages, bullock-trains, and such like, arranged as halting-places, between which Moore and his followers ran, exposed to a shower of bullets. Twice this gallant officer, under cover of night, led a party of Europeans, and spiked the guns of the enemy. These, however, were easily repaired or replaced by others from the arsenal.

On the 21st of June, a very great mob, including a number of Oude budmashes, was seen collecting round the intrenchment. The regular infantry corps are described as never coming out to fight in full uniform. This day, some few had on their jackets and caps; but the majority were dressed like recruits. For once, a systematic attack was made, under a recognised leader. The enemy brought forward huge bales of cotton, and attempted to push these on, and thus approach in two parties, under cover from the church compound on the one side, and the unfinished barracks on the other. But the indefatigable Captain Moore had witnessed the preparations, and was enabled to counteract them by a very able distribution of his small force. The rebel leader, "a well-made, powerful man," fell at the onset; and the enemy dispersed, with 200 or 300 killed and wounded.

The loss sustained by the British is not recorded. Several men had fallen from sun-stroke—a calamity of daily occurrence; and all were nearly prostrated by fatigue. At mid-day, when the action was over, one of the ammunition waggons exploded; and the rebels perceiving their advantage, directed a heavy fire against the spot, to hinder the Europeans from approaching to prevent the flames from spreading to the other waggons. In the midst of the cannonading, Lieutenant Delafosse approached the burning mass, laid himself down beneath it, pulled away the loose splinters, and flung earth on the flames. Two soldiers brought him buckets of water, which he threw around him; and, while the vessels were being refilled from the drinking-water of the men close by, he continued to throw earth on the burning waggon, with six cannon directed on the spot. The brave officer and his men accomplished their object, and escaped unhurt.*

The prisoners in the trenches were not the only sufferers. Besides several Europeans captured in the city, and the majority of the Christians (whether Eurasians or natives), many Hindoos and Mohammedans suspected of aiding or serving the British force, were put to death. A list was made of all the bankers, who were mulet of their wealth, and property of every description was plundered or wantonly destroyed.† Any attempt to carry intelligence or supplies to the besieged, was punished with death or mutilation; and, indeed, since the reoccupation of Cawnpoor, about twelve natives have proved, to the satisfaction of government, their claim to a pension, on the ground of having suffered mutilation of the hand or nose (and, in some instances, of both), by order of the Nana or his diabolical lieutenant, Azim Oollah, for bringing supplies to the British camp.‡ Sir Hugh Wheeler, in a letter previously quoted, speaks of all the Christian population taking refuge in the intrenchment; but this could not have been

possible, on account of the extremely limited space. The official, or semi-official, account§ states, that “there was a large number of Europeans resident in cantonments, many of whom were individuals connected with the civil, railway, canal, and other departments. There were, also, nearly the whole of the soldiers’ families of H.M. 32nd, which was stationed at Lucknow. The whole number of the European population, therefore, in Cawnpoor—men, women, and children—could not have amounted to less than 750 lives.” The number of Eurasians, of pensioners and natives attached to the British, within the camp, is nowhere officially stated;|| those who resided in the city, or were excluded from the intrenchment for want of space, were among the earliest of the Nana’s victims.

Lieutenant Delafosse has recorded some terrible scenes, to which he was an eyewitness during the siege; his only consolation under such distressing circumstances being, that he had no relatives, especially no female relatives, to grieve or tremble for. He describes one poor woman, named White, as walking in the trenches beside her husband, carrying her twin infants. The party was fired on, the father killed, and the mother’s arms were both broken. The children fell to the ground, one of them wounded; and the mother flung herself on the ground beside them. Again—an ayah, who had remained with her mistress, was sitting, as she thought, safely under the walls of the barrack, when suddenly she was knocked over by a round shot, and both her legs carried away. The child, though hurled from her arms, was taken up uninjured.

One poor lady was hit by a ball, which entered the face near the nostril, and passed through the palate and jaw. Her daughter, also severely injured in the shoulder, forgetting her own suffering, was seen striving to alleviate the greater agony endured by her mother. They both died from their wounds.¶ Notwithstanding all this misery, we are assured “there was not one

* Mr. Shepherd’s Account. Lieutenant Delafosse, in his narrative (*Times*, October 15th, 1857), omits all mention of this heroic and effective service.

† Statement forwarded by Supreme government of India to Court of Directors.

‡ Russell.—*Times*, February 24th, 1859.

§ Statement forwarded by Supreme government to Court of Directors.

|| Mr. Shepherd, writing from memory, gives the following classification of the besieged, whose total number he places at 900. The European

troops (already enumerated) he estimates at 210; officers of the three Native infantry, cavalry, and others, with the staff, 100; merchants, writers, and others, about 100; drummers, about 40; women and children of soldiers, about 160; women of writers, merchants, and drummers, 120; ladies and children of officers, 50; servants, cooks, and others, after a great number had absconded on hearing the enemy’s guns firing, 100; sick sepoys and Native officers who remained with us, 20.

¶ Statement of Lieutenant Thomson.

instance of dejection through cowardice. The very children seemed inspired with heroic patience, and our women behaved with a fortitude that only Englishwomen could have shown.”* The pangs of hunger even were not wanting to complete the misery of the besieged. “One poor woman, who was in a wretched state, bordering on starvation, was seen to go out of the protection of the trenches, with a child in each hand, and stand where the fire was heaviest, hoping that some bullet might relieve her and her little ones from the troubles they were enduring. But she was brought back, poor thing! to die a more tedious death than she had intended.”†

The sufferings of the soldiers’ wives and children must have been fearful. After the burning of the thatched barracks, many of them had to remain in the trenches night and day.

Up to the very last the besieged kept up some communication with Lucknow, through the fidelity and courage of native messengers. Major Vibart, in a letter dated “Sunday night, 12 P.M., 21st June,” writes—

“This evening, in three hours, upwards of thirty shells were thrown into the intrenchment. This has occurred daily for the last eight days: an idea may be formed of our casualties, and how little protection the barracks afford to women. Any aid, to be effective, must be immediate. In the event of rain falling, our position would be untenable. According to telegraphic despatches received previous to the outbreak, 1,000 Europeans were to have been here on the 14th. This force may be on its way up. Any assistance you can send might co-operate with it. Nine-pounder ammunition, chiefly cartridges, is required. Should the above force arrive, we can, in return, insure the safety of Lucknow. . . . We have lost about a third of our original number. The enemy are strongest in artillery. They appear not to have more than 400 or 500 infantry. They move their guns with great difficulty on account of the unbroken bullocks. The infantry are great cowards, and easily repulsed.”‡

This appears to have been the last official letter received from Cawnpoor. It was conveyed by means of messengers retained by Mr. Gubbins, before the blockade of Lucknow. The men, thirty in number, were all “Passees”—a numerous class in Oude, armed with bows and arrows. They hire themselves out, sometimes singly, sometimes in parties, and have the character of being very faithful servants to their employers, but otherwise arrant thieves.§ The Passees contrived to cross the Ganges at

Cawnpoor, though the ferry was strictly guarded by the enemy; and conveyed Sir Henry Lawrence’s despatches into Sir Hugh Wheeler’s camp, and returned with his replies.|| Mr. Gubbins states, that it was understood that a private messenger from Sir Hugh, had delivered to Sir Henry, a day or two after the arrival of Major Vibart’s letter, a packet containing a memorandum of Sir Hugh’s last wishes, written when escape seemed hopeless.¶ Still later, a private letter from Lieut.-colonel Wiggins to Colonel Halford, dated “Cawnpoor, 24th June, 1857,” after acknowledging the receipt of the colonel’s “most welcome letter of the 21st,” and the cleverness of the bearer, proceeds to describe Nana Sahib’s attack as having “continued now for eighteen days and nights.” The condition of misery experienced by the besieged, is declared to be “utterly beyond description. Death and mutilation, in all their forms of horror, have been daily before us. The numerical amount of casualties has been frightful. Among our casualties from sickness,” the writer adds, “my poor dear wife and infant have been numbered. The former sank on the 12th, and the latter on the 19th. I am writing this on the floor, and in the midst of the greatest dirt, noise, and confusion.” In conclusion, he urges the immediate dispatch of “*deux cents soldats Britanniques*.”**

It is probable that the unvarying confidence expressed by the beleaguered Europeans at Cawnpoor, that 200 British soldiers would suffice to raise the siege, and enable them to disperse thrice as many thousand well-armed and well-supplied foes by whom they were hemmed in, had some effect in inducing Sir Henry Lawrence to proceed on the disastrous Chinhut expedition. Early on the 28th of June, Colonel Master (7th light cavalry) received a scrap of paper from his son, Lieutenant Master, 53rd N.I., conveyed through some private (native) channel. The few lines it contained were these:—

“Cawnpoor, June 25th, 8½ P.M.

“We have held out now for twenty-one days, under a tremendous fire. The rajah of Bithoor has offered to forward us in safety to Allahabad, and the general has accepted his terms. I am all right, though twice wounded. Charlotte Newnham and Bella Blair are dead. I’ll write from Allahabad. God bless you!

“Your affectionate son,
“G. A. MASTER.”

§ Sleeman’s *Journey through Oude*, vol. i., p. 25.

|| Gubbins’ *Mutinies in Oudh*, p. 160.

¶ *Ibid.*, p. 174.

** *Ibid.*, p. 445.

* Statement of Lieutenant Thomson.

† Statement of Lieutenant Delafosse.

‡ Gubbins’ *Mutinies in Oudh*, p. 444.

It was too true. Sir Hugh Wheeler, with his brave and gentle companions, had indeed given themselves over into the hand of their deadly foe. Sir Henry Lawrence at once anticipated treachery; and, judging by the event, it would have been better to have held out to the last extremity, and to have starved within the trenches, or been shot down or cut in pieces there, than to have capitulated to such pitiless wretches as the besiegers subsequently proved themselves to be. At that time, however, no one had any adequate conception of the ruthlessness of the monster with whom they had to do.

Mr. Shepherd mentions some interesting particulars regarding the crisis of the siege, in the *Account* already quoted.

"Many persons [he states] were exceedingly anxious to get out of the intrenchment and go into the city, thinking, from want of better information, that they would be very secure there; in fact, several went out quietly in the night under this impression, and, as I afterwards learnt, were murdered by the rebels.

"Among others, my own family (consisting of wife and a daughter, my infant daughter having died from a musket-shot in the head on the 18th), two nieces, Misses Frost and Batavia, both of seventeen years of age, a sister, and her infant son, a brother twenty-two years old, and two old ladies, wished very much to leave, but could not do so on account of our large number. It was therefore considered expedient that one should go and ascertain how matters stood in the city.

"With this view I applied to the general, on the 24th of June, for permission to go, at the same time offering to bring him all the current information that I might collect in the city, asking, as a condition, that on my return, if I should wish it, my family might be allowed to leave the intrenchment. This my request was granted, as the general wished very much to get such information, and for which purpose he had previously sent out two or three natives at different times, under promises of high rewards, but who never returned. He at the same time instructed me to try and negotiate with certain influential parties in the city, so as to bring about a rupture among the rebels, and cause them to leave off annoying us, authorising me to offer a lac of rupees as a reward, with handsome pensions for life, to any person who would bring about such a thing. This, I have every reason to think, could have been carried out successfully, had it pleased God to take me out unmolested; but it was not so ordained (it was merely a means, under God's providence, to save me from sharing the fate of the rest); for as I came out of the intrenchment disguised as a native cook, and, passing through the new unfinished barracks, had not gone very far when I was taken a prisoner, and under custody of four sepoy and a couple of sowars, all well armed, was escorted to the camp of the Nana, and was ordered to be placed under a

guard: here several questions were put to me concerning our intrenchment (not by the Nana himself, but by some of his people), to all of which I replied as I was previously instructed by our general; for I had taken the precaution of asking him what I should say in case I was taken. My answers were not considered satisfactory, and I was confronted with two women-servants who three days previously had been caught in making their escape from the intrenchment, and who gave a version of their own, making it appear that the English were starving and not able to hold out much longer, as their number was greatly reduced. I, however, stood firm to what I had first mentioned, and they did not know which party to believe. However, they let us alone. I was kept under custody up to the 12th of July, on which date my trial took place, and I was sentenced to three years' imprisonment in irons, with hard labour, from which I was released by the European troops on the morning of the 17th idem."*

It is not surprising that the unfortunate besieged should have been anxious to escape from their filthy prison at almost any hazard. The effect of the intense heat was aggravated by the stench arising from the dead bodies of horses and other animals, which could not be removed; and the influx of flies added to the loathsomeness of the scene. Five or six men fell daily beneath sun-stroke; but women and children sickened and died faster still in an atmosphere saturated with pestilential vapours.

Shepherd says that, on the 24th of July, "there were provisions yet left to keep the people alive, on half rations, for the next fifteen or twenty days. Of gram† we had a large quantity, and it formed the principal food of all the natives with us, which they preferred to otta and dhol, as it gave them no trouble as regards cooking; for a little soaking in water was sufficient to make it fit to eat; and many scrupulous Hindoos lived the whole period entirely upon it."

James Stewart, a pensioner, formerly a Christian drummer in the 56th N.I., says, that he and the other drummers of the three regiments were charged with the removal of the dead, and received for their subsistence gram and a glass of brandy daily. "The only article of food was gram, which was steeped in four buckets, and placed in such a position that all could help themselves." He also bears witness to the "hourly encouragement" given to the besieged by General Wheeler.‡

Natives might exist where Europeans would perish of inanition. This was the Book (Further Papers, No. 4, p. 181), as "grain," a blunder which involves a material mis-statement as regards the position of the besieged.

‡ Deposition of James Stewart.—*Friend of India*, August 27th, 1857.

* Shepherd's *Brief Account of the Outbreak at Cawnpore*.—Further Parl. Papers (No. 4, 1857), pp. 173 to 185.

† Gram is a coarse kind of grain, commonly used for feeding horses. The word is given in the Blue

case here. Lieutenant Thomson asserts, of his own knowledge, that "two persons died of starvation; a horse was greedily devoured, and some of my men were glad to feed upon a dog. Our daily supply of provisions, for twenty-two days, consisted of half a pint of pea-soup and two or three chupatties (or cakes made of flour); these last being, together, about the size of an Abernethy biscuit. Upon this diet, which was served to all without distinction—officers and privates, civilians or soldiers—the garrison was reduced to a company of spectres long before the period of capitulation; and when this took place there were only four days' rations, at the above rate of supply, in stock."

Lieutenant Delafosse asserts, that the besieged had been on half-rations some days before the close of the siege.*

Thus, the morning of the 25th of June found the besieged hopeless of timely relief, enduring the most complicated and aggravated sufferings in a building the walls of which were honey-combed with shot and shell, the doors knocked down or widely breached, and the angles of the walls shattered by incessant cannonading; while a few splintered rafters alone remained to show where verandahs had once been. Such was the state of affairs when Nana Sahib sent a letter to General Wheeler, some accounts say by an Eurasian prisoner named Jacobi, the wife of a watchmaker; others, by an aged widow named Greenaway, formerly the proprietress of the *Cawnpoor Press*; who, with her sons (merchants), had been seized at their zemindaree at Nujuffghur, sixteen miles from Cawnpoor.† The proposal for surrender was thus worded:—

"All soldiers and others unconnected with the acts of Lord Dalhousie, who will lay down their arms and give themselves up, shall be spared and sent to Allahabad."‡

General Wheeler consulted with his officers how to act. He was himself decidedly unwilling to surrender, and the younger soldiers advocated resistance to the last; but Captain Moore,§ whose fortitude (for it was a higher quality than courage) was unquestioned,

and who was the very life-sinews of the beleaguered band, represented strongly the state of the ladies and others maddened by suffering; reminded the general, that at least half their small force had fallen in the intrenchment; and that out of fifty-nine artillerymen, all but four or five had been killed at their guns.¶ These arguments were irresistible; Sir Hugh reluctantly gave way, and empowered Captain Moore to consent to the proffered arrangement. The next steps are not clear. According to one account, Mrs. Greenaway appears to have returned to the Nana, and reported the success of her mission; whereupon she was again sent to the intrenchment, accompanied by Azim Oollah and another ringleader, styled Jowlah Persaud. Colonel Ewart subsequently came to the camp of the Nana, accompanied by other Europeans.¶

It is probable, however, that the meeting was not held within the intrenchment, but in the unfinished barracks outside. Azim Oollah, it is alleged, attempted to open the conversation in English, but was prevented from doing so by some of the Mussulman troopers of the 2nd light cavalry, who accompanied him.**

The treaty, signed on the evening of the 26th, stipulated, "That the garrison should give up their guns, ammunition, and treasure; should be allowed to carry their muskets and sixty rounds of cartridges with them; that the Nana should provide carriage for the sick, wounded, women and children, to the river's bank, where boats should be in readiness to convey all to Allahabad." A committee of officers and gentlemen went to the ghaut to see whether the necessary preparations were being made, and found everything in readiness.†† The besieged were eager to breathe purer air than that of a prison which had become almost a charnel-house. It appears that, after the capitulation, they were allowed to walk freely out of the intrenchment, and that they strolled about the neighbourhood that evening.‡‡ The thought of their approaching deliverance must have been embittered

* *Times*, October 15th, 1857.

† *Shepherd's Account*; *Diary of the Nunna Nawab*; and summary of events published in *Times*, October 15th, 1857.

‡ Statement sent by Supreme government to Court of Directors.

§ The wife of Captain Moore was with him in the intrenchment.

¶ These and other important facts are enumerated in *Captain* (formerly *Lieutenant*) Mowbray Thom-

son's letter to the *Times*, dated Sept. 8th, 1858; written in contradiction of the mis-statements put forward in the name of Sergeant Murray's widow.

¶ Statement of the Nunna Nawab.

** *Shepherd's Account*.—Further Parl. Papers (No. 4), p. 181.

†† Statement of Lieutenant Thomson.

‡‡ Russell mentions this circumstance as having been told him "by Sir John Inglis, on the authority of the excellent chaplain, the Rev. Mr. Moore."

by grief for those whom they expected to leave behind in that terrible burying-place the dry well. They little thought how soon their own bleeding bodies would find a similar destination.

Of those whose names have been mentioned in the course of the narrative, few, if any, but must have lost some dear friend or relative. The son of the general (Lieutenant Godfrey Richard Wheeler, of the 1st N.I.) had been killed by a round shot, while lying wounded by his mother's side;* Mrs. Ewart had seen her husband badly wounded, and her friend (Mrs. Hillersdon) sink, with her child, of fever and exhaustion; Brigadier Jack had died of fever, and Sir George Parker, Bart. (magistrate), of sun-stroke. The total number of those who had perished is not recorded; but Lieutenant Thomson states positively, "we lost 250 men in the intrenchment, principally by shells;" and women and children fell by this means, as well as by disease. Probably, therefore, not half the number of Europeans (750) who had entered the intrenchment, left it on the fatal morning of the 27th of June; and of the number of half-castes and natives who perished with and for the Europeans, no estimate has been formed.† It was about 8 A.M. when the British reached the landing-place, situated a mile and a-half from the station. Breakfast was laid out as had been arranged, and the embarkation was carried on without hindrance or hesitation. The Europeans laid down their muskets, and took off their coats. Some of the boats (thirty in all) pushed off from the shore; and the others were striving to get free from the sand in which they had been purposely imbedded, when, at a prearranged signal, the boatmen sprang into the water, leaving fire in the thatches of the boats; and two guns, before hidden, were run out and opened on the Europeans. The men, says Lieutenant Delafosse, jumped out of the boats; and, instead of trying to free them from their moorings, swam to the first boat they saw loose. A remark in Lieutenant Thomson's narrative shows that the attempt was unsuccessfully made. He states—"When the boat I first took shelter in was fired, I jumped out, with the rest, into the water, and tried to drag her off the sand-bank, but to no purpose; so I deserted her, and made across the river to the Oude side, where I

saw two of our boats." A third boat got safe over to the opposite side of the river; but all three were met there by two field-pieces, guarded by a number of cavalry and infantry. One of these boats was early swamped, and a round shot went through the second of them before it had proceeded a mile down the stream. The passengers were then taken on board the third boat, which, with a freight of fifty persons, continued its way for five or six miles, followed, on the Oude side, by about 2,000 mutineers (infantry and cavalry), with two guns. Captains Moore and Ashe (the leaders of the defence), Lieutenant-colonel Wiggins, and Lieutenants Burney, Glanville, Satchwell, and Basilico, were killed; Major Vibart, Captain Turner, Lieutenants Thomson, Fagan, Mainwaring, and a youth named Henderson, were wounded. The boat grounded about nightfall; but the Europeans managed to get once more afloat, and to distance their pursuers, who followed along shore with torches and lighted arrows, trying to set the boat on fire; and so nearly succeeding, that the Europeans were compelled to throw overboard the thatched covering which had shielded them from the sun and rain. On the following day the boat again grounded on a sand-bank at Nujfghur; and here Captain Whiting, Lieutenant Harrison, and several privates were killed. Captain Turner was hit a second time. Captain Seppings was wounded, as was also his wife (the only female mentioned as having accompanied this party), and Lieutenants Daniel and Quin. A storm came on, and drove the boat down stream, until it again stuck at Soorajpoor, where, at daylight on the Monday morning, the fugitives were discovered and attacked by the retainers of a hostile zemindar. Lieutenants Thomson and Delafosse, with twelve men, went on shore to drive back their assailants, and thus enable their companions to get off the boat. This they did most effectually; but, proceeding too far inland, they were surrounded, and, being hotly pressed, lost sight of the boat, and were forced to take refuge in a small temple on the river-bank. At the door of the temple one of the party was killed: the remaining thirteen, after vainly attempting a parley, had recourse to their firelocks, and several of the enemy were soon killed or put *hors de*

* *Memoir* of Rev. H. S. Polehampton, p. 315.

† "It is reported that the persons who came out that morning from the intrenchment, amounted to

450."—*Shepherd's Account*. How many Eurasians or natives may have been included in the capitulation, is matter of conjecture.

combat. The rebels then brought a gun to bear on the little stronghold; but finding that it made no impression, they had recourse to heaping up firewood before the doorway. Unfortunately the temple was round, so that the party within could not prevent their pushing the wood round to the front. The fire, however, did not have the desired effect; handfuls of powder were therefore thrown upon it; and the smoke thereby produced nearly stifled the Europeans, who determined to sally forth and make for the river. On their charging out of the temple, the enemy fled in all directions. Six of the party (it is supposed because they could not swim) ran into the crowd, and sold their lives as dearly as they could; the remaining seven threw themselves into the Ganges. Two of these were shot ere long; a third, resting himself by swimming on his back, unwittingly approached too close to the bank, and was cut up; and the other four swam six miles down the river, three of them being wounded, till at last the weary Europeans were hailed by two or three sepoys belonging to a friendly chief, who proved to be Maharajah Deeg Becjah Sing, of Byswarrah in Oude. Exhausted by a three days' fast, and conceiving, from the freedom from pursuit that they had experienced during the last half mile of their flight that they were safe, the fugitives at once went to the rajah, who protected and fed them from the 29th of June to the 28th of July, and ultimately provided for their escort to the camp of a detachment of Europeans proceeding from Allahabad to Cawnpoor, to join the force under the command of Brigadier-general Havelock.* Lieutenant Thomson speaks of the avidity with which he and his companions devoured the "capital meal of dhol and chupatties," given them by the friendly rajah; and he remarks, that "to swim six miles is a great feat to accomplish at any time; but, after a three days' fast, it really must sound very like an impossibility. Nevertheless it is true!"

It appears that all the boats were brought back to Cawnpoor: and of the passengers, "many were killed at once; others, the wives and children of the European officers and soldiers, were placed as prisoners in a house in the cantonments: some of these were released from their sufferings by

death; others were suffered to remain alive until the arrival of the force under General Havelock sealed their death-warrant."† Among the persons who escaped from the boats were James Stewart, pensioner, 56th N.I., whose deposition has been already quoted, and who, with his wife and a Mrs. Lett, scrambled to shore from a foundering boat, and contrived to find their way to Allahabad. Mrs. Murray, a sergeant's wife, also escaped.‡

Concerning the actual massacre, much interesting information has been supplied by Myoor Tewarree, a sepoy of the 1st N.I., a man of considerable intelligence and proved fidelity. When the mutiny broke out at Cawnpoor, Myoor Tewarree was with three companies of his regiment at Banda. He had been instructed in the English language by Mr. Duncan, a writer; and, on the outbreak there, he concealed Mr. Duncan and his wife in his hut, and thus saved their lives. This act brought on him the suspicion of his comrades; and when he marched with them into Cawnpoor, he was seized by the Nana, robbed of all he possessed, and imprisoned, with four other suspected sepoys, in the same house with the Europeans.

He declares, that when the Nana's treachery became apparent, the boat with General Wheeler and his family on board, cut its cable, and dropped down the river, followed by two companies of infantry and two guns. At some little distance from Cawnpoor the boat grounded, was overtaken, and fired on. The traitors "could not manage the large gun, not knowing how to work the elevating screw;" but, with the small gun, they fired grape tied up in bags, and the infantry discharged their muskets. The Europeans responded with their rifles so effectually that they drove off the sepoys, and the storm which came on that night floated them off the sand-bank. They had, however, proceeded only a few miles before they were overtaken by several boatsful of Oude infantry, surrounded, and taken back captives to Cawnpoor. Fifty gentlemen, twenty-five ladies, a boy and three girls, were brought on shore. The Nana ordered the "memsahibs" to be separated from the sahibs, and shot by the 1st N.I. But the "Gillies Pultun,"§ the oldest regiment in the service, hardened as it had become in mutiny, refused to take part in the savage butchery. The men said, "We will not shoot Wheeler

* Statement sent by Supreme government. † *Ibid.*

‡ A Lieutenant Brown escaped from another boat, but perished from exhaustion.

§ Gallies' regiment. Introductory Chapter, p. 99.

Sahib, who has made the name of our Pultun great, and whose son is our quartermaster; neither will we shoot the other gentlemen [sahib-logue]: put them in prison." But the Oude sepoy said, "Put them in prison? No; we will kill them all." The male Europeans were then made to sit on the ground, and two companies of sepoy prepared to fire on them, when one of the ladies (the wife of either the superintending surgeon or medical storekeeper) rushed to her husband, and sitting down beside him, placed her arm round his waist, declaring, that if he must die, she would die with him. The other ladies followed her example; and all sat down close to their husbands, who said, "Go, go;" and vainly strove to drive their wives away. The Nana then directed the sepoy to part them by force, which was done; "but they could not pull away the doctor's wife, who there remained. Then, just as the sepoy were going to fire, the padre [Moucrieff was dead] called out to the Nana, and requested leave to read prayers before they died. The Nana granted it, and the padre's bonds were loosed so far as to allow him to take a small book from his pocket, from which he read; but at this time one of the sahibs, who was shot in the arm and leg, kept crying out to the sepoy, 'If you mean to kill us, why don't you set about it; be quick, and get the work done at once; why delay?' After the padre read a few prayers, he shut the book, and the sahibs shook hands all round. Then the sepoy fired. One sahib rolled one way, and one another; but they were not dead, only wounded. Then they went and finished them with their swords." After this, the whole of the women and children, including those taken out of the other boats, to the number of 122, were taken away to the house formerly used by the Europeans as an hospital, and afterwards inhabited by the Nana.

Myoor Tewarree was asked, "Were any of the women dishonoured?" He replied, "No, none that I am aware of, except in the case of General Wheeler's younger daughter; and about her I am not certain. When the rebels were taking the memsahibs out of the boat, a sowar (cavalryman) took her away with him to his house.

She went quietly; but at night she rose and got hold of the sowar's sword. He was asleep; his wife, his son, and his mother-in-law were sleeping in the house with him. She killed them all with the sword, and then she went and threw herself down the well behind the house. In the morning, when people came and found the dead in the house, the cry was, 'Who has done this?' Then a neighbour said, that in the night he had seen some one go and throw himself into the well. They went and looked, and there was Missce Baba, dead and swollen."*

That a young girl should kill two men and two women with a sword, is so glaringly improbable, that the wide circulation of this story, and its repeated assertion as a fact,† only proves the credulity with which all rumours, however wild and improbable, are received when they fall in with the prevailing tone of the public mind. But the evidence of another survivor and eye-witness of the Cawnpoor massacre, corroborates the first part of the story, as regards the seizure of Miss Wheeler by a trooper. Towards the end of the year 1858, a half-caste Christian, named Fitchett, or Fitchelt, presented himself to the local authorities at Meerut, as a candidate for admission into the police levy. The usual inquiries into his antecedents, led to the discovery that, when the mutiny broke out at Cawnpoor, he had been a musician in the band of one of the native regiments, and his life had been spared in consequence of his proclaiming his willingness to embrace Mohammedanism, which he did by an easy process, almost on the spot. He was enrolled in the rebel force, and witnessed the second massacre—that of the women and children—on the 16th of July; which cannot be narrated until the events which precipitated, if they did not cause it, have been told, and likewise the arrival of the Futtehghur fugitives, to swell the list of the Nana's victims. When the Nana fled to Futtehghur, Fitchett accompanied him thither; and he declares that he frequently saw Miss Wheeler; that she travelled with a trooper who had taken her from Cawnpoor; and that he was shown into the room where she was, and ordered to read extracts from the English newspapers, which the rebels received from

* Evidence taken at the Cawnpoor camp, August 15th, 1867.—*Friend of India*, September 3rd, 1867.

† Shepherd states, that a young lady, "reported to be General Wheeler's daughter," had been seized by a sowar, and killed four persons and herself: but

his giving this as a matter of fact, detracts from the value of his general evidence, except regarding matters which he actually witnessed; and he was a prisoner at the time of both the first and second Cawnpoor massacres.

Calcutta; he being employed by them for the purpose of translating the news, in which, particularly that relating to the progress of the war in China, they evinced much interest. She had a horse with an English side-saddle, which the trooper had procured for her, and she rode close beside him, with her face veiled, along the line of march. When the British approached Futtehghur, orders were sent to the sowar to give Miss Wheeler up; but he escaped with her at night, and it is supposed she went with him to Calpee. Mr. Russell, writing in October, 1858, remarks—"It is not at all improbable that the unfortunate young lady may be still alive, moving about with Tantia Topee, and may yet be rescued."*

Two other girls, British or Eurasian, survived the Cawnpoor massacre. Georgiana Anderson, aged thirteen, received a sword-cut on the shoulder, but was rescued by a native doctor. All her relatives at the station were murdered. She lived among the natives, kindly nursed and cared for, during several weeks; at the expiration of which time she was sent safely into Cawnpoor, then reoccupied by the British, and is now living with her grandmother at Monghyr. The other girl, aged sixteen, was less fortunate; and her name is withheld by Mr. Russell, who instituted inquiries into the truth of her story, as published in the *Times*; the results of which partly corroborated and partly confuted her statements. "She is," he writes, "the daughter of a clerk; and is, I believe, an Eurasian, or has some Eurasian blood in her veins. It would be cruel to give her name, though the shame is not her's. She was obliged to travel about with a sowar; and, to escape persecution, became a Mohammedan."†

This is apparently the person whose narrative was published by Dr. Knighton, of the College, Ewell, Surrey. Her account of her escape is, that after seeing Kirkpatrick (an Eurasian merchant of Cawnpoor) and two little girls murdered in the boat, on the deck of which she was standing, and being herself rudely searched and robbed of the money and jewels she had brought from the barracks, she grew dizzy and fell down. The mutineers flung her into the river; she scrambled on shore, and crept along on her hands and knees till she reached a tree about half a mile inland. Soon, stealthy steps approached the spot. They were

those of Miss Wheeler, who had also been thrown into the river, the murderous sepoys thinking that, being insensible, she would sink to the bottom. In about an hour the fugitives were surprised by a party of the mutineers, and dragged off in different directions. What became of Miss Wheeler does not appear from this narrative, but the other unfortunate was dragged along till her clothes were almost entirely torn off; and her appeal for mercy to the troopers, was answered by a declaration that she had not long to live; but before being put to death, she would be made to feel some portion of the degradation their brethren felt at Meerut, when ironed and disgraced before the troops. After four hours' walking, she arrived at a place very near Bithoor, where some of the enemy were encamped. Here she sank on the ground, overcome with shame and exhaustion, while the heartless sepoys gathered round with mockery and reviling. An African eunuch, who had just brought some despatches from Ahmed-Oollah, the Moolvee of Fyzabad, to Nana Sahib, interfered for her protection; and, throwing a chuddur, or large native veil over her, had her conducted to a tent. She saw no more of him till she went to Lucknow, and was compelled to accompany the rebels in their progress through the North-West Provinces. She was at length released, and found her way to Calcutta, where she is now living with her friends.

And here we may close the record of the first Cawnpoor massacre, and turn to the scarcely less painful examination of the causes which delayed the arrival of forces from Calcutta, to a period when the brave defenders of Cawnpoor, heart-sick with hope deferred, had surrendered to their treacherous foe, with the bitter pang added to their sufferings, that when (as they concurred in declaring) 200 Europeans might have saved them, government had made no effort to send troops with the speed befitting an errand of life or death, but had treated the agonising appeal for "aid, aid, aid!" much in the same tone as that in which Mr. Colvin had been reproved for enacting, on his own responsibility, a measure which he thought might arrest, in its early stage, the avalanche of mutiny and massacre; but which the governor-general in council, taking a serenely distant view of the matter, blamed as manifesting "unnecessary haste."‡

* *Times*, Dec. 8th, 1858. † *Ibid.*, Feb. 24th, 1859.

‡ See page 188, *ante*.

In vain the leading men in the North-Western Provinces had combined in reiterating in successive telegrams—"Time is everything." "Spare no expense in sending reinforcements to Allahabad and Cawnpoor." The Supreme government moved with the utmost deliberation, maintaining, to the last possible moment, the position of dignified incredulity with which they had received the information of mutiny at Barrackpore in the early spring of 1857; treating the most reasonable alarm as "a groundless panic," and being beaten inch by inch off the field of indolent security; even the capture and retention of Delhi by the rebels, being insufficient to rouse them to the conviction of the imminent danger of the Europeans at other stations, especially those most richly stored and weakly defended. The wretched incapacity manifested at Meerut, was at length appreciated at Calcutta, and General Hewitt was superseded. Now, it is pretty generally admitted, that had either of the Lawrences, Montgomery or Colvin, Herbert, Edwardes, or Nicholson—anybody acquainted with the native character, whether pro-native or anti-native in their tone—been in authority at Meerut, that cruel court-martial sentence would never have been ratified; and the presiding officer would not have written to a friend that night—"The court is over, and those fellows have got ten years a-piece. You will hear of no more mutinies."* These flippant words stand out in terrible contrast to the cries for mercy uttered by Englishmen and Englishwomen, and refused on the

plea of the tyrannical sentence, the felon's irons; adjudged as the penalty of what they deemed devotion to religious duty and maintenance of social rights, for both are united in that much misapplied word—caste.

The Calcutta despatches prove that the authorities there were not blind to the infatuation which produced the Meerut outbreak, or the incapacity which prevented its suppression. The "thirty troopers who revolutionised India," became a bye-word; and the Meerut authorities were severely censured for not instantly sending off a portion of the European troops, if not to maintain Delhi, at least to rescue their countrywomen and the children. Yet the Indian journals assert, that the blame attached to the Meerut authorities for having been so panic-struck by the effect of their own act, that they folded their hands quietly, while, as they had every reason to anticipate, a most unequal struggle was taking place within a three hours' ride of them—is equally attributable to the Supreme government, not only for leaving Delhi without so much as a European company to close its gates, but for not sending speedy reinforcements to Cawnpore, when, by a vigorous effort, 2,000 men might have been dispatched there in time to raise the siege and to deliver the whole beleaguered band, instead of being the immediate cause of a massacre more terrible than that already related.

From the facts enumerated in the following chapter, the reader will judge how far the Supreme government can be justly reproached for culpable delay.

CHAPTER XII.

CALCUTTA AND BARRACKPOOR.—MAY AND JUNE, 1857.

At Calcutta, the government on the one side, and the European population and press almost unanimously on the other, took an opposite view of affairs. The governor and council disbelieved in the ex-

istence of any general disaffection either among the troops or the people, which was a natural opinion for the party responsible for having caused, or at least not striven to remove, the alleged discontent, to abide by

* See a history of the Bengal Mutinies, dated "Umballah, August, 1857," and introduced in the *Times*, as the production of "a gentleman whose acquirements, experience, and position, admirably qualify him for the work of observation and re-

view."—*Times*, October 24th, 1857. This authority remarks, that the Native officers who composed the court-martial were as obedient as usual, but that every one of them was said to have been murdered during the outbreak.

as long as possible: the European citizens, on the contrary, accepted General Hearsey's conclusions to their fullest extent, and went far beyond them, believing that an organised conspiracy had been concocted by the Mohammedans, and assented to by the Hindoos, civil and military (or rather military and civil), for the extermination of the British. The one party exposed the fallacies of the other; while both misinterpreted the signs of the times, being far too prejudiced regarding the cause of the outbreak, to adopt vigorous measures for its suppression at the earliest possible moment, and with the smallest possible waste of gold and silver and of human life.

The public journals advocated the formation of volunteer corps; and the Trades' Association offered their services to government, either as special constables, or in any other manner that might seem desirable for "the preservation of order, and the protection of the Christian community of Calcutta." The Masonic fraternity, the Americans, and French inhabitants of Calcutta, the British Indian Association, with all the leading Mohammedans and Hindoos, followed the example; but the proffered co-operation was refused by government on the ground of its being unnecessary, no general disaffection having been evinced by the Bengal sepoys. Writing on the 25th of May, the governor-general in council avers, that "the mischief caused by a passing and groundless panic has been arrested; and there is every reason to hope that, in the course of a few days, tranquillity and confidence will be restored."*

Another body, the native Christians of Krishnagpur, proffered their services, and begged to be employed, themselves, their carts and bullocks, in carrying stores to the seat of war. Only those acquainted with the miserable deficiencies of the Indian commissariat, can understand the value or full meaning of the offer; yet the volunteers were refused any public acknowledgment of their loyalty by the governor-general, on the ground that they had volunteered as Christians, not as subjects.† With strange perversity, the Supreme government trampled on caste with one foot, and on Christianity with the other. For the needless, heedless offence given to caste, concessions

were made by the governor-general as by the commander-in-chief, long after the eleventh hour, by a proclamation which, in each case, "fell to the ground a blunted weapon." On the 29th of May, the military secretary, Colonel Birch, issued his first and only proclamation to the army on the subject of the greased cartridges. An officer, then at Calcutta, who certainly cannot be accused of advocating undue regard to native feelings or prejudices, says, had this statement been published in January, it would in all probability have been effective; but Colonel Birch and the government were dumb at that time. Yet at the close of May, "when every word falling from government was liable to be misconstrued, a full and complete explanation was offered regarding the substitution of the Enfield rifle for Brown Bess, and the whole question of the greased cartridges!‡ Alas, for that terrible 'Too late!' which attaches itself as the motto of statesmen without prescience or genius, of little men in great positions!"§

Lord Canning certainly deserves credit for the promptitude with which he acted on the suggestions of Sir Henry Lawrence, and all the leading functionaries in the North-West, of gathering together European troops with all speed from every possible quarter. Bombay, Madras, and Ceylon were sent to for troops, and a steamer was dispatched to the Straits of Sunda, to intercept the Chinese expedition. In the latter end of May, and the beginning of June, reinforcements entered Calcutta in rapid succession. The well-known 1st Fusiliers hastened from Madras, the 64th and 78th Highlanders from Persia, the 35th from Moulmen; a wing of the 37th, and a company of royal artillery, from Ceylon. By the 10th of June, 3,400 men were at the orders of the governor-general, independent of H.M. 53rd in Fort William, 800 strong; from 1,500 to 2,000 sailors, and all the European inhabitants who had tendered their services.

The conduct of the authorities was altogether unaccountable. Instead of being glad to notify the arrival of these reinforcements, and to strengthen the hands of the well-disposed, confirm the allegiance of the waverers, and overawe incipient mutiny, the European troops were, it is alleged by

* Parl. Papers on the Mutinies, 1857 (No. 2).

† Asserted by Lord Shaftesbury at Exeter Hall, January 5th, 1858.

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‡ For government circular, see Appendix, p. 340.

§ *Mutiny of the Bengal Army*: by One who has served under Sir Charles Napier; p. 73.

the writer recently quoted, smuggled in like contraband goods. "For instance," he adds, "if it were known that the *Auckland*, or some other war steamer, was bringing troops, and the public were in consequence naturally on the tiptoe of excitement respecting her, orders would be transmitted, that on the arrival of the *Auckland*, the telegraph should announce the *Sarah Sands*, or a similar *nom-de-guerre*. The ship thus came up unnoticed; the troops generally landed in the dark, and were smuggled into the fort."*

On the 24th of May, the governor-general informed Sir Henry Lawrence, in reply to his urgent solicitations on behalf of Cawnpoor, that it was impossible to place a wing of Europeans there in less time than twenty-five days.† Sir Henry was far from being convinced of the impossibility of the measure: moreover, he was not silenced by Lord Canning's explicit statement of what could and could not be done; and, on receiving it, he instantly sent off another telegram in the following words:—

"I strongly advise that as many ekka daks be laid as possible from Raneegunje to Cawnpoor, to bring up European troops. Spare no expense."‡

The director-general of post-offices at Raneegunje, having probably been informed of Sir Henry Lawrence's opinion, sent a telegram to Calcutta on the same day (May 26th), in which he remarks—"Ekkas are not, I think, adapted for Europeans, nor do I think that time would be gained."§

On the 27th of May, the secretary to government sent off two telegrams, each dated 8.30 P.M. One of these conveyed the thanks of the governor-general in council to Sir Hugh Wheeler, for "his very effective exertions," and assured him "that no measures had been neglected to give him aid." The other curtly informed Sir Henry Lawrence—"Every horse and carriage, bullock and cart, which could be brought upon the road, has been collected, and no means of increasing the number will be neglected."||

The special point of the previous tele-

gram—namely, the ekkas—is slurred over; and it appears as if the Calcutta authorities were not a little annoyed by the perpetual jogs on the elbow of their subordinates in the North-West, and were more inclined to accept the dictum of the "post-master-general," which accorded with their own ideas of "possibility," than by strenuous efforts to comply with the earnest appeals of Sir Henry Lawrence and Sir Hugh Wheeler. Yet Lord Canning, in his instructions to the army then only advancing against Delhi, does not fail to enforce the point so vainly pressed on him. "Time is everything," he writes to the commander-in-chief, "and I beg you to make short work of Delhi." The commander-in-chief might, with good reason, have retaliated by entreating the governor-general to strengthen his hands by making "short work" of Cawnpoor.

A considerable portion of the public and press of Calcutta were extremely dissatisfied at the proceedings of the government, and severely censured the supineness to which they deemed the fate of Cawnpoor attributable, notwithstanding the unexpected detention of the Fusiliers at Allahabad.

The then acting editor of the *Friend of India*, has written a small volume on the mutiny, in which he thus states what was probably the popular view of the question:—

"A thousand English volunteer infantry, 400 cavalry, and 1,500 sailors, were at the disposal of government a week after the revolt became known.

* * * The waters of the Ganges do not rise until the latter end of June; and it would have been scarcely advisable to push troops up by that route so long as there was a prospect that the vessels might get aground.

"The railway and the road offered the greatest facilities for the transit of men, guns and stores; and both were in the best condition. The line was opened to Raneegunje, 120 miles from Calcutta; and, up to that point, there was no difficulty in sending a couple of regiments by a single train. Whilst the volunteers were learning how to load and fire, and the merchant seamen were being instructed in the use of artillery, government might have placed on the road, from the terminus to Cawnpoor, a line of stations for horses and bullocks, at intervals of five miles, guarded, if necessary, by posts of armed men; the streets and the course of Calcutta could

* "One who has served under Sir Charles Napier," gives as his authority, "personal observation, the telegraphic reports, and the notice of the circumstance by the local press."—(p. 99).

† Telegram, May 24th, 1857.—Appendix to Parl. Papers on Mutiny, p. 315.

‡ Appendix to Parl. Papers on Mutiny, p. 322.

This telegram is twice printed in the course of three pages. The first time (p. 322), the word "ekas" (country cart) is given incorrectly; the second, it is printed as "extra"—of course entirely altering the meaning. The value of the Papers printed for Parliament is seriously diminished by the frequency of these blunders.

§ *Ibid.*, p. 329.

|| *Ibid.*, p. 324.

have supplied any number of horses. There were 1,600 siege bullocks at Allahabad, and 600 at Cawnpoor; carriages and commissariat stores of all kinds might have been collected, for the use of a division, with seven days' hard work; and had government only consented to do, just a fortnight beforehand, what they were coerced to do on the 14th of June, they might have had, on the first day of that month, a force of 2,000 Europeans at Raneegunje, fully equipped with guns and stores, the infantry capable of being pushed on at the rate of 120 miles a-day, and the artillery, drawn by horses, elephants, and bullocks, in turns, following at a speed of two miles an hour, day and night.*

The *Friend of India* avers, that a column of 500 men might safely have left Calcutta, and reached Cawnpoor, by the 8th of June at latest; and the guns, escorted by half a wing of a European regiment, might have joined them seven days afterwards.

The news from the North-West Provinces at length convinced the Calcutta government, that if they desired to have territory left to rule over, it was necessary to adopt measures for its defence. The Calcutta volunteers were given to understand that their services would now be accepted; but, according to their own testimony, the majority suffered a feeling of pique, at the previous refusal, to outweigh their sense of public duty; and, "in consequence of the discouragement offered by the government, only 800 were enrolled in the Volunteer Guard, horse and foot; whereas, had their first proposition been accepted, the number would have amounted to between three and four thousand."†

On the following day, the unpopularity of Lord Canning was brought to its climax by the enactment of a law involving the re-institution of the licensing system, and a rigid censorship of the press (English and native), for the ensuing twelve months. The reasons for this measure have been already stated,‡ and need not be recapitulated here. Great excitement was occasioned; and the infraction of the liberty of the press—that is, the European portion of it—was loudly denounced. The English journalists were, of course, quite convinced of the necessity of arresting the torrent of sedition poured forth by the native papers; but they could not see the slightest necessity, notwithstanding the imminent danger with which they professed to believe Calcutta menaced, for placing any check upon the abuse which

was daily poured forth on the government, collectively and individually, nor on the fierce invectives against the natives of India generally, which the government foresaw might goad the entire population into rebellion. The angry journalists expected to find great sympathy in England; but, on the contrary, the necessity of the measure was generally appreciated by both parliament and the press.

The Arms Act, passed at the same time, was another and equally unreasonable cause of dissatisfaction. The extreme anti-native party in Calcutta had pressed for the establishment of martial law, which the government had wisely refused. It was then urged that there had been an unusual importation of arms into Calcutta, and that purchases of these had been largely made by natives. An act was therefore passed, empowering the government to demand from the inhabitants of any district a list of the arms each man possessed, with a view to the granting of a licence for the retention of any reasonable amount. Lord Grey, in vindicating the "impartial policy of the Arms Act," intimated that "it had been resorted to from sheer necessity, and to prevent a trade which might, and there was no doubt would, have been carried on between the natives and some bad Europeans, had the latter been allowed to possess arms to any extent." Lord Granville stated, that a suggestion had been made to Lord Canning that Christians should be exempted from the Act; but he had most properly felt that, since many of the native rajahs, zemindars, and their retainers, had exposed their lives and property in order to stand by the cause of the government, any act subjecting them to a disarmament from which all Europeans and Christians were expressly exempted, would have been a most unwise and impolitic measure. In the course of the same debate, Lord Ellenborough likened "our position in India to that of the Normans in Saxon England," and declared that the Anglo-Indians must, for a time at least, "assume the appearance of an armed militia." The comparison and phraseology were altogether unfortunate. The cases are totally dissimilar: and even passing over the anomaly of a so-called armed militia maintaining a military despotism over 180 millions of disaffected subjects, the prospect thus opened is hardly a pleasant one for the British merchants and traders, who look to India for an increased

* Mead's *Sepoy Revolt*, p. 84.

† Calcutta petition to the Queen, for the recall of Lord Canning.

‡ Introductory Chapter, p. 22.

outlet for their commerce, and hope to find their hands strengthened by receiving the valuable products which she could so cheaply and so plentifully supply, provided only her rulers can manage to govern her peacefully, and employ her revenues in developing her resources, and irrigating her fertile plains with the fair water of her noble rivers, instead of deluging the land with blood and tears. An important admission was, however, made by Lord Ellenborough in speaking of a provision of the Press Act, regarding the suppression of any passage in a public journal calculated "to weaken the friendship of native princes towards us." After bearing testimony to the important results which had attended the fidelity of the rajahs of Rewah and Gwalior, the ex-governor-general added, that if the Indian newspapers, "in the spirit which too much animates persons in that country, had expressed a hope that, when our rule was re-established, there would be further and further annexations, I assure you that every part of Central India, chiefs as well as subjects, would have been in arms against us."*

The tone thus denounced had, however, been taken by many journals, and it was most necessary that Lord Canning should possess some counteracting power. The Anglo-Indian papers did not always originate incendiary articles: they occasionally copied articles issued by the London press, written hastily on a very partial and prejudiced view of the subject, and without regard to the effect likely to result from their reproduction in India. It is a fact that the Indian princes study European politics with avidity, and watch their bearing on England. Much more do they examine, through the medium of their interpreters, the language held regarding them in the English papers, and the comments made thereon by the local press.

The first despatches which conveyed to England tidings of the Meerut and Delhi catastrophe, narrated also the admirable conduct of Sindia and Holcar, of the rajahs of Bhurtpoor, Jheend, and Putteeala. An Anglo-Indian correspondent of the *Times*, mentioned the death of the ill-used Nizam,† and the accession to the musnud of his son, Afzool-ood-Dowla, a prince of thirty years of age, "born to the purple of Hyderabad,

and proportionately dull, ignorant, and sensual."

The *Times*, commenting on this information, in evident ignorance of the vital importance to the British government of the policy which might be adopted by the Hyderabad durbar, remarked—"The fact seems to be, that we have arrived at that point in our Indian career, when the total subjection of the native element, and the organisation of all that we have conquered, becomes a matter of necessity. We have gone so far in the conquest of the country, that it is now necessary to complete the task. * * * We would even hope that the death of the Nizam may be the occasion of the Deccan being brought more completely under British sovereignty. We cannot now refuse our part or change our destiny. To retain power in India, we must sweep away every political establishment and every social usage which may prevent our influence from being universal and complete."‡

In the course of another mail or two, when the extent of the danger became better understood, a different tone was adopted, as it was soon seen that the native durbar—that is to say, the Nizam, under the guidance of his able minister, Salar Jung, and his venerable uncle, Shums-ool-Omrah,§ had remained faithful to the British government, in opposition to the desire of the great mass of his fanatical Mussulman subjects.

From this and many similar circumstances, it seems evident that an imperative sense of duty was Lord Canning's motive in placing a temporary restriction on the press. The censorship was enacted only for a year, and expired then without the slightest effort being made for its renewal. Lords Elphinstone and Harris earnestly seconded its imposition; the Calcutta council were unanimous regarding its necessity: yet the great weight of censure was poured out on the governor-general, who, from being, "personally, extremely popular," and praised as "a conscientious, hard-working man, and no jobber (a wonderful merit in that country),"|| became the object of the most sweeping and unqualified animadversion. Lord Canning conducted himself with much dignity, exercising the censorship he had felt it necessary to

* Indian debate, as reported in *Times*, December 8th, 1857.

† See Introductory Chapter, p. 55.

‡ *Times*, June 29th, 1857.

§ *Ibid.*

|| Speech of the Earl of Ellenborough.—*Times*, December 8th, 1857.

assume, without anger and without fear, although aware that a petition was being framed in Calcutta, addressed to the Queen, soliciting his recall, which petition was eventually sent to England by the hand of Mr. Mead, the ex-editor of the *Friend of India*—removed from that office on the ground of his infractions of the conditions of the Press Act.

Among the difficulties which beset the Indian government, not the least pressing was that of finance. This was ever a weak point. In the palmiest days of peace, the revenue could never be made, by British rulers, to meet the expenditure: in war, no better expedient had presented itself than to inflict on the helpless people of India a debt similar to that with which England is burdened. One of the ablest and most eloquent of living statesmen, has repeatedly drawn attention to the unjust expedient to which successive governors-general have resorted, to supply an ever-recurring deficit at the expense of those who are not allowed to have any voice in the levying or expenditure of money which they and their children are heavily taxed to supply.

Mr. Gladstone denounced the Indian debt as being "charged upon a country whose revenues we are drawing in this country by virtue of the power of the sword." But (he added) "apart from that, I say it is most unjust that the executive government should have, for any purpose of its own, or for any purpose of the people of England, the power of entailing these tremendous charges upon the people of India."*

* *Times*, April 27th, 1858.

† Report of Indian debate.—*Times*, July 7th, 1858.

‡ A London journal, the *Press*, November 28th, 1857, has the following remarks:—"Lord Dalhousie's measure sent down the whole public funds of India from ninety-seven, at which they stood at the time, to eighty at a stroke. Every existing fundholder was therefore irretrievably compromised; and no one was thereafter able to realise except at a sacrifice of from seventeen to twenty per cent. It was not, be it observed, the conversion of the five per cents. into fours that the fundholders complained of; for that, by raising the value of the four per cents. to par, was a benefit to the old holders, while those who accepted the conversion had no reason to complain, as they might, if they liked, have taken cash. To the moneyed class in particular, the conversion itself was a thing almost immaterial; for, as mere temporary holders, they cared comparatively little about the rate of interest except in so far as it affected the market price of their stock. It was because the conversion—followed almost imme-

diately by the opening of a new five per cent. loan at par—made this stock absolutely unsaleable, that they with cause complained. It made it unsaleable, at least, except at a rate of discount that was ruin to them; and the consequence has been to close the pocket of the Indian capitalist to the government ever since. The remedy which the Indian government has endeavoured to apply—namely, that of raising the amount of interest without providing for the redemption of the stock that is thus depreciated—only aggravates the evil which it is meant to cure. Because, although the rate now offered be sufficient in itself, it but the more assures the lender of the fact, that his capital, if so invested, will be invested beyond recall; for if the Company can see no way to relief but by constantly raising its interest, a five per cent. loan must very soon be followed by a six per cent., and a six per cent. by a seven per cent., as its wants increase. And with each rise in the rate of interest the stock of the old holders will fall in market value, and be utterly unsaleable except at a price far below the sum which the owner lent."

On a subsequent occasion, he adverted indignantly to the twelve or fifteen millions sterling imposed as a permanent burden on the people of India by the Afghan war.†

The manner of effecting loans in India does not appear to have been calculated to lessen the dissatisfaction which the wealthier natives could not but feel at being denied any voice in their appropriation. An important step taken by Lord Dalhousie, is thus described in his famous farewell minute. After stating several facts which seemed "to promise well for the financial prosperity of the country," his lordship adds—

"A measure which was carried into effect in 1853-'54, was calculated to contribute further to that end. During those years the five per cent. debt of India was entirely extinguished. Excepting the payment of a comparatively small sum in cash, the whole of the five per cent. debt was either converted into a four per cent. debt, or replaced in the open four per cent. loan. The saving of interest which was effected by this operation, amounted to upwards of £300,000 per annum.

"At a later period, by a combination of many unfavourable circumstances, which could not have been anticipated, and which were not foreseen in England any more than by us in India, the government has again been obliged to borrow at the high rate of five per cent. But the operation of 1853-'54 was not the less politic or less successful in itself; while the financial relief it afforded was timely and effectual."

The Calcutta Chamber of Commerce took a different view of the matter,‡ and maintained that the lenders were ill-used. The government, instead of having a large surplus available for the operation, were, they asserted, obliged, not from any unforeseen causes, but in the natural course of things

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(financial difficulty being the chronic condition of the Anglo-Indian government), immediately to open a new loan at five per cent. Money to the amount of four millions was borrowed by government, between the conversion of the five per cent. into a four per cent. debt in 1854, and the close of 1856, chiefly at five per cent., but partly at four-and-a-half per cent.

The four-and-a-half per cent. loan was suppressed, and a five per cent. loan opened in January, 1857—a measure which gave rise to much distrust, and seriously impeded the operations of the executive, when the sudden emergency occasioned by the revolt had to be met.

An officer, describing to a friend in England the state of affairs in Calcutta, 12th of June, 1857, says—"The Company's paper is down very low; the new five per cent. loan few subscribe to, and the four per cents. were yesterday at twenty discount; and I see, by the newspaper, that at Benares it was at forty-two discount. We must have a new loan, and you must give us the money, I expect. Out of the treasuries alone that have been robbed, I should think nearly two millions of money have been taken; and then fancy the expense of the transport of all these Europeans."*

On the evening of the day on which the Arms and Press Acts had been passed, a message from Major-general Harsey reached Calcutta, desiring the aid of European troops to disarm the Native troops at Barrackpoor, as he believed their fidelity could not be relied on. The request was immediately complied with; and, on the afternoon of Sunday, the 14th, the sepoy at Barrackpoor, and also all except the body-guard of the governor-general in Fort William, Calcutta, and the neighbourhood, were quietly disarmed. The necessity for this measure must have greatly increased Lord Canning's perplexities. Although "Pandyism" had originated at Barrackpoor, it was thought to have been trodden out there, and the government actually intended to dispatch troops from thence to join the force against Delhi, heedless of the opinion expressed by Lieutenant-governor Colvin at Agra, and his policy of "preserving the peace by not permitting Native troops to meet and directly fight their brethren."† It would have

been objectionable on the lowest ground of expediency, as a most dangerous experiment, to send men to fight against their countrymen, co-religionists, and, in many cases, their own relations. Even supposing them to have started for Delhi in all good faith, it was not in human nature to resist such combined temptations as those which would have met them on the road, or on reaching their destination. Sooner or later they would, rather than have fired on, have fraternised with their mutinous comrades. There were excellent British officers at Barrackpoor; and they were, perhaps, disposed to overrate their own influence with the men. The accounts sent to England by the Indian government, do not clearly show what intimations were made to the troops to induce them to volunteer to march against Delhi, and to use the new rifle; but it would appear that they were given to understand that, by so doing, they would gain great credit, and place themselves beyond suspicion. For the offer to march against Delhi, the 70th N.I. were thanked by the governor-general in person; and it was subsequent to this that they professed their readiness to use the new cartridges. In an address to government, dated June 5th, and forwarded by the colonel (Kennedy) commanding the 70th N.I., the petitioners aver—

"We have thought over the subject; and as we are now going up country, we beg that the new rifles, about which there has been so much said in the army and all over the country, may be served out to us. By using them in its service, we hope to prove beyond a doubt our fidelity to government; and we will explain to all we meet, that there is nothing objectionable in them."‡

The petition of the 70th N.I. to join the force before Delhi, was read aloud, by Lord Canning's order, at the head of various Native corps, and the effect it produced was apparently beneficial. For instance, the 63rd N.I., at Berhampoor, expressed themselves (in very English phraseology, but with very un-English feeling) "prepared and ready, with heart and hand, to go wherever, and against whomsoever you may please to send us, should it even be against our own kinsmen."§ The governor-general in council desired Major-general Harsey to thank the 63rd N.I. publicly, "for this soldier-like expression of their

* Diary of officer in Calcutta.—*Times*, Aug. 3, 1857.

† Appendix to Papers on Mutiny, p. 188.

‡ Further Parl. Papers, 1857 (not numbered), p. 46.
§ *Ibid.*, p. 70.

loyalty and attachment to the government.”*

The offer may have been honestly made; for the natives are the veriest children of impulse; but few who knew them would doubt that the reaction would be sudden and strong, and that mercenary troops so peculiarly situated, would, when brought face to face—father with son, brother with brother—lose all notion of being “true to their salt”. in the natural feelings of humanity. The very expression of being ready to oppose their own kinsmen, suggests that the possibility of being placed in such a cruel position had already occurred to them.

On the 9th of June, a Mussulman of the 70th N.I. came to Captain Greene, and the following very remarkable conversation ensued regarding the intended march from Barrackpoor to Delhi :—

“ ‘Whatever you do,’ said the sepoy, ‘do not take your lady with you.’ I asked him, ‘Why?’ He said, ‘Because the mind of the natives, kala admi (black men), was now in a state of inquietude, and it would be better to let the lady remain here till everything was settled in the country, as there was no knowing what might happen.’ On my asking him if he had any reason to doubt the loyalty of the regiment, he replied, ‘Who can tell the hearts of a thousand men?’ He said that he believed the greater portion of the men of the regiment were sound, and in favour of our rule; but that a few evil men might persuade a number of good men to do an evil deed.

“ I then asked him the meaning of all this about the cartridges. He said, ‘That when first the report was spread about, it was generally believed by the men; but that subsequently it had been a well understood thing that the cartridge question was merely raised for the sake of exciting the men, with a view of getting the whole army to mutiny, and thereby upset the English government; that they argued, that as we were turned out of Cabool, and had never returned to that place, so, if once we were entirely turned out of India, our rule would cease, and we should never return.’ Such is the opinion of a great bulk of the people. A Native officer also warned me that it would be better not to take up Mr. —. He said that if I went he would sleep by my bed, and protect me with his own life.”

Captain Greene adds, that a Hindoo had told him that the Mussulmans generally, in all regiments, were in the habit of talking to the effect that their “‘raj’ was coming round again.”†

It is evident, from the foregoing state-

ment, that a dangerous degree of excitement existed among the Barrackpoor troops. Matters were brought to an issue by a report being made to Colonel Kennedy, that a man of the 70th N.I. had been heard to say, “Let us go beyond Pultah, and then you will hear what we will do.” General Hearsey made inquiries, and convinced himself that “some villains in the corps were trying to incite the good men and true to mutiny.” He endeavoured to persuade the men to find out and deliver over the offenders: they would not do this; and he resolved on disarming the entire brigade of four regiments.‡ The officers of the 70th strenuously opposed the measure, declaring that “the reported speech must have been made by some budmash, and that Colonel Kennedy, being new to the regiment, did not and could not know the real and devoted sentiments of the Native officers and men with respect to their fealty.”§

The brigadier wisely persisted in a step which must have been most painful to him; and he adds, what will readily be believed, that he spoke “very, very kindly” to the men at the time of the disarming. The officers of the 70th were deeply affected by the grief evinced by their men. They went to the lines on the following day, and tried to comfort them, and induce them to take food. They found that the banyans (native dealers) had, in some instances, refused to give further credit, under the impression that the regiment would soon be paid up, and discharged altogether; while a large number were preparing to desert, in consequence of a bazaar report that handcuffs and manacles had been sent for. Captain Greene pleaded earnestly with Major-general Hearsey in favour of the regiment, which “had been for nigh twenty-five years his pride and his home;” declaring, “all of us, black and white, would be so thankful to you if you could get us back our arms, and send us away from this at once.”||

Of course the petition could not be granted. The safety of such officers as these was far too valuable to be thus risked. Probably their noble confidence, and that evinced by many others similarly

* Further Parl. Papers, 1857 (not numbered), p. 71.

† *Ibid.*, p. 8.

‡ Letter from Major-general Hearsey to his sister; dated, “Barrackpoor, June 16th, 1857.”—*Daily News*, August 6th, 1857.

§ Major-general Hearsey to secretary to government, June 15th, 1857.—Further Parl. Papers (not numbered), p. 6.

|| Letters of Captain Greene to Major-general Hearsey, June 14th and 15th, 1857.—*Ibid.*, pp. 6, 7.

circumstanced, will be called sheer infatuation, and no allowance made for circumstances under which zeal might easily outrun discretion. But let it be remembered it was their own lives, nothing more, nothing less, that they were so willing to hazard losing; and the cause, which rendered them heedless of personal danger, was an absorbing desire for the honour of their corps, the welfare of their men, and the service of their country.

And most effective has their devotion been. No mere human wisdom, under whatever specious name it may be disguised—discretion, policy, expediency—could have done what the fearless faith of these gallant sepoy leaders did to break the first shock of the mutiny, to stop a simultaneous rising, to buy, when "time was everything," a few weeks', days', hours' respite, at the cost of their life-blood. It was extreme coercion that lit the fires at Meerut and Delhi; it was extreme conciliation that saved Simla and Lucknow. If some officers carried their confidence too far, and did not see that the time for conciliatory measures had for the moment passed, it must be recollected that they could not know the full extent of the secret influences brought to bear on the minds of their men; far less could they counteract the effect of panic caused, in repeated instances, by the cruel blundering of the highest local authorities, where these happened to be incapacitated for the exercise of sound judgment, by infirmity of mind and body (as has been shown at Meerut), or by the indiscriminating rashness of a hasty spirit (as is alleged to have been the case at Benares).

The panic in the lines of the Barrackpoor sepoys, on the evening of Sunday, the 14th, was far outdone by that which seized on the minds of the Calcutta population, in anticipation of the possible consequences of the measure which, after all, was so peaceably accomplished. The fact of the sepoys having allowed themselves to be disarmed without resistance, could not be denied; but the newsmongers and alarmists made amends for having no struggle to narrate, by enlarging on the imminent danger which had been averted. An order had been given by the governor-general to

search the lines, after the disarming should have been accomplished,* for tulwars (native swords), or other weapons. Brigadier Harsey did so, and acquainted the governor-general with the fact of the order having been obeyed. He makes no mention of any weapons having been found; but only adds—"All quiet."† The description of the condition of the troops on the following day, has been shown; as also the entreaty of the officers of the 70th N.I., for the re-arming of their regiment. Yet Dr. Duff, writing to England, says, that "when, after disarming, the sepoys' huts were searched, they were found to be filled with instruments of the most murderous description—huge knives of various shapes, two-handed swords, poniards, and battle-axes; many of the swords being serrated, and evidently intended for the perpetration of torturing cruelties on their European victims—cruelties over which, in their anticipation, these ruthless savages, while fed and nurtured by the government, had doubtless fondly gloated!"‡ Of course, the official statements since laid before parliament, prove all this to be idle rumour; but it is quoted here as showing what fables were accepted as facts, and indorsed as such by men of note in Calcutta. The Europeans, moreover, believed themselves to have escaped, by a peculiar providence, a plot laid for their destruction by some undetected Mussulman Guy Fawkes. The maharajah of Gwalior had been visiting Calcutta shortly before the mutiny, and had invited the whole European community to an exhibition of fireworks, across the river, at the Botanic Gardens. The entertainment was postponed on account of a violent storm; and it was afterwards alleged that a scheme had been thereby thwarted, of seizing that night on Fort William, and massacring the Christian community.§ New rumours of a similar character were spread abroad in every direction. As at Simla, so at Calcutta, nothing was too palpably absurd to be related and received as possible and probable. True, the year 1857 will go down to posterity as one of previously unparalleled crime and disaster. But it will also take its place as a year of "canards."

The native tendency to exaggeration and

on the subject. He states that some of the conspirators underwent the penalty of death. It is strange that other writers have not mentioned so remarkable and important event, if anything of the kind really occurred.

* Further Parl. Papers, 1857 (not numbered), p. 52.

† *Ibid.*, p. 59.

‡ See Dr. Duff's *Letters on India*, p. 37.

§ *Ibid.*, p. 2. Dr. Duff speaks very decidedly

high colouring was well known. Every Englishman in India, every educated European, must have learned in childhood to appreciate the story-telling propensities of the Asiatics. The *Arabian Nights* are a standing memorial of their powers of imagination. In composition or in conversation, they adopt a florid, fervid style, natural to them, but bewildering to Europeans in general, and peculiarly distasteful to the Anglo-Saxon mind. In the limited intercourse between superior and inferior, master and servant, the "sahibs" would cut short the Oriental jargon very quickly; but when, in the fever of excitement, domestic servants, khitnutgars or ayahs, a favourite syce (groom) or some personal attendant, came full of a bazaar report of horrors perpetrated at stations hundreds of miles off, they were listened to as if every syllable had been Gospel truth; and, through similar channels, the newspaper columns were filled with the most circumstantial details of often imaginary, always exaggerated, atrocities.

Strange that the experience of a hundred years had had so little effect in giving the rulers of India an insight into native character, and in enabling them to view the real dangers and difficulties of their position, unclouded by imaginary evils. But no! the tales of mutilation and violation publicly told, and the still fouler horrors privately whispered, though now for the most part denounced and disowned, then made many a brave man pale with alarm, as he looked on his wife and children. Fear is even more credulous than hope; and the majority, while under the bewildering influence of excitement, probably believed in the alleged abominations. It seems likely, however, that some of the retailers of these things must have had sufficient experience of the untrustworthiness of the hearsay evidence on which they rested, to understand their true character. If so, and if, indeed, they promulgated lies, knowing or suspecting them to be such, they committed a deadly sin; and on their heads rests, in measure, the blood of every man who, wild with terror, rushed from the pre-

sence of his fellow-creatures to the tribunal of his God, or proved, in the presence of assembled heathens, his disbelief in the existence of an ever-present Saviour, by destroying his wife or child. Several instances of suicide occurred during the mutiny.* Of wife or child-murder there are few, if any, attested instances; but it is sufficiently terrible to know, that the thought of escaping the endurance of suffering by the commission of sin, was deliberately sanctioned, as will be shown by a subsequent chapter, even by ministers, or at least by a minister, of the Christian religion.

It was well for England and for India, that the governor-general was a man of rare moral and physical courage. No amount of energy could have compensated for a want of self-reliance, which might have placed him at the mercy of rash advisers, and induced the adoption of coercive measures likely to turn possible rebels into real ones, instead of such as were calculated to reassure the timid and decide the wavering, by the attitude of calm dignity so important in a strong foreign government. General Mansfield, then in Calcutta, wrote home, that "the one calm head in Calcutta was that upon Lord Canning's shoulders."† The assertion seems, however, too sweeping. Certainly there was another exception. The viceroy's wife was as little susceptible of panic as her lord, and continued to reside in a palace guarded by natives, and to drive about, attended by a sepoy escort, with a gentle, fearless bearing, which well befitted her position.

Lord Canning was much blamed for not immediately exchanging his sepoy for a European guard; but Earl Granville defended him very happily, on grounds on which the sepoy officers may equally base their justification. "I think," said Lord Granville, "that at a moment when great panic existed in Calcutta, Lord Canning was rash in intrusting himself to troops whose fidelity might be suspected; but it was at a time when he felt, that as our dominion in India depended upon the belief in our self-confidence and courage, it was of the greatest importance that the head of

hardly deserve the sole blame: suicide is usually the termination of the lives of persons who have habitually disregarded the revealed will of God, by sensual indulgence, or what is commonly termed the laws of nature—by long-continued mental effort, to the neglect of their physical requirements.

† Stated by Earl Granville in India debate.—*Times*, December 8th, 1857.

* Mrs. Coopland, in the narrative of her *Escape from Gwalior*, remarks—"We heard of the shocking suicides of the commodore of the *Mary* and of General Stalker. The reason we heard assigned for this, both in the papers and by people who ought to know, is that the climate so upsets people's nerves, as to render them unfit for any great excitement or responsibility."—(p. 76.) The climate can

the Europeans in that country should not be thought to be deficient in those qualities. And I am quite sure, that among Englishmen even, too great an indifference to personal danger is not likely very long to tell against Lord Canning.”*

It is probable that the governor-general hoped, by retaining his sepoy guard, to counteract in some degree the dangerous tendency of the alarm manifested by his countrymen. An officer “who witnessed the living panorama of Calcutta on the 14th of June,”† has drawn a lively sketch of the prevailing disorder and dismay.

He declares—

“It was all but universally credited that the Barrackpoor brigade was in full march against Calcutta; that the people in the suburbs had already risen; that the King of Oude, with his followers, were plundering Garden-reach. Those highest in office were the first to give the alarm. There were secretaries to government running over to members of council, loading their pistols, barricading the doors, sleeping on sofas; members of council abandoning their houses with their families, and taking refuge on board ship: crowds of lesser celebrities, impelled by these examples, having hastily collected their valuables, were rushing to the fort, only too happy to be permitted to sleep under the fort guns. Horses, carriages, palanquins, vehicles of every sort and kind, were put into requisition to convey panic-stricken fugitives out of the reach of imaginary cut-throats. In the suburbs, almost every house belonging to the Christian population was abandoned. Half-a-dozen determined fanatics could have burned down three parts of the town. A score of London thieves would have made their fortunes by plundering the houses in the neighbourhood of Chowringhee (the patrician quarter of the city), which had been abandoned by their inmates.”‡

The writer adds—“It must in fairness be admitted, that whilst his advisers—the patricians of Leadenhall-street—were hiding under sofas, and secreting themselves in the holds of the vessels in port, Lord Canning himself maintained a dignified attitude.” The admission is worth noting. It is only to be regretted that other exceptions were not made; for it is scarcely possible but that there were such. Only, to

have singled them out would have been to stigmatise the unnamed.

At daybreak on the 15th of June, the King of Oude, with Ali Nukki Khan, and other leading adherents, were arrested, and lodged as prisoners in Fort William. The official intimation simply relates the fact, without stating the reason of the arrest, or the manner in which it was performed. Private authorities state that it was accomplished as a surprise. The force employed consisted of 500 men of H.M. 37th foot (which had arrived a few days before from Ceylon, and had been present at the disarming at Barrackpoor),§ and a company of the royal artillery. Mr. Edmonstone, the foreign secretary, then went forward to the residence of the ex-minister. He seemed startled by the sight of the soldiers, but surrendered himself to their custody without a word of remonstrance. His house was searched, and his papers secured. The party then proceeded to arrest the king, telling him that the governor-general had reason to believe him connected with the mutiny. Wajid Ali behaved on this occasion, as on that of his deposition, with much dignity. Taking off his jewelled turban, and placing it before the foreign secretary, he said—“If I have, by word, by deed, or in any way whatever encouraged the mutineers, I am worthy of any punishment that can be devised: I am ready to go wherever the governor-general thinks fit.” The apartments were then searched; and, in the words of one of the officers engaged, “the king, his prime minister, and the whole batch, papers and all, were seized.”||

The Calcutta population viewed this measure, which was simply a precautionary one, as undoubted evidence of a discovered conspiracy. Dr. Duff, writing from Calcutta, and deeply imbued with the fever of the time (as from the nature of his rare gift of popular eloquence he would be likely to be), enters very fully into the subject.¶

for the barrack-square in England, affording no protection whatever from the sun. They had white jackets on, I was glad to see; but even then, the heat was so great that the cross-belt was wet through from perspiration. Stocks of course.”—*Times*, August 3rd, 1857.

|| *Times*—*Ibid*.

¶ These letters, addressed to Dr. Tweedie, Convener of the Free Church of Scotland's Foreign Mission Committee, were published in 1858, under the title of *The Indian Rebellion; its Causes and Results*: and “the views and opinions which they embody,” are described in the preface as “the ripe result of

* Stated by Earl Granville in India debate.—*Times*, December 8th, 1857.

† See also similar statements published in Indian correspondence of *Times*, *Daily News*, and other papers of August, 1857. Dr. Duff says—“The panic throughout Sunday night rose to an inconceivable height. With the exception of another couple, Mrs. Duff and myself were the only British subjects in Cornwallis-square on that night.”—*Letters*, p. 24.

‡ *Mutiny of the Bengal Army*: by One who has served under Sir Charles Napier; p. 105.

§ An officer employed on the expedition, remarks, that the 37th wore “the small forage-cap, fit only

"On Monday morning," he writes, "the ex-King of Oude and his treasonable crew were arrested, and safely quartered in Fort William. Since then various parties connected with the Oude family, and other influential Mohammedans, have been arrested; and on them have been found several important documents, tending to throw light on the desperate plans of treason which have been seriously projected. Among others has been found a map of Calcutta, so sketched out as to divide the whole of the town into sections. A general rise was planned to take place on the 3rd instant, the anniversary of the battle of Plassey. The city was to be taken, and the Feringhi Kaffirs [foreign infidels], or British and other Christian inhabitants, to be all massacred. Hereafter, parties who swore on the Koran, and proved that they had taken an active share in the butchery and pillage of the Europeans, were to have certain sections of the town allotted to them for their own special benefit!" All this, and much more of a similar sort, Dr. Duff declares to have been "timeously and providentially revealed." That is to say, all this was firmly believed during the panic; but very little, if any, has been established by subsequent examination, or is now on record.

Time, the revealer of secrets, has brought nothing to light to the disparagement of the King of Oude. On the contrary, many of the accusations brought against him have been disproved. Impartial observers assert, that "there is not a shadow of a shade of evidence to connect him with the rebellion."* Whether from his own convictions, or by the advice of the queen-mother (a woman of unquestioned ability), he appears to have steadily adhered to the policy which alone admitted a prospect of redress—that of submission under protest.

Mr. Russell, writing from Lucknow in February, 1859, remarks—"It is now universally admitted, that it was owing to his influence no outbreak took place at the time of the annexation."† Up to the period of the mutiny, and, indeed, to the present moment, he has firmly refused to

thirty years' observation." It is added, that the most fastidious critic will hardly require any apology for the want of the author's revision; because the letters are "tense with the emotions, and all aflame with the tidings of that terrible season." It is not, however, a question of style, but of fact. Misstatements like the one regarding the Barrackpoor sepoys and the King of Oude, with many other stories

accept any allowance from the British government. He may be our prisoner; he will not be our pensioner: but has continued, by the sale of his jewels, to support himself and the royal family. The anomalous position of the deposed king certainly did not strengthen the British government during the mutiny; and when Wajid Ali heard of the fall of Cawnpore, and the precarious tenure of Lucknow, the magnificent capital of his dynasty (held by a slender garrison of the usurping race, against their own revolted mercenaries), he might well feel that the seizure of his misgoverned kingdom had been followed by a speedy retribution. In the hands of a native government, Oude would have been, as in every previous war, a source of strength to the British government; now it threatened to be like the "Spanish ulcer" of Napoleon Buonaparte. If Wajid Ali yearned for vengeance, he had it in no stinted measure, though a prisoner. Vengeful, however, none of his house appear to have been: their vices were altogether of another order. Perhaps he had himself benefited by the sharp lessons of adversity; and while becoming sensible of the folly of his past career of sensuality and indolence, might hope that the English would profit by the same stern teaching, and learn the expediency of being just.

On the 17th of June, Sir Patrick Grant, the newly-appointed commander-in-chief, arrived at Calcutta from Madras, and with him Colonel Havelock, who had just returned from Persia. Both were experienced Indian officers. Sir Patrick Grant commenced his career in the Bengal army, and had early distinguished himself by raising the Hurrianah light infantry—a local battalion, which he commanded for many years: he subsequently married a daughter of Lord Gough; became adjutant-general; and was from thence raised to the command of the Madras army, being the first officer in the Company's service who had ever attained that position.

Colonel (afterwards Sir Henry) Havelock was a Queen's officer, who had seen service in Burmah and Afghanistan, in the calculated to set the British mind "aflame" against the natives, ought in justice to have been recanted. Dr. Duff is a well-known and respected minister, of unquestioned ability; and his errors cannot, in justice to the cause of truth, be passed unnoticed, even though under the pressure of an important avocation: they may have escaped his memory.

* Russell.—*Times*, March 28th, 1859. † *Ibid*.

Gwalior campaign of 1843, and the Sutlej campaigns of 1845-'6; after which he became quartermaster-general, and, subsequently, adjutant-general of her Majesty's forces in India. In 1829 he married the third daughter of Dr. Marshman, the companion of the apostolic Carey in founding the Baptist Mission at Serampoor; and, in the following year, he openly joined that denomination of Christians, receiving public baptism in the manner deemed by them most scriptural. The step drew on him much ridicule from those who, having never had any deep religious convictions, could not understand their paramount influence on a loftier spirit. It was not, however, a measure likely to hinder his advancement in his profession; although, if it had been, Havelock was a brave and honest man, and much too strongly convinced of the paramount importance of things eternal, to have hazarded them for any worldly advantage. At the same time, it is certain he made no sacrifice of things temporal by allying himself with the once despised but afterwards powerful party, which exercised remarkable influence through the *Friend of India*, of which paper Dr. Marshman was the proprietor. As a boy, he is said to have been called "old Phlos" by his playfellows at the Charter-house, on account of his grave, philosophic demeanour. In after years, he delighted in expounding the Scriptures to his men, and in warning them against the besetting sins of a soldier's daily life, drunkenness and its attendant vice. His efforts were crowned with success. At a critical moment during the campaign in Burmah, Sir Archibald Campbell gave an order to a particular corps, which could not be carried out, owing to the number of men unfitted for duty by intoxication. The general was informed of the fact. "Then," said he, "call out Havelock's saints; they are never drunk, and he is always ready."*

Again—when, in 1835, Havelock sought the appointment of adjutant to the 13th light infantry, opposition was made from various quarters, on the ground that he was

a fanatic and an enthusiast. Lord William Bentinck examined the punishment roll of the regiment; and finding that the men of Havelock's company, and those who joined them in their religious exercises, were the most sober and the best-behaved in the regiment, he gave Havelock the solicited appointment; remarking, that he "only wished the whole regiment was Baptist."†

Colonel Havelock's personal habits were simple, even to austerity; and to these, but still more to his habitual trust in an overruling Providence, may be attributed the spring of energy which enabled him to declare, on the morning of his sixty-second birthday—"Nearly every hair on my head and face is as grey as my first charger; but my soul and mind are young and fresh."‡ Military honours he coveted to a degree which appears to have rendered him comparatively insensible to the horrors of war; and it is strange to contrast the irrepressible disgust with which Sir Charles Napier chronicles the scenes of slaughter through which he had cut his way to fame and fortune, with the almost unalloyed satisfaction which Havelock seems to have found in a similar career.

These two veterans (each of whom attained eminence after toiling up-hill, past the mile-stones of threescore years) have left on record widely different opinions. Napier uniformly denounced war as "hellish work."§ Havelock, "having no scruples about the compatibility of war with Christianity,"|| prayed constantly, from his school-days to advanced age, "to live to command in a successful action."¶ This single sentence, which conveys the cherished desire of a lifetime, is one of those utterances that reveal, beyond all possibility of error, the character, even the inner being, of the writer. Lord Hardinge is said to have pronounced Havelock, "every inch a soldier, and every inch a Christian."** And this praise was true in its degree; for Lord Hardinge†† measured Havelock by his own standard of Christianity; and Havelock himself steadily pursued what he believed

* Rev. William Brock's *Biographical Sketch of Sir Henry Havelock*, p. 37.

† *Ibid.*, p. 45.

‡ *Ibid.*, p. 121.

§ *Life of Sir Charles Napier*; by Sir William Napier.—Vol. iii., p. 410.

|| Rev. W. Brock's *Biographical Sketch of Sir Henry Havelock, K.C.B.*—p. 18.

¶ Letter to Mrs. Havelock; July 13th, 1857.—*Ibid.*, p. 163.

** Brock's *Havelock*.—Preface.

†† Napier writes—"Hardinge is very religious; he had prayers on the field of battle! Thou shalt not kill, is the order; and it seems strange, in the heat of disobedience, to pray and make parade."—*Life*, vol. iii., p. 368. It must, however, be remembered, that to pray to be protected in battle, and to be led into it, are totally different petitions.



to be the path of duty. Still, that a Christian far advanced in years, should, after long experience of offensive warfare (the Afghan campaign for instance), continue to pray to be at the head of a battle, is startling, and would be incomprehensible, had we not daily evidence how apt men are (in Archbishop Whateley's words) to let their opinions or practices bend the rule by which they measure them.

These comments would be superfluous but for the extreme interest excited by the closing passages of Havelock's life, on which we are now entering, and which, from their peculiar character, have thrown an interest round the chief actor, scarcely warranted by the relative importance of his proceedings as compared with those of other Indian leaders, several of whom have been strangely underrated.* It is frequently asserted that Havelock resembled the Puritans of English history: his spare small figure, and worn and thoughtful face, helps the comparison; and it is asserted, in words of more discriminating praise than those previously quoted, that "a more simple-minded, upright, God-fearing soldier, was not among Cromwell's Ironsides."† But it must be remembered that the Puritans fought for civil and religious liberty, for themselves and for their children; and Havelock, employed in repeated foreign wars of conquest and subjugation, might as well be compared to the gallant Baptist missionaries, Knibb and his coadjutors (who struggled so efficiently, amid poverty, calumny, and cruel persecution, for the anti-slavery cause in the West Indies), as to an English Round-head.

The arrival of Sir Patrick Grant may be supposed to have removed from the governor-general the chief responsibility of the military measures now urgently required. Tidings from Neil at Allahabad, told that the course of mutiny, instead of being arrested, was growing daily stronger; and Sir Henry Lawrence continued to urge on the governor-general the extreme peril of the Cawnpoor garrison. When Grant and Havelock reached Calcutta on the 17th of June, there was yet time, by efforts such as Warren Hastings or Marquis Wellesley would have made, to have sent a force

which might have forestalled the capitulation. The regular rate of dawk travelling is eight miles an hour, night and day; and there was no good reason why the 508 miles between the railway terminus at Raneegunje and Cawnpoor, should have been such a stumblingblock. Had Sir Henry Lawrence's suggestion of the *ekkas* been adopted by Sir P. Grant immediately on his arrival at Calcutta, Cawnpoor might still have been saved, the troops might have slept under cover the whole day, with their arms and ammunition by their side, and arrived fresh and strong at the scene of action. It was no fear of their being cut off in detail that prevented the attempt being made; for they went up the country all through June, July, and August, in parties of fourteen, twelve, and, on one occasion, of eight men;‡ yet not a single detachment was ever cut off. Far different was the energy displayed in Northern India, where, as we have seen, the Guides marched 750 miles, at the rate of twenty-seven miles a-day, and went into action immediately afterwards.

The supineness of the Supreme government regarding Cawnpoor, is by far the most serious charge brought against them by the press. The refusal of the co-operation of the Goorkas is a branch of the same subject; but it is not difficult to conjecture the motive of the Supreme government for desiring to dispense with such dangerous auxiliaries. The well-known Jung Bahadur, the first minister and virtual ruler of Nepal, had, at the beginning of the mutiny, offered to send a force to the assistance of the English. The proposal was accepted; and three thousand troops, with Jung himself at their head, came down from the hills in forced marches, in the highest possible spirits at the thought of paying off old scores on the sepoys, and sharing the grog and loot of the English soldiers. Second thoughts, or circumstances which have not been made public,§ induced the Supreme government to alter their determination with regard to the Goorkas; and the force, after passing through the Terai (the deadly jungle which lies at the foot of their hills), were arrested by a message of recall. They had expected

* One of Havelock's biographers declares, that he set forth to command "the avenging column," having "received his commission from the Lord of Hosts. He had by long training been prepared for the 'strange work' of judgment against the mur-

derous hosts of India."—Owen's *Havelock*, p. 195.

† *Westminster Review*, October, 1858.

‡ Appendix to Parl. Papers, 1857; p. 350.

§ The original offer is said to have been accepted by an unauthorised functionary.

to reach Oude by the 15th of June; but on learning that their services could be dispensed with, they started back to Khatmandoo, the capital of Nepal; which they reached, after suffering greatly from sickness and fatigue. Scarcely had they returned, before another summons arrived from Calcutta, requesting that they should be again sent to Oude, and the march was recommenced on the 29th of June. When they at length reached British territory, much reduced by death and disease, Lawrence and Wheeler had been dead a fortnight.

Jung Bahadur is said to have expressed his indignation very decidedly; and in writing to his friend Mr. Hodgson, late of the Bengal civil service, he concluded his narrative of the affair by exclaiming—"You see how I am treated. How do you expect to keep India with such rulers as these?"*

Still, as has been stated, Lord Canning may have had good reason for desiring the recall of the Goorkas; and the very fact of being subsequently compelled to avail himself of their services, would account for his silence regarding the apparent incertitude of his previous policy. The fact, pointed out by Lord Dalhousie, that the Nepaulese government always armed and made hostile preparations when war broke out in Europe, and the strong suspicions entertained of an intimate understanding existing between the courts of Russia and Nepal, were arguments calculated to increase the repugnance any civilised government must have felt in accepting the aid of a horde of half-civilised mountaineers, whose fidelity in the case of a reverse would be extremely doubtful, and who, in the event of success, would unquestionably prove a scourge to the unoffending agriculturists, whom the British government was bound to protect. The consideration of this point, therefore, only strengthens the conclusion, that want of energy in relieving Cawnpoor, is by far the most important of the errors attributed to the Supreme government during the crisis. The measures recommended by the Lawrences† for the rapid collection of troops at Calcutta, had been taken; but the good to be derived therefrom was neutralised by their apparently unjustifiable detention in Bengal. It is further asserted by Mr. Mead (who, at the time of which he writes, edited the

Friend of India), that a question of military etiquette was another impediment to the dispatch of relief for the protracted agony then being endured in the Cawnpoor trenches. "The fiery Neil," it is asserted, "having quelled mutiny at Benares, and punished it at Allahabad, chafed impatiently till a force of men, properly equipped, could be got together for the relief of Cawnpoor; but he was not allowed, in this instance, to follow the impulse of his daring nature. Colonel Havelock had arrived in Calcutta; and the rules of the service would not allow a junior officer to be at the head of an enterprise, however fit he might be to carry it to a successful conclusion. Time was lost to enable Colonel Havelock to join at Allahabad."‡ There is nothing in Havelock's published letters to show, that on arriving at Calcutta, he himself, or indeed any one round him, felt the intense anxiety which the telegrams of Lawrence and Wheeler were calculated to excite. He writes under date, "Calcutta, Sunday, June 21st," to Mrs. Havelock (then, happily for all parties, far from the scene of strife, educating her younger children "under the shadow of the Drachenfels"), that he had been reappointed brigadier-general, and had been recommended by Sir P. Grant for an "important command; the object for which is to relieve Cawnpoor, where Sir Hugh Wheeler is threatened; and support Lucknow, where Sir Henry Lawrence is somewhat pressed."§

An officer of great promise, Captain Stuart Beatson, came to Calcutta about the same time as Sir Patrick Grant. Beatson had been sent to Persia, on the outbreak of the war, to raise a regiment of Arab horse; but on the conclusion of peace he returned to India, and found that his own regiment, the 1st cavalry, had mutinied. Being thus at liberty, he made inquiry, and saw reason to believe that a corps of Eurasian horse might be raised on the spot; and he accordingly framed a scheme, by which each man was to receive forty rupees (£4) per month, nett pay; horse, arms, and accoutrements being furnished by government. The scheme was rejected, and Captain Beatson was informed that "the government had no need of his services." One month later, when the want of cavalry was

* Mead's *Sepoy Revolt*, p. 89.

† Sir Henry begged Lord Canning, on the 24th of May, to get "all the Goorkas from the hills;" but probably he referred to those under our own

rule, not to the Nepaulese.—Appendix to *Parl. Papers*, p. 315.

‡ *Ibid.*, p. 141.

§ Brock's *Havelock*, p. 141.

an acknowledged grievance, and the price of horses had risen enormously, the authorities were compelled to raise a corps on the basis of one hundred rupees per mensem for each trooper, who was not the less supplied with horse, arms, accoutrements, and camp equipage.*

That Captain Beatson was an officer of ability and character, is proved by his being selected by Brigadier-general Havelock for the highest position in his gift, that of adjutant-general. The government having at length issued their tardy orders, Havelock

and Beatson quitted Calcutta on the 23rd of June, leaving the entire population in a relapse of panic—that day being the centenary of Plassy; and there being a prophecy which the Mohammedans were asserted to have resolved on verifying—that the raj of the East India Company would then expire. As on a previous occasion, the day passed quietly; and both Europeans and natives having mutually anticipated violence, were, the *Friend of India* states, equally “rejoiced at finding their necks sound on the following morning.”

CHAPTER XIII.

AZIMGHUR, BENARES, JAUNPOOR, AND ALLAHABAD.—MAY AND JUNE, 1857.

It is necessary to return to the northward, and follow the course of mutiny in what General Havelock, in the letter lately quoted, terms the “disturbed provinces”—a very gentle phrase, inasmuch as the whole country to which he refers was at that time in a state of total disorganisation, the officers of government holding out in hourly peril of their lives or hiding, with their wives and babes, among the villagers or in the jungle; the native farmers and peasantry themselves pillaged and harassed by mutineers and dacoits; strife and oppression characterising the present state of things, with famine and pestilence brooding over the future.

Azimghur is the chief place of a district in the province of Allahabad, about fifty-six miles north-east of Benares. The headquarters and eight companies of the 17th N.I. were stationed here. There were no European soldiers. The commandant, Major Burroughs, was an experienced officer, proud of his regiment, but quite aware of the trial to which its fidelity would be exposed, and sedulously watchful to remove every temptation. Up to the 18th of May, the most favourable opinion was entertained of the 17th N.I.; and the judge of Azimghur, Mr. Astell, writing to its command-

ing officer, congratulated him on the great love and respect entertained for him personally.† Many sepoy, of various regiments, were in the Azimghur district. The 17th N.I. had been quartered with the 19th and 34th at Lucknow, in 1855; and when the latter regiments were disbanded (at Berhampoor and Barrackpoor), Major Burroughs, fearing the consequence of the renewal of intercourse between them and his own men, issued an order forbidding strangers to visit the lines without special permission. But as communication outside the cantonment could not be prevented, the major addressed his regiment, on the 20th of May, in forcible language. He spoke of his thirty years' connection with that corps; reminded the men that many of them had been enlisted by him during the twelve years he had filled the position of adjutant; and declared that they knew he had never misled or refused to listen to them. Unfortunately (considering the critical position of affairs), he concluded his address by requiring them to be ready to use the new cartridge—by tearing it, however, with their hands, not biting it with their teeth.

Previous to this parade, and, indeed, immediately after the reception of the Meerut intelligence, such measures as were practicable had been taken for the defence of the treasury (which contained £70,000), and for the protection of the ladies and

* *Mutiny of the Bengal Army*: by One who has served under Sir Charles Napier; p. 109.

† Report of Major Burroughs' Return of regiments which have mutinied.—Parl. Papers (Commons), 15th March, 1859; p. 25.

children. The Cutcherry and public offices had been partially enclosed by a breast-work, and "the post guns, under a select guard, had been placed at the treasury for its defence." On the 1st of June, two warnings were secretly and separately given, by a sepoy and a pay havildar, that the grenadiers were arming with the intent of attacking the treasury. The adjutant rode down to the lines, found all quiet, and the report was disbelieved. At sunset on the 3rd, the treasure was marched off towards Benares, by two companies of the 17th, and eighty of the 13th irregular cavalry, under Lieutenant Palliser, sent to Azimghur for that purpose.* It does not seem to have occurred to the officers that the measure was likely to produce excitement or dissatisfaction. According to the statement of one of these (Lieutenant Constable, 17th N.I.), they were all at mess, and had the ladies with them, when nine o'clock struck, and two muskets were fired on parade, evidently as a signal; then, "whirr went the drums—all knew that the regiment was in revolt." The Europeans rushed from the mess-room to the Cutcherry, placed the ladies on the top of it, and directed the gunners to prepare for service. The reply was an unqualified refusal to fire themselves, or let any one fire on their countrymen. The mutineers approached with deafening shouts. The officers went to meet them. There was an interval of intense anxiety; but it was soon over. The men "behaved with romantic courtesy. They formed a square round their officers, and said they not only would not touch, but would protect them, only that there were some of the mutineers who had sworn the death of particular officers; therefore they begged the whole party to take to their carriages, and be off at once. 'But how are we to get to our carriages,' said the Europeans, 'seeing that they are scattered all through the station?' 'Ah! we will fetch them,' replied the sepoys. And so they did; and gave the party an escort for ten miles out of the station, on the road to Ghazipoor,"† which place (forty miles from Azimghur) the fugitives reached quite unmolested. The only blood shed was

that of Quartermaster Hutchinson, who was deliberately shot down by a sepoy.

The doors of the gaol were opened, and about 800 prisoners let loose to plunder the deserted European dwellings, and then to band themselves together as dacoits, and infest the country districts. The gaol and treasury guards, and the Native artillerymen with the two guns, went off with the 17th N.I., in pursuit of the treasure escort, which was soon overtaken. The two companies of the 17th immediately fraternised with the mutineers, who seized the treasure. The Irregulars would not act against their countrymen, neither would they join them, despite the temptation of sharing the plunder: on the contrary, they rallied round their officers, and brought them safely to Benares. There were in Azimghur, as in almost every other scene of mutiny, Eurasians and native Christians who were left at the mercy of the mutineers; while the Europeans, especially of the higher class, having carriages and horses, money and influence, with a numerous retinue of servants, were able to effect their escape. No English missionary was stationed here; but there was a flourishing school under the charge of Timothy Luther, a native Christian of experience, ability, and piety. Mr. Tucker took great interest both in the school and schoolmaster; and it is said that, after the mutiny, he and his family were brought away from Azimghur, where they had lain concealed, "by an escort kindly dispatched from Benares."‡ A temporarily successful attempt was made, by a private person, for the reoccupation and maintenance of the station. Mr. Venables, a wealthy indigo-planter (one of the European "interlopers" for whom the East India Company had small respect), possessed a large estate at Doorie Ghaut, twenty-two miles on the Goruckpoor side of Azimghur. He had, from the nature of his occupation, great influence with the respectable and industrious portion of the agricultural community, who had all to lose, and nothing to gain, from an irruption of revolted mercenaries and escaped convicts. The natives cheerfully rallied round him: he procured arms for their use, marched at their head, and reoccupied Azimghur, which the mutineers had already deserted. A detachment of one hundred men of the 65th N.I., and fifty of the 12th irregular cavalry, were sent to support him; and with these he held his position for some weeks, as a flood-gate against the waves of

* Report of Brigadier J. Christie.—*Parl. Papers* (Commons), 15th March, 1859; p. 23.

† Statement of Lieutenant Constable.—*Times*, August 6th, 1857.

‡ Rev. M. A. Sherring's *Indian Church during the Great Rebellion*, p. 283.

mutiny; collecting the revenue, and maintaining a certain degree of order.

Benares—the famous seat of Brahminical lore, the holy city of the Hindoos, dear to them as Mecca to the Moslem—occupies an elevated position on a curve of the Ganges, 460 miles from Calcutta, and eighty-three from Allahabad. Its ancient name was *Casi*, or “the splendid,” which it still retains. It was also called *Varanashi*, from two streams, *Vara* and *Nashi*; so termed in Sanscrit: the Mohammedans pronounced the word “*Benares*,” a corruption followed by the English. Benares is full of structures, which are as finger-posts, marking the various phases of Indian history. They stand peculiarly secure; for the Hindoos assert that no earthquake is ever felt within the limits of the hallowed city. The temple to *Siva* tells of the palmy days of Brahminism; the ruins of a once world-famous observatory, attest the devotion to science of *Rajah Jey Sing*, of *Jeypoor*; and the mosque built by *Aurangzebe*, on the spot where a Hindoo temple had been razed to the ground by his orders, remains in evidence of the only persecutor of his dynasty, and the ruler whose united ambition and bigotry increased the superstructure of his empire, but irreparably injured its foundation.

A few miles distant stands a more interesting, and probably more ancient, monument than even *Siva's* temple. It is the *Sara Nath*—a solid mass of masonry, from forty to fifty feet in diameter, originally shaped like a bee-hive, and supposed to be a Buddhistic structure. Then there is the public college for Hindoo literature, instituted during the residency of the easy, kind-hearted scholar, *Jonathan Duncan* (the “*Brahminised Englishman*,” as *Macintosh* called him), afterwards governor of *Bombay*. Teachers of Hindoo and Mohammedan law and literature abound. The former trust habitually for their support to the voluntary contributions of pilgrims of rank, and to stipends allowed them by different Hindoo and Mahratta princes. They do not impart religious instruction for money, owing to the prevailing idea that the *Vedas*, their sacred books, would be profaned by being used for the obtaining of pecuniary advantage.

The population of Benares was estimated at about 300,000, of whom four-fifths were Hindoos. It included a considerable number of ex-royal families and disinherited jaghire-

dars. Altogether, the city seemed as well calculated to be a hotbed of disaffection for the Hindoos, as *Delhi* had proved for the Mohammedans. If a fear of conversion to Christianity had been a deep-rooted, popular feeling, it would surely have found expression here. The commissioner, *Henry Carre Tucker*, was a man who desired the promulgation of the Gospel above every other object in life. The Benares citizens knew this well; but they also knew that his views were incompatible with the furtherance of any project for the forcible or fraudulent violation of caste. He was one of those whose daily life bore witness to a pure and self-denying creed; and refuted, better than volumes of proclamations could have done, the assertions of *Nana Sahib* and his followers, that the so-called Christians were cow-killing, pig-eating infidels, without religion themselves, and with no respect for that of others. In his public capacity, *Mr. Tucker* had been singularly just, patient, and painstaking; and his private character, in its peacefulness, its unimpeachable morality, and its abounding charity, peculiarly fitted him for authority in a city the sanctity of which was jealously watched by the Hindoos. When the mutiny broke out, he found his reward in the power of usefulness, insured to him by his hold on the respect and affections of the people: and it is worthy of remark, that while so many civilians perished revolver in hand, the very man who “had never fired a shot in his life, and had not a weapon of any kind in the house,”* escaped with his female relatives and young children uninjured.

In May, 1857, there were at Benares the 37th N.I., an irregular cavalry regiment of *Seiks* from *Loodiana*, and about thirty European artillerymen. Some excitement was manifested in the lines of the 37th, on learning what had occurred at *Meerut* and *Delhi*; but this apparently subsided. *Mr. Tucker*, however, urged on the government the necessity of having “a nucleus of Europeans” at Benares, and 150 of H.M. 10th foot were sent thither from *Dinapoor*. On the 23rd of May, the commissioner reported to the Supreme government—“Every thing perfectly quiet, both in the lines and city of Benares, and in the whole Benares division; and likely, with God's blessing, to continue so. I am quite easy and confident.”† The position of affairs continued

* *Times*, August 18th, 1857.

† Appendix to Parl. Papers on Mutiny, p. 314.

equally satisfactory until the 3rd of June, when Colonel Neil arrived with a detachment of the 1st Madras Fusiliers. Sixty men of that regiment, with three officers, had reached Benares on the previous day, and four companies were on the road. Colonel Neil was a man of extraordinary energy and determination; but these predominant qualities naturally inclined him to act on general conclusions, with little regard for the peculiarities of the case in point, or for any opinion that differed from his own. Such, at least, is the impression which a review of the public documents regarding his brief career in North-Western India, is calculated to produce; and if the evidence of his coadjutors may be trusted, "the fiery Neil," despite his courage, his honesty, and, above all, his anxiety for the besieged at Cawnpore, was instrumental in lighting flames which he was compelled to stay and extinguish at the cost of leaving Sir Hugh Wheeler and his companions to perish. The charge is a very serious one. It is brought by Major-general Lloyd, not as a personal attack, but indirectly against "the military authorities at Benares;" for proceedings which "caused the instant revolt of the 6th regiment at Allahabad, on the 6th of June, and at Fyzabad on the 8th of June."* The responsibility of that policy is declared by Colonel Neil himself to have been his own, he having taken his measures not only without consulting the civil authorities, but by overruling the judgment of the officer commanding at the station, Brigadier Ponsonby.† In fact, from the very outset, Colonel Neil (a Madras officer) manifested a defiant distrust of every regiment of the Bengal army, and evinced very little desire to protect the unoffending agricultural population of the districts through which he passed, from the aggressions of his soldiers and camp-followers. In former wars, it had been the proudest boast of our generals, that the villagers never fled from British troops, but were eager to bring them supplies, being assured of protection and liberal payment. Colonel Wilks, in contrasting the campaigns conducted by Mohammedan conquerors, with those of Cornwallis, Lake, and Wellesley, dwells forcibly on the misery inflicted by the former, and revealed by the existence of the well-known phrase *Wulsa*, which signified the departure of the entire

population of a village, or even of a district; children, the aged and the sick, being borne off to take shelter in the nearest woods or jungles, braving hunger and wild beasts sooner than the presence of an armed force. Great loss of life invariably attended these migrations, which were especially frequent in Mysore in the days of Hyder Ali. The Indian despatches of General Wellesley testify, in almost every dozen pages, to the unceasing forethought with which he strove to maintain a good understanding with the population: and any one who will compare the manner in which his troops were fed and sheltered, with the suffering endured in the campaign of 1857, before the arrival of Sir Colin Campbell, will understand that the indiscriminate burning of villages, and the pillaging of "niggers," was the most costly amusement Europeans in India could indulge in.

Colonel Neil commenced the expedition with what the newspapers called an "example of *zubberdustee*—the phrase for small tyrannies." The term, however, is not fairly applicable to an act which was, in the best sense of the word, expedient, though it seems to have been accompanied with needless discourtesy. While he was preparing to enter the railway with a detachment of Madras Fusiliers, intending to proceed from Calcutta to Rancegunge, one of the officials said that the train was already behind time, and if the men could not be got into the carriages in two or three minutes, they would be left behind. Colonel Neil, without making any reply, ordered a file of men to take his informant into custody. "The man shouted for assistance; and the stokers, guards, and station-master crowded round to see what was the matter, and were each in turn stuck up against the wall, with a couple of bearded red-coats standing sentry over them. The colonel next took possession of the engine; and by this series of strong measures, delayed the departure of the train until the whole of his men were safely stowed away in the carriages." The *Friend of India* related this instance of martial law with warm approbation; adding—"We would back that servant of the Company as being equal to an emergency."‡ Of the details of Neil's march little has been related. He has been frequently compared to "an avenging

* Letter from Major-general Lloyd to his brother, the Rev. A. J. Lloyd, Sept. 3rd, 1857.—*Daily News*, October 30th, 1857.

† Colonel Neil to Adjutant-general.—*Parl. Papers*, p. 57.

‡ Mead's *Sepoy Revolt*, p. 125.

angel;" and his track was marked by desolation; for Havelock's force, in its subsequent advance, found the line of road almost deserted by the villagers, who had dismantled their dwellings,* and fled with their little property. Colonel Neil reached Benares, as has been stated, on the 3rd of June. He had intended starting with a detachment for Cawnpoor on the following afternoon; but shortly before the appointed time, intelligence was received from Lieutenant Palliser, of the outbreak which had taken place at Azimghur; and, as usual, the affair was greatly exaggerated, four officers being described as killed.† Brigadier Ponsonby consulted with Colonel Neil regarding the state of the Native troops at Benares. The Sikhs, and the 13th Native cavalry, were believed to be staunch, but doubts were entertained of the 37th N.I.; and the brigadier proposed that, on the following morning, their muskets should be taken away, leaving them their side-arms. The colonel urged immediate disarmament: the brigadier gave way; and the two officers parted to make the necessary arrangements. At 5 P.M., Neil was on the ground with 150 of H.M. 10th, and three officers; sixty of the Madras Fusiliers, and three officers; three guns and thirty men. At this time no intimation had been received by any officer, of the corps being disposed to mutiny: on the contrary, Lieutenant-colonel Spottiswoode, the commanding officer of the 13th, declares that his European non-commissioned staff, "observed nothing doubtful in the conduct of the men;" but that, "up to the very last moment, every man was most obedient and civil to all authorities."‡ The brigadier came on parade at the appointed hour; but Neil observed, that "he appeared far from well, and perfectly unable to act with energy, or the vigour required on the emergency."§ The account given by the colonel of the ensuing proceedings is too long for quotation, and too general and confused to afford materials for a summary of facts. With regard to his assuming the lead, he says he did so after the firing commenced, by desire of the brigadier, who "was on his back on the ground, seemingly struck by a stroke of the sun, and declared himself

quite unfit for anything."|| Between the incapacity of one commander, and the vigour of the other, the sepoys were driven wild with panic, and the European officers nearly killed by the hands of their own countrymen. Brigadier Ponsonby's private letter recounting the affair, was published by his friends in the *Times*, in vindication of that officer's "foresight and judgment." He does not mention having consulted with Neil at all; but speaks of "Colonel Gordon, my second in command," as having advised the immediate disarmament of the 37th foot; to which the brigadier adds—"After some discussion, I agreed. We had no time (it being between 4 and 5 P.M.) to lose, and but little arrangement could be made (fortunately)." There is no explanation given why the haste and disorder which characterised the proceedings should be termed fortunate. The personal feelings of the military authorities towards one another could not be so called. Ponsonby expressly asserts that he conducted the entire disarmament; and takes credit for the panic inspired "by the suddenness of our attack." "Something very like a *coup de soleil*" obliged him, he says, "to make over the command to the next senior officer, but not until everything was quiet."¶ This statement is, of course, in direct opposition to Neil's assertion, that, during the crisis, the brigadier was "on his back," utterly prostrate in mind and body. A perusal of the official reports of the various subordinate officers, and of the private Indian correspondence of the time, concerning this single case, would well repay any reader desirous of obtaining an insight into the actual working of our military system in India in 1857. Incidental revelations are unwittingly made, which, though of no interest to the general reader, are invaluable to those whose duty it is to provide, as far as may be, against the recurrence of so awful a calamity as the mutiny of the Bengal army. There are other accounts of the affair—a private and circumstantial, but clear one, by Ensign Tweedie, who was dangerously wounded on the occasion; and an official one by Lieutenant-colonel Spottiswoode. Young Tweedie has no leaning to the sepoys; but as the

* *Journal of an English Officer in India*: by Major North, 60th Rifles; p. 13.

† Appendix to Parl. Papers, 1857; p. 372.

‡ Parliamentary Return of regiments which have mutinied (15th March, 1859); p. 28.

§ Lieutenant-colonel Neil to Adjutant-general, June 6th, 1857.—Parl. Papers on Mutiny, p. 57.

|| *Ibid.*, p. 57.

¶ Letter from Brigadier Ponsonby; Benares, June 13th, 1857—*Times*, August 18th, 1857.

Meerut authorities considered that their blunder had been the salvation of India, so he thought that, "although the sepoys might have been quietly disbanded, the mistake that provoked the row was a most fortunate one." The disarming, he believes, "might have been effected in perfect peace and quietness, had it been gone about in a less abrupt and threatening manner." The 37th were drawn up in front of their lines, with the cannon pointed at them. The Europeans were posted within musket range, and the Seiks and irregular cavalry within sight. The 37th, seeing themselves hemmed in with musketry and artillery, naturally suspected that they were to be blown to pieces; and all the assurances of their officers proved insufficient to keep them composed. They were ordered to put their muskets into the little stone buildings called kotes, or bells. The majority of their number obeyed at once, and European soldiers were then marched towards the bells of arms, with the view of securing them from any attempt which the sepoys might make to recover them. This movement accelerated the crisis. Ensign Tweedie states—

"The sepoys were beforehand with the Europeans, and, making a sudden rush at the bells of arms, recovered their muskets, and fired at once upon their own officers and upon the advancing Europeans, retiring at the same time within their lines, and thence keeping up a brisk fire upon the Europeans. Up to this time, however, no officer had been hit. The sepoys of the 37th ensconced themselves for the most part behind their huts, some of them behind the bells of arms. The majority of their officers had fallen back at once upon the European column. Major Barrett, however, indignant at the way in which what he believed to be good sepoys had been dealt with, resolved, as he told them, to share their fate, and, along with the European sergeant-major, remained exposed to the fire opened from the half-battery, as also from the European musketry upon the huts. But the sepoys' worst blood was up, and several of their number fired upon him, others attacking him with their fixed bayonets. He was compelled to flee for his life, and a guard of faithful sepoys (principally of the grenadier company) having formed round his person, conducted him in safety to his bungalow in the cantonments. The sergeant-major also was saved by the same faithful escort. In the meantime, Captain Guise, of the 13th Irregulars, was only leaving his bungalow, and rashly attempted to reach the parade-ground, where his troop was drawn up, by riding through the lines of the 37th N.I. His chest was positively riddled with bullets in the attempt. Of course, his death was instantaneous.

"The sepoys still kept up a smart fire upon the scanty Europeans, who were labouring under the great disadvantage of having to deal with an enemy effectually secured behind their huts from obser-

vation. The officers of the 37th were posted with the European musketry, and were exposed, of course, to a smart fire. Several privates were knocked over within five yards of me, and yet not a single officer got touched. For about twenty minutes we remained under this fire. But our brave fellows began to drop off rather fast, and accordingly it was resolved to charge the huts. As a preliminary to this, a party was dispatched to set them on fire; and in the meantime, we officers of the 37th retired, and took our place beside the Seiks, who, we understood, were to take part in the charge. They form an irregular corps, and have only two officers attached to them—viz., a commandant (Colonel Gordon) and an adjutant. As both of these were mounted, there was need of our services in the ranks.

"Here I remained for about ten minutes, in the momentary expectation of the charge being ordered. The brigade-major, Captain Dodgson, then galloped across the parade-ground, and, placing himself at the head of the irregular cavalry, informed them that their commandant, Captain Guise, had been killed, and that he had been sent by Brigadier Ponsonby to supply his place. They flashed their swords in reply, giving vent, at the same time, to a low murmur, which struck me as somewhat equivocal. Captain Dodgson had scarce ceased addressing them when one of their number fired upon him with a pistol. The bullet only grazed the elbow of his sword arm, just at that point where the ulnar nerve passing over a process of bone is so easily irritated as to have gained for that piece of bone the common name of 'funny-bone.' The consequence was complete paralysis of the hand and arm; his sword dropped powerless across his saddle, and the rascal who had fired the shot rushed upon him to cut him down, but another of the troop interfered to rescue him, and, being well mounted, he succeeded in escaping from the *mêlée*."

These particulars are very striking, narrated as they are by a youth evidently possessed of unusual powers of observation, and on whose mind a scene so novel and exciting would naturally make a lively impression. One point, however, he has possibly mistaken; for an officer of the 13th, writing to inform the widow of Captain Guise of her bereavement, says—"Your dear husband was at his post, as he ever was; and, at the head of his regiment, he entered vigorously on the work of cutting up the rebels. His horse being fleetier than those of his men, he got in advance, and was only followed by Mix Bund Khan, an Afghan. Your husband followed a 37th rebel closely, and came up with him in the Sudder Bazaar, where the miscreant turned round, and fired his musket." The writer proceeds to say that the horse was wounded, and fell; that Captain Guise vainly strove to reach the sepoy with his sword, being

* Ensign Tweedie's Letter.—*Times*, August 25th, 1857.

entangled with the trappings of the fallen horse; that his follower "did his best to get at the man, but, owing to the narrow position they were in, he could not manage it;" and the mutineer found time to reload his musket, and shoot the officer through the heart. The Afghan trooper attempted to follow the perpetrators of the foul deed; but, owing to the intricacies of the place, they quickly escaped. "More than one sepoy came up before the deed of death was completed, and they are also implicated, perhaps, in the murder."* The statement of the unfortunate officer's having got in advance of his men in attacking the 37th, rests on the authority of a brother officer, and would be received without hesitation, but for strong contradictory evidence. The remaining portion of the narrative is highly improbable. Captain Guise would hardly have been so rash as to follow a single rebel into the Sudder Bazaar, leaving the regiment which he commanded to mutiny in his absence. Besides, Ensign Tweedie's assertion of the captain's chest being riddled with bullets, is confirmed by the official record of casualties, which describes the body as bearing the marks of "gunshot wounds in head, chest, abdomen, and both arms; and two very deep sabre-cuts on left side of the head."

Colonel Neil's statement is most positive. He asserts that Captain Guise "was killed before reaching parade, by the men of the 37th N.I."† The circumstance is of some importance, because the death or absence of their leader had evident influence with the irregular cavalry: moreover, the relatives of Captain Guise have publicly repudiated a statement which they consider calculated to injure his reputation.

When Guise fell, Brigadier Ponsonby directed Captain Dodgson to assume command of the 13th.‡ He was, as has been shown, immediately fired on by a trooper, and the others then broke into revolt. At the same moment, the Seiks, who had been watching the Europeans as they knelt and fired into the 37th, suddenly dashed forward, and rushed madly on the guns. A corporal of H.M. 10th writes home—"The Seik regiment turned on the artillery; but you never saw such a sight in

your life: they were mowed down, and got several rounds of grapeshot into them when out of our range."§ In a very short space of time, the whole body of the mutineers, 37th foot, 13th cavalry, and Loodiana Seiks, were dispersed with great slaughter.

A civilian (Mr. Spencer) who was present, says—"The sum total was, that the 37th were utterly smashed, and the Seiks and cavalry frightened out of their wits." He adds—"Many of the officers are furious, and say we have been shedding innocent blood; and the whole thing was a blunder."||

Major-general Lloyd asserts, in the most unqualified terms, "that though the men of the 37th had lodged their arms in their bells of arms, they were fired on with grape and musketry; the Seiks present, and most of the 13th irregular cavalry, joined them in resisting the attack, and it was everywhere stigmatised as 'Feringhee ka Dag-hah.'"¶

Colonel Spottiswoode offers evidence to the same effect, in his narrative of his own proceedings during the *émeute*. Writing on the 11th of March, 1858, he states—

"Up to this moment I am still not convinced that the 414 sepoys that stood on parade, and near 400 on detached duty on the afternoon of the 4th June, 1857, were all mutinous, or were not well-disposed towards government; and from what I have since heard from the men that are with the regiment now, that the evil-disposed did not amount to 150; for when I called on the men to lodge their arms in their bells of arms, I commenced with the grenadiers; and so readily were my orders attended to, that in a very short time I had got down as far as No. 6 company, and was talking to one man who appeared to be in a very mutinous mood; so much so, that I was just debating in my own mind whether I should shoot him, as I was quite close, and had my pistol in my pocket: I was disturbed by some of the men, for there were two or three voices calling out, 'Our officers are deceiving us; they want us to give up our arms, that the Europeans who are coming up may shoot us down.' I called out, 'It is false;' and I appealed to the Native officers, who have known me for upwards of thirty-three years, whether I ever deceived any man in the regiment; when many a voice replied, 'Never; you have always been a good father to us.' However, I saw the men were getting very excited at the approach of the Europeans, when I told them to keep quiet, and I would stop their advance; I galloped forward, and made signs to the party not to advance, calling out, 'Don't come on.' Fancying they had halted, I went

* Extract of letter published in the *Times*, September 3rd, 1857; by Mr. W. V. Guise, brother to the deceased officer.

† Colonel Neil's despatch, June 6th, 1857. ‡ *Ibid.*

§ Letter published in the *Times*, Sept. 11th, 1857.

|| *Ibid.*, August 10th, 1857.

¶ Extract of a letter from Major-general Lloyd.—*Daily News*, Oct. 30th, 1857.

back to the lines, and had only just got among my men, when I heard one solitary shot, followed immediately by two others in succession; those three were fired from the 37th lines, and from No. 2 company, and, as I afterwards heard, were fired by the pay havildar of 2nd company: immediately a rush was made at the bells of arms, which were opened by this man; a general fire commenced; while I and all my officers were in the lines among our men, without receiving any insult or molestation; indeed, many of the officers were surrounded and protected by the men of their respective companies, among whom the grenadiers were conspicuous."

Colonel Spottiswoode proceeds to state that, after the firing commenced, he succeeded in joining the guns and European detachment; and seeing there was no chance of clearing the lines by the present proceedings, he offered to fire them, which duty he performed by order of Brigadier Ponsonby, who, on his return, he found incapacitated by a sun-stroke. Spottiswoode then proceeded, with a party of Europeans, to scour the cantonments, and to bring in all the women and children to the Old Mint, a large building previously chosen for the purpose. No sign of mutiny was made by the Sciks on guard at the treasury. While Colonel Spottiswoode was gathering in the civilians and ladies, he had occasion to pass the regimental paymaster's office, where fourteen of his own men were on duty. They immediately rushed to him, and begged that he would enable them to protect the treasure committed to their charge. The colonel spoke a few words of encouragement, and proceeded on his immediate duty, which, having satisfactorily accomplished, he returned to the paymaster's compound, and there found the men in a state of extreme alarm and confusion; for they had been joined in the interim by a party of fugitives belonging to the 37th N.I., who had been burnt out of their lines, "and who seemed to think that our object was to destroy indiscriminately every sepoy we could come across." The result of a long conversation with these men, convinced the colonel that the majority of the men were entirely ignorant of the intentions of the turbulent characters, who were only a very small minority; and he declares, that even those who contrived to join Colonel Neil and the guns, expressed the same opinion as his own fugitive men, of surprise at the fire being opened on men who had surrendered their arms; saying—"You drove away all the good men who were anxious

to join their officers, but could not in consequence of the very heavy fire that was opened, and they only ran away for shelter." A further circumstance adduced by Colonel Spottiswoode is, that a company of the 37th, then on duty at the fort of Chunar, fifteen miles distant, remained there perfectly staunch for six months, at the expiration of which time they returned to headquarters.* After the Benares affair, a party of the men who remained with their officers were sent, under their tried friend Major Barrett, to join their comrades at Chunar.

The Europeans resident at Benares, of course, spent the night in great alarm, as there seemed every probability that the sepoys might return and blockade them. One of the party at the Mint says—

"We slept on the roof—ladies, children, ayas, and punkah coolies; officers lying down dressed, and their wives sitting up by them fanning them, gentlemen in the most fearless *dishabille*, sleeping surrounded by ladies. In the compound or enclosure below there is a little handful of Europeans—perhaps 150 altogether; others are at the barracks half a mile off. There is a large collection of carriages and horses; little bedsteads all over the place; and two circular quick-hedges, with flower-gardens inside, are falling victims to the sheep and goats which have been brought in to provision the place; add to this a heap of more beer-boxes than your English imagination can take in, and throw over all the strong black and white of a full moonlight, and you have the Mint as it looked when the English of Benares had sought refuge in it."†

This writer adds, that there was "a picnic, gipsified look about the whole affair," which rendered it difficult to realise the fact, that "the lives of the small congregation were upon the toss-up of the next events." Another witness says—"The choice of a sleeping-place lay between an awfully heated room and the roof. The commissioner slept with his family in a room, on slakedowns, with other families sleeping round them; and there, from night to night, they continued to sleep."‡ The terrible characteristics of war were, however, not long wanting, for the wounded and dying were soon brought in; and, from the window, the sight that greeted the eye was "a row of gallowses, on which the energetic colonel was hanging mutineer after

* Parliamentary Return regarding regiments which have mutinied: March 15th, 1859; p. 30.

† *Times*, August 10th, 1857.

‡ Letter of the Rev. James Kennedy.—*Times*, August 8th, 1857.

mutineer, as they were brought in.* Besides the casualties already noted, the assistant-surgeon and two men of H.M. 10th had been killed, and two ensigns and nine privates wounded. Young Tweedie was fetched from his bungalow in cantonments at two in the morning. He had dragged himself thither after being severely wounded, a bullet having gone clear through his shoulder and back; two others passing harmlessly through his forage-cap, and three through his trowsers, of which one only inflicted any injury, and that but slightly grazing the thigh.†

Towards daybreak on the morning of the 5th, when the wearied crowd huddled together at the Mint were falling asleep from sheer exhaustion, they were aroused by the news, "The magistrate has just been sent for—the city is rising." The kotwal had sent to ask aid: but the answer was, "Do your best; we cannot spare a man."‡ and he appears to have succeeded marvellously well in subduing the riots. The nominal rajah of Benares was the representative of the family reduced by Warren Hastings to the condition of stipendiaries, when, after taking possession of the city, the governor-general found himself in such imminent danger, that he was glad to fly by night to the fortress of Chunar.§ The present rajah, on leaving Benares, took refuge in Ramnagar—the fort and palace where Cheyte Sing, the last prince *de facto*, had been assaulted and slain in 1781. The Europeans at the Missionary College,|| being afraid to attempt reaching the Mint, fled to Ramnagar, where they were kindly received and sent on, under the escort of the rajah's sepoy guard, to Chunar.¶ All the natives of rank then in Benares appear to have been true to us; but one of them is mentioned by the judge (Mr. Frederick Gubbins) as having rendered essential service. Rajah Soorut Sing, a

Seik chieftain, under "a slight surveillance" at the time of the outbreak, went to the Seik guard stationed at the Mint, and, by his example and influence, prevented the men from rising against the civilians and ladies collected there, and seizing the treasure—amounting to about £60,000. A writer who enters very fully into the conduct of Mr. Gubbins at this crisis, and appears to possess private and direct information thereon, says, that the rajah's interference was most opportune; for "already the Seiks began to feel that they at least were capable of avenging their comrades; when Soorut Sing, going amongst them, pointed out to them that the attack must at all events have been unpremeditated, or the civilians would not have placed themselves and their families in their power."** The same authority pays a high and deserved tribute to the fidelity of the rajah of Benares; and likewise to that of another Hindoo, Rao Deo Narrain Sing, who, in addition to "great wealth and immense influence," possessed "strong sense and ability of no common order." "After the mutiny, the Rao and the Seik sirdar, Soorut Sing, actually lived in the same house with Mr. Gubbins. The former procured for us excellent spies, first-rate information, and placed all his resources (and they were great) at the service of our government." The rajah, "although not so personally active as the Rao, was equally liberal with his resources, which were even greater; and never, in our darkest hour, did he hang back from assisting us." The name of Mr. Gubbins was, it is said, a proverb for "swift stern justice;"†† and if that phrase is intended to bear the signification commonly attached to it by Europeans in India in the year of grace 1857, it seems certainly fortunate that there were some natives of influence to reason with their countrymen against the panic which a

* Letter from a clergyman, dated "Bangalore, July 4th."—*Times*, August 25th, 1857. The reverend gentleman, in another part of his communication, reverts to the "scores and scores of prisoners" whom the "indefatigable Colonel Neil" was hanging; and is anxious about the state of feeling in England, "lest there should be any squeamishness about the punishment in store for the brutal and diabolical mutineers."

† Ensign Tweedie's Letter (*Times*, August 25th, 1857); and Rev. James Kennedy's Letter.—*Times*, August 8th, 1857.

‡ Kennedy's Letter.—*Ibid.*

§ See *Indian Empire*, vol. i., p. 361.

|| There were eleven European missionary families

in Benares—six attached to the Church of England Mission, two to the London Mission, and three to the Baptist Mission. The aggregate property of these establishments amounted to upwards of £20,000.—Sherring's *Indian Church*, p. 251.

¶ Letter from the chief missionary in charge of the Benares College.—*Times*, August 6th, 1857.

** *Mutiny of the Bengal Army*: by One who has served under Sir C. Napier: p. 90. The Europeans afterwards subscribed £100 to present Soorut Sing with a set of fire-arms.—Statements of Mr. John Gubbins, on the authority of his brother at Benares.—*Times*, September 2nd, 1857.

†† Rev. James Kennedy.—*Times*, August 21st, 1857.

newly erected row of gibbets (three separate gibbets, with three ropes to each)* was calculated to produce. The people of Benares are described, in the correspondence of the period, as "petrified with fear of our soldiers being let loose on them." Martial law was speedily proclaimed; and on the 29th of June, the Rev. James Kennedy writes—"Scarcely a day passed without some poor wretches being hurled into eternity. Such is the state of things here, that even fine delicate ladies may be heard expressing their joy at the vigour with which the miscreants are dealt with."† The number of sepoy killed on the night of the 4th has not been estimated,‡ neither is there any record of the number of natives executed on the scaffold, or destroyed by the far more barbarous process of burning down villages, in which the sick and aged must often have fallen victims, or escaped to perish, in utter destitution, by more lingering pangs. The dread of the European soldiers, which seized on the people in consequence of the occurrences of the 4th of June, was viewed as most salutary; and the writer last quoted (a clergyman), remarks, that the natives "think them, the European soldiers, demons in human form; and to this opinion our safety is in a degree traceable."

The Europeans at Benares were reinforced by detachments of the 78th Highlanders, a regiment which, from the strangeness of its costume, created great excitement among the natives.

On the 22nd of June, a report was received that a body of mutineers were encamped about thirty miles from the city. On the evening of the 26th, a force consisting of 200 of the 78th Highlanders, the Loodiana regiment, and thirty troopers of the 13th, were sent from Benares in search of them. One of the party, in narrating the expedition, writes—"The rascals, of course, fled for life on the approach of the gallant Highlanders. You will, however, be gratified to learn, that twenty-four of the rebels were cut up by the cavalry and infantry, twenty-three caught and hung on the spot, twenty villages razed to the ground, and from forty to fifty villagers flogged, in order to cool their thieving propensities. A few days before the detachment left, the magis-

trate offered a reward of 1,000 rupees for the head or person of the leader of the rebels, who is well known to the natives."

The villagers did not betray the rebel leader. Indeed, it is remarkable how rarely, in the case of either Europeans or natives, they ever earned "blood-money," even though habitually wretchedly poor, and now almost starving, in consequence of the desolation wrought by the government and insurgent forces. The leader was, nevertheless, captured by the troops, and "hung up on a tree, to keep nine others company that had been hung there the same morning." The Europeans returned to camp "in high spirits."§ The newly arrived soldiers, however, who had not been accustomed to such warfare, had not had their houses burned, and were accustomed to view their lives as held on a precarious tenure, did not set about the task of destruction with quite such unalloyed satisfaction as is displayed in the correspondence of the civil amateurs. There is a lengthy, but most graphic, account of the early experience of a Highlander, which will not bear condensing or abstracting. Perhaps with the exception of Mowbray Thomson's *Story of Cawnpoor*, nothing more touching in its simplicity has been written regarding any scene of the mutiny.

Few can read the Highlander's narrative without remembering that he and his detachment ought (if all concerned had done their duty) to have been already at Cawnpoor, instead of starting, on the very evening of that fatal 27th of June, on such an expedition as he describes.

The hanging and the flogging, the blood-money and the burning villages; the old man "trying to trail out a bed" from his cottage, at the risk of perishing in the flames; the group of young children standing in the midst of a little courtyard, the decrepit man and aged woman, the young mother in a hot fever, with a babe "five or six hours old," wrapped in her bosom; all waiting together till the fire should consume them, and end their hopeless, helpless misery—these and other cases (of which there must have been hundreds unrecorded), are surely enough to quench the thirst for vengeance in any human breast, or at least to prove the necessity of striving to mitigate, not increase, the miseries of intestine strife;

* *Times*, August 21st, 1857.

† *Ibid.*

‡ The clergyman, whose letter, dated "Bangalore, July 4th," has been recently quoted, states, on the authority of an officer engaged in the Benares affair,

that 100 of the Madras Fusiliers, under Colonel Neil, killed 650 of the mutineers.—*Times*, August 25th, 1857.

§ Letter dated "Benares, June 29th, 1857."

remembering ever, that even without the cruel aggravation of village-burning, every outcast sepoy was punished many times over in his starving family.

"We arrived at Benares on the 25th of June, a distance of 421 miles, in eight days and nine nights. On the evening of the 27th of June, there were 240 of the 78th (I was one of them), 100 of the Seiks, and 30 of the sowars—that is, Native cavalry—went out of Benares in carts, except the horsemen. At 3 o'clock P.M., next day, we were divided in three lots to scour the country. The division I was in went to a village, which was deserted. We set fire to it and burned it to the ground. We were coming back, when a gentleman came to us, and said, that a village over about two miles was full of them, and they were drawn up to give us battle. We marched, or rather ran to them; we got within 300 yards of them, when they ran. We fired after them, and shot eight of them. We were going to the village, when a man came running out to us, and up with his hand and saluted our officer. We shouted, that he was a sepoy, and to seize him. He was taken, and about twelve more. We came back to the carts on the road, and an old man came to us, and wanted to be paid for the village we had burned. We had a magistrate with us, who found he had been harbouring the villains and giving them arms and food. Five minutes settled it; the sepoy and the man that wanted money were taken to the roadside, and hanged to a branch of a tree. We lay on the road all night beside the two men hanging. Next morning, we got up and marched some miles through the fields, the rain pouring down in torrents. We came to another village, set fire to it, and came back to the road. During this time the other divisions were not idle. They had done as much as us. When we came back, the water was running in at our necks, and coming out at our heels. There were about eighty prisoners; six were hung that day, and about sixty of them flogged. After that, the magistrate said that there was a Holdar that he would give 2,000 rupees to get, dead or alive. We slept on the road that night, and the six men hanging beside us. At 5 o'clock P.M. the bugle sounded 'fall-in.' The rain came down in torrents. We fell-in, and off we marched, up to the knees in clay and water. We came to a village and set it on fire. The sun came out, and we got dry; but we soon got wet again with sweat. We came to a large village, and it was full of people. We took about 200 of them out, and set fire to it. I went in, and it was all in flames. I saw an old man trying to trail out a bed. He was not able to walk, far less to carry out the cot. I ordered him out of the village, and pointed to the flames, and told him, as well as I could, that if he did not he would be burned. I took the cot, and dragged him out. I came round a corner of a street or lane, and could see nothing but smoke and flames. I stood for a moment to think which way I should go. Just as I was looking round, I saw the flames bursting out of the walls of a house, and, to my surprise, observed a little boy, about four years old, looking out at the door. I pointed the way out to the old man, and told him if he did not go I would shoot him. I then rushed to the house I saw the little boy at. The door was by that time in flames. I thought not of myself, but of the poor helpless child. I rushed in;

and after I got in, there was a sort of square, and all round this were houses, and they were all in flames; and instead of seeing the helpless child, I beheld six children from eight to two years old, an old dotal woman, an old man, not able to walk without help, and a young woman, about twenty years old, with a child wrapped up in her bosom. I am sure the child was not above five or six hours old. The mother was in a hot fever. I stood and looked; but looking at that time would not do. I tried to get the little boys to go away, but they would not. I took the infant; the mother would have it; so I gave it back. I then took the woman and her infant in my arms to carry her and her babe out. The children led the old woman and old man. I took the lead, knowing they would follow. I came to a place that it was impossible to see whereabouts I was, for the flames. I dashed through, and called on the others to follow. After a hard struggle, I got them all safe out, but that was all. Even coming through the fire, part of their clothes, that did not cover half of their body, was burned. I set them down in the field, and went in at another place. I saw nothing but flames all round. A little further I saw a poor old woman trying to come out. She could not walk; she only could creep on her hands and feet. I went up to her, and told her I would carry her out; but no, she would not allow me to do it; but, when I saw it was no use to trifle with her, I took her up in my arms and carried her out. I went in at the other end, and came across a woman about twenty-two years old. She was sitting over a man that, to all appearance, would not see the day out. She was wetting his lips with some *siste*. The fire was coming fast, and the others all round were in flames. Not far from this I saw four women. I ran up to them, and asked them to come and help the sick man and woman out; but they thought they had enough to do; and so they had, poor things; but, to save the woman and the dying man, I drew my bayonet, and told them if they did not I would kill them. They came, carried them out, and laid them under a tree. I left them. To look on, any one would have said that the flames were in the clouds. When I went to the other side of the village, there were about 140 women and about sixty children, all crying and lamenting what had been done. The old woman of that small family I took out, came to me, and I thought she would have kissed the ground I stood on. I offered them some biscuit I had for my day's rations; but they would not take it; it would break their caste, they said. The assembly sounded, and back I went with as many blessings as they could pour out on anything nearest their heart. Out of the prisoners that were taken, the man for whom the 2,000 rupees were offered was taken by us for nothing. We hanged ten of them on the spot, and flogged a great many—about sixty. We burned another village that night. Oh, if you had seen the ten march round the grove, and seen them looking the same as if nothing was going to happen to them! There was one of them fell; the rope broke, and down he came. He rose up, and looked all around; he was hung up again. After they were hanged, all the others were taken round to see them. Then we came marching back to the carts. Left Benares on the 6th of July, or rather the night of the 5th. We had to turn out and lie with our belts on. On the 6th we, numbering 180, went out against 2,000. We came up close to them; they were drawn up in three lines; it looked too many

for us; but on we dashed, and in a short time they began to run. We set fire to a large village that was full of them; we surrounded it, and as they came rushing out of the flames, shot them. We took eighteen of them prisoners; they were all tied together, and we fired a volley at them and shot them on the spot. We came home that night, after marching twenty miles, and fighting nearly thirty to one. In this country, we are told that we had killed 500 of them: our loss was one man and one horse killed, and one man and one horse wounded."

The news of the disarmed 37th having been fired into by the European artillery, told as it probably was with exaggeration, and without mention of the mutinous conduct of a portion of the regiment, spread rapidly among the Native troops at the neighbouring stations, and placed a new weapon in the hands of the plotting and discontented, by rendering it more easy for them to persuade their well-disposed but credulous comrades, that the breach between them and the English could never be healed, and that their disbandment and probable destruction was only a question of time and opportunity. At Allahabad the effect was sudden and terrible, and likewise at the intermediate post of Jaunpoor.

Jaunpoor is the chief place of a district of the same name, acquired by the East India Company in 1775. It stands on the banks of the river Goomtee, 35 miles north-west from Benares, and 55 miles north-east from Allahabad. There is a large stone fort here, which has been used for a prison. The cantonment, situated at the east of the town, was on the 5th of June, 1857, held by a detachment of the Loodiana Seiks from Allahabad, 169 in number, with a single European officer, Lieutenant Mara.

As Brigadier Gordon declared of the regiment at Benares, so with the detachment at Jaunpoor; the loyalty of the men had "never been suspected by any one, civil or military."* The officer in command at Benares (Glasse), declares that the European guns were turned on the Loodiana corps, without its having given one token of mutiny; that the lives of several officers were in the power of the men, and nothing would have been easier than to shoot them, had the regiment been actuated by a mutinous spirit; but that with the exception of one

man, who fired at Colonel Gordon, and whose shot was received in the arm by a faithful havildar (Chur Sing, who risked his life in the defence of his officer), no such attempt was made. It will be evident, he adds, that after grape had once been poured into the regiment, it would be almost excusable if some men, though conscious of the innocence and rectitude of their own intentions, should be hurried into the belief that the government, conceiving the whole native race actuated by the same spirit of treachery, had resolved to deal the same punishment to all.†

There is reason to believe, that the sole and simple motive of the *émeute* at Jaunpoor, was a conviction that the British had betrayed, at Benares, their resolve to exterminate the entire Bengal army at the first convenient opportunity, without distinction of race or creed—regular or irregular, Hindoo or Mohammedan, Seik or Poorbahl. A similar report had nearly occasioned a Goorka mutiny at Simla, and was counteracted with extreme difficulty. It is possible, that had a true and timely account of what had taken place at Benares been received at Jaunpoor, Lieutenant Mara would have been enabled to explain away, at least to some extent, the exaggerated accounts which were sure to find circulation in the native lines. No such warning was given. A bazaar report reached the residents, on the 4th of June, that the troops at Azimghur had mutinied on the previous evening. On the following morning there was no post from Benares; and about eight o'clock, three Europeans rode in from the Bubcha factory, two miles and a-half from Jaunpoor, stating that the factory had been attacked by a party of the 37th mutineers, and that they had made their escape through a shower of bullets. Mr. Cæsar, the head-master of the Mission school,‡ said to Lieutenant Mara, "The 37th are upon us." The officer replied, "What have we to fear from the 37th; our own men will keep them off."§ The Europeans and Eurasians assembled together in the Cutcherry, and the Seiks were placed under arms, awaiting the arrival of the mutineers; until, about noon, news arrived, that after plundering and burning

* Return of regiments which have mutinied, p. 33.

† *Ibid.*, p. 32.

‡ The Church Missionary Society had a station at Jaunpoor, under the superintendence of the Rev. C. Reuther. They supported a church and five schools, with about 600 scholars in all. The

majority of the people of Jaunpoor were Mohammedans; and the conversions are always more rare among them, than among the Hindoos, notwithstanding the barrier of caste.

§ Letter from a gentleman in charge of the Missionary College at Benares.—*Times*, Aug. 6th, 1857.

the Bubcha factory, they had gone along the Lucknow road. The Europeans did not quit the Cutcherry; but being relieved from immediate apprehension, they ordered dinner, and made other arrangements. "About half-past two," Mr. Cæsar writes, "Lieutenant Mara, myself, and some others, were in the verandah, when, as I was giving orders to a servant, a shot was fired, and on looking round, I saw that poor Mara had been shot through the chest." There is no European testimony on the subject, but the deed is assumed to have been done by one of Mara's own men. Mr. Cæsar continues—"We ran inside the building; and just within the doorway, Mara fell on the ground. Other shots being fired into the rooms, we retired into the joint magistrate's Cutcherry, and barricaded the doors: we did this with little hopes of escaping from the mutineers. They were about 140 in number; while the gentlemen in the room (for some were absent) were only nine or ten. We fully expected a rush to be made into the apartment, and all of us to be killed. The hour of death seemed to have arrived. The greater part of us were kneeling or crouching down, and some few were engaged in prayer."

The mutineers were not, however, blood-thirsty. They soon ceased firing, and began plundering the treasury, which contained £26,000; and when the Europeans ventured to fetch the lieutenant from the outer room, and to look forth, they saw the plunderers walking off with bags of money on their shoulders. Two of the planters saddled their own horses and fled. The rest of the party prepared to depart together. Lieutenant Mara was still living, and was carried some distance on a charpoy. Mr. Cæsar, who gives a circumstantial account of their flight, does not mention when the unfortunate officer was abandoned to his fate; but it appears that, being considered mortally wounded, they left him on the road; for Mr. Spencer, a civilian, writing from Benares a few days later, says—"They left poor O'Mara* dying, and got into their carriages and drove away."† This is not, however, quite correct; for the party (or at least most of them) left the Cutcherry on foot; Mrs. Mara, the wife of the fallen officer, having difficulty in moving on with any rapidity on account of her stoutness. The

corpse of Mr. Cuppage, the joint magistrate, lay at the gate. The fugitives hurried on, and were passing the doctor's house, when his carriage was brought out, apparently without orders, by faithful native servants. Five ladies, eight children, an ayah, the coachman, with Messrs. Reuther and Cæsar (the latter, revolver in hand), found room therein, and proceeded towards Ghazipoor. There were also three gentlemen on horseback, and two on foot; but while stopping to drink water by the road-side, Mrs. Mara's carriage overtook the party, the native coachman having brought it unbidden; and all the fugitives were thus enabled to proceed with ease. They crossed the Goomtee at the ferry, with their horses and carriages, observed, but not molested, by a crowd of natives, one of whom asked a European for his watch, saying that he might as well give it him, as he would soon lose it. But this seems to have been a vulgar jest, such as all mobs delight in, and no insult was offered to the women or children. It would be superfluous to narrate in detail the adventures of the fugitives. Mrs. Mara died of apoplexy; the others safely reached Karrakut, a large town on the left bank of the Goomtee. Here Hingun Lall, a Hindoo of some rank and influence, and of most noble nature, invited them to his house. "He stated," says Mr. Cæsar, "that he had a few armed men, and that the enemy should cut his throat first, before they reached us." His hospitality was gratefully accepted, and a "sumptuous repast" was in preparation for the weary guests, when the clashing of weapons was heard, and "the Lalla," as he is termed, placed the ladies and children in an inner room, and bade the men prepare for defence. But although the town was three times plundered by distinct bodies of the enemy, the Lalla's house was not attacked. The mutineers knew that to attempt to drag the refugees from so time-honoured a sanctuary as the dwelling of a Rajpoot, would have been to draw on themselves the vengeance of the majority of the Oude chiefs, who were as yet neutral. The Europeans, therefore, remained unharmed. On the evening of the 8th, a letter was brought them, addressed to "Any Europeans hiding at Karrakut." It came from Mr. Tucker, the Benares commissioner, who was as remarkable for his efforts to preserve the lives of his countrymen, as some of his coadjutors were to avenge their deaths. He offered rewards for the heads of living

* The name is variously spelt, but is given in the *East India Register* as "Patrick Mara."

† Letter published in *Times*, August 10th, 1857.

friends rather than for those of dead foes; and his policy was decidedly the more successful of the two; for the villagers generally proved willing to hazard the vengeance of the hostile forces by saving life, but could rarely, if ever, be induced by threats or promises to earn blood-money.

An escort of twelve volunteers, and as many of the 13th irregular cavalry, arrived on the following day; and, before night, the rescued party joined the Benares community in the Mint. Four persons (either Europeans or East Indians), left behind at Jaunpore, are said to have perished. These were Mr. and Mrs. Thriepland, the deputy-magistrate and his wife, who, after hiding themselves during the night of the outbreak in the house of one of the native police, were discovered and slaughtered by the irregular cavalry; a pensioned sergeant named Bignold; and a Mr. Davis, formerly an indigo-planter's assistant, supposed to have been put to death by the villagers.*

"A life pension of 100 rupees (£10) per mensem," was granted by government to Hingun Lall, with the honorary title of deputy-magistrate; with permission, as the Lalla was an old man, to commute the pension to a life jaghire, to be extended to a second life on easy terms.†

Allahabad is built on a spot which possesses rare natural advantages for the purposes of commerce and defence, and has been, from a very early period, the site of a strongly fortified city. The ancient Palibothra is said to have formerly stood here; and the Brahmins still attach importance to the place, on account of the Prayaga, or sacred confluence of three most holy streams, which unite at Allahabad—namely, the Ganges, Jumna, and Sreeswati. By bathing at one favoured spot, the pilgrim is supposed to receive the same benefit that he would have derived from separate immersion in each stream; and this is no mere saving of trouble, inasmuch as the Sreeswati is elsewhere inaccessible to mortal touch, and everywhere invisible to mortal sight: but the Hindoos assert that it joins the other rivers by a subterranean channel. Devotees come here and wait, in boats, the precise period of the moon when, according to their creed, ablutions, duly performed, will wash from their souls the defilement of

sin; and the hopelessly sick, or extremely aged, come hither also, and, fastening three vessels of water round their bodies, calmly step into the water and quit this life, passing by what they believe to be a divinely appointed road, into the world beyond the grave. The emperor Akber, who patronised all religions, and practised none, was popular with both Mohanmedans and Hindoos. He built the modern Allahabad (the city of God), intending it as a stronghold to overawe the surrounding countries. The lofty and extensive fort stands on a tongue of land washed on one side by the Ganges, on the other by the Jumna, and completely commands the navigation of both rivers. As a British station, it occupies a position of peculiar importance. It is the first in the Upper Provinces, all to the eastward being called down-country. It is situated on the Grand Trunk road, 498 miles from Calcutta, 1,151 from Madras, 831 from Bombay, and 74 from Benares. Add to these advantages a richly stored arsenal, and a treasury containing £190,000;‡ and it may be easily understood that its security ought to have been a primary consideration: yet, at the time of the Meerut outbreak, there was not a European soldier in Allahabad. The fort, and extensive cantonments some four miles distant, were occupied by the 6th N.I., a battery of Native artillery, and five companies of the Seik regiment of Ferozpoor, under Lieutenant Brasyer, an officer of remarkable nerve and tact.

Sir Henry Lawrence early pressed on the government the importance of strengthening Allahabad with Europeans:§ and seventy-four invalid artillerymen were consequently detached from Chunar, and arrived at Allahabad in the latter part of May. Two troops of the 3rd Oude irregular cavalry were sent by Sir H. Lawrence for the further protection of the fort.|| Several detachments of H.M. 84th marched through Allahabad between the time of the arrival of the Chunar artillerymen and the outbreak of the mutiny; and the officer in command of the station had discretionary orders to detain them if he deemed their presence needful; but there was nothing in the manner of the Native troops to occasion any doubt of their fidelity, or justify the detention of the Europeans. On the

* Mr. Cæsar's Narrative. Vide Sherring's *Indian Church*, pp. 267 to 276.

† Parl. Papers on Mutiny, 1857 (No. 7), p. 118.

‡ Lieutenant-colonel Simpson's account of the

Mutiny at Allahabad.—See *Times*, August 26th, 1857.

§ Appendix to Parl. Papers on Mutiny, p. 187.

|| *Ibid.*

contrary, remarkable tranquillity prevailed; and there is no record of incendiary fires or midnight meetings, such as usually preceded mutiny. Two men, who attempted to tamper with the 6th N.I., were delivered up to the authorities, and the entire regiment volunteered to march against Delhi. The governor-general in council issued a general order, thanking the 6th for their loyalty, and directed that "the tender of their services should be placed on the records of government, and read at the head of every regiment and company of the Bengal army, at a parade ordered for the purpose."* The order reached Allahabad, by telegraph, on the afternoon of the 4th of June. It was received with enthusiasm both by officers and men, and a parade was ordered, and carried through apparently to the satisfaction of all parties. But this state of things was of brief duration. On the 5th of June, ominous messages came to Colonel Simpson (the commandant at the fort), of external dangers. Sir Henry Lawrence desired that the civilians should retire within the fort for the present; and Sir Hugh Wheeler likewise sent word from Cawnpore, "to man the fort with every available European, and make a good stand." Then came the tidings of what had occurred at Benares; the Europeans learning that the sepoys, instead of quietly surrendering their arms, had resisted and fled, and were reported to be marching against Allahabad; while the native version of the story was—that the 37th, after being disarmed, had been faithlessly massacred by the Europeans. There was a certain foundation of fact for both these statements. The well-disposed sepoys, who were the majority, had (as is stated by the best authority) quietly obeyed the order for disarmament: the turbulent minority had resisted; and their revolt, precipitated, if not caused, by what the European officers call the mistake of one commander, and the incapacity of another (disabled by a sun-stroke), involved many loyal sepoys in the mutiny. It does not appear that the officers and men at Allahabad had any explanation, or arrived at any mutual understanding, with regard to the proceedings at Benares; only it was taken for granted by the former, that the latter would be ready to fight, as foes, the countrymen whom they had, until then, regarded as comrades in arms, identified with them in feeling and in interest.

* Appendix to Parl. Papers on the Mutiny, p. 361.

On the night of the 5th (Friday), nearly all the Europeans slept in the fort; and the civilians, covenanted and uncovenanted, formed themselves into a volunteer company about a hundred strong. Two guns, and two companies of the 6th N.I., were ordered down to the bridge of boats, which crosses the Jumna beneath the fort, in order to be ready to play upon the Benares insurgents; the guns of the fort were at the same time pointed on to the Benares road. Captain Alexander, with two squadrons of Oude cavalry, was posted in the Alopec Bagh—a large encamping-ground, under the walls of the fort, which commanded all the roads to the station. The main body of the 6th remained in their lines, in readiness to move anywhere at the shortest notice.

Saturday evening came, and the Europeans were relieved by the non-arrival of the mutineers. Colonel Simpson and the chief part of the officers sat together at mess at nine o'clock; and the volunteers who were to keep watch during the night were lying down to rest, and wait their summons. The volunteers were all safe in the fort; but there were two officers, less prudent or less fortunate, outside the gates. Captain Birch, the fort-adjutant (a married man with a family), had preferred remaining in his own bungalow; and Lieutenant Innes, the executive engineer, lay sick in his, having resigned his appointment on the previous day from ill-health. There were, besides, some Europeans and many Eurasians, merchants' clerks, and such like, in their own dwellings. None of them seem to have entertained any suspicion of what was going on in the lines of the 6th N.I., to which several Benares mutineers had found their way, and succeeded in inducing the 6th to join the mutiny. A Mohammedan, who acted, or affected to act, as an agent of the king of Delhi, was very active in heightening the panic and excitement. He is generally supposed to have been a Moolvee, or Moslem teacher; but some said he was a Native officer; others, that he was a weaver by trade. As the "Moolvee of Allahabad" he subsequently contrived to obtain notoriety.

The discussions in the lines of the 6th N.I. were brought to an issue by a bugler rushing on parade, and sounding an alarm. Colonel Simpson had just quitted the mess, and was walking to the fort, when he heard the signal. Ordering his horse, he mounted, and galloped to the parade, where he

"found the officers trying to fall-in their men." The colonel had previously ordered the two guns to be brought from the bridge of boats to the fort, under the charge of an artillery officer (Lieutenant Harward) and a Native guard. Instead of obeying the order, the men had insisted on taking them to cantonments. Harward sought the assistance of Lieutenant Alexander, who sprang on his horse, and, hastily ordering his men to follow him, rode up to the mutineers, "and, rushing on the guns, was killed on the spot."* Harward was likewise fired on; and, seeing that resistance was hopeless, he galloped into the fort, where he found the civilians assembled on the ramparts, listening to what they believed to be the attack of the Benares mutineers. One of the civilians writes—"The firing grew heavier, and we all thought that the insurgents had entered the station, and were being beaten off by the regiment, so steady was the musketry—regular file firing. On, on it continued, volley after volley. 'Oh!' we all said, 'those gallant sepoys are beating off the rebels;' for the firing grew fainter in the distance, as if they were driving a force out of the station. But before long the sad truth was known."†

First, Lieutenant Harward rode in, and told what he witnessed. Colonel Simpson arrived shortly after, and narrated the open mutiny of the regiment and the firing on the officers, of whom Captain Plunkett, Lieutenants Stewart and Haines, Ensigns Pringle and Muuro, and two sergeants, were slaughtered on parade. The colonel himself had had a narrow escape. A havildar and some sepoys surrounded and hurried him off the field. He rode to the treasury, with the view of saving its contents, but was at once fired on by the sentry, and afterwards "received a regular volley from the guard of thirty men on one side, with another volley from a night picket of thirty men on the other. A guard of poor Alexander's Irregulars stood passive." The colonel adds—"I galloped past the mess-house, where the guard was drawn out at the gate and fired at me. Here my horse got seriously wounded, and nearly fell;

but I managed to spur him to the fort (two miles) without further impediment. There the horse died shortly after of three musket-shot wounds. On reaching the fort I immediately disarmed the guards of the 6th regiment on duty and turned them out, leaving the Seik regiment to hold it, the only European troops being seventy-four invalid artillery, got from Chunar. The Madras European regiment began to pour in a few days after, and the command devolved on the lieutenant-colonel [Neil] of that corps."‡

No mention is made by Colonel Simpson of the horrible scene which is alleged to have taken place in the mess-room, after he and the senior officers had left it. Eight unposted ensigns,§ mere boys fresh from England, and doing duty with the 6th N.I., were bayoneted there; and three of the officers who escaped heard their cries as they passed.||

When the poor youths were left for dead, one of them, said to be Ensign Cheek (a son of the town-clerk of Evesham in Worcestershire), although severely injured, contrived to escape in the darkness to a neighbouring ravine, where he concealed himself for several days and nights, taking refuge from the heat of the sun by day, and wild beasts by night, amid the branches of a tree, and supporting life solely by the water of a neighbouring stream. On the night of the mutiny, no Europeans dared stir out of the fort to rescue those outside, or bring in the wounded. Their own position was extremely critical; the personal influence of Lieutenant Brasyer with the Seiks, being chiefly instrumental in preserving their fidelity.¶ The temptation of plunder was very great, and the work of destruction was carried on with temporary impunity. The treasury was looted, the gaol thrown open, and reckless bands of convicts were poured forth on the cantonments and city. Captain Birch and Lieutenant Innes, who had intended passing the night in the same bungalow, fled together towards the Ganges, and are supposed to have been murdered by the mutineers or insurgents. Lieutenant Hicks

* Lieutenant-colonel Simpson's account.—*Times*, August 26th, 1857.

† Letter of Allahabad civilian.—*Times*, August 25th, 1857.

‡ Lieutenant-colonel Simpson's account.

§ The "Allahabad civilian" speaks of nine; but the official returns name eight—Ensigns Cheek, Codd, Way, Beaumont, Bailiff, Scott, and two Smiths.—

Supplement to the *London Gazette*, May 6th, 1858.

|| Letter of Allahabad civilian.—*Times*, August 25th, 1857.

¶ Mr. Hay, an American missionary, in Allahabad at the time of the mutiny, and who was personally acquainted with Lieutenant Brasyer, says that he "rose from the ranks."—*Times*, September, 1857.

and two young ensigns, left with the guns when Lieutenant Harward went to seek the aid of Captain Alexander, were not injured by the sepoys. They did not venture to take the direct road to the fort; but plunged into the Ganges, and, after some time, presented themselves at the gate in safety, having first blackened their bodies with mud, in default of any other covering. Eleven European men (uncovenanted servants, railway inspectors, and others), three women, and four children, are mentioned in the *Gazette* as having perished. No list of the Eurasians or natives murdered is given; but six drummers (Christians) of the 6th N.I. are stated as having been killed, it was supposed on the night of the mutiny, "whilst attempting to bury the murdered officers."* The 6th N.I. quitted the city on the morning after the *émeute*; but the Moolvee had still a considerable host around his standard; and the European garrison, though reinforced by successive detachments of the Madras Fusiliers, had, during the first days after the mutiny, quite enough to do to hold their own within the fort, against the internal dangers of drunkenness and insubordination. Consequently, no efforts seem to have been made, and no rewards offered, for the missing Europeans; and the brave young ensign remained in his tree, with his undressed wounds, sinking with hunger and exhaustion, and listening anxiously, through four live-long days and nights, for the sound of friendly voices. On the fifth day he was discovered by the rebels, and taken to a serai, or sleeping-place for travellers, where he found Conductor Coleman and his family in confinement, and also a well-known native preacher named Gopinath, who had escaped with his wife and family from Futtehpore. When the poor youth was brought in, he nearly fainted. Gopinath gave him some gruel, and afterwards water, to allay his burning thirst. The agony of his wounds being increased by lying on the hard boards, Gopinath prevailed on the daroga who had charge of the prisoners, to give Ensign Cheek a charpoy to lie on. This was done, and the sufferer related to his native friend all he had undergone, and bade him, if he escaped, write to his mother in England,

and to his aunt at Bancoorah. At length the daroga, jealous of the intercourse between the captives, placed Gopinath in the stocks, separating him from the others, and even from his own family. A body of armed Mohammedans came in and tried to tempt or terrify him into a recantation. His wife clung to him, and was dragged away by the hair of her head, receiving a severe blow on the forehead during the struggle. The ensign, who lay watching the scene, heard the offer of immediate release made to the native, on condition of apostasy, and, mastering his anguish and his weakness, called out, in a loud voice, "Padre, padre, be firm; do not give way." The prisoners remained some days longer in hourly expectation of death. At length the Moolvee himself visited them. But they all held their faith; and at length, the approach of Lieutenant Brasyer, with a detachment of Sikhs, put the fanatics to flight. The conductor and the catechist, with their families, were brought safely into the fort. The ensign survived just long enough to be restored to his countrymen. Before sunset on the same day (17th June), the spirit that had not yet spent seventeen summers on earth, entered into rest with something of the halo of martyrdom upon it.†

It was well that Colonel Neil had arrived at Allahabad; for martial law had been proclaimed there immediately after the mutiny; and the system adopted by individual Europeans, of treating disturbed districts with the license of a conquering army in an enemy's country, had fostered evils which were totally subversive of all discipline.

Among the documents sent to England by the governor-general in council, in proof of the spirit of turbulent and indiscriminate vengeance which it had been found necessary to check, is an extract from a letter, communicating the strange and humiliating fact, that it was needful to restrain British functionaries from the indiscriminate destruction, not only of innocent men, but even of "aged women and children;" and this before the occurrence of the second, or the publication of the first, massacre at Cawnpore. The name of the

* Supplement to *London Gazette*, May 6th, 1858.

† The authority relied on regarding Ensign Cheek, is the Narrative of Gopinath Nundy, and of the Rev. J. Owen, of the American Board of Missions, a society which has expended a considerable

sum of money in Allahabad. Another account, more graphic, but less authentic, was published—as an extract of a letter from an officer in the service of the Company—in the *Times*, of September 7th, 1857.

writer of the letter, and of the persons therein mentioned, are all withheld by government; and the quotation begins abruptly.

"—has adopted a policy of burning villages, which is, in my opinion, the most suicidal and mischievous that can be devised; it prevents the possibility of order being restored; the aged, women and children, are sacrificed, as well as those guilty of rebellion. Cultivation is impossible; a famine is consequently almost certain. The sternest measures are doubtless necessary, and every possible endeavour should be made to apprehend and punish those actually engaged in plunder or rebellion; but here there seems to be no discrimination. A railway officer, whose report you will probably see, did excellent service, and seems to have behaved very gallantly when sent with a small guard to restore the railway where it might have been injured; but, in accordance with the custom, as he met with opposition from some plunderers and mutineers, he burnt ten villages, which he found deserted. The Trunk road now passes through a desert; the inhabitants have fled to a distance of four or five miles; and it seems to me to be obviously the proper policy to encourage all peaceable persons to return, not to destroy the villages and render the return of the people impossible. Some five persons have been invested with the powers of life and death in the station of Allahabad; each sits separately, and there are also courts-martial in the fort.

"You will do the state service if you can check the indiscriminate burning of villages, and secure the hanging of the influential offenders, instead of those who cannot pay the police for their safety."*

In a subsequent letter, written probably by the same person, but evidently by a civilian of rank, the following passage occurs:—"You have no conception of the dangers and difficulties created by lawless and reckless Europeans here. One of them cocked his pistol at Lieutenant Brasyer in the fort. The ruffian was as likely as not to have pulled the trigger; and, in that case, as Lieutenant Brasyer himself observed to me, his Seiks would have slain every European in the fort. This was before Colonel Neil took the command: if it had happened in his time, the probability is that the offender would have been tried and hanged."†

An Allahabad "civil servant"—one of the five persons already mentioned as invested with powers of life and death, and who speaks of himself as having been subsequently appointed by the commis-

sioner, Mr. Chester, as "the political agent with the force," which, from the date of his letter (June 28th) must have been Neil's—gives the following account of the proceedings after the arrival of the Fusiliers, before, and after, the arrival of their colonel. He writes—

"We dared not leave the fort; for who knows what the Seiks would have done if it had been left empty? However, let us not breathe one word of suspicion against them, for they behaved splendidly, though they are regular devils. We lived on in this way till the Madras Fusiliers came up, and then our fun began. We 'volunteers' were parted off into divisions, three in number; and your humble servant was promoted to the command of one, the 'flagstaff division,' with thirty railroad men under his command, right good stout fellows, every one of whom had been plundered, and were consequently as bloodthirsty as any demons need be. We sallied forth several times with the Seiks into the city, and had several skirmishes in the streets, when we spared no one. We had several volleys poured into us; but their firing was so wild that their bullets passed over and around us harmlessly. The 'flagstaff' was always to the front; and they were so daring and reckless, that 'the flagstaff boys' became a byword in the fort. Every rascality that was performed was put down to them; and, in the end, the volunteers got a bad name for plundering. The Seiks were great hands at it, and, in spite of all precaution, brought a great amount of property into the fort. Such scenes of drunkenness I never beheld. Seiks were to be seen drunk on duty on the ramparts, unable to hold their muskets. No one could blame them, for they are such jolly, jovial fellows, so different from other sepoys.

"When we could once get out of the fort we were all over the place, cutting down all natives who showed any signs of opposition; we enjoyed these trips very much, so pleasant it was to get out of that horrid fort for a few hours. One trip I enjoyed amazingly: we got on board a steamer with a gun, while the Seiks and Fusiliers marched to the city; we steamed up, throwing shot right and left, till we got up to the bad places, when we went on shore and peppered away with our guns, my old double-barrel that I brought out bringing down several niggers, so thirsty for vengeance was I. We fired the places right and left, and the flames shot up to the heavens as they spread, fanned by the breeze, showing that the day of vengeance had fallen on the treacherous villains."‡

The luckless British residents (not to speak of the native shopkeepers) were most shamefully treated by their defenders. What the city thieves and sepoys left, was looted by the Europeans and Seiks, who apparently could recognise no difference

the non-adoption of which is stated by the governor-general in council, to have "been made a matter of complaint against the Indian government."—p. 2.

† Letter dated "Allahabad, July 22nd, 1857."—*Ibid.*, p. 23.

‡ Letter of Allahabad civilian, dated, June 28th, 1857.—*Times*, August 25th, 1857.

* Letter, dated July 6th, 1857.—Parl. Papers (Commons), February 4th, 1857. Moved for by Henry D. Seymour. Showing the proceedings "taken for the punishment of those who have been guilty of mutiny, desertion, and rebellion" in India; and the reason why the country generally was not put under martial law "after the mutinies"—a measure,

between friend and foe in this respect. The work of destruction was carried on with impunity under the very walls of the fort. Costly furniture, of no value to the plunderers, was smashed to pieces for the mere love of mischief. These did for private, what the enemy had done for public, property. Drunkenness was all but universal, and riot reigned supreme.

The Rev. J. Owen, a clergyman who had resided many years in Allahabad, and had been the founder of the establishment supported in that city by the American Board of Missions—writes in his journal on the 10th of June—

“Our affairs in the fort are just now in a very bad way. A day or two since, some Europeans went out with a body of Sikhs to the godowns, near the steamer ghaut, where large quantities of stores are lying. The Europeans began to plunder. The Sikhs, ever ready for anything of the kind, seeing this, instantly followed the example. The thing has gone on from bad to worse, until it is now quite impossible to restrain the Sikhs, untamed savages as they are.

“The day before yesterday, a poor man came to me, saying that he had had nothing to eat that day, and had been working hard as a volunteer in the militia. The colonel (Simpson) happened to be passing at the time. I took the man to him, telling him that the poor fellow was working hard, and willing to work, in defence of the fort; but that he and his wife were starving. The colonel went with me at once to the commissariat; and there, notwithstanding many objections on the ground of formality, assisted me in getting for him a loaf of bread. . . . One of the commissariat officers told me yesterday morning, that he did not know how those widows and children who came in on Monday night, could be supplied with rations, for they were not fighting-men! Everything is as badly managed as can be; indeed, there seems to be no management at all.”

The arrival of Colonel Neil changed the aspect of affairs. He had rapidly, though with much difficulty, made his way from Benares, which he left on the evening of the 9th, reaching Allahabad on the afternoon of the 11th, with an officer and forty-three of the Madras Fusiliers. The line of road was deserted; the terrified villagers had departed in the old “Wulsa” style; scarcely any horses could be procured; and coolies, to assist in dragging the dawkh carriages, were with difficulty obtained. Colonel Neil (always ready to give praise where he deemed it due) says—“Had it not been for the assistance ren-

dered by the magistrate at Mirzapoor (Mr. S. G. Tucker), we should have been obliged to have marched on and left our baggage. We found the country between this [Allahabad] and Mirzapoor infested with bands of plunderers, the villages deserted, and none of the authorities remaining. Major Stephenson, who left Benares the same evening with a hundred Fusiliers by bullock-van, experienced the same difficulties. Many of the soldiers have been laid up in consequence of the exposure and fatigue; four have died suddenly.”† The officer who accompanied Colonel Neil, says they accomplished “upwards of seventy miles in two nights, by the aid of a lot of natives pushing our men along in light four-wheeled carriages.”‡

Colonel Neil had probably received no adequate information of the state of Allahabad. The telegraphic communication between that place and Benares had been completely cut off. The “lightning dawkh” had been speedily destroyed by the mutineers; and at a later stage they had an additional incentive to its destruction, some of the more ingenious among them having discovered that the hollow iron posts which supported the wires, would make a good substitute for guns,§ and the wire, cut up in pieces, could be fired instead of lead. In fact, the whole of the proceedings which followed the Allahabad mutiny, were by far the most systematic of any until then taken by the rebels. Colonel Neil found the fort itself nearly blockaded; and the bridge of boats over the Ganges was in the hands of the mob in the village of Daragunje, and partly broken. “I was fortunate,” he states, “to bribe some natives to bring a boat over to the left bank of the Ganges, in which I embarked part of my men: the people of the fort having by this time seen us, sent over boats some way down. By these means we all got into the fort, almost completely exhausted from over-long nights’ march|| and the intense heat.” The men might rest; but for the colonel, it would seem, there was important work to do, which admitted not of an hour’s delay. Assuming the command (superseding Colonel Simpson), he assembled his staff and held a council of war, at which he determined to

* *Sherer’s Indian Church*, p. 214.

† Despatch from Colonel Neil to government, June 14th, 1857.—Further Parl. Papers relative to the Mutinies, 1857 (not numbered), p. 60.

‡ Letter dated “Allahabad, June 23rd.”—*Times*, August 28th, 1857.

§ Colonel Neil’s despatch, June 17th, 1857.—Further Parl. Papers, p. 67.

|| *Sic in orig.*

attack Daragunje next morning. He then paraded the volunteers, addressed them in very plain language regarding their "recent disgraceful acts of robbery and drinking," and threatened to turn the next transgressor out of the fort. On the following morning, sixty Fusiliers, three hundred Seiks, and thirty cavalry, marched out under his own command. "I opened fire," Colonel Neil writes, "with several round shots, on those parts of Daragunje occupied by the worst description of natives; attacked the place with detachments of Fusiliers and Seiks, drove the enemy out with considerable loss, burnt part of the village, and took possession of a repaired bridge, placing a company of Seiks at its head for its protection."* Thus he reopened the communication across the Ganges.

On the 12th, Major Stephenson's detachment arrived. On the 13th, Colonel Neil attacked the insurgents in the village of Kydgunge, on the left bank of the Jumna, and drove them out with loss. A few days later he sent a steamer with a howitzer to clear the river, some distance up the country—an expedition which, he says, "did much execution." Before, however, he could act with any efficiency against the mutineers, he had found it necessary to reorganise the Allahabad garrison. On the 14th, he writes—"I have now 270 Fusiliers in high health and spirits, but suffering from the intense heat." Yet on that day, he adds, "I could do little or nothing." He accomplished, however, important work within the fort, by checking, with an energy like that of Clive, the prevailing debauchery and insubordination. From his first arrival he had "observed great drinking among the Seiks, and the Europeans of all classes;" and he soon learned the lawlessness which had proceeded even to the extent of the open plunder of the godowns belonging to the Steam Navigation Company, and of the stores of private merchants; the Seiks bringing quantities of fermented liquor, spirit, and wine into the fort, and selling their "loot" at four annas, or sixpence the bottle all round, beer or brandy, sherry or champagne. Colonel Neil did not share the previously quoted opinion of one of the civilians of the hanging committee, regard-

ing the "jolly Seiks;" on the contrary, he thought their devilry dangerous to friends as well as to foes; and was extremely anxious at the idea of their continuing in the same range of barracks with the Fusiliers. They had been, he said, "coaxed into loyalty; they had become overbearing, and knew their power;" and he felt obliged to temporise with them, by directing the commissariat to purchase all the liquor they had to sell. He further sent down the only two carts he had, to empty what remained in the godowns into the commissariat stores, and to destroy all that could be otherwise obtained. The next move was a more difficult one—namely, to get the Seiks out of the fort. They were very unwilling to go; and, at one time, it seemed likely to be a question of forcible ejection—"it was a very near thing indeed." The influence of Captain Brasyer (who, Colonel Neil says, "alone has kept the regiment together and all right here") again prevailed, and the Seiks took up their position outside the fort, and were consoled for being forbidden to loot European property, by constant employment on forays against suspected villages, the prospect of plunder being their spring of action.† Even after their ejection, it was no easy matter to keep them from the fort, and prevent the re-establishment of the boon companionship, which was so manifestly deteriorating the morality and discipline of both parties. The colonel declared that the Seiks had been running in and out like cats; he had blocked up some of their ways, but there were still too many sallyports; and, in writing to government, he states—"There is no engineer officer here; there ought to be; and one should be sent sharp."‡

Colonel Neil now resolved on forwarding the majority of the women and children to Calcutta. The fort was still crowded, notwithstanding the expulsion of the Seiks; and in a state of extreme filth, the native low-caste servants having fled. On the 15th and 17th of June, he sent down, by two steamers, fifty women and forty-six children, "all the wives, children, widows, or orphans of persons (several ladies and gentlemen) who have been plundered of all they had, and barely escaped with their lives." Seventeen men accompanied the

* Despatch from Colonel Neil to government, June 17th, 1857.—Further Parl. Papers, p. 46.

† Despatches of Colonel Neil, Allahabad, June 14th,

17th, and 19th, 1857.—Further Papers for 1857 (not numbered), pp. 46, 48, and 60.

‡ Colonel Neil's despatch, June 17th, 1857; p. 61.

party, the crews of the steamers (Mohammedans) being suspected. The voyage was safely accomplished, and was attended by an interesting circumstance. One of the persons selected to take charge of the Englishwomen and their children, and who performed the office with great ability and tenderness, was a Hindoo convert, named Shamacharum Mukerjee, by birth a Brahmin of high-caste. He had been baptized in early youth by Scotch missionaries, and had from that time pursued, with rare determination of purpose, a most difficult course. He worked his passage to England on board a sailing ship; landed with a single letter of introduction from Dr. Duff; got into an engineering establishment, for the sake of learning that business; bore up, amid all the discouragements that await an alien with a dark skin and an empty purse; endured the chilling winds and dense fogs of an uncongenial climate, rising at six, and going regularly to his work, till, his object being accomplished, he was enabled to return to India, where he was fortunate in procuring an appointment.*

To return to Allahabad. On the 17th of June, Neil writes—"The Moolvee has fled, and two of his men of rank were slain on the 15th." One of the insurgent leaders was captured, and brought before Captain Brasyer. He was a young man, magnificently dressed, and said to be a nephew to the Moolvee. Some questions were put to him, and he was ordered into confinement. The Sikhs were about to take him away, when, suddenly, by a violent effort, he freed his hands, which had been fastened at his back, seized a sword, and made a thrust at one of his captors. Captain Brasyer sprang forward, wrested the weapon from his hand, and flung him on the ground; and "the enraged Sikhs, while the chief was prostrate, placed their heels on his head, and literally crushed out his brains, and the body was thrown outside the gates."† Colonel Neil mentions, that "some Christian children" had been "sent in" at this date; but he does not say by whom.

On the 19th of June, he states—"Two hundred bullocks, with drivers, were brought

in here yesterday: this is all our public carriage at present. Our commissariat officer is away; and that department is, in consequence, inefficient." There was an utter absence of ordinary stores: the commonest articles of food could with difficulty be obtained, and great scarcity of medicine was felt here and at Benares. No information is given regarding the 1,600 siege-train bullocks, which, on the 28th of the previous month, the commissariat officer at Allahabad was ready, "if allowed, to give for the immediate conveyance of Europeans from the river Sone to Cawnpore."‡ In fact, the state of things at Allahabad, as incidentally described in the public despatches and private correspondence of the period, is most discreditable to those responsible for it. From the middle of May to the 6th of June, the local authorities were totally unmolested. At least, they might have laid in supplies to the fort, and prepared in every possible way for the speedy and easy conveyance of a few hundred British troops, the short distance of 120 miles. Cawnpore was only thus far off; and this fact makes it more terrible to think of the three weeks' maintenance of the intrenchments, from the 6th to the 27th of June, and the yet more exhausting agony endured by the bereaved women and children, from the 27th of June to the 16th of July. Their condition could not have been known to their countrymen without some immediate effort being made for their relief; and it could scarcely have remained unknown had our system of intelligence been less generally defective. There were some marked exceptions; but at Allahabad they had no system at all. Setting apart Colonel Neil, Captain Brasyer, the magistrate (Mr. Court), and a few others, whose influence may be traced, the majority of the Europeans seem to have concentrated their energies on indiscriminate slaughter. The preservation of their countrymen in scattered stations, and even of British dominion in India; the conciliation and protection of the agricultural classes, as a means of facilitating the advance of the relieving force; the inducing the villagers and itinerant traders of all sorts, especially grain merchants, to come forward fearlessly to our aid, certain of payment and reward for the various services they had it in their power to render, and, above all, of being shielded from the exactions of Sikhs and Goorkas, or even lawless Europeans;—these, it is to be feared, were

* *Missionary Sketches in Northern India*; by Mrs. Weitbrecht; p. 97.

† Rev. Mr. Hay's account of Allahabad Mutiny. *Times*, September, 1857.

‡ Telegram from Allahabad to Calcutta.—Appendix to Parl. Papers, p. 327.

considerations quite beyond the ordinary class of volunteers. An able military leader anywhere, but specially in India, must needs be also a statesman and financier. Neil's occupation of a separate command was too brief to show to what extent he might have possessed these qualities; and his eager panegyrists have praised his "vigour," and boasted of the panic it inspired among the natives, in a manner which is calculated to detract undeservedly from his fame, when, the thirst for vengeance being assuaged, posterity shall learn to look calmly on the Indian mutiny of 1857, and weigh the deeds of the chief actors with a steadier hand than contemporary judges are likely to possess. Then it may, perhaps, be deemed that Neil's best services were not those which earned him temporary popularity; and that his admirers may be glad to palliate the "village-burning" and "unlimited hanging" system pursued by him before the capitulation of Cawnpoor, as having been, perhaps, a mistaken policy, adopted in the hope of terrifying the wavering into submission, and so bringing the war to a speedy close. The very reverse was the case. The worst massacres occurred after the firing into the disarmed troops at Benares; and, strange to say, a similar cruel blunder is declared by Captain Thomson, in his *Story of Cawnpoor*, to have driven the 53rd N.I. into rebellion. He declares, most positively, that the men were quietly cooking their

food in their lines, when General Wheeler (of whom he speaks as a once admirable, but worn-out, commander), under the influence of some extraordinary misconception, gave the fatal order to Lieutenant Aslie, of the artillery, which caused the 53rd to be dispersed and driven from the station with 9-pounders.* These facts must be borne in mind; because the "esprit de corps," evinced by the mutineers, is to some extent explained by the fact, that several of the revolted regiments asserted, at different periods, each one its own special grievance, and urged it, too, upon the consideration of their own officers, when, as will be seen in subsequent chapters, the fortune of war brought them into communication. The difficulties with which Colonel Neil had to contend at Allahabad, have been very insufficiently appreciated. Disease, drunkenness, and insubordination among the Europeans and Sikhs, were more dangerous foes than the Moolvee and his rabble host, though stated to amount to three or four thousand. Cholera appeared among the Fusiliers on the evening of the 18th, when several men came into hospital with the disease in its worst form. Before midnight eight men were buried, and twenty more died during the following day.† All the cholera patients were carried to the Masonic lodge, a short distance from the fort, which had been converted into an hospital; but the want of comforts for the sick was painfully felt. "The barracks,"

* Since the publication of the chapter containing the account of the siege and first massacre of Cawnpoor, Captain Thomson has issued a most interesting work on the subject, reiterating his previous statements, with important additional particulars. The 2nd cavalry were, he says, the first to rise. The old subahdar major of the regiment defended the columns and treasure in the quarter-guard as long as he could, and was found, in the morning, lying beside the empty regimental chest, weltering in his blood. He recovered, however, but was killed by a shell while defending the intrenchment. "An hour or two after the flight of the cavalry, the 1st N.I. also bolted, leaving their officers untouched upon the parade-ground. The 56th N.I. followed the next morning. The 53rd remained, till, by some error of the general, they were fired into. I am at an utter loss to account for this proceeding. The men were peacefully occupied in their lines, cooking; no signs of mutiny had appeared amongst their ranks; they had refused all the solicitations of the deserters to accompany them, and seemed quite steadfast, when Aslie's battery opened upon them by Sir Hugh Wheeler's command, and they were literally driven from us by 9-pounders. The only signal that had preceded this step was the calling into the intrenchments of the Native officers of the regiment. The whole

of them cast in their lot with us, besides 150 privates, most of them belonging to the grenadier company. The detachment of the 53rd, posted at the treasury, held their ground against the rebels about four hours. We could hear their musketry in the distance, but were not allowed to attempt their relief. The faithful little band that had joined our desperate fortunes was ordered to occupy the military hospital, about 600 yards to the east of our position, and they held it for nine days; when, in consequence of its being set on fire, they were compelled to evacuate. They applied for admission to the intrenchments, but were told that we had not food sufficient to allow of an increase to our number." They were, consequently, dismissed to care for their own safety as they best could; Major Hillersden giving each man a few rupees, and a certificate of fidelity.—*Story of Cawnpoor*: by Captain Mowbray Thomson; pp. 39, 40.

† The American missionary, Owen, notes in his diary, June 19th, the deaths of three ladies on that day—named Hodgson, Purser, and Williams—of cholera; adding, "I predicted that the filth allowed to accumulate about the doors and in the drains, would breed disease of some kind. The authorities have now commenced the work of cleansing and sprinkling them with lime."—*Sherer's Indian Church*, p. 226

the colonel writes, "are in bad order, followers of any description being almost unprocurable; there are but few punkahs, and no tatties;* the men have, therefore, not the proper advantages of barrack accommodation for this hot season. I regret to add, that the supply of medicines here has failed; there appears to have been little or none kept in Allahabad; and our detachments only brought up sufficient for the march."† On the 19th, he writes—"I hope no time will be lost in sending up here an efficient commissariat department; such should be here. We are most badly off in that respect; and the want of bread, &c., for the Europeans, may no doubt increase the disease."‡ On the 22nd, he announces, by telegram, the decrease of cholera, and the arrival of the head-quarters of H.M. 84th, and 240 more of the Fusiliers; adding—"Davidson, of commissariat, arrived; now hope to get something done. Endeavouring to equip, with carriage and provisions, 400 Europeans, with two guns, to push on towards Cawnpoor."§ Two days later, it was discovered that there were but sixteen dhoolies, or litters, available (although a considerable number of these was a primary requisite for the projected expedition), and that all materials for making others were wanting, as well as workmen: a supply was therefore telegraphed for, and ordered by government, the order being given at Calcutta, on the day of the capitulation of Cawnpoor.

An officer of the Fusiliers writes to England on the 23rd—"He (the colonel) is now hard at work getting his force together to move on to the assistance of Cawnpoor and Lucknow, both places being in the greatest danger, for all the sepoys that have run away are now gathering around Lucknow. Our reports concerning that city and Cawnpoor are most gloomy; but reports in this country and at this time are always against us. You can have no idea of the awful weather, and of our sufferings from the heat; we sit with wet clothes over our heads, but the deaths from sun-stroke continue large: that dreadful scourge cholera has also broken out, and we have lost already seventy fighting-men. We buried twenty, three nights ago, at one funeral; and the shrieks of the dying were some-

thing awful: two poor ladies who were living over the hospital died, I believe, from fright. We have now got about 400 men outside the fort, and the disease is certainly on the decline. Up to to-day we have had little to eat; indeed, I would not have fed a dog with my yesterday's breakfast; but our mess and the head-quarters arrived yesterday, and our fare was much better to-day. All the village people ran away; and any one who had worked for the Europeans, these murderers killed; so if the population was to a man against us, we should stand but a bad chance. A poor baker was found with both his hands cut off, and his nose slit, because he had sent in bread to us."||

The extreme hatred evinced for the English, must have been aggravated by the policy planned by Neil, and carried through by his subordinates without the slightest discrimination. This was to "completely destroy all the villages close to, and forming the suburbs of, the city," and to make a severe example by "laying the city under the heaviest possible contribution, to save it from destruction also." He expected great service from the gentlemen of the railway engineers, who formed the volunteer corps already alluded to; as these, with the faithful Native troopers, would enable him to strike a few blows against the zemindars and parties of insurgents he could not otherwise reach.¶ The leader of the volunteers, the "civilian" already quoted, undertook the mission with vengeful zest. He writes—"Every day we have had expeditions to burn and destroy disaffected villages, and we have taken our revenge. I have been appointed chief of a commission for the trial of all natives charged with offences against government and persons; day by day we have strung up eight and ten men. We have the power of life and death in our hands, and I assure you we spare not. A very summary trial is all that takes place; the condemned culprit is placed under a tree with a rope round his neck, on the top of a carriage; and, when it is pulled away, off he swings."**

One of the "rank and file" volunteers, a railway official, has also furnished an account of the proceedings of the corps; which entirely agrees with that of its leader.

|| Letter published in the *Times*, August 26th, 1857.

¶ Colonel Neil's despatch, June 17th, 1857.

** Letter of Allahabad civilian, June 28th, 1857.

* *Tatties*, thatched screens wetted to cool the air.

† Further Parl. Papers relative to the Mutinies, 1857 (not numbered), p. 48.

‡ *Ibid.*, p. 59.

§ *Ibid.*, p. 32.

After relating the outbreak of cholera, he proceeds to state—

"Colonel Neil immediately ordered all us civilians out of the fort. Stern and harsh as the order appeared, I verily believe that it was our salvation. The night we were turned out we slept on the ground on the glacis of the fort, under the shelter of the guns, all the males taking their turn as sentries to guard the women and children. Every native that appeared in sight was shot down without question, and in the morning Colonel Neil sent out parties of his regiment, although the poor fellows could hardly walk from fatigue and exhaustion, and burned all the villages near where the ruins of our bungalows stood, and hung every native they could catch, on the trees that lined the road. Another party of soldiers penetrated into the native city and set fire to it, whilst volley after volley of grape and canister was poured into the fugitives as they fled from their burning houses. In a few hours, such was the terror inspired, that it was deemed safe for us to go up to the station. Of course we never go out unarmed; and all men (natives) we employ are provided with a pass. Any man found without one, is strung up by the neck to the nearest tree."*

The civilians were, perhaps, naturally more inveterate and indiscriminating in their vengeance than the military; having suffered greater destruction of property; but both combined to scourge the wretched peasantry. The official and private letters of the time have been largely and literally quoted in evidence of facts which would hardly be believed on other authority than that of the chief actors. The reinforcements of Fusiliers marked their way, from Benares to Allahabad, in blood and flame, not following the regular track, for that was almost deserted; but making *dours*, or forays, in the direction of suspected villages. Captain Fraser's detachment was joined by two civilians—Mr. Chapman and Mr. Moore, the magistrate of Mirzapoor. The troops were out some four or five days; leaving Benares on the 13th, and reaching Allahabad on the 19th of June. The account is too long for insertion; but it begins and ends with "burning villages"—a process to which civilians in general (being almost all of them, in some way or other, connected with the collection of the revenue) would probably not have been so partial, had they been fundholders instead of stipendiaries. Two villages near Gopeegunjé were first visited with destruction. Their inhabitants were accused of having plundered grain. Captain Fraser and a party of Fusiliers proceeded thither, called on the principal persons to appear, and, finding they had escaped, set

fire to the houses. Next came the turn of three zemindars, accused of having proclaimed themselves rajahs, and of plundering. Lieutenant Palliser, who, with eighty of the 13th irregular cavalry, had joined Fraser near Gopeegunjé, went, with fifty of his men and Messrs. Chapman and Moore, to a village three miles off. They captured the zemindars, brought them into camp, tried them by court-martial, and hanged them before eight o'clock the same evening. At daybreak on the 16th, Fraser, with a hundred Fusiliers and the eighty Irregulars, marched in pursuit of "a man named Belour Sing, who, with 1,200 followers, was reported to be in a village five miles from the Grand Trunk road." For the leader of 180 men to endeavour to apprehend the leader of 1,200 men, would seem somewhat rash; but Belour Sing did not abide the struggle; he fled, leaving his house and village, named Dobaar, to be burned by the Europeans. Everything was found to have been carried off except some grain and a small quantity of gunpowder. A reward of 200 rupees was offered by Mr. Chapman for the capture of the chief.

There was one gratifying incident in this expedition. A zemindar came to the camp one evening with a Native officer. The latter, who was in command of twelve sepoy, said that he and his companions had succeeded in preserving some government treasure, amounting to 12,000 rupees, although they had been attacked by dacoits, and the village burned. Captain Fraser proceeded to the spot, about a mile off the road between Barood and Sydabad, and there found the faithful sepoy at their post.

There were a few more court-martial sentences, a village burned by the Fusiliers, and two by the irregular cavalry, before the series of murderous raids were brought to a conclusion by the arrival of the party, all unharmed, at Allahabad.† This sort of service may be spirited work for amateurs; but it is doubtful whether it does not materially injure the discipline, which is the soul of efficiency in a regular army. Shortly afterwards, as will be shown, Palliser's Irregulars, to his rage and disgust, refused to follow him in fair fight.

On the 30th of June, Neil states (in a private letter), that, for want of food and

* Letter of railway official, Allahabad, June 23rd. —*Daily News*, August 25th, 1857.

† Captain Fraser's despatch, Allahabad, June 19th, 1857.—Further Papers, 1857 (not numbered), p. 47.

carriage, he had been unable to send a single man to relieve Cawnpoor; for the awful heat rendered it certain death to have moved troops without, or with only a few, tents. Besides, he adds—"I could not leave this, the most important fortress in India, insecure. To cover all, cholera has attacked us with fearful virulence. Within three days there were 121 cases in the Fusiliers alone, and fifty-seven deaths. I was so exhausted for a few days, I was obliged to lie down constantly, and only able to get up when the attacks were going on, and then I was obliged to sit down on the batteries to give my orders and directions."

On the afternoon of the same day, a column marched for Cawnpoor, under the direction of Major Renaud, "a gallant and

most intelligent officer,"* "brave even to rashness."† It consisted of 400 Europeans, 300 Seiks, 100 irregular cavalry, under Palliser, and two guns, under Lieutenant Harwood.

The first day's march was extremely trying, for the troops had to encounter a hot wind, "like the breath of a furnace." They had, besides, hot work to do, for "some villages were fired; and any native found in arms, who could not prove his asserted innocence, was summarily hanged, such being the instructions under which we acted."‡ On the 4th of July, the march was arrested by a brief message from Sir Henry Lawrence—"Halt where you now stand; or, if necessary, fall back."§ The reason was, that Cawnpoor had capitulated, and all the besieged were supposed to have perished.

CHAPTER XIV.

JHANSI, NOWGONG, CHUTTERPOOR, LOGASSE, CHIRKAREE, KUBRAI, ADJYGHUR, BANDA, FUTTEHPOOR, HUMBERPOOR, JALOUN, OORAI, AND SUMPTER.—MAY AND JUNE, 1857.

ANOTHER district in the Cawnpoor (military) division was destined to take the second rank, amid the dreary scenes of mutiny, in connection with a treacherous, pitiless massacre, perpetrated at the instigation of an angry and ambitious woman, upon all the Europeans placed by the flood of revolt within her reach.

The annexation of Jhansi, and the contempt with which the lately reigning family were treated, have been shown in the introductory chapter. The independence of the little principality was gone beyond redemption, if English supremacy continued; and when the Ranees heard that the vast mercenary army of the Feringhees had revolted, she resolved to cast in her lot with them in a war of extermination. In the prime of life (some years under thirty), exceedingly beautiful, vigorous in mind and body, Lakshmi Bai had all the pride of the famous Rajpoot prince,|| who—

"rather than be less,
Cared not to be at all."

* *Mutiny of the Bengal Army*: by One who has served under Sir Charles Napier; p. 122.

† *Journal of Major North, 60th Rifles*; p. 26.

She was a heathen: the forgiveness of injuries was no article in her creed; and believing herself deeply injured by the infraction of the Hindoo laws of adoption and inheritance, she threw aside every consideration of tenderness for sex or age, and committed herself to a deadly struggle with the Supreme government, by an act, for which, as she must have well known, her own life would, in all human probability, pay the forfeit. Her relatives (that is, her father and sister) fought for and with her; but there is no proof that she had any able counsellor, but rather that she was herself the originator of the entire proceedings which made Jhansi an important episode in the war, from the time when the Ranees flung down the gauntlet by a reckless, ruthless massacre of men, women, and children of the hated usurping race, till the moment when she fell lifeless from her white war-horse, by the side of her dead sister.

Nowhere was the overweening confidence

‡ *Ibid.*, p. 28.

§ *Ibid.*, p. 37.

|| The Rana Umra, the opponent of the Emperor Jehangir.—*Tod's Rajast'han*, vol. i., p. 367.

of the English more remarkable than at Jhansi, which, as the residence of a Native court, had attained some importance for its trade and manufactures. The former rajah had paid great attention to the regulation of its streets and bazaars, which were remarkably clean and orderly.* Sleeman estimated its population at 60,000†—a very large number in proportion to the size of the place, and the state of which it was the capital. Jhansi town is situated among tanks and groves of fine timber trees, and is surrounded by a good wall. The palace was itself a fortress, built on a rock overlooking the town; and the imposing appearance of this lofty mass of stone, surmounted by a huge round tower, was justified by the number of cannon it possessed, said to amount to some thirty or forty pieces. The government had had repeated warning of the bitter discontent which the annexation of any state, however small, caused in the capital, by drying up the main source of income of the citizens, who depended for a livelihood on the expenditure of the court; yet Jhansi was left, fort and all, without a single European soldier.

Jhansi lies on the route from Agra to Saugor, 142 miles south of the former, 130 north of the latter, and 245 west of Allahabad. The troops in the station consisted of—

Detail of Foot Artillery—*Europeans*, none; *Natives*, 27. Wing of the 12th N.I.—*Europeans*, 6; *Natives*, 522. Head-quarters and wing of 14th Irregular Cavalry—*Europeans*, 5; *Natives*, 332.

In all—11 Europeans to 881 Natives.

In the spring of the year the cartridge question had been the pretext, or the cause, of excitement and disaffection; but the infantry at Jhansi and at Nowgong (the nearest military station), are asserted "to have become ashamed at the mention of it;" and the burning of empty bungalows had ceased some time before the outbreak of the mutiny.‡ Captain Dunlop, the officer in command of the station, had no distrust of the troops; and the commissioner, Captain Skene, and the deputy-commissioner, Captain Gordon, concurred, up to the last, in ridiculing the precautions taken at Nowgong. Such, at least, is the

* Thornton's *Gazetteer*.

† Sleeman's *Rambles and Recollections*, vol. i., p. 282.

‡ Captain Scot, 12th N.I., to deputy-adjutant-general.—*Parl. Papers on Mutinies* (No. 4), p. 121.

statement of the case by Captain Scot, of the 12th N.I., then on duty at the latter station.§ Unfortunately, he writes from memory only; for the documents which would have shown, beyond the possibility of doubt, the state of affairs at Jhansi and Nowgong, were destroyed, with the other records, in the conflagration which took place at both places; and the accounts sent to Cawnpore met a similar fate.

Captain Scot, however, states from his own knowledge, that some days before the mutiny occurred, Captain Dunlop sent over to Major Kirke, the officer in command at Nowgong, letters from Skene and Gordon, declaring that they had learned, from separate sources, that one Luckmun Rao (the servant of the Ranees of Jhansi) was doing his best to induce the 12th N.I. to mutiny; but whether with or without the authority of the Ranees, had not been ascertained. Subsequent letters spoke of spies, or agents of sedition, finding their way to the Native lines, and being strongly opposed by some of the more loyal and zealous sepoys. Of the fidelity of the Irregulars no suspicion appears to have been entertained; and, indeed, both at Jhansi and Nowgong, the infantry revolted first, though "the cavalry were the most bloodthirsty" afterwards.

The only European testimony on record regarding the mutiny, is a brief and scarcely legible note from Captain Dunlop. Concerning the massacre which ensued, there is none; for no European witness survived to tell the tale. The note runs thus:—

"To the Officer commanding at Nowgong.

"Jhansi, June 4th, 1857; 4 P.M.

"Sir,—The artillery and infantry have broken into mutiny, and have entered the Star Fort. No one has been hurt as yet. Look out for stragglers.

"Yours, &c.,

"J. DUNLOP."

This communication reached Major Kirke, by express, at eleven o'clock on the following day.

On the 10th, a letter in English came from Tewary Hossein, the tehsildar of Mowraneeppoor (thirty miles from Nowgong), stating that he had heard of the murder of every European at Jhansi, and had received a perwaannah, to the effect that the Ranees were seated on the gadi (Hindoo

§ See despatch last quoted; and a long letter published in the *Times*, September 11th, 1857; not signed, but evidently written by Captain Scot, to the wife of Lieutenant Ryves, acquainting her with that officer's escape to Gwalior and Agra.

throne), and that he was to carry on business as hitherto. He added, that he meant to leave the place at once; and he did so. The same afternoon, the mails that had been sent towards Jhansi on the 5th and subsequent days, were brought back in one bag, the runners having feared to enter the station.*

Many weeks elapsed before any authentic statements could be obtained of the proceedings at Jhansi, after the transmission of Captain Dunlop's note. At length Captain Scot ascertained and communicated to government the following account, which he obtained from three natives, one of whom was with the Europeans during the whole of the outbreak. The evidence was given by the three witnesses separately at Nowgong, Mahoba, and Banda; and agreed so nearly as to be received as trustworthy.

Only one company (7th) of the 12th N.I. mutinied on the 4th of June. Headed by a havildar, named Goor Bux, the men marched into the Star fort. This was a small building, where the guns and treasure were kept, close to the infantry guns.

Captain Dunlop paraded the rest of the 12th N.I., with the cavalry; and they all said they would stand by him. Disarming them, of course, was out of the question. Captain Dunlop was an energetic officer, and had been reported, by General Wheeler, a few days before, as "a man for the present crisis." Seeing that all continued quiet, he employed himself, on the 6th of June, in preparing shells at the quarter-guard of the 12th N.I. He then posted some letters; and in returning from the office, with Ensign Taylor, crossed or approached the parade. Here he and his companion were shot dead by some of the 12th. The poor ensign had only arrived at Jhansi a few days before, having made great haste to rejoin his regiment, when the mutiny began. Lieutenant Campbell, 15th N.I., serving with the 14th Irregulars, escaped to the palace-fort, where Lieutenant Burgess, of the revenue survey department, with

several English and Eurasian subordinates, had been for some time residing. On the evening of the 4th of June, they were joined by Captain Skene, his wife and two children; Lieutenant Gordop, Dr. M'Egan, his wife and sister; Lieutenant Powys, his wife and child; Mrs. G. Browne, her sister and child; and the English and Eurasian *employés* in the Civil and Canal departments, and Salt excise. Lieutenant G. Browne, the deputy-commissioner, fled to Oorai, with Ensign Browne and Lieutenant Lamb.† Lieutenant Ryves‡ and another European, named McKellar, escaped to Gwalior. Lieutenant Turnbull took refuge in a tree, but was discovered and shot down. Whether the Europeans in the fort held any communication with the Rance is not known; but they are stated to have remained unmolested till the 7th of June, and to have been employed, during the interval, in endeavouring to get provisions and ammunition into the fort (though with very partial success), and in piling stones against the gates to prevent their being opened. Unhappily there were traitors within, as well as rebels without. Lieutenant Powys was found by Captain Burgess, lying bleeding from a wound in the neck. He survived just long enough to point out the four assassins who had attacked him. These were Mussulmans employed in the revenue survey; they were immediately put to death.§ When attacked, the Europeans are said to have made great havoc among the besiegers with rifles and guns; but to have themselves lost only one of their number, Captain Gordon, who was shot through the head while leaning over the parapet, pulling up a bucket which a syce in the lower enclosure had filled with wheat. The little garrison appears to have been totally unprovisioned for a siege. The letters written by Dunlop to Kirke, before the partial mutiny on the 4th, prove this; and afterwards, it was probably as much as the officers could do to obtain supplies for the party within the walls. Attempts were vainly made to send word to Nagode and

* Further Parl. Papers, 1857 (No. 4), p. 125.

† Statement of Commissioner Erskine.—*London Gazette*, May 6th, 1857; p. 2248.

‡ In the *East India Army List* for 1858, Lieutenant Ryves is mentioned as having been killed on the 6th at Jhansi; but this must be an error. He quitted Jhansi, with a detachment, two or three days before the mutiny; and although he may have returned there, he certainly reached both Gwalior and Agra some time later.—Officer's Letters, in *Times*, September 3rd and 11th, 1857.

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§ This is the account given by the native with the Europeans in the fort; but according to the statement of another native in the city at the time, the immediate incentive to the murder of Lieutenant Powys was, that that officer seeing Captain Burgess' khitmutgar (table-attendant) attempting to pull down the stones that secured the gates, shot him; whereupon, the brother of the fallen man cut down the officer with his tulwar, and was instantly put to death by Lieutenant Burgess.—Further Parl. Papers, 1857 (No. 4), p. 132.

to Gwalior for help: some of the clerks tried to escape in native clothes, letting themselves down by ropes; but they were caught and killed.

Kala Khan, risaldar of the 14th cavalry, was active in the assault. Ahmed Hossein, the tehsildar of Jhansi, likewise took a leading part, in connection with the adherents of the Rance. The men employed in the Salt excise joined in the attack. The Europeans felt that the struggle was hopeless, and the Hindoos and Mohammedans are alleged to have induced them to surrender, by swearing that their lives should be spared. Captain Skene opened the gates, and marched out.* The traitors instantly threw their vows to the wind; and, separating the men from the women, tied the former in a row by ropes, took the whole party into a garden in or near the city, and there beheaded them all except John Newton, the quartermaster of the 12th N.I. (a very dark half-caste), his wife, and four little children. This family was spared by the rebels, and carried off by them when they were driven from Jhansi. Lieutenant Powys is thought to have died in the fort. He could not walk out with the rest of the party. His wife was torn from him, and fell in the general massacre. "The men died first," writes Captain Scot; "Burgess taking the lead, his elbows tied behind his back, and a prayer-book in his hands. What a sad end for so kind-hearted and unselfish a man! But to die confessing the faith is a noble death. The rest died in the same way. They tried hard to get the women and children saved." But it was in vain. The Rance does not appear to have been appealed to; but it is too probable that it was by the orders of this ambitious and childless widow—disinherited herself, and prohibited from exercising the right of adoption—that the ruthless deed was consummated. The women, we are told, "stood with their babes in their arms, and the older children holding their gowns. They had to see the men killed;" but there was every reason to believe "they were spared any violence save death."†

The care bestowed by Captain Scot, in his official capacity, in sifting and collecting evidence from every available source, would, under any circumstances, be very commendable; but is specially satisfactory,

as refuting the painful story which went the round of the English and Indian journals at the time, with regard to the fate of Captain Skene and his young wife. Their friends may be sure they joined with their fellow-Christians in "confessing the faith;" and were probably better prepared to meet death by the sword, than many of their countrymen might be to struggle with the great adversary on their beds in England. But the long interval which elapsed before the particulars above related were ascertained, gave room for the wildest rumours. Captain Scot's account was not published until August. In the meantime, the following extract from a letter, said to have been written from India to a relative of the maligned officer, was published far and wide:—

"Frank Gordon, Alice Skene, his wife, and a few peons, managed to get into a small round tower when the disturbance began; the children and all the rest were in other parts of the fort—altogether, sixty. Gordon had a regular battery of guns, also revolvers; and he and Skene picked off the rebels as fast as they could fire, Mrs. Skene loading for them. The peons say they never missed once; and before it was all over they killed thirty-seven, besides many wounded. The rebels, after butchering all in the fort, brought ladders against the tower, and commenced swarming up. Frank Gordon was shot through the forehead, and killed at once. Skene then saw it was no use going on any more, so he kissed his wife, shot her, and then himself."

Information subsequently obtained, regarding the massacre, tended to confirm the evidence adduced against the Rance. Mr. Thornton, the deputy-collector, writing on the 18th of August, states it as the general impression, that the mutineers, after killing their own officers and plundering the treasury (which contained about £45,000), were going off; and it was wholly at the instigation of the Jhansi princess, with a view to her obtaining possession of the district, that they, together with other armed men furnished by the Rance, attacked the fort. He adds, that they induced the Europeans to surrender, by solemnly swearing to allow them to depart unmolested; notwithstanding which, "they allowed them to be massacred by the Rance's people in their presence, in a most cruel and brutal manner, having no regard to sex or age. For this act, the mutineers are said to have received from her 35,000 rupees in cash, two elephants, and five horses. The Rance has now raised a body of about 14,000 men, and has twenty guns, which had been kept concealed by the former Jhansi chief, by being buried within

* The day on which the surrender was made, appears to have been the 8th of June.

† Captain Scot's Letter.—*Times*, Sept. 11th, 1857.

the fort, and of which nothing was known to our officers. I am not certain whether she intends to make any resistance in case our troops come to this quarter; but none of the other native chiefs in Bundelcund have as yet turned against our government.”*

Leaving the Ranee to possess, for a brief space, the blood-stained gadi of Jhansi, we follow the stream of revolt in the sister-station of

Nowgong.—The troops stationed here were almost the counterpart of those at Jhansi; but happily there was no vindictive princess at Nowgong to urge them on to imbrue their hands in the blood of their officers, or their helpless families. The troops consisted of—

A company of Artillery—*Europeans*, 2; *Natives*, 105. Head-quarters and right wing of 12th N.I.—*Europeans*, 6; *Natives*, 604. Left wing of the 14th Irregular Cavalry—*Europeans*, 1; *Natives*, 273.†

In all—nine Europeans to 982 Natives.

The first symptoms of disaffection were manifested by the burning of empty bungalows, which commenced on the 23rd of April, and was evidently the work of incendiaries, though the guilty persons could not be discovered. The excitement subsided, and matters went on quietly until the 23rd of May, up to which time the Europeans were very imperfectly informed of the fatal events which had occurred in other stations. On that day, the risaldar in command of the cavalry, informed Major Kirke that his corps had learned, by letter from Delhi, the murder of every Christian in that city. He appeared to wonder at the little the Europeans knew of the proceedings in Delhi, while he and his companions were so well-informed on the subject. On the same day, Major Kirke's orderly, a sepoy of the 12th N.I., rushed into the major's house, and told him that he had just got away from a party of twenty or so Poorbeahs and Boondelas, who had asked him to point out the officers' mess-house. They seemed to be disappointed in the non-appearance of an accomplice to guide them. The orderly said he had made an excuse and got away from them. Major Kirke, with his adjutant, his son, and one or two armed sepoys, went to the spot indicated, after having caused it to be surrounded by sowars (under the command of

the risaldar before mentioned), that no person might escape. Only three men were captured: one ran off; and rather than stop, or make a reply, beyond saying he was a sepoy, let himself be fired at three times: the two others found a hiding-place in a hollow tree, till the party had passed, and then darted off towards the artillery lines, which were afterwards vainly searched for the fugitives. The risaldar was believed to have connived at their escape; and he endeavoured to persuade the Europeans that the orderly's story was altogether a fabrication; but Major Kirke considered that the sepoy had made up a story to put the officers on their guard, not choosing to reveal the actual circumstances. From that night the Irregulars, both officers and men, behaved in a most unsatisfactory manner; the former with the “freezing politeness which Mohammedans well know how to assume;” the latter doing duty in a gay, careless fashion, as much as to say, “It will soon be at an end—we are merely amusing ourselves obeying orders;” while even the sick in the hospital were insolent to the doctors, until a few days before the mutiny, when the ill-feeling either subsided or was disguised. The 12th N.I. were most suspected; but the officers slept nightly in their lines; and in the first few days of June, mutual confidence appeared restored. The Europeans, relieved by the altered tone of the sowars, considered that the news of the massacre of the Christians at Delhi, had possibly roused a fanatical feeling, which had subsequently given place to a conviction “that their pay and earthly prospects were not to be despised.”‡ This was deemed the case with the risaldar, who had been specially distrusted. He was a grey-headed man, of delicate constitution, and his rank and pay were important considerations; and he evinced much distress on hearing the state of affairs at Jhansi, as communicated in Captain Dunlop's letter, received at 11 A.M. on the 5th of June. The Europeans reminded him that no word had come of the Irregulars mutinying; but he said he much feared they would do so, as they had very few officers, European or Native, and most of the men were very young. Before the Jhansi news reached Nowgong, four out of five companies of the wing of the 12th N.I. (following the example of the 70th N.I.) had volunteered

* Further Parl. Papers (No. 4), p. 169.

† Parl. Return, 9th February, 1858; p. 3.

‡ Report of Captain Scot.—Further Papers, 1857 (No. 4), p. 122.

It is hardly necessary to remark that the Bengal presidency did not assume a loftier tone of feeling in questions regarding religion or morality under the auspices of Lord Clive. The priestly office was not then deemed inconsistent with mercantile pursuits; and the saving of souls gave place to the engrossing cares of money-making. As to the general state of society, Clive's own account affords abundant evidence of the aptitude with which cadets and writers, fresh from public schools, or, it may be from the pure atmosphere of a quiet home, plunged headlong into a career of extravagance and notorious profligacy, of which the least revolting description would have made their mothers sicken with disgust. One walk about Calcutta would, it appears, suffice to show a stranger that the youngest writers lived in splendid style, which Lord Clive explains, by saying "that they ride upon fine prancing Arabian horses, and in palanquins and chaises; that they keep seraglios, make entertainments, and treat with champagne and claret;"—the certain result being, to become over head and ears in debt to the banyan, or native agent, who, for the

ceive presents after they had been required to sign covenants enjoining their rejection. For instance, his staunch adherent, General Carnac, after his colleagues had executed the covenants, delayed a certain time, during which he received a present of 70,000 rupees from Bulwant Singh, the Hindoo rajah of Benares, who joined the English against Shuja Dowlah; and he appears to have afterwards obtained permission to appropriate a further sum of two lacs of rupees, given by the emperor, whose unquestioned poverty did not shield him from the extortions of British officers. It has been urged that Clive made atonement for the doubtful means by which he acquired his wealth by its liberal distribution; and the act chiefly insisted upon is the grant of an annuity of £500 a-year to General Lawrence, when he left India enfeebled by asthmatic complaints and the increasing infirmities of age, and returned in honourable poverty to his native land. Considering that Clive acknowledged that to the patronage and instructions of Lawrence he owed all his early success, the extent of the allowance was no very remarkable evidence of a munificent disposition. The dowries of three or four thousand pounds each to his five sisters, with an injunction "to marry as soon as possible, for they had no time to lose" (ii., 161), evince a strong desire to get them off his hands. The princely estates purchased by him, in various parts of the country, were undisguised manifestations of his ostentatious mode of life: among them may be named the noble property of Claremont (obtained from the Duchess of Newcastle), Walcot, Lord Chatham's former residence at Bath, and a house in Berkeley-square. No description of expense was spared to render these aristocratic dwellings fitting exponents of the grandeur of the Indian *millionnaire*; and the smaller accessories of picture galleries and

sake of obtaining the cover afforded by the bare name of a servant of the powerful English company, supplied the youths with immense sums of money, and committed "such acts of violence and oppression as his interest prompts him to."* It may be remembered that Clive commenced his own Indian career by getting into debt; and there is reason to believe that for *all* the proceedings mentioned by him in the above quotation, the company's servants might have pleaded his lordship's conduct in extenuation of their own.†

After the departure of Clive, a select committee continued, by his advice, to preside over the affairs of Bengal, the chair of the governor being filled by Mr. Verelst until December, 1770. During the administration of this gentleman and his temporary successor, Mr. Cartier, no changes were made in the system of the "double government:" that is to say, of a sway carried on in the name of a nabob, but in reality by English officials. Mill forcibly describes the utter want of any efficient system, or of well-known and generally recognised laws, which formed the prevailing

pleasure-grounds did not hinder Clive from carefully following out his leading object—of obtaining parliamentary influence. Six or seven members were returned at his expense, and their efforts doubtless did much to mitigate, though they could not wholly avert, the storm which burst over his head in 1772. The decision of the committee employed in examining his past conduct pronounced, as was fitting, a sentence of mingled praise and condemnation. He had notoriously abused the powers entrusted to him by the nation and the company; but he had rendered to both important services. Such a decision was ill calculated to soothe the excited feelings of Clive, whose haughty nature had writhed under proceedings in which he, the Baron of Plassy, had been "examined like a sheep-stealer." The use of opium, to which he had been from early youth addicted, aggravated the disturbed state of his mind, without materially alleviating the sufferings of his physical frame; and he died by his own hand in Nov., 1774, having newly entered his fiftieth year.—(Malcolm's *Life*.)

* Clive's speech on East Indian Judicature Bill, March, 1722.—(Hansard's *Parl. Hist.*, 355.)

† The French translator of the *Siyar ul Mutakherin* (who was in the service of the Bengal presidency and well acquainted with Clive, to whom he occasionally acted as interpreter) explains a forcible denunciation by Gholam Hussein, of the conduct of certain persons who were tempted by the devil to bring disgrace on families, as an allusion to the violation of all decorum committed by Meer Jaffier, in giving to Clive "ten handsome women out of his seraglio—that is, out of Surajah Dowlah's." Had the donation been conferred on a good Mussulman, instead of a disbeliever in the Koran, the sin would, it seems, have been thereby greatly diminished.—(*Siyar ul Mutakherin*, i., 722.)

feature of this period. The native tribunals retained scarce the shadow of authority; the trade of the country was almost ruined by the oppressions committed on the people; and the monopoly of the inland traffic in salt, betel-nut, and tobacco, when at length unwillingly relinquished by the English officials, did not prove the relief to the Bengalee merchants that might have been expected, owing to the heavy pressure of tyranny and extortion to which they were subjected. In fact, there were so many channels by which the natives could be wronged and the company plundered, that closing up one or two might change the direction of the flood, but could not diminish its volume. Clive was naturally unwilling to acknowledge how much of the task for which he had been munificently rewarded had been left unfulfilled; and it was not till after long and bitter experience that the E. I. Cy. learned to appreciate, at their proper value, his exaggerated account of the revenues* obtained through his aggressive policy. And here it may be well to pause and consider for a moment the nature of our position in Bengal, and, indeed, in the whole of the south of India. The insatiable ambition of Aurungzebe had urged him onwards without ceasing, until every Mohammedan kingdom in the Deccan had become absorbed in the Mogul empire. The impolicy of this procedure has been before remarked on. The tottering base forbade the extension of an already too weighty superstructure; but the emperor persevered to the last. Becjapoor and Golconda fell before him, and the governments established by their usurping dynasties were swept off by a conqueror who had time to destroy institutions, but not to replace them. The result was the rapid rise of the many-headed Mahratta power, and the equally rapid decay of Mogul supremacy, even while Aurungzebe, his sons, grandsons, and great-grandsons were all in arms together for its support. The death of the emperor, well nigh hunted down by the foes who from despising he had learned to hate, followed as it was by repeated wars of

succession and intestine feuds, reduced his descendants, step by step, until their last representative, Shah Alum, became nothing better than the pageant of every successful party. The disastrous battle of Paniput (1761) left the Mahratta state thoroughly unhinged, and, together with internal strife, incapacitated its rulers for assuming that dominant position in India under which such men as Sevajee, Bajee Rao, or the first peishwa, Maharashtra, would doubtless have aspired. In fact, India in the middle of the eighteenth century, resembled, in a political point of view, a vast battle-field strewn with the fragments of ruined states, and affording on every side abundant evidence of a prolonged and severe conflict, from which even the victors had emerged irretrievably injured. In the Deccan this was especially the case; and the only relics of legitimate power rested with a few small Hindoo states (Tanjore, Mysoor, Coorg, &c.), whose physical position or insignificance had enabled them to retain independence amid the general crash of monarchies. The representatives of the E. I. Cy. in India understood the state of affairs, but very imperfectly: it appears that, in 1756, they did not even clearly know who Ballajee Bajee Rao (the actual ruler of the Mahratta state) might be; but at the same time, they had been too long anxious spectators of the proceedings of Aurungzebe and his successors, to be ignorant of the thoroughly disorganised state of the empire. The successful manœuvres of Dupleix and Bussy must have sufficed to remove any lingering doubt on the subject; while the jealousy of the two nations in Europe rendered it evident, that in the absence of a native power (Mussulman or Hindoo) sufficiently strong to compel their neutrality, a contest for supremacy must, sooner or later, take place between the French and English, especially as the former had all along assumed political pretensions ill at variance with the peaceful pursuits of trade. Without entering on the difficult question of the general proceedings of the English company, far

* In addressing the House of Commons, in 1772, Clive described Bengal as "a country containing fifteen millions of inhabitants, a revenue of £4,000,000, and trade in proportion." The extreme distress then existing he treated as a temporary effect of dissensions in the company at home, and misgovernment in India, dating of course from his departure; and he spoke of the venality that prevailed, equally among high and low, with a bold assumption of disinterestedness, declaring, "that in the richest country

in the world, where the power of the English had become absolute, where no inferior approached his superior but with a present in his hand, where there was not an officer commanding H.M. fleet, nor an officer commanding H.M. army, nor a governor, nor a member of council, nor any other person, civil or military, in such a station as to have connection with the country government who had not received presents, it was not to be expected the inferior officers should be more scrupulous."—Almon's *Debates*, 1772.

less attempting to vindicate the special aggressions and tricky policy of Clive and his successors, it seems, nevertheless, of absolute necessity to bear in mind the hopeless complication of affairs through which Anglo-Indian statesmen had to grope their way at this critical period; nor do I feel any inconsistency, after employing the best years of my life in pleading—faintly and feebly, but most earnestly—the rights of native British subjects (made such by the sword), in avowing, in the present instance, my conviction, that having once taken a decided course by the deposition of Surajah Dowlah, it would have been better to have assumed at once all power, in name as in reality, over Bengal, and given the natives the benefits they were entitled to expect under a Christian government, instead of mocking their hopes by placing on the musnud a Mussulman usurper of infamous character,—deposing, reinstating, and after his death continuing the pretence in the person of his illegitimate son. Such an unworthy subterfuge could answer no good purpose; it could deceive no one—certainly not the European governments of Spain, Portugal, Holland, and France; for they were severally experienced actors in the theatre of oriental policy. The native population knew, to their cost, that all real authority was now vested in the English presidency; but its members were far too eagerly employed in gathering up spoil for themselves, to heed the cries of the poor in Bengal, or the remonstrances of the company in England. The consequence was, the “middle-men” reaped an abundant harvest, heedless of the ruinous effects of their negligence and venality alike on those they served and those they governed. The directors in London, buoyed up by the representations of Clive, and the flattering promises of their servants abroad, augmented their dividends, fully expecting to find this step justified by largely increasing remittances from India. On the contrary, the anarchy which prevailed, and the additional expenses of every department of government, with the abuses that crept in,* swallowed up the diminishing revenues; and though every ship brought home individuals who had amassed wealth as if by magic, yet heavy bills continued to be drawn on the company; the

* Clive, in allusion to the charges of contractors, commissioners, engineers, &c., said—“Every man now who is permitted to make a bill, makes a fortune.” During his own administration, he found soldiers charged for in the hospital-list, whose funeral expenses had been long paid.—(*Life*, iii., 137—288.)

bullion sent for the China trade was wholly, or in part, appropriated; and the investments continued to diminish alike in quantity and quality. The British government had before set forth a claim to control both the revenues and territorial arrangements of India. The subject was warmly contested in parliament; and in 1767, a bill passed obliging the E. I. Cy. to pay the sum of £400,000 per annum into the public treasury,† during the five years for which alone their exclusive privileges were formally extended. In 1769, a new term of five years was granted, on the same condition as that above stated, with the additional stipulation of annually exporting British manufactures to the amount of £300,000 and upwards. The directors, in the following year (1770), declared a dividend at the rate of twelve per cent; but this improvident procedure was taken in the face of a failing revenue and an increasing debt. In the Carnatic, the ill-advised pledge of co-operation with the Nizam had brought the Madras presidency in collision with Hyder Ali; and in Bengal, affairs grew more and more involved, until the necessity for a change of policy became evident to save the country from ruin and the company from bankruptcy. Mr. Vansittart (the ex-governor), Mr. Scrafton, and Colonel Forde, were sent out in 1769, to investigate and arrange the business of the three presidencies: but this measure proved of no effect; for the *Aurora* frigate, in which they sailed, after doubling the Cape of Good Hope, was never more heard of, and probably foundered at sea.

The loss of Mr. Vansittart was a new disaster to the native population of Bengal, since he well knew the ruinous condition to which they had been reduced by the baneful influence of the monopolies so cruelly enforced by his countrymen; and notwithstanding the perverse proceedings of Clive, and his adherents in the E. I. House in associating with him as fellow-commissioner his sworn foe, Luke Scrafton, still some comprehensive measure might have been expected to have been devised by a man generally considered kind-hearted, to relieve the overwhelming misery in which he would have found the native population involved, had he been permitted to reach

† The E. I. Cy. themselves proposed to purchase the extension of their privileges by suffering the public to participate in the territorial acquisitions gained with the aid of the army and navy. The government interfered (ostensibly at least) to check the simultaneous increase of debt and dividend.

Calcutta in safety. The miseries of a land long a prey to oppression and misgovernment, had been brought to their climax by drought. The rice crops of December, 1768, and August, 1769, were both scanty, and the absence of the heavy periodical rains, usual in October, produced an almost total failure of the harvest earnestly desired in the following December. The inferior crops of grain and pulse ordinarily reaped between February and April, were dried to powder by the intense heat, and Bengal, formerly the granary of India, became the scene of one of the most awful famines on record. Not merely whole families, but even the inhabitants of entire villages were swept off by this devastating scourge.* The bark and leaves of trees were eagerly devoured by thousands of starving wretches, who therewith strove—too often in vain—to appease the gnawing pangs of hunger, happy if their sufferings did not goad them to seek relief by more unnatural and loathsome means; for the last horrors that marked the siege of the Holy City were not wanting here; the child fed on its dead parent, the mother on her offspring. The people thronged the towns in the hope of obtaining succour, the highways were strewn with the corpses of those who had perished by the way, and the streets of Moorshedabad and Calcutta were blocked up with the dying and the dead. Day after day the Hooghly rolled down a pestilential freight of mortality, depositing loathsome heaps near to the porticoes and gardens of the English residents. For a time a set of persons were regularly employed in removing the rapidly accumulating masses from the public thoroughfares; but the melancholy office proved fatal to all employed in it: exposure to the effluvia was certain death; and during the worst period, dogs, vultures, and jackals were the only scavengers. The hot, unwholesome air was filled with shrieks and

lamentations, amidst which arose the voices of tender and delicate women, nurtured in all the refinements of oriental seclusion, who now came forth unveiled, and on their knees besought a handful of rice for themselves and their children.†

Large subscriptions were raised by the presidency, the native government, and individuals of all ranks and countries. In Moorshedabad alone, 7,000 persons were fed daily for several months; and fearful scenes, involving the destruction of large numbers of the weak and the aged, took place at these distributions, from the fierce struggles of the famished multitudes. Of the total amount of life destroyed by this calamity, no trustworthy estimate has ever been given.‡ Mr. Hastings—perhaps the best authority—supposes Bengal and Bahar to have lost no less than half their inhabitants: other writers state the depopulation at one-third; and even the lowest calculations place the loss at three million of human beings—or one-fifth the inhabitants of the three provinces (including Orissa.)

The question of how far the Bengal authorities were to blame for this calamity, was warmly discussed in England. Their accusers went the length of attributing it wholly to a monopoly of rice by them; but this was so far from being the case, that, with the exception of the necessary measure of storing a sufficient quantity (60,000 maunds) for the use of the army, all trading in grain was strictly forbidden by an order of council in September, 1769. If, as was asserted, certain functionaries did—as is very possible, in defiance of prohibitions, enunciated but not enforced§—make enormous profits of hoards previously accumulated, these were but exceptional cases; and it may be added (without any attempt to exculpate those who, in the face of misery so extreme, could bargain coolly for exorbitant gains), that the reason for regret was

* The anonymous but well-informed author of *English Transactions in the East Indies*, published at Cambridge in 1776, states, that the duty laid by Clive on salt was thirty-five per cent.; the previous tax, even under the monopolies established by Mohammedan nabobs, having been only two-and-a-half. He adds, that the five gentlemen who signed resolutions regarding trading monopolies in India, to levy taxes upon necessities of more than one-third their value, instead of the fortieth penny with which they were before charged, were all, on their return to England, chosen as members of parliament to co-operate in arranging the national assessments.—(143.)

† *Vide Siyar ul Mutakherin*, ii., 438. Hamilton's *Gazetteer*, i., 214. Macaulay's *Clive*, 83.

‡ Gleig's *Life of Warren Hastings*, i., 309. Malcolm's *Clive*, iii., 253. Grant's *Sketch*, 319.

§ The author of *English Transactions*, recently quoted, concurs with many writers of the period in asserting, that some of the company's agents, finding themselves conveniently situated for the collection of rice in stores, did buy up large quantities, which they so managed as to increase immensely the selling price to the people, for their private gain (p. 145); and Dr. Moodie, in his *Transactions in India* (published anonymously in London in 1776, but of which a copy bearing his name, with many MS. additions, is in the possession of the E. I. Co.), mentions the case of a needy English functionary at the court of the nabob, who made £60,000 in a few months.

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not that some few persons had had the forethought to make provision for the day of want, but that a policy of evident necessity should have been neglected by the rulers of a population mainly dependent for subsistence on so precarious a staple as rice. The true cause of complaint against the Bengal presidency—and it is a heavy one—rests on the systematic oppression and utter misgovernment which their own records reveal as having existed, despite the orders of the directors in England. These again, deceived by the gross exaggerations of Clive, looked upon Bengal as a fountain fed by unseen springs, from which wealth, to an immense extent, might be perpetually drawn, without the return of any considerable proportion to the country from whence it was derived. Clive, during his second administration, had promised the company a net income from Bengal of £2,000,000 per annum, exclusive of all civil or military disbursements; and he declared in parliament, in 1772, that India continued to yield “a clear produce to the public, and to individuals, of between two and three million sterling per annum.”* It is certain that the Bengal investment of 1771, amounting in goods alone to £768,500, was “wholly purchased with the revenues of the country, and without importing a single ounce of silver”†—a fact which abundantly confirms the declaration of Hastings,—that the sufferings of the people, during the famine, were increased by the

violent measures adopted to keep up the revenues, especially by an assessment termed *na-jay*, “a tax (in a word) upon the survivors, to make up the deficiencies of the dead.”‡ Besides this, when the immense and absolutely incalculable amount of specie exported, from the time of the deposition of Surajah Dowlah to the epoch of the famine, is considered in connexion with the notorious deficiency of the circulating medium, and the abuses and erroneous policy connected with the coinage,§ it is easy to understand how fearfully scarcity of money must have aggravated the evils of failing harvests; and how, when rice rose from a standard of price (already permanently augmented under British supremacy to four, six, and even ten times the usual rate), it became of little importance to the penniless multitudes whether it might or might not be purchased for a certain sum, when all they had in the world fell short of the market value of a single meal. In England, the rates of labour are always more or less influenced by the price of provisions; but when the Bengal merchants endeavoured to raise the manufacturing standard, their attempts were soon forcibly put down by the local authorities, who well knew that Indian goods, purchased at a premium consistent even with a Bengalee’s humble notion of a “fair day’s wages for a fair day’s work,” would not, when sold in the European markets, indemnify the company for prime cost, for

* Malcolm’s *Life of Clive*, iii., 287.

† Verelst’s *State of Bengal*, see pp. 81—85.

‡ Gleig’s *Life of Warren Hastings*, i., 310.

§ A cotemporary English writer, reviewing the evidence given before parliament in 1772, remarks, that from 1757 to 1771, it is acknowledged or proved, that the E. I. Cy. and their servants received between twenty-nine and thirty millions sterling from Indian princes and their subjects, besides a sum not known, arising from trading monopolies.—(Parker’s *Evidence*, 281.) Of the amount above stated, the company received nearly twenty-four million, and their servants upwards of five-and-a-half as presents, which were, however, but one form of what Clive termed the “long track of frauds under the customary disguise of perquisites,” which annually brought lacs to junior servants whose salaries were mere pittance.—(*Life of Clive*, iii., 84; *Life of Hastings*, i., 300.) No estimate could be formed of the fortunes thus accumulated, because the prohibition of the directors to send remittances home, exceeding a certain limited amount, by bills drawn on them in England, led Clive and the whole body of officials who, at a humble distance, followed in his footsteps, to invest their wealth in the purchase of diamonds, or to transmit vast sums through the medium of the Dutch and French companies, by which means these inferior settlements had money in abundance, while the investments at Calcutta were often procured by

loans, of which eight per cent. was the lowest interest taken for a long series of years. Among the charges brought against Clive, when examined before parliament in 1772, were frauds in the exchange and the gold coinage. According to Ferishta, no silver coin was used in India as late as A.D. 1311; and Colonel Briggs, in commenting on this passage, remarks, that up to a very late period, the chief current coin in the south of India was a small gold fanam, worth about sixpence.—(i., 375.) Since then, however, gold having been entirely superseded by silver, measures were instituted to bring the former again into circulation; and on the new coinage Clive received a heavy per-centage, as governor. The ill-fated bankers—Juggut Seit and his brother—had introduced a tax on the silver currency during the short reign of Surajah Dowlah, which the English very improperly adopted. It consisted in issuing coins called *sicca* rupees, every year, at five times their actual value, and insisting on the revenues being paid in this coin only, during the period of its arbitrary value—that is, during the year of coinage. In three years it sank to the actual value of the silver; but its possessor, on payment of three per cent., might have it recoinced into a new *sicca* rupee of the original exaggerated value. *Vide* Dow’s account of this ingenious method of yearly “robbing the public of three per cent. upon the greater part of their current specie.”—(*History of Hindoostan*, i., Introduction, p. cxlvii.)

duties and other expenses, exclusive of the profit, which is the originating motive of all commercial associations. Now, it is a well-known fact, that many men who, in their private capacity, would sooner face ruin than inflict it on the innocent, will, as members of a senate or corporation (under the influence of a vague notion of state-necessity or the good of proprietors, whose interests it is their acknowledged duty to consult), institute proceedings of a character utterly opposed to the simple principles of action which guide them in the daily intercourse of domestic life. Flagrant wrong they shrink from with unaffected disgust; but still there are few men who do not, with strange inconsistency, manifest by their practice that public affairs require a constant sacrifice of integrity to expediency, which once admitted as justifiable in their private career, must inevitably destroy the mutual confidence which forms the basis of that distinguishing national characteristic—an English home. The ignorance of the E. I. Cy. of the actual state of affairs (in great measure the result of the newness of their position), was doubtless the leading cause of their suffering the continuance of many unquestionably faulty practices, from the difficulty of providing efficient substitutes. The course of events was well fitted to teach them the great lesson—that there is no course so dangerous to rulers as a persistence in tyranny and misgovernment. The misery of the mass, aggravated by the shameless extortions of English functionaries, necessitated a large increase of military expenses: * taxes were literally enforced at the point of the bayonet; “bur-jaut,” or the compulsory sale of articles at less than their actual cost, became a notorious practice; and, simultaneous with these iniquitous proceedings in India, were the pecuniary involvements of the company in London; and, what was yet more disgraceful, the fierce strife between the proprietors and directors, and again between both these and his majesty’s ministers.

While the sums obtained from Meer Jaffier and Cossim Ali were in process of payment, the affairs of the company went on smoothly enough: annual supplies were furnished for the China trade, and likewise for the Madras presidency (which was always in difficulties, notwithstanding the various

sums obtained from Mohammed Ali, the nabob of Arcot), while five lacs or more were yearly drawn by the Bombay presidency.† The dividend of the E. I. Cy., from Christmas, 1766, to Midsummer, 1772, averaged eleven per cent. per annum; during the last-named year it had reached twelve-and-a-half per cent., and this notwithstanding the stipulated payment to government of £400,000, in return for the continuance of the charter. Meantime the bonded debt of Bengal increased from £612,628, in 1771, to £1,700,000, in 1772; and the company, though most unwillingly, were obliged to throw themselves upon the mercy of the ministry (of which the Duke of Grafton and Lord North were at the head), and confess their utter inability to furnish their annual quota; and further, their necessity of soliciting from the Bank of England a loan of above a million sterling to carry on the commercial transactions of the ensuing season.

The government, thus directly appealed to, had ample grounds for instituting an inquiry into the condition of an association which, notwithstanding its immense trading and territorial revenues, had again become reduced to the verge of bankruptcy. It was argued, that the bitter complaints of venality and mismanagement, freely reciprocated by the directors and the servants of the company, were, on both sides, founded in truth. Moreover, the representations made on behalf of Mohammed Ali by his agents, particularly Mr. (afterwards Sir John) Macpherson, had considerable effect, not only generally in producing an unfavourable opinion of the dealings of the E. I. Cy. with Indian princes, but specially by inducing the sending to Arcot of a royal ambassador, Sir John Lindsay, and subsequently of Sir Robert Harland, between both of whom and the local government the most open hostility existed. These proceedings have had too little permanent effect to need being detailed at length, but they illustrate the state of feeling which led to the parliamentary investigations of 1772, and resulted in the first direct connexion of the ministry with the management of East Indian affairs, by the measure commonly known as the *Regulating Act* of 1773. A loan was granted to the company of £1,400,000 in exchequer bills,‡ and various

* Dow asserts, that “seven entire battalions were added to our military establishment to enforce the collections.”—(*Hindoostan*, I., cxxxix.)

† *Original Papers*, sent from India and published in England by Governor Vansittart.—(ii., 74.)

‡ The conditions of the loan were, that the sur-

distinct provisions were made to amend the constitution of that body, both at home and abroad, and to ameliorate the condition of the native population newly brought under their sway. A governor-general (Warren Hastings) was nominated to preside over Bengal, and to some extent control the presidencies of Madras, Bombay, and Bencoolen (in Sumatra); the number of counsellors was reduced to four; and these, together with the governor-general, were appointed for five years:* the old Mayor's Court at Calcutta was set aside, and a Supreme Court of judicature, composed of a chief justice and three puisne judges (all English barristers) established in its place, and invested with civil, criminal, admiralty, and ecclesiastical jurisdiction over all British subjects† resident in the three provinces (Bengal, Bahar, and Orissa); but the governor-general and members of council were exempted, unless indicted for treason or felony. Europeans were strictly forbidden to enter into the inland traffic in salt, betel-nut, tobacco, and rice; and the governors, counsellors, judges, and revenue-collectors, were rigidly prohibited all trade whatever. Not only the covenanted servants of the company, but also the civil and military officers of the crown, were forbidden to receive presents from the natives; and the maximum of the legal rate of interest in Bengal was fixed at twelve per cent. per annum. Specific punishments were affixed to the violation of the above

enactments, on conviction before the Supreme Court.

The majority of these regulations were of a nature which, from the political character of the English constitution, could be enforced against British subjects only by the express authority of their national rulers.‡ The privity of the Crown thus of necessity established in the affairs of the company, was further secured by a proviso, that all financial and political advices transmitted from India, should, within fourteen days after their arrival, be communicated to the administration by the Court of Directors;§ and any ordinance of the governor-general in council might be disallowed by the Crown, provided its veto were pronounced within two years after the enactment of the obnoxious measure.

The state of Bengal, at the period at which we have now arrived, has been sufficiently shown in the foregoing pages. The only events still unnoticed with regard to the CALCUTTA PRESIDENCY, are the death of the nabob, Syef-ad-Dowlah, of small-pox; the accession of his brother, Mobarik-ad-Dowlah, a boy of ten years old; and the departure of Shah Alum from Allahabad to take possession of his own capital of Delhi. After the retreat of the Doorani invader, the government of this city had been assumed by Nujeeb-oo-Dowla (the Rohilla chief frequently alluded to in previous pages), and, together with such authority, territorial and judicial, as yet remained

plus of the clear revenue of the company should be paid half-yearly into the exchequer, till the liquidation of the debt; that in the interim, their annual dividend should not exceed six per cent.; and that until the reduction of their total bond-debt to £1,500,000, the dividend should not exceed seven per cent.—(13 George III., c. 64.) Among the alterations made by this enactment in the internal arrangements of the association, was a decree for the annual election of six directors for the term of four years; the interval of a year to be then suffered to elapse before the same person could be again eligible; whereas the directors had been previously annually chosen for a single year, at the close of which they might be at once re-elected. The qualification for a vote was raised from £500 to £1,000 stock, and regulations were framed to prevent the collusive transfer of stock for electioneering purposes.

* The salary of the governor-general was fixed at £25,000 per ann.; the counsellors, £10,000 each; chief justice, £8,000; puisne judges, £6,000 each; to be received in lieu of all fees or perquisites.

† Notwithstanding the absolute nullity of any power in the youth on whom the title of nabob had been last conferred, the natives of Bengal were not yet viewed as British subjects; and by the *Regulating Act*, could not be sued in the Supreme Court,

(except upon any contract in writing, where the object in dispute exceeded 500 rupees in value), unless they were themselves willing to abide by the decision of that tribunal. This protective clause was set forth only in the directions for civil proceedings, and (probably from inadvertence) not repealed in those which regarded the penal court. The omission enabled the chief justice to adjudge the celebrated Nuncomar to death for forgery, at the suit of a native.

‡ The preamble to the act states it to have been a necessary measure, because several powers and authorities previously vested in the E. I. body had "been found, by experience, not to have sufficient force and efficacy to prevent various abuses which have prevailed in the government and affairs of the said company, as well at home as in India, to the manifest injury of the public credit, and of the commercial interests of the said company."

§ The regulations and ordinances decreed by the governor-general in council, were invalid unless duly registered and published in the Supreme Court of judicature. Appeals against any of them might be laid before the king in council by any person in India or in England, if lodged within sixty days after the publication of the act complained of, either at the Supreme Court or the E. I. House, where notices of all such measures were to be affixed.

connected therewith, was exercised by him in the name of the young prince, Jewan Bukht, the eldest son of Shah Alum, who had been left behind at the period of his father's flight in 1758. The encroachments of the Jat Rajah, Sooraj Mull, into whose hands Agra had fallen after the battle of Paniput, in 1761, resulted in a regular conflict between him and Nujeeb-oo-Dowla, in 1764. The rajah was killed at the very commencement of hostilities; and the endeavour of his son and successor, Jowher Sing, to prosecute the war by the assistance of the Mahratta chieftain, Mulhar Rao Holcar, proved ineffectual. In 1769, the peishwa's army crossed the Chumbul, and after desolating Rajast'han and levying arrears of chout from the Rajpoot princes, they proceeded to overrun the country of the Jats, which at this time extended from Agra to the borders of Delhi on the north-west, and near to Etawa on the south-east, and afforded a revenue of nearly £250,000. The Mahrattas gained a decided victory near Bhurtpoor, and made peace with the Jats on condition of receiving a sum of about £75,000. They then encamped for the monsoon, intending at its expiration to enter Rohilcund, and revenge on the leading chiefs the part played by them in concert with the Afghan victor at the bloody field of Paniput. Nujeeb-oo-Dowla took advantage of the interval to negotiate a treaty on behalf of himself and the Rohillas in general; and his overtures were favourably received, on account of the mutual need each party had of the other to obtain an object desirable in the sight of both, the withdrawal of the emperor from the immediate influence of the English, and his re-establishment in Delhi. The arrangement was marred by the death of Nujeeb-oo-Dowla, at the close of 1770. His son, Zabita Khan, who appears to have inherited the ambition, unchecked by the loyalty or prudence of his father, assumed the charge of affairs, and showed no inclination to procure the return of his liege lord. In the following year, Rohilcund was overrun by the Mahrattas; the strong fortress of Etawa fell into their hands; Delhi was seized by them, and Zabita Khan fled to Seharunpoor, the capital of his own patrimony in Rohilcund.

* Etal Rao lay encamped on the banks of the Jumna, when the emperor (then heir-apparent) fled from Delhi. He received the fugitive with the utmost kindness.—swore on the holy waters of the Ganges not to betray him; and more than redeemed

The prince, Jewan Bukht, was treated with marked respect, and the emperor given to understand, that if he did not think fit to accept the repeated invitations made to him to return to his capital, his son would be formally placed on the throne. In an evil hour, Shah Alum yielded to a natural desire of taking possession of the scanty remains of imperial power which formed his ill-omened inheritance. The darkest hour he had hitherto encountered had afforded him experience of the fidelity of a Mahratta general;* nor does there seem to have been any sufficient reason for his anticipating the mercenary and unprincipled conduct which he eventually received at their hands, which, however, never equalled in treachery the proceedings of his professed friend and nominal servant, but most grasping and relentless foe, Shuja Dowlah, the cherished ally of the English. In fact, the insidious counsels and pecuniary aid furnished by this notable schemer, were mainly instrumental in resolving Shah Alum to quit Allahabad, which he did after receiving from the Bengal presidency a strong assurance "of the readiness with which the company would receive and protect him, should any reverse of fortune compel him once more to return to his provinces."† The commander-in-chief (Sir Robert Barker) and Shuja Dowlah attended the royal march to the frontier of the Corah district, and then took leave with every demonstration of respect and good-will; the latter declaring that nothing but the predominant influence of the Mahrattas at court prevented his proceeding thither and devoting himself to the performance of the duties of the vizierat. Shah Alum reached Delhi in December, 1771, and entered its ancient gates amid the acclamations of the populace. Happily, his enjoyment of this gleam of prosperity was unmarred by a knowledge of the almost unexampled miseries which awaited him during the chief part of the ensuing six-and-twenty years. Could but a passing glimpse of coming sorrows have been foreshadowed to him, the lowliest hut in Bengal would have seemed a blessed refuge from the agonies of mind and body he and his innocent family were doomed to endure within the stately walls of their ancestral home.

his pledge, in spite of threats and bribes, by guarding the prince for six months, and then escorting him to a place of safety.—(Franklin's *Shah Alum*.)

† Official Letter from Bengal, 31st August, 1771. Auber's *British Power in India*, i., 287

The BOMBAY PRESIDENCY, so far as its finances were concerned, continued to be a heavy tax on the E. I. Cy., the net revenue not sufficing to defray a third of its civil and military expenditure.*

In the MADRAS PRESIDENCY, events had taken place which the superior importance and interest of Bengal affairs have prevented from being noticed in chronological succession. Reference has been made to the ill-feeling which sprang up between the E. I. Cy. and Mohammed Ali (the nabob of their own nomination.) The cause was twofold—first, the English expected to find the province, of which Arcot was the capital, a mine of wealth, and hoped to derive from the nabob, when firmly established there, considerable pecuniary advantage. They soon discovered their mistake as to the amount of funds thus obtainable, and still more with regard to the expenditure of life and treasure to be incurred in establishing the power of a man who, though of very inferior capacity, was inordinately ambitious, and yet distrustful—not perhaps without cause—of the allies, by whose assistance alone his present position could be maintained, or his views of aggrandisement carried out. The chief points in the long-continued hostilities, undertaken by the presidency to enforce his very questionable claims to sovereignty or tribute, may be briefly noted, nor can the painful admission in justice be withheld—that many expeditions dispatched under the auspices of Mr. (afterwards Lord) Pigot, whatever their ostensible motive, were really prompted by a desire to replenish a treasury exhausted by military expenses, especially, by the long war with the French, which commenced in 1746, and terminated with the reduction of Pondicherry in 1761. The miseries of the native population must have been too great to admit of much increased exaction. Since its first invasion by Aurungzebe,† the Carnatic had been, almost without interruption, the scene of rapine and disorganisation; imperial agents, usurping nabobs, and chout-collecting Mahrattas had claimed revenues, and exacted contributions, as each

found opportunity; and the commanders of districts and forts maintained their often ill-gotten authority, by resisting or complying with the demands made upon them, according to the urgency of the case. But the great load of suffering fell ever on the unarmed and inoffensive peasantry, whose daily sustenance was to be procured by daily work. This suffering was not of a character peculiar to the epoch now under consideration: it would seem that, from time immemorial, the working classes of Hindoostan had practically experienced the scourge of war; for every one of the multifarious languages of the peninsula has a word answering to the Canarese term *Wulsa*, which, happily, cannot be explained in any European tongue without considerable circumlocution. The *Wulsa* denotes the entire population of a district, who, upon the approach of a hostile army, habitually bury their most cumbrous effects, quit their beloved homes, and all of them, even to the child that can just walk alone, laden with grain, depart to seek shelter (if, happily, it may be found) among some neighbouring community blessed with peace. More frequently the pathless woods and barren hills afford their sole refuge, until the withdrawal of the enemy enables them to return to cultivate anew the devastated fields. Such exile must be always painful and anxious: during its continuance the weak and aged die of fatigue; if long protracted, the strong too often perish by the more dreadful pangs of hunger. Colonel Wilks affirms, that the *Wulsa* never departed on the approach of a British army, when unaccompanied by Indian allies;‡ but this is poor comfort regarding the measures taken on behalf of Mohammed Ali, since there is no reason to suppose his troops more scrupulous than their fellows, or less feared by the unhappy peasantry. The fort and district of Vellore were captured for him, in 1761, from Murtezza Ali,§ with the assistance of the English, after a three months' siege; but the treasure taken there ill repaid the cost of the conquest. The latter part of 1763, and nearly the whole of the following twelve-

* In the *Report of Select Committee*, June, 1784, the net revenue of Bombay for the year ending April, 1774, is stated at £109,163; civil and military charges, £347,387: leaving a deficiency of £238,224.

† During the nineteen years preceding the death of Aurungzebe, in 1707, his favourite general, Zulfeccar Khan, was employed in the Carnatic in ceaseless and destructive hostilities; and it is recorded that nineteen actions were fought, and 3,000 miles

marched by this officer in six months only. Famine and pestilence—the direct consequences of prolonged and systematic devastation—followed, and even exceeded in their ravages the scourge of war. The terrible sufferings of the people, during this melancholy period, are affecting described in many of the memoirs comprised in the valuable Mackenzie collection.

‡ Wilks' *History of Mysore*, i., 309.

§ See previous pages, especially Note †, p. 262.

months, were taken up in a struggle with Mohammed Esoof, a brave and skilful officer, who had long and faithfully served the English as commandant of sepoys. He had been placed in command of Madura, as renter; but the unproductive condition of the country rendered it, he declared, impossible to pay the stipulated sum. The excuse is believed to have been perfectly true; but it was treated as a mere cloak to cover an incipient attempt at independence. An army marched upon Madura, and Esoof, fairly driven into resistance, commenced a desperate contest, which occasioned heavy loss of life on the side of the English, and the expenditure of a million sterling, before hostilities terminated by the seizure and betrayal of his person into the hands of Mohammed Ali, by whom he was condemned to die the death of a rebel, and actually executed as such.

His betrayer was a man named Marchand, who had joined him among a body of French troops sent to his aid by the Mahratta rajah of Tanjore, from whom a heavy sum had recently been extorted on the plea of arrears of tribute due to the general government of the Carnatic. The acquisition of the Northern Circars, in 1766, and the treaty made by Lord Clive with Nizam Ali, has been noticed, as also the impolicy of engaging to hold a body of troops in readiness to do the will of so belligerent and unscrupulous a leader. It was not long before the fulfilment of this pledge was insisted on, and the immediate consequence proved the commencement of a long and disastrous series of wars with Hyder Ali. Since his sudden

separation from the French, in 1760, his road to eminence had been short and sanguinary. Force and fraud, used indifferently, according to the nature of the obstacle to be overcome, had raised Hyder to the supreme authority in Mysoor; and a skilful admixture of the same ingredients, enabled him gradually to acquire possession of many portions of Malabar and Canara, until then exempt from Moslem usurpation. The strife at one period existing between Nizam Ali and his elder brother, Bassalut Jung, induced the latter to make an attempt at independence, in prosecution of which he marched, in 1761, against Sera,* a province seized by the Mahrattas, and separated by them from the government of the Deccan, of which it had previously formed a part. The resources of Bassalut Jung proving quite insufficient for the projected enterprise, he gladly entered into an arrangement with Hyder Ali; and, on receiving five lacs of rupees, made over his intention of conquering Sera to that chief, on whom he conferred the title of nabob, together with the designation of Khan Bahadur—"the heroic lord." Sera was speedily subdued, and its reduction was followed, in 1763, by the seizure, on a most shameless pretext, of Bednore,† a territory situated on the loftiest crest of the Ghauts, 5,000 feet above the level of the sea, abounding in magnificent forests, and fertilized by copious rains, which produce harvests of remarkable abundance. The sequestered position of this little kingdom, had hitherto preserved it from Mohammedan invasion, and enabled successive rulers to accumulate

* The districts of Great and Little Balipoor were included in the province of Sera: the former was held as a jaghire by Abbas Kooli Khan, the persecutor of Hyder in childhood. Bassalut Jung wished to exclude this territory from that over which he assumed the right of investing Hyder with authority,—(a right, says Wilks, which could only be inferred from the act of granting); but the latter declared the arrangement at an end, if any interference were attempted with the gratification of his long-smouldering revenge. Abbas Kooli Khan fled to Madras, leaving his family in the hands of his bitter foe; but Hyder showed himself in a strangely favourable light; for in remembrance of kindness bestowed on him in childhood by the mother of the fugitive, he treated the captives with lenity and honour. This conduct did not, however, embolden Abbas Kooli to quit the protection of the English, or throw himself on his mercy; and, some years later (in 1769), when Hyder presented himself at the gates of Madras, he embarked in a crazy vessel, and did not venture to land until the hostile force had reascended the mountain-passes.—(Wilks' *Mysoor*, i., 440.)

† The last actual rajah of Bednore died in 1755,

leaving an adopted heir, of about seventeen years of age, under the guardianship of his widow. The youth animadverted with severity on the conduct of the ranee, with regard to a person named Nimbeia, and the result was his own assassination by a *jetti* or athlete, who watched an opportunity to dislocate his neck while employed in shampooing him in the bath. The guilty ranee selected an infant to fill the vacant throne; but, about five years after, a pretender started up, claiming to be the rightful heir, and describing himself as having escaped the intended doom by means of a humane artifice practised by the athlete. Hyder readily availed himself of the pretext for invading Bednore, though he probably never entertained the least belief of the truth of the story; and the whole army treated the adventurer with the utmost derision, styling him the "Rajah of the resurrection." So soon as Bednore was captured, Hyder, setting aside all conditions or stipulations previously entered into, sent the ranee and her paramour, with his own *protégé*, to a common prison in the hill-fort of Mudgherry, whence they were liberated on the capture of the place by the Mahrattas in 1767. The ranee died directly after her release.

much treasure. The mountain capital (eight miles in circumference) fell an easy prey to the Mysorean chief; "and the booty realised may," says Colonel Wilks, "without the risk of exaggeration, be estimated at twelve million sterling, and was, through life, habitually spoken of by Hyder as the foundation of all his subsequent greatness."* The subjugation of the country was not, however, accomplished without imminent danger to the life of the invader.†

Hyder now assumed the style of an independent sovereign, and struck coins in his own name. Having completed the necessary arrangements for the occupation of the lesser districts included in his new dominions (which comprehended two places often named in the history of early European proceedings on this coast,—Onore and Mangalore), he next seized the neighbouring territories of Soonda and Savanoor, and then rapidly extended his northern frontier almost to the banks of the Kistnah. Here, at length, his daring encroachments were

* *History of Mysoor*, i., 452. Mill says—"More likely it was not a third of the sum" (iii., 469); but native testimonies and the reports of the French mercenaries in the service of Hyder, with other circumstances, tend to confirm the opinion of Wilks. In a life of Hyder Ali, written by the French leader of his European troops, whose initials (M.M.D.L.T.) are alone given, it is stated that two heaps of gold, coined and in ingots, and of jewels, set and unset, were piled up until they surpassed the height of a man on horseback. They were then weighed with a corn measure. Hyder gave a substantial proof of the extent of his ill-gotten booty, by bestowing on every soldier in his service a gratuity equal to half a year's pay.—(*History of Ayder Ali Khan, Nabob Bahader*; translated from the French: Dublin, 1774.)

† The ministers of the late dynasty entered into an extensive conspiracy for his assassination and the recovery of the capital. Some vague suspicions induced Hyder to cause inquiry to be made by his most confidential civil servants. The persons so employed were, strangely enough, all concerned in the plot. They performed their commission with apparent zeal, and read the result to the dreaded despot as he lay on a couch shivering with ague. His keen perceptions were undimmed by bodily infirmity; but affecting to be duped by the garbled statements made by the commissioners, he detained them in consultation until he felt able to rise. Then, entering the durbar, or hall of audience, he examined and cross-examined witnesses until the mystery was quite unravelled. The commissioners were executed in his presence, many unhappy nobles of Bednore arrested, and, before the close of the day, 300 of the leading confederates were hanging at the different public ways of the city. Hyder, we are told, retired to rest with perfect equanimity, and rose on the following morning visibly benefited by the stimulating effect of his late exertions. Peace of mind had, however, fled from him; and, notwithstanding the terrible perfection which his inquisitorial and sanguinary

arrested by Mahdoo Rao, the young and energetic Mahratta peishwa, who (taking advantage of the accommodation with Nizam Ali, which had succeeded the partial destruction of Poonah by the latter in 1763) crossed the Kistnah, in 1764, with a force greatly outnumbering that of Hyder. A prolonged contest ensued, in which the advantage being greatly on the side of the Mahrattas, and the army of Hyder much reduced, he procured the retreat of the peishwa, in 1765, by various territorial concessions, in addition to the payment of thirty-two lacs of rupees. When relieved from this formidable foe, he forthwith commenced preparations for the conquest of Malabar, which he succeeded in effecting after an irregular war of some months' duration with the proud and liberty-loving Nairs, or military cast; for the disunion of the various petty principalities neutralised the effects of the valour of their subjects, and prevented any combined resistance being offered. Cananore,‡ Cochin, Karical—all fell, more or less com-

police system subsequently attained, the dagger of the assassin was an image never absent from his sleeping or waking thoughts, save when banished by the stupor of complete intoxication, which became to him a nightly necessity. One of his most intimate associates relates, that after having watched over him during a short interval of convulsive sleep, snatched in his tent during a campaign, Hyder exclaimed on awaking—"The state of a yogee (religious mendicant) is more delightful than my envied monarchy: awake, they see no conspirators; asleep, they dream of no assassins."—(*Wilks's Mysoor*, i., 143.)

‡ The Dutch possessions on the Malabar coast had been materially lessened during the interval between the last mention made of them in 1740 (p. 245), and the invasion of Hyder Ali in 1768. The expensive trading establishments maintained there proved a heavy drain on the finances of the company, which Stavorinus, on the authority of Governor Mossel, alleges to have been occasioned by the continual disputes and wars in which they had been engaged with the native princes, "and not a little by the infidelity and peculation of the servants who have been employed here." Mossel declares, "it would have been well for the Dutch company had the ocean swallowed up the coast of Malabar an hundred years ago." Under these circumstances, the best thing was to get rid of such unfortunate acquisitions. Cranganore was sold to the rajah of Travancore; and Cananore, in 1770, for the sum of 100,000 rupees, to a recently established potentate, styled by Stavorinus the Sultan of Angediva or Anchediva, a little rocky isle, two miles from the coast of North Canara. This chief belonged by birth to the mixed class, the offspring of intercourse (after the Malabar custom) between native women and Arabian immigrants: they bore the significant appellation of Moplah or *Mapilla* (the children of their mothers); but were mostly believers in the Koran. Ali Rajah, the purchaser of Cananore, had risen by trade to wealth, and thence to political importance: he took

pletely, into the power of Hyder; and Maan Vecram Raj, the Zamorin, or Tamuri rajah of Calicut, disgusted by the faithlessness of his unprincipled opponent, and terrified by the cruel and humiliating tortures inflicted on his ministers to extort money, set fire to the house in which he was confined, and perished in the flames.* Shortly after this event, Hyder was recalled to Seringapatam by the alarming intelligence that the English and Mohammed Ali had united with the Nizam in a confederacy for the reduction of his dangerous ascendancy. Hyder was a complete master of every description of intrigue. He succeeded, by dint of bribery, in withdrawing Nizam Ali from the alliance into which the English had unwisely entered, and the very corps which had accompanied the Nizam into the dominions of Hyder, sustained in its retreat an attack from their united forces.† Madras was imperilled by the unlooked-for appearance of 5,000 horse, under the nominal command of Tipoo, the eldest son of Hyder Ali, then a youth of seventeen. The president and council were at their garden-houses without the town; and had the attendance an early opportunity of propitiating the favour of Hyder, at the expense of the high-born Hindoo princes in his vicinity. When Stavorus himself visited India, in 1775-'8, the Dutch possessions on the Malabar coast nominally extended a distance of about thirty-two leagues; but, excepting the little island of Paponetty, and a few insignificant villages on the shore, the company had "no other actual property in the soil than in that upon which their fortifications are constructed."—(Stavorus' *Voyages*, iii., chapters xiii. and xiv.)

* Several of the personal attendants of the Zamorin being accidentally excluded when the doors were fastened, threw themselves into the flames, and perished with their master. This catastrophe had no effect in softening the heart of Hyder, or inducing him to show compassion to the ministers. The Nairs, rendered desperate by his cruelty, rose against him repeatedly, and were, if captured, either beheaded or hanged, until the idea struck their persecutor of preserving them to populate certain other portions of his dominions. The experiment proved fatal to the majority of the unhappy beings upon whom it was tried: of 15,000 who were subjected to this forced emigration, only 200 survived the fatigue and hardships of the way and the change of climate, which Indians in general—and particularly the natives of Malabar—can ill bear under every possible circumstance of alleviation.—(Wilks' *Mysoor*, i., 477.)

† Either from generosity or policy, five English companies, attached to the Nizam as a guard of honour, were suffered by him to depart and join the force under Colonel Smith three days before the commencement of open hostilities by the new allies.

‡ Hyder prevailed on the Nizam to give the order to retreat, and was himself clearly perceived by the English issuing directions for that purpose, in the midst of a select body of infantry, whose scarlet

tation of the invaders been less absorbed in the accumulation of plunder, they might have seized as their prize the whole of these functionaries, and dictated at leisure the terms of general peace and individual ransom. But they delayed until news arrived of a decisive victory gained by Colonel Smith, at Trincomalee,‡ over Hyder and Nizam Ali, which being closely followed by other advantages on the side of the English (including the successful defence of Amboor),§ brought the campaign to an end. Hyder retreated within his own frontier, and the Nizam concluded a peace with the English in February, 1768, by which he agreed to receive seven lacs per annum for six years, as temporary tribute for the Circars, instead of the perpetual subsidy of nine lacs per annum previously promised. Hyder was himself equally solicitous of forming a treaty with the Madras presidency. He did not scruple to avow his inability to oppose at once both them and the Mahrattas; and he candidly avowed that disinclination to make common cause with the latter people, was the leading incentive to his repeated overtures for alliance with the English. His offers were, dresses, with lances eighteen feet long, of bamboo, strengthened by bands of polished silver, rendered them no less picturesque in appearance than formidable in reality. The retreat was, for the moment, delayed by a singular incident. Nizam Ali invariably carried his favourite wives in his train, even to the field of battle. On the present occasion, directions were given to the drivers of the elephants on which they were seated, to decamp forthwith,—an undignified procedure, which was firmly opposed by the fair occupant of one of the howdahs. "This elephant," she exclaimed, "has not been instructed so to turn; he follows the imperial standard;" and though the English shot fell thick around, the lady waited till the standard passed. A considerable body of cavalry, roused to action by the sense of shame inspired by this feminine display of chivalry, made a partial charge upon the enemy.—(Wilks' *Mysoor*, ii., 38.)

§ The assault lasted twenty-six days, at the expiration of which time, the besieged were relieved by the approach of the British army. In honour of the steady courage there manifested, the 1st battalion of the 10th regiment bear "the rock of Amboor" on their colours. Hyder had a narrow escape during this enterprise; for while examining the fortifications, under cover of a rock which sheltered him completely from the direct fire of the fort, a cannon-shot rebounded from a neighbouring height, and cut in two his only companion, leaving him unhurt. The Mysorean court were, according to Colonel Wilks, the most unscientific in all India; and being ignorant of the simple principle by which a ball would rebound amid the rocks which limited its influence, until its force was spent, they attributed the fate of Khakee Shah to a miracle of vengeance, wrought to punish his recent offence of taking a false oath on a false Koran, to aid Hyder in deceiving and entrapping his ancient and much-injured patron, Nunjeraj.—(Wilks.)

however, haughtily rejected. Driven to desperation, he put forth all his powers, ravaged the Carnatic, penetrated to Trichinopoly, laid waste the provinces of Madura and Tinnevely, and finally, after drawing the English army, by a series of artful movements, to a considerable distance from Madras, he selected a body of 6,000 cavalry, marched 120 miles in three days, and suddenly appeared on the Mount of Saint Thomas, in the immediate vicinity of the English capital. The presidency were struck with consternation. The fort might undoubtedly have held out till the arrival of the army under Colonel Smith, but the open town with its riches, the adjacent country, and the garden-houses of the officials, would have been ravaged and destroyed; moreover, the exhausted state of the treasury afforded little encouragement to maintain hostilities with a foe whose peculiar tactics enabled him to procure abundant supplies for his troops in a hostile country, and to surround his enemies with

* Hyder, throughout his whole career, displayed a peculiarly teachable spirit in every proceeding relative to his grand object in life—the art of war. Kunde Rao, a Brahmin, early instructed him in Mahratta tactics; and by their joint endeavours a system of plunder was organised, which Sevajee himself might have admired. The Beder peons (described by Colonel Wilks as “faithful thieves”) and the Pindaries (a description of horse who receive no pay, but live on the devastation of the enemy’s country), were among the most effective of Hyder’s troops. The general arrangement seems to have been, that the army, besides their direct pay, should receive one-half the booty realised; the remainder to be appropriated by their leader; and the whole proceeding was conducted by a series of checks, which rendered the embezzlement of spoil almost impossible. Moveable property of every description, obtained either from enemies or (if practicable without exciting suspicion) by simple theft from allies, was the object of these marauders;—from convoys of grain, cattle, or fire-arms, down to the clothes, turbans, and earrings of travellers or villagers, whether men, women, or children. Kunde Rao at length became disgusted by the uncontrolled ambition and covetousness of Hyder. Unwilling to see the ancient Hindoo institutions of Mysoor swept off by an avowed disbeliever in all religion, he went over to the side of the unfortunate rajah, and was, as before stated, in the hour of defeat delivered up to his fierce and relentless foe, who retained him two years exposed in an iron cage in the most public thoroughfare of Bangalora; and even when death at length released the wretched captive, left his bones to whiten there in memory of his fate. (See Wilks’ *History of Mysoor*, i., 434, the *French Life of Ayder*, and Dr. Moodie’s *Transactions in India from 1756 to 1783*, for an account of this almost unexampled act of barbarity.) In his later career, Hyder declared, that the English were his chief tutors in military stratagems; and for Colonel Smith he expressed particular respect, calling him his pre-

devastation and scarcity in the heart of their own domains.* A treaty was concluded with him in April, 1769, of which the principal conditions† were a mutual restoration of conquests and a pledge of alliance, defensive but not offensive. The distinction involved in the latter proviso was, as might have been foreseen, of little avail; for the foes against whom Hyder especially desired the co-operation of the English troops, were the Mahrattas, who periodically invaded his territories; and on the expected approach of Mahdoo Rao, he urgently appealed to the presidency for the promised aid, which they withheld on the plea of complicated political relations, and thus excited, with too just cause, the vindictive passions of their ally. The military abilities of the peishwa were of no common order: and he approached with the determination of materially circumscribing the power of a rival whose proceedings and projects, after long undervaluing, he began to appreciate correctly. Seizing one by one the conquests‡ of Hyder, ceptor in the science of war, and having his picture suspended in the palace of Seringapatam.

† Other clauses provided, that the company were to be allowed to build a fort at Onore, and to have the sole right of purchasing pepper in the dominions of Hyder Ali; payment to be made to him in guns, saltpetre, lead, gunpowder, and ready money. The directors strongly reprobated the supply of offensive implements to so dangerous a potentate, and likewise the cannon afterwards sold to him, and the shipping built by his orders,—remarking, that such a procedure could not conduce to the welfare of the presidency, although it might suit the views of individuals.

‡ The battle of Chercoolee, which occurred while the Mysoreans were retreating to Seringapatam, was attended by some incidents singularly illustrative of the character of Hyder, who, though well able to be courtly on occasion, was habitually fierce in his anger and coarse in his mirth, and in either case equally unaccustomed to place any restraint on his tongue or hand. When under the influence of intoxication, his natural ferocity occasionally broke out in the most unbridled excesses; but he rarely drank deeply, except alone and at night. On the eve of this disastrous battle, the alarms of war prevented him from sleeping off the effects of his usual potation; and in a state of stupid inebriety he sent repeated messages desiring the presence of Tippoo, which owing to the darkness and confusion, were not delivered until daybreak. When Tippoo at length appeared, his father, in a paroxysm of rage, abused him in the foulest language, and snatching a large cane from the hand of an attendant, inflicted on the heir-apparent a literally severe beating. Burning with anger, and smarting with pain, the youth, when suffered to retire, hastened to the head of his division, and dashed his sword and turban on the ground, exclaiming, “My father may fight his own battle; for I swear by Allah and the Prophet, that I draw no sword to-day.” Then throwing aside his outer garment of cloth of gold, he tied a coloured handkerchief round his head, and assumed the guise of one

he marched onward until the Mysoor state shrank into narrower limits than it had occupied under the native government at the beginning of the century. The authority of the usurper tottered; and the Hindoo rajah, thinking the conjuncture of affairs favourable to the assertion of his claims, strove to open a communication with the Mahratta general; but the proceeding being detected, the unhappy prince was immediately strangled while in the bath. Still Hyder cared not, at this crisis, openly to seat himself on the ivory throne of Mysoor: double governments were in fashion throughout India, and the brother of the late rajah was proclaimed his successor. He did not long survive this perilous distinction; and Hyder, with unblushing effrontery, affected to choose from the children of the royal lineage, for the next pageant, a boy of sense and spirit—qualities which would necessarily unfit him to be the tool of the deadly foe of his family.* The retreat of the Mahrattas was secured on more favourable terms than could have been expected, by reason of the fast-failing health of the peishwa, who, in the same year (1772), died of consumption. He left no child, and his widow, who had renounced the world. After the ensuing complete victory of the Mahrattas, Tippoo was advised by his faithful friend, Seyed Mohammed (who related the adventure to Colonel Wilks), to make his way to Seringapatam as a travelling mendicant; and they contrived to reach the capital that night, to the great relief of Hyder, who believing his son lost, had refused to enter the city, and was awaiting further intelligence in a small mosque, probably unable to bring himself to encounter the burst of anger and sorrow to which his wife, the mother of Tippoo, who had great influence with him, would give vent on learning the circumstances which he knew, and the issue he feared.—(*Mysoor*, ii., 146.)

* Hyder assembled the children in the royal hall of audience, which he had previously caused to be strewn with fruits, sweetmeats, flowers, books, coin, and toys of all description: each took what struck his fancy; one boy seized a brilliant little dagger, and soon afterwards a lime with the unoccupied hand. "That is the rajah," said Hyder; "his first care is military protection; his second, to realise the produce of his dominions."—(*Idem*. ii., 163.)

† *History of the Mahrattas*, ii., 237. The actual revenue of the Mahratta state, at this period (including the jaghires of Holcar, Sindia, Janojee Bhonslay, and Dummajee Guicowar, together with tribute, fees, fines, and extra revenue of every description), amounted to about seven million sterling per ann., including Mahdoo Rao's personal estate, which seldom exceeded £30,000 per ann. He was, however, possessed of twenty-four lacs of private property, which he bequeathed to the state, and which indeed was much needed. At the time of his accession, a large outstanding debt existed; and although at his death, reckoning sums due, the value of stores and other property, a nominal balance existed, yet the

to whom he had been devotedly attached, burnt herself with his body. Maharashtra is described as having greatly improved under his sway, and as being, in proportion to its fertility, probably more thriving than any other part of India, notwithstanding the inherent defects of its administrative system, and the corruption which Madhoo Rao restrained, but could not eradicate. His death, says Grant Duff, "occasioned no immediate commotion: like his own disease, it was at first scarcely perceptible; but the root which invigorated the already scathed and wide-extending tree, was cut off from the stem; and the plains of Paniput were not more fatal to the Mahratta empire, than the early death of this excellent prince."†

The above sketch illustrates, so far as the limits of this work will permit, the position of the three presidencies and of the leading neighbouring states, at the period when great and rapid changes were about to be effected in the whole scope and tenor of Anglo-Indian policy. The princes of Rajasthan were engaged in holding their own against the marauding Jats and Mahrattas, under Holcar and Sindia,‡ who, for their own ends, thought fit to interfere in a disputed treasure itself was empty. The ordinary army of the peishwa comprehended 50,000 good horse; and calculating the contingent which Guicowar and Bhonslay were bound to furnish at from ten to fifteen thousand, Holcar and Sindia's army at 30,000, and allowing 3,000 for the Puar of Dhar, his total force at command must have amounted to about 100,000 fine cavalry, exclusive of Pindarries. No wonder that Hyder Ali should have been ever solicitous to shun contact with, and form alliances against, such a force under such a leader. By official records, it appears that of 449 officers under Mahdoo Rao, ninety-three were Brahmins, eight Rajpoots, 308 Mahrattas, and forty Mohammedans.—(*Idem*., p. 270.)

‡ Holcar and Sindia both acquired valuable territorial possessions (or rather the mortgage of them) in Mewar, which, like most of the Rajpoot principalities, was about this time a prey to internal miseries,—its fields, mines, and looms all unworked, and hordes of "pilfering Mahrattas, savage Rohillas, and adventurous Franks" let loose to do their wicked will in its once fruitful valleys. Oudipoor had nearly fallen before Sindia, but was bravely and successfully defended by Umra Chund, the chief minister of Rana Ursi, who, in 1770, succeeded in compelling Sindia to accept a ransom, and raise the siege. This excellent minister fell a victim to court intrigues; but his death, says Tod, "yielded a flattering comment on his life: he left not funds sufficient to cover the funeral expenses, and is, and will probably continue, the sole instance on record in Indian history, of a minister having his obsequies defrayed by subscription among his fellow-citizens." They yet love to descant upon his virtues; and "an act of vigour and integrity is still designated *Umra-chunda*—evinced, that if virtue has few imitators in this country, she is not without ardent admirers."

cession to the throne of Amber or Jeypoor. Pretexts, more or less plausible, were put forth by other Mahratta leaders for the same course of invasion and plunder. The state of the Rohillas will be more particularly mentioned in a subsequent page. The far-distant Seiks had gradually increased in number and power, and could now furnish 80,000 men fit to bear arms. They possessed all the fertile country of the Punjaub between Sirhind and Attoc.

ADMINISTRATION OF WARREN HASTINGS.—This celebrated governor superseded Mr. Cartier in the Bengal presidency in April, 1772. He had accompanied Mr. Vansittart to England in 1764, and was at that time in the enjoyment of a moderate independence, and a reputation for ability and disinterestedness of no common order. Presidents and counsellors, commanders military and naval—in a word, the whole body of European officials, of any rank in the service—are recorded as having received costly presents from the native princes. In this list the name of Warren Hastings is alone wanting; and as it is certain his position in the court of Meer Cossim must have afforded more than average opportunities for the accumulation of wealth in a similar manner, the exception tends to prove that the love of money formed no part of his "sultan-like and splendid character."* On the con-

trary, he was generous even to prodigality; by which means, a brief sojourn in England, surrounded by family claims, reduced his finances to a condition little above that in which they had been fifteen years before; when, through the influence of a distant relative in the E. I. direction, the impoverished scion of a noble house had been dispatched, at the age of seventeen, as a writer to Calcutta.† There, as we have seen, he had risen from the lowest grade of office to a seat at the council-board, aided by general talent and application to business, but especially by the then rare advantage of acquaintance with the Persian language—the medium through which official correspondence in India was mainly conducted. The evidence given by him during the inquiry instituted by parliament in 1766, regarding the system of government adopted by the E. I. Co., afforded a fair opportunity for the exposition of his views on a subject of which he was well calculated, both by experience and ability, to form a correct opinion; and although the hostility of the Clive party in the India House, prevented—happily for Hastings—his being suffered to accompany his former chief, Mr. Vansittart, in the projected mission to Bengal, no objection was made to his appointment to the station of second in council at Madras, whither he proceeded in 1769. Here his measures

* Bishop Heber's *Journal* (London, 1828), i., 330.

† The pedigree of the young writer can, it is affirmed, be traced back to the fierce sea-king, long the terror of both coasts of the British channel, whose subjugation called forth all the valour and perseverance of the great Alfred; and in tracing the political career of the Indian governor, one is tempted to think that not a few of the piratical propensities of Hastings the Dane, were inherited by his remote descendant. The more immediate ancestors of Warren Hastings were lords of the manor of Daylesford, in Worcestershire, and retained considerable wealth up to the time of the civil war in which King Charles I. lost his crown and life, and their existing representative all his possessions, except the old manor house, which being from poverty unable to retain, they sold in the following generation to a London merchant. To regain the ancient home of his family was the aspiration of Warren Hastings, while still a child of seven years old; and the hope which first dawned on his mind as he lay on the bank of the rivulet flowing through the lands of Daylesford to join the Isis, never passed away, but cheered him amid every phase of his chequered career, from the time when he learned his daily tasks on the wooden bench of the village school, or laboured at a higher description of study at the next school to which he was sent, where he was well taught, but so scantily fed, that he always attributed to that circumstance his stunted growth and emaciated appearance. From Newington Butts he was

transferred to Westminster school, where Churchill, Colman, Lloyd, Cumberland, Cowper, and Impey, were fellow-students. His comrades liked and admired the even-tempered boy, who was the best of boatmen and swimmers; and so high were his scholarly acquirements, that upon the sudden death of the uncle, who had placed him at Westminster, Dr. Nicholl, then head-master, offered to bear the expense of sending his favourite pupil to Oxford. But the distant relative on whom the responsibility of the decision devolved, persisted in sending the youth to India, and he was shipped off accordingly. Some seven years after, when about four-and-twenty, he married the widow of a military officer. She soon fell a victim to the climate, leaving Hastings one child, who was sent to England for health and education. The death of this son, to whom he was fondly attached, was the first intelligence received by the bereaved father on his arrival in 1764, and it rendered him more than commonly indifferent to the management of his pecuniary affairs. On leaving India, the chief part of his savings remained vested there, the high rate of interest being probably the inducement; but great advantages of this description are usually of a precarious character, and Hastings lost both principal and interest. This calamity did not hinder him from providing liberally for an aunt, for an only and beloved sister, like himself, the offspring of an early and ill-starred marriage, and for other pensioners, although his own Indian equipment had to be purchased with borrowed money.

were especially directed to improve the investments on which the dividends of the company mainly depended, and these exertions were instrumental in procuring his promotion to the station of governor of the Bengal presidency.*

Affairs there had reached the last stage of disorganisation. Seven years had elapsed, since the acquisition of the dewannee, without the establishment of any efficient system for the government of the people, and the result was the total absence of "justice or law, or adequate protection to person or property anywhere in Bengal, Bahar, and Orissa, except at Calcutta; the boys of the service being sovereigns of the country, under the unmeaning title of supervisors, collectors of the revenue, administrators of justice, and rulers, heavy rulers, of the people." These youths—whom Hastings elsewhere describes as "most of them the agents of their own banyans (native managers), and they are devils"—occupied more lucrative positions than the governor himself, obtaining from one to three lacs a-year; but they were a dangerous class to meddle with, being "generally sons, cousins, or *leves* of directors."† The new governor was not the man to risk provoking a powerful opposition to his administration by their recall, but contented himself with some indirect and partial attempts to retrench their power, and pave the way for its gradual withdrawal.

Meanwhile, the measures dictated by the Court of Directors were to be carried out, and the task was one of much greater delicacy and importance than persons imperfectly acquainted with the constitution of Indian society could possibly conceive. The company were extremely dissatisfied with the amount of revenues levied by the native officials, and were well disposed to attribute

* Among the fellow-passengers of Hastings, during his voyage, was a German baron named Imhoff, who, in the hope of finding remunerative employment as a portrait painter, was proceeding to India, accompanied by his wife, a very beautiful and accomplished woman, a native of Archangel, and their children. The result of some months of constant intercourse between two persons of high intellectual acquirements, and feelings stronger than their principles, may be conjectured. Hastings was taken dangerously ill; the lady nursed him (according to the Rev. Mr. Gleig) "with a sister's care;" and before the vessel reached Madras, it was arranged that a divorce should be sued for in the Franconia courts by the baroness, who, during the long years which might and did elapse pending the decision of the judges, was to continue to live with the baron. This arrangement was actually carried out—the Imhoffs

to their mismanagement and venality the ruinous condition both of their own finances and of the trade of the country. This frame of mind procured a ready reception to the charges brought before them through irregular channels, by means of the long purse and restless intrigues of Nuncomar, against Mohammed Reza Khan, who, it was alleged, had been guilty of extensive embezzlements of revenue, and likewise of an illicit monopoly of rice during the recent famine. Hastings was consequently directed to put in immediate execution the resolve of the company—"to stand forth as dewan, and to take upon themselves the entire care of the revenues;" and, likewise, to institute a public examination into the conduct of the ex-dewan. These instructions were addressed by the secret committee of the company, not to the council, but privately to the governor, and were received by him in the evening of the tenth day after his accession to office. On the following morning, orders were dispatched to Moorsheedabad for the seizure of Mohammed Reza Khan, which was effected with the utmost secrecy in the silence of midnight. The Mussulman, with characteristic composure, upon being unexpectedly made a prisoner, attempted neither resistance nor expostulation, but bent his head and submitted to the will of God. It was considered necessary by the presidency to subject to a like arrest and examination the brave Hindoo chief, Shitabroy, whose distinguished services had been rewarded by a similar appointment in Bahar to that given to Mohammed Reza Khan in Bengal, although the directors had given no order on the subject, nor was any accusation whatever on record against him. The inquiry into the conduct of these ex-officials and their subordinates was delayed for some months, on the plea of giving time for the followed Hastings from Madras to Calcutta; and when the marriage was at length formally dissolved, the baron returned to his native country with wealth to purchase and maintain the position of a landed proprietor, leaving the governor-general of India to marry the divorced lady, and adopt her two sons. Whether from ignorance of these facts, or a politic desire to overlook the antecedents of the union of a distinguished public servant, it appears that Queen Charlotte welcomed Mrs. Hastings with especial affability to a court remarkable for its high standard of female character. It is but justice to state, that Mr. and Mrs. Hastings remained devotedly attached to each other; and that the affectionate attentions of her son and daughter-in-law, Sir Charles and Lady Imhoff, were the solace of Hastings under the many self-sought sorrows of his old age.

† *Life of Warren Hastings*, pp. 147, 235, 269.

deposition of complaints. In the meanwhile, the *Khalsa*, or government revenue establishment, was transferred from Moorshedabad to Calcutta; the office of naib-dewan was abolished both for Bengal and Bahar; the British council formed into a board of revenue; and a native functionary or assistant dewan, under the old Hindoo title of roy-royan,* appointed to act in the *Khalsa*, to receive the accounts in the Bengal language, and make reports. The great obstacle to an equitable and satisfactory arrangement of the revenues, was the utter ignorance of the law-makers regarding the tenure of land; but Hastings, influenced by the necessity of a speedy decision, and considering it better "to resolve without debate, than to debate without resolving,"† cut the Gordian knot by determining to let the lands in farm for a period of five years.‡ In many instances, the hereditary Hindoo rulers of districts had sunk into the condition of tributaries, and in that character had been forcibly included by their Moslem conquerors in the large class of zemindars or middle-men, by whom the village authorities of the old system of numerous independent municipalities were gradually supplanted in Bengal. By the present regulations, when the zemindars, and other middle-men of ancient standing, offered for the lands, or rather land-rents, which they had been accustomed to manage, terms which were deemed reasonable, they were preferred; when their proposals were considered inadequate, a pension was allotted for their subsistence, and the lands put up for sale—a proceeding which, of necessity, involved the repeated commission of glaring injustice and impolicy; for many men who had nothing to lose were installed, to the expulsion of previous zemindars, who only offered what they could realise with ease to their tenants (for so these must be called, for want of a proper term to express a false position) and remuneration to themselves. To the ryots, or actual cultivators, leases or titles were given, enumerating all the claims to which they

were subject, and prohibiting, under penalties, every additional exaction. These arrangements, however fair-seeming in theory, were founded on incorrect premises, and proved alike injurious to the interests of the company and the welfare of the people.§ Regarding the administration of justice, Hastings exerted himself with praiseworthy zeal. Aware of the intention of the home government to take this portion of Indian affairs under their especial consideration, he feared, not without reason, that their deliberations might issue in an endeavour to transplant to India the complicated system of jurisprudence long the acknowledged and lamented curse of lawyer-ridden England. In the hope of mitigating, if not averting this evil, he caused digests of the Hindoo and Mohammedan codes to be prepared under his supervision, and forwarded them to Lord Mansfield and other legal functionaries, with an earnest entreaty that they might be diligently studied; and in such changes as the altered state of affairs immediately necessitated, he was careful, by following the plain principles of experience and common observation, to adapt all new enactments to the manners and understanding of the people, and the exigencies of the country, adhering as closely as possible to ancient usages and institutions.||

There was justice as well as policy in this procedure; and it is only to be regretted that it was not carried out with sufficient exactitude. All attempts to force a code of laws, however excellent, upon people unfitted by antecedent circumstances to receive the boon, have proved abortive: a heathen nation must be educated—and that often very gradually—in the principles of truth and justice brought to light by the Gospel, before they can rightly appreciate the practical character of these virtues. The thief will not cease to steal, the perjurer to forswear, or the corrupt judge abstain from bribery at mere human bidding; a stronger lever is requisite to raise the tone of society, and produce a radical change in its

* The roy-royan had before been the chief officer under the naib-dewan, having the immediate charge of crown lands, and the superintendence of the exchequer.—(Auber's *British Power in India*, i., 369.)

† Gleig's *Life of Warren Hastings*, i., 301.

‡ Under Mohammed Reza Khan's management, the system followed was the ruinous one introduced by Mohammedan nabobs, of farming out the lands annually.—(Dow's *Hindoostan*, vol. i., p. cxxxv.)

§ No European was permitted, directly or indirectly, to hold lands in any part of the country.

|| Halhed's *Digest of Hindoo Laws* was drawn up

in Sanscrit by certain pundits (Hindoo doctors of law), translated from Sanscrit to Persian, and thence to English. The Mohammedan code, such as it is, has but one legitimate source—the Koran; nevertheless, an immense mass had been written on the subject, of which a digest called the *Hedayat*, filling four large folio volumes, was framed by order of Aurungzebe; and of this work a *précis* was now executed under the supervision of Hastings. The Brahmins would accept nothing for themselves but bare subsistence during their two years' labour. Promises were made of endowments for their colleges,

wholespirit, before public virtue could flourish in a moral atmosphere so deeply vitiated as that of Bengal. After centuries of oppression and venality, the new rulers felt that their safest policy was to commence a course of gradual amelioration, rather than of abrupt changes—abolishing only punishments openly at variance with the common dictates of humanity, such as torture and mutilation. Stipendiary English magistrates were appointed to act with native colleagues; civil and criminal tribunals were established in each district, under the check of two supreme courts of appeal—the Suddur Dewanee Adawlut, and the Nizamut Suddur Adawlut. In these arrangements one great error was, however, committed, in overlooking, or wilfully setting aside, the system of *punchayets*, or Indian juries, which had, from time immemorial, been the favourite and almost unexceptionable method of deciding civil disputes.

The immediate difficulties of the presidency at this period were, how to raise funds wherewith to provide the investments, which were expected to be regularly furnished from the revenues; and to obtain relief from a bond-debt, varying from a crore* to a crore and a-half of rupees, the interest of which alone formed an item of ten lacs in the yearly disbursements. In a pecuniary point of view, the cessation of the enormous salary of nearly £100,000, paid to Mohammed Reza Khan, was an advantage. He had filled, during the preceding seven years, the double office of naib-subah (properly subahdar) and naib-dewan; that is to say, he had been entrusted with the exercise of all the higher powers of government, judicial and financial (comprehended in the *nizamut*), and likewise with the charge of the education and management of the household affairs of Mubarik-ad-Dowlah; the expenditure of the yearly stipend of £320,000 having been entrusted exclusively to him. Hastings now resolved on reducing the nabob's allowance by one-half—a diminution which, together with the stoppage of the sala-

ries of Mohammed Reza Khan and Shitabroy, effected, it is asserted, a clear yearly saving of fifty-seven lacs of rupees, equivalent, at the then rate of money, to between six and seven hundred thousand pounds. The youth and inexperience of Mubarik-ad-Dowlah rendered it necessary to nominate a new superintendent for his establishment; and the selection made was so strange, that it gave rise to much subsequent criticism, as to the real motive for choosing a female, and yet setting aside the mother of the prince. Hastings thought fit to appoint to the post of *gouvernante* Munnee Begum—a person who, previous to her entrance into the seraglio of Meer Jaffier, had been a dancing-girl, but who was now possessed of great wealth; the ostensible reason for the choice being “the awe” with which she was regarded by the nabob, and the improbability of her forming any plots against the English rulers. There were, of necessity, many affairs which eastern customs forbade to be transacted by a woman; and the coadjutor chosen for her was Rajah Goordass, the son of Nuncomar, who, because he inherited neither the ability nor the guile of his father, would, Hastings alleged, prove a safe instrument of conferring favour on the latter, and inducing him to make every effort for the establishment of the guilt of Mohammed Reza Khan. The Hindoo, however, needed no incentive to stimulate his deep-rooted animosity against his Musulman rival; yet, with all his ingenuity, he failed to establish the justice of the charges of embezzlement and monopoly† brought against the ex-dewan, or to prevent his acquittal, after prolonged examination before a committee, over which the governor presided. The innocence, and more than that, the excellent conduct, of Shitabroy, and the great exertions made by him to mitigate the sufferings of the people during the famine, were clearly proved at an early stage of the inquiry. A formal apology was made for the restraint to which he had been subjected; and a *sirpah*, or costly state

but not performed.—(*Hastings*, iii., 158.)—* A crore of rupees, according to the existing standard, amounted to much above a million sterling.

† The charge of oppressing the people, and applying the most cruel coercion to delinquent renters, was certainly not disproved. Dow, who was in Bengal during the early part of the administration of Mohammed Reza Khan, declares that, on the plea of their inability to fulfil their contracts being a pretence, many of the zemindars were bound to stakes and whipped with such unrelenting barbarity, that “not a few of them expired in agonies under the

lash;” and many of the ryots, reduced to despair, fled the country.—(*Hindoostan*, i., cxxxvi.) These statements derive corroboration from the reasons given by the directors for ordering the trial of the dewan. In the same communication, allusion is made to the repeated accusations brought against the agents of English officials, “not barely for monopolising grain, but for compelling the poor ryots to sell even the seed requisite for the next harvest.”—(*Letter to Bengal*, 1771.) See Dr. Moodie's *Transactions in India* for important information regarding the conduct of Mohammed Reza Khan during the famine.

dress, with jewels, and an elephant richly caparisoned, were presented, to adorn his triumphant return to Patna, to fill the office of roy-royan—the highest to which a native functionary could, by the recent regulations, be appointed. No small degree of humiliation was therefore blended with these marks of returning favour, which, even if unalloyed, would probably have arrived too late to repair past wrongs. Above a twelvemonth's detention in the uncongenial climate of Calcutta, aggravated by the workings of a proud spirit subjected to unmerited indignity, inflicted a mortal injury on the health of the brave chief, who died shortly after his acquittal. The appointment of roy-royan was, in testimony of his worth, transferred to his son Callian Sing, to whom the English, by the oddest assumption in the world, thought fit "to confirm the title of Maha Rajah."* But the recent changes, notwithstanding the diminution of expenditure with which they were attended, did not furnish ready money to cover the current outlay of the civil and military services of the presidency, which had risen to an enormous height; much less to meet the demands of the company at home. Hastings was deeply impressed with the exigencies of the case; and although the Court of Directors—however strongly they urged the adoption of measures to procure relief from the bond-debt by which their movements were fettered—uniformly stated, in the most forcible language, their desire for the merciful government of the people over whom they had assumed sway, and urged the adoption of an honest and straightforward policy on all occasions, yet their representative, on looking round him, and perceiving the difficulties attendant on the strict fulfilment of the various duties enjoined, thought it best, whatever else he slighted, to obey the leading injunction of getting money, comforting himself with the belief that his employers would gladly receive the fruits of his success, without caring to question the manner in which they had

* Letter from Bengal, Nov., 1773. The ancient title of Maha Rajah (the great king), borne by the highest Indian potentates before the Christian era, was not, it appears, usurped by Hindoos in modern times until the later Mogul emperors took upon themselves to confer titles, which their own usurpations had rendered unmeaning, and which by Hindoo laws could be obtained only by inheritance. Under the English, "Maha Rajahs" became very frequent; and Nuncomar held this title, which descended to his son Goordass. I have been unable to trace the origin of this celebrated man, or to find the authority upon

been acquired. In this resolution he was, no doubt, strengthened by the exceptional instance in which, deviating from their usual tone of instruction, they suggested the policy of taking a shameful advantage of the condition of the emperor, by withholding from him the annual subsidy of about £300,000, guaranteed by them in return for the perpetual grant of the dewannee.† So flagrant an inconsistency was quite enough to inspire Warren Hastings with a general distrust of the sincerity and good faith of his employers, and to incite him to grasp at immediate and unjust gains, rather than frankly set forth the actual position of affairs, and trust to the common sense and humanity of the company to give him time to develop the resources of the country, invigorate its wasted trade, cheer the drooping spirits of its industrious population; and, by these legitimate means, together with reformatory measures for the reduction of the illicit gains of European officials, to restore the commerce and revenue of Bengal to a healthy and flourishing condition.

But such a course of conduct required an amount of sturdy independence—or, better far, of stanch religious principle—rarely manifested by public men of any age or country. Warren Hastings, gifted as he was in many respects, had no pretensions of this nature. A long series of years spent in the company's service, had rendered their interest a primary consideration with him. Though lavish in his expenditure, he had, as has been before shown, no avarice in his composition. "He was far too enlightened a man to look upon a great empire merely as a buccancer would look on a galleon."‡ The love of power and fame burned strong within him; and in taking possession of the highest appointment in the gift of the E. I. Cy., he expressed his disgust at the possibility of the government of Bengal continuing "to be a mere chair for a triennial succession of indigent adventurers to sit and hatch private fortunes in;"§ and urged the advisability of being entrusted

which Macaulay speaks of him as the "head of the Brahmins of Bengal."—(*Essay on Hastings*, 36.)

† As early as Nov., 1768, the select committee, in a letter to Bengal, began to speculate on finding a plea for breaking faith with the emperor; remarking, among other contingencies—"If he flings himself into the hands of the Mahrattas, or any other power, we are disengaged from him; and it may open a fair opportunity of withholding the twenty-six lacs we now pay him."—(Thornton's *British India*, ii., 37.)

‡ Macaulay's *Essay on Warren Hastings*, p. 10.

§ Gleig's *Life of Hastings*, i., 377.

with sufficient authority to carry into execution, without check or hindrance, the ambitious schemes which filled his mind, and to the fulfilment of which he was ready to devote his life. The constitution of the presidency was a subject of grave complaint with him; for, saving a certain prestige attached to the chair, and the single privilege of a casting vote, the governor had no superiority over any other member of the board, except the invidious description of exclusive authority, occasionally conferred by private communications, as in the case of Mohammed Reza Khan.

A change was at hand, but by no means such as Hastings desired; in the meanwhile, during the continuance of the old system, the majority of the councillors sided with him, and enabled him to pursue his own policy, despite the opposition and remonstrances offered by the minority on various occasions, especially with regard to his summary method of dealing with the emperor. The removal of this unfortunate prince from the immediate sphere of British protection, was asserted to be sufficient justification not only for the withdrawal of the yearly subsidy (to which the faith of the company had been unconditionally pledged),* but even for the repudiation of the arrears which Shah Alum had been previously assured were only temporarily kept back by reason of the pecuniary difficulties occasioned by the famine. Nor was this all: the emperor, while at the mercy of the arrogant Mahrattas, was compelled to sign *sunnuds*, or grants, making over to them Allahabad and Corah. The governor left by him in charge of these districts, knowing that the order for their relinquishment had been forcibly extorted, asked leave to place them under British protection. Hastings agreed with the Mogul officer in the impropriety of obeying a mandate issued under compulsion; but that same mandate was not the less set forth by him as conveying a formal renunciation, on the part of Shah Alum, of these districts, which were forthwith formally

* The very *sunnuds* which form the title-deeds of the company, distinctly set forth the annual payment of twenty-six lacs to the emperor, Shah Alum, as a first charge on the revenues of Bengal.

† Col. Smith attested that, in 1768, Shuja Dowlah came to him, expressed his desire to possess Allahabad and Corah, and "proffered four lacs of rupees in ready money, and to swear secrecy on the Koran, if he would aid in its accomplishment." The same officer bore witness, that the emperor sensibly felt the conduct of the vizier, and had declared, with emotion, that it seemed as if he "did

resumed in the name of the company; and as their distance from Calcutta rendered them too expensive possessions to be retained without an addition of military force quite disproportioned to the revenue derivable therefrom, they were openly sold to the man who had once before obtained them by treachery and murder, and who (p. 287), after his defeat by the English, had spared neither intrigue nor bribery for their regainment.† It was an act quite unworthy the representative of a great English association, to let the paltry sum of fifty lacs induce him to sacrifice the last remnants of dominion to which the unfortunate emperor had been taught to look as a refuge from the worst evils that could befall him, to the ambition of his faithless and ungrateful servant. Sir Robert Barker remonstrated earnestly against this procedure, which was arranged after repeated private conferences at Benares, held between Shuja Dowlah and Mr. Hastings, during nearly three weeks of close intercourse. He declared it to be a flagrant breach of the treaty of Allahabad of 1765, by which the dewanee of Bengal was granted to the company; and said that the emperor might, and probably would, if opportunity offered, bestow the *sunnuds* on a rival nation. Hastings treated the possibility with scorn; declaring, "the sword which gave us the dominion of Bengal, must be the instrument of its preservation;" if lost, he added—"the next proprietor will derive his right and possession from the same natural charter." Even had the imperial grants been worth no more than the parchment they were written on, the company would have been unjustifiable in withholding the purchase-money they had pledged themselves to give: but the truth was, the *sunnuds* had a real, though not very definite value, of which Hastings was fully aware, though he now chose to ridicule them as much as his predecessor Clive had exaggerated their importance; and for precisely the same reason—of temporary expediency.‡ It is difficult for the

not wish him to have an habitation of his own on the face of the earth."—(Auber's *India*, i., 191-2.)

‡ In 1784, when arguing in favour of aiding, instead of oppressing the emperor, Hastings writes, that he demanded assistance from the English on the right of gratitude; asserting, "that when the French and Hyder earnestly solicited his grants of the Carnatic, and offered large sums to obtain them, he constantly and steadily refused them. We know, by undoubted evidence, that this is true." These firmans had therefore a marketable value very different to that of "waste paper."—(*Life*, iii., 192.)

English reader to appreciate the feelings which, in the minds of the Indian population, lent a peculiar degree of legality to grants unquestionably issued by the Great Mogul. The powerful and arrogant ruler of Oude ventured not on assuming the style of a sovereign: he knew the temper of neighbouring communities, and possibly of his subjects, too well to attempt this innovation; and his successor earnestly solicited, and at length with difficulty obtained from Shah Alum the title of vizier, or first subject of an empire which had little more than nominal existence, while he was himself undisputed master of an independent state as large as Ireland.

The sale of Allahabad and Corah was only one portion of the treaty of Benares. The counterpart was an arrangement for the hire of the British force to Shuja Dowlah, in the novel and degrading character of mercenary troops; and this, notwithstanding the repeated orders of the directors to refrain from all participation in aggressive warfare, and the recent (July, 1772) and unanimous declaration of the council, when called upon to assist their ally against the invasions of the Mahrattas—"that no object or consideration should tempt or compel them to pass the political line which they had laid down for their operations with the vizier, which were to be defensive only;" adding, that "not a single sepoy was to pass the frontiers of his territories."*

The people against whom Hastings agreed to co-operate, in violation alike of the orders of his employers and the resolutions of his colleagues, were the Rohilla rulers of the country lying N.W. of Oude and E. of the Ganges. The establishment of this military colony had been, as we have seen, forcibly effected during the decline of the empire, partly by the retention of lands as hereditary property, which had been originally granted on the ordinary jaghire tenure, but chiefly by the aggressions of Ali Mohammed Khan,† the adventurous leader of an ever-increasing body of Afghans, whose title was avowedly that of the sword. Successive rulers of the Oude province—themselves usurpers of equally short standing—had made various attempts to subdue Rohil-

cund, and annex it to their own dominions, but without any permanent result. The country was, at the present time, divided into numerous petty principalities, under independent chiefs or sirdars, all of whom derived their origin from the same stock, being of one tribe—that of Ali Mohammed Khan. The very nature of their power rendered their union improbable for any other purpose except temporary coalition against an invading force; but in that event—if all were true to the common cause—they could, it was estimated, bring into the field 80,000 effective horse and foot. Still it was less their number than their bravery, dexterity with the sword, and skill in the use of war-rockets, that had heretofore enabled them to hold their ground against the imperial troops, the rulers of Oude, and their worst foes—the Mahrattas. Against the latter they had fought with relentless fury on the plains of Paniput; and though, for a time, the prudence of Nujeeb-oo-Dowla had averted the threatened vengeance, the danger was delayed, not dissipated. The open hostility displayed by his son, Zabita Khan, to Shah Alum, and the evident preparations made by him for war at Scharunpoor, were followed by the invasion of his territories by the imperial troops, under a brave commander named Nujeeb Khan, in conjunction with the Mahrattas; but the latter contrived to reap all the benefit of the enterprise.

Shuja Dowlah did not view without uneasiness the prospect of the subjugation of Rohilcund by the Mahrattas. To have a territory he had long coveted seized and occupied by the most dangerous people all India could furnish for neighbours, was a calamity to be averted at any hazard; and he gladly entered into an alliance with the Rohillas, in 1773, to which the English became a party, to make common cause against the invaders. The leading Rohilla chief, Hafiz Rehmet, whose territories formed the western boundary of Oude,‡ though compelled by dire necessity to consent to co-operate with the nabob-vizier, as the sole means of defence against an immediate and overpowering foe, was so distrustful of his ultimate designs, that he positively refused to take the field against the Mahrattas until

tirely on the north side of the Ganges, except Etawa and one or two straggling districts. Those of Zabita Khan commenced on the Jumna, about fourteen miles from Delhi, and were bounded by Sirhind on the west; and those of Ahmed Khan Bungush, bordered on the Corah country—Furruckabad being the capital.—(Auber's *India*, vol. i., 189.)

* Auber's *British Power in India*, i., 385.

† Ali Mohammed is said to have been the son of a Hindoo *aheer* or shepherd, adopted in infancy by a Rohilla chief, and treated in all respects as his own child.—(*Siyar ul Mutakherin*, iii., 20.)

‡ The possessions of Hafiz Rehmet Khan joined the western limits of Oude, and were situated en-

assured by Sir Robert Barker, on the faith of the English, that no ungenerous advantage should be taken of his absence from his own frontier by their mutual ally. This temporary and precarious confederacy of powers, strong only if heartily united, did not prevent the hostile force from crossing the Ganges and committing great ravages in Rohilcund; but their withdrawal was at length purchased by a bond for forty lacs, given by Hafiz Rehmet, on behalf of himself and his fellow-chiefs, to Shuja Dowlah, who became guarantee for the gradual payment of the money to the Mahrattas. The succeeding events are very confusedly, and even contradictorily, related by different writers. The native, and apparently least inconsistent version, is given in the narrative of the son of Hafiz Rehmet, who states that the Mahratta leaders, Holcar and Sindia, subsequently negotiated with his father to join them against Shuja Dowlah, offering, as an inducement, to surrender to him the bond given on his behalf, and a share of such conquests as might be made in Oude. The Rohilla chief, whom all authorities concur in describing as of upright and honourable character, refused to listen to this proposition, and warned his ally of the intended attack, which, however, the Mahrattas were prevented by intestine strife from carrying into execution. The ever-trencherous and ungrateful vizier, relieved from this danger, immediately demanded the payment of the bond which he held simply as a guarantee against loss, for the benefit, not of the Mahrattas, but of himself and the English; and he had the art to persuade the latter people that the deed in question had actually been drawn up for the express purpose of providing for the expenses incurred in resisting the common foe. Hafiz Rehmet, however disgusted by this shameless demand, was not in a condition to offer effectual resistance, having lost many of his bravest commanders in the recent hostilities. He therefore forwarded his own share of the required sum, and entreated his fellow-chiefs to follow his example; but they refused to submit to such extortion; and after many ineffectual attempts at compromise, he reluctantly prepared for the inevitable conflict, observing, "that as he must die

some time, he could not fall in a better cause."*

Shuja Dowlah, notwithstanding the pains he had taken to win over some of the minor sirdars or governors, the indefensible character of the country, and the vast numerical superiority of his own troops, was little disposed to confront, without extraneous assistance, the small but hardy Afghan bands, who were resolved to struggle, even unto death, in defence of their hearths and homes in the fair valleys of Rohilcund. There were soldiers in India whose steady disciplined valour might be depended upon when fighting as hired mercenaries against such combatants as these. A single English battalion was to native armies as the steel to the bamboo: with this addition they became all-powerful; without it, the death of a favourite leader, the outburst of a thunder-storm, a few wounded and ungovernable elephants, or a hundred other possible and probable contingencies, might change in an instant the shout of victory and the eager advance, into the yell of defeat and the headlong flight, amidst which even the commanders would lack presence of mind to issue any better orders than the very watchword of panic—chellao! chellao! (get on! get on!)+ The deceitful representations made by Shuja Dowlah regarding the reason for which he had been intrusted with the Rohilla bond, was intended to give the English a plausible pretext to aid him in punishing an alleged breach of treaty. At the same time, he was too well acquainted with the wants and difficulties of the Calcutta presidency, and with the character of the governor, to feel any necessity for circumlocution in intimating his desire of seizing Rohilcund, and his readiness to pay a large sum for the assistance of a British force in the accomplishment of the projected usurpation.

Neither regard for the honour of his nation, nor the dignity of his own position as the representative of a great commercial body, nor even for the private reputation which he often declared "it had been the study of his life to maintain unblemished," withheld Hastings from receiving this proposition with favour, and even encouraging it by dwelling on the advantages to be derived by the projector from its execution. The result was the insertion of a clause in

* *Life of Hafiz Rehmet*, English abridgment, published by Oriental Translation Fund, pp. 112—113. Also Sir Robert Barker's evidence in 1781. Thornton's *British Empire in India*, ii., 44.

† *Vide* Colonel Wilks' graphic narrative of the battles of Hyder Ali, especially of his defeat by the Mahrattas at Cherroolee, and flight to Seringapatam. —(*History of Mysoor*, ii., 144.)

the treaty of Benares, by which the English governor agreed to furnish troops to assist the ruler of Oude in "the reduction" or expulsion of their late allies the Rohillas, for a gratuity of forty lacs of rupees, to be paid when the "extermination" should be completed, the vizier to bear the whole charge (computed at 210,000 rupees a month) of the British force employed in the expedition.*

In the spring of 1774, the second of the three brigades into which the Bengal army was divided—viz., that of Allahabad,† joined the forces of Shuja Dowlah, and the combined troops entered the Rohilla country. The English commander was possibly already prejudiced against Hastings, on account of the determination manifested by the latter to keep the military under the complete control of the civil authority; but this circumstance was not needed to deepen the natural disgust excited by being employed in an undertaking deservedly stigmatised as "infamous." The conduct of the nabob-vizier was, from first to last, as bad as cruelty, cowardice, and rapacity could make it. The Rohillas, astounded by the approach of English troops, anxiously strove to make terms of peace; but the demand of the invader for *two crore* of rupees, evinced his uncompromising resolve to proceed to extremities. Hafiz Rehmet took post near the city of Bareilly, with an army of 40,000 men. The English commenced the attack by a cannonade of two hours and a-half, the rapidity and persistence of which defeated the frequent attempts of the enemy to charge; at length, after Hafiz Rehmet‡ and one of his sons, with several chiefs of note, had been killed whilst rallying their dispirited followers, the rest turned and fled. Shuja Dowlah had heretofore remained a

quiet spectator of the fight, surrounded by his cavalry and a large body of artillery; but the fortune of the day being decided, his troops made up for their past inactivity by pursuing, slaughtering, and pillaging the fugitives and the abandoned camp, "while the company's troops, in regular order in their ranks, most justly observed," (says their commander), "we have the honour of the day, and these banditti the profit." Then followed a fearful destruction of villages, the whole country being overspread with flames for three days after the battle. Colonel Champion vainly besought Shuja Dowlah to give orders for the cessation of these atrocities; and he also appealed to Hastings§ to plead the cause of the unhappy family of Hafiz Rehmet; but the answer was, that such interference would probably aggravate the sufferings it was designed to alleviate: and this rebuff was accompanied by an intimation that it was the business of Colonel Champion to fight and not to diplomatisé, and that it was especially incumbent on him to refrain from any line of conduct which should afford the nabob-vizier a pretext for refusing to pay the forty lacs—literally, the price of blood.

Thus sharply admonished, Colonel Champion was compelled to abide by the "great political maxim," till then utterly disregarded in Anglo-Indian policy,—"that no power which supports another as the mere second in a war, has the smallest right to assume a prominent place in the negotiations which are to conclude that war."||

Shuja Dowlah was therefore suffered to finish the affair entirely to his own satisfaction; which he did by following up the slaughter of about 2,000 Rohillas on the field of battle, with the expulsion of 18,000

* Hastings avowed himself "glad of any occasion to employ the E. I. Co's forces, which saves so much of their pay and expenses" (*Life*, i., 359); and regrets being unable to derive "some advantage from the distractions of the Mahratta state."—(i., 397.)

† The Allahabad brigade, established by Clive, drew from Fort William no less than two million sterling in five years. The sum of 30,000 rupees per month, paid according to agreement by Shuja Dowlah, during that period, was scarcely felt as a relief, for the officers in command contrived to reap the chief benefit therefrom.—(*Gleig's Life of Warren Hastings*, i., 343.)

‡ The old warrior, conspicuous from his long white beard, stately bearing, and noble charger, when all was lost, was seen to gallop forward to perish (to our shame) on English bayonets.—(*Heber*, i., 434.)

§ Warren Hastings remarked, that Colonel Champion had little reason to express indignation regarding the destruction of the villages; and he quoted a

letter written by this officer during the war with the vizier, in 1764, in which he declared, that according to his instructions he had been ravaging the enemy's country, and had "destroyed upwards of 1,000 villages." This barbarous system was unhappily employed, without scruple, by European commanders; and Clive especially, as a favourite measure, subsidised bands of Mahrattas for the express purpose of spreading devastation round the French settlements and encampments. Orme's work contains irrefragable testimony of the desolating hostilities of even Europeans, practised at the expense of the wretched peasantry, who beheld every art of a boasted civilisation employed in strife and bloodshed, and their fields not only ravaged by rival invaders with fire and the sword, but even the mounds reared with unwearied labour thrown down, and the waters let loose to destroy the cultivations previously irrigated with unavailing toil.

|| *Life of Hastings*, i., 439.

of their countrymen, who, with their wives and children,* were driven forth to beg, steal, or starve. The Hindoo peasantry, who formed the mass of the population, were unfavourably affected by the change. It was at first attempted to show that they had experienced a great benefit by being delivered from the "grinding tyranny" of the Rohillas; but other and more trustworthy accounts, describe the case differently, and assert that these people, unlike their race in general, encouraged agriculture, while in another point they shared the Afghan characteristic—of freedom from any passion for the accumulation of wealth. The population over whom they had usurped sway, being left in the undisturbed possession of their religion and customs, were therefore probably better situated under the immediate sway of these independent chiefs, than beneath the delegated despotism of the Mogul emperors.† Their expulsion was, however, not quite complete; for one chief, Fyzoolla Khan, continued to resist the power of the usurper, and took post with the remains of the army on the skirts of the mountains near Pattir Ghur. After some ineffectual attempts to dislodge him, the vizier found his own troops becoming so discontented from arrears of pay, that he was glad to bring hostilities to a close, by entering into an agreement with Fyzoolla Khan, who agreed to surrender half the treasure which he had contrived to carry off, on condition of receiving a grant of Rampoor and certain dependent districts in Rohilcund, yielding a revenue of above £150,000 per annum.

This arrangement was, however, hurried to a conclusion more by a consideration of the failing health of the vizier, than even from the discontent of the troops. The cause of his rapid decline was ostensibly attributed to a cancerous disease; but the Mussulman historian of these times alludes to a current report—that it was the direct consequence of a wound inflicted by the hand of the daughter of Hafiz Rehmet, who, when the murderer of her father filled up the measure of his crimes by an attempt to dishonour her, stabbed him with a small dagger she had concealed for the purpose. The unhappy girl was immediately put to

death; but the wound she had inflicted, though slight, proved mortal, the dagger having been previously poisoned by her mother. Such is the story told by Gholam Hussein and his translator. The former denies, the latter affirms, its truth, and adduces certain circumstances—such as the friendship of the author for the sons of Hafiz Rehmet, his alliance with the English, and other causes, for a desire to pass slightly over so painful a matter.‡ This at least is certain,—that Shuja Dowlah, immediately after the accomplishment of his much-desired object, the possession of Rohilcund, was seized by mortal sickness, while yet strong in the full energy of middle life; that he lingered through many months of intense bodily anguish, and then died, leaving his usurped dominions to a youth whose addiction to the most hateful forms of sensuality rendered him an object of general contempt.

The Rohilla war was the last transaction of importance which marked the career of Hastings as governor under the old system. Among the other measures of this epoch, was one of a quite unexceptionable character—the removal of a tax on marriage. He likewise exerted himself vigorously for the suppression of gangs of thieves and plunderers, who, under the name of *decoits*, committed terrible ravages in Bengal. Troops of *senassies*, or religious mendicants, (the pilgrim-gipsies of Hindoostan), did great mischief under the cloak of fanatical zeal. The truth was, that during the late season of anarchy, crime of all descriptions had been greatly augmented; and many who had first laid violent hands on food, at the instigation of ravening hunger, continued as a trade what they had yielded to as a momentary temptation. The measures adopted for suppressing gang-robbery were, however, of a character so flagrantly unjust, that no Christian governor could be justified in adopting, far less in initiating them. Each convicted criminal was to be executed in his native village, of which every member was to pay a fine according to his substance; and the family of the transgressor were to become slaves of the state, to be disposed of at the discretion of government. These iniquitous regulations were enacted, notwithstanding the avowed knowledge of the presidency, that the custom of selling slaves was aliko repugnant to the doctrines of the Koran and the Shastras. Moreover, it was at this very time found necessary to take measures to check the kidnapping of chil-

* Stated by Colonel Champion at 100,000 souls.

† Hafiz Rehmet is said to have been "an excellent sovereign" (Heber, i., 434), and Fyzoolla Khan "a liberal landlord."—(*Report on Rohilcund* 1808.)

‡ *Siyar ul Mutakherin*, iii., 268.

dren, and carrying them out of the country in Dutch and French vessels,—a practice which “had greatly increased since the establishment of the English government.”*

Hastings Governor-general.—The great change in the constitution of the Bengal presidency, decreed by the Regulating Act of 1772-’3, was unwelcome intelligence to the governor, who justly considered the actual though ill-defined supremacy vested in the Calcutta presidency, with the high-sounding but empty title given to its head, poor compensation for having his movements fettered by four coadjutors, each one scarcely less powerful than himself. The erection of a Supreme Court of judicature, to be conducted by Englishmen after the national method, he knew to be an innovation likely to produce considerable dissatisfaction in the minds of the natives; and the result proved his surmise correct: but no small part of the blame attaches to the individuals of whom it was composed, their ignorance of the customs of the people they came to judge being aggravated by a haughty indifference to the deep-rooted and undeviating adherence to ceremonial observances and the rights of sex and caste, which form so prominent a feature in the manners of the whole native population, both Hindoo and Mohammedan. Hastings, indeed, consoled himself for the dangerous character of the new legal courts, because the chief justice, Sir Elijah Impey, his old schoolfellow at Westminster, was the best man that could have been chosen for the office “in all England.”† Most authorities have formed a very different estimate of the same person; and Macaulay has not hesitated to declare, that “no other such judge has dishonoured the English ermine since Jefferies drank himself to death in the Tower.”‡

Towards the new councillors—General Clavering, Colonel Monson, and Mr. (afterwards Sir Philip) Francis§—Hastings was not favourably disposed. They knew this, and came prepared to resent any semblance of disrespect. The occasion offered itself before they set foot in Calcutta: the salute

* *Revenue Consultations* of April and May, 1774; and official letters from Bengal of this date, quoted in Auber's *British Power in India*, i., 432.

† *Life of Hastings*, i., 471.

‡ *Essay on Warren Hastings*, p. 50.

§ Pronounced very decidedly by Macaulay to be the author of the *Letters of Junius*.—(*Idem*, p. 30.) The strongest argument on the other side, is the steady denial of Francis himself, which he reiterated so late as 1817—that is, the year before his death, at the advanced age of eighty-eight.

from Fort William consisted of seventeen, instead of twenty-one, discharges; and the expected guard of honour did not await their landing. The governor-general understood the effect of these apparent trifles on the minds of the natives of all ranks, and had calculated the degree of respect absolutely necessary to be shown to his colleagues: so, at least, they reasoned; and within six days after their arrival in October, 1774, a struggle commenced, which rendered the council-chamber of Calcutta a scene of stormy debate for the space of four years.

Mr. Barwell, the fourth member nominated by the Regulating Act, was an experienced Indian official. He had not always been on good terms with Hastings; but he now steadily, though with little effect, adhered to him against the new-comers. Hastings himself possessed a remarkable degree of self-control,|| and rarely suffered the violence of Clavering, the pertinacity of Monson—or, worse than all, the sharp tongue and ready pen of Francis—to drive him from the vantage ground of equanimity, or tempt him to lay aside the quiet tone of guarded cynicism, to which the eloquent enthusiasm of his earlier and purer life had long since given place.

The Benares treaty and the Rohilla war were the first subjects of discussion. On the plea of keeping faith with the political agent¶ placed by him at the court of Shuja Dowlah, Hastings refused to produce the correspondence; and this circumstance, combined with other manifestations of a desire to crush or evade inquiry into matters in which he was personally concerned, gave rise to many grave imputations on his character. The Rohilla war was deservedly denounced by the majority as a shameful expedient to raise money; but, unhappily, party feeling against Hastings alloyed their zeal, and ensured defeat by its own violence. In diplomacy, all three combined were no match for him, as they soon learned with bitter mortification. The clause in their instructions which directed examination to be made into past oppressions, was ample war-

|| In the council-chamber at Calcutta hangs a portrait of Hastings, bearing the legend—“*Mens æqua in arduis*,” and no better comment need be desired to accompany the semblance of the pale face, slight frame, singularly developed brow, penetrating eye, and thin, firmly-closed lips of the man of whom it has been said, “hatred itself could deny no title to glory—*except virtute*.”—(*Macaulay's Essay on Warren Hastings*, p. 92.)

¶ The Mr. Middleton mentioned under such suspicious circumstances in the next page.

rant for the inquiries instituted by them into various complaints urged by natives of rank against the governor.* No doubt, many of these were well founded; for it is not likely that a person, so indifferent to the common rules of honesty and humanity in all matters of foreign policy, would be scrupulously just in his internal arrangements. But the most puzzling point in the quarrels of this epoch, is the repeated accusation brought against him of venality—urged with a degree of vehemence which may be illustrated by a single extract from the official records, in which the “gentlemen of the majority” (as Hastings sarcastically called them) complain, in plain terms, of the “formidable combination of reciprocal interest” which he had established, “by accepting unwarrantable advantages himself, and conniving at those which were received by the company’s servants.”† To this heavy charge is added:—“In the late proceedings of the revenue board, there is no species of peculation from which the honourable governor-general has thought it right to abstain.”‡

It has been before stated, that Hastings was not avaricious—far from it: he had neither taste nor talent for the accumulation of wealth, and appears to have habitually mismanaged his pecuniary affairs. For that very reason, the high salary attached to his office proved insufficient to cover his ill-regulated expenditure: and this circumstance may account for his having availed himself of means to recruit his own exchequer, closely resembling in character those simultaneously employed by him on behalf of the company.

Many specific accusations were urged against him. Among others, the extraordinary appointment of Munnee Begum as guardian to the nabob, was now distinctly

stated to have been purchased by her in the first instance, and subsequently retained by bribery; and it was alleged in corroboration, that in the examination of her receipts and disbursements, a large sum remained unaccounted for. She was placed under restraint, and on being closely questioned as to the cause of the defalcation, she pleaded having given three lacs of rupees to the governor-general and his immediate retainer, Mr. Middleton.§ The receipt of this sum was not denied; but Hastings vindicated his own share in the transaction, by asserting that the lac-and-a-half taken by him had been used as “entertainment money,” to cover the extraordinary outlay necessitated by his visit to Moorshedabad, over and above the charge of upwards of 30,000 rupees made by him on the Calcutta treasury for travelling expenses; together with a large additional sum for his companions and attendants.

This explanation is quite insufficient as regards the exaggerated scale of expenditure adopted by the governor-general during his absence from Calcutta; far less can it justify so large a deduction from the income of the nabob, immediately after his allowance had been cut down to the lowest point. The result of the investigation was the removal of Munnee Begum from office, and her supersession by Rajah Goordass, the son of Nuncomar, by whom the accusation of collusion between the begum and the governor had been preferred. The appointment was the act of the majority, conferred—not, of course, for the sake of Goordass, who was deemed incapable of doing much good or harm—but as a strong mark of the feelings entertained by them to his father; although, at this very time, as Hastings savagely declared, “the old gentleman was in gaol, and in a fair way to be hanged.”||

* Among these was the rane of Burdwan, the relict of the late rajah, Tillook Chund, whose ancestors had governed their rightful heritage as a zemindarree during the whole period of Moham-medan rule. The rane complained that she had been set aside from the government during the minority of her son, a boy of nine years old, to make room for a corrupt agent. Another accusation brought against Hastings was that of unduly favouring his native steward, named Cantoo Baboo (a former servant of Clive’s), who had been not only allowed to farm lands to the value of £150,000 per annum, but also to hold two government contracts, one in his own name, and the other in that of his son, a boy of ten or twelve years of age, amounting to a still higher sum.—(Dr. Moodie’s *Transactions in India*, p. 241.)

† The majority steadily refused even the customary presents or *muzzurs* (of comparatively small value,

offered by the natives of rank), as a dangerous practice; and commented severely on the reasons adduced by Hastings for receiving and paying them into the company’s treasury, and by Barwell for receiving and retaining them.—(*Letter from Bengal*, October, 1774.)

‡ *Consultations of Bengal Council*, May, 1775.

§ Of the lac-and-a-half of rupees (which, by the existing standard, considerably exceeded £15,000 in value) no account was ever rendered, or defence set up, by Mr. Middleton.—(Mill’s *India*, iii., 633.)

|| The concentrated bitterness of this expression appears in a striking light when contrasted with the singular moderation of Hastings at the time of the trial of Mohammed Reza Khan, on the charges of wholesale plunder and sanguinary oppression. He then remarked on the little chance of capital punishment being inflicted, let the trial end how it would; giving as a reason—“On ne pend pas des gens qui ont un million dans leur poche.”—(*Life*, i., 264.)

The means by which the most dangerous and deadly foe ever encountered by Hastings was dashed to the ground at the very moment when his hand was uplifted to strike, are of a nature which must ever leave some degree of uncertainty as to the degree of culpability attributable to the chief actors.*

The antecedent circumstances require to be rightly understood before any clear conception can be formed on a matter which created no ordinary degree of interest in the mind of the English public, and afforded to Burke a fitting theme for some of the most thrilling passages in his eloquent speeches, in the long subsequent impeachment of Hastings. It will be remembered that Nuncomar, previous to his appointment as naib-dewan to Meer Jaffier, had been detained at Calcutta by order of the directors, on the ground of being a dangerous intriguer, whose liberty might endanger the safety of the state; and this conclusion was arrived at mainly through evidence brought forward by Hastings, who conducted the examination, and was known to entertain a very unfavourable opinion of Nuncomar. At the period of the trial of Mohammed Reza Khan, the governor-general took great credit for the manner in which, notwithstanding his private feelings, he had entered freely into all the complaints brought forward by the Brahmin ex-dewan against his Mussulman successor. He even showed Nuncomar considerable personal attention until the termination of the affair, when the accusations not being established, were pronounced malicious and libellous. Nuncomar felt that he had been used as a mere tool; and, stung to the soul by the disgrace in which his ambitious schemes had terminated, he retired into temporary obscurity, and eagerly waited an opportunity of revenge.

The dissensions which took place in the council, speedily afforded the desired opportunity; and just four months after the establishment of the new government, Nuncomar presented a memorial to the council, which contained a formal statement of bribes, to a great extent, received by the governor-general from Mohammed Reza Khan, as the price of bringing the inquiry into his conduct to a favourable termination. Francis read the paper aloud: a stormy

altercation followed. Hastings, for once, lost all temper; called his accuser the basest of mankind; indignantly denied the right of the councillors to sit in judgment on their superior; and, upon the request of Nuncomar to be heard in person being granted by the majority, he left the room, followed by Barwell. General Clavering took the vacant chair,—Nuncomar was called in, and, in addition to the previous charges, he alleged that two crores and a-half of rupees had been paid by Munnee Begum to Hastings, and that he had himself purchased his son's appointment, as her colleague in office, with another crore.

Hastings felt the ground giving way beneath his feet. The arrangement (to use the most lenient epithet) between him and Munnee Begum, regarding the "entertainment money," would, if other testimony were wanting, suffice to prove that he had not scrupled to obtain, in a more or less surreptitious manner, large sums in addition to the regular salary (£25,000 per annum), and allowances attached to his position of governor-general. The probability was a strong one, that the various and specific charges which the vindictive Brahmin was prepared to maintain at the hazard of his life, would contain at least sufficient truth to enable the adversaries of Hastings to triumph over him, by the ruin of the reputation he had, from early youth, spent laborious days and anxious nights in acquiring. To lose this was to lose all: he had no extraneous influence with the crown, the ministers, in parliament, or even with the company, sufficient to prop up his claims to the high position which credit for personal disinterestedness, still more than for great and varied talents, had obtained for him. With a mind depressed by gloomy apprehension, he prepared for the worst; and, to avoid the last disgrace of dismissal, placed in the hands of two confidential agents† in London his formal resignation, to be tendered to the directors in the event of a crisis arriving which should render this humiliating step of evident expediency. Meanwhile he met his foes with his usual undaunted mien, and carried the war into the enemy's country, by instituting proceedings in the Supreme Court against Nuncomar and two kinsmen, named Fowke, in

* One of the most moderate and unprejudiced authorities on this subject truly remarks, that "opinions may, indeed, differ as to the extent of Hastings' culpability; but he must be a warm parti-

san, indeed, who will go to the length of declaring that the hands of the governor-general were altogether clean."—(Thornton's *British India*, ii., 71.)

† Col. Maclean and Mr. Graham.

the company's service, for an alleged conspiracy to force a native, named Camul-odeen, to write a petition reflecting falsely and injuriously on himself and certain of his adherents, including his banyan Cantoo Baboo, on whom he was known to have conferred undue privileges. Clavering, Monson, and Francis, after hearing the evidence adduced at an examination before the judges, placed on record their conviction that the charge was a fabrication, and had no foundation whatever in truth. Within a few days from this time a more serious offence was alleged against Nuncomar—he was arrested on a charge of forging a bond five years before, and thrown into the common gaol. The ostensible prosecutor was a native of inconsiderable station; but Hastings was then, and is still, considered to have been the real mover in the business. The majority manifested their convictions in the most conspicuous manner: they dispatched urgent and repeated messages to the judges, demanding that Nuncomar should be held to bail; but to no purpose. The assizes commenced; a true bill was found; Nuncomar was brought before Sir Elijah Impey, and after a protracted examination, involving much contradictory swearing, was pronounced guilty by a jury of Englishmen, and condemned to death.

The animus of the whole affair could not be mistaken: all classes were infected by a fever of excitement; and Clavering, it is said, swore that Nuncomar should be rescued, even at the foot of the gallows. Impey behaved throughout the trial with overbearing violence, and not only refused to grant a reprieve until the pleasure of the home authorities should be known, but even censured the counsel of Nuncomar, in open court, for his laudable attempt to prevail on the foreman of the jury to join in recommending his client to mercy.* Hastings, who might, had he chosen, have set his character in the fairest light by procuring the respite of his accuser, remained perfectly

quiescent, and thereby confirmed the general conviction that he dared not encounter the charges of Nuncomar.

The sufficiency of the evidence by which the act of forgery was established, is a question of secondary importance when compared with the palpable injustice of inflicting capital punishment for a venial offence on a person over whom the judges had but a very questionable claim to exercise any jurisdiction at all.† Forgery in India was the very easiest and commonest description of swindling—a practice which it was as needful, and quite as difficult, for men of business to be on their guard against in every-day life, as for a loungers in the streets of London to take care of the handkerchief in his great-coat pocket. The English law, which made it a capital offence, was just one of those the introduction of which into Bengal would have been most vehemently deprecated by Hastings, had he not been personally interested in its enforcement. The natives, both Mussulman and Hindoo, were astounded at the unprecedented severity of the sentence; many of them, doubtless, remembered the notorious forgery of Clive, and the fate of Omichund; and now an aged man, a Brahmin of high caste, was sentenced to a public and terrible doom for an act, a little more selfish in its immediate motive, but certainly far less dreadful in its effects. The offence which had not barred an Englishman's path to a peerage, was now to doom a Hindoo to the gallows. And yet not so; the ostensible reason deceived no one; and even the warmest partisans of Hastings could not but view Nuncomar rather as the determined opponent of the governor-general, about to pay with life the forfeit of defeat, than as a common felon, condemned to die for a petty crime. The Mussulmans were mostly disposed to view with exultation the fate of the inveterate foe of Mohammed Reza Khan; but the Hindoos waited in an agony of shame and doubt the dawn of the day which was to witness the

* Thornton's *British India*, ii., 84. Burke publicly accused Hastings of having "murdered Nuncomar, through the hands of Impey." Macaulay views the matter more leniently as regards Hastings; but deems the main point at issue quite clear to everyone, "idiots and biographers excepted," and considers any lingering doubt on the subject quite set aside by the strong language in which Impey was subsequently described by Hastings as the man "to whose support I was at one time indebted for the safety of my fortune, honour, and reputation."—(ii., 255.) But this

evidence is not unexceptionable, since it is very possible that these words referred to the important decision of the judges, at a subsequent crisis in the career of Hastings, when his resignation was declared invalid, and Clavering reluctantly compelled to relinquish his claim to the position of governor-general.

† Inasmuch as Nuncomar was not a voluntary inhabitant of Calcutta at the time when the offence was said to have been committed, but a prisoner brought and detained there by constraint, under the circumstances referred to in the preceding page.

ignominious end of a Brahmin who, by their laws, could, for the darkest crime ever pictured by the imagination of man, only be punished with loss of caste. The fatal morning of the 5th of August arrived, and Nuncomar stepped into his palanquin with the dignified serenity so often displayed by his countrymen when brought face to face with a violent death, and was borne through countless multitudes, who beheld the melancholy procession with an amazement which swallowed up every other feeling. Calmly mounting the scaffold, the old man sent a last message to the three councillors who would, he knew, have saved him if possible, commending to their care his son, Rajah Goordass. He then gave the signal to the executioner. The drop fell, and a loud and terrible cry arose from the assembled populace, which immediately dispersed—hundreds of Hindoos rushing from the polluted spot to cleanse themselves in the sacred waters of the Hooghly.

The majority in council, thus publicly defeated, sympathised deeply with the fate of this victim to political strife; and the older English officials could not but remember for how many years Nuncomar had played a part, of selfish intrigue it is true, but still an important and conspicuous part in Anglo-Indian history; for his co-operation had been gained at a time when governors and members of council, then mere commercial factors, paid assiduous homage to native functionaries.* The feelings of Hastings may be conjectured from an ex-

pression which escaped him many years later, that he had never been the personal enemy of any man but Nuncomar,† “whom from my soul I detested even when I was compelled to countenance him.” He likewise foresaw the effect the fate of his fallen foe would produce in the minds of the natives. To contest with a fortunate man, was, in their sight, especially in that of the Mohammedan population, like fighting against God himself—as futile, and, in some sort, as impious. As to the power of the majority in council, its prestige was gone for ever; although, how the right of making war and peace, levying taxes, and nominating officials, came to be vested in one set of men, and the exclusive irresponsible infliction of capital punishments in another, was a question quite beyond the comprehension of the Bengalees. The governor-general felt relieved from the danger of any more native appeals, pecuniary or otherwise;‡ and whilst the air was yet filled with weeping and lamentation, he sat down to write a long and critical letter to Dr. Johnson about the *Tour to the Hebrides*, Jones’ *Persian Grammar*, and the history, traditions, arts, and natural productions of India. From this time he renounced all idea of resigning his position, and repeatedly declared, in both official and private communications, that nothing short of death or recall should hinder him from seeing the result of the struggle with his colleagues. That result may be told in his own words—“his adversaries sickened, died, and fled,”§ leaving him

* Nuncomar was governor of Hooghly in 1756. He was induced by the English to take part with them against his master, Surajah Dowlah, whose orders of affording aid to the French when besieged in Chandernagore he disobeyed, to serve his secret allies, to whom on several occasions he rendered considerable service, and in so doing incurred the suspicions of the nabob, and was dismissed from office. His subsequent career has been shown in previous pages; its termination adds another name to the list of remarkable deaths which awaited the chief actors in the conspiracy that was carried into execution on the field of Plassy. At the division of spoil which took place in the house of the Seit brothers, nine persons were present. Of these, three (the Seits and Roy-dullub) were murdered by Meer Cossim Ali; the fourth (Clive) died by his own hand; the fifth (Meeran) perished by lightning; the sixth (Scrafton) was lost at sea; the seventh (Omichund) died an idiot; the eighth (Meer Jaffier) went to his grave groaning under every suffering which pecuniary difficulties, domestic sorrows, and bodily diseases, resulting from debauchery, could inflict. Of the death of Mr. Watts I have seen no record. Gassitee Begum, and several confederates not present on the occasion above referred to, were put to death at

various times. Meer Cossim himself died poor and in obscurity.

† *Life*, iii., 338. This speech needs qualification; for Hastings, on his own showing, entertained for Francis, Clavering, and many minor functionaries, a feeling for which it would be difficult to find any other name than personal enmity. One gentleman, appointed by the majority to supersede a favourite nominee of his own as resident at Oude, he speaks of as “that wretch Bristowe,” and entreats his old friend Mr. Sullivan (the ancient opponent of Clive, and the chairman of the Court of Directors) to help rid him “from so unworthy an antagonist,” declaring that he would not employ him, though his life itself should be the forfeit of refusal.—(ii., 336.)

‡ Francis, when examined before parliament in 1788, declared, that the effect of the execution of Nuncomar, defeated the inquiries entered into regarding the conduct of Hastings; “that it impressed a general terror on the natives with respect to preferring accusations against men in great power;” and that he and his coadjutors were unwilling to expose them to what appeared to him and his fellow-councillors, as well as to the Bengalees, a manifest danger.—(Mill, iii., 641.)

§ *Life of Hastings*, iii., 305.

the undisputed master of the field. The first to fail was Colonel Monson, who, after two months' sickness, fell a victim to the depressing influence of climate, and the wear and tear of faction. The casting vote of Hastings, joined to the undeviating support of Barwell, restored his complete ascendancy in council, which he exercised by reversing all the measures of his adversaries, displacing their nominees to make way for officials of his own appointment, and by reverting to his previous plans of conquest and dominion, of which the leading principle was the formation of subsidiary alliances with the native princes, especially of Oude and Berar, — a policy which, in skilful hands would, he foresaw, act as a powerful lever wherewith to raise England to a position of paramount authority in India. But once again his ambitious career was destined to receive a severe though temporary check. The accounts sent home by the Clavering party, furnished both the government and the directors of the E. I. Cy. with strong arguments for his immediate recall. With the proprietors he had been, and always continued to be, a special favourite, and they vehemently opposed the measure. Still there seemed so little chance of his continuance in office, save for a limited time, and on the most precarious and unsatisfactory tenure, that his agents and friends, after much discussion, thought themselves warranted in endeavouring to effect a compromise, by tendering his voluntary resignation in return for a private guarantee on the part of government for certain honours and advantages not clearly stated. The resignation was proffered and accepted, but it appears that the conditions annexed to it were not fulfilled; for the negotiators sent Hastings word, by the same ship that brought an order for the occupation of the chair by General Clavering (pending the arrival of the newly-appointed governor-general, Mr. Welcher), that they hoped he would not abide by the pledge given on his behalf, since the stipulations made at the same time had been already flagrantly violated.*

On receipt of this varied intelligence, Hastings was, or affected to be, at a loss

how to act; but the violence of General Clavering in attempting the forcible assumption of the reins of government, afforded him an inducement or a pretext to repudiate the proceedings of his representatives in London, and declare that his instructions had been mistaken; that he had not, and would not resign. Clavering insisted that the resignation which had been tendered and accepted in England, could not be revoked in India: he therefore proceeded, with the support of Francis, to take the oaths of office, issue proclamations as governor-general, hold a council, and formally demand the surrender of the keys of the fort and the treasury. But Hastings had the advantage of that possession which an old adage pronounces to be "nine-tenths of the law;" he warned the officers of the garrison at Fort William, and of all the neighbouring stations, to obey no orders but his at their peril, and altogether assumed so daring an attitude, that his adversaries shrank from the alternative of civil war, and consented to abide by the decision of the judges. The notorious partiality of the chief justice left little doubt of the issue; but apart from any such bias, the decree was sufficiently well-grounded. The right of Clavering rested on the resignation of Hastings, and Hastings would not resign. In such a case the most reasonable course was to let things remain as they were, pending the decision of the home authorities. The defeated party, and especially Francis, behaved with unexpected moderation; but the victor, not contented with his triumph, strove to prevent Clavering from reassuming his place in the council, on the ground that it had been formally vacated, and could not be reoccupied except with the combined sanction of the ministers and directors. This absurd proposition Hastings maintained with all the special pleading of which he was an unrivalled master; but the judges could not, for very shame, support him, and Clavering was suffered to resume his former position. These proceedings occurred in June, 1777. They had a most injurious effect on the health of the high-principled but hasty-tempered general; so much so, that Hastings'

* See Letters of Maclean and Stewart.—(*Life*, ii., 95.) The "gross breach" of agreement so loudly complained of, was the investment of General Clavering with the order of the Bath. This same "red ribbon" created as much spleen and envy among the English functionaries, as the privilege of carrying a fish on their banners did among the ancient Mogul nobility; and a strange evidence of the consequence,

attributed to the intriguing nabob of Arcot at the English court, was afforded by the knightly insignia being sent to him, with authority to invest therewith General Coote, and the royal ambassador, Sir John Lindsay.—(*Auber's India*, i., 306.) The greatest wonder is, that the honest and plain-spoken general did not flatly refuse to receive the honour by the hand of one he so thoroughly despised.

prophecy that he would soon die of vexation, was realised in the following August.* Mr. Wheler, on his arrival in November, was compelled to content himself with the rank of a councillor, instead of the high office he had expected to fill. National difficulties fast following one another, engaged the whole attention of English politicians; and war with America, conjoined to the hostility of France, Spain, and Holland, with the armed neutrality of the Baltic, and growing discontent in Ireland, left the ministry† little inclination to begin reforms in India, which must commence with the removal of a man whose experience, energy, and self-reliance might be depended upon in the most perilous emergency for the defence of British interests in India; although, in less critical times, his aggressive policy necessitated an amount of counter-action quite inconsistent with the unchecked authority he so ardently desired to obtain, and which, for many reasons, it seemed advisable to vest in the governor-general. These considerations procured for Hastings a temporary confirmation in office after the expiration of the term originally fixed by the Regulating Act. In 1779, a new parliamentary decree announced that the £1,400,000 borrowed of the public, having been repaid by the company, and their bonded debt reduced to £1,500,000, they were authorised to declare a dividend of eight per cent. The raising of the dividend seems to have been an ill-omened measure; for once again it was followed by an increase of pecuniary distress, which not even the inventive brain and strong arm of the governor-general could find means to dissipate, although the departure of Francis freed him from the restraining presence of a severe and prejudiced, though public-spirited censor. Before their final separation, a partial and temporary reconciliation took place, effected under peculiar circumstances, through the mediation of Mr. Barwell, who, having amassed an ample fortune, returned to enjoy it in England in 1780. Unanimity in the council was indeed of the first necessity to meet a great and instant danger—namely, the alarming excitement occasioned among the native population by the perse-

* It was about this period that the news of the much-desired divorce arrived, which enabled the Baroness Imhoff to become Mrs. Hastings. The Mussulman chronicler, in relating the splendid festivities with which the marriage was celebrated, asserts that the governor-general, vexed at the absence of Clavering, went himself to his house, and

vering attempts of the Supreme Court to extend its jurisdiction over the whole of the company's territory, and to exert a controlling power even over the council itself. Macaulay has drawn a picture of this period in language too vivid and graphic to be condensed, and which has a peculiar value as proceeding from the pen of one who himself filled the position of councillor in the Bengal presidency, in an expressly legal capacity. In enumerating the evils attending the new tribunal, he states that it had "collected round itself,"—

"A banditti of bailiffs' followers compared with whom the retainers of the worst English spunging-houses, in the worst times, might be considered as upright and tender-hearted. Many natives highly considered among their countrymen were seized, hurried up to Calcutta, flung into the common gaol, not for any crime even suspected, not for any debt that had been proved, but merely as a precaution till their cause should come to trial. There were instances in which men of the most venerable dignity, persecuted without a cause by extortioners, died of rage and shame in the gripe of the vile alguazils of Impey. The harems of noble Mohammedans, sanctuaries respected in the east by governments which respected nothing else, were burst open by gangs of bailiffs. The Mussulmans, braver, and less accustomed to submission than the Hindoos, sometimes stood on their defence; and there were instances in which they shed their blood in the doorway, while defending, sword in hand, the sacred apartments of their women. Nay, it seemed as if the faint-hearted Bengalee, who had crouched at the feet of Surajah Dowlah—who had been mute during the administration of Vansittart, would at length find courage in despair. No Mahratta invasion had ever spread through the province such dismay as this inroad of English lawyers. All the injustice of former oppressors, Asiatic and European, appeared as a blessing when compared with the justice of a Supreme Court." • "The lapse of sixty years, the virtue and wisdom of many eminent magistrates who have during that time administered justice in the Supreme Court, have not effaced from the minds of the people of Bengal the recollection of those evil days."—(*Essay*, p. 49.)

The power of the Supreme Court continued to increase, until it seemed as if every other function of government would be swept away in the vortex created by its ever-growing circles. Not satisfied with treating with the utmost contempt the magistrates and judges of the highest respectability in the country, the "black agents," as the chief justice at length brought him in triumph to pay homage to the bride. The fatigue and excitement, perhaps, accelerated a crisis, for the general died a few days later.—(*Siyar ul Mutakherin*, ii., 477.)

† The dissolution of the Rockingham ministry, by the sudden death of its chief, in 1782, was one of the circumstances which prevented Hastings' recall.

temptuously termed them,* he at length fairly ventured upon a distinct assumption of dominant authority in Bengal, by summoning the governor-general and council individually to defend themselves against a suit for trespass committed by them in their official capacity. Hastings could bear much from his "respectable friend, Sir Elijah Impey;" but there were limits even to his tolerance; and Francis, who had long vehemently remonstrated against the tyranny of the Supreme Court, willingly shared the responsibility of releasing various persons wrongfully imprisoned by the judges, and of preparing to resist the outrageous proceedings of the sheriff's officers, if necessary, by the sword. But before matters had proceeded to the last extremity, a compromise was effected between the governor-general and chief justice, by means of an offer which the former had clearly no right to make, and the latter no shadow of excuse for accepting. It will be remembered, that before the Regulating Act came into operation in India, a court of appeal had been projected, under the title of *Sudder Dewannee Adawlut*, to consist of the governor-general and council in person; but this arrangement had not been carried out, because the intended members feared to find their decisions set aside by the overweening authority assumed by the "king's judges," as the officers of the Supreme Court delighted to style themselves, in contradistinction to the company's servants. It was precisely this independence (in itself so just and necessary, though misused in unworthy and indiscreet hands) that Hastings desired to destroy; and he did so, for the time at least, most effectually, by offering Impey, in addition to the office already held by him, that of chief justice of the *Sudder Dewannee Adawlut*, with a salary and fixed emoluments amounting to nearly £8,000 a-year, to be held during the pleasure of the governor-general and council. Francis and Wheler united in opposing this arrangement, and stated, in plain terms, that the idea of establishing peace upon the ground of adverse claims still unrelaxed, and which nothing even appeared to reconcile but the lucrative office given to the chief justice, could be maintained only upon suppositions highly dishonourable to the public justice

and to the executive administration of Bengal. This view of the case was perfectly just. Even as far as the rival functionaries (executive and judicial) were concerned, it could produce only a temporary pacification, while its worst effect was—as a parliamentary committee afterwards affirmed—that it gave the governor-general an ascendancy by which he was "enabled to do things, under the name and appearance of a legal court, which he would not presume to do in his own person."† The measure was carried by Hastings and Coote,‡ in defiance of Francis and Wheler; and the chief justice entered on his double functions, and the receipt of his double salary, with much alacrity, but considerably diminished arrogance, and continued to give undeviating allegiance to his patron, until news arrived of an act of parliament, passed in 1782, for the limitation of the powers of the Supreme Court of judicature; accompanied by the recall of Impey, to answer before the House of Commons the charge of having "accepted an office not agreeable to the true intent and meaning of the act 13 Geo. III."

The ascendancy of Hastings afforded some relief to the natives against wanton outrage, and the subsequent restraint laid on Anglo-Indian jurisdiction, contributed to their further relief. But the terrible prestige given by the unwarrantable proceedings of these times could not easily pass away. Moreover, even when its first terrors had been set aside, the labyrinth of innumerable and inexplicable forms, aggravated by the difficulties of a foreign language, in which a native found himself surrounded when brought within the mysterious circle of an English court of law, was calculated to deepen rather than remove the prejudices of persons who might be impelled by suffering to seek relief from present injury or redress for past wrongs, by a course of litigation which experience could scarcely fail to prove so tardy and expensive in its progress, as frequently to neutralise the benefit of an upright and unprejudiced decision. I can speak from personal experience of the fear entertained, by both Mussulmans and Hindoos, of being by any hook or handle involved in the harassing intricacies of a lawsuit; and even to the present day, many natives from the interior habitually fix their abodes on the safe side of the Mahratta ditch—the boundary of chancery and other civil branches of the Supreme Court.

The uncompromising opposition of Francis

* Letter of Impey to Lord Weymouth.—(Mill.)

† Report of Committee, 1781.

‡ Sir E. Coote, who had taken the place of Barwell, seconded Hastings, though with doubt and hesitation.

to the scheme of Hastings, together with differences on points of foreign policy, terminated in the renewal, and even increase, of former ill-feeling. The governor-general recorded, in an official minute, his disbelief in the "promises of candour" made by his opponent, and declared his public, like his private conduct, "void of truth and honour." Francis, whose health and spirits had been for some time visibly failing, and who, in the words of his opponent, had lost all self-control, and needed to be dealt with like "a passionate woman,"* could ill bear this unmerited taunt. After the council had risen, he placed a challenge in the hands of Hastings. It had been expected, and was immediately accepted. The example had been previously given by General Clavering (the commander-in-chief) and Mr. Barwell; and now the governor-general of India and the senior councillor, with remarkable disregard for the interests of their employers at a very critical period (not to speak of higher principles, which were quite out of the question), proceeded to edify an assemblage of women and children, by fighting a duel, as the Mussulman chronicler has it, "according to the established custom of the nation."† At the first exchange of shots, Francis fell, severely but not mortally wounded. He recovered slowly, and resumed his seat at the council board; until, wearied with the unequal contest, he threw up his position and returned to England at the close of 1782, leaving to Hastings the undisputed supremacy. Wheeler had gradually been relaxing in his opposition. After the departure of his unbending colleague, he sided almost invariably with the governor-general, who spared no efforts to conciliate him by every possible means, especially by "providing handsomely for all his friends."‡ Yet, however great the triumph of Hastings, and undisguised his delight at the successful termination of a six years' conflict, abundant cause for anxiety remained, on every side, to lower the exulting tone he might have otherwise assumed. The ministers of the

crown and the directors of the company suffered his retention of the highest office in India simply as a measure of temporary expediency; and even his staunch friends, the proprietors, failed not to give occasional and qualified censure to the unscrupulous deeds of the man on whose abilities and experience they relied for the fulfilment of those financial expectations which he had made it his great object to realise. But the very uncertainty of his position tended to encourage his innate propensity for temporising measures, and induced him to purchase golden opinions from his fellow-officials by conniving at innumerable illicit proceedings, for the interest of individuals, to the manifest injury of the revenues of the company and the prosperity of the provinces. Reforms are generally most unpopular where most needed; and Hastings, after forming plans for a large reduction of expenditure, set them aside until, as he remarked, he should be more certain of his own fate; "for I will not," he adds, "create enemies in order to ease the burdens of my successors."§ This very natural feeling, though somewhat inconsistent with the excessive zeal expressed by the writer for the pecuniary interests of the company, is quite in accordance with the unscrupulous manner in which he dealt with native princes—treating their rights and claims as valid or invalid, as substantial or mere empty-seeming, just as it suited his immediate object.|| Such habitual double-dealing, however convenient the weapons it might afford for an immediate emergency, could not fail to render his publicly-recorded opinions a tissue of the most flagrant contradictions; and it tended materially to produce the evils which he endeavoured to prove had resulted solely from the opposition made to his measures by the ex-majority. Those evils are thus enumerated by his own pen:—"An exhausted treasury; an accumulating debt; a system charged with expensive establishments, and precluded, by the multitude of dependents and the curse of patron-

* *Life of Hastings*, ii., 384.

† *Siyar ul Mutakherin*, ii., 518.

‡ Wheeler's support was not, however, quite undeviating; and his despotic chief complained of his attachment to "the lees of Mr. Francis, and his practice of a *strange policy* of hearing whatever any man has to say, and especially against public measures."—(*Life of Hastings*, ii., 384.)

§ *Idem*, iii., 31.

|| He himself acknowledged how little he allowed an "expression dictated by the impulse of present

emergency," to impose upon him "the obligation of a fixed principle." And one of his ablest and not least partial advocates, in the present day, admits that his determination to hold "his post and his purposes" in defiance of the directors, led him "to devise arguments and assign motives intended to meet the exigency of the moment, and, therefore, sometimes as much at variance with themselves as were the arguments of those by whom he was so vehemently and invariably opposed."—(Professor Wilson's *Note on Mill's India*, iv., 30.)

age, from reformation; a government debilitated by the various habits of inveterate licentiousness; a country oppressed by private rapacity, and deprived of its vital resources by the enormous quantities of current specie annually exported in the remittance of private fortunes, in supplies sent to China, Fort St. George, to Bombay, and lately to the army at Surat, and by an impoverished commerce; the support of Bombay, with all its new conquests; the charge of preserving Fort St. George, and recovering the Carnatic from the hands of a victorious enemy; the entire maintenance of both presidencies; and lastly, a war, either actual or depending, in every quarter and with every power of Hindostan.”*

Before proceeding to describe the manner in which Hastings, now alone at the helm, steered his way through this troubled sea of dangers and difficulties, and likewise through personal trials of his own seeking, it is necessary to narrate, as briefly as possible, the leading events which, since his promotion to the station of governor-general in 1772, had taken place in the minor or sister presidencies of Bombay and Madras.

BOMBAY, 1772 to 1780.—The possession of the little island of Salsette and the fort of Bassein had long been earnestly coveted by the E. I. Cy., and in 1768, they strongly urged on their Indian representatives the additional security to Bombay to be derived from the annexation of these places; which, however, they desired to see effected “rather by purchase than war.” Under the strong government of Madhoo Rao, the latter experiment would have been sufficiently hazardous; and the result of negotiations opened in 1772, clearly proved the small chance that existed of a voluntary surrender of territories no less valued by the one party than desired by the other. The death of the Mahratta peishwa produced dissensions in the state which, by destroying unity of interest even in Poona itself, offered to the English a prospect of obtaining, in the character of mediators or partisans, the concessions vainly sought for by more legitimate means. Madhoo Rao, always patriotic and unselfish, had diligently striven to avert the calamities by which his early death was likely to be attended. Perceiving his end approaching, he caused his uncle Ragoba to be released from confinement, and in the most affecting and im-

pressive manner entreated him to guard and guide the person and counsels of his brother and successor Narrain Rao, a youth of seventeen. Ragoba appeared kindly disposed to the nephew thus committed to his charge, and the new peishwa was formally invested by the pageant-rajah with the insignia of office. But before long, dissensions arose between the chief ministers of Narrain (Sukaram Bappoo, Nana Furnuvees, and others, appointed by Madhoo Rao) and Ragoba, the result of which was his confinement to certain apartments in the palace. While smarting under the check thus given to his ill-regulated ambition, Ragoba, stimulated by the evil counsels of his tale-bearing wife, Anundee Bye, was induced to gratify the jealous hatred entertained by her against Gopika Bye, the mother of Madhoo and Narrain, by giving a written sanction for the seizure of the young peishwa, which she wickedly converted into an order for his assassination, by changing the word *dhu-ravè* (to seize) into *maravè* (to kill.) A domestic, who had been publicly flogged by order of the destined victim, was a chief mover in the plot, which was carried out by working on the discontent of a body of unpaid infantry. They had been extremely turbulent during the afternoon of the 30th of August, 1773, and in the night the ringleader, Somer Sing, entered the palace by an unfinished doorway newly opened to make an entrance distinct from that of the portion inhabited by Ragoba. Narrain Rao, on starting from sleep, fled, pursued by Somer Sing, to his uncle's apartments, and flung himself into his arms for protection. Ragoba interfered, but Somer Sing exclaimed—“I have not gone so far to ensure my own destruction; let him go; or you shall die with him.” Ragoba was too deeply compromised to give way to remorse: he disengaged himself from the grasp of his nephew, and got out on the terrace. Narrain Rao strove to follow him, but was seized by the leg and flung to the ground by the vengeful servant before named. At this moment one of the personal attendants of the peishwa entered, unarmed, and flew to his rescue; but his fidelity cost him his life, for both master and servant were dispatched by the swords of the assassins.† The unfortunate Narrain Rao appears to have manifested a degree of indecision and timidity, on this trying occasion, remarkable in one of his caste and nation; but these failings were probably not radical defects, but rather incidental.

* *Life of Hastings*, ii., 329.

† Grant Duff's *Mahrattas*, ii., 249.

to an unformed character.* A searching investigation was instituted into the affair by Ram Shastree, the celebrated judge, whose integrity and ability had reflected so much honour on the administration of his beloved disciple Madhoo Rao. To him Ragoba confessed his partial participation in the crime, and asked what atonement he could make. "The sacrifice of your own life," replied the uncompromising judge; "for neither you nor your government can prosper; and, for my own part, I will neither accept of employment, nor enter Poona whilst you preside there."† He kept his word, and retired to a sequestered village, from whence he witnessed the fulfilment of his prediction; for Ragoba's "ill-luck" became proverbial, and communicated itself, in a greater or less degree, to every enterprise in which he was concerned. At the onset, the total absence of a rival claimant enabled him to obtain, without difficulty, the confirmation of the rajah of Sattara to his assumption of the rank of peishwa; but his title was subsequently rendered invalid by the posthumous birth of a son, the rightful heir to Narrain Rao. Considerable doubt was thrown upon the legitimacy of the child by the means adopted by the ministers (Nana Furnavees, Sukaram Bappoo, and others), to provide a male substitute, in the event of their influence being endangered by the birth of a girl; but, as the case happened, the manœuvre only served to endanger their own cause, and afford Ragoba a pretext for resisting the claims of the son of his murdered nephew, who was

proclaimed peishwa when only forty days old. The English authorities appear to have been quite misled by the representations which accompanied his appeal for their assistance; and even when compelled to recognise the utter futility of attempting to establish his supremacy in defiance of the general feeling of the Mahratta nation, they seem never to have rightly understood the nature of his claims, or the basis on which they rested. The cession of Bassein and Salsette, with the payment of a large sum of money, formed the leading stipulations on the part of the Bombay authorities; but as Ragoba was very unwilling to consent to any sacrifice of territory, they took advantage of the plea afforded by an inclination manifested by the Portuguese to regain their ancient possessions, to forcibly occupy them with British troops, protesting, nevertheless, that they held them only on behalf of Ragoba, until he should himself settle the arrangements of the pending treaty. The part taken by Sindia and Holcar, in siding with the ministers, left him no choice but to comply with the demands of the English; and, in return for his concessions,‡ 2,500 men were landed at Cambay, under Colonel Keating, in the early part of the year 1775, to aid his own mob-like assemblage of about 20,000 men. The campaign was successful, though attended with considerable loss of life;§ but preparations for the renewal of hostilities, at the close of the monsoon, were suddenly arrested by the interference of the Bengal presidency. The Bombay authorities were sharply reprimanded for disregarding the recent regu-

* Madhoo Rao, whose generous nature rose superior to the unworthy considerations which induced the Mogul emperors to treat their near relatives as dangerous rivals, and confine them from infancy to state prisons, delighted in cherishing and drawing public attention to the good qualities of his intended successor. The Mahrattas relate, that the brothers were witnessing an elephant-fight from a small hill in the environs of Poona, when one of the animals becoming excited, rushed furiously towards the spot where they were seated. The companions and attendants of the peishwa, forgetting all courtly etiquette, took to their heels, and Narrain jumped up to run off with the rest. "Brother," said Madhoo Rao, "what will the ukbars [*native newspapers*] say of you?" The boy instantly resumed his seat, and retained it until the danger, which became imminent, had been averted by the bravery of a bystander, who, drawing his dagger, sprang in front of the peishwa and turned the animal aside by wounding it in the trunk.—(Duff's *Mahrattas*, ii., 251.)

† *History of Mahrattas*, ii., 249. An interesting feature in the intercourse of Madhoo Rao and Ram Shastree, is related by Duff. The peishwa devoted himself, at one period, to the practice of "Jhep" or

religious meditation, to a degree which interfered with his public duties. Ram Shastree told him, that if he were inclined to revert to the condition of devout and austere poverty, which by the Hindoo doctrine was the especial duty of a Brahmin, he would gladly do the same; but if, on the contrary, Madhoo intended to follow the example of his predecessors, and retain the position of an earthly potentate, the duties incumbent on the assumed office ought to be his first consideration. "The musnud, or a life of self-denial in the holy city of Benares,—which you will," said the honest Mentor; "I will abide with you in either station." Happily for Maharashtra, Madhoo Rao remained its ruler, and Ram Shastree its leading judge,—an unimpeachable one, for he had no thirst for power, and all his habits were consistent with his characteristic rule—to keep nothing more in his house than sufficed for the day's consumption.

‡ Ragoba, or Rugonath Rao, having no other funds, deposited with the company, jewels valued at upwards of six lacs. These gems were, about twenty-eight years later, freely presented to Bajee Rao on his restoration to the office of peishwa, in 1813.

§ In the small detachment of Colonel Keating, 222 persons perished, including eleven officers.

lations, which placed the control in matters of foreign policy in the hands of the governor-general and the supreme council; and, besides being blamed for insubordination, they were informed that an envoy (Colonel Upton) would be sent direct from Bengal to conclude a treaty of peace. This latter proceeding could not fail to irritate the Bombay officials, and to lower their authority, and, indeed, that of the English in general, in the eyes of the Mahratta ministers, than whom no men living were better able to appreciate the weakness arising from divided counsels. The consequence was, that after a negotiation conducted, on the part of the Mahrattas, with more than characteristic procrastination, Nana Furnavees and the ministers of the infant peishwa, concluded a treaty at Poorunder, by which Colonel Upton promised that the English should relinquish the cause of Ragoba, and guarantee the disbandment of his army on certain stipulations quite contrary to the views of that individual. Of Salsette Island they were to retain possession, but to relinquish certain cessions in Guzerat, made by the Mahratta chief Futteh Sing Guicowar. No sooner had this humiliating agreement been entered into than the home despatches arrived, highly applauding the conduct of the Bombay authorities, and bidding them, in any and every case, retain all their late acquisitions, especially Bassein, if it were included in the number; which was not the case. The mandate came late, but its effects were soon manifested in a partial breach of faith, by continued though guarded favour shown to Ragoba, and a decided inclination to break with the Poona ministry. Nana Furnavees, a politician of much ability and more cunning, strove to prevent the renewal of hostilities, by affecting to encourage the pretensions of a French adventurer, named St. Lubin, who, after imposing upon the Madras government in the character of an agent of the court of Versailles, had returned to France, and by exaggerated representations of the influence acquired by him at Poona, had induced the minister of marine to intrust him with a sort of clandestine commission, as an experiment for ascertaining if any footing might be gained (the port of Choul being especially desired.)

No one had less inclination to suffer the introduction of French power into Maharashtra than Nana Furnavees; and by the little favour shown to the avowed agent of another European state (Austria), then at

Poona, it seems that he considered St. Lubin as a mere impostor, and encouraged him simply as a means of alarming the English government by an affected alliance with France. These proceedings served, on the contrary, to incite immediate operations before the anticipated arrival of French auxiliaries at Poona. Even Hastings was dissatisfied with the treaty of Poorunder; and notwithstanding the censure bestowed on the previous "unwarrantable" interference of the local authorities, they were now directed "to assist in tranquillising the dissensions of the Mahratta state." Ostensibly for the promotion of this object, Colonel Leslie was dispatched, with a strong detachment, to march across the centre of India, from Bengal to the western coast. The Bombay presidency, delighted with this indirect admission of the advisability of their former measures, determined not to wait the arrival of reinforcements, but to make war at once, upon the strength of their own resources; and Mr. Carnac, who had the lead in council, was himself placed at the head of a committee, to aid in the direction of military operations. In fact, despite the oddity of making war under the superintendence of civilians, the infirm health and inexperience in Indian warfare of Colonel Egerton, the officer on whom the command devolved by right of seniority, rendered such a step of absolute necessity to the carrying out, with any prospect of success, the wild plan of advancing with a force (including a few straggling horse under Ragoba) of less than 4,500 men, to attack the ministerial party in their own capital. So bold a design imperatively needed rapidity in execution; yet, after crossing the Ghaut (mountain-pass), the army, without any reason for such ill-timed tardiness, advanced only eight miles in eleven days. The enemy had fully prepared for their reception; and the deliberate progress of the English was but slightly opposed, until, at about sixteen miles from Poona, they found themselves face to face with the Mahratta host. Mr. Carnac and Colonel Cockburn (who had taken the lead, in consequence of the sickness of Colonel Egerton) seem to have been panic-struck by the imminent danger which they had wantonly incurred, and they immediately issued orders for a silent midnight retreat. In vain the junior officers and Ragoba, whose military experience was treated with undeserved contempt, urged that, from the

well-known tactics of the enemy, such an attempt, made in defiance of clouds of trained cavalry, was more perilous than the boldest advance. And so the event proved; for the first retrograde movement of the English gave the signal for attack to the whole hostile force. The bravery and skill of Captain Hartley, the officer in command of the rear-guard,* together with his extraordinary influence with the native troops, conduced materially to save the invading army from total destruction. After several furious charges, the enemy desisted, without having made a serious impression on any part of the line. But the loss of 300 men, including fifteen officers, had so completely dispirited the military leaders, that they now, in continued opposition to the arguments and entreaties of Hartley and others, declared advance and retreat alike impossible, and that nothing remained but to make peace with the Mahrattas on any terms,—in other words, to confess themselves caught in their own trap, and consent to such a ransom as their captors might dictate. They were even prepared to give up Ragoba to his foes, the ministers; but he, aware of the ungenerous intention, made private terms of surrender with Sindia. The almost independent power of this chief, and the jealousy existing between him and the Poona authorities, enabled the English, by a direct application to him, to obtain more favourable terms than might otherwise have been conceded; but despite the moderation of the victors, the Convention of Wurgauum formed a fitting ending to one of the few disgraceful campaigns recorded in the annals of the Anglo-Indian army. Every point in dispute was yielded; all acquisitions made since the death of Madhoo Rao (of course including Salsette) were to be relinquished, as also the revenue raised by the company in Broach,† and even in Surat, which the Mahrattas had never possessed. Hostages (Mr. Farmer and Lieutenant Stewart) were left with Sindia for the performance of the treaty: nevertheless, the first act of the committee by whom the whole affair had been so terribly mismanaged, on descending the Ghaut in safety, was to countermand the

order dispatched in agreement with the recent convention forbidding the advance of the troops from Bengal.‡

The presidency were indignant beyond measure at this discreditable conclusion of their attempt to show Calcutta what Bombay could do. Hastings was, on his part, no less irritated by a series of rashly-planned and ill-executed measures, which nothing but "success, that grand apology for statesmen's blunders,"§ could excuse. His own long-cherished hopes of taking advantage of the dissensions of the Mahratta state proved equally fruitless. A mistaken idea of the connexion of Moodajee Bhonslay, the ruler of Berar, with the house of Seva-jee, led Hastings to stimulate Moodajee to assert his supposed claim to the raj, or sovereignty, upon the death of Ram Rajah in 1777, and the appointment, under the name of Shao Maharaj, of a distant relative, adopted as his son, and heir to his gilded captivity by the deceased prince. The effort proved fruitless, for Moodajee retained a lively recollection of kindness received from the grandfather of the infant peishwa, and despite the promptings of ambition, was reluctant to interfere with the power of that family. These kindly feelings, one of the Hindoo guardians of the child (either Nana Furnavees or Sukaram Bappoo) had taken pains to cherish, by placing his infant charge in the arms of young Raghoo, the son of Moodajee, and styling him the protector of the peishwa. Hastings himself remarks that acts of this description establish in the minds of the Mahrattas "obligations of the most solemn kind," and afford "evidence of a generous principle, so little known in our political system."|| The powerful minister, Nana Furnavees, was, however, actuated by less generous principles, his chief object being to use the little peishwa as an instrument for his own aggrandisement and that of his family, to whom he designed to transmit his paramount authority over the puppet minister of a puppet rajah. These designs were not likely to escape the notice of his colleagues in office, and dissensions arose, of which Sindia took full advantage

* Sindia loudly extolled the conduct of the rear-guard, which he compared "to a red wall, no sooner beat down than it was built up again."—(Duff.)

† A petty Mogul nabob held Broach, in subordination to the Mahrattas until 1772, when it was captured by a British force under General Wedderburne, who was killed in the assault.

‡ The hostages were, nevertheless, generously released by Sindia, who did not even demand the parole of Lieutenant Stewart not to fight against him, but, on the contrary, said—"Resume your place in the army; your sword is your subsistence."—(Wilks.)

§ Duff's *Mahrattas*, ii., 379.

|| *Life of Hastings*, ii., 361.

for the establishment and increase of his own power, by interfering as much as possible in the garb of a mediator.* Under the pressure of external hostilities, internal disputes invariably gave way to co-operation for mutual defence; and such was the immediate effect produced by the repudiation by the governor-general of the Convention of Wurgaum, which he declared invalid, inasmuch as the English committee had far exceeded the powers vested in them. This was actually the case; and Mr. Farmer had informed Sindia that they had no power to enter on any treaty without the sanction of the supreme government. The Mahratta chief treated this excuse as a mere pretence to avoid giving an inconvenient pledge, and scornfully asked, if their authority was so limited, by whose order they had ventured to break the treaty concluded by Colonel Upton? The question was unanswerable; the danger imminent; and Mr. Carnac, consoling himself with the idea that if, after what had passed, the Mahrattas were duped, the fault was their own, dispatched a plenipotentiary to the camp of Sindia for the avowed purpose of concluding a treaty, which he confirmed by every outward mark of good faith, under a *mental reservation* of the invalidity of the whole transaction.

On their return to Bombay, Mr. Carnac, Colonel Egerton, and Colonel Cockburn (a brave and steady soldier, but totally unfit for so arduous a command), were dismissed the service, and the recall of Colonel Leslie was only prevented by his death of fever. The offence of the latter officer was the

slowness of his march from Bengal, and his mistaken policy in allowing some Rajpoot allies of the Mahrattas to engage him in petty hostilities, and hinder the accomplishment of his main object—namely, speedy arrival at the seat of war. General Goddard was chosen by Hastings for the command, and his progress was altogether as speedy and fortunate as that of his predecessor had been slow and unsatisfactory. After receiving great kindness, bestowed under circumstances of much doubt and difficulty by the Afghan ruler of Bhopal,† Goddard marched boldly on, manifested his good sense by cordial co-operation with the Bombay government, carried out their plan of attacking Guzerat (notwithstanding the almost independent authority with which he was invested), and having, by extraordinary expedition, avoided the snares laid to interrupt his progress, crossed the Taptec on the 1st of January, 1780, and before the end of the month, carried by storm Ahmedabad, the great but decayed capital of the province. The famous fortress of Gwalior‡ was captured on the night of the 3rd of August, by a force of 2,400 men, sent direct from Bengal by Hastings; and the year terminated with the conquest of Bassein by Goddard. But these successes were counterbalanced by disasters in other quarters, which rendered the English anxious to conclude a speedy peace with the Mahrattas on almost any terms. The aspect of affairs was indeed alarming; for, at this period, Hyder Ali and the Nizam had merged, for the moment, their mutual animosities,

* Sukaram Bappoo, the chief rival of Nana Furnavees, at length became his victim, and was secretly removed from one fortress to another, till he perished miserably under bodily suffering created rather by the effects of unwholesome food and harsh treatment, than the slight infirmities of a green old age. Among his various prisons was that of Pertabgurb, on the western side of which lay an abyss formed by 4,000 feet of rugged rock. From the eastern side the spot was plainly visible where his Brahmin ancestor, 120 years before, won over by Sevajee, swore the treacherous, midnight oath to deliver up his master, Afzool Khan, to planned assassination.—(Duff's *Mahrattas*, ii., 396.)

† This little principality, situated on the north-eastern bank of the Nerbudda, was formed by the usurpations of Dost Mohammed, an Afghan in the service of Aurungzebe. During the troubles that succeeded the death of the emperor, he assumed the title of nawab (*anglicé* nabob), and rallied round him bands of adherents whom he had invited from Bengal. His successors contrived to extend their sway, and, what was more difficult, to gain the good-will of the intractable Gonds, or people of Gondwarra, the inhabitants of the southern portion of the Bhopal

territory, chiefly through the instrumentality of an able Hindoo minister, Bejee Ram, and a lady of remarkable ability, who for more than half a century greatly influenced, if she did not control, the councils of the principality, under the name of Mahjee Sahiba, the "lady-mother," an appellation descriptive of her benevolent character only, for she was childless. Hindoos and Mohammedans agree in cherishing the memory of this beloved princess, and vie with one another in citing anecdotes illustrative of her judgment and integrity. She attained the age of eighty.—(Major Hough's *Bhopal Principality*.)

‡ Gwalior, the famous state-prison of Akber and Aurungzebe, had, upon the dismemberment of the Delhi empire, fallen into the hands of a Jat chief, known as the rana of Gohud. It was taken by Sindia in 1779, and captured, in turn, by the British troops under Major Popham, the scarped rock on which the citadel stood being ascended at daybreak by means of wooden ladders. Hastings had formed a very exaggerated idea of the power of the rana of Gohud, to whom he restored the fortress; but on discovering his mistake, he changed his policy, and sanctioned its recovery by Sindia, in 1784—conduct which formed an article in his impeachment.

and confederated with their sworn foes, the Poona ministers, for the express purpose of expelling the English and the nabob Mohammed Ali from the Carnatic. The causes which led to this alarming coalition of Hindoo and Mussulman powers, are closely interwoven with the history of the—

MADRAS PRESIDENCY FROM 1769 to 1780.

—The principles which guided the counsels of this government were so avowedly bad, that their ruinous consequences seem to have been the natural fruit of the tree they planted. In 1772, the presidency made war upon the poligars or chiefs of certain adjacent districts called the Marawars, not that they had any quarrel with them, but simply because the tyrannical nabob had "made them his enemies, and therefore," the Madras councillors add, "it is necessary they should be reduced. It is necessary, or it is good policy they should. We do not say it is altogether just, for justice and good policy are not often related."* Hostilities were commenced on the above not "altogether just" grounds, and they were carried on, to adopt the same smooth-tongued phraseology, in a not altogether merciful manner. The poligar of the greater Marawar (a boy of twelve years of age), was taken at the capture of his capital of Ramnadaporam, in April, 1772, after brave but unskilful resistance on the part of its native defendants (the tribe called Colerics by Orme.) The poligar of the lesser Marawar was slain after a treaty of peace had been actually concluded, owing to a misunderstanding between the English commander and the son of the nabob, Omdut-al-Omrah. The peasantry, as usual, remained passive during the siege of the various forts: they expected to be little affected by the change of one despot for another; but the grinding exactions of the new conqueror, which are said to have surpassed even those of Hyder Ali in the amount of misery inflicted, soon convinced them of their error; and on being turned out of their lands, many took up arms in sheer despair—the inverted plough

being the general symbol of revolt. The English officer, Colonel Bonjour, who had been ordered to superintend the settlement of the country in the manner desired by Mohammed Ali, remonstrated forcibly against an object which, being in itself oppressive to the last degree, would require for its accomplishment "extremities of a most shocking nature."† For instance, the impossibility of seizing the armed and watchful foe, must, he said, be met by such reprisals as the complete destruction of the villages to which they belonged, the massacre of every man in them, and the imprisonment (probably to end in slavery) of the women and children; with other "severe examples of that kind."‡ Colonel Bonjour received an answer very similar to that given by Hastings to Colonel Champion in the case of the Rohillas, to the effect, that these things were the natural consequences of war, and that the worthy Mohammed Ali must not be affronted by impertinent interference. In fact, the majority of the Madras council, at this period, were the nabob's very humble and obedient servants, although some trouble was taken to conceal the fact from their "honourable masters" in Leadenhall-street. Subserviency of so manifestly degrading a character, could scarcely be the result of any but the most unworthy motives; and the simple truth appears to have been, that the leading English councillors entered upon the extension of the power of the Mohammedan nabob of Arcot, as a particularly safe and promising speculation, since if their efforts succeeded, great part of the profit would be their own; and in the event of failure, the expenses must be borne by the company. So early as 1769, three members of council held a large assignment of territorial revenue, which the Court of Directors subsequently discovered; and many official and private persons received from the nabob, bonds for the repayment of money lent and *not lent*, the true consideration given or promised being of a description which neither party cared to specify.

* Parl. Papers, quoted by Mill, iv., 100.

† Mill's *India*, iv., 103.

‡ Col. Wilks describes the sway of Hyder as one succession of experiments as to how far extortion could be practised on the farmer without diminishing cultivation. When his subjects claimed justice at his hands, he punished the offenders by a heavy fine, but pocketed the money himself, declaring that this appropriation was, by restraining oppression, nearly as good for the people, and a great deal better for the sovereign. Nevertheless, Wilks states that

the misrule of Mohammed Ali "left at an humble distance all the oppression that had ever been practised under the iron government of Hyder."—(*Mysoor*, ii., 103.) Swartz corroborates this statement by his remarks on the regularity and dispatch with which the government of Mysoor was conducted. "Hyder's economical rule is to repair all damages without losing an instant, whereby all is kept in good condition, and with little expense. The Europeans in the Carnatic leave everything to go to ruin."—(*Idem*, p. 572.)

When Englishmen of a certain rank "could make open and undisguised offers of their services to become directors of the E. I. Cy.,"* and even stoop to occupy seats in the British parliament purchased with his funds, avowedly for the promotion of his interests, little cause for surprise remains that Anglo-Indian functionaries, placed for the time beyond the reach of that public opinion which with so many men stands in the stead of conscience, should, by degrees, lose all sense of shame, and scarcely take ordinary pains to conceal their venality. Even had they been more on their guard, the conduct of Mohammed Ali could scarcely have failed to provoke recriminations calculated to expose the whole nefarious system. His love of money, though it fell far short of his thirst for power, was still excessive: he never willingly parted with gold, but accumulated large hoards, giving bonds to his real and pretended creditors, until they themselves became alarmed at the enormous amount of private debts with which the revenues of Arcot were saddled. Meanwhile, the legitimate expenditure of government was narrowed within the smallest possible limits; the troops, as usual, were in arrears of pay, and the promises made to the E. I. Cy. remained unfulfilled. The booty obtained by the seizure of the Marawars had only served to whet the appetite of Mohammed Ali and the party of whom he was at once the tempter and the dupe. There was a neighbouring state better worth attacking—that of Tanjore, a Mahratta principality against which the nabob of Arcot had no shadow of claim, except that of having, by dint of superior strength, exacted from thence an occasional subsidy. Its late ruler, Pertap Sing, had, it is said, more than once purchased the mediation of the leading English officials by borrowing from them large sums of money at exorbitant interest: but his son and successor, Tuljajee, forsaking this shrewd policy, applied to the Dutch at Negapatam, and the Danes at Tranquebar, for the means wherewith to pay a heavy sum which he had been compelled to guarantee to the Arcot authorities as the price of peace, so late as 1771.

* *Vide Wilks' Mysoor*, ii., 213; and Burke's admirable speech on the Carnatic debts, in which he affirmed that the nabob of Arcot had returned eight members to one British parliament.

† Lord Pigot went out as a writer to Madras in 1736; was promoted to the government in 1754; went home, in 1763, with an immense fortune; and successively obtained the rank of a baronet and of

Some small portion of this agreement remained unfulfilled, and it served to afford a sufficient pretext for the invasion of Tanjore. In fact, such a formality could only be necessary for the sake of preserving appearances with the company and the British public. George III. had, it was well known, been prepared, by wilful perversions of the truth, to take a generous and manly, but wholly mistaken and prejudiced view of all matters regarding Mohammed Ali, whom he had been induced to regard as an independent sovereign of high principle and ability, whose plans the English were, in gratitude and duty, bound to further to the uttermost. Existing disputes between the governments of Poona, Guzerat, and Berar, prevented the chiefs of the Mahratta confederation interfering to protect the rajah; therefore, taking advantage of the opportunity, hostile proceedings were commenced, and ground broken before Tanjore on the 20th of August; on the 6th of September a breach was effected; and on the following day, during the intense heat of noon, while the garrison were for the most part at rest, in expectation of an evening attack, the English troops were, with the least possible noise, marshalled for the assault. The stratagem was entirely successful; the fort was captured almost without loss, and the rajah and his family fell into the hands of Mohammed Ali, by whom his dominions were formally occupied. The indignation of the company was naturally roused by a procedure which lacked even the threadbare excuse of zeal for their service. Orders were issued (though somewhat tardily, owing to the disturbed state of affairs at home) for the restoration of the rajah of Tanjore; and Lord Pigot,† his proved friend, was sent out as governor, in 1775, for their enforcement. This act of justice was not carried through in a purely disinterested manner, for stipulations were made for the maintenance of an English garrison within the citadel, and the payment of tribute to the nabob. The latter clause failed to reconcile Mohammed Ali to the surrender of Tanjore: he even formed a plan for its forcible detention,‡ which was forestalled by the prompt

an Irish peer. A treaty with the rajah of Tanjore, in 1762, was one of his favourite measures, and he felt naturally annoyed by its shameless violation.

‡ *Vide Wilks' Mysoor*, ii., 225. Mohammed Ali had secretly ordered a large amount of military stores from the Danish authorities at Tranquebar, but they arrived too late for the purpose designed. The Danes had no great reason to rejoice

and decisive measures of Lord Pigot, who proceeded in person, in the spring of 1776, to reinstate Tuljajee in his former dignity. The council took advantage of his absence to consider the delicate question of the pecuniary claims of individuals, especially those of Mr. Paul Benfield. The case of this individual may serve to illustrate the character of the nabob's debts, the majority of which were similar in kind, though less in degree, in proportion to the opportunities, audacity, and cunning of the parties concerned. Mr. Benfield was a junior servant of the company, with a salary of a few hundred pounds a-year, which, as all old Indians know, could leave little margin for extravagance; nevertheless, this clever adventurer, having in his own scheming brain a talent for money-making scarcely inferior to that vested in the fairy purse of Fortunatus, contrived not only to support a splendid establishment and equipages, unrivalled at Madras even in those days of luxury and ostentation, but also to obtain certain assignments on the revenues of Tanjore, and on the growing crops of that principality, to the enormous extent of £234,000, in return for £162,000 ostensibly lent to the nabob of Arcot, and £72,000 to individuals in Tanjore. Such was the leader of the party arrayed on the side of Mohammed Ali, who had actually signed bonds to the amount of nearly a million and a-half sterling, backed by assignments on the revenues of Tanjore; and the very nature of these claims caused them to be urged with peculiar acrimony and violence. In Calcutta, the character of the majority by whom Hastings was at this very time so fiercely opposed, was wholly different to that with which Pigot had to struggle. Clavering, Monson, and Francis might be reproached with party spirit, but in all pecuniary matters their reputation was unblemished, and their public proceedings were, consequently, free from the baneful

and narrowing influence of self-interest. At Madras the case was wholly different; the majority consisted of men of deeply corrupt character, who, in return for accusations of venality in abetting the aggressions of the nabob, reciprocated the charge against all the upholders of the rajah, from the governor downwards.* The previous career of Lord Pigot did not facilitate the performance of the invidious task he had undertaken. Like Clive, he had formerly accumulated an immense fortune by questionable means, and had returned to root up abuses which, at an earlier stage, might have been nipped in the bud. Even his present visit to Tanjore, and the part played by him in the struggle for the appointment of a resident at that government, was far from being free from all suspicion of private ends and interests, either as regarded himself or his immediate retainers. But, however alike in their views and motives, the positions of Clive and Pigot were very different. The latter, instead of possessing supreme authority, was subordinate to a governor-general by no means inclined to afford cordial support to any reformatory measures, save of his own introduction; and Lord Pigot, trusting too much in his own strength, by a haughty and violent line of conduct,† soon brought matters to a crisis he was unprepared to meet. The imprisonment of Sir Robert Fletcher, with the attempted suspension of two of the leading members of council, was retaliated by his own arrest, performed in a very unsoldier-like style by the temporary commander-in-chief of the army, Colonel Stuart, with the aid of a coachman in the pay of Mr. Paul Benfield.‡ Having thus unceremoniously disposed of their chief, the majority proceeded to enact a series of legal, or rather illegal forms, and assumed the whole power of government.§ They did not long enjoy their triumph; for the home authorities, astonished and alarmed by such

in the transaction, for Hyder made them pay a fine of £14,000 sterling for furnishing his inveterate foe with warlike weapons; and Mohammed Ali, despite his desire to keep the affair quiet, liquidated but a small portion of the stipulated price. The whole matter came to light in 1801, when the E. I. Co. took possession of the Carnatic, and on the production of the secret correspondence with the nabob, paid the Danish Co. a balance of £42,304.—(Wilks, ii., 10.)

* The scale on which bribery was carried on, may be conjectured from the fact, that Admiral Pigot declared in the House of Commons, in 1778, that his brother, the late governor, had been offered a bribe, amounting to £600,000 sterling, only to defer for a time the reinstatement of the rajah of Tanjore.

† Swartz, commenting on the proceedings of which he was an eye-witness, remarks:—"Probably his intentions were laudable, but he began not with God."

‡ Col. Stuart was on terms of close intimacy with Lord Pigot; had breakfasted and dined with him on the day of the arrest, and was ostensibly on the way to sup with him, when the carriage of the governor, in which they were both seated, was, by the appointment of the colonel himself, surrounded and stopped by the troops.—(Mill, iv., 134.) The governor was dragged out, made a prisoner, and thrust into Benfield's chaise.—(Vide Abstract of Trial of Stratton, Brooke, Floyer, and Mackay. Murray; London, 1780.)

§ Hastings "persuaded his colleagues to acquiesce in the new arrangements."—(Life, ii., 108.)

strange excesses, recalled both the deposed governor and his opponents, that the whole matter might be brought to light. Before these orders reached India, Lord Pigot had sunk under the combined effects of mental suffering and imprisonment for nine months in an ungenial climate. His death terrified all parties into a compromise. The chief civil servants concerned in the affair returned to England; the four members of council paid the to them very trifling fine of £1,000 each, and the subordinates crept back into the service. Colonel Stuart was tried by a court-martial, and, unhappily for the company, acquitted.

The new governor, Sir Thomas Rumbold, reached Madras in 1778, and applied himself, with much energy, to the improvement of his private fortune. The council cheerfully followed so pleasant an example; and unwonted tranquillity prevailed within the presidency, the predominant feature being wilful blindness to the storm gathering without. Yet even Mohammed Ali beheld with alarm that the utterly inconsistent, hesitating, yet grasping policy long persisted in, was about to issue in the conjoined hostilities of Hyder Ali, the Nizam, and the Mahrattas, to each of whom distinct occasions for quarrel had been given; and to these dangers the fear of French invasion, owing to the outbreak of European war, was added. Hyder Ali, their most formidable foe, had been made such by their own misdoings. He had earnestly de-

sired to keep the Mahrattas at bay by means of an alliance with the English, whose enmity he dreaded, fearing, above all things, the unseen resources of the E. I. Cy. The Madras government temporised with him for years, and he bore all manner of neglects and slights, waiting, in sullen silence, an opportunity of revenge. After the death of Madhoo Rao, he regained his previous conquests, and largely increased them. The little principality of Coorg,* and Gooty, the eagle's nest of Morari Rao, fell successively: the first, before a sudden invasion, most barbarously carried through; the other under peculiar circumstances of treachery.† The Mahratta chieftain soon perished under the influence of the insalubrious climate of a hill-fort, called Cabal Droog, aggravated by food of so unwholesome a character as to be almost poisonous. His family, being subjected only to the first of these evils, survived him fifteen years, and then perished in a general massacre of prisoners, ordered by Tippoo, in 1791.

At the close of the year 1770, Hyder contemplated with delight the fertile banks of the Kistna, newly become the northern boundary of the empire he had erected; but still unsatisfied with its extent (as he would probably have been had it comprised all India), he proceeded in person to besiege the fortress of Chittledroog,‡ which, amid the chances and changes of previous years, had fallen into the hands of a brave Hindoo

* Hyder entered Coorg in 1773. The rajah (Divaia) fled, and was afterwards captured; but the people hastily assembled on a woody hill, which was immediately surrounded by the enemy. Seating himself with much state, Hyder proclaimed a reward of five rupees for each head that should be brought to him. After receiving about 700, two were deposited on the heap of such singular beauty, that, looking earnestly at them, he ordered the decapitation to cease. The remaining Coorgs were not, however, disposed to submit tamely to the usurper notwithstanding the tribute paid to the finely-formed heads of their murdered countrymen; and when he proceeded to raise the assessment on produce from the ancient tenth to a sixth, they rose as one man, but were again reduced to submission by a sweeping massacre of nearly every individual of note.—(Wilks.)

† Gooty is almost impregnable under ordinary circumstances; but the number of refugees from the town, and the quantities of cattle driven into the citadel, had exhausted the reservoirs of water; and Morari Rao, after above three months' siege, was reluctantly compelled to treat for peace, which Hyder guaranteed on condition of receiving eight lacs of rupees in coin, or that amount in jewels, immediately, and a hostage for the subsequent payment of four more. The hostage, a brave but inexperienced youth, won by the praise bestowed on his chief and himself by the conqueror, imprudently boasted that

nothing short of being reduced to three days' water would have induced Morari Rao to capitulate. Hyder forthwith resumed the blockade, which he maintained until the garrison, in an agony of thirst, consented to an unconditional surrender, and then such as escaped with life and liberty were robbed of every other possession; even the women being despoiled of their accustomed ornaments, for the exclusive benefit of the perfidious invader.

‡ The second siege of Chittledroog lasted three months, and was attended with immense loss of life. The garrison believed the place invested with supernatural strength as the site of a famous temple dedicated to the goddess Cali, so long as her rites were duly performed. Unlike Hindoo deities in general, Cali was supposed to delight in blood, and consequently her worshippers, despite the rashness of such a proceeding, regularly sallied forth, after performing their devotions, on every successive Monday morning during three months; and notwithstanding the warning to the besiegers, given by the loud blast of a horn as the signal for the outburst, and the foreknowledge of all except the exact point of attack, the Beders never once returned without carrying off the specific number of heads to be offered to their tutelary deity, upon whose shrine about 2,000 of these bloody trophies were found ranged in small pyramids after the fall of the place.—(Colonel Wilks' *History of Mysoor*, ii., 182.)

poligar or chief. The native garrison defended the place with the fearless zeal of fanaticism, but were betrayed by a corps of Mohammedan mercenaries, whom Hyder found means to corrupt through the medium of their spiritual instructor, a hermit of reputed sanctity, who resided unmolested on the plain below, near the hostile encampment. The natives of the surrounding territory (chiefly of the Beder tribe) had manifested unconquerable attachment to the fallen chief. In vain Hyder had seized all the visible property, and consumed all the provisions on which his practised pilferers could lay hands; neither these measures, nor the infliction of the most cruel punishments on every person engaged in the conveyance of supplies to the besieged, could deter men, women, and even children from sacrificing their lives, in continued succession, in the attempt to support the garrison. Hyder at length determined to sweep off the whole remainder of the population, whose fidelity to their besieged countrymen had alone prevented their following the general example of flight to the woods, or other provinces. About 20,000 were carried away to populate the island of Seringapatam; and from the boys of a certain age, Hyder formed a regular military establishment of captive converts, in imitation of the Turkish janissaries (new soldiers.) These regiments, under the name of the "Chelah"* battalions, were extensively employed by Tippoo Sultan. The reduction of the small Patan state of Kurpa and several minor places, next engaged the attention of the Mysorean. One of these expeditions nearly cost him his life, by rousing the vengeance of a party of Afghan captives, who having overpowered their guards in the dead of night, rushed to his tent, and the foremost having succeeded in effecting an entrance, aimed a deadly blow at the rich coverlid which wrapped what he took to be the body of the sleeping despot. But Hyder himself had escaped to the protection of the nearest corps. On first hearing the uproar he guessed its cause; for it was a portion of his earthly punishment that, sleeping or waking, the dagger of the assassin was never absent from his thoughts. Despite the burden of advancing years, his mental and physical energies were wholly unimpaired.

* Chelah was a softened name for slave; first employed by Akber, who disliked the harsh term, but not the odious thing denoted. Slavery has, however, habitually assumed a milder form in the East than the West Indies, under Hindoo and Mohammedan, than under Christian masters; and the

Springing from his couch, he performed the favourite feat of the nursery hero, Jack the Giant-killer, by stealthily laying his long pillow in the place of his own body. Then cutting a passage through the side of the tent, he effected a safe and unsuspected retreat. The wretched Afghans were slain or disarmed; those taken alive were reserved for various cruel deaths, such as having their hands and feet struck off, or being dragged round the camp tied to the feet of elephants, until, and even long after, life had left their mangled bodies.

Such was the barbarous character of the foe whom the English had so long braved with impunity, that, from the sheer force of habit, they continued to treat him with contemptuous superiority, even after the unpromising state of their own affairs, in various quarters, rendered it obviously advisable to adopt a conciliatory policy. The renewal of European war, would, it was probable, prove the signal for an attempt, on the part of the French, to regain their lost possessions in India, by the co-operation of some of the more powerful native states. It was notorious that St. Lubin and other adventurers, had essayed to ingratiate themselves as representatives of their nation, with the Mahrattas and also with Hyder. But both these powers were bent on avoiding any intimate connexion with European states, whose tendency to become supreme they justly dreaded, though they were ever desirous to purchase, at a high rate, the services of foreigners to discipline their troops. Hyder especially dreaded the effect of French influence, and would certainly have had no dealings with that government, save as a counterpoise to the English and Mohammed Ali, whom he cordially detested. Affairs were in a very precarious condition, when intelligence of the renewal of war in Europe reached Bengal (July, 1778); and, though somewhat premature in character, Hastings thought the information sufficiently authentic to warrant the immediate seizure of the whole of the French settlements before reinforcements should arrive from England, or time be given for the adoption of any concerted plan of defence. Chandernagore, with the factories at Masulipatam and Karical, surrendered without resistance. Pondicherry bondsmen of the palace, even beneath the sway of Hyder, had so much the air of "children of the house," that the good missionary, Swartz, praises the care evinced for orphans, in total ignorance that Hyder's protection had been purchased by the severance of every natural tie of family, country, and creed.

was captured after a combined attack by sea and land. The French squadron, under M. Tronjolly, was worsted by the English admiral Sir Edward Vernon, and quitted the coast by night; but the garrison, under M. Bellecombe, held out bravely, and availed themselves of every advantage derivable from the strong defences, which had been restored since their destruction in the course of the last war. A breach having been effected, and a combined assault planned by the troops under Sir Hector Munro, in conjunction with the marines and seamen, further resistance became hopeless; the place capitulated, and its fortifications were razed to the ground. The fortress and port of Mahé alone remained to the French. The territory in which they were situated (on the Malabar coast), beside being included in the recent conquests of Hyder, was the dépôt for the military stores which he obtained from the Mauritius; he was therefore extremely anxious for its retention by its French possessors, and dispatched a vakeel (ambassador or envoy) to Madras, threatening the invasion of Arcot in the event of any hostile attempt on Mahé. The fortress was nevertheless besieged and taken in March, 1779, although the colours of Mysoor were hoisted on the walls with those of the French, and its troops assisted in the defence. The presidency were not without misgivings regarding the hazard incurred by these multiplied provocations, and Sir Thomas Rumbold made an effort to discover the intentions of Hyder, by dispatching to his court the missionary Swartz, the only ambassador he would consent to receive. "Send me the Christian," said Hyder; "he will not deceive me."* The reward of the envoy was to be some bricks

and mortar, to build a church, from the stores at Tanjore.† These had been already promised for service rendered to government in his capacity of a linguist, but withheld from time to time. Hyder, who had ever been distinguished by discrimination of character, fully appreciated the singlemindedness and unaffected piety of his visitor, with whom he held frequent intercourse,‡ and suffered him to convey religious instruction to the European soldiers in his service, and to hold unrestricted communication, not only with them, but also with the native troops, through the medium of the Persian, Tamul, Mahratta, and Hindoostanee languages. Swartz refused to accept any gift from Hyder, even for his church, and on taking leave, stated with earnestness, that a desire for the prevention of war was the sole motive that had induced him to undertake a political mission, which, under the circumstances, he considered as in nowise derogatory to the office of a minister of God, who is a God of peace. "Very well, very well," said Hyder; "if the English offer me the hand of peace and concord, I shall not withdraw mine."

Swartz returned to Madras and related the verbal assurance, which qualified the written communication of which he was the bearer, wherein the various grievances sustained by the Mysorean state, as well as by Hyder personally, from the time of the breach of faith regarding Trichinopoly in 1754, down to the recent offence of attempting to march an army, without even asking his sanction, through his recently acquired territory of Cudapah to that of Bassalut Jung at Adoni, were enumerated; with the ominous conclusion—"I have not yet taken revenge; it is no matter."

* Swartz had exerted his great personal influence very successfully for the peaceful and equitable settlement of Tanjore. Hyder had probably heard much in his favour; and his own opinion, formed from subsequent observation, was forcibly shown by the order issued in the Carnatic war, "to permit the venerable Father Swartz to pass unmolested and show him respect and kindness, for he is a holy man, and means no harm to my government."

† Private resources Swartz had none; little help could be expected from the Europeans of Madras, who, he says sorrowfully, could contribute 10,000 pagodas for a playhouse, "but to build a playhouse people had no money." The immorality of nominal Christians, he considered the most serious obstacle to the conversion of the heathen; especially in the case of the rajah of Tanjore.—(Wilks, ii., 569.)

‡ Perhaps two more opposite characters never engaged in familiar converse than when the vindictive, ambitious, and merciless Hyder sat and talked with the

gentle, self-denying, peace-loving missionary, in one of the stately halls of the palace of Seringapatam, overlooking gardens adorned with fountains, cypress groves, trees grafted so as to bear two kinds of fruit, and every refinement that luxury could suggest. Hyder appears to have made no attempt to disguise his barbarous system of administration; for Swartz speaks with horror of the dreadful tortures inflicted on the collectors of revenue if they failed, under any circumstances, to collect the stated revenue. "Although Hyder sometimes rewards his servants, yet the principal motive is fear. Two hundred people, with whips, stand always ready to use them. Not a day passes on which numbers are not flogged. Hyder applies the same cat to all transgressors alike,—gentlemen, horsekeepers, tax-gatherers, and his own sons;" but they are not dismissed, but continued in office; for Hyder, adds Swartz, "seems to think that almost all people who seek to enrich themselves are void of all principles of honour."

The authorities, immersed in the deadly stupor of indolence and venality, conducted themselves as if wholly indifferent to the threat thus significantly conveyed. Swartz found that he had been a mere tool, and that Hyder had appreciated more justly than himself the selfish duplicity of Sir Thomas Rumbold and his colleagues. Still persevering in the insulting affectation of a desire to preserve amity, they actually sent to the magnificent court of Mysoor—to a sovereign enriched with the spoil of principalities and provinces—a private person of no note as ambassador (Mr. Gray), bearing with him an ill-made English saddle (hogskin to a Mussulman!) and a rifle which loaded at the breech. The presents were declined as unworthy the giver or intended receiver; neither would Hyder grant a private audience to the envoy; but on learning, through one of his nobles, the desire of the presidency to form an alliance with him, he sent word that he had at one period earnestly and repeatedly solicited it without effect, but was now strong enough to stand alone.

The most alarming part of this defiant message is said to have been withheld by Sir Thomas Rumbold,* whose policy was at the time directed to carrying off an immense fortune safe to England. Taking leave of the council, he congratulated them on the prospect of peace at a moment when every nerve ought to have been strained to prepare for defence against invasion, and took his departure in time to avoid the receipt of the recall then on its way to India.† Among the political errors urged against him was the offence given to Nizam Ali, by compelling his brother and subject, Bassalut Jung, to make over the Guntoor Circar to the company in 1779, instead of suffering him to enjoy it for life, as agreed upon by the treaty of 1768; and then using this extorted concession as a means of gratifying the cupidity of Mohammed Ali, to whom this fine district was to be let in farm. Both the London directors and the Bengal authorities strove to assuage the anger of the Nizam at conduct which he was both able and willing to resent; but the Madras officials persisted in justifying their conduct in this respect, and also

in endeavouring to repudiate the arrears of peshcush, or tribute, due for the other Circars, as warranted by their pecuniary necessities, and far less faulty in principle, than the breach of faith committed in withholding the tribute pledged to the emperor as a first charge upon the revenues of Bengal.

Hyder Ali had spies everywhere. He was perfectly aware of the ill-feeling existing between the controlling and subordinate governments, and made no secret of the hostile intentions and utter contempt he entertained towards the latter. The extraordinary apathy of the majority of the council, together with the violent measures used to stifle the representations of the few who advocated the adoption of immediate measures for the defence of the Carnatic, gave weight to his assertions that the time had arrived for all Indian powers to unite in expelling the one great European state which threatened to engulf every other. Now, in its moment of weakness, when the reins of authority were vested in incapable and selfish hands, a short and decisive struggle might, by the conjoined strength of Mohammedans and Hindoos, brought to bear against the common foe, be attended with such complete success as "to leave not a white face in the Carnatic." The confederacy advocated by Hyder was actually formed, and a plan laid down which, if all parties had carried out their pledge as he did his, might have gone far to realise the desired object. Mohammed Ali, for once a true prophet, foretold the coming storm; but in vain. The presidency persisted in declaring that the dark clouds which they could not deny overshadowed the political horizon, would pass away or be dissipated by the precautions of the Bengal council;—days, weeks, months elapsed, at a time when even hours of continued peace were of incalculable importance, without any attempts for reinforcing weak garrisons in important positions, or for making arrangements for the provisioning of troops, notwithstanding the obvious necessity of the latter measure in all cases of threatened invasion, especially by a foe whose desolating and destructive mode of warfare was proverbial. Yet the very man who had once before dictated terms at the gates of Madras, was treated as a mere braggart, even after he had actually crossed the frontier, and was approaching, with his two sons, at the head of above 80,000 men, supported by a large train of artillery and a considerable body of

* *Vide* Captain James Munro's *Coromandel Coast*, p. 130. Dr. Moodie's MSS., in library of E. I. Cy.

† A criminal prosecution was commenced against him in 1782, in the House of Commons, but adjourned from time to time, and eventually dropped.

Europeans (chiefly French), constituting, without doubt, the best-disciplined army ever marshalled by a native Indian power. At length the burning of Conjeveram, the largest village in the Carnatic (sixty miles from Fort St. George, and thirty-five from Arcot), and the testimony of numerous terrified and bleeding fugitives, closely followed by the sight of the much-dreaded predatory horse of the foe, prowling about amid the garden-houses round Mount St. Thomas, changed doubts, sneers, and cavils into unspeakable dismay, which the tidings of every successive hour tended to increase. Hyder pursued his favourite policy of creating a desert about the places he desired to conquer. Round Fort St. George he drew a line of merciless desolation, extending from thirty to thirty-five miles inland, burning every town and village to the ground, and inflicting indiscriminate mutilation on every individual who ventured to linger near the ashes. The wretched peasantry, victims of the quarrels of usurping powers, whose actions they could neither understand nor influence, were sacrificed by thousands by fire or the sword, while multitudes, doomed to more protracted suffering, were driven off in a whirlwind of cavalry into exile or slavery, frequently to both united;—the father torn from his virgin daughter; the husband from the wife; the mother borne away in the torrent, unable so much as to snatch her shrieking infant from the trampling hoofs of the snorting horses. Yes! Hyder was indeed at hand: dense clouds of smoke, mingled with flame, were the sure harbingers of his approach. The country-people fled, wild with terror, to Madras; and no less than 300,000 were suffered to take up their abode in the black town in the space of three days.

The assembling of the troops was evidently of the first importance. There was no lack of men or ammunition; but a grievous deficiency of discipline, and general discontent, engendered by the severe suffering inflicted by the non-payment of arrears.* A strong and united effort, by the local authorities, to relieve their wants

and inspire confidence, was, however, all that was needed to restore their wonted efficiency; but so far from any decisive measures being taken, delays and disputes arose; for the commander-in-chief, Sir Hector Munro, could not be spared to take the head of the army, because his vote alone insured the supremacy in council of his own opinions and those of the president, Mr. Whitehill. Lord Macleod,† who had recently arrived from England with a highland regiment 1,000 strong, was desired to assume the command, but he positively refused to accept the responsibility of carrying out the hazardous plan devised by Munro, of uniting the main body with that absent in the Guntoor Circar, under Colonel Baillie, at the distant site of Conjeveram, and strongly urged the adoption of the more reasonable course suggested by the minority, of marshalling the forces with the least possible delay on St. Thomas' Mount. Munro, wedded to his project, determined to take the field in person, and actually proposed and carried that he should appoint a nominee to occupy his seat in council so long as it continued vacant. The opposition members indignantly reprobated this arrangement; and one of them (Mr. Sadleir) so provoked the majority, that they decreed his suspension, which was followed up by a challenge from Sir Hector.

The subsequent conduct of the campaign corresponded with this inauspicious commencement. In the very face of the enemy, when from Cape Comorin to the Kistna all was plunder, confusion, and bloodshed, the civil and military authorities continued to quarrel with each other. Munro persisted in attempting the junction of the troops in the centre of a country occupied by an enemy. He marched to Conjeveram with the main body, which comprised 5,209 men, of whom 2,481 were European infantry and 294 artillery, and there awaited the arrival of Colonel Baillie, whose force consisted of about 150 Europeans and 2,000 sepoys. Hyder was at the time engaged in besieging Arcot; but his invariable policy—from which the English general might have

* The force of the nabob alone, in 1776, was stated by Col. Matthews, before a Parl. Committee, to amount to 35,000 effective men. That of the presidency comprehended about 30,000; but even the English forces were on the brink of mutiny for want of pay. In 1777, a regiment completely equipped for service, and stationed a few miles from Hyder's frontier, seized Captain Campbell and their other officers, and were only brought to release them by

the interference of Col. James, the commandant of Trichinopoly, who made himself personally responsible for the utmost extent of arrears he could provide funds to meet. The European officers and native troops under Colonel Fullarton, were, at a subsequent period, twelve months in arrear, and obtained their very food on credit.

† Lord Macleod afterwards quitted India, in consequence of Col. Stuart being placed over him.

learned a useful lesson—of directing his chief energies to the most prominent danger, induced him to send the flower of the army, under Tippoo, to intercept the detachment under Baillie, which was accomplished at a spot about fifteen miles distant from Conjeveram.

After a severe conflict of several hours, Baillie succeeded in repelling his assailants, but with so much loss, that he sent word to the general he could not join him unless reinforced in such a manner as to be capable of resisting the opposition of the enemy. He suggested that Munro himself should advance to the rescue; instead of which, the general thought fit again to divide his small army by sending forward a detachment under Colonel Fletcher, to strengthen that threatened by Tippoo.

The intelligence of Hyder regarding the plans and proceedings of the English, was as speedy and reliable as their information concerning him was tardy and misleading. His plot to surprise and destroy Colonel Fletcher on the march was, happily, neutralised by the discreet change of route ordered by that officer; and it is considered, that had the junction of the detachments been followed up, after a few hours' rest, by speedy movement, the conjoined troops might have made their way safely to Conjeveram. But needless delay gave time for Tippoo to fix cannon at a strong post on the road, and, worse still, for Hyder himself to advance in person and oppose their passage. The little band, both Europeans and sepoy, sustained furious and repeated assaults with extraordinary steadiness, inspired with the hope that Munro would take advantage of the opportunity to relieve them by attacking the foe in the rear. Hyder was not without apprehensions on this score, which were heightened by the representations of the French officers in his service, especially of Lally and Pimorin.* The fate of the day hung in suspense until two of the tumbrils blew up in the English lines, and at once deprived them of ammunition, and disabled their guns; they nevertheless maintained the contest for another hour and a-half. At the end of that time but 400 men remained, many of them wounded yet they still rallied round their

* Lally was the commander of a small body of European mercenaries who had successively served Nizam Ali and Bassalut Jung, before entering the service of Hyder. Pimorin was a French officer.

† Of eighty-six officers, thirty-six were killed, thirty-four wounded, and sixteen surrendered unhurt.

leader, desiring to cut their way through the hostile ranks or perish in the attempt. But Colonel Fletcher lay dead on the field of battle, and Colonel Baillie, willing to save the lives of his brave companions, and despairing of relief from head-quarters, held up his handkerchief as a flag of truce. An intimation of quarter being given, the English laid down their arms; but had no sooner done so than a fierce onslaught was made by the enemy, and the whole of them would have been slain in cold blood, including even the native women and children who had accompanied the detachment, but for the interference of the French mercenaries. Baillie was brought, stiff with wounds, into the presence of his barbarous conqueror, and eventually perished in the prison of Seringapatam. About 200 Europeans were taken, of whom fifty were officers.† They were destined to linger long years in a captivity more terrible than death.

When tidings of this disaster reached Conjeveram, Munro threw his heavy guns and stores which could not be removed, into a tank, and retreated from that place to Chingleput, where he hoped to procure a supply of rice for the army; but being disappointed by the conjoined effect of Hyder's alertness and his own want of precautionary measures, he retreated to Madras. Here general consternation and alarm prevailed, aggravated by the utter want of provisions, military stores, or funds even to pay the troops, European or native; the latter, in the service of Mohammed Ali, deserted in whole regiments simply for that reason. The state of things seemed hopeless, when the vigorous measures of the supreme government at Bengal gave a new turn to affairs. The unfaltering courage and clear perceptions of Hastings were never exerted more advantageously than at this crisis. He had already instituted a negotiation with the Nizam for the restoration of the Guntoor Circar, the chief bone of contention; and he maintained a correspondence with the Mahratta ruler of Berar, Moodajee Bhonslay, which had the effect of rendering that chief unwilling to co-operate actively with his countrymen against the English, though he did not care openly to refuse joining the general confederacy. But these measures were manifestly insufficient to meet the present crisis. Hyder had followed up his success at Conjeveram by the siege and capture of Arcot. Wandewash, Vellore, Chingleput, and other bul-

warks of the Carnatic, were wretchedly provisioned and closely blockaded; while the numerous forts under the direct control of the nabob, Mohammed Ali, were, for the most part, surrendered without a blow, from the various and often concurrent causes of disgust at an incapable and extortionate master, corruption, and despondency. Such was the news brought to Calcutta by a swift-sailing ship, flying before the south-west monsoon. In twenty-four hours the governor-general's course was taken. Supplies of every description—of men, money, and provisions—were gathered in, and dispatched under the charge of the veteran general Sir Eyre Coote, whose very name was a host, and to whom the sole conduct of the war was to be entrusted; for Hastings, rightly deeming the emergency a justification for exerting the utmost stretch of authority, took upon himself to suspend Mr. Whitehill, the venal and incapable governor of Fort St. George.

On reaching Madras, Coote found at his disposal a force numbering altogether 7,000 men, of whom only 1,700 were Europeans. Despite the manifest disparity of numbers, he earnestly desired to bring Hyder to a regular engagement, believing that the danger to be incurred by such a proceeding would fall far short of that resulting from the waste of resources and dispiriting effects of the harassing hostilities carried on by his opponent in a country already desolated. The wary Mysorean well knew the foe with whom he had now to cope, and neither taunts, threats, nor manœuvring, could induce him to risk a pitched battle. This very circumstance enabled the English to relieve Wandewash,* Permacoil, and other besieged places; but only for a time: the indefatigable foe marched off uninjured to blockade a different fortress, and Coote followed till his troops were well-nigh worn out.† At length a seeming evil procured the long-desired engagement; for Hyder, encouraged by the presence of a French fleet on the coast, intrenched his army in a strong post near Cuddalore, close to the village called by Europeans Porto Novo, and strove to

intercept and cut off the supplies of the English, who had recently been repulsed in an attack on the pagoda of Chillambrum. Coote advanced boldly, and having discovered a means of approach for a portion of the troops by a passage through a ridge of sand-hills, formed by Hyder for his own use, the general contrived, by a series of simple yet skilful and admirably executed movements, to marshal his forces in the face of several heavy batteries, and finally succeeded, after a close and severe contest, in forcing the line of the enemy and fairly putting them to flight.

At the commencement of the battle (about nine o'clock on the morning of the 1st July, 1781), Hyder took up his position on a little hill commanding the scene of action, and there he sat until four in the afternoon, cross-legged, on a low stool, watching every movement made by or against the English, and so enraged by the unexpected progress of affairs, as to become stupid with vexation. Fourteen years before, when defeated by Colonel Smith,‡ he had been observed by the English officers, with cool self-possession, issuing orders for a retreat, in the manner of one who could afford to wait and bide his day of triumph. But Hyder was an old man now; a pampered tyrant, accustomed to tread on the necks of his fellow-beings; and he believed the time at length arrived to triumph over the power of the people by whom he had been long braved with impunity. The cup of revenge was at his lips; was it to be flung to the ground almost untasted? Considerations of this nature shut out from view all thought of personal danger, and rendered him deaf to the arguments offered to induce him to quit a position rapidly becoming extremely perilous. The nobles in attendance were silenced by the obscene abuse, always lavishly bestowed by their imperious master when out of temper; their horses and servants had disappeared in the general flight before the advancing foe; but Hyder remained seated until a groom, who through long and faithful service was in some sort a privileged man, came forward, and is said to have replied—"What! put my chargers, worth more than one hundred rupees each, in competition with your cannon-balls, that only cost a few pice (halfpence.) No, no: you shall hear of me often, but see me never. I will keep you marching until your legs are as big as your bellies, and your bellies the size of your legs; and then you shall fight when I choose, not when you please."

* Wandewash was most gallantly defended by Lieut. Flint, who, notwithstanding very deficient resources, and without a single artilleryman, not only held his ground during seventy-eight days of open trenches against the flower of Hyder's army, but raised a little corps of cavalry, and procured provisions for his garrison and supplies for the main army.

† When urged by the British commander to decide the fortune of war by a pitched battle, Hyder

‡ At Trincomalee in 1767. (See p. 318.)

drawing the legs of Hyder from under him, thrust his slippers on his feet, and with blunt fidelity prevailed on him to rise, saying, "we will beat them to-morrow; in the meanwhile mount your horse." Hyder complied, and was out of sight in a few moments, leaving the discomfited group, around his stool of repentance, to save themselves as they best could. Luckily for them, the English had no cavalry wherewith to carry on the pursuit. The victory was, however, fraught with important consequences. It induced the hostile force to fall back upon Arcot. Sir Eyre Coote followed, and encouraged by previous success, ventured to attack Hyder near Pollilloor, in a position which, besides great natural advantages, was held by the superstitious Mysorean in particular estimation as a lucky spot, being that on which he had cut off the detachment under Baillie in the previous year. The British troops became furious at the sight of the unburied remains of their fallen comrades; but insurmountable obstacles retarded their advance. They could not get at the enemy; two tumbrils broke (as on the previous occasion); and to make the confusion greater, Sir Hector Munro, having received a hasty rebuke from Coote, sullenly seated himself beneath the only tree in the plain, and refused to issue a single command. The loss of the English was about 500 killed, including some officers; and the action would probably have terminated in a defeat, had their wily adversary suspected the existence of the dissension and confusion which temporarily prevailed in an army characterised by united action and steady discipline. The campaign ended with the surprise of the Mysoreans at the pass of Sholingur, on the road to Vellore: their loss was estimated at 5,000 men; while that of the English fell short of 100.

Meanwhile, an important change had taken place at Madras in the nomination of Lord Macartney as governor and president of Fort St. George. The appointment of a man of acknowledged talent and strict integrity was, doubtless, a great step towards abolishing the systematic venality which had long disgraced the presidency; and the earnest and straightforward manner in which the new ruler applied himself to his arduous and invidious task, justified the expectations entertained on his behalf. But the difficulties which surrounded him were great beyond expectation. Disastrous news awaited his

arrival in June, 1781. First, that the Carnatic, which Sir Thomas Rumbold had represented in a most peaceful and promising condition, was actually occupied by a ruthless foe; secondly, that the means of defence had been vainly sought for by men possessed of the local experience in which he was of necessity wholly deficient; and thirdly, that the increasing scarcity which prevailed through the Carnatic, threatened to terminate in a terrible famine. Macartney was called on to decide how best to meet these difficulties without clashing with the extraordinary powers vested in the brave and indefatigable, but peevish and exacting General Coote, and still more with the supreme authority wielded by the seemingly conciliatory, but really dictatorial and jealous Hastings.

Lord Macartney brought to India intelligence of war with Holland; and despite the objections of Coote, who desired to see the whole force concentrated for the reconquest of Arcot, the Dutch settlements were attacked; Sadras, Pulicat, and Negapatam successively taken; after which the troops of Hyder began to evacuate the forts which they had occupied in Tanjore. But these successes were soon followed by renewed disasters. A French fleet arrived on the Coromandel coast in January, 1782, and after intercepting several vessels bound to Madras with grain, landed 3,000 men at Porto Novo, where Tippoo speedily joined them with a large body of troops. An English and native detachment, about 2,000 strong, stationed in Tanjore, under Colonel Brathwaite, misled by a system of false information carried on by the spies of Hyder, were surprised by a conjoined force under Tippoo and Lally, and after maintaining a desperate resistance for six-and-twenty hours, against an enemy who outnumbered them twenty to one, were at length completely surrounded, and either slain or captured. The conclusion of a peace with the Mahrattas being officially announced at Madras in the month of June, gave an opportunity for opening a similar negotiation with Hyder. The terms on which it had been obtained were not, however, of a nature to induce so wary a politician to make important concessions. The English, he well knew, had purchased peace by the surrender of almost all they had been fighting for—that is, by reverting to the terms of the indignantly repudiated treaty of Poorunder; and even these conditions had been made through the instrumen-

tality of the formidable and intriguing Sindia.* But Hyder desired an interval of tranquillity in which to settle a plan of combined operations with the French admiral Suffrein; he therefore proceeded to treat with Sir Eyre Coote, who remained in suspense until the vakeel from Mysoor was suddenly withdrawn, and the old general discovered that his whole stock of provisions had been consumed, while the troops were kept in a state of inactivity by the artifice of Hyder. The subsequent attempts of the English to force a battle were unavailing; and matters grew from bad to worse, until towards the close of the year, Coote, who had previously sustained a fit of apoplexy, now suffered a fresh seizure, which compelled him to resign the command to general Stuart, and retire to Bengal. Madras was by this time reduced to a terrible condition. The ravages of famine, after spreading over the whole Carnatic,† at length became felt in the presidency, and increased with alarming rapidity, until the number of deaths amounted to, and continued for several weeks, at from 1,200 to 1,500. The French appear to have been ignorant of the state of affairs; for they made no attempt to blockade the coast; and supplies from Bengal and the Northern Circars came in time to aid in preventing the scourge of pestilence from following the ravages of famine. Hyder Ali had ever been accurately informed regarding the condition of every leading English settlement, and would doubtless have not failed to take advantage of the condition of the capital of the presidency, but that his marvellous energies of mind and body, so long vouchsafed, so terribly misused, were fast failing. His health had been for some time declining, and, in November, symptoms

appeared of a mortal disease described as peculiar to natives of high rank, and therefore called the raj-poora, or royal boil. He died at Chittore, in December, 1782,‡ leaving Tippoo§ to prosecute hostilities with the English. The defalcation of the Mahrattas had, it is said, led him to regret the confederacy he had formed, and even to regard it as the most impolitic act of his whole career. "I have committed a great error," he exclaimed with bitterness; "I have purchased a draught of seandee|| (worth about a farthing) at the price of a lac of pagodas. I can ruin their resources by land, but I cannot dry up the sea."¶ It would have been well for his successor had he profited by this dear-bought experience; but Tippoo, fierce, headstrong, and bigoted, was the last person in the world to gain wisdom on such easy terms. A leading characteristic of Hyder had been perfect toleration to every religious sect. Though quite capable of respecting the genuine piety of such a man as Swartz, he appears to have been himself devoid of any belief whatever; and alternately countenanced and joined in the ceremonial observances of the Mohammedans and Hindoos, and even the grossest forms of idolatry, superstition, and magical incantation performed by the latter, simply from motives of policy.

His cruelties, great and terrible as they were, resulted from the same cause, excepting only those prompted by his unbounded sensuality. Tippoo Sultan, on the contrary, had all the insatiable ferocity of the wild beast whose name he bore, when the fearful relish for human blood has once been acquired; and none of his victims could have suggested a more appropriate badge than the stripe of the royal tiger, which formed part of his insignia.** With him, the fiendish

* The price paid to Sindia was the surrender of the city of Broach and its dependencies. The arrangements referred to (commonly known as the *Treaty of Salbye*) were concluded in May, 1782.

† An eye-witness pathetically describes the manner in which the natives, "whose very excess and luxury, in their most plenteous days, had fallen short of our severest fasts—silent, patient, resigned without sedition or disturbance, almost without complaint," perished in multitudes.—(Moodie's *Transactions*.)

‡ It is said that Hyder, like Hamilcar, swore his son to wage incessant war against the English; but the truth of this assertion is doubtful.

§ The age of Hyder is very differently stated. Wilks (the best general authority regarding Mysoor) states that he was seven years old in 1728, which would make him about sixty at the time of his death; but Mill and other writers unanimously speak of him as attaining a far more advanced age; and the careful and accurate Thornton

describes him as little younger than Aurungzebe. || Date wine, a cheap but very intoxicating liquor.

¶ *Mysoor*, ii., 373. Col. Wilks gives this strange confession on the authority of Poornea, the Hindoo minister, to whom it was addressed. Hyder, it must be recollected, had no ally on whom he could rely. The Mahrattas had forsaken him, and from the French he could only receive very partial aid, since he had predetermined, under no circumstances, to admit them in force to Mysoor.—(*Idem*, 374.) At a very critical period (March, 1782), Hyder resented the attempt of a French officer to take possession of Chillambrum, by turning him out of the fort, and the troops, having no bullocks, were actually compelled to drag their artillery back to Porto Novo!

** Tippoo Sultan is thought to have been named after a famous ascetic for whom Hyder Ali had a regard, and who had assumed this strange designation to signify sovereignty obtained over the tiger-like passions of the flesh.—(Wilks' *Mysoor*, ii., 567.)

delight of inflicting pain and degradation, physical and moral, seems to have been an instinct developed even in early boyhood.

In vain the stern reprimands of his dreaded father were frequently sounded in his ears; in vain the repeated infliction of corporal punishment by the long whips, which Hyder declared to be better security for good government than all the reading and writing in the world;—Tippoo could never be restrained from indulging the vicious tendencies which subsequently found vent in the form of religious persecution. He persisted in inflicting the outward mark of Islam on such Christians as fell in his power,* and insulted the peaceful Hindoo subjects of his father by wantonly defiling their places of worship, and slaying the animals they hold most sacred, especially the sacred bulls, which he recommended to his associates as the best possible beef. Yet Tippoo, stanch Mussulman as he deemed himself, and sworn foe to idolatry, was not the less a slave to the gross superstitions of which the Brahminical creed of modern times is so largely composed; and, like Hyder himself, he rarely failed, in commencing a difficult and dangerous undertaking, to have the *jebbum*—a strange species of magical incantation—performed on his behalf by the Hindoos, simultaneously with the offering up of prayers for success in the mosques.† Add to these characteristics that of an irrepressible tendency for pilfering and lying, and we have, perhaps, about as detestable a person as can well be conceived. In activity in battle, he is said to have surpassed his father, and to have equalled him in personal daring; but in every other more needful capacity of a despotic ruler, he was immeasurably inferior. His uncontested succession was ensured by the manœuvres of two Brahmins, the chief ministers of Hyder,‡ who concealed the death of the sovereign as long as possible, in order to give his heir time to return from his post on the western frontier of Mysoor, whither he

* When a youth, his father punished him severely for having inflicted circumcision on an English soldier, at a time when he was anxious to conciliate the good-will of the Madras presidency.

† The *Jebbum*, though purely a Hindoo ceremonial, was frequently resorted to by Mohammedans; one, of which the details are on record, is said to have cost Mohammed Ali £5,000, which he did not grudge, since it killed *Lord Pigot*; and another, after several failures, produced the death of Hyder himself.—(Wilks' *Mysoor*, ii., 255.)

‡ The chief ministers, relatively speaking; for Hyder was himself the acting head of every department.

had proceeded to repel the incursions of the English under Colonel Humberstone. Lord Macartney, on learning the late event, earnestly pressed the commander-in-chief (General Stuart) to take immediate advantage of the confusion likely to arise from a change of ruler. But here again the spirit of disunion, which prevailed to so remarkable an extent in the Madras presidency, forbade speedy and combined action. The general claimed to be allowed to exercise the same independent authority bestowed by the supreme government on Sir Eyre Coote, and the governor contended, as Hastings had done in Bengal, for the entire subordination of the military to the civil authority. The general, to vindicate his alleged right, took the course natural to an opiated and narrow-minded man, of acting in direct opposition to the instructions given by the presidency; and during the remainder of this the first war with the new ruler of Mysoor, the very spirit of discord ruled in the senate, the camp, and the field, neutralising every success, and aggravating every disaster. By the urgent solicitations of Hastings, Coote was again induced to return to the Carnatic; although, before his departure from thence, some serious disputes had taken place between him and Lord Macartney, notwithstanding the care evinced by the latter to act in the most conciliatory manner. But the ill-defined authority vested in the Supreme Council of Bengal, in conjunction with the personal misunderstanding which unhappily existed between Hastings and Macartney,§ tended to mingle personal feelings with public questions; and the dissensions between them increased in violence, until the governor-general took the resolve not only of delegating to Sir Eyre Coote the uncontrolled conduct of the war, but also, in the event of determined resistance at Fort St. George, of enforcing that measure by the deposition of the president. The death of Coote, four days after landing at Madras,||

§ The spotless integrity of Lord Macartney was a standing reproach to Hastings, who in dealing with him completely lost his temper. Thus, in a communication dated 13th of April, 1783, he desires Lord Macartney to explain some misunderstanding which had arisen on an official subject, adding as a reason, "if you consider the estimation of a man [the governor-general of India writing to the head of a subordinate presidency!] so inconsiderable as I am deserving of attention."—(*Life*, ii., 63.)

|| During the voyage, Coote was chased for two days and nights by a French ship of the line; and the agitation caused thereby accelerated his death.

perhaps prevented intestine strife; for Lord Macartney, though courteous and moderate, was by no means inclined to submit tamely to the lot of his predecessor, Lord Pigot. In all other respects the loss of the experienced general was a severe calamity. Despite the irritation and excitability consequent on ill-health, with other failings less excusable—such as extravagance as a commander, and covetousness in his private capacity—he possessed a degree of activity, precision, and experience far beyond any of his contemporaries; besides which, a frank soldierly manner, aided by the charm of old association, and his own strong attachment to the troops, rendered him beloved by the army in general, and especially by the native soldiers. Many a white-haired sepoy, in after times, loved to dwell on the service they had seen under “Coote Bahadur;” and offered, with glistening eye and faltering voice, a grateful tribute to his memory, while making a military salutation to the portrait of the veteran, suspended in the Madras exchange. The death of Coote was nearly simultaneous with the arrival of M. de Bussy. He had been long expected; but his plans had been twice disconcerted by the capture of the convoy destined to support him, by Admiral Kempenfelt, in December, 1781. A similar disaster occurred in April, 1782; and when, after much delay, he reached the Carnatic in the following June, he found a conjuncture of affairs awaiting him by no means favourable to his views. Hyder was dead, and Tippoo absent on an expedition for the recovery of Bednore, which had surrendered to an English force under General Matthews. This enterprise, which unforeseen circumstances alone rendered successful, had been undertaken for the express purpose of withdrawing the Mysoreans from Arcot. The object was accomplished, but the expected advantages were greatly lessened by the previous ill-advised destruction of the forts of Wandewash and Carangoli, which had been demolished by the for once united decision of Lord Macartney and General Stuart, although almost every military opinion, from that time to the present, has pronounced the measure premature, if not

wholly inexpedient. Considerable pecuniary acquisitions were expected to be realised from the capture of Bednore; but these anticipations proved delusive,—whether owing to the large sums carried off by the native governor (himself the intended victim of Tippoo),* or whether from the peculation of English officers, is a disputed question. The place was only retained about three months, at the end of which time it was captured by Tippoo, who having (by his own account) discovered that the English officers, in violation of the terms of capitulation dictated by him, were carrying away treasure and jewels to a large amount, caused them all to be marched off in irons to different prisons, where they endured a rigorous and dreary captivity, terminated, in the case of Matthews and several others, by a cruel death.

Meanwhile Bussy, disappointed in the hope of joining the main body of the Mysorean army under Tippoo, concentrated his force at Cuddalore, which was subsequently invested by General Stuart. It was of evident importance to use the utmost expedition in order to forestal the large reinforcements expected from France, and which did eventually arrive. Nevertheless, Stuart, although compelled to some degree of obedience to the Madras government, contrived to neutralise their plans by marching at the rate of three miles a-day, and thus occupied forty days, instead of the usual period of twelve, in reaching Cuddalore. The siege,† when commenced, proved long and sanguinary; and in an attack which took place on the 13th of June, 1783, the English lost upwards of 1,000 men. M. de Suffrein arrived shortly after, and landed a body of 2,400 men to strengthen the garrison; but Stuart had recklessly determined to carry out the commands of the presidency as literally as possible; and all the British troops entrusted to his charge, including a detachment under Colonel Fullarton, which had marched to his aid from Tanjore, would probably have been sacrificed to the spleen of one unprincipled man, but for the arrival of orders for the immediate cessation of hostilities, in consequence of the peace newly concluded between France and Eng-

* The governor was a chelah, or slave, named Sheik Ayaz, to whom Hyder had been so strongly attached, that he repeatedly declared he wished he had begotten him instead of Tippoo. The consequence was, Tippoo cordially hated Ayaz, and had arranged to put him to death; but the letter being intercepted, the intended victim hastened to make his escape.

† Bernadotte, afterwards Crown Prince of Swe-

den, was captured in a midnight sally made by the garrison. He was treated with great kindness by General Wangenheim, commandant of the Hanoverian troops in the English service; and in later life, when their relative positions were strangely altered, the general had ample reason to remember, with satisfaction, the compassion he had evinced towards the wounded sergeant.—(Wilks, ii., 442.)

land. This intelligence, at an equally opportune moment, reached the troops engaged in the defence of Mangalore, which, though a place of very inferior strength, had stood a siege of fifty-six days, the defence being directed by Colonel Campbell, the attack by Tippoo himself, who had proceeded thither with the main body after taking Bednore. The French envoy, Peveron, is accused of having kept back the intelligence he came to bring, in order to enable Tippoo to retain the aid of Cossigny (the French engineer), Lally, and Boudenot. The declaration could, at length, be no longer withheld. Cossigny quitted the Mysoor army, and insisted on his companions withdrawing likewise. Tippoo was beyond measure enraged by what he considered nothing short of treacherous desertion; and his late allies, as the sole means of escaping unhurt by his resentment, were glad to avail themselves of the protection of the English. After some unsuccessful attempts to carry the place by his own unassisted strength, he agreed to an armistice, to extend over the coast of Malabar. One leading condition was the supply of a stated monthly allowance of provisions to Mangalore, sufficient for the use of the garrison without trenching on their previous stock. This stipulation was broken by his furnishing articles deficient in quantity and deleterious in quality: no salt was sent, and many of the sepoys, Colonel Wilks affirms, became actually blind, as well as affected by various other ailments, in consequence of being compelled to eat rice in its simple, undigestible state, without the addition of any of the usual condiments. The Madras government were extremely anxious to conclude a peace; and to this circumstance, as also to the want of union among those in command, may be attributed the supineness of General Macleod and the scruples which prevented his effective interposition for the succour of Mangalore, which, after nearly a nine months' siege, fell before its cruel and perfidious foe. Colonel Campbell died soon after, overwhelmed with fatigue and disappointment. Tippoo had succeeded in his immediate object of proving to the native Indian powers his sufficiency to effect that which had baffled the skill and discipline of his French auxiliaries: in every other respect he had little reason to congratulate himself on the conquest of an inconsiderable place, purchased by a long and costly siege, which, besides having hindered his attention to the affairs of his own

dominions, had left the English free to gain considerable advantages in other quarters. The misconduct of General Stuart, in the expedition to Cuddalore, had filled the measure of his offences, and induced the governor and council to order his arrest and forcible embarkation for England.* After this decisive measure matters took a different and far more favourable turn.

The abilities of Mr. Sullivan, the resident at Tanjore, and of colonels Lang and Fullarton, had been successfully exerted in various ways. Caroor and Dindegul, Palgaut and Coimbatore, were captured; and Colonel Fullarton was even preparing to ascend the Ghauts and march on Seringapatam, when he received tidings of a treaty of peace concluded between Tippoo Sultan and the Madras government, on the basis of a mutual restoration of conquests. The so-called peace was, however, but a hollow truce, to which nothing but fear of the Mahrattas and the Nizam had driven the sultan. Throughout the whole of the negotiations he behaved in the most insulting manner to the British commissioners,† who had been inveigled to his court to be held up in the light of suitors for peace; and even when the treaty was concluded, the fulfilment of his pledge of restoring his captives to liberty, gave fresh occasion for resentment, by revealing the treatment to which they had been subjected. Hyder had shown little humanity in his dealings with English prisoners, whom he kept in irons, chained in pairs, because "they were unruly beasts, not to be kept quiet in any other way." But Tippoo Sultan far surpassed his father in barbarity, and the English learned, with horror and indignation, that many officers distinguished by rank, skill, or bravery, had been poisoned or assassinated in their dungeons; that others, especially the younger of these unfortunates, had suffered torture and ignominy of a revolting description; and that even the most fortunate among the captives had sustained close confinement in loathsome dens, their beds the damp ground; with food so miserably insufficient, as to give scope for the untiring fidelity and self-devotion of their native companions in affliction, to show itself by the frequent sacrifice of a portion of the scanty pittance

* One of the sons of Mohammed Ali expressed his view of the matter in broken English, by declaring "General Stuart catch one Lord [Pigot], one Lord [Macartney] catch General Stuart."

† Messrs. Sadleir, Staunton, and Hudleston.

allowed for their maintenance, in return for unremitting labour, to mend the fare of the European soldiers.*

The treaty entered into with Tippoo by the Madras authorities was transmitted to Bengal, and signed by the Supreme Council, on whom the full powers of government had devolved, owing to the absence of Mr. Hastings at Lucknow. On his return to Calcutta, Hastings found much fault with the treaty, especially because it made no mention of the nabob of Arcot. He drew up a new one, and peremptorily commanded the Madras authorities to forward it to Tippoo. Macartney positively refused compliance; Hastings could not compel it; and so the matter ended.

CLOSE OF HASTINGS' ADMINISTRATION.—

Before the commencement of the war with Hyder, the financial condition of every one of the three presidencies had become seriously embarrassed. In August, 1780, the Supreme Council had been under the necessity of contracting a new debt, and when to this heavy burden on the Bengal revenues an additional one was added by the costly military operations required for the defence of the Carnatic, the governor-general felt compelled to announce to the directors the probability of a total suspension of the investment, unless the purchase-money were sent from England. Nothing short of the most absolute necessity could, however, induce Hastings to endanger his standing with the Court of Proprietors, by the execution of so unpopular a measure, while any source of supply remained available; yet such as there were had been already severely taxed. The nabob of Oude and the rajah of Benares were tributary princes. Viewed in this light, they were bound in all cases of difficulty to furnish assistance to the superior and protecting state. The degree of co-operation to be afforded was an open question, which Mr. Hastings, who now held undisputed sway in Bengal, thought fit to decide in person, and, with that intent, proceeded to the wealthy, populous, and venerated city of Benares. The rajah, Cheyte Sing, was the son and successor of Bulwunt Sing, whose alliance the English had courted during the war with Shuja Dowlah. The

* Their exemplary conduct is the more deserving of admiration from the severe trials to which their fidelity had been recently exposed, as recorded in the pages of Wilks, Fullarton, and other military authorities. The mismanagement of the finances of the Carnatic had told fearfully on the condition of the army; even veteran sepoy, who had served un-

usurping nabobs of Oude had asserted the claim of the sword over the district of which Benares forms the capital, on the plea of its being a district dependent on their government. Bulwunt Sing made common cause with the English; and on the conclusion of peace, an article was expressly inserted to secure him from the vengeance and cupidity of the nabob-vizier. This proved increasingly difficult; until at length, in 1774, it was proposed by Mr. Hastings, as the sole mode of protecting the rajah, to insist on his being declared independent of Oude, and tributary to Bengal. A stated sum was fixed to be paid annually, and the Supreme Council unanimously decreed that no more demands of any kind should be made upon him on behalf of the company. Cheyte Sing forwarded the tribute to Patna with remarkable regularity; nevertheless, in 1778, the necessities of the presidency were considered to justify a demand for a heavy contribution (five lacs of rupees) to be furnished immediately. The rajah pleaded poverty, and asked for time; but troops were sent against him, and he was compelled to furnish the sum originally demanded, with a fine of £2,000 for military expenses. He had, unhappily, incurred the personal enmity of the governor-general, by courting Clavering and Francis during their brief day of power; and the offence was one Hastings was little disposed to let pass unpunished. In 1780, the system of exaction commenced against Cheyte Sing, was continued by a new demand of five lacs, from which he endeavoured to gain relief by arguments and supplications, enforced by a private offering of two lacs, which Mr. Hastings accepted, not as a part of the contribution, but as a distinct item, and then proceeded as before to exact the five lacs, with an additional mulct or fine of £10,000, for the trouble of compelling payment. In 1781, the unfortunate rajah was again importuned for supplies of money and troops; but this time unreasonable demands appear to have been made, simply with the object of provoking conduct which was to serve as a plea for the complete confiscation of his whole possessions. The amount now demanded was not to be less than fifty lacs, with a contingent of 1,000 men. The rajah beder Clive, were but imperfectly, if at all provided for. Colonel Fullarton expressly states, that the natives under his command were nearly twelve months in arrear, and that many were driven to such extremities as to be compelled to sell their children into slavery to save themselves from starvation.—(*View of English Interests in India, 1782 to 1784*; pp. 98-201.)

haved with remarkable moderation: he doubtless guessed the views entertained by Hastings—either the seizure of his forts with their contents, or the sale of his dominions to the ruler of Oude; and he left no means untried to avert, by submission, evils which it was hopeless to combat by force. On the approach of the governor-general, he went to meet him with every demonstration of respect; and, in token of entire submission, laid his turban on the lap of the reserved and impassive Englishman, the last act of humiliation in a country, where, to be bareheaded, is considered unspeakable degradation. This conduct did not check, perhaps it accelerated the extreme measures adopted by Hastings, who asserted that besides falsely pleading poverty, the rajah was really plotting to become perfectly independent of the presidency; but to this charge his youth and inexperience afford the best contradiction, when viewed in conjunction with the unresisting manner in which he suffered the governor-general to take possession of Benares, though attended by a very slender escort, and even to go the length of arresting and confining him to his own palace. The two companies of sepoy placed on guard there, were not provided with ammunition, so little was any resistance anticipated on the part of this incipient rebel. The people were expected to witness, with indifference, the change of rulers. On the contrary, they were rendered desperate by an aggression which involved the downfall of one of their own race and religion, to be followed by the transfer of the sacred city and its fertile environs into the hands of aliens, who had no sympathies with their creed, and no interest in their welfare. Great crowds assembled round the palace and blocked up all the avenues; and before reinforcements with ammunition could arrive to support the sepoy guard, a furious attack had been made, in which the greater part perished. The rajah, so far from coming forth to head the mob, took advantage of the confusion to make his escape, and was let down the steep bank of the Ganges, by means of turbans tied together, into a boat which conveyed him to the opposite shore. The multitude rushed after him, leaving the palace to be occupied by the English troops. Had they at once proceeded in search of Hastings, no effective resistance could have been offered, since he had no protection beyond that of the thirty gentlemen of his party and fifty armed sepoy.

Cheyte Sing had, however, no thought of organised operations against his persecutor, and he sent repeated apologies, and offers of the most complete submission, all of which were treated with contemptuous disregard. The numbers of the insurgents continued to increase; the building in which the English party had taken up their abode was blockaded, and the sole means of conveying intelligence to Bengal was by the subtlety of native messengers, who, taking advantage of the custom of laying aside in travelling their large golden earrings, because tempting to thieves, placed on this occasion not the ordinary quill or roll of blank paper in the orifice, but dispatches from Hastings to the commanders of British troops to come to his rescue. Before these orders could be executed, affairs assumed a still more menacing aspect. A slight skirmish, brought on by a premature attack made by an English officer, at the head of a small body of men, on Ramnagar, a fortified palace beyond the river, terminated in the death of the leader, and many of his followers by the hands of the people of Benares. The survivors retreated; and Hastings, alarmed for his own safety, fled by night to the fortress of Chunar, leaving the wounded sepoy behind. The excitement spread for hundreds of miles; the husbandman quitted the field, the manufacturer his loom, and rallied round Cheyte Sing; the oppressed population of Oude rose against the misgovernment of Asuf Dowlah and his English allies; and even Bahar seemed ripe for revolt. The rajah at length assumed a haughty and defiant tone; but the absence of skill or discipline rendered the tumultuary force thus voluntarily assembled utterly incapable of taking the field against a European army, and the troops, under Major Popham, were everywhere victorious. The fastnesses of the rajah were stormed, his adherents, to the number of 30,000, forsook his standard, and returned to their ordinary avocations, while their late ruler quitted the country for perpetual exile. Benares was annexed to the British dominions. To save appearances, a relation of the banished ruler was appointed rajah, but, like the nabob of Bengal, he became a mere stipendiary, removable at the pleasure of the presidency. This tyrannical procedure completely failed in promoting the avowed object of Hastings—the attainment of a large sum of ready money; for, notwithstanding the indignities used in searching even the

persons as well as the wardrobes of the mother, wife, and other females of the family of Cheyte Sing (in violation of the articles of capitulation), the booty realised was not only unexpectedly small (£250,000 to £300,000), but was wholly appropriated as prize-money by the army.* Thus the immediate effect of the expedition was to enhance the difficulties it was intended to relieve, by the expenses attendant on putting down a revolt wantonly provoked; and so far from meeting the approbation of the company, the conduct pursued towards the rajah was denounced as "improper, unwarrantable, and highly impolitic." Nevertheless, the war into which Cheyte Sing had been driven was held to justify his expulsion from Benares; and the positive declaration of Hastings, that an order for the reinstatement of the rajah would be regarded by him as the signal for his own instant resignation of office, probably prevented any step being taken to make amends for past wrongs.

The next expedient adopted to fill the empty treasury of Calcutta, was more successful in its results, but, if possible, more discreditable in character. Asuf-ad-Dowlah, the successor of Shuja Dowlah, was a young man, not devoid of a certain description of ability† and kindly feeling; but his better qualities were neutralised by an amount of indolence and sensuality, which rendered him a political nobody in the sight of the presidency, and a severe scourge to his subjects by reason of the extortions and cruelty perpetrated in his name by unworthy favourites. Already sundry concessions (such as the Benares tribute) had been extorted from him, which Hastings would never have so much as proposed to his father; and these, together with general misgovernment and extravagance, had reduced the treasury of Oude to a condition which left its master little to fear from the rapacity of his neighbours. Continued drought had heightened his distress, by diminishing the power of the people to meet the heavy taxation demanded

from them; and he found himself unable to pay any portion of the arrears of his own mutinous troops, much less to maintain the costly detachment and the long train of officials, civil as well as military, forced upon him by the English.

In an evil hour he sought counsel with the governor-general at Chunar, pleaded poverty, and gave as one, among many reasons for inability to fulfil the heavy conditions into which he had been led to enter, the large proportion of his father's wealth bequeathed to his mother and grandmother. These princesses had been uniformly treated by Shuja Dowlah with the highest consideration and respect: his wife, especially, had won his entire confidence by repeated evidences of energetic and devoted affection. During his lifetime the chief direction of his pecuniary affairs had been entrusted to her management, and, after his death, the two ladies remained in possession of certain extensive jaghires, with other property, to a large extent; not for their exclusive use, but for the maintenance of the rest of his family and those of preceding nabobs, amounting (including female retainers of all kinds) to about 2,000 persons. The profligate prince had early coveted the inheritance of his relatives, and he continued to exact contributions from them, until his mother, wearied and alarmed by his importunities and injurious treatment, consented to surrender an additional sum of thirty lacs, on condition of his signing a formal pledge, guaranteed by the Supreme Council of Bengal, that she should be permitted to enjoy her jaghires and effects exempt from further persecution. This covenant, effected through the mediation of Bristowe, the English resident at Lucknow, was approved of and confirmed by the majority then dominant in Calcutta. Hastings disapproved, but being in the minority, could offer no effective opposition. In 1781, when his authority became again (for a time) supreme, he scrupled not to set aside all former promises by empowering the nabob

* Hastings would seem to have outwitted himself in this matter. The wife of Cheyte Sing was a person of high character, much-beloved and esteemed, and safety and respect for her person, together with those of the other ladies of the family of the ill-fated rajah, were among the express terms of capitulation. Yet Hastings was unmanly enough to question the "expediency of the promised indulgence to the ranees," and to suggest that she would "contrive to defraud the captors of a considerable portion of the booty, by being suffered to retire without examina-

tion." The intimation did not pass unheeded. The defenceless ladies were subjected to the insulting search of four females, but with what effect does not appear; and their persons were further insulted by the licentious people and followers of the camp. But the officers and soldiery maintained that Hastings had expressly made over to them the whole profits of this nefarious transaction, and would not so much as lend a portion to government. The share of the commander-in-chief was £36,000.—(Mill, Moodie, &c.)

† *Vide* the charming stanzas translated by Heber.

to take possession of the jaghires of both princesses, as a means of paying his debts to the company; and, as a further assistance, the English troops, whose maintenance pressed heavily on the Oude revenues, were to be withdrawn. Mr. Hastings asserted, in justification of his conduct, that the begums had evinced an inclination to take part with Cheyte Sing; but the accusation is improbable in itself, and unsupported by any reliable evidence: their other alleged fault—of embarrassing the government of the nabob—was contradicted by the statements repeatedly forwarded by the English resident, of the persecutions endured by them at the hands of the local authorities. Asuf-ad-Dowlah (who, ever since the covenant signed in 1775, had been repeatedly violating it in different ways) was at first delighted at having his refractory relatives deprived of the protection to which they had constantly appealed; but on quitting Chunar, and regaining his own dominions, he began to consider the matter in a different light. Unsupported by the plausible reasoning of Hastings, the proposed plan of despoiling his mother and grandmother appeared fraught with ignominy; and Mr. Middleton (who had been recently restored to the position of British resident) described, in the strongest terms, the almost unconquerable repugnance evinced by the nabob towards the violent measures agreed on at Chunar. He was peremptorily informed, that in the event of his continued refusal, the seizure of the jaghires and personal property of the begums would be accomplished by the English without his co-operation. The weak and vacillating prince, fearful of the effect such an assumption of authority by foreigners might produce on the minds of his subjects, reluctantly consented to accompany the expedition sent to attack the princesses in their own territory, in the

commencement of the year 1782. The town and castle of Fyzabad (the second place in Oude) were occupied without bloodshed, the avenues of the palace blocked up, and the begums given to understand that no severities would be spared to compel the complete surrender of their property. But here a serious obstacle presented itself. Even Middleton doubted what description of coercion could be effectually adopted, without offering an offence of the most unpardonable description to the whole native population; for the ladies were hedged in by every protection which rank, station, and character could confer, to enhance the force of opinion which, on all such occasions, is in the east so strong and invariable, "that no man, either by himself or his troops, can enter the walls of a zenana, scarcely in the case of acting against an open enemy, much less the ally of a son acting against his own mother."* In this dilemma it was deemed advisable to work upon the fears and sympathies of the begums in the persons of their chief servants, two eunuchs, who had long been entrusted with the entire management of their affairs. There is, perhaps, no page in Anglo-Indian history so deeply humiliating to our national feelings, as that which records the barbarities inflicted on these aged men, during a period of nearly twelve months. Certainly no other instance can be found equally illustrative of the false varnish which Hastings habitually strove to spread over his worst actions, than the fact that, after directing the mode of dealing with the eunuchs—by rigorous confinement in irons, total deprivation of food, and, lastly, by direct torture;† after inciting the indirect persecution of the princesses and the immense circle of dependants left to their charge by the nabob-vizier, by cutting off their supplies of food and necessities;‡—after quarrelling with and dismiss-

* Middleton's defence. *Vide* House of Commons Papers, March, 1781; and Mill's *India*, vol. iv.

† The account of these disgraceful proceedings is very fragmentary, but amply sufficient to warrant the assertions made in the text. Three principal facts are on record. The first is a letter from Middleton to the English officer on guard, dated January, 1782, desiring that the eunuchs should "be put in irons, kept from all food," &c. The second is a letter from the same officer to the president, pleading the sickly condition of his prisoners as a reason for temporarily removing their chains, and allowing them to take a little exercise in the fresh air. This was refused, and the captives were removed to Lucknow. The third communication, addressed still by one company's servant to another, is a direct order for the admission of torturers to "inflict corporal punishment"

on two aged prisoners accused of excessive fidelity to their mistresses; and lest the feelings of a British officer should rise against the atrocities about to be inflicted, an express injunction was added, that the executioners were to have "free access to the prisoners, and to be permitted to do with them whatever they thought proper."—(*Idem*.)

‡ The women of the zenana were at various times on the eve of perishing for want; and on one occasion the pangs of hunger so completely overpowered the ordinary restraints of custom, that they burst in a body from the palace and begged for food in the public bazaar, but were driven back with blows by the sepoys in the service of the E. I. Co.—(*Dr. Moodie's Transactions*, p. 455.) Major Gilpin, the commandant of the guard, humanely advanced 10,000 rupees for the relief of these unfortunates.

ing his favourite employé Middleton, for having been backward in conducting a business from which a gaoler of Newgate prison might turn with disgust,—he, nevertheless, when it became advisable to adopt lenient measures (since no further payments could be extorted by cruelty), had the consummate hypocrisy to remove the guard from the palace of the begums, and release the eunuchs, on the express understanding that their sufferings had proceeded from the nabob and his ministers, but their release from his own compassionate interference. The previous ill-feeling justly entertained by the princesses and their adherents against Asuf-ad-Dowlah, probably lent some countenance to this untruth; and the commanding officer by whom the eunuchs were set at liberty, described, in glowing terms, the lively gratitude expressed by them towards their supposed liberator. "The enlargement of the prisoners, their quivering lips and tears of joy, formed," writes this officer, "a truly affecting scene." He adds a remark, which could scarcely fail to sting the pride, if not the conscience, of one so susceptible of censure in disguise—"If the prayers of these poor men will avail, you will, at the last trump, be translated to the happiest regions in heaven."* In the benefits to be derived from the recent despoliation, Hastings hoped to share largely, for he expected that the E. I. Cy., in gratitude for an accession of £600,000 to their exhausted treasury, would cheerfully assent to his appropriation of the additional sum of £100,000, which he had actually obtained bonds for from Asuf-ad-Dowlah at Chunar. An extortion like this, committed at a time when the excessive poverty and heavy debts of the nabob-vizier, the clamours of his unpaid troops, and the sufferings of the mass of the people, were held forth in extenuation of the oppression of his mother and grandmother, together with other acts of tyrannous aggression, needs no comment. The directors positively refused to permit his detention of the money, and, moreover, commanded that a rigorous investigation should be instituted into the charges of disaffection brought against the begums; and that, in the event of their innocence being proved, restitution should be made.

* Parl. Papers, quoted by Mill, iv., 458.

† Letter of Hastings to council, 1784. They gave rich gifts to Mrs. Hastings, in the form of chairs and couches of exquisitely carved ivory, &c.

‡ Except a heavy exaction from Fyzoolla Khan.

Hastings strongly deprecated this equitable measure. He urged that the evidence offered under such circumstances would be sure to be favourable to persons whose cause should be so manifestly upheld by the company; and supported his views on the subject by many characteristic arguments, such as its being unsuitable to the majesty of justice to challenge complaint. A compromise was effected; the nabob, at his own urgent desire, was permitted to restore the jaghires wrested from his relatives; while the ladies, on their part, thankful for even this scanty justice, "made a *voluntary* concession of a large portion of their respective shares" of the newly-restored rents.†

This transaction is the last of any importance in the administration of Warren Hastings.‡ Various causes appeared to have concurred to render him as anxious to resign as he had once been to retain his post. The absence of his wife, to whom he was tenderly attached, and his own failing health, had doubtless their share in rendering him weary of a task, the difficulties of which had been lately increased by a change in the council-board calculated to destroy the despotic power essential to the policy of a ruler, whose measures, however cleverly planned and boldly executed, were rarely of a character to bear impartial, much less hostile criticism. Beside these reasons, his opponents suggested that of recent private extortions from the nabob-vizier; and it cannot be forgotten, that although he pleaded urgent necessity as an inducement for the directors to suffer him to appropriate the bonds obtained at Chunar, yet, about three years later, he was enabled, notwithstanding his habitual extravagance, to bring home a fortune avowedly not far short of £100,000, apart from the costly jewels exhibited by Mrs. Hastings, and the well-furnished private purse which there are grounds for believing her to have possessed.

The prolonged administration of Hastings, his winning manner, and conversance with native languages, together with the imposing effect of the state by which he had, from motives of policy, thought fit to surround himself, made a deep impression on the minds of the Indian population. I have myself met with ballads, similar to those alluded to by Heber and Macaulay, which commemorate the swift steeds and richly-caparisoned elephants of "Sahib Hushing;" they likewise record his victory over Nuncomar who refused to do him homage.

The Indian version of the story makes, however, no mention of the accusation of forgery, but resembles rather the scripture story of Haman and Mordecai, with a different ending. The Bengalees possibly never understood the real and lasting injury done them by Hastings, in fastening round their necks the chains of monopoly, despite the opposition of his colleagues, and contrary to the orders of the company. Once fully in operation, the profits of exclusive trade in salt and opium* became so large, that its renunciation could spring only from philanthropy of the purest kind, or policy of the broadest and most liberal character. With his countrymen in India, Warren Hastings was in general popular. It had been his unceasing effort to purchase golden opinions; and one of the leading accusations brought against him by the directors, was the wilful increase of governmental expenses by the creation of supernumerary offices to provide for adherents, or to encourage those already in place by augmented salaries. His own admissions prove, that attachment to his person, and unquestioning obedience to his commands, were the first requisites for subordinates; and the quiet perseverance with which he watched his opportunity of rewarding a service, or revenging a "personal hurt," is not the least remarkable feature in his character.

He quitted India in February, 1785. Notwithstanding the unwarrantable measures adopted by him to raise the revenues and lessen the debts of the company, he failed to accomplish these objects, and, on the contrary, left them burdened with an additional debt of twelve-and-a-half million, and a revenue which (including the provision of an European investment) was not equal to the ordinary expenses of the combined settlements.† Doubtless, great allowance must be made for the heavy drain occasioned by the pressing wants of the Bombay and Madras presidencies, and decided commendation awarded for the energetic steps taken to avert the ruin in which the Mahratta war and the invasion of Hyder

threatened to involve these possessions: but it is equally true, that the double-faced and grasping policy of the governor-general tended to neutralise the benefit of his courage and decision, and, as in the case of Lord Pigot, fomented, instead of allaying, the evils of dissension and venality, which were more destructive to the interests of the E. I. Cy. than any external opposition.

Had Hastings resolved to abide by the conviction which led him on one occasion to exclaim, that he "wished it might be made felony to break a treaty," the consequences would have been most beneficial both to India and to England, and would, at the same time, have saved him long years of humiliation and anxiety. He little thought that the Rohilla war, the sale of Allahabad and Oude, and the persecution of the begums, would rise in judgment against him on his return to his native land,—bar his path to titles and offices of state, and compel him to sit down in the comparatively humble position which had formed the object of his boyish ambition, as master of Daylesford, the ancient estate of his family.

But Francis, now a member of parliament, had not been idle in publishing the evil deeds which he had witnessed without power to prevent; and Burke, whose hatred of oppression equalled his sympathy for suffering, brought forward the impeachment as a question which every philanthropist, everyone interested in the honour of England or the welfare of India, was bound to treat as of vital importance. Political motives, of an exceptionable character, on the part of the ministers, favoured the promoters of the trial; and after many tedious preliminaries, Warren Hastings appeared at the bar of the House of Lords, and knelt before the tribunal of his country, in presence of one of the most remarkable assemblages ever convened in the great hall of William Rufus. Of the brilliant aristocracies of rank, talent, wealth, and beauty, of which England then boasted, few members were absent. The queen and princesses had come to witness the impeachment of a subject known to

* The 12th article of impeachment against Hastings set forth, "that he granted to Stephen Sullivan, son of Lawrence Sullivan, chairman of the Court of Directors, a contract for four years for the provision of opium; that in order to pay for the opium so provided, he borrowed large sums at an interest of eight per cent., at a time when he declared the drug could not be exported with profit; and yet he sent it to China, which was an act of additional criminality, as he knew that the importation of opium was prohibited

by the Chinese." Sullivan sold the contract to a Mr. Benn for £40,000; Benn to a Mr. Young for £60,000; and the latter reaped a large profit.—(Mill.)

† A comparison of the receipts and disbursements of the year ending April, 1786, exhibited a deficit of about £1,300,000. The arrears of the army amounted to two million; and "the troops at Madras and Bombay were in a state of utter destitution, and some of them in open mutiny." The ascertained Bengal debt alone was about four million sterling.

have enjoyed no ordinary share of royal favour, and to listen to the charges urged against him by the thrilling eloquence of Burke, the solid reasoning of Fox, and the exciting declamation of Sheridan. The trial commenced with a strong feeling on the part of the public against the accused; but it dragged on, like most state proceedings, until people ceased to care how it ended. At length, after seven years spent in law proceedings of a most tedious character, the wrongs inflicted in a distant clime, and at a distant period, became almost a matter of indifference: a sort of sympathy, such as is often felt for acknowledged criminals, took the place of lively indignation; and when the inquiry ended in the acquittal of Hastings, he was generally believed to have been sufficiently punished by the insuperable obstacles which his peculiar position had imposed to prevent his selection for any public office, and by the ruinous condition to which his finances had been reduced by the costly expenses, legitimate and illegitimate, of the painful ordeal through which he had passed. The law charges alone exceeded £76,000. Probably still larger sums were expended in various kinds of secret service—"in bribing newspapers, rewarding pamphleteers, and circulating tracts;"* beside £12,000 spent in purchasing, and £48,000 in adorning, Daylesford: so that Hastings, when finally dismissed, turned from the bar of the House of Lords an absolute pauper—worse than that—an insolvent debtor. The company came to his relief with an annuity of £1,000 a-year, and a loan of £50,000, nearly half of which was converted into a gift; and they continued to aid him at intervals, in his ever-recurring difficulties, up to the period of his death, in 1818, aged eighty-six.

* Macaulay's *Essay on Hastings*, p. 100.

† Lord Macartney, on taking possession of the office of president of Madras, made a formal statement of his property, and on quitting office presented to the company a precise account of the increase effected during the interval. The E. I. Co. met him in the same frank and generous spirit by the gift of an annuity of £1,500. It is to be regretted that he lent the sanction of example to the vice of duelling, then frightfully prevalent, by a meeting with a member of council (Mr. Sadleir) with whom a misunderstanding had arisen in the course of official duty. On his return to England he was challenged by General Stuart, and slightly wounded. The seconds interfered, and the contest terminated, though Stuart declared himself unsatisfied.

‡ The establishment of a Board of Control, with other important measures, respectively advocated by Fox or Pitt, will be noticed in a subsequent section.

ADMINISTRATION OF LORD CORNWALLIS.—

The government of Lord Macartney terminated in Madras about the same time as that of Mr. Hastings in Bengal; and a high testimony to the ability and unsullied integrity† of the former gentleman, was afforded by the offer of the position of governor-general, which he declined accepting, unless accompanied by a British peerage. This concession was refused, on the ground that, if granted, it would convey to the public an impression that a premium was necessary to induce persons of consideration in England to fill the highest office in India, and the appointment was consequently conferred on Lord Cornwallis. To him was entrusted the charge of carrying into execution some important alterations contemplated by the act of parliament passed in 1784; and by means of an express provision in the act of 1786, the powers of commander-in-chief were united in his person with that of the greatly enlarged authority of governor-general.‡ He arrived in Calcutta in the autumn of 1786, and immediately commenced a series of salutary and much-needed reforms, both as regarded the collection of revenue and the administration of justice. Mr. Macpherson, the senior member of council,§ who had temporarily presided over the affairs of government, had successfully exerted himself to diminish the waste of the public finances connived at by his predecessor; and Lord Cornwallis set about the same task with a steadiness of principle and singleness of motive to which both English officials and Indian subjects had been long unaccustomed. The two great measures which distinguish his internal policy, are the establishment of a fixed land-rent throughout Bengal, in exact accordance with the opinions of Francis; and the formation of a

§ Mr. Wheler was dead. Mr. (afterwards Sir John) Macpherson went to India, in 1766, as purser in a vessel commanded by his uncle, contrived to ingratiate himself with the nabob of Arcot, and returned to England as his agent. After a strange series of adventures, which it is not necessary to follow in detail, he rose to the position of acting governor-general, in which capacity he obtained for the company the valuable settlement of Penang or Prince of Wales' Island, by an arrangement with the King of Queda. His brief administration was likewise marked by a duel with Major Brown (on the Bengal establishment.) The Court of Directors, tired of witnessing the peace of their territories endangered by such proceedings, unanimously affixed the penalty of dismissal from the company's service to any person who should send a challenge on account of matters arising out of the discharge of their official duties.—(Auber's *British India*, ii., 39.)

judicial system to protect property. The necessity of coming to some speedy settlement regarding the collection of territorial revenue, whether under the denomination of a rent or a tax, is the best apology for the necessarily imperfect character of the system framed at this period on the sound principle of giving a proprietary right in the soil; but even a brief statement of the different views taken by the advocates of the zemindarree settlement, and of the opposite arguments of those who consider the right in the soil vested in the ryots or cultivators, would mar the continuity of the narrative.

The foreign policy of the governor-general was characterised by the novel feature of the reduction of the rate of tribute demanded from a dependent prince. Asuf-ad-Dowlah pleaded, that in violation of repeated treaties, a sum averaging eighty-four lacs per annum had been exacted for the company during the nine preceding years; and his arguments appeared so forcible, that Lord Cornwallis consented to reduce this sum to fifty lacs per annum, which he declared sufficient to cover the "real expenses" involved in the defence of Oude. Negligent, profuse, and voluptuous in the extreme, the nabob-vizier was wholly dependent on foreign aid to secure the services of his own troops or the submission of his own subjects; he had therefore no alternative but to make the best terms possible with the English, and might well deem himself fortunate in finding the chief authority vested in a ruler whose actions were dictated by loftier motives than temporary expediency; and influenced by more worthy considerations than the strength or weakness of those with whom he had to deal. The extreme dissatisfaction openly expressed by Englishmen in India, regarding the peace of 1784, and the insulting conduct of Tippoo, led the Mahrattas and the Nizam to believe that the E. I. Co would gladly take part with them in a struggle against one whose power and arrogance were alarmingly on the increase; but their overtures were met by an explicit declaration, that the supreme government (in accordance with the recent commands of the British parliament) had resolved on taking no part in any confederacy framed for purposes of aggression. Tippoo and the Mahrattas therefore went to war on their own

resources, and continued hostile operations for about a year, until the former was glad to make peace, on not very favourable terms, in order to turn his undivided attention to a portion of the territories usurped by his father, and enact a new series of barbarities on the miserable inhabitants of the coast of Malabar. The first measure by which this barbarian signalled his accession to despotic sway, was the deportation of upwards of 30,000 native Christians from Canara. The memory of the deeds of Cardinal Menezes, and other staunch supporters of the "Holy Inquisition," had not passed away; and Tippoo affirmed, that it was the narrative of the intolerance exercised by the "Portuguese Nazarenes" which caused "the rage of Islam to boil in his breast,"* and induced him to vent his wrath upon the present innocent generation, by sweeping off the whole of both sexes and every age into slavery, and compelling them to observe and receive the external rites of the Moslem creed. Of these unfortunates, not one-third are believed to have survived the first year of exile and degradation. The brave mountaineers of Coorg drew upon themselves the same fate by the constant struggles for liberty, to which they were incited by the odious tyranny of the usurper. Tippoo at length dealt with them in the manner in which a ferocious and half-crazed despot of early times did with another section of the Indian population.† The dominant class in Coorg had assembled together on a hilly, wooded tract, apart from the lower order of the peasantry (a distinct and apparently aboriginal race.) Tippoo surrounded the main body, as if enclosing game for a grand circular hunt; beat up the woods as if dislodging wild beasts; and finally closed in upon about 70,000 persons, who were driven off, like a herd of cattle, to Seringapatam, and "honoured with the distinction of Islam,"‡ on the very day selected by their persecutor to assume sovereignty, or rather imperial sway, by taking the proud title of Padsha, and causing his own name to be prayed for in public in place of that of the Mogul Shah Alum, as was still customary in the mosques all over India.

The Guntoor Circar, to which the English had become entitled upon the death of Bassalut Jung, in 1782, by virtue of the

great detestation for the immorality of the Coorgs, who, he truly affirmed, systematically pursued a most extraordinary system of polygandria, by giving to several brothers one and the same woman to wife.

* Wilks' *History of Mysoor*, ii., 530.

† Mohammed Toghlaq. See page 75.

‡ Tippoo, in his celebrated production, the *Sultaun-u-Towareekh*, or King of Histories, expresses

treaty of 1768, was obtained from Nizam Ali in 1788. The cession was expedited by a recent quarrel between him and Tippoo Sultan, which rendered the renewal of the treaty of 1768 peculiarly desirable to the former, inasmuch as it contained a proviso that, in the event of his requiring assistance, a British contingent of infantry and artillery should march to support him against any power not in alliance with the E. I. Cy.; the exceptions being the Mahrattas, the nabobs of Arcot and Oude, and the rajahs of Tanjore and Travancore. The Nizam would fain have interpreted the revived agreement as warranting a united attack on Mysoor; but his schemes were positively rejected by Lord Cornwallis, on account of the recent engagement entered into with that state, which was still professedly at peace with the English. Yet it was evident to every power in India, that the sultan only waited a favourable opportunity to renew hostilities. The insulting caricatures of many of the company's servants, held up to mockery and coarse jesting on the walls of the houses of Seringapatam, might have been an idle effusion of popular feeling; but the wretched captives still pining in loathsome dungeons, in violation of the promised general release of prisoners, and the enrolment of a number of English children as domestic slaves to the faithless tyrant, afforded, in conjunction with various rancorous expressions, unmistakable indications of his deadly hatred towards the whole nation.* The inroad of the Mysoreans on the territory of the rajah of Travancore, brought matters to an issue. The rajah, when menaced by invasion from his formidable neighbour, appealed to the E. I. Cy. for their promised protection, and an express communication was made to Tippoo, that an attack on the lines of defence formed on the Travancore frontier, would be regarded as a declaration of war with the English. The lines referred to, constructed in 1775, consisted of a broad and deep ditch, a strong bamboo hedge, a slight parapet, and a good rampart, with bastions on rising grounds, almost flanking one another. They extended a distance of thirty miles (from the island of Vaipen to the Anamalaiah range), but were more imposing than effectual, as it was hardly possible to defend so great an extent. Tippoo approached this barrier in December, 1789,

and proceeded to erect batteries. An unsuspected passage round the right flank of the lines, enabled him to introduce a body of troops within the wall, and he led them onward, hoping to force open the nearest gate, and admit the rest of the army. The attempt proved, not merely unsuccessful, but fatal to the majority of the assailants. They were compelled to retreat in confusion, and, in the general scramble across the ditch, Tippoo himself was so severely bruised, as to limp occasionally during the remainder of his life. His palanquin fell into the hands of the enemy, the bearers having been trodden to death by their comrades; and his seals, rings, and personal ornaments remained to attest his presence, and contradict his reiterated denial of having borne any part in a humiliating catastrophe, which had materially deranged his plans. More than this, alarm at the probable consequence of a repulse, induced Tippoo to write, in terms of fulsome flattery, to the English authorities, assuring them that the late aggression was the unauthorised act of his troops. Lord Cornwallis treated these assertions with merited contempt, and hastened to secure the co-operation of the Nizam and the Mahratta ministers of Poona, to which he would gladly have added that of Sindia, had not the price demanded been the aid of British troops for aggressive warfare in Rajpootana, which was unhesitatingly refused. He proceeded to make vigorous preparations for a campaign, by assembling troops, collecting supplies, and meeting financial difficulties in an open and manly spirit. Further outlay for a European investment he completely stopped, as a ruinous drain on resources already insufficient to meet the heavy expenditure which must inevitably be incurred in the ensuing contest, the avowed object of which was to diminish materially the power of the sultan; for, as Lord Cornwallis truly declared, in a despatch to General Medows, if this despot were "suffered to retain his present importance, and to insult and bully all his neighbours, until the French should again be in a condition to support him, it would almost certainly leave the seeds of a future dangerous war." Meanwhile, Tippoo confirmed these convictions, and justified the intended procedure by a renewed attempt upon Travancore, and succeeded in razing the defences and spreading desolation over the country. The invasion of Mysoor compelled him to return for its

* Col. Fullarton, writing in 1784, accuses Tippoo of having caused 200 English to be forcibly circumcised and enrolled in his service.—(*View*, 207.)

defence; and the system of intelligence established by his father, together with his own activity, enabled him to take advantage of the separation of the English army into three divisions, to attack them in detail, break through their chain of communication, and transfer hostilities to the Carnatic. These reverses were partially compensated by the success of a fourth detachment from Bombay in obtaining possession of the whole of Malabar. The second campaign was opened in February, 1791, by Cornwallis in person. Placing himself at the head of the army, he entered Mysoor by the pass of Mooglee, and in the commencement of March, laid siege to the fortress of Bangalore. Though the troops had been little harassed by hostile operations, they were much enfeebled by the fatigues and privations of a tedious march; the cattle were worn to skeletons, and their supplies, both of food and ammunition, nearly exhausted. The arrival of a Mahratta reinforcement had been long and vainly expected; and affairs were in a most critical state, when the successful assault, first of the town, and subsequently of the citadel of Bangalore (carried by a bayonet charge), relieved the mind of the commander-in-chief from the gloomy prospect involved in the too probable event of defeat. Nevertheless, difficulties and dangers of no ordinary character remained to be combated. At the close of March the army moved from Bangalore northward, for the purpose of forming a junction with the auxiliary corps of cavalry expected from the Nizam. When, after being repeatedly misled by false information regarding the vicinity of the Hyderabad troops, the desired union was at length successfully effected, it proved a fresh source of trouble and disappointment; for the 10,000 light troops so anxiously awaited, instead of rendering good service in the field, were so ill-disciplined and untrustworthy, as to be incapable of conducting even a foraging expedition, and therefore did but augment the distress and anxiety they were sent to lessen.*

Though surrounded on every side by

* Their commander is said to have been influenced by intrigues carried on between the mother of Tippoo and the favourite wife of the Nizam. The former lady successfully deprecated the wrath excited by the gross insults lately offered by her son, in return to solicitations addressed by some female members of the family of Nizam Ali when in peril at Adoni.

† Twenty English youths, the survivors of the unhappy band whom Tippoo, with malicious wantonness,

circumstances of the most depressing character, Cornwallis, with undaunted courage, made such preparations as the possession of Bangalore placed in his power for the siege of Seringapatam. An earnest desire to bring to a speedy close hostilities, the prolongation of which involved a grievous sacrifice of life and treasure, added to the alarming information constantly arriving in India regarding the progress of the French revolution, induced him to advance at once upon the capital of Mysoor, despite the defective character of his resources. The troops marched, in May, to Arikera, about nine miles distant from Seringapatam, through a country which, in anticipation of their approach, had been reduced to the condition of a desert. Tippoo Sultan took up a strong position in their front, from whence he was driven by Lord Cornwallis—forced to action, defeated, and compelled to retreat and take refuge under the works of his capital, for the safety of which he now became seriously alarmed. Recognising too late the folly of wantonly provoking the vengeance of a powerful foe, he gave orders that the caricatures of the English should be carefully obliterated from all public places; at the same time taking the savage precaution of slaughtering, without distinction, such prisoners as he had privately detained, lest they should live to afford incontrovertible evidence of his breach of faith and diabolical cruelty.†

Lord Cornwallis was, however, quite unable to pursue his recent success. The deplorable condition of the army, in which smallpox was now raging, with diseases immediately resulting from insufficient food and excessive fatigue under incessant rains, compelled him to issue a reluctant order for retreat. It seemed madness to remain under such circumstances in such a position, still more to hazard further advance, on the chance of the long-delayed succour expected from the Mahrattas; and after destroying the battering train and other heavy equipments, which the loss of cattle‡ prevented them from carrying away, the English, in deep disappointment and depression, com-

had caused to be trained and dressed like a troop of Hindoostanee dancing-girls, were first sacrificed to his awakened fears; but there were many other victims, including native state prisoners. A few Englishmen contrived to effect their escape, and one of them wrote an account of the treatment received.—(See *Captivity of James Scurrey*: London, 1824.)

‡ Nearly 40,000 bullocks perished in this disastrous campaign.—(Mill's *India*, v., 396.)

menced their homeward march. Orders were dispatched to General Abercromby (governor of Bombay), who was advancing from the westward, to return to Malabar; and Lord Cornwallis, having completed these mortifying arrangements, was about six miles *en route* to Bangalore, when a party of horse unexpectedly rode in upon the baggage flank. They were taken for enemies, but proved to be forerunners of the despaired-of Mahratta force, under Ilurri Punt and Purseram Bhow. In answer to the eager interrogatories poured in upon them on all sides, they replied that numerous messengers had been regularly sent, at different times, with accounts of their approach; every one of whom had been cut off by the unsleeping vigilance of the light troops of the enemy. Their tardy arrival was in some measure accounted for by the time spent by them in co-operation with a detachment from Bombay under Captain Little, in the siege of Darwar, one of the great barriers of Tippoo's northern frontier. The place held out against the unskilful and dilatory operations of the assailants for twenty-nine weeks, when the arrival of news of the capture of Bangalore induced its surrender, which was followed by the easy conquest of all the possessions of the sultan north of the Toombuddra.

The Mahrattas now declared themselves unable to keep the field, unless the English could give them pecuniary support; and Lord Cornwallis, unable to dispense with their aid, was compelled to advance them a loan of twelve lacs of rupees, to obtain which he took the bold measure of ordering the Madras authorities to coin the bullion sent out for the China trade into rupees, and forward it without delay. The ample supplies of draught cattle and provisions, together with the innumerable miscellaneous contents of the bazaar of a Mahratta army,* afforded a most welcome relief to men half-famished and wretchedly equipped. Still the advanced season, and the return of General Abercromby, compelled the continuance of the

* The Mahrattas commenced by asking exorbitant prices for their goods; but when compelled by the diminished purses of the purchasers to reduce their demands or stop the sale, they took the former alternative; but still continued to realise immense profits, since their whole stock-in-trade had been accumulated by plunder. Their bazaar is described by Col. Wilks as comprising every imaginable article, from a web of English broadcloth to a Birmingham penknife; from the shawls of Cashmere to the secondhand garment of a Hindoo; from diamonds of the first water to the silver earring of a poor

retreat to Bangalore; which was followed up by the occupation of Oossoor, Rayacottah, and other forts, whereby communication between the presidency and the Carnatic, through the Policade Pass, was laid open. By this route a convoy reached the camp from Madras, comprising 100 elephants laden with treasure, marching two abreast; 6,000 bullocks with rice; 100 carts with arrack; and several hundred coolies with other supplies.

The war was viewed by the British parliament as the inevitable consequence of the cruelty and aggression of Tippoo. The energetic measures of Lord Cornwallis were warmly applauded, and reinforcements of troops, with specie to the amount of £500,000, sent to assist his operations. Comprehensive arrangements were made for provisioning the troops, by taking advantage of the extensive resources and experience of the *Brinjarries*,† or travelling corn-merchants, who form a distinct caste, and enjoy, even among the least civilised native states, an immunity for life and property, based on the great services rendered by these neutral traders to all parties indiscriminately, from a very remote period. Measures were likewise adopted for the introduction of a more efficient system of intelligence. The general campaign which opened under these auspicious circumstances, was attended with complete success. The intermediate operations were marked by the capture of the hill-forts of Nundydroog, Savendroog, and Ootradroog. All three were situated on lofty granite rocks, and deemed well-nigh inaccessible—especially Savendroog (*the rock of death*); and so implicit was the confidence placed by Tippoo in the strength of its natural and artificial defences, that he received with joy the tidings of the assault, making sure that the malaria for which the neighbouring jungle had acquired a fearful celebrity, would fight against the English, and slay one-half, leaving the other to fall by the sword. But the very character of the place diminished the watchfulness of its garrison, and tempted them to witness with plundered village maiden; from oxen, sheep, and poultry, to the dried salt-fish of the Concan. The tables of the moneychangers, overspread with the coins of every country of the east, were not wanting in this motley assemblage; and among the various trades carried on with remarkable activity, was that of a tanner, so that the English officers were enabled to obtain, by means of ambulatory tan-pits, what their own Indian capitals could not then produce, except as European imports—excellent sword-belts.—(*Mysoor*, iii., 158-9.)

† A Persian compound, designating their office.

contemptuous indifference the early approaches of the besiegers, who, after a series of Herculean labours (in which the utmost exertions of human strength and skill, were aided in an extraordinary manner by the force and sagacity of some admirably-trained elephants), at length succeeded in effecting a practicable breach in what formed the lower wall of the rock, although it rose 1,500 feet from a base of above eight miles in circumference. Lord Cornwallis and General Medows stood watching with intense anxiety the progress of the assault, which commenced an hour before noon on the 21st December, 1791. The band of the 52nd regiment played "Britons, strike home;" and the troops mounted with a steady gallantry which completely unnerved the native forces assembled to defend the breach. A hand-to-hand encounter with men who had already overcome such tremendous obstacles, was sufficient to alarm the servants of a more popular master than Tippoo, and they fled in disorder, tumbling over one another in their eager ascent of the steep and narrow path which led to the citadel. The pursuers followed with all speed; but the majority of the fugitives had effected their entrance, when a sercant of the 71st regiment shot, at a distance, the soldier who was closing the first gate. All the other barriers the English passed together with the enemy, of whom about 100 were slain, while many others perished among the precipitous rocks, in endeavouring to escape. This important enterprise, which the commander-in-chief had contemplated as the most doubtful operation of the war, was effected in twelve days from the first arrival of the troops. The casualties were not numerous, and the actual assault only lasted an hour, and involved the loss of no single life on the side of the besiegers. It was well-timed; for even so much as half-an-hour's delay would have sufficed to bring to the scene of action the Mysorean detachment, then fast approaching to aid their comrades.

The counter-hostilities of Tippoo were

* In detaining the garrison close prisoners, notwithstanding a proviso for their liberation. Bad faith was the notorious characteristic of Tippoo, who, says Col. Wilks, could not be made to appreciate the value of truth even as a convenience. Among his letters, translated by Col. Kirkpatrick, is one in which he desires the commander of an attack on a Mahratta fortress to promise anything until he got possession, and then to put every living thing—man, woman, child, dog, and cat—to the sword, except the chief, who was to be reserved for torture.

feebly conducted; but the irrepressible tendency of the Mahrattas for freebooting on their own account, led them again to derange the plans of Lord Cornwallis, by neglecting to support General Abercromby, and their misconduct facilitated the conquest of the fort of Coimbatore by the Mysoreans. The flagrant violation of the terms of surrender* (a besetting sin on the part of Tippoo), afforded a reason for rejecting his overtures for peace; and on the 1st of February, 1792, Lord Cornwallis, in conjunction with the Hyderabad and Poona armies, advanced to the attack of Seringapatam, under the walls of which the sultan, with his whole force, lay encamped. Aware of his inability to compete in the field with the formidable confederacy by which he was opposed, Tippoo hoped to be able to hold out against their combined efforts in his island-capital,† by keeping them at bay until the want of supplies, in an already exhausted country—or, in any case, the recurrence of the monsoon—should compel their retreat. The dilatory and unskilful tactics of the native troops would probably have contributed to realise these anticipations; but the English commander-in-chief correctly appreciated the danger of delay, and chose to incur the charge of rashness by attempting to surprise the tiger in his den, rather than waste strength and resources in the dispiriting operations of a tedious and precarious blockade. It was deemed inadvisable to await the arrival of expected reinforcements from Bombay, or even to divulge the plan of attack to the allies, who, on the night of the 6th, were astounded by the news that a handful of infantry, unsupported by cannon or cavalry, were on the march to attack the dense host of Tippoo, in a fortified camp under the walls of his capital; and that Lord Cornwallis, in person, commanded the division destined to penetrate the centre of the hostile force; having gone to fight, as they expressed it,‡ like a private soldier. The sultan had just finished his evening's repast when the alarm was given.§ He mounted, and beheld

† Seringapatam is situated on an island formed by two branches of the Cauvery, which after separating to a distance of a mile and a-half, again unites about five miles below the point of division. A "bound hedge" of bamboo and other strong shrubs surrounded the capital, and Tippoo's encampment occupied an enclosure between this hedge and the river.

‡ There were two other columns, commanded by General Medows and Colonel Maxwell.

§ The Indians usually attack at midnight or day-break.

by the light of the moon an extended column passing rapidly through his camp, driving before them a cloud of fugitives, and making directly for the main ford of the stream which lay between them and the capital. This movement threatened to cut off the retreat of Tippoo, who perceiving his danger, hastened across the ford in time to elude the grasp of his pursuers and take up a position on a commanding summit of the fort, from whence he continued to issue orders till the morning. His troops had already deserted by thousands. One band, 10,000 strong (the *Ahmedy Chelabs*, composed of the wretched Coorgs), wholly disappeared and escaped to their native woods, accompanied by their wives and children; and many of the *Assud Oollahes* (a similar description of corps) followed their example. A number of Europeans, forcibly detained in the service of Tippoo Sultan, likewise fled to the protection of the English, including an old Frenchman, named Blévette, who had chiefly constructed the six redoubts which offered the most formidable obstacles to the assailants. Two of these were captured and retained by English detachments, at the cost of much hard fighting. The night of the 7th afforded an interval of rest to both parties, and time to ascertain the extent of their respective losses. That of the British was stated at 535 men, including killed, wounded, and missing; that of the enemy at 23,000, of whom 4,000 had fallen in the actual contest. On the following morning operations were commenced against the strong triangular-shaped, water-washed fort, in which the sultan had taken refuge. His gorgeously furnished garden-palace was turned into an hospital for the wounded English, and the magnificent cypress groves, and other valuable trees, cut down to afford materials for the siege. General Abercromby arrived in safety with the Bombay army, having perfected a line of communication with the Malabar coast; the Brinjarries maintained such abundance in the camp of Cornwallis as had not been known since the commencement of the war; and the soldiers, stimulated by the hope of speedily liberating, with their own hands, the survivors of their murdered countrymen, worked with unflagging energy at the breaching batteries. Tippoo, seriously alarmed, made overtures for peace, and after much delay, occasioned by his treacherous and unstable policy, and his unceasing efforts to gain time, was at length compelled to sign a

preliminary treaty, the terms of which involved the cession of half his territories to the allies, and the payment of about three million and a-half sterling. Two of his sons, boys of eight and ten years of age, were delivered up to Lord Cornwallis, as hostages for the confirmation and fulfilment of the agreement; but despite this guarantee, Tippoo showed evident signs of an inclination to renew hostilities, on finding that the English insisted on his relinquishment of Coorg, the rajah of which principality he had hoped to seize and exhibit as a terrible instance of vengeance. Lord Cornwallis, who appears to have acted throughout the war with equal energy and moderation, endeavoured to conciliate him by the surrender of Bangalore—a fortress and district which, in a military point of view, far surpassed Coorg in value; but on the latter point he took decided ground, justly deeming it a clear duty to reward the good service rendered by the rajah, by preserving him from the clutches of his relentless foe. Preparations for a renewed siege at length brought matters to an issue. The previous arrangements were formally confirmed by Tippoo on the 19th of March, and the treaty delivered to Lord Cornwallis and the allies by the royal hostages.

The total territorial revenue of the sultan, according to the admitted schedule, averaged from about two-and-a-half to three million sterling, one-half of which was now made over to the allies, to be divided by them in equal portions, according to the original terms of the confederation. By the addition now made to their possessions, the boundary of the Mahrattas was again extended to the river Toombuddra. The allotment of the Nizam reached from the Kistna beyond the Pennar, and included the forts of Gunjecotah and Cuddapah, and the province of Kurpa. The British obtained Malabar and Coorg, the province of Dindigul (a valuable accession to their southern territory), together with Baramahl and the Lower Ghauts, which formed an iron boundary for Coromandel. The Anglo-Indian army were ill-pleased with this termination of the war. They had set their hearts on nothing less than the storming of Seringapatam; and when, in consequence of Tippoo's overtures for peace, orders were given to desist from further operations, they became, says an officer who was present, "dejected to a degree not to be described, and could with difficulty be restrained from

continuing their work." Their dissatisfaction was increased by the miserable artifice of Tippoo, who, desirous of assuming before his own troops a defiant attitude, although really a suitor for peace, gave secret orders to fire on the English soldiery, both with cannon and musketry. Under such circumstances, it needed all the weight of the public and private character of Lord Cornwallis, to enforce the admirable precept with which the general orders to the victorious troops concluded,—“that moderation in success is no less expected from brave men than gallantry in action.” In acknowledgment of their excellent conduct, a donation, equal to twelve months’ batta, was awarded them, out of the money exacted from the sultan. The disinterestedness of the commander-in-chief and of General Medows was displayed in their refusal to accept any portion of this sum, or of the prize-money. Their cordial co-operation and perfect confidence in each other’s zeal and integrity, had been conspicuous throughout the war, forming a pleasing contrast to the divided counsels and personal quarrels which had, of late years, diminished the efficiency of the military and civil services of the officers of the company. This unanimity enabled Lord Cornwallis to take full advantage of the influence he possessed over the Nizam and the Mahrattas. Their mutual distrust, combined with the respect inspired by the English commander-in-chief, led them to entrust to him the sole control of the late operations. These were no sooner terminated by the treaty of Seringapatam, than occasions of quarrel reappeared among the allies. The Nizam, by far the weakest of the three powers, petitioned to be allowed to retain the services of a British detachment. His request was granted, greatly to the annoyance of the Mahrattas, whose discontent at finding him thus favoured, was aggravated by the refusal of Lord Cornwallis to suffer a similar stipendiary force to be permanently annexed to the army of the peishwa, or rather of his ambitious guardian, Nana Furnavees. In this case the concession

must have provoked immediate hostilities with Mahadajee Sindia, since it was to oppose his large and formidable corps of regular artillery (under De Boigne* and other European officers), that the services of an English detachment were especially desired. Such a procedure would have been inconsistent with the pacific policy by which it was both the duty and inclination of Lord Cornwallis to abide; and Sindia was therefore suffered to retain, without interference on the part of the only enemy he feared, the dominant position which the time-serving policy of Hastings had first helped him to assume, as vicegerent of the Mogul empire. His power, before reaching its present height, had received a severe check, from the efforts of other ambitious chiefs to obtain possession of the person, and wield authority in the name, of the hapless Shah Alum,† who, from the time of the death of his brave general, Nujeef Khan, in 1782, had been tossed about, like a child’s toy, from one usurper to another—a tool during their prosperity, a scape-goat in adversity. Sindia became paramount in 1785; but having engaged in war with Pertab Sing of Jeypoor, advantage was taken of his absence by Gholam Kadir Khan, the son of Zabita Khan, the Rohilla, to gain possession of Delhi in 1788. This he accomplished through the treachery of the *nazir* or chief eunuch, to whom the management of the imperial establishment was entrusted. The inmates of the palace were treated by the usurper with a degree of malicious barbarity which it is hardly possible to conceive any human being evincing towards his unoffending fellow-creatures, unless actually possessed by an evil spirit. After cruelties of all descriptions had been practised to extort from the members and retainers of the imperial family every article of value which still remained in their possession, Gholam Kadir continued to withhold from them even the necessities of life, so that several ladies perished of hunger; and others, maddened by suffering, committed suicide. The royal children‡ were compelled to

* De Boigne was a Savoyard by birth, and had been an ensign in the service of the E. I. Cy.

† Among the few who faithfully adhered to the cause of Shah Alum, was the widow of the notorious Sumroo, who had entered the imperial service, or rather that of Nujeef Khan, after quitting Oude, and married the daughter of an impoverished Mogul noble. The “Begum Sumroo” received Christian baptism, at the request of her husband. After his death, in 1778, she was suffered to retain the jaghire

granted to him for the support of five battalions of disciplined sepoyes and about 200 Europeans, chiefly artillerymen, whose movements she directed from her palanquin, even on the actual field of battle. An imprudent marriage with a German, named Vaissaux, for a time endangered her influence; but after his seizure by the mutinous troops, and death by his own hand, she regained her authority.

‡ The Shahzada, Prince Jewan Bukht, had taken refuge at Benares. Lord Cornwallis granted him a

perform the most humiliating offices; and when Shah Alum indignantly remonstrated against the atrocities he was compelled to witness, the Rohilla sprang upon him with the fury of a wild beast, flung the venerable monarch to the ground, knelt on his breast, and, with his dagger, pierced his eye-balls through and through. The return of Sindia terminated these horrible scenes. Gholam Kadir took to flight, but was captured by the Mahratta chief, who cut off his nose, ears, hands, and feet, and sent him in an iron cage to Shah Alum—a fearful example of retributive barbarity. He perished on the road, and his accomplice, the treacherous nazir, was trodden to death by an elephant. The condition of the imperial family, though ameliorated, remained barely tolerable during the supremacy of Sindia; for the stated allowance for the support of the emperor and his thirty children, though liberal in its nominal amount, was so irregularly paid, that the royal household often wanted the necessaries of life.

The arrogance of Mahadajee increased with his power;* and not only the Nizam and the Poona ministry headed by Nana Furnavees, but even the English, began to contemplate an approaching struggle as inevitable; when their apprehensions were unexpectedly removed by his death, of fever, in February, 1794, aged sixty-seven. He left no male issue, but bequeathed his extensive territorial possessions to his great-nephew and adopted son, Dowlut Rao, then a youth of fifteen.

The administration of Lord Cornwallis ended in the preceding year; its concluding feature being the capture, once again, of Pondicherry and all the French settlements in India, in consequence of the national

declaration of war. The charter of the E. I. Cy. was at the same time (1793) renewed for a term of twenty years.† Arrangements were made for the relief of the financial difficulties of Mohammed Ali. The management of the revenues of the Carnatic, which had been temporarily assumed by Lord Cornwallis during the war, was partially restored to the nabob at its conclusion, and the payments to his creditors reduced from the twelve lacs of pagodas (conceded to them most improperly by the Board of Control in 1785), to somewhat more than six lacs. Attempts were likewise made, but with little success, to induce the profligate Asuf-ad-Dowlah to adopt reformatory measures, to stay the ruin which seemed about to overwhelm the fair province, or rather kingdom, of Oude.

ADMINISTRATION OF SIR JOHN SHORE.—This gentleman (afterwards Lord Teignmouth) had been many years in the service of the company, and was selected for the high post of governor-general,‡ expressly on account of the ability and perseverance which he had brought to bear on the intricate and little understood question of Indian revenue. His pacific disposition was likewise viewed as affording a guarantee for the fulfilment of the strict injunctions of the British parliament—to shun every description of aggressive warfare on behalf of the company, whether in the character of a principal or an ally. Upon the death of Mahadajee Sindia, preparations for hostilities against the Nizam were carried on by his young successor, Dowlut Rao Sindia, with the co-operation of the Poona authorities and all the leading Mahratta chieftains.§ The attempts of Sir John Shore at friendly mediation were treated with insulting indifference by the Mahrattas, so soon as they

yearly stipend of four lacs (promised, but not paid, by the vizier of Oude), which, after the death of the prince, was continued to his family by the E. I. Cy.

* What a blow would have been inflicted on the pride and bigotry of Aurungzebe, could it have been foretold that one of his dynasty would be compelled, by a Mahratta, to sign a decree forbidding the slaughter of kine throughout the Mogul dominions. Yet this was enforced by Sindia on Shah Alum.

† In the year ending April, 1793, the receipts of the company in India amounted to £8,225,628; the total expenses to £7,007,050: leaving a surplus of £1,218,578 clear gain. In the outgoings, were included the interest of Indian debts (the principal of which amounted to £7,971,665), and money supplied to Bencoolen and other distant settlements; making a drawback of £702,443. The debts in England, exclusive of the capital stock, were £10,983,518. The capital stock had been increased

in 1789, from four to five million, on which sum a dividend of ten-and-a-half per cent. was now paid.

‡ General Medows had been offered the position on the expected resignation of Lord Cornwallis; but he declined it, declaring his intention of staying in India just long enough "to lead the storming party at Seringapatam, or until the war is over," and no longer. He adds, that he had saved £40,000 out of the liberal appointments of the company, and should feel amply compensated if they pronounced "the labourer worthy of his hire."—(Auber's *India*, ii., 121.)

§ Tookajee Holcar and the rajah of Berar, with the representative of the Puar and other influential families, took the field; while the Guicowars from Guzerat, and others, sent detachments to join the general assembly of Mahrattas, gathered together for the last time under the nominal authority of the peishwa, Madhoo Rao II., who was himself completely controlled by Nana Furnavees.—(Duff, iii., 111.)

perceived his determination of preserving a strict neutrality. The Nizam advanced to Beder, where the enemy hastened to give him battle. After an indecisive action, he retreated by night to Kurdla, a small fort surrounded by hills. He was besieged, closely blockaded, and compelled to purchase peace by the most ignominious concessions, which, if carried out, would have completely crippled his resources, and left him at the mercy of his old foe, Nana Furnavees. But at this crisis the "Mah-ratta Machiavelli" overreached himself. The severity and excess of his precautionary measures wrought upon the high spirit of the young peishwa (then one-and-twenty years of age) with unexpected violence, and, in a moment of deep depression, caused by the indignity to which he was subjected, he flung himself from a terrace of the palace, and expired in the course of two days, after expressing a strong desire that his cousin, Bajec Rao, should succeed to the authority of which he had been defrauded.* This arrangement would have been generally popular; for Bajec Rao, then about twenty years of age, bore a high character for skill in manly and military exercises, and was besides deeply read in ancient Brahminical lore, and a studious follower of the intricate observances of caste. Beneath this fair surface lay, as Nana Furnavees truly declared, the weakness of his father Ragoba, and the wickedness of his mother Anundee Bye, as yet undeveloped.

The talents of Bajec Rao, even had they been likely to be used for good instead of for evil, would probably have been equally opposed to the views of the minister, who wanted a mere puppet to occupy the musnud on public occasions, and then return to his gilded prison. With this intent he caused the widow of the late Madhoo Rao II. (herself a mere child) to adopt an infant, whom he proclaimed peishwa. Sindia espoused the cause of Bajec Rao, and the dissensions which followed enabled Nizam Ali to procure a release from three-fourths of the cessions and payments stipulated for by the treaty of Kurdla.

The remaining events during the administration of Sir John Shore may be briefly

* Bajec Rao had endeavoured to open a secret intercourse with Madhoo Rao, which being discovered by Nana Furnavees, drew severe reproaches and more strict surveillance on both cousins.—(Duff.)

† In this year the Calcutta bench, and orientalists in general, sustained a heavy loss in the death of the upright judge and distinguished scholar, Sir William

noted. Fyzoolla Khan, the Rohilla ruler of Rampore and its dependent districts, died in 1794.† His eldest son, Mohammed Ali, succeeded to the government, but was seized and murdered by his younger brother, Gholam Mohammed Khan, who was in turn deposed by the conjoined troops of the English and the vizier. A jaghire of ten lacs of revenue was conferred on Ahmed Ali, the youthful son of the murdered ruler; provision was made for the maintenance of Gholam Mohammed, who came to reside at Benares, under the protection of the British government; and the treasures and remaining territory of the late Fyzoolla Khan, were delivered up to the wasteful and profligate Asuf-ad-Dowlah.

Mohammed Ali, of Arcot, died in 1795, aged seventy-eight, and was succeeded by his eldest son, Omdut-al-Omrah. In the same year the English effected the complete reduction of the Dutch settlements in Ceylon, Malacca, Banda, Amboyna, Cochin, and the Cape of Good Hope.‡ Asuf-ad-Dowlah died in 1797. A dispute concerning the succession arose between his brother Sadut Ali, and his alleged son Vizier Ali, a youth of seventeen, said to be of spurious descent.§ Sir John Shore eventually decided in favour of the former, with whom he entered into a new treaty, by which the fort of Allahabad was made over to the English, the annual subsidy increased to seventy-six lacs of rupees, twelve lacs guaranteed by the vizier as compensation money for the expenses incurred in the recent interference, and an annual pension of a lac and a-half of rupees settled on Vizier Ali, beside other arrangements regarding the support of the company's troops, deemed necessary for the defence of Oude.

In the beginning of 1798, the governor-general, who had been raised to the peerage with the title of Lord Teignmouth, resigned his position on account of ill-health, and returned to England. Despite his high character as a financier, the pecuniary results of his four years' sway were disastrous, and the scourge of war was but temporarily delayed. Tippoo evidently waited an opportunity to renew hostilities; and the expensive preparations made to invade Mysoor, in

Jones, aged forty-eight. He was the first president of the Asiatic Society of Bengal, Warren Hastings the patron, and Charles Wilkins a member.

‡ These conquests were mainly effected through the zeal of Lord Hobart, governor of Madras.

§ On inquiry, it appeared that the alleged children of Asuf-ad-Dowlah were all supposititious.

the event of his taking part with the Dutch, together with the requirements of the presidencies of Madras and Bombay, obliged the supreme government, in 1796, to open the treasury for a loan bearing twelve per cent. interest. In the following year, increasing involvements compelled a considerable reduction in the investments—a step never taken, it will be recollected, except under the stern pressure of necessity.

ADMINISTRATION OF LORD MORNINGTON (MARQUIS WELLESLEY).—An impending war with Mysoor, intricate political relations based on the temporary interest of other native powers, an exhausted treasury, and an increasing debt,—such were the difficulties that awaited the successor of Lord Teignmouth. After some delay, the choice—happily for England and for India—fell upon a nobleman no less distinguished for decision of purpose than for deliberation and forethought in counsel, gifted with a mind alike capable of grasping the grandest plans, and of entering into the minute details so important to good government. Lord Mornington was but seven-and-thirty when he was selected for the arduous office of exercising almost irresponsible authority over British India; but he had been early called to play an important part in public life, and had, from circumstances, been led to regard Indian affairs with peculiar interest, even before his appointment as one of the six commissioners of the Board of Control,

* The Earl of Mornington (afterwards Marquis Wellesley) was descended from an ancient family, whose founders went over to Ireland with Strongbow, and held (on the tenure of bearing the royal standard "*quando opus fuerit*") the castle and manor of Dangan, in the county Meath, where the future governor-general of India was born in 1760. The name of his father fills an honoured place in the musical annals of England, as the composer of some of the finest chants and glees in the language: his mother, the Countess of Mornington, was highly gifted both in person and in intellect, and especially remarkable for force of character, which she retained unimpaired even to advanced age, and transmitted to at least three of her sons—the subject of this notice, "the Iron Duke," and Baron Cowley. The death of Lord Mornington, in 1781, arrested the college studies of his young successor, and called him when scarcely of age, to relinquish the classic pursuits by which he might else have become too exclusively engrossed, for the severer duties of public life. Close intimacy with the Cornwallis family, doubtless contributed to direct his attention to Indian affairs; and the influence of the Eton holidays regularly passed with Archbishop Cornwallis at Lambeth Palace, from 1771 to 1779, had probably its effect in producing, or at least strengthening the love of justice and high sense of honour for which the young lord became distinguished, as well as in im-

in 1793.* In this position he continued for the ensuing five years, attending sedulously to its duties, and availing himself to the utmost of the opportunities it afforded of becoming intimately acquainted with the condition of the E. I. Cy., the mode of government adopted in the three presidencies, and the position and history of neighbouring powers. The subject was, to the highest degree, attractive to a statesman who considered that "the majesty of Great Britain was her trade, and the throne of the commerce of the world the fittest object of her ambition." The able and indefatigable, but prejudiced historian of India, was probably but imperfectly acquainted with the character and antecedents of Lord Mornington, when he remarked that he came out as a war-governor: still less ground existed for the assertion, that his lordship had "possessed but little time for acquainting himself with the complicated affairs of India, when all his attention was attracted to a particular point."† The remarkable letter, addressed to Lord Melville from the Cape of Good Hope, in 1798,‡ abundantly attests the extraordinary amount of information already accumulated by the writer, as well as the profound and far-sighted views which he had been enabled to form therefrom. The mental qualifications of Lord Mornington were rendered generally attractive by the dignified and courteous bearing, and the sweet, yet powerful utterance

planting the deep and clear views of religion which formed the solace of his honoured age. His first care was the voluntary liquidation of his father's debts; the next, a most liberal provision for the education of his brothers and sisters, especially for that of Arthur, whose capacities he early appreciated. A brilliant career in the Irish House of Parliament, was speedily followed and surpassed by his success as an orator in the British House of Commons, where, strangely enough, his first speech was in reprobation of the conduct of Lord North in making Warren Hastings governor-general of India, after his unprincipled conduct regarding the Rohillas. The opinions delivered by him on the questions of war with the French republic, the disputes regarding the regency, the abolition of the Irish parliament, and Catholic emancipation, have their page in history; but none occupy a higher place in the memory of those who cherish the name of the Marquis Wellesley, than his unwavering and indignant denunciation of the slave-trade, which he declared to be an "abominable, infamous, and bloody traffic," the continuance of which it was a disgrace to Great Britain to sanction, even for an hour. (*Vide Debate on motion of Mr. Dundas for gradual abolition, April, 1792.*)

† Mill's *India*; edited by Prof. Wilson, vi., 73.

‡ *Despatches, Minutes, and Correspondence of the Marquis Wellesley*; edited by R. Montgomery Martin, i., 1—15. Murray: London, 1836.

which enhanced the effect of his rare eloquence. His small but perfectly symmetrical figure, formed a worthy model for the chisels of Bacon and Chantry; while the easel of Lawrence rendered the delicate but clearly defined outline of the nose and mouth, the soft, gazelle-like* eyes and dark arched brows, in contrast with the silver locks which clustered round his lofty forehead—scarcely less publicly known, in his own time, than the remarkable profile and eagle-eye of his younger brother are at present.

On his arrival in Madras, in April, 1798, Lord Mornington was accompanied by his younger brother Henry, afterwards Lord Cowley, in the capacity of private secretary. The future duke, then Lt.-Col. Wellesley, with his regiment (the 33rd), had been already some months in India. After a brief stay at Madras (of which presidency Lord Clive, the son of the hero of Arcot, was appointed governor), Lord Mornington proceeded to Calcutta, and commenced a series of civil reforms; but his attention was speedily arrested by the intrigues of Tippoo and some French adventurers, who, though in themselves of small importance, might, he well knew, at any moment give place to, or acquire the rank of powerfully supported representatives of their nation. In fact, schemes to that effect were in process of development; though the success of the British by sea and land, the victories of Nelson on the Nile, and that of Acre by Sir Sidney Smith, in conjunction with Lord Mornington's own measures, eventually prevented Buonaparte from putting into execution his cherished plan of wresting from England her growing Indian empire. The republican general and his great adversaries, the brothers Wellesley, had a long series of diplomatic hostilities to wage in distant hemispheres, before the last fierce struggle which convulsed the European continent with the death-throes of the usurped authority of the citizen emperor! Their battle-fields and council-chambers, as yet, lay wide apart; but the letters of Buonaparte to Tippoo Sultan and to Zemaun Shah, the successor of the fierce Doorani conqueror of Paniput, who had threatened to renew the incursions of his grandsire in Hindoostan, served to convey an impression to the

native princes that a European power did exist, eagerly waiting its opportunity to fight the English with their own weapons. So strongly impressed was Tippoo with this conviction, that he sent ambassadors to the French governor of the Mauritius (M. Malarctic), with proposals for an offensive and defensive alliance against their mutual rival, offering to bear the whole expenses of the French auxiliary force to be sent to his assistance, and to furnish them with every accustomed allowance except wine and spirits, with which he declared himself entirely unprovided. The truth was, that Tippoo, in laudable conformity with the ordinance of his standard of action, the Koran, forbade his subjects to use any description of intoxicating plants or beverages; and, as far as possible, caused the white poppy and the hemp-plant to be destroyed even in private gardens. Those only who, like Colonel Tod and other travelled historians, have had the opportunity of searching out for themselves authentic records illustrative of the condition of the people of India at different epochs, can fully appreciate the political importance of this measure, and its probable effect in tending to stay the moral and physical degradation which the abuse of all intoxicating compounds never fails to produce, especially of that valuable medicine, but when misused, detestable drug, opium.

The offer of the sultan was warmly welcomed by the French governor, and a small detachment† of volunteers sent to Malabar, and received as an earnest of further assistance. Lord Mornington addressed repeated remonstrances to Tippoo respecting this notorious breach of faith; and received, in return, the same empty professions of good-will which had been previously made to Lord Cornwallis. There was but one course to be taken with a man who met all arguments regarding the hostile operations in which he was engaged by positive denial or wilful silence; and the governor-general, despite the exhausted treasury and financial involvements which even a peace-governor had been unable to avoid, now found himself compelled to prepare for the renewal of war. He proceeded to Madras, where, by infusing his own spirit into this heretofore venal and incapable presidency, he procured

* This expression may savour of exaggeration or affection to persons unacquainted with Lord Wellesley. Those who have watched him while speaking on subjects which touched his feelings, will, on the contrary, consider the comparison a poor compliment

to eyes gifted with the power of reflecting every varying phase of thought and feeling, but ever tender and gazelle-like in repose.

† About 150; composed of convicted criminals and the refuse of the rabble of the island.—(*Despatches.*)

the adoption of measures for the complete equipment of the armies on the coasts of Coromandel and Malabar. The conduct of Nizam Ali, the subahdar of the Deccan, afforded much ground for uneasiness. The refusal of Sir John Shore to suffer the English subsidiary detachment to fight against the Mahrattas, had induced him to raise a large corps, trained and officered by French adventurers, under the immediate superintendence of a M. Raymond, who was justly suspected of being in communication with Tippoo. Lord Mornington felt that the course of events might render this body a nucleus for all powers and persons jealous or envious of British supremacy. He therefore hastened to make overtures for a closer alliance with the Nizam; and on the 1st of September, a new treaty was concluded, by which the subsidiary detachment in his service was increased from two to six battalions, and the E. I. Cy. became pledged for his protection against any unjust demands on the part of the Mahrattas. The Nizam consented to the immediate disbandment of Raymond's corps, and the surrender of their officers as prisoners of war; but as he manifested some hesitation regarding the fulfilment of these stipulations, the French cantonments were unexpectedly surrounded by the whole English force, in conjunction with a body of the Hyderabad cavalry. The men, already disaffected,* upon a promise of continued employment and the payment of arrears, laid down their weapons; the officers were quietly arrested, and, in a few hours, 14,000 men, possessing a train of artillery and a well-supplied arsenal, were completely disarmed and disorganised. The private property and arrears due to the officers were carefully secured to them by the governor-general, and arrangements made for their honourable treatment and speedy transport to their own country.

The primary importance of neutralising the danger of French influence at the court of the Nizam, did not blind Lord Mornington to the advisability of avoiding hostilities with the Mahrattas. The supremacy of

Nana Furnavees and his baby peishwa, had given place to that of Sindia and Bajee Rao, with whom Nana had become partially reconciled; and through his influence, a pledge of co-operation, in the event of a war with Mysoor, was given by them, but apparently with the most treacherous intent.

These precautionary measures concluded, Lord Mornington felt himself in a position to bring matters to an issue. The "violent and faithless"† character of the sultan, rendered it necessary to take summary steps for the reduction of his power and arrogance, which had again become alarming. The abandonment of his French connexions was at first all that was desired; but the expense of military preparations having been incurred—the cession of the maritime province of Canara, with other territory and a large sum of money, the establishment of accredited residents on the part of the E. I. Cy. and their allies at his capital, and the expulsion of all Frenchmen from his service and dominions, were now demanded. Tippoo resorted to his old plan of evasion, hoping to procrastinate until the season for attacking Seringapatam should be past; and when hard driven, wrote a tardy consent to receive an English envoy to negotiate terms of more intimate alliance with that nation, while, at the same time, in his capacity of citizen and wearer of the red cap of liberty, he dispatched an embassy to the French Directory, soliciting speedy assistance "to attack and annihilate for ever our common enemies."‡

As on a previous occasion, his duplicity was met by a declaration of war; and on the 5th of March, the British force, under General (afterwards Lord) Harris, and that of the Nizam under his son Meer Alum, entered the Mysoor territory, with the intent of marching directly upon the capital. Lord Mornington truly declared, "that an army more completely appointed, more amply and liberally supplied in every department, or more perfect in its discipline and in the acknowledged experience, ability, and zeal of its officers, never took the field in India."§ The very abundance of the equipments of the invaders formed, in some sort, an im-

* M. Raymond, a man of considerable talent, died a few months before these events, and a struggle for ascendancy had induced disunion among the troops, who, it may be added, were avowed red republicans.

† Words of Lord Cornwallis.

‡ *Wellesley Despatches*, v., 15.

§ The army assembled at Vellore exceeded 20,000 men, including 2,635 cavalry, and 4,381 Europeans; to which was added the 6,500 men serving with the

Nizam, and a large body of Hyderabad cavalry. The army of the western coast, assembled at Cananor, under General Stuart, amounted to 6,420 men, of whom, 1,617 were Europeans; while a third corps, under Colonels Read and Brown, from the southern districts of the Carnatic, at once threatened the enemy in flank, and secured abundance of provisions to the main-body of the invaders. A British fleet, under Admiral Rainier, lay off the coast.

pediment to their speedy progress; and this circumstance, together with the cumbersome baggage of the Nizam's troops, and the innumerable camp followers, tended to produce so much confusion, that the forces were repeatedly compelled to halt, and destroy a part of the mass of stores with which they were encumbered; until at length, the loss of powder, shot, and other military stores, became sufficiently considerable to excite alarm. Nearly the whole of the draught and carriage bullocks, comprising upwards of 60,000, died in the march to Seringapatam, although it was scarcely retarded a day by the opposition of the enemy. In the meantime, General Stuart, with the force from Bombay, had crossed the western frontier, and been attacked on the 6th of March, by the sultan with a superior force, near Periapatam. After a brisk action, in which the rajah of Coorg effectively seconded the English general by personal bravery and commissariat supplies,* Tippoo, being worsted, drew off his army, and hastened to meet the main body of the enemy under General Harris. This he accomplished near Malavelly, on the Madoor river, but was again defeated with heavy loss. His subsequent attempts to impede or harass the progress of the invaders, were frustrated by their unexpected changes of route; and he learned with dismay, that the battering train, with the last of the army, had actually crossed the Cauvery fifteen miles east of Seringapatam, while he was yet at a distance, keeping guard in an opposite direction,—an indubitable proof how greatly his system of intelligence fell short of that maintained by his father. Deeply disappointed, he summoned his chief officers to his presence. "We have arrived," he said, "at our last stage; what is your determination?" "To die with you," was the unanimous reply; and the assembly separated,

* The rajah of Coorg had collected 6,360,000 lbs. of rice, and 560,000 lbs. of grain, for the use of the troops; and his whole conduct during the present war, warranted praise equal to that awarded him on the previous occasion, of having been "the only ally who had performed all his obligations with fidelity, efficiency, and honour."—(*Mysoor*, iii., 247.) It is no disparagement to the acknowledged merits and peculiarly chivalrous character of the rajah, to add, that he had the deepest wrongs, both as regarded family and national relationship, to avenge upon the usurping dynasty. The reduction of Coorg had been at first effected by Hyder, through treacherous interference, during a contested succession. Of the two families, one was destroyed; the representative of the other (Veer Rajunder) escaped

after a tearful farewell, having resolved to intercept the expected passage of the English across the stream to the island on which Seringapatam is situated, and make death or victory the issue of a single battle. The equipments of the sultan were in order, and his troops well placed to contest the fords; but the advancing foe did not approach them, but took up a position on the south-western side of the fort, on the 5th of April, exactly one month after crossing the Mysoor frontier, having advanced at the rate of not seven miles a-day on hostile ground, and not five from the commencement of the march. The consequence of this unexpected tardiness, and of great loss of stores, was, that despite the extraordinary supplies assembled by the governor-general, it was ascertained, on the 18th of April, that but eighteen days' provision for the fighting men, at half allowance, remained in store.† The siege was of necessity carried on with the utmost diligence. The sultan made overtures for peace, but rejected the terms of the preliminary treaty now proposed—namely, the surrender of his remaining maritime territories, and of half his entire dominions, with the payment of two crore of sicca rupees, and the total renunciation of French auxiliaries. Every hour's delay rendered the position of the allies more critical; and on the 28th, when the sultan renewed his proposals for a conference, he was informed that no ambassadors would be received unless accompanied by four of his sons and four of his generals (including Seyed Ghofar) as hostages, with a crore of rupees, in token of sincerity.

No answer was returned. Tippoo's hereditary aversion to the English had been raised to the highest pitch by the representatives of the French adventurers about his person. Naturally sanguine, he had buoyed himself up with expectations of the arrival of succours direct from France, from Egypt, from the hands of Tippoo, and upon the outbreak of the previous war, hastened to join the English. Notwithstanding the ruthless manner in which the population and resources of his country had been treated, he was able, by his intelligence and activity, to aid materially the operations of the Bombay army. Mill, who is little inclined to bestow praise on Indian princes, speaks of him as possessing a remarkable "enlargement of mind, and displaying a generosity and a heroism worthy of a more civilised state of society."—(v., 453.) Col. Wilks narrates many actions which confirm this testimony. So, also, does Major Dirom's *Narrative*.

† There must have been, also, much disgraceful jobbery, the effects of which were happily neutralised by a public tender of 1,200 bullock-loads of rice.

or from the Mauritius; and when at length the progress of the siege drew from him a sincere attempt at negotiation, his haughty spirit could not brook the humiliating conditions named as the price of peace, and he suffered hostilities to proceed, comforting himself with the idea that Seringapatam was almost invincible; that the failure of supplies would probably even now compel the enemy to withdraw; and that, at the worst, "it was better to die like a soldier, than to live a miserable dependent on the infidels, in the list of their pensioned rajahs and nabobs." Despite the manliness of Tippoo's words, his deeds evinced a strange mixture of indecision and childish credulity. For years he had shown himself the bigoted and relentless persecutor of his Hindoo subjects; and so effectual had been his measures, that only two Brahminical temples remained open throughout his dominions. Yet now, those very Brahmins, whom he had compelled to violate the first rules of their creed, by fleshing their weapons on the bodies of sacred animals, were entreated to put up prayers on his behalf, and the *jebbum** was performed at great cost by the orders of a Mussulman sovereign, to whom all kinds of magical incantation were professedly forbidden, and who simultaneously put up earnest and reiterated prayers in the mosque, requesting thereto the fervent *amen* of his attendants. Then he betook himself to the astrologers, and from them received statements calculated to deepen the depression by which his mind was rapidly becoming unhinged. The evident progress of affairs might well furnish them with a clue to decypher the predictions of the stars, and a set of diagrams were gravely exhibited as warranting the conclusion, that so long as Mars should remain within a particular circle, the fort would hold out: he would touch the limit on the last day of the lunar month, the 4th of May; then it would be advisable to offer the oblations prescribed by law to deprecate an expected calamity. It is possible that the true movers in this singular scene may have been certain faithful servants of Tippoo Sultan, who, as the danger increased, beheld with grief his accustomed energy give place to a sort of despairing fatalism, alternating with bursts of forced gaiety, which were echoed

back by the parasites by whom he had become exclusively surrounded. Seyed Ghofar was one of the most zealous and able of the Mysorean commanders. Although wounded at an early period of the siege, he did not relax his exertions for the defence of the capital, or his efforts to awaken its master to action, despite the despairing exclamation—"He is surrounded by boys and flatterers, who will not even let him see with his own eyes. I do not wish to survive the result. I am going about in search of death, and cannot find it." On the 3rd of May, a practicable breach (100 feet wide) was effected. On the morning of the 4th, the sultan offered the oblation before arranged; and after an attempt to ascertain the aspect of his destiny by the reflection of his own face in a jar of oil, returned to his accustomed station on the fortifications. Seyed Ghofar, seeing the trenches unusually crowded, sent word that the attack was about to commence; but the courtiers persuaded their infatuated lord that the enemy would never dare the attempt by daylight; and he replied, that it was doubtless right to be on the alert, although the assault would certainly not be made except under cover of night.

Excited by such mistaken security, the brave officer hastened towards the sultan. "I will go," said he, "and drag him to the breach, and make him see by what a set of wretches he is surrounded: I will compel him to exert himself at this last moment." The arrival of a party of pioneers, to cut off the approach of the foe by the southern rampart, induced him to delay his intention for the purpose of first giving them their instructions; and, while thus engaged, a cannon-ball struck him lifeless to the ground, and saved him from witnessing the realisation of his worst anticipations.

Tippoo was about commencing his noon-day repast, when he learned with dismay the fate of his brave servant. The meal was scarcely ended before tidings were brought of the actual assault, and he hastened to the breach along the northern rampart.

The leader of the storming party was Major-general Baird, who had, at his own request, been deputed to head the attack on the fortress, within whose walls he had been immured in irons for three years and a-half.† The hope of releasing captives treacherously detained, and of preventing such faithless outrages for the future, would, apart from less commendable feelings, have been suffi-

* See previous p. 357.

† Baird was taken prisoner with the survivors of Col. Baillie's detachment, and not released until 1784.

cient to excite to the utmost a less ardent temperament. Mounting the parapet of the breach, in view of both armies he drew his sword, and, in a voice which thrilled through every heart, called to the columns into which the assaulting force* had been divided, "to follow him and prove themselves worthy the name of British soldiers." A forlorn hope, composed of a sergeant and twelve men, led the van of either column, followed by two subaltern detachments, and were met on the slope of the breach by a small but resolute body of Mysoreans. Nearly the whole of the first combatants perished, but their place was rapidly supplied by the forces led by Baird; and in six minutes after the energetic call to arms, the British colours were planted on the summit of the breach. This important step accomplished, much danger and difficulty remained; for the traverses, especially along the northern rampart, were stronger than had been expected, and the sultan in person animated the exertions of his defenders. After much hard fighting, the British columns overcame all intermediate obstacles, and menaced Tippoo and his supporters both in front and rear.† The confusion then became complete: the Mysoreans fled in various directions; some through a gateway in the rampart opening on the palace, some over the fortifications, and others by a water-gate leading to the river. The sultan, after long fighting on foot, being slightly wounded, was seen to mount his horse, but what he had next done, no one knew. It was conjectured that he had taken refuge within the palace; and the chief persons admitted to his confidence during the last few perilous days, alleged that obscure hints had escaped him of an intention to follow the ancient Indian custom, by putting to death the females of his family, destroying certain private papers, and then sallying forth to perish on the swords of his foes. According to instructions previously framed, Major Allan was deputed to proceed to the palace with a flag of truce, and offer protection to Tippoo and every one in it, on the proviso of immediate and unconditional surrender. The major laid aside his sword, in evidence of his peaceable intentions, and prevailed upon the attendants to conduct him and two brother officers to the presence

of the two eldest sons of Tippoo, from whom he with difficulty obtained warrant for the occupation of the palace, within which many hundred armed men were assembled; while, without the walls, a large body of troops were drawn up, with General Baird at their head. The fierce excitement of a hard-won field had been increased by the horrible and only too well authenticated information of the massacre of about thirteen Europeans taken during the siege;† yet the torrent of execration and invective was hushed in deep silence when the sons of the hated despot passed through the ranks as prisoners, on their way to the British camp. The royal apartments were searched, due care being taken to avoid inflicting any needless injury on the feelings of the ladies of the harem, by removing them to distinct rooms; but still the important question remained unanswered—what had become of the sultan?

At length it was discovered that private intelligence had reached the killedar, or chief officer in command, that Tippoo was lying under the arch of the gateway opening on the inner fort. General Baird proceeded to the spot, and searched a dense mass of dead and dying, but without success, until a Hindoo, styled Rajah Khan, who lay wounded near the palanquin of the sultan, pointed out the spot where his master had fallen. Tippoo had received two musket-balls in the side, when his horse being wounded sank under him. Rajah Khan, after vainly striving to carry him away, urged the necessity of disclosing his rank as the sole chance for his preservation. This Tippoo peremptorily forbade, and continued to lie prostrate from the loss of blood and fatigue, half-buried under a heap of his brave defenders, until an English soldier coming up to the spot, strove to seize the gold buckle of his sword-belt, upon which he partly raised himself, seized a sabre that lay beside him, and aimed a desperate blow at his assailant, who, in return, shot him through the temple.

Thus perished Tippoo Sultan, in the forty-seventh year of his age. The body, when eventually dragged forth, was found to have been rifled of every ornament except an amulet on the right arm, immediately below the shoulder. The head was un-

* Comprising 2,494 Europeans, and 1,882 natives.
† The fact was subsequently ascertained by examining the bodies. The rumour being in itself sufficiently probable, may palliate, but cannot justify,

the threats used by General Baird to the princes and others, who had surrendered on the faith of the assurances of Major Allan, to draw from them the whereabouts of Tippoo.—(Thornton's *India*, iii., 59.)

covered, and, despite the ball which had entered a little above the right ear and lodged in the cheek, and three wounds in the body, the stern dignity of the countenance,* its glowing complexion, the expression of the dark full eyes unclosed and surmounted by small arched eyebrows marred by no distortion, were altogether so life-like, that the effect, heightened by the rich colouring of the waistband and shoulder-belt, almost deceived the bystanders; and Colonel Wellesley and Major Allan bent over the body by the uncertain and flickering glare of torch-light, and felt the pulse and heart, before being convinced that they were indeed looking on a corpse.† The remains were deposited beside those of Hyder Ali, in the superb mausoleum of Lâll Baug, with every ceremonial demanded by Mussulman usage. The minute-gun and other military honours, practised by Europeans, were paid by order of the commander-in-chief, a ceremonial which, however well intended, was misplaced. It would have been better taste to have suffered the bereaved family of the sultan, who had died in defence of his capital, to bury their dead, undisturbed by the presence of his triumphant foes. Terrific peals of thunder and lightning,‡ to an extent remarkable even in that tempestuous district, burst over the island of Seringapatam, and formed a fitting close to the funeral rites of the second and last representative of a brief but blood-stained dynasty. The prediction of Hyder was fulfilled: the empire he had won his son had lost, and with it life itself. The romantic circumstances attendant on the death of Tippoo may tend to throw a false halo over his character; but admiration for his personal bravery, or even better-grounded praise for his excellent

measure in striving to put down the use of intoxicating preparations, which had become a very curse to India, must not be permitted to disguise the fact that, with few exceptions, his career was one of blood and rapine, beside which that of Hyder appears just and compassionate.

Tippoo manifested remarkable industry in his endeavours to establish the reputation of a reformer; but the regulations framed for the government of his dominions, were enforced by penalties of so revolting a character, as alone to prove the lawgiver unfit to exercise authority over his fellow-men; equally so, whether these were prompted by diabolical wickedness, or the aberrations of a diseased intellect. "History," says Colonel Wilks, "exhibits no prior example of a code perverting all possible purposes of punishment as a public example, combining the terrors of death with cold-blooded irony, filthy ridicule, and obscene mutilation—the pranks of a monkey with the abominations of a monster."§ Such a despotism, based on usurpation and fraud, and exercised with unparalleled ferocity, Britain may well rejoice in having been permitted to abolish.

The total military establishment of Tippoo was estimated at about 100,000, including matchlockmen and peons (revenue officers or police); his field army at 47,470 effective troops. The granaries, arsenals, and magazines of all kinds in Seringapatam, were abundantly stored;|| but a very exaggerated idea had, as is commonly the case, been formed of the amount of his treasure in gold and jewels, the total value of which did not reach a million and a-half sterling, and was entirely appropriated by the conquering army. In acknowledgment of the energy and forethought displayed by the

* The sultan was about five feet ten inches in height, had a short neck and square shoulders; his limbs were slender, feet and hands remarkably small, and nose aquiline. His dress consisted of a jacket of fine white linen, loose drawers of flowered chintz, a crimson girdle, with a handsome pouch slung over his shoulder by a belt of red and green silk.

† This expression, says Col. Wilks, was noticed only by those who saw Tippoo for the first time; it wore off the more speedily owing to his excessive garrulity and harsh, inharmonious voice.

‡ Two officers and several privates were killed.

§ *History of Mysore*, iii., 269.

|| On the 4th of May, there were in the fort 13,739 regular troops, and 8,100 outside and in the intrenchments, with 120 Frenchmen, under the command of a *chef de brigade*, M. Chapuis: In the assault, 8,000 Mysoreans were killed, including twenty-four principal officers killed and wounded, beside

numbers of inferior rank. The total loss of the British, during the siege, was twenty-two officers killed and forty-five wounded (twenty-five of these in the storming of the citadel); rank and file—*Europeans*, 181 killed, 622 wounded, twenty-two missing; *natives*, 119 killed, 420 wounded, and 100 missing. In the fort were found 929 pieces of ordnance (373 brass guns, sixty mortars, eleven howitzers, 466 iron guns, and twelve mortars), of which 287 were mounted on the fortifications: there were also 424,400 round shot; 520 lbs. of gunpowder, and 99,000 muskets, carbines, &c. Within the fortress were eleven large powder-magazines; seventy-two expense magazines; eleven armories for making and furnishing small arms; three buildings with machines for boring guns; four large arsenals, and seventeen other store-houses, containing accoutrements, swords, &c.; and many granaries abundantly filled with provisions of every description.—(Beatson's *War with Tippoo*.)

governor-general, in directing the whole resources of British India to one point, and thus, humanly speaking, ensuring success in a single campaign, he was raised a step in the peerage,* and informed that, by the concurrent authority of his majesty's ministers and the Court of Directors, a portion of the spoils of Seringapatam, to the value of £100,000, would be directed to be appropriated for his use, the remainder to be divided among the troops. Lord Wellesley was far from rich, but he unhesitatingly refused this tempting offer, as an encroachment on the claims of the army, and, moreover, as being an injurious precedent, likely to afford the future arbiters of peace and war, in India, pecuniary temptations to a belligerent policy. A star and badge of the order of St. Patrick, composed of some of Tippoo's jewels, was all that he accepted at the time. In 1801, an annuity of £5,000 was settled on him by the company.

Unfortunately, this memorable example of disinterestedness did not prevent some very discreditable proceedings with regard to the distribution of the prize-money; and the commander-in-chief (Harris) and six general officers (Floyd, Baird, Popham, Bridges, Stuart, and Hartley), were considered by the home authorities to have appropriated to themselves a very undue proportion; General Harris, in particular, having received one-eighth instead of one-sixteenth part of the whole. The command of Seringapatam was entrusted by Harris to Colonel Wellesley, much to the displeasure of General Baird, who exclaimed—"Before the sweat was dry on my brow, I was superseded by an inferior officer!" The governor-general showed his conviction of the propriety of the measure, by subsequently investing his brother with the superintendence of the civil government of Mysoor. As, despite his strong family affection, Lord Wellesley is universally acknowledged to have been distinguished for a judicious and impartial selection of particular men for particular positions, perfect reliance may be placed on his own assertion, that, despite the jealousy to which the appointment made

by Harris would give rise among the senior officers, he confirmed, and would himself have originated it if necessary, simply because, from his "knowledge and experience of the discretion, judgment, temper, and integrity" of Colonel Wellesley, he considered him "the most proper for the service."† The generous warmth with which Lord Wellesley cherished the abilities of his younger brothers, was, it may be thought, part of his private rather than public character; but it was closely allied with the active benevolence which formed the main-spring of his whole career. The cadets of the service found themselves, for the first time, the objects of almost parental scrutiny. Talent, zeal, and industry were found to ensure a better welcome at government-house, under an administration celebrated for a singular union of oriental magnificence, patrician refinement, and scholastic lore, than patronage, high birth, or the yet more congenial aristocracy of talent could obtain, unsupported by meritorious service.

The disposition made by Lord Wellesley of the newly-conquered territory, was warmly approved in England, and excited in India a general feeling of surprise at its equity and moderation. The fortress of Vellore, in the Carnatic, was fitted up for the family of Tippoo,‡ and an allowance made for their support, more liberal than that previously assigned by him; his chief officers were all provided for by jaghires or pensions, dispensed with a well-considered munificence, which furnished a striking contrast to the parsimonious dealings of their late master. The affections of the Hindoo population were conciliated§ by an unlooked-for act of generosity. Cham Raj, the pageant-sovereign placed by Hyder on the throne of Mysoor in 1772, died of smallpox in 1796. He had been regularly exhibited in public at the annual feast called the Dussera; but Tippoo chose to dispense with the ceremony of nominating a successor, and caused the son of Cham Raj, a child of two years old, to be removed with his great-grandmother (a woman of above ninety), his grandmother, and other female relatives, from the

* Rather a doubtful advantage in the sight of the receiver, who was wont to allude to the merging of an English earldom into an Irish marquise, as having changed his English ale into Irish buttermilk.

† Baird could not be trusted with such authority.

‡ Tippoo left three legitimate and seventeen illegitimate children; twenty-four died before him.

§ The chiefs of districts submitted cheerfully to the conquerors. The only opposition offered was that of

Dhoondea Waugh, a Mahratta, who after serving under Tippoo, set up for himself as leader of a predatory band, was taken prisoner, and remained in confinement for years in the fortress of Seringapatam. Amid the general confusion of the assault he managed to escape, and soon collected round him a daring band of freebooters; nor was it until after several months' hostilities, that he was at length defeated and slain in a charge of cavalry led by Col. Wellesley.

ancient Hindoo palace to a miserable hovel, where they were found by the English authorities, in 1799, in a state of deep poverty and humiliation. Their sorrow was turned into joy and gratitude on being informed that the conquerors had resolved, not simply to restore them to liberty, but to place the young prince Kistna Raj Oodavcer on the throne* of his fathers, in their ancient capital of Mysoor, with a revenue exceeding that of the former Hindoo kingdom. The English reserved to themselves, by treaty, the right of interposing with paramount authority, in the event of any financial or political questions arising similar to those which had long distracted the Carnatic; but so far from employing their unquestioned supremacy to vest (as had been the case on former occasions) all power and profit in English functionaries, nearly every office, civil and military, was left to be filled by the natives themselves. Poornea, the experienced and trustworthy Hindoo chief minister under the usurping dynasty, was continued in office with the decided approbation of the female guardians of the young rajah. Colonel Wellesley, in all respects, but especially by judicious abstinence from needless interference, justified his selection for military commandant; while the rectitude and abilities as a linguist, of Colonel (afterwards Sir Barry) Close, facilitated his satisfactory fulfilment of the delicate position of political resident. The result was, that the Marquis Wellesley, at the close of his memorable administration, was enabled to declare, that the actual success of the arrangement of Mysoor had realised his most sanguine expectations.

* Literally so, for he was seated on the ancient ivory throne, which Aurungzebe is said to have expressly sanctioned his ancestor in using, and which was found in a lumber-room of the palace after the siege. The throne of Tippoo was taken to pieces, its various parts forming splendid trophies of victory. The ascent to the musnud was by small silver steps on each side, its support a tiger, somewhat above the natural size, in a standing attitude, entirely covered with plates of pure gold, the eyes and teeth being represented by jewels of suitable colours. A gilded pillar supported a canopy fringed with pearls; from the centre was suspended an image of the *Uma*, a bird about the size and shape of a small pigeon, formed of diamonds, rubies, and emeralds inlaid in gold, and valued in India at 1,600 guineas. It was presented to King George III., as a fitting tribute to royalty, being generally regarded in the East as the harbinger of victory and sovereign power to the favoured individual whom it deigned to overshadow. By a singular coincidence, a bird of this "august" species (for such, according to M. d'Herbelot, is the

Of the usurpations of Hyder, besides those restored to the Hindoo dynasty, to the value of thirteen lacs of pagodas† per annum; and after liberal provision for the families of Hyder and Tippoo, and their chief officers, a large overplus remained, the division of which, between the English and the Nizam, formed the basis of a new treaty.‡ The former took possession of the fortress, city, and island of Seringapatam, the districts of Canara, including all the sea-coast of Mysoor, together with Coimbatore and Daramporam, the intervening country between the territories of the E. I. Cy. on the Coromandel coast, and on that of Malabar; of the forts and posts forming the heads of the principal passes above the Ghauts, on the table-land of Mysoor, and the district of Wynaad. To the Nizam were given territories yielding an equal revenue with those appropriated by the English in the districts of Gooty, Goorumcondah, and the tract of country situated along the military line of Chittledroog, Sera, Nundidroog, and Colar, but without the forts, which it was considered would strengthen, to a dangerous extent, the position of a fluctuating and doubtful ally. The course to be adopted with regard to the Mahrattas, was a difficult question. The peishwa had wholly failed in his engagements of co-operation against Tippoo;§ nevertheless, the governor-general deemed it politic to offer him a share in the conquered territory on certain conditions, which he looked upon as necessary preliminaries to the establishment of a solid and satisfactory peace; especially the reception of an English subsidiary force, and an amicable adjustment, according to English arbitration, of the claim of chout meaning of its Persian name) built its nest in a grove of trees, under the shade of which the governor-general dictated his despatches while resident at Madras, for the purpose of more conveniently superintending the conduct of the war. The natives hailed with delight the prosperous omen, and received the tidings of the capture of Seringapatam as confirmation of the victorious augury conveyed by the presence of the *Uma*, which the marquis was subsequently empowered to add to his crest, with the motto, "*Super Indos protulit Imperium*."

† A pagoda was then above eight shillings in value.

‡ The whole of Tippoo's annual revenue was estimated at 30,40,000 pagodas. To the rajah of Mysoor was assigned 13,60,000; to Nizam Ali, 5,30,000; to the E. I. Cy. 5,37,000; for the maintenance of the families of Hyder and Tippoo (in charge of the British government), 2,40,000; and for Kummur-u-Deen, commander of Tippoo's cavalry, and his family (in charge of the Nizam), 7,00,00 pagodas.—(Duff, iii., 177.)

§ Bajee Rao had actually accepted a heavy bribe from Tippoo to break faith with the English.—(Duff.)

long urged against the Nizam. These stipulations were peremptorily rejected; and the reserved districts of Harponnelly, Soonda above the Ghauts, and others, equal in value to between one-half and two-thirds of the previously described portions, were thereupon shared agreeably to the articles of the partition treaty by the company and Sadut Ali.

A fresh contract was entered into between the latter parties in October, 1800, by which the Nizam, who was notoriously incapable of defending himself against the Mahrattas, purchased the services of additional troops from the company and the promise of their aid against every aggressor, by the cession of all acquisitions made from the dominions of Tippoo, either by the late treaty or that of Seringapatam in 1792. The proposition originated with the minister of the Nizam; and the governor-general prudently hastened to close an arrangement which placed the maintenance of the previously subsidised, as well as additional troops, on a more satisfactory footing than the irregular payments of a corrupt government. The countries thus ceded yielded a revenue of about 1,758,000 pagodas. By this arrangement, says Mill, "the English acquired a small territory, with the obligation of defending a large one." This is not correct, inasmuch as the company were previously bound, both by considerations of honour and policy, to protect their ally in time of need; and by the new compact they did but secure themselves against pecuniary loss in so doing. Circumstances again altered their relative positions; or, to speak more plainly, the British power, increasing in an eddying circle, manifested in this as in other cases, its inherent tendency to absorb the misgoverned and unstable principalities which sought and found in its strength temporary support, being driven by necessity, or induced by ignorance or recklessness, to adopt a procedure calculated to induce eventually their political extinction. Lord Wellesley, like many other great statesmen, anticipated but very imperfectly the result of his favourite measure. He hoped to find the subsidiary system instrumental in mitigating the turbulence of the native states of India, by controlling the sources of dissension, and encouraging and enabling minor chiefs to cultivate the arts of peace in the independent enjoyment of their respective rights.* But, in truth, the first elements of stability were wanting; and although the personal

rectitude and ability of a nabob or a rajah, or their chief ministers, might for a time hold together the incongruous elements of Moslem and Hindoo communities, under an efficient rule, distinct, so far as internal regulations were concerned, from the paramount power, provided that were exercised with rigid moderation; yet the more frequent consequence of becoming subsidiary, was utter indifference on the part of the sovereign to the progress of a principality over which he had lost all absolute control; and, on the part of his subjects, contempt and indifference for his diminished power. The oriental idea of authority is identified with despotism; exercised in every variety of form, from the homeliest phase of patriarchal sway, to the unapproached grandeur of Solomon: still the same in essence—the delegated government of God. In the Christian world, despite the blinding influence of our sins and imperfections, we do recognise, by the light of the Gospel, the inestimable worth of civil liberty. The law of the land, apart from the individual who dispenses it, is the basis on which the nationality and independence of every English and American subject rests securely. But to Asiatics this is still a hard saying, and must remain so, until the same source from which we learned to realise its practical importance, be laid open to them also. If British supremacy prove, indeed, the instrument for the spiritual and moral regeneration of India, thrice blessed will be both giver and receiver. Yet whatever be the result, the immediate duty is clear—to spread the Gospel as widely as possible, and to endeavour by good government, by just laws honestly administered, by lenient taxation equitably assessed, to show our native subjects the value of the tree by its fruits.

To return to the affairs of the subsidiary states. The turbulent and dangerous character of Vizier Ali, the rival candidate for the dominion of Oude, rendered it advisable to remove his residence from Benares to Calcutta. The youth remonstrated strongly, but without effect; and while visiting, by appointment, the British resident Mr. Cherry, he spoke in violent terms of the hardship of the threatened coercion. The resident is represented to have behaved with much moderation; but Vizier Ali, giving vent to rage, started up and made a thrust at him with his sword; an example which, according to eastern custom, was immediately followed by his attendants.

* Wellesley Despatches, iv., 151.

Mr. Cherry was killed while attempting to escape through a window, and two of his companions shared his fate. The assassins, apparently in the hope of heading a general insurrection, hurried to the residence of the English magistrate,* who, after sending his wife and family to the terrace on the top of the house, seized a long spear, took up his position on a narrow staircase, and delayed their ascent until a party of horse arrived and put them to flight. Vizier Ali sought refuge in the woody country of Bhootwal, and being joined by several disaffected zemindars, soon mustered a considerable predatory force, wherewith to make incursions on Oude. The parsimonious and timid administration of Sadut Ali had rendered him extremely unpopular; and he urgently entreated that the English troops might be stationed immediately about his person to protect him, if need were, against his own army, whose faithlessness and disaffection likewise formed his excuse for not personally taking the field, in co-operation with his allies, against their joint foe. His assistance was not needed; Vizier Ali soon found himself abandoned by his followers, and was, in December, 1800, delivered over by the rajah of Jeypoor to the British government, and detained prisoner in Fort William.†

At the close of hostilities, the marquis pressed on the nabob the propriety of disbanding a force which, by his own showing, was worse than useless. This proposition, Sadut Ali met by a declaration of his desire to resign a position which he found full of weariness and danger. On the further development of his views, it appeared that the abdication in question was to be in favour of his son; and that in quitting the musnud, he intended to carry away the treasures and jewels inherited from Asuf-ad-Dowlah, leaving his successor to pay the arrears due to the E. I. Cy. and the native troops as best he could. These conditions were promptly rejected, and a long discussion ensued, which terminated in the disbandment of all the native troops (their arrears being first wholly liquidated), and the substitution of an additional European force (numbering, in all, 13,000 men), in return for which, the provinces of the Doab and Rohil-

cund‡ were conceded in perpetuity. To adjust the provisional administration of the ceded districts, three of the civil servants of the company were formed into a board of commissioners, and the Hon. Henry Wellesley nominated president and lieutenant-governor. For this appointment Lord Wellesley was blamed by the directors, as an evidence of partiality towards his brother, at the expense of the covenanted officials; but the propriety of the selection (as in the case of Colonel Wellesley in Mysoor) was amply justified by the result; and the disinterestedness (as far as regarded pecuniary motives) of both nominee and nominator was apparent, from no emolument being attached to the delicate and onerous office. By the late treaty, the tribute paid to the ruler of Oude by the nabob of Furruckabad (the Patan chief of a district in the province of Agra), was transferred to the E. I. Cy., and an arrangement made—it is said with his perfect acquiescence—by which he renounced political power, and was added to the growing list of titled stipendiaries. Several of the more powerful zemindars of the ceded territories resisted the proposed alterations, and made attempts at independence; especially Bugwunt Sing, who possessed the forts of Sasnee and Bidjeglur; the rajah Chutter Sâl; and the zemindar of Cutchoura: but they were all overpowered in the course of the years 1802—1803, and compelled to seek safety in flight.

The character of Sadut Ali was strikingly evinced, in the course of his negotiations with Lord Wellesley, by an attempt to win from the latter a sanction similar to that given to his half-brother (Azuf-ad-Dowlah), for the plunder of the begum, the grandmother of both these hopeful rulers. The intimation was met with merited disdain; but the old lady, fearing to be exposed to continuous indirect persecution, took the prudent step of ensuring the peaceable enjoyment of her personal property, by offering to constitute the company her heir—a proposition which was gladly accepted.

While these changes were taking place in Oude, others of a similar character were carried out in Tanjore and Arcot. Rajah Tuljajee died in 1787, leaving his adopted son and heir, Serfojee, a boy of ten years old, under the public tutelage of his half-brother, Ameer Sing, and the private guardianship of the missionary Swartz. Ameer Sing succeeded for a time in persuading the English authorities to treat the adoption of

* Mr. Davis, father of the present Sir J. Davis.

† Vizier Ali was afterwards removed to Vellore, where his family were permitted to join him. He died there, a natural death.—(Davis's *Memoir*.)

‡ The gross revenues of the ceded provinces were one crore, thirty-five lacs, 23,474 rupees.

his young ward as illegal, and caused him to be confined and cruelly ill-treated. The vigilance and untiring exertion of Swartz* occasioned a searching investigation, and the evidence brought forward on the matter led both Lord Cornwallis and Sir John Shore to consider the claims of Serfojee as well founded. The oppression exercised by Ameer Sing over the widows of the deceased rajah, was accompanied by general maladministration. During the first war with Tippoo, the management of Tanjore had been assumed by the English, as the sole means of rendering its resources available against the common foe; and on the conclusion of peace, a prolonged discussion arose concerning the propriety of restoring to power a ruler whose legal and moral claims were of so questionable a character. The supreme government, fearing to incur the imputation of excessive rigour, replaced Ameer Sing in his former position: but the home authorities do not appear to have approved of this decision; for in June, 1799, they expressly instructed Lord Wellesley not to relinquish possession of the territories of Arcot and Tanjore, which, in the event of hostilities with Tippoo, would "of course come under the company's management," without special orders to that effect. The measure thus taken for granted by the directors, had not been adopted by the governor-general, who deemed the brief and decisive character of the war a sufficient argument against a step the immediate effect of which "would have been a considerable failure of actual resources, at a period of the utmost exigency." The disputed succession afforded a better plea for the assumption of the powers of govern-

* Swartz spared no pains in implanting religious principles, or in cultivating the naturally gifted intellect of Serfojee. The death of the good missionary, in 1798, prevented him from witnessing the elevation of his grateful pupil, who honoured the memory of his benefactor, less by the erection of a stately monument, than by his own life and character. Bishop Heber, in noticing the varied acquirements of Serfojee, states that he quoted Fourcroy, Lavoisier, Linnaeus, and Buffon fluently; that he had "formed a more accurate judgment of the merits of Shakspeare than that so felicitously expressed by Lord Byron," and was "much respected by the English officers in the neighbourhood, as a real good judge of a horse, and a cool, bold, and deadly shot at a tiger."—(*Journal*, ii., 459.)

† The key to the cypher was found among the private papers of the sultan. The English were designated by the term *new-comers*; the Nizam, by that of *nothingness*; the Mahrattas, as *despicable*. In commenting on the disclosure of these proofs of faithlessness on the part of the nabobs of the Carnatic,

Ameer Sing was deposed, and Serfojee proclaimed rajah, in accordance with the terms of a treaty, dated October, 1799, by which he renounced all claim to political authority, in return for nominal rank, and the more substantial advantage of a pension of one lac of star pagodas, with a fifth of the net revenues. The assertion of complete authority over the Carnatic, was expedited by the discovery, consequent on the capture of Seringapatam, of a secret correspondence, in cypher,† carried on between Mohammed Ali and his successor, Omdutal-Omrah, with Tippoo, in direct violation of the treaty of 1792. The conduct of the nabob during the late war, in withholding promised supplies, had given rise to suspicions of treachery which were now confirmed. His failing health induced Lord Wellesley to delay the contemplated changes; but on his death, in 1801, the dispositions made by him in favour of his illegitimate son, Ali Hoossein, a minor,‡ were set aside in favour of Azim-ad-Dowlah, a nephew of the late prince, who made over to the company all claim to real power, on condition of receiving the title of nabob, and the allotment of a fifth part of the net revenues of the Carnatic for his support. The company further engaged to provide for the family of the preceding nabobs, and to pay their debts. The government of the extensive and populous, though dilapidated city of Surat, was assumed by the company in 1800; the Mogul nabob, or governor, resigning his claims on receipt of a pension of a lac of rupees annually, in addition to a fifth of the net revenues guaranteed to him and his heirs.

The commencement of the nineteenth century, as favouring the views of the directors, Mill exclaims, "Nothing surely ever was more fortunate than such a discovery at such a time." Yet, although plainly intimating the possibility of fabricating evidence to prove a lie, he is compelled, by his own truthfulness, to bear witness to the character of the great man, against whom he appears to be, on the whole, strangely prejudiced. "With regard to Lord Wellesley," he adds, "even his faults bear so little affinity with this species of vice, and his most conspicuous virtues are so directly opposed to it, that we may safely infer it to be as unlikely in his case as in any that can well be supposed, that he would fabricate evidence to attain the objects of his desire."—(vi., 312.)

† The governor-general was disposed to confirm the will of the late nabob in favour of Ali Hoossein, despite his illegitimacy; but his refusal (too late withdrawn) to accept the terms offered on behalf of the E. I. Co., occasioned his being altogether set aside. He was carried off by dysentery in the following year. Ameer Sing, the deposed rajah of Tanjore, died a natural death in the commencement of 1802.

century, thus strongly marked by the extension of British power in India, is no less memorable for the bold and decisive measures of foreign policy, planned and executed by the governor-general. The threatened invasion of Zemaun Shah had been no vague rumour. A letter addressed by the Afghan leader to Lord Wellesley, peremptorily demanding the assistance of the English and their ally, the nabob vizier, in rescuing Shah Alum from the hands of the Mah-rattas, and replacing him on the throne of his ancestors, had furnished ample reason for precautionary measures against the renewed incursions, under any pretext, of the dreaded Afghans. To avert this evil, there appeared no surer method than to form a close alliance with Persia; and for this purpose Captain (afterwards Sir John) Malcolm was dispatched as British envoy, in December, 1799, to the court of Teheran, attended by a magnificent embassy. The result was completely successful. Ali Shah engaged to lay waste the country of the Afghans if ever they should invade India, and to permit no French force to form a settlement on any of the shores or islands of Persia; the English, on their part, promised to aid the Shah in the event of invasion, whether from France or Cabool. Internal dissension between Zemaun Shah and his brother Mahmood, rendered the issue of the above negotiation of less importance as regarded the Afghans, whose turbulence found vent in civil war; but the danger of French encroachments still pressed severely on the mind of the governor-general. The injury inflicted by the privateering force of the Mauritius and Bourbon upon the Indian coasting trade, and even upon that with Europe, was of serious magnitude. Between the commencement of hostilities and the close of 1800, British property, to the amount of above two million sterling, had been carried into Port St. Louis. Lord Wellesley resolved to attempt the extinction of this fertile source of disasters, by the conquest and occupation of the French islands; and, with this intent, assembled at Trincomalee* in Ceylon, a force comprising three royal regiments and 1,000 Bengal volunteers. The project fell to the ground through the pertinacity of Admiral Rainier, who declared that he could not lawfully take part in the

proposed expedition, without the express sanction of the king. The favourable opportunity was lost; and French privateers continued, during several subsequent years, to harass and plunder the commercial navigation of the eastern seas. The troops assembled by the zeal of Lord Wellesley, found useful and honourable employ. He had repeatedly suggested to the home government the propriety of dispatching an Indian armament for the reinforcement of the British force in Egypt; and on the receipt of orders to that effect in 1801, 1,600 native infantry were added to the body already raised, and forwarded to Mocha as fast as transports could be provided for them.† Sir David Baird had command of the land troops; Rear-admiral Blankett, of a squadron of the company's cruisers, sent on with a small detachment as an advance guard, but Sir Home Popham was dispatched from England to direct the naval part of the expedition. The struggle was well nigh ended before their arrival, by the defeat of the French in Egypt on the 21st of March, with the loss to the victors of their brave leader, Sir Ralph Abercromby. General Baird marched from Suez to Rosetta, at the head of 7,000 men, in the hope of contributing to the capture of Alexandria; but the treaty of surrender was already in progress; and with its ratification, hostilities were brought to a close. The striking demonstration of the power of England, made by bringing together numerous and effective armaments from the east and west, to fight her battles upon the banks of the Nile, was doubtless calculated to "enhance her renown, and confirm her moral as well as political strength." Still, it is well added by Mill, that had the Anglo-Indian army been permitted to accomplish the purpose for which it was first designed by the governor-general, the conquest of the Mauritius and Bourbon would have been a more substantial though less brilliant service.

Upon the restoration of Pondicherry (in accordance with the treaty of Amiens), measures were taken by Buonaparte which amply proved the wisdom of the energetic precautions of the Marquis Wellesley against attempts for the revival of French influence in India. Seven general, and a proportionate number of inferior officers, were sent from

* Trincomalee was taken from the Dutch in 1796.

† Lord Wellesley, with his usual foresight, gave orders for the occupation of Perim, a small island in the straits of Bab-el-Mandeb, the possession of which

would have effectually shut up the French forces in the Red Sea, even had they passed through Egypt. The Earl of Elgin, then ambassador to the Porte, effectively co-operated with the marquis in various ways.

France with 1,400 regular troops, and £100,000 in specie. The renewal of war in Europe afforded a reason for the reoccupation of Pondicherry in 1803, and enabled the E. I. Cy. to direct undivided attention to the complicated hostilities then carried on with the Mahrattas, the only Indian people possessing in themselves resources to maintain unaided a long contest. The most vulnerable part of the British frontier lay contiguous to the country possessed by Sindia. The death of Nana Furnavces, in 1800, left this enterprising chief no formidable rival at the court of Poona; and Bajee Rao the peishwa, appeared little less entirely under his control than the pageant-emperor of Delhi. In the event, therefore, of a struggle for supremacy, arising out of the numerous causes of quarrel abounding on both sides, the Mahratta confederacy, including the rajah of Berar, the representative of the Holcar family in Malwa, and the Guicowar of Guzerat, with other leaders of minor rank, led by Sindia and the peishwa, and aided by the skill and science of French officers, could collect a force against their European rivals which it would require a costly sacrifice of blood and treasure to repel. The best mode of averting this dangerous possibility appeared to be the formation of a strict alliance with one, at least, if not with the whole of the Mahratta chiefs. The error of Hastings, in sanctioning the aggressions of Sindia in Hindoostan Proper, had furnished experience which strengthened the convictions of Lord Wellesley with regard to the policy of forming connexions with native powers, only on conditions calculated to secure an ascendancy, more or less direct, in their councils. Perfect neutrality amid scenes of foreign and domestic warfare, venality, extortion, and bloodshed, could scarcely have been recommended by considerations of duty or of policy; and such a course, even supposing it to have been practicable, must have involved the infraction of old as well as recent treaties, offensive and defensive, with the Nizam and others. As for Lord Wellesley, his clear and statesmanlike view of the case, formed after careful examination of the actual state of British power in India, was never marred by doubt or hesitation in the moment of action. Fettered by the parliamentary denunciation against the extension, under any circumstances, of the Anglo-Indian empire, yet, convinced that its foundations must be largely in-

creased before a state of secure and tranquil authority could be reasonably expected, he was often driven to adduce secondary causes to justify measures, which might have been sufficiently vindicated on the score of political necessity, since they involved no moral wrong. The wretchedness of the people of the Carnatic and Oude, abundantly excuse the steps taken to place them under the immediate superintendence of the company, in preference to employing, or rather continuing to employ, the military force of England in riveting the chains of a foreign despotism, founded on usurpation of the worst kind, that of sworn servants betraying their master in the hour of weakness. There were no lawful heirs to these states; or, if there were, they should have been searched for in the ancient records of the Hindoos: the Mohammedans were all intruders in the first instance, and the existing leaders of every denomination, with few exceptions, rebellious subjects. Why, each one of the African chiefs, whom English colonists and Dutch boors have so unscrupulously exiled from their native territories, had more of hereditary right and constitutional privilege on his side than all the Indo-Mohammedan dynasties put together. The case of the Hindoos is widely different; but in excuse, or rather in justification, of the conduct of the company, it may be urged that they found the great majority of the native inhabitants of India, under Moslem rulers, a conquered and much-oppressed people; and that, if England do her duty as a Christian state, they will, and—with all her errors and shortcomings, it may be added, they have materially benefited by the change.

The Rajpoot states were the only ones which, although brought in collision with the Mogul empire, were never wholly absorbed in it. The Mahratta confederation had been founded on the ruins of the vast dominion won by the strong arm of Aurungzebe, and lost through persecuting bigotry and the exactions consequent on unceasing war. Sevajee and Bajee Rao (the first usurping peishwa, or prime minister) built up Mahratta power. Madhoo Rao I. arrested its dissolution; but Mahadajee Sindia, prompted by overweening ambition, enlarged his chieftdom until its overgrown dimensions exceeded in extent the whole remainder of the Mahratta empire, and threatened speedily to destroy the degree of independence still existing in Rajpootana. Dowlut Rao possessed equal ambition and energy with his

predecessor, but far less judgment and moderation. The retirement to Europe, in 1796, of the experienced and unprejudiced leader of the European trained bands, De Boigne, and the accession to authority of a French leader named Perron, with strong national feelings, gave a decidedly anti-English bias to the counsels of Dowlut Rao. The peishwa Bajee Rao, knew this, and had, in the time of Sir John Shore, courted the protection of the supreme government, as a means of securing to himself some degree of authority. The danger of provoking war, by giving offence to Sindia, induced the refusal of this request. The accession to office of Lord Wellesley was attended with a reversal of the policy of both parties. Perceiving the great advantage to be derived from the permanent settlement of a subsidiary force at Poona, the governor-general formally offered the services of a body of the company's troops, for the protection of the peishwa and the revival of the energies of his government. The very circumstance of the boon, once urgently sought, being now pressed on his acceptance, would have sufficed to ensure its rejection by so capricious and distrustful a person as Bajee Rao: but other reasons—especially the meditated departure of Sindia, to superintend his own disaffected troops in Hindoostan, and the impending war between Tippoo and the English—were not wanting to confirm his determination. The conquest of Mysoor again changed the aspect of affairs; but Bajee Rao, in accordance with the sagacious counsels of Nana Furnavees,* even after the death of the wary minister, continued to reject the alliance pressed on him by the English, until an unexpected chain of events compelled him to look to them exclusively for help and protection.

SINDIA AND HOLCAR.—A new actor had recently come forward on the stage of Mahratta politics, whose progress seemed likely to diminish the authority of Sindia, and enable Bajee Rao to exercise unquestioned supremacy at Poona. Of these anticipated results only the former was realised; the predatory chief in question, Jeswunt Rao Holcar, proving strong enough not only to harass but to defeat the

* Nana Furnavees was imprisoned by Sindia; but being released in 1798, on payment of ten lacs of rupees, he accepted office under Bajee Rao.

† When the power of Ahalya Bye became established, the beautiful but wicked wife of Ragoba sent a female attendant to bring her an account of the personal appearance of a princess so highly cele-

troops of Sindia, and drive Bajee Rao from his capital. The founders of the Sindia and Holcar families were, it will be remembered, men of humble origin; they became distinguished as leaders of Pindarries, a class of the lowest freebooters who had from early times infested the Deccan. Bajee Rao I., though always ready to avail himself of their services for the invasion of Mogul provinces, took care to exclude such dangerous subjects from Maharashtra, by habitually stationing them in Malwa, where the power of the two leaders became paramount. The progress and history of Mahadajee Sindia has been incidentally told in previous pages; but of Mulhar Rao Holcar little mention has been made since the battle of Paniput, in 1760, when he was named as one of the few leaders who escaped the carnage of that day. Having retreated into Central India, he employed himself, during the remaining years of his life, in settling and consolidating his possessions in Malwa and the Deccan. He had established considerable influence in Jeypoor, and obtained from the rajah an annual tribute of three lacs and a-half of rupees. A considerable part of the province of Candeish had been allotted to him for the maintenance of his troops; beside which, several villages were granted, by the peishwa and the Nizam, to the females of his family. The only lineal descendant of Mulhar Rao, a vicious youth of unsound mind, succeeded his grandfather in 1766, but survived him only nine months. His mother Ahalya (pronounced *Alea*) Bye, a singularly gifted woman, declared her intention, as the sole representative of both the deceased rulers, to select a successor. Ragoba† attempted to interfere; but Madhoo Rao, with characteristic chivalry, directed his uncle to desist from further opposition to the projects of a person whose right and ability to manage affairs were alike indisputable. With the entire approbation of the leading military commanders in the army of her deceased relatives, Ahalya Bye took the reins of power in her own hands. The Mohammedan custom of rigid seclusion had happily not been imitated by Mahratta females; Ahalya Bye had therefore no conventional impediment of any kind to check the free exercise of brated, and so universally beloved. The description of a small slight woman, with irregular features, but "a heavenly light on her countenance," set the fair *intrigante* at rest as to any rivalry in the attractions by which she set most store; and, without noticing the last part of the description, Aundee Bye remarked, "But she is not handsome, you say."

her physical or mental powers. Still there were duties inconsistent with a woman's sphere of action; and to ensure their fulfilment, she formally adopted as her son,* and elected as commander-in-chief, Tookajee Holcar, the leader of the household troops; of the same tribe, but no otherwise related to Mulhar Rao. Like our great Elizabeth, the fitness of her ministers proved the judgment of the selector. The conduct of Tookajee, during a period of above thirty years, justified the confidence reposed in him. Ahalya Bye died, aged sixty, worn out with public cares and fatigues, aggravated by domestic sorrows; but without having had, during that long interval, a single misunderstanding with her brave and honest coadjutor. The history of the life of this extraordinary woman, given by Sir John Malcolm, affords evidence of the habitual exercise of the loftiest virtues; and it is difficult to say, whether manly resolve or feminine gentleness predominated, so marvellously were they blended in her character. The utter absence of vanity, whether as a queen or a woman;† the fearless and strictly conscientious exercise of despotic power, combined with the most unaffected humility and the deepest sympathy for suffering; learning without pedantry, cheerfulness without levity, immaculate rectitude with perfect charity and tolerance;—these and other singular combinations would almost tempt one to regard Ahalya Bye as too faultless for fallen and sinful humanity, but for the few drawbacks entailed by her rigid adherence to almost every portion of the modern Brahminical creed, in which, happily, persecution has still no part, though self-inflicted austerities and superstitious observances have gained a most undue prominence. The declining age of the princess was saddened by the resolution taken by her only surviving child, Muchta Bye, of self-immolation on the grave of her husband. The battle-field had widowed Ahalya Bye at twenty; yet—despite the modern heresy of the Hindoos, that the voluntary sacrifice of life, on the part of the bereaved survivor, ensures immediate reunion between those whom death has divided, and their mutual entrance into the highest heaven, she had not been tempted by this lying doctrine to commit suicide,

but had lived to protect her children and establish the independence of the Holcar principality. Now, flinging herself at the feet of Muchta Bye, she besought her child, by every argument a false creed could sanction, to renounce her purpose. The reply of the daughter was affectionate but decided. "You are old, mother," she said, "and a few years will end your pious life. My only child and husband are gone, and when you follow, life I feel will be insupportable; but the opportunity of terminating it with honour will then have passed." Every effort, short of coercion, was vainly practised to prevent the intended "*suttee*;"‡ but the unfaltering resolve of the devoted widow remained unshaken, and her wretched parent accompanied the procession, with forced composure, to the funeral pyre: but when the first vivid burst of flame told of the actual consummation of the sacrifice, self-command was lost in anguish; the agonising shrieks of their beloved ruler mingled with the exulting shouts of the immense multitude; and excited almost to madness, the aged princess gnawed the hands she could not liberate from the two Brahmins, who with difficulty held her back from rushing to die with her child. After three days spent in fasting and speechless grief, Ahalya Bye recovered her equanimity so far as to resume her laborious round of daily occupations, including four hours spent in receiving ambassadors, hearing petitions or complaints, and transacting other business in full *darbar* or court; and she seemed to find solace in erecting a beautiful monument to the memory of those she lamented, and in increasing the already large proportion of the revenues devoted to religious purposes and public works. Her charity was not bounded by the limits of the principality: it began at home (for she fed her own poor daily), but it extended to far-distant lands. The pilgrim journeying to Juggernaut in Cuttack, in the far north amid the snowy peaks of the Himalaya, or south almost to Cape Comorin, found cause to bless the sympathy for individual suffering, as well as the reverence for holy shrines, manifested by Ahalya Bye with royal munificence; while the strange traveller, without claim of creed or country, was arrested

* Although Tookajee always addressed her by the name of "mother," he was considerably her senior.

† A Brahmin wrote a book in her praise. Ahalya Bye, after patiently hearing it read, remarked, that she was "a weak, sinful woman, not deserving

such fine encomiums," directed the book to be thrown into the Nerbudda, which flowed beneath her palace window, and took no farther notice of the author.—(Malcolm's *Central India*, i., 193.)

‡ *Suttee* or *sati*, denotes the completed sacrifice.

on his weary, dusty road, by water-bearers stationed at intervals to supply the wants of the passer-by; and the very oxen near her dwelling at Mhysir, were refreshed by cooling draughts brought by the domestic servants of the compassionate princess.

The beasts of the field, the birds of the air, the fishes of the sea, had all their allotted share of her bounty; and however puerile some of her minor arrangements may sound to European ears, or fanatical the habits of a sovereign who never discarded the plain white weeds of Hindoo widowhood, or touched animal food; yet, probably, these very traits of character conspired to add to the reputation her government retains in Malwa as the best ever known, the personal reverence paid to her memory as more than a saint, as an Avatar, or incarnation of the Deity.

A blessing rested on the efforts of Ahalya Bye, despite the fettering power of heathen darkness. Indore grew, beneath her sway, from a village to a wealthy city; bankers, merchants, farmers, and peasants, all thrived beneath her vigilant and fostering care. Malcolm states, that he made inquiries among all ranks and classes in the countries she had governed, and could elicit no information calculated to detract, in the judgment of the most impartial inquirer, from the effect of the eulogiums, or rather blessings, poured forth whenever her name was mentioned, except the large sums bestowed on Brahmins, and the expenditure of state funds in the erection and maintenance of public works on foreign soil. The remarks made by one of her chief ministers, when commenting on what Sir John considered misdirected bounty, afford a suggestive text alike to eastern and western potentates. He asked, "whether Ahalya Bye, by spending double the money on an army that she did in charity and good works, could have preserved her country for above thirty years in a state of profound peace, while she rendered her subjects happy and herself adored? No person doubts the sincerity of her piety; but if she had merely possessed worldly wisdom, she could have devised no means so admirably calculated to effect the object. Among the princes of her own nation, it would have been looked upon as sacrilege to have become her enemy, or, indeed, not to have defended her against any hostile attempt. She was considered by all in the same light. The Nizam of the Deccan and Tippoo Sultan

granted her the same respect as the peishwa, and Mohammedans joined with Hindoos in prayers for her long life and prosperity."*

After the death of Ahalya Bye, in 1795, the sole authority centred in Tookajee Holcar, who survived his excellent mistress about two years. He left two legitimate sons, Casee and Mulhar Rao. The elder was of weak intellect and deformed person; the younger, able and active. Ahalya Bye and Tookajee had hoped that the example of their unanimity would be followed by the brothers in the joint exercise of authority, but neither of the princes were capable of the self-denial and lofty rectitude necessary for such a course; and preparations for a war of succession were at once commenced, but abruptly terminated by the treacherous interference of Dowlut Rao Sindia, who having inveigled Mulhar Rao to his camp, caused him to be shot through the head; and retaining possession of Casee Rao, not only compelled him to pay the heavy price stipulated for the murder of his brother, but reduced him to the condition of a mere tool. An avenger arose unexpectedly to scourge the unprincipled ambition of Sindia. Two illegitimate sons of Holcar, Jeswunt Rao and Etojee, survived their father; the latter was seized and imprisoned by Sindia and Bajee Rao. He escaped and joined a body of freebooters; but being recaptured, was trampled to death by an elephant in the city of Poona. Jeswunt Rao sought refuge at Nagpoor with Ragojee Bhonslay of Berar. His confidence was betrayed; and through the intrigues of Sindia and the peishwa, he also was made a captive, but succeeded in eluding his guard, and reaching Candeish about a year and a-half after the death of Mulhar Rao. Resolved to make an effort to rescue the possessions of his family from the hands of Sindia, he took the name of assertor of the rights of Kundee Rao, the infant son of Mulhar Rao, then a prisoner at Poona, and assembled a heterogeneous force of Pindarries, Bheels, Afghans, Mahrattas, and Rajpoots. In 1798, he joined his fortunes with those of Ameer Khan, a Mohammedan adventurer, less daring and reckless, but quite as unprincipled as himself, on whom he subsequently conferred the title of nabob. A terrible series of hostilities ensued between Sindia and Holcar. From the appearance of the latter chief, in 1800, the natives of Central India date the commencement of

* Malcolm's *Central India*, i., 189.

an epoch of eighteen years' duration, which they emphatically designate "the time of trouble." The trained battalions of Sindia were defeated, and his capital, Oojein, and other chief places, captured and rifled by Holcar and Ameer Khan, with a barbarity which was horribly revenged on the wretched inhabitants of Indore by the instrumentality of Sirjee Rao Ghatkay, the father-in-law of Sindia, and the prompter as well as executor of his worst actions. Between four and five thousand persons are said to have perished by the sword, or under tortures inflicted by the ferocious Pindarries, for the express gratification of their diabolical leader; and the wells within the limits of Indore were actually choked up by the bodies of females, who had rushed on death to avoid the lust and cruelty which reigned unchecked for a period of fifteen days, and ended only with the slaughter or flight of almost every citizen, and the demolition of every house. Jeswunt Rao, with Indore, lost his only means of giving regular pay to his soldiers. Without attempting disguise, he told them the actual state of the case, and bade such as chose follow his fortunes in quest of plunder. The invitation was accepted with acclamation, and Jeswunt Rao became avowedly the leader of an army of freebooters, whose worst licentiousness he directed rather than curbed, and whose turbulence he bent to his will by the habitual display of the dauntless courage which formed the distinguishing characteristic of his family, and by the coarse humour and inimitable cajolery peculiar to himself.* His declared object was the restoration of Mahratta supremacy over India by a revival of the predatory system of Sevajee; but of this there was never any reasonable prospect. Jeswunt Rao was not the man to found a state even on the most precarious basis; he was "terrible as a destroyer," but powerless to erect or consolidate dominion.

The marauding force increased daily. Sindia renounced the cause of Casee Rao (who became thenceforth a dependent on

his half-brother), and would have willingly purchased peace by the surrender of the infant Kundee Rao; but Holcar knew his strength, and had, besides, gone too far to recede with safety. A desperate contest took place between the two chiefs near Poona, in October, 1802, when the personal exertions of Jeswunt Rao, who had staked his all on the event, with the determination of not surviving defeat, resulted in a complete victory. By turning his own guns on the ungovernable Patans of Ameer Khan, who was quite unable to check their violence,† Holcar saved the city from indiscriminate pillage; not, however, from any motive of justice or compassion, but only that he might be enabled to plunder it systematically and at leisure, for the payment of the arrears of his troops and the replenishment of his private coffers. After committing every description of extortion, and giving, in his own person, an example of hard-drinking, by unrestrained indulgence in his favourite liquors, cherry and raspberry brandy, he left Amrut Rao (Ragoba's adopted son) in charge of the government, and marched off to pursue his marauding avocations in Central India.

The triumph of Holcar completely changed the relative position of Bajee Rao and the English. Surrounded by a select body of troops, the peishwa waited the result of the contest; and when it was decided, fled from Poona, leaving with the British resident a draft treaty for the company, requesting the permanent establishment of a subsidiary force within his dominions, and proffering in return the assignment of a certain amount of territory, and a pledge to hold no intercourse with other states, except in concert with the English. The treaty of Bassein, arranged on this basis, was concluded in 1802. It entailed the subjection of the claims of the peishwa on the Nizam, and on Anund Rao Guicowar, the chief of Baroda in Guzerat, with whom the English had recently become closely allied; their interference having been solicited in

* The following anecdote indicates that, with all his vices, Jeswunt Rao was not what a modern writer designates a *sham*. At an early period of his career, the accidental bursting of a matchlock deprived him of the sight of an eye. When told of the irreparable injury inflicted, he exclaimed, in allusion to the Indian proverb that one-eyed people are always wicked—"I was bad enough before, but now I shall be the very Gooroo (high-priest) of rogues." He had no religious scruples, but would plunder temples and private dwellings with equal indifference. The madness in which his career ended, is regarded as the punishment of sacrilege.

† Ameer Khan had little personal courage. After the battle of Poona he came to Jeswunt Rao, who was tying up his wounds, and boasted of good fortune in escaping unhurt; "for, see!" he said, pointing to the feather mounted in silver, which adorned his horse's head, "my khuljee has been broken by a cannon-ball." "Well, you are a fortunate fellow," retorted the Mahratta, with a burst of incredulous laughter; "for I observe the shot has left the ears of your steed uninjured, though the wounded ornament stood betwixt them."—(*Central India*, i., 229.)

favour of the legitimate heir in a case of disputed succession. These concessions involved a heavy sacrifice of political power; but they were slight compared with those which would have been exacted by Sindia or Holcar; and Bajee Rao could scarcely fail to fall into the hands of one or other of these leaders, if not upheld by extraneous support. Like his father, he had few personal friends, and so little deserving the name of a party at Poona, that the governor-general, on discovering his unpopularity, appears to have doubted what course to pursue with regard to his reinstatement on the musnud. The treaty had been entered upon in the belief that the majority of the jaghiredars, and the great mass of the nation, would co-operate with the English for the restoration of the peishwa. But if his weakness or wickedness had thoroughly alienated their confidence, the case was different; and Lord Wellesley plainly declared, that "justice and wisdom would forbid any attempt to impose upon the Mahrattas a ruler whose restoration to authority was adverse to every class of his subjects."

In the absence of any general manifestation of disaffection, Bajee Rao was escorted by an English force to the capital from whence he had fled with so little ceremony. Amrut Rao retired on learning his approach, and eventually became a state pensioner, resident at Benares. Tranquillity seemed restored. There could be no doubt that Holcar, Sindia, and Ragojee Bhonslay of Berar, would all feel mortified by a treaty which gave the English that very ascendancy in the councils of Poona they, or at least Sindia and Holcar, individually coveted. Still Lord Wellesley considered that their mutual deep-rooted enmity would prevent a coalition for so desperate an object as war with the English. Perhaps the result would have realised these anticipations had Bajee Rao been true to his engagements; instead of which, he behaved with accustomed duplicity, and corresponded with both Sindia and Ragojee Bhonslay, to whom he represented his recent voluntary agreement as wholly compulsory, and endeavoured to incite them to hostilities, trusting to the chapter of accidents for the improvement of his own position. Yet, when the moment

for action came, his schemes were lost in timidity and indecision: he would not trust others; he could not trust himself.

Holcar had heretofore expressly disavowed any unfriendly feeling towards the English;* and they would willingly have mediated between him and the peishwa, had the rancorous animosity of the latter suffered them to enter upon the negotiation. Sindia courted the co-operation of Holcar through the instrumentality of Ragojee Bhonslay, and went so far as to surrender the child Kundee Rao, and acknowledge Mulhar Rao as the representative of the Holcar family, surrendering to him their territories in Malwa, and recognising his various claims throughout Hindoostan. Despite these concessions, the robber-chief hung back; and when pressed by the confederates to unite his army with theirs in the Deccan, with a view to making war upon the E. I. Cy., he asked who was to take care of Northern India? and withdrew to pillage the defenceless provinces of friend and foe.

The gathering storm did not escape the observation of the governor-general. Hostile preparations were commenced in every part of British India, and a declaration of his intentions demanded from Sindia; who replied curtly, yet candidly, that he could not give any until after an approaching interview with the Bhonslay; but would then inform the resident "whether it would be peace or war." This pledge was not redeemed; the meeting took place, and was followed by vague and general professions of good-will to the British government, mingled with complaints against the peishwa for an undue assumption of authority in signing the treaty of Bassein. The civil expressions of the chiefs ill accorded with the hostile and menacing attitude occupied by their armies on the frontiers of Oude. Major-general Wellesley, to whom his brother had delegated full powers, political as well as military, either for negotiation or war, brought matters to an issue with characteristic frankness, by proposing as a test of the amicable intentions of the two chiefs, that they should respectively withdraw their forces, pledging himself to do the same on the part of the English. The offer being rejected, the British resident was with-

* The day after the taking of Poona, Col. Close, the British resident, was sent for by Holcar, whom he found in a small tent ankle-deep in mud, with a spear wound in the body and a sabre-cut in the head; which last he had received from an artillery-

man while leading a charge on the guns of the enemy. He expressed a strong wish to be on good terms with the English, and, with reluctance, permitted the withdrawal of the resident, after which the worst outrages were committed at Poona.

drawn, and preparations made on both sides for an appeal to arms.

MAHRATTA WAR.—The governor-general well knew that the finances of his employers were in no condition to endure the drain of protracted warfare, and he resolved to follow out the policy so brilliantly successful in the Mysoor campaign, of bringing the whole force of British India to bear on the enemy; not, however, by concentration on a single point, but by attacking their territories in every quarter at the same time.

The army, by his exertions, was raised to nearly 50,000 men. The troops in the Deccan and Guzerat numbered 35,600, of whom 16,850 formed the advanced force under General Wellesley; in Hindoostan, 10,500 men were under the command of General (afterwards Lord) Lake; 3,500 were assembled at Allahabad to act on the side of Bundelcund; and 5,216 were destined for the invasion of Cuttack. The armies of Sindia and Ragojee were estimated at about 100,000 men, of whom half were cavalry; and 30,000 regular infantry and cavalry, commanded by Europeans, chiefly French, under M. Perron, the successor of De Boigne. Himmut Bahadur, an influential Mahratta chief of Bundelcund,* sided with the English against the rajah, Shumsheer Bahadur. The campaign opened by the conquest, or rather occupation, of Ahmednuggur, the ancient capital of the Ahmed Shahi dynasty, on the 1st of August, 1803. The army under Major-general Wellesley, by whom it was accomplished, after much marching and counter-marching, fought the famous battle of Assaye, so named from a fortified village (near the junction of the Kailna and Juah rivers, 261 miles north-west of Hyderabad), before which the confederates had encamped 21st August, 1803. They numbered 50,000 men, and were supported by above a hundred pieces of artillery. The British counted but 4,500 men; and their leader beheld with anxiety the strength of the foe, even though, on finding the Mahrattas at length drawn up in battle array, the exulting remark re-echoed through the ranks—"They cannot escape us." While the British lines were forming, the Mahrattas opened a murderous can-

nonade. The 74th regiment sustained heavy loss, and were charged by a body of the enemy's horse. The 19th light dragoons drew only 360 sabres, but they received the order for a counter-charge with a glad huzza; and being manfully seconded by native cavalry, passed through the broken but undismayed 74th amid the cheers of their wounded comrades, cut in, routed the opposing horse, and dashed on at the infantry and guns. The troops of the line pressed on after them, and drove the enemy into the Juah at the point of the bayonet. The victory was complete, but dearly purchased; for one-third of the conquerors lay dead or wounded at the close of this sanguinary action. Of the Mahrattas, 1,200 were slain; the bodies of the fallen were scattered around in dense masses, and ninety-eight pieces of cannon remained on the field. Ragojee Bhonslay fled at an early period of the action, and Sindia soon followed his example. The cavalry evinced little inclination to out-stay their masters; but the infantry behaved with greater steadiness; the artillerymen stood to the last, and eight of the trained battalions of De Boigne manifested unflinching determination. When resistance became hopeless, the majority surrendered.†

In the meantime, success still more brilliant in its results had attended the army under Lake, who was himself the very model of a popular commander, as brave and collected in the front of the battle as in a council of his own officers. The destruction of Sindia's force under Perron, the capture of Agra and Delhi, with the person of the emperor—these were the leading objects to which he was to direct operations; and they were all so perfectly fulfilled, that the governor-general declared, his most sanguine expectations having been realised, he was unexpectedly called on to furnish fresh instructions. General Lake first came in sight of the enemy's cavalry at Coel, near the fort of Alighur, whither they retired after a slight skirmish. Alighur, the ordinary residence of M. Perron, was, in his absence, bravely defended by the governor, M. Pedrons. It was well garrisoned, and surrounded by a

* The ancient Hindoo dynasty of Bundelcund, of which Chutter Sâl was the last efficient representative, was overwhelmed by the Mahrattas about 1786. Shumaheer Bahadur was an illegitimate descendant of the first peishwa, Bajee Rao. Himmut Bahadur, by a not unfrequent combination, was a *gosaen* (religious devotee) and a soldier of fortune.—(*Duff*).

† The fidelity of these mercenary troops is rendered more remarkable by the fact, that a politic proclamation, issued by the governor-general at the commencement of the war, had had the effect of inducing the British part of the European officers to quit the service of Sindia, on condition of the continuance of the pay previously received from him.

deep and wide moat, traversed by a narrow causeway, which formed the sole entrance to the fort, and for which, by some strange neglect, a drawbridge had not been substituted. One of the British officers who had come over from the service of Sindia, offered to head an attack on the gateway. The daring enterprise was carried out. Of four gates, the first was blown open by troops exposed to a heavy fire; the second easily forced; the third entered with a mass of fugitives; but the fourth, which opened immediately into the body of the place, resisted even the application of a 12-pounder. In this extremity, a party of grenadiers, led by Major M'Leod, pushed through the wicket and mounted the ramparts. Opposition soon ceased, and the British found themselves masters of the fortress, with the loss of 278 men killed and wounded, including seventeen European officers. Of the garrison, about 2,000 perished; many of whom were drowned in the ditch while attempting to escape.

From Alighur, Lake marched to the north-westward, and on the 11th of September, encamped within six miles of Delhi. The tents were scarcely fixed, when the enemy appeared in front. Perron had just quitted the service of Sindia, in consequence of the well-founded jealousy manifested towards him by that chief and the leading native officers. M. Bourquin, the second in command, took his place; and on learning the advance of the British against Delhi, crossed the Jumna with twelve battalions of regular infantry, and 5,000 cavalry, for the purpose of attacking General Lake, whose force, after providing for the safety of his baggage, amounted to about 4,500 men. Bourquin took up a position on rising ground, with swamps on either side, defended in front by seventy pieces of cannon, half-buried amid long grass. From this secure station he was withdrawn by a feint, which, with less highly disciplined troops, would have been very hazardous. Lake advanced to reconnoitre, and after having a horse shot under him, fell back with the cavalry in regular order upon the infantry, who had been meanwhile ordered to advance. The enemy followed the retreating cavalry, until the latter, opening from the centre, made way for the foot to advance to the front. Perceiving the trap into which he had fallen, Bourquin halted, and commenced a deadly fire of grape, round, and canister; amidst which the British troops

moved on without returning a shot until within one hundred yards of the foe; they then fired a volley, and charged with the bayonet. Sindia's infantry, unequal to a hand-in-hand encounter, abandoned their guns, fled, and were pursued as far as the banks of the Jumna, in which river numbers perished. The total loss of the Mahrattas was estimated at 3,000; that of the British at 585, including fifteen European officers.

After being seventeen hours under arms, the troops took up fresh ground towards the river, and next morning encamped opposite the city of Delhi. In three days every show of resistance ceased, the fort was evacuated, Bourquin and five other French officers surrendered as prisoners of war, and the unfortunate Shah Alum thankfully placed himself under the protection of the British commander, September 10th, 1803.* General Lake next marched against Agra, where all was strife and confusion. The garrison had been under the command of British officers, who, on the breaking out of the war, were confined by their own troops. Seven battalions of Sindia's regular infantry were encamped on the glacis, but the besieged feared to admit them, on account of the treasure which they wished to reserve for themselves. The battalions were attacked on the 10th of October, and defeated after a severe conflict; three days afterwards, those who remained came over in a body, and were admitted into the E. I. Co's service. The siege of the fort was then commenced, and a breach effected, when further proceedings were arrested by the capitulation of the garrison, the imprisoned officers being released, in order to make terms with their countrymen. The surrender was accomplished on condition of safety for life and private property, leaving treasure to the amount of £280,000 to be divided among the troops as prize-money.

It is almost impossible to sketch a campaign carried on simultaneously by different widely-separated armies, without losing the thread of the narrative, or interfering with the chronological succession of events. Choosing the latter as the lesser evil, it may be mentioned that, towards the close of October, General Lake quitted Agra in pursuit of a large force, composed of fifteen

General Lake found Shah Alum seated under a small tattered canopy, his person emaciated by indigence and infirmity, and his countenance disfigured with the logs of his eyes, and bearing marks of extreme old age, joined to a settled melancholy.

regular battalions, dispatched by Sindia from the Deccan to strengthen his northern army; of which there now remained but two battalions, the wreck of the Delhi troops. The total was, however, formidable; being estimated at about 9,000 foot and 5,000 horse, with a numerous and well-appointed train of artillery. Their design was supposed to be the recovery of Delhi; but as the British advanced, the Mahrattas retreated; and Lake, fearing they would escape his vigilance, and suddenly reappear in some unlooked-for quarter, followed with his cavalry by forced marches, until, on the 1st of November, he found himself, after a night's journey of twenty-five miles, in face of an enemy in apparent confusion, but advantageously posted, and refreshed by rest. After an ineffectual and disastrous attempt at attack, the British general was compelled to withdraw his brigade out of reach of cannon-shot, and await the arrival of the infantry. The details of this portion of the action are somewhat vaguely told. The 76th regiment, which was chosen to head the attack, with some native infantry,* who had closed to the front, first reached the point from which the charge was to be made, and stood alone, waiting until the remainder of the column should be formed by their comrades, whose march "had been retarded by impediments in the advance,"† the nature of which is not stated. So galling was the fire opened by the enemy, that Lake, who conducted in person every operation of the day, and had already had one horse shot under him, resolved to lead the van to the assault, sooner than stand still and witness its destruction. At this moment his second horse fell, pierced by several balls. His son, who officiated as aide-de-camp, sprang to the ground, and had just prevailed on the general to take the vacant seat, when he was struck down by a ball. Lake had a singularly affectionate nature; the fall of his child, severely if not mortally wounded, was well calculated to unnerve, or, in his own phrase, "unman" him; but he knew his duty, and loved the troops, who, he writes with unaffected modesty, "at this time wanted every assistance I could give them."‡ Leaving Major Lake on the field, the general rode on with his gallant band, until, on

arriving within reach of the canister-shot of the foe, their ranks were so rapidly thinned as to render regular advance impracticable, and tempt the Mahratta horse to charge. But this "handful of heroes," as they were gratefully termed by Lake, himself "*le brave des braves*," repulsed their assailants, who withdrew to a little distance. The order to the British horse to charge in turn, was brilliantly executed by the 29th dragoons. They dashed through both lines of the opposing infantry, wheeled round upon the cavalry, and, after driving them from the field, turned the rear of the enemy's second line. The British foot failed not to take advantage of the opportunity thus afforded. The whole force had by this time arrived on the field of battle, and the issue soon ceased to be doubtful; yet the hardy veterans of De Boigne's regiments, though deprived of almost all their experienced officers, would not surrender. About 2,000 of them were broken, surrounded and made prisoners, but the majority fell with weapons in their hands. "The gunners," writes the victorious general, "stood by their guns until killed by the bayonet: all the sepoy of the enemy behaved exceedingly well; and, if they had been commanded by French officers, the event would have been, I fear, extremely doubtful. I never was in so severe a business in my life, or anything like it; and pray to God I never may be in such a situation again. * * * These fellows fought like devils, or rather heroes."§

The battle of Laswaree was in all respects memorable. It completed the overthrow of the European disciplined brigades, and gave to England undisputed mastery over Delhi and Agra, with all Sindia's districts north of the Chumbul. These advantages were gained at a heavy sacrifice of life. The English loss amounted to 172 killed and 652 wounded: that of the Mahrattas was estimated at 7,000.||

The detached expeditions had likewise successfully accomplished their respective missions. All Sindia's possessions in Guzerat were captured by a division of the Bombay troops under Lieutenant-colonel Woodington. Broach was taken by storm on the 29th of August; and the strong hill to praise others, barely notices his own gallant deeds or those of his son: but he mentions, the day after the battle, that parental anxiety rendered him "totally unfit for anything." Happily, Major Lake's wound proved less severe than was at first expected.

|| *Memoir of the Campaign*; by Major Thorn.

* The second battalion of the 12th native infantry, and five companies of the 16th.—(Thornton, iii. 338.)

† Despatch of Lake to the governor-general.—(*Wellesley Despatches*, vol. iii., 443.)

‡ *Wellesley Despatches*, iii., 446.

§ *Idem*, p. 446. General Lake, habitually so ready

fort of Powanghur, which overlooked the town of Champaneer, surrendered on the 17th of September.

The seizure of Cuttack was accomplished by detachments of the Madras and Bengal forces under Lieutenant-colonel Harcourt. The Brahmins of Juggernaut placed their famous pagoda under the protection of the British on the 18th of September; and the fall of Barabuttee, the fort of Cuttack, on the 14th of October, completed the reduction of the whole province.

In the subjection of Bundelcund, Lieutenant-colonel Powell was materially aided by Himmot Bahadur, the Hindoo leader previously mentioned, who joined the British detachment in the middle of September, with a force of about 14,000 men. The army of Shumsheer Bahadur made but feeble resistance, and on the 13th of October was driven across the river Betwa. Their chief eventually became a British stipendiary.

The concluding operations of the war were performed by the army under Major-general Wellesley and Colonel Stevenson. A detachment under the latter leader took possession of Boorhanpoor on the 15th of October, and two days after marched to besiege Aseerghur, called by the natives "the key of the Deccan." The fortress surrendered on the 21st, and with it the conquerors became masters of Sindia's Decani possessions, including several dependent districts in Candeish. After a short time spent in pursuing the rajah of Berar, who retreated to his own dominions, and in receiving some overtures for peace, of an unsatisfactory character, from Sindia, General Wellesley descended the Ghauts on the 25th of November, with the intention of assisting Stevenson in the projected siege of Gawilghur. The junction was effected on the 29th of August, near the plains of Argaum, where the British commander, on reconnoitring, perceived with surprise the main army of the Berar rajah, comprising infantry, cavalry, and artillery, regularly drawn up, about six miles from the spot where he had himself intended to encamp. Sindia's force, consisting of one very heavy corps of cavalry, a body of Pindarries, and other light troops, supported those of Berar. It was late in the day, and the English were wearied with a long march under a burning

sun; yet their leader thought it best to take advantage of the opportunity rarely afforded of meeting the Mahrattas in a pitched battle. Forming two lines of infantry and cavalry, Major-general Wellesley advanced to the attack. A body of 500 foot, supposed to have been Persian mercenaries, rushed upon the 74th and 78th regiments with desperation, and were destroyed to a man. Sindia's horse charged the British sepoy, but were repulsed; after which the ranks of the enemy fell into confusion and fled, pursued by the British cavalry, assisted by auxiliary bodies of Mysoor and Mogul horse. The loss of the victors, in killed, wounded, and missing, was 346 men; that of the Mahrattas is nowhere stated, but must have been very considerable.

The siege of Gawilghur, invested on the 5th of December, involved no ordinary amount of labour and fatigue, in consequence of the difficulty of carrying the guns and stores to the point of attack. The outer fort was taken by storm on the 15th; the inner fort was escaladed by the light company of the 94th, headed by Captain Campbell, who opened the gates and admitted the rest of the assailants.*

The confederate chieftains had by this time become extremely solicitous for the termination of war. The rajah of Berar dispatched vakeels or envoys to the British camp the day after the battle of Argaum; but in consequence of the inveterate manœuvring and procrastination of the Mahrattas, even when really desirous of concluding a treaty, affairs were not finally arranged until the 17th of December. By the treaty of Deogaum, then signed, the rajah consented to surrender the province of Cuttack, including the district of Balasore, to the company, and to relinquish to the Nizam certain revenues extorted from him on various pretences. He further pledged himself to submit all differences which might arise between him and the Nizam or the peishwa to British arbitration, and promised to receive into his service no European or American subject of any state at war with the English, nor even any Englishman, without the express sanction of the governor-general.

Sindia had now no alternative but to

* The defence had been gallantly conducted by two Rajpoot leaders, whose bodies were found amid a heap of slain. Their wives and daughters were intended to have all shared their fate; but the ter-

rible order had been imperfectly performed with steel weapons, instead of by the usual method of fire; and though several died, the majority being carefully tended, recovered of their wounds.—(*Wellesley Desp.*)

make peace on such terms as the conquerors thought fit to grant; and on the 30th of December he signed the treaty of Surjee Anjengaum in the British camp, by which he ceded his rights over the country between the Jumna and the Ganges (including the cities of Delhi and Agra), and to the northward of the Rajpoot principalities of Jeypoor and Joudpoor; also the forts of Ahmedabad and Broach, with their dependent districts. On the south he yielded Ahmednuggur to the peishwa, and some extensive districts to the Nizam. In return, the leading places conquered during the war, not above named, were restored to him. Shortly after this arrangement, Sindia entered the general alliance of which the British government formed the dominant portion, and agreed to receive a subsidiary British force, whose expenses were to be furnished from the revenue of the territories already ceded.

The leading objects of the war had been fully carried out, in accordance with the plans of the governor-general. Among the less conspicuous but important services rendered by Lake, were the formation of alliances with the rajahs of Jeypoor, Joudpoor, Boondi, and Macherry; with the Jat rajah of Bhurtpoor, the rana of Gohud, and Ambajee Inglia, the unfaithful successor of Perron in the service of Sindia.* Lord Wellesley was anxious to maintain the independence of the Rajpoot principalities against Mahratta aggressions, both as a matter of justice and policy. Their territories were guaranteed to them against external enemies, with immunity from tribute; but they were not to receive European officers into their service without the sanction of the British government, and were to defray the expense of any auxiliary force required to repel invaders from their dominions.

WAR WITH HOLCAR.—Despite so many brilliant victories, attended with such substantial results, the British armies could not quit the field. During the recent hostilities, Holcar had remained in Malwa, levying enormous contributions upon the adjoining provinces. The success of the British arms seems to have convinced him of his mistake in neglecting to co-operate with chiefs of his own nation against a power whose efforts were steadily directed to the sup-

pression of the predatory warfare by which he had reached, and could alone expect to maintain, his present position. When too late he bestirred himself to negotiate with the Rajpoots, the Bhurtpoor rajah, the Rohillas, the Seiks, and finally with Sindia, whom he recommended to break the humiliating treaty he had recently formed, and renew the war. But Sindia had suffered too severely in the late hostilities to provoke their repetition; and being, moreover, exasperated by the time-serving policy of Holcar,† he communicated these overtures to Major Malcolm, then resident in his camp. The inimical feelings entertained by Holcar, had been already manifested by the murder of three British officers in his service, on a false charge that one of them had corresponded with the commander-in-chief. Still it seemed highly improbable that he could seriously intend flinging the gauntlet at a nation whose military achievements had become the theme of every tongue in India; and the English authorities, anxious to bring matters to a speedy and amicable conclusion, invited him to send commissioners to their camp, to explain his views and desires. The Mahrattas are ever apt to treat conciliatory measures as symptomatic of weakness; and Holcar was probably influenced by some such consideration in framing the conditions for which his vakeels were instructed to stipulate with General Lake as the terms of peace, and which included leave to collect *chout* according to the custom of his ancestors, with the cession of Etawa and various other districts in the Doab and Bundelcund, formerly held by his family. Holcar had not without reason blamed Sindia for too exclusive attention to the rules of European discipline, and the neglect of the guerilla warfare which Sevajee and Bajee Rao had waged successfully against Aurungzebe. This was the weapon with which he now menaced the English, in the event of non-compliance with his demands. "Although unable," he said, "to oppose their artillery in the field, countries of many coss should be overrun, and plundered, and burnt; Lake should not have leisure to breathe for a moment, and calamities would fall on lacs of human beings in continued war by the attacks of his army, which would overwhelm like the waves of the sea."

* Sindia seized the Gohud province, and gave it in chage to Ambajee Inglia, who went over to the English. They kept Gwalior, and divided the rest of the province between the rana and Inglia.

† Ameer Khan was actually dispatched by Holcar to co-operate with Sindia; but the news of the battle of Assaye reached him on the march, and he returned as he came.—(Ameer Khan's *Memoirs*.)

Such a menace, from one of the most reckless and powerful marauders by whom the timid peasantry of Hindoostan were ever scourged, was tantamount to a declaration of war—a formality which, it may be remarked, forms no part of Mahratta warfare. Yet it was not till further indications appeared of his intention to commence hostilities at the first convenient moment, that the negotiation, which Holcar desired to gain time by protracting, was broken off, and Lord Lake and Major-general Wellesley directed to commence operations against him both in the north and the south. The governor-general entered on this new war with unaffected reluctance. Once commenced, it could not be arrested by an accommodation such as that entered into with Sindia; for a predatory power must, he thought, be completely neutralised, in justice to the peaceable subjects of more civilised governments. It was important to secure the cordial co-operation of the subsidiary and allied states against the common foe; and this was effected by the declaration of Lord Wellesley—that all territory conquered from Holcar should be divided among the British auxiliaries without reserve.

The opening of the campaign was disastrous. Major-general Wellesley could not advance in consequence of a famine which prevailed in the Deccan. Lake, after storming the fort of Rampoor (16th May, 1804), was compelled to withdraw the main army into cantonments for the rainy season, leaving Colonel Monson, with five sepoy battalions and 3,000 irregular horse, to watch the movements of the foe. The proceedings of this commander were most unfortunate. Though "brave as a lion," he wanted decision of purpose and confidence in the native troops. After making an ill-advised entrance into the dominions of the enemy, he became alarmed at the reported approach of Holcar in person; and fearing the probable failure of supplies before the British could join the Guzerat force under Colonel Murray, he retreated forthwith. A retrograde movement on the part of British troops was proverbially more hazardous in native warfare than the boldest advance. Holcar eagerly followed, attacked and defeated the irregular cavalry left in the rear to forward intelligence of his proceedings, and summoned the main body to surrender. This being indignantly refused, furious and reiterated onsets were made by him on the sepoy battalions at the

Mokundra pass, which they resisted with steadiness and success, till, at evening, their assailants drew off a few miles. Monson, not considering his position tenable, continued the retreat; the native troops behaved admirably, and, though harassed by the enemy, and exposed to heavy rains, reached Kotah in two marches.

Kotah was a Rajpoot principality, originally formed of lands separated from Boondi. It remained for above a century and a-half of secondary importance, until it fell beneath the sway of Zalim Sing, a Rajpoot of the Jhala tribe, who governed under the name of regent—it would appear, with the full consent of the rightful prince or rana, Omeida Sing. Zalim Sing played a difficult part with extraordinary ability, and by dint of consummate art, perfect self-control, and unfailing energy, so steered the vessel of state, that while every other Rajpoot principality tottered under the effects of the furious attacks or undermining intrigues of the encroaching Mahrattas, Boondi, though ever first to bend to the storm, raised her head as soon as it had passed over, as if strengthened by the trial. Excessive humility and moderation formed the disguise beneath which the regent attained the position of a general arbitrator in the never-ceasing disputes of neighbouring governments, which he fostered under pretence of mediation. His deep duplicity did not preserve him from incurring strong personal hostility; and Tod, after narrating no less than eighteen attempts at his assassination, represents him as sleeping in an iron cage for security. At the time at which we have now arrived, "the Nestor of India" was about sixty-five years of age. His position was one of peculiar difficulty. To keep peace with Holcar he had paid dearly, both in money and character, having stooped to form an intimate alliance with Ameer Khan as a means of averting the scourge of indiscriminate plunder from the fertile fields of Boondi, great part of which were cultivated for his exclusive benefit; yet Colonel Monson, on his arrival with the weary and half-famished troops, demanded from the regent nothing less than their admission into the city, which could not be granted without creating great confusion and insuring the deadly vengeance of the Mahrattas. To the English, Zalim Sing was yet more unwilling to give offence. Their paramount authority was being daily augmented and consolidated; nor could he

doubt that Kotah, like other native principalities, would eventually do well to find in a dependent alliance on the dominant power, an alternative from complete extinction.* Even now, he was ready to make common cause with the retreating and dispirited troops, or to do anything for their succour, to the extent of his ability, outside the walls of Kotah; but the pertinacity of Monson in demanding admittance was unavailing, and the detachment marched on to Rampoor, through an inundated country barely traversable for the troops, and impracticable for cannon and stores, which were consequently destroyed and abandoned. A reinforcement sent with supplies by General Lake, gave temporary relief to the harassed soldiers, but could not remedy the incapacity of their commander; and after many more struggles and reverses,† attended with a complete loss of baggage on the road to Agra, the confusion of one very dark night brought matters to a climax; the troops fairly broke and fled in separate parties to the city, where the majority of the fugitives who escaped the pursuing cavalry, found an asylum on the 31st of July, 1804.

These proceedings increased the rabble force of Holcar tenfold. Adventurers and plunderers of all descriptions (including the wreck of the armies of Sindia and the Bhonslay) flocked to his standard; and after making the regent of Kotah pay a fine of ten lacs for his partial assistance of the English,‡ the Mahratta chief invaded their territories, at the head of an immense army,§ in the character of a conqueror. At his approach the British troops abandoned Muttra with its stores; but the fort was reoccupied by a detachment sent by General Lake, who had marched hastily from Cawnpore, in hopes of bringing the enemy to action. He was, however, completely outwitted by Holcar, who occupied the attention of the British general by manœuvring his cavalry; while his infantry, by

a rapid movement, succeeded in investing Delhi. The city, ten miles in circumference, had but a ruined wall, with scarcely more than 800 sepoy, for its defence; nevertheless, these troops, headed by Lieutenant-colonels Ochterlony and Burn, after nine days' operations, compelled a force of 20,000 men to raise the siege.|| Holcar, with his cavalry, withdrew to the Doab, whither he was followed by Lake, who, after a long pursuit, by marching fifty-three miles in twenty-four hours, eventually came up with the enemy on the 17th of November, under the walls of Furruckabad. The Indian horse never could stand a charge in the field; their leader knew this, and was himself the first to fly, followed by his panic-struck adherents, of whom 3,000 were cut to pieces by the victors, and the rest escaped only by the superior swiftness of their horses. The Mahratta chief made his way to Deeg, a strong fort belonging to Runjeet Sing of Bhurtpoor, a Jat leader, who, after the defeat of the detachment under Monson, had quitted the English, and joined the opposite interest.

The determined proceedings of Lake induced the confederate chiefs to evacuate Deeg and retreat to Bhurtpoor, a city not very formidable in appearance, of six to eight miles in circumference, defended by a high mud wall, and a broad ditch not easily fordable. But the rajah was skilful and desperate. Holcar had little to boast of; for while himself heading a defeated army in the field, his strongholds, in various quarters, had been reduced by the English; and a detachment of troops from Guzerat had occupied Indore, and were preparing to intercept his retreat. Still he was a marauder by profession, whose kingdom was in his saddle; whereas the Jat rajah truly declared he had no home but in his castle—every hope was bound up in its battlements. The defence was most determined; and even when a practicable breach had been effected, attempts to take the place by storm were neutralised by the ready inven-

* When Colonel Tod was employed in forming an alliance between the supreme government and the Kotah principality, he took an opportunity of assuring Zalim Sing that the English desired no more territory. The old politician smiled, as he answered—"I believe you think so; but the time will come when there will be but one sicca (stamp of sovereignty on coin) throughout India. You stepped in at a lucky time; the *p'foot* (a sort of melon, which bursts asunder when fully matured) was ripe, and you had only to take it bit by bit. It was not your power so much as our disunion that made you sovereigns, and will keep you so."—(*Rajasthan*, i., 766.)

† When the younger European officers were heart-sick, and well-nigh sinking with fatigue, the sepoys were frequently heard bidding them be of good cheer; for they would carry them safely to Agra.—(Duff.)

‡ Zalim Sing and Holcar (both one-eyed men) met in boats on the Chumbul, each fearing treachery.

§ According to Malcolm, Holcar's army comprised 92,000 men (66,000 cavalry, 7,000 artillery, 19,000 infantry), with 190 guns.—(*Central India*, i., 238.)

|| The sepoys were on duty day and night. To keep up their spirits under incessant fatigue, Ochterlony had sweetmeats served out, and promised them half a month's pay when the enemy was repulsed.

tion of the besieged. Stockades and bulwarks rose as if by magic to blockade the breach; the moat was rendered unfordable by dams; and, during the attack, pots filled with combustibles, and burning cotton-bales steeped in oil, were flung upon the heads of the assailants. The British were four times repulsed, with a total loss of 3,203 men in killed and wounded; nor did even their highly-prized military reputation escape unimpaired. On one occasion, the famous 76th, in conjunction with the 75th, refused to follow their officers after the 12th Bengal sepoys had planted the colours on the top of the rampart. The bitter reproaches of their general recalled them to a sense of duty, and, overpowered with shame, they entreated to be led to a last attack, in which they displayed much desperate but unavailing courage. The operations of the siege were for a time intermitted to procure further reinforcements. The rajah, convinced that his destruction, however temporarily retarded, was but a question of time, offered twenty lacs of rupees, with other concessions, as the price of peace, and the proposal was accepted, although at the risk of leaving on the minds of the natives a dangerous example of successful resistance. The advanced state of the season, the fear of the hot winds, together with the menacing attitude of Sindia, then under the influence of his father-in-law, the notorious Shirjee Rao Ghatgay, were sufficient reasons for refraining from engaging the flower of the British army, at a critical period, in a contest with a desperate man, who, if mildly treated, might be neutralised at once. The son of the rajah of Bhurtpoor was therefore taken as a hostage for the fidelity of his father, and the restoration of the fortress of Deeg held forth as its reward. The force of Holcar had been reduced by desertion, more than by actual loss, to less than a fourth of its number at the opening of the campaign. The separate treaty entered into by the rajah of Bhurtpoor left him no hope but in the co-operation of Sindia, who affected to be desirous of mediating with the British government on his behalf. The power of both chiefs was, however, broken, and few obstacles remained towards a general pacification, on terms very advantageous to the English; when their whole policy was abruptly changed by the passing of the office of governor-general from the hands of the Marquis Wellesley into those of Lord Cornwallis, in 1805.

As early as January, 1802, Lord Wellesley had signified to the Court of Directors his desire of quitting India. The motives for the proffered resignation were various. They included several acts, on the part of the directory, which the marquis deemed derogatory to the reputation of himself and his brothers, as well as to that of his stanch coadjutor, Lord Clive, the governor of Madras; but the chief ground of complaint was the disfavour shown to his favourite scheme of founding a college at Calcutta, for the express instruction of young civilians in the description of knowledge absolutely requisite for the fulfilment of their allotted duties. The glaring ignorance of native languages evinced by European rulers, had long been a manifest hindrance to the good government of the people of India, as well as a bar to the kindly intercourse which might otherwise have subsisted. It was this primary defect which the marquis hoped to rectify, and at the same time to infuse into the youths of the service something of the *esprit de corps*, which he remembered with such vivid pleasure to have existed at Eton. The *College of Fort William* was his favourite project. The company did not deny the want of systematic instruction, which was daily more painfully felt; but they could not be brought to consent to the expenditure which Lord Wellesley deemed absolutely needful to fulfil the double object of educating Europeans and affording encouragement to native talent. The Board of Control supported the views of Lord Wellesley; but the project was, after all, but very imperfectly carried out, so far as the Indian population was concerned: for the instruction of civilians destined to serve the E. I. Cy., a college (Haileybury) was founded in England a few years later. Another cause which rendered the governor-general unpopular with his employers, was his deliberate and avowed opinion in favour of the extension of trade with England to India-built shipping, instead of confining it solely to the chartered vessels of the E. I. Cy. Despite the obvious policy, as well as justice, of this measure, as the only means of preventing Indian commerce from finding its way to Europe by more objectionable channels, "the shipping interest," then greatly predominant in the counsels of the company, violently opposed any alteration which should trench on their monopoly, and contrived, in many ways, to render Lord Wel-

lesley sensible of their unfriendly feelings. Nevertheless, his proffered resignation was deprecated by an entreaty to remain at least another year, to settle the newly-acquired territories, and concert with the home authorities the foundation of an efficient system for the liquidation of the Indian debt. The renewal of war with the Mah-rattas, despite the brilliant success with which it was attended, could not but involve an increase of immediate expenditure, though compensated by a more than proportionate augmentation of territory. But the investments were impeded; and a failure in the annual supplies was ill borne by the company, however advantageous the promise of ulterior advantages; consequently, a clamour arose against the marquis as a war-governor, which decided his recall at the time when all material obstacles were removed, and his whole energies directed towards the attainment of a solid and durable peace. He had been sent out for the express purpose of cradicating French influence, an object which he had completely accomplished, though, of necessity, at the cost of much war and more diplomacy.*

The Wellesley administration—from 1798 to 1805—formed a new era in the annals of the E. I. Cy. Principles of honour and public spirit were engrafted which bore much fruit in after days; and many a friendless cadet of the civil and military service found in rapid promotion the direct reward of talent and integrity. Nay, more; there are honoured veterans still with us, who, after the lapse of half a century, delight to attribute their success to the generous encouragement or kindly warnings of the good and gifted Marquis Wellesley.†

Perfect toleration was his leading rule; nevertheless, he did not hesitate to interfere for the suppression of such heathen customs as were manifestly incompatible with the spirit of a Christian government; such as the frightful amount of infanticide annually

* Into his minor measures, especially the restrictions placed on the liberty of the press, it is not practicable to enter: the motives for some of them were purely political—to check the conveyance of dangerous information, or lying rumours to foreign states; while the edict forbidding the publication of newspapers on Sundays, had the double object of reverence for the sabbath and a desire to show the nations, that not only the missionaries, but the Europeans in general had a religion—a fact which might well have been doubted.

† The rising talent of the civil service was called out in a peculiar manner by Lord Wellesley. The youths of the three presidencies, who had distin-

committed at the mouth of the Ganges. Neither was he withheld, by timid or sectarian views, from affording liberal encouragement to the able and zealous men (Buchanan and Carey, for instance) who had devoted themselves to the office of Christian missionaries. To all around him engaged in the cause of religion or good government, he extended cordial sympathy as fellow-workers; and if a shadow of blame can be cast on his ever-discriminating praise, it would be that of having been sometimes too liberally bestowed. But the full measure of love and confidence he gave so freely, was returned into his own bosom. Military and civil officials, of all ranks and classes—from the Earl of Elgin, at Constantinople, and Lord Clive, at Madras, to the humblest clerk—vied in affording the fullest and most correct information for the use of the governor-general; and the merchants and bankers seconded his measures in the most effective manner by furnishing government loans on the lowest possible terms. At the close of the administration of Sir John Shore, it had been difficult to raise money on usurious interest; but the Marquis Wellesley, on the eve of a hazardous war, found men who could appreciate the policy of his measures, and make them practicable, even at considerable pecuniary risk.‡

The general feeling in India was, unhappily, not appreciated or shared in England. The marquis returned, after an arduous and brilliantly successful administration, to find the uncertain tide of popular feeling turned against him. The British public were well acquainted with the aggressive and grasping policy of Hastings, and the manner in which he had made the weakness or wickedness of native princes conduce to the aggrandisement of his employers or his own personal interest. It was a very natural conclusion to be arrived at by persons ignorant of the general disorganisation of India, that a governor who had added hun-

guished themselves in their examinations at the college of Fort William, were placed in the secretary's office of the governor-general, and educated under his immediate care for the respective departments, for the duties of which they were best fitted. Of those thus brought forward, three (Metcalf, Adams, and Butterworth Bayley) became acting governors-general; and the majority attained high positions in India and in England.

‡ Mr. (afterwards Sir Charles) Forbes, the head of the well-known firm at Bombay, was the chief of those who, by taking up government paper at par, as well as furnishing supplies, restored the confidence of the wealthy natives in the stability of the E. I. Cy.

dreds of miles and thousands of subjects to an empire, which Hastings had been stigmatised as an usurper and oppressor for increasing by units and tens, must have been guilty of the same sins in an aggravated degree. Besides, the augmentation of territory and population had been effected in the teeth of a parliamentary prohibition of the most decided character. The oldest and ablest Indian politicians vainly strove to show the utter impracticability of neutrality, and argued that England, now the dominant power, could not relinquish her high position in measure, but must, of necessity, abandon territorial sovereignty and commercial advantage in almost equal degree. The company were smarting beneath the expenses of a war, which a little patience would have brought to the most satisfactory conclusion, by the prostration of the predatory power, which was equally opposed to all regular governments, foreign or native. But no! an immediate compromise was the order of the day; the withdrawal of the plundering Mahrattas from the company's territories was a relief to be obtained upon any terms, even by a direct violation of the pledge voluntarily given to the Rajpoot states to maintain their independence against their marauding foes. What matter if all Rajast'-han were overrun by these eastern Goths. The company's investments would go on meanwhile; and when Sindia and Holcar had quite exhausted all outside the magic circle, it would be time enough to devise some other sop wherewith to engage them. This selfish policy, disguised by the few who understood the real state of the case by much abstract reasoning regarding the admitted justice of non-interference in general, deceived many good men and raised a strong, though short-lived clamour, against the champion of the opposite system. The feeling of certain leaders in the directory, joined with party politics of a very discreditable description in the ministry, found a channel in the person of a *ci-devant* trader named Paull, who, having accumulated a large fortune in India, came to England and entered parliament in the character of impeacher of the Marquis Wellesley, to whom, by his own account, he owed heavy obligations, and entertained, in common with the generality of Anglo-Indians, "the highest respect." The leading accusations were aggressions on native states: extravagance and disregard of home authorities,—at speculation or venality, not even

calumny dared hint. The first charge regarding Oude was thrown out by the House of Commons, and the accuser died by his own hand, prompted by vexation or remorse. Lord Folkstone strove to carry on the impeachment by moving a series of condemnatory resolutions, which were negatived by a majority of 182 to 31, and followed by a general vote of approbation. Thus ended, in May, 1808, a persecution which cost the noble marquis £30,000, and excluded him from office during its continuance; for, with rare delicacy, he refused repeated solicitations to re-enter the service of the Crown until the pending question should be satisfactorily settled. He lived to see the general recognition of the wisdom of his policy; and on the publication of his *Despatches* in 1834-'5, the E. I. Cy. made the *amende honorable*, by the unusual procedure of the erection of his statue in the E. I. House,* a grant of £20,000, and the circulation of his *Despatches* for the instruction and guidance of their servants in India. He died beloved and honoured, aged eighty-three; having twice filled the office of viceroy of Ireland—been secretary of state for foreign affairs; beside other distinguished positions. This is not the place to tell of the efficient manner in which the illustrious brothers worked together for the defeat of the national foe, Napoleon: here we have to do with the marquis as an Indian governor; in that character let the pen of the historian of the E. I. Cy. speak his merits. "The Marquis Wellesley was ambitious; but his ambition sought gratification not in mere personal aggrandisement, but in connecting his own fame with that of the land to which he belonged, and of the government which he administered,—in the diffusion of sound and liberal knowledge, and the extension of the means of happiness among millions of men who knew not his person, and some of them scarcely his name. That name is, however, stamped for ever on their history. The British government in India may pass away—its duration, as far as human means are concerned, will depend on the degree in which the policy of the Marquis Wellesley is maintained or abandoned—but whatever its fate, or the length of its existence, the name and memory of the greatest statesman by whom it was ever administered are imperishable."†

* Lord Wellesley remarked, that to witness this compliment (rarely paid until after death), was "like having a peep at one's own funeral."

† Thornton's *India*, iii., 575.

SECOND ADMINISTRATION OF LORD CORNWALLIS.—The new governor arrived at Fort William in July, 1805, and immediately assumed the reins of office. The interval of thirteen years between his resignation and resumption of authority in India, had told heavily on his strength of mind as well as of body, and the once indefatigable commander-in-chief returned to the scene of his former successes a worn and weary man, fast sinking to the grave under the infliction of chronic dysentery. Yet the English authorities, in accordance with popular opinion, declared him to be the only man fit to curb and limit the too extensive dominion obtained by the late administration in conjunction with the gallant Lake, whose services, though their effects were denounced, had been acknowledged by a peerage.

Lord Cornwallis had given proof of moderation by suffering Tippoo to purchase peace with a third of his revenues, and had rather relaxed than straitened the connexion of the E. I. Cy. with various native states. Despite the unsatisfactory results of his arrangements, and still more so of those formed by Sir John Shore, the Directory and Board of Control agreed in reverting to the non-intervention system, and urged the arduous office of effecting an immediate and total change of policy upon the ex-governor-general with so much vehemence, that he, from self-denying but mistaken views of duty, would not suffer failing health to excuse the non-fulfilment of what, with strange infatuation, was pressed on him as a public duty. It is not easy to understand the process of reasoning by which Lord Cornwallis was led to adopt such extreme opinions regarding the measures to be taken towards Sindia and Holcar. He had warmly approved the arrangements of the Marquis Wellesley regarding the occupation of Seringapatam and the complete suppression of the usurping dynasty; yet, now the arrogant and aggressive Sindia, and the predatory Holcar were to be conciliated, not simply by the surrender of a succession of dearly-purchased conquests, but by the renunciation of alliance with the Rajpoot and other states, who had taken part with the British forces against the marauding Mahrattas in the late crisis.

Sindia had suffered, if not caused, the English residency attached to his camp to be attacked and plundered by a body of Pindarries, and had himself detained Mr. Jenkins; yet no reparation was to be de-

manded for this outrage: and the governor-general, in his impatient desire to conclude a peace, would even have waived insisting upon the release of the resident; but from this last degrading concession the English were happily saved by the intervention of Lord Lake. Nothing could exceed the indignation of the brave and honest general on learning the nature of the proposed treaty, which he felt to be based on the unworthy principle of conciliating the strong at the expense of the weak. The territories conquered from Holcar had been distinctly promised to be divided among the allies of England; instead of which, they were all to be restored to the defeated chief; and the breach of faith thus committed towards the only power able to resent it, was to be repaired at the expense of the powerless rana of Gohud, who had made over Gwalior to the English on being enrolled among the list of subsidiary princes. He was now to be reduced to the condition of a mere stipendiary, dependent on his hereditary foe for subsistence; for all Gohud, including Gwalior, was to be given to propitiate the favour of Sindia—"an act," writes the governor-general, "entirely gratuitous on our part." Equally so was the renunciation of our connexion with the numerous rajahs, zemindars, jaghiredars, and other chiefs on the further side of the Jumna, for whose protection the British faith had been solemnly pledged. Lord Lake, who had been mainly instrumental in forming the majority of these alliances, and had, in his capacity of commander-in-chief, received material assistance from several of the parties concerned, addressed an earnest remonstrance to the governor-general against the proposed repudiation, declaring that the weaker allied princes never could be induced by any argument or temporary advantage to renounce the promised support of the E. I. Cy., and that the bare proposition would be viewed "as a prelude to their being sacrificed to the object of obtaining a peace with the Mahrattas." This communication bore date the day following that on which Lord Cornwallis expired. For some time before his death, he passed the morning hours in a state of weakness amounting to insensibility; but the evening usually brought him sufficient strength to hear despatches read, and even to dictate replies. Had the energetic appeal and arguments of Lake been sent a few days earlier, they might perhaps have been instrumental in delaying and modifying the

ungenerous and selfish measures which cost England so dearly in character and blood and treasure, by strengthening the predatory power it was alike her duty and her interest to abase. It is hardly possible that the man who steadily befriended the rajah of Coorg, even at the hazard of renewing a perilous war with Tippoo, could seriously intend to abandon the Rajpoot and other princes to the shameless marauders against whom they had recently co-operated with the English, unless prejudice and ignorance, aided by mental debility, had blinded him to the plain facts of the case. But whatever effect the honest exposition of Lake was calculated to produce on the mind of Lord Cornwallis, can be only surmised from his habitual conscientiousness. He had been extremely desirous of personally superintending the progress of the negotiations, and hoped by short and easy stages to reach headquarters; but at Ghazipoor near Benares, an accession of weakness stopped his journey, and after lingering some time in the state previously described, he died there October 5th, 1805, aged sixty-six years.

No provision had been made by the home government to meet this highly probable event.* Sir George Barlow, the senior member of council, on whom the chief authority temporarily devolved, had been associated with Lord Wellesley throughout his whole administration, and cordially seconded his lordship's views regarding subsidiary alliances. During the last illness of Lord Cornwallis, while hourly expecting his own accession to power, Sir George had expressed in writing "his confident hope that an accommodation would be effected with Sindia and with Holcar, on terms not differing essentially from those to which he was aware that Lord Wellesley was prepared to accede." Most certainly his lordship would never have consented to an accommodation which involved a direct breach of faith with numerous weak states. Sir George must have known this; but his conduct was in perfect accordance with the principle which enabled a certain well-known individual "to

live and die vicar of Bray." The result was, however, less satisfactory; for though the E. I. directors were inclined to reward implicit obedience to their mandates with the highest position in their gift, the ministers of the crown were not equally compliant; and although they also were desirous of purchasing peace on any terms, the recent appointment was neutralised, and a rule laid down that thenceforth no servant of the company should fill the office of governor-general. Sir George was placed in charge of Madras; but before his removal from Calcutta he had contrived to neutralise, as far as possible, the effects of the measures which he had assisted in enacting; his avowed expectation being that the native states, when left to themselves, would forthwith engage in a series of conflicts which would, for the present at least, keep them fully employed, and prevent the renewal of hostilities with the English. Sindia† and Holcar received the proffered concessions with unmixed astonishment at the timidity or vacillation of their lately dreaded foe. The Rajpoot and other princes indignantly remonstrated against the renunciation of an alliance pressed upon them by the British government in her hour of need. The rajah of Jeypoor, who had especially provoked the vengeance of the Mahrattas, felt deeply aggrieved by the faithlessness with which he was treated, and his bitter reproaches were conveyed to Lord Lake through the mouth of a Rajpoot agent at Delhi. Disgusted at being made the instrument of measures which he denounced, and at the almost‡ total disregard manifested towards his representations, Lord Lake resigned his diplomatic powers in January, 1806, and after about twelve months spent in completing various necessary arrangements regarding the forces, and settling, agreeably to the instructions of the government, the claims of various native chiefs, he quitted India, leaving behind him a name that will be honoured and beloved so long as the Indian army shall subsist.§ He died in England, 21st February, 1808, aged 64.

* Lord Grenville publicly stated, that it had been generally supposed in London that Lord Cornwallis would not bear the voyage; and, in any case, could not long survive his arrival in India.—(Thornton.)

† One of the few concessions demanded from Sindia was the exclusion from office of his father-in-law; but even this was eventually renounced, and Shirzee Rao became again paramount. Happily his audacity at length grew offensive to Sindia, and an altercation took place which enabled the attendants,

under pretence of securing the person, to take the life of a miscreant whose memory is still execrated in Poona for the cruel oppression practised there.

‡ Lord Lake was so far successful, that his representations against the immediate danger, as well as faithlessness, of dissolving the alliance with the rajahs of Macherri and Bhurtpoor, induced Sir George to delay the execution of a determination which he nevertheless declared to be unchanged.

§ Major-general Wellesley, after receiving a

Little difference of opinion now exists regarding the accommodation effected with the Mahrattas. The non-intervention policy was soon abandoned; but its results justify the declaration of Grant Duff, that the measures of Sir George Barlow were no less short-sighted and contracted than selfish and indiscriminating. His provisional administration terminated in July, 1807,* its concluding event being an alarming mutiny among the native troops in the Carnatic. The immediate cause was the enforcement of certain frivolous changes of dress, together with other orders trivial in character, but involving a needless interference with the manners and customs of the soldiery, which had been introduced without the knowledge of Lord William Bentinck, the successor of Lord Clive in the government of Madras. "The new regulations required the sepoys to appear on parade with their chins clean shaved, and the hair on the upper lip cut after the same pattern, and never to wear the distinguishing mark of caste, or their carrings when in uniform. A turban of a new pattern was also ordered for the sepoys."†

These ill-advised changes might possibly have been accomplished without occasioning any serious disturbance, had a cordial understanding subsisted between the British and the native officers. But this was not the case; and the consequence of the alienation existing between them was, that the sons of Tippoo Sultan, then resident at Vellore, took advantage of the princely income and unusual degree of liberty allowed them as state prisoners, to assemble a large band of adherents, who made it their business to inspire the soldiery with aversion to their foreign masters, on the ground that the newly-devised turban, and its concomitants, though ostensibly ordered for the sake of convenience and unanimity, were really the tokens and forerunners of a forcible conversion to Christianity. The assertion was an utter absurdity. The Hindoos themselves, whose creed makes no provision for con-

verts, were scarcely more devoid of proselytising zeal than the English had shown themselves, despite the opposite tendency of a religion which directs its professors "to preach the gospel to all nations." The military officers had, as a body (for there were exceptions), no need to defend themselves against any imputation of over-anxiety to manifest the excellencies of their faith in their lives and conversation, or by any encouragement of missionary labours. Of Christianity the natives in the vicinity of Vellore knew nothing, and were consequently ready to believe just anything, except that its divine Founder had enjoined on all his disciples a code so fraught with humility, chastity, and brotherly kindness, that if observed it must infallibly render Christians a blessing to every state, whether as rulers or as subjects.

Rumours of the growing disaffection were abroad, but excited little attention in the ears of those most concerned. Unmistakable symptoms of mutiny appeared, and were forcibly‡ put down, until, on the 10th of July, 1806, the European part of the Vellore garrison were attacked by their native colleagues, and Colonel Fancourt and 112 Europeans had perished or been mortally wounded, before Colonel Gillespie, at the head of a body of dragoons, terminated a contest which involved the destruction of about 350 of the mutineers, and the imprisonment of 500 more. Lord William Bentinck became the sacrifice of measures adopted without his sanction, and was recalled, together with the commander-in-chief, Sir John Cradock. The obnoxious orders were repealed, the allowances of the sons of Tippoo were diminished, their place of imprisonment changed from Vellore to Bengal; and, by slow degrees, the panic wore off. The captive insurgents were gradually set at liberty; the cheerful obedience of the men, and their customary fidelity to those whose salt they ate, returned; and the British officers "ceased to sleep with pistols under their pillows."§

knighthood of the Order of the Bath, quitted India in 1805, ill-pleased with the manner in which the services of his brother and himself were received.

* Mill's *History of British India* terminates with the peace with the Mahrattas. In an able, but prejudiced, and without the comments of Prof. Wilson, misleading summary of the commercial results of the Wellesley administration, the revenues are shown to have been raised from £8,059,880, in 1805-6, to £15,403,409; but the war expenditure, with the interest on the increased debt, which had been tripled,

caused the annual charges to exceed the receipts by above two million. This was a temporary addition, but the revenues of the conquered territories were a permanent gain, viewed as so certain, that Barlow held forth the prospect of a million sterling as the annual surplus, to follow immediately on the restoration of peace.

† Auber's *India*, ii., 432.

‡ The severe coercion employed may be conjectured from the fact that 900 lashes each were inflicted upon two grenadiers for refusing to wear the "hat-shaped" turban. § Bentinck's *Memorial*.

ADMINISTRATION OF LORD MINTO—1806 to 1813.—The new governor-general (formerly Sir Gilbert Elliot) came to India strongly prepossessed in favour of a neutral policy, but was speedily compelled to modify his views.

Holcar, on his return to Malwa, found occupation in quelling the disturbances arising from the non-payment of arrears to his turbulent followers, who made use of the boy, Kundee Rao, to intimidate his uncle into the liquidation of their claims. The object being accomplished, the child became, as he had himself predicted, the victim of the wrath of Jeswunt Rao; and Casee Rao died suddenly soon after, having been likewise, it was supposed, assassinated to prevent the possibility of the rights of any legitimate descendant of Tukajee being brought into collision with those of Jeswunt Rao. These and other atrocities were the forerunners of madness, which appeared in temporary paroxysms, with intervals of partial sanity, employed by Jeswunt in making extensive military preparations, especially in casting cannon, a work which he superintended night and day, using stimulants to supply the place of food and rest. It soon became necessary to confine him; and twenty to thirty men with difficulty succeeded in binding the despot fast with ropes, like a wild beast. His fierce struggles gradually subsided into speechless fatuity, and, at the expiration of three years, during the greater part of which he was fed like an infant with milk, the dreaded freebooter died a miserable idiot in his own camp, on the 20th of October, 1811.* Before his insanity, Holcar had taken advantage of the withdrawal of British protection to ravage and pillage the states of Rajast'han, especially Jeypoor or Amber, under the old pretext of exacting arrears of chout. The quarrels of the Rajpoot princes gave full scope for his treacherous interference. The hand of Crishna Kumari, the high-born daughter of the rana of Oodipoor, was an object of dispute between Juggut Sing of Jeypoor, and Maun Sing of Joudpoor. Holcar was bought off by Juggut Sing, but this arrangement did not prevent him from suffering his general, Ameer Khan, to hire his services to the opposite party. The chief commenced his task by ridding the rajah of Joudpoor of a rebellious feudatory, named

Sevace Sing, whom he deluded, by oaths and protestations of friendship, into visiting his camp. The intended victim entered the spacious tent of the Patan with a body of friends and attendants, and was received with every demonstration of respect. Ameer Khan invented a plausible pretext for a short absence, and caused the cords of the tent to be suddenly loosened; then, taking advantage of the confusion, he ordered a sharp fire of musketry and grape to be poured indiscriminately on the whole of the crowded assembly. The massacre was complete; and not only the companions of the betrayed Rajpoot, but those of Ameer Khan himself, with a party of dancing-girls and musicians, were mercilessly sacrificed. The rana of Oodipoor was seriously alarmed by the enmity of so unprincipled an adversary. He vainly appealed to the British government, as possessing the paramount authority in India, to interfere for the protection of their oppressed neighbour: his entreaties, like those of Zalim Sing, were disregarded, and the proud representative of the Surya race (the offspring of the sun) was compelled to fraternise with the infamous Patan adventurer by the exchange of turbans, as well as to subsidise his troops at the cost of a fourth of the revenues of the principality. This was in itself deep abasement, but worse remained behind. Ameer Khan, in conjunction with Ajeet Sing, a Rajpoot noble, whose memory is, for his conduct on this occasion, execrated throughout Rajast'han, succeeded in convincing the unhappy rana, that the death of his child was absolutely necessary to save the principality from destruction at the hands of the rival suitors. With his consent, poison was mixed with the food of the princess; but she ate sparingly, and its murderous purpose was not accomplished. The high-spirited girl, on discovering the design thus temporarily frustrated, bade her father attempt no more concealment, since, if his welfare and the safety of the state required it, she was ready to die by her own act. Accordingly, having bathed and dressed, as if for a nuptial feast, she drank off the poison. The first two draughts proved harmless, for nature revolted, and the noxious beverage was rejected; but the third time a more insidious preparation was administered, and Crishna

* Holcar was of middle height, remarkably strong and active. A small but handsome mausoleum was erected to his memory near Rampoor, and his favourite horse ranged in freedom around it. Tod describes

this animal with enthusiasm, as the very model of a Mahratta charger, with small and pointed ears, full protruding eyes, and a mouth that could drink out of a tea-cup.—(*Rajast'han*, ii., 720.)

slept to wake no more in this life. Her mother died of grief; her father survived to endure the galling reproaches of some of his most faithful chiefs; and Oodipoor, so far from benefiting by the unnatural crime, lost from that hour its remaining glories.*

Ameer Khan, elated by success, grew more daring in his plans; and, attended by large bodies of Pindarries, undertook, in 1809, an expedition against the indolent and effeminate rajah of Berar. Lord Minto became alarmed by the probable subversion of the principality, and, departing from the non-intervention policy, sent a strong detachment for the defence of Nagpoor, and notified to the invader that the territories of the rajah were under British protection. A blustering and defiant reply was returned, upon which Colonel Close marched into Malwa, and occupied Seronje, the capital of Ameer Khan, with other of his possessions. The strict commands of the home authorities, together with considerations of finance, prevented the governor-general from following up these vigorous measures by the complete overthrow of "one of the most notorious villains India ever produced;"† and the immediate safety of Berar having been secured, Ameer Khan was suffered to escape with undiminished powers of mischief. Before the close of his administration, Lord Minto had reason to repent this mistaken lenity. Berar was again invaded, and one quarter of the capital burnt by the Patan and Pindarry freebooters, a party of whom proceeded to set at nought British authority, by an irruption into the fertile province of Mirzapoor. The advisability of reverting to the bold and generous policy of the Marquis Wellesley became evident; and Lord Minto, whose term of office had nearly expired, urged upon the directors the necessity of vigorous measures. Indeed,

* Malcolm's *Central India*, i., 340. Tod's *Rajasthan*, i., 466. Malcolm states, that the circumstances attending the death of the princess excited loud and bitter wailing throughout the city of Oodipoor. An aged chief, named Sugwan Sing, having heard of the intended sacrifice, mounted his horse and rode with breathless haste to the palace. He found the rana and his counsellors seated in solemn silence; and to his impetuous inquiry, whether Crishna were alive or dead, Ajeet Sing, the instigator of the tragedy, replied by an injunction to respect the affliction of a bereaved parent. Sugwan Sing unbuckled his sword and shield, and laid them at the feet of the rana, saying, "my ancestors have served yours for more than thirty generations, but these arms can never more be used on your behalf," then turning to Ajeet Sing, he reproached him with having brought ignominy on the Rajpoot name, add-

the leading acts of Lord Minto himself were neither of a strictly defensive nor neutral character. Sir George Barlow's withdrawal of protection from the petty chiefs south of the Sutlej, had tempted a neighbouring potentate, with whom the company had heretofore no connexion, to extend his conquests in that direction. The leader in question was the famous Runjeet Sing, rajah of Lahore, a Seik chief of Jat descent. To prevent further aggression, the minor Seik powers menaced by him were declared under British supremacy, and a strong force assembled for their defence. Runjeet Sing, unwilling to provoke a contest, concluded a treaty with the company, by which he consented never to maintain a larger body of troops on the left bank of the Sutlej than was needful to support his authority already established in that quarter. As a further guarantee for his good faith, a detachment, under Sir David Ochterlony,‡ took up a permanent station at Loodiana, on the eastern side of the river.

The multiplied aggressions of France on the vessels of the E. I. Cy., and the fear of attempts to regain a territorial position in India, induced the dispatch of embassies to Persia§ and Cabool, for the sake of forming a more intimate alliance with those kingdoms. The Mauritius, Bourbon, and the Moluccas were captured by the British in 1810; and Java, with its dependencies, was conquered by Lord Minto, in person,|| in 1811. Of these valuable acquisitions, Bourbon, the beautiful island of Java, and the Moluccas, were relinquished at the general pacification in 1815.

Some few remaining incidents of importance, which occurred in the time of Lord Minto, remain to be chronicled. The first of these is the death of the aged emperor Shah Alum, in 1806, aged eighty-

ing, as he quitted the assembly, "May the curse of a father light upon you—may you die childless." The malediction excited considerable attention, and the successive deaths of all the children of the guilty noble, were viewed as its fulfilment.

† Tod's *Rajasthan*, i., 468.

‡ Sir David Ochterlony and Runjeet Sing, like Holcar and Zalim Sing, were both one-eyed men.

§ Sir John Malcolm was sent to Persia by E. I. Cy.; Sir Harford Jones and Sir G. Ouseley, by the Crown.

|| Lord Minto had been compelled to visit Madras in 1809, in consequence of the strong dissatisfaction which prevailed among the European officers, arising from reduced allowances; but greatly aggravated by the dogged and tyrannical proceedings of the governor, Sir George Barlow. By a judicious blending of firmness and conciliation, Lord Minto succeeded in allaying an alarming tumult.

three. He was succeeded in his titular authority by his eldest son, Akber Shah, who made some feeble attempts at the acquisition of real power, but soon renounced the futile endeavour. The exertions of the Travancore authorities in 1809, to throw off the yoke of the E. I. Cy., involved some destruction of life, but terminated in the principality becoming completely dependent on Fort St. George. The tribute exacted from Cochin was also largely increased.

The last feature was an impending rupture with the Goorkas, a tribe who had come into notice about the middle of the eighteenth century, and had gradually assumed a dominant influence over the whole of the extensive valley of Nepaul. During the second administration of Lord Cornwallis, they had completed the attainment of territory (less by violence than by fraud and corruption) which presented, on the side of the English, a frontier of 700 miles. Disputes had arisen between the Goorkas and certain chiefs, who, through the cessions made by the vizier of Oude, or other arrangements, had become British feudatories. The so-called pacific policy of Lord Wellesley's successors had emboldened aggression in all quarters; and the seizure of Bhootwal (a border district of the ancient viceroyalty of Oude) was followed by renewed invasion; until, in 1813, a new turn was given to affairs by the demand of the English authorities for the immediate surrender of the usurped territories. Before an answer could arrive from the court of Nepaul, the reins of government passed from the hands of Lord Minto, who returned to England, where he died (June, 1814), aged sixty-five. He was an able and energetic man; and the removal of his prejudices paved the way for a similar change of feeling on the part of his countrymen.*

MOIRA, OR HASTINGS' ADMINISTRATION, 1813 to 1823.—Lord Moira reached Calcutta in October, and, in the following month, received the tardy reply of the Goorkalese sovereign to the demand of Lord Minto for the evacuation of Bhootwal and Sheoraj. It was complimentary in manner, but uncompromising in substance. There were many reasons for avoiding immediate hostilities in this quarter, and attempts were made to settle the question by amica-

ble negotiation; but the persistence of the commissioners from Nepaul in reviving points previously settled, being at length silenced by a positive refusal to enter on such discussions, the British agent was warned to quit the frontier; and the envoys were recalled to Katmandoo, the capital of Nepaul. Lord Moira was too anxious to avert a frontier war, to give place to hasty resentment; and he addressed a remonstrance to the Nepaulese government regarding the insulting manner in which the late negotiation had been broken off. No answer being returned to this communication, a detachment was sent from Goruckpoor to occupy the disputed lands, an object which was effected without opposition. The British troops placed the direction of affairs in the hands of native officials, and withdrew, congratulating themselves on the easy fulfilment of an unpromising task.

The position of the northern mountaineers was but very imperfectly understood by the Calcutta functionaries, who now wielded the sceptre of the Mogul. During the palmy days of the empire, while the reins of government were held by too firm a hand for servants to appropriate to themselves the delegated sway of the sovereign, the plains at the foot of the mountains, between the river Teesta on the east and the Sutlej on the west, had been possessed by numerous petty Hindoo rajahs, who became tributary to the emperor, and received, in return, protection from the aggressions of the lawless hill-chiefs, most of whom maintained their independence, though some were content to own a sort of vassalage to the empire, in return for the possession of a portion of the magnificent forest of *Sal* trees, and of the rich plain called the *Turagee*, lying between them and Hindoostan. The old highland rajahs, whose families had warred with their lowland countrymen from time immemorial, held their own during the continuance and after the decline of Mohammedan power, until one of themselves, an aspiring chief, named Prithi Narayan Sah,† rajah of the small state of Goorka, to the north-west of Nepaul, incited by the early victories of the English in Bengal, armed and disciplined a body of troops after the European fashion, and proceeded to absorb the surrounding states, in a manner described as closely

* In 1813, an attempt to impose a house-tax occasioned great excitement in the holy city of Benares: the people practised a singularly combined, and eventually successful system, of passive resistance.

† According to Col. Kirkpatrick, the Goorka dynasty claim descent from the ranas of Oodipoor. Hamilton states, they belong to the Magar tribe, which has but very partially yielded to Brahminism.

resembling that which had rendered the nation he imitated masters of India. The nabob of Moorshedabad, Meer Cossim Ali, attempted to interfere on behalf of some of the weaker chiefs in 1762-'3, but sustained a signal defeat; and an expedition sent by the Bengal government, in 1767, to succour the rajah of Nepaul, proved equally unsuccessful. Prithi Narayan died in 1771, but his successors carried on the same scheme of conquest, crossed the Gogra river, seized Kumaon, and even strove to gain possession of the rich valley of Cashmere. The lowland rajahs, when transferred by the cession of the vizier of Oude from Mussulman to British rule, were suffered to retain undisturbed possession of their territories on payment of a fixed land-tax. The Goorkalese, on the contrary, as each hill-chieftain was successively vanquished, exterminated the family, and, with the conquered possessions, took up the claims and contests of their former lords, and were thus brought in contact with numerous rajahs and zemindars, actually occupying the position of British subjects. The complaints laid before the supreme government by these persons were generally but lightly regarded; and, unless under very peculiar circumstances, the Goorkalese were treated as good neighbours, whom it was desirable to conciliate. Under a strong government at Calcutta, outrages on the frontier were of comparatively rare occurrence, and, when firmly demanded, reparation was usually made; but the unfortunate measures of Sir George Barlow incited aggressions which were not to be so easily checked as heretofore. The rajah (a prince with a long string of names, differently given by different authorities)* was a minor. The chief authority rested in the hands of a military aristocracy, headed by a powerful family called Thappa, of whom one member, Bheem Sein, exercised the office of prime minister, with the title of general, while his brother, Umur Sing, held command of the army. The expediency of war with the English was much canvassed by the Goorkalese chiefs. The decision arrived at was, that their native fastnesses would always afford an invulnerable position, and by issuing thence on predatory incursions, a state of hostility could be made more

advantageous, than peace purchased at the sacrifice of their favourite system of encroachment. The British, on their part, viewed the approaching struggle with little apprehension. The Bengal officers, especially, made sure of victory. From the days of Clive to those of Lake, with scarcely an exception, they had but to take the field and march straight against the enemy, to ensure his precipitate flight. The uncontested occupation of Bhootwal and Sheoraj, seemed the natural effect of their military reputation, and considerable surprise was excited by tidings that the Goorkalese had set them at defiance, by taking advantage of the withdrawal of the troops to surround the three police-stations in Bhootwal, where after killing and wounding twenty-four of the defenders, the superior local officer of the British had been murdered in a very barbarous manner. The governor-general demanded from the court of Katmandoo the disavowal of any share in this outrage, and the punishment of its perpetrators; but received a menacing reply, which precluded further hope of an amicable arrangement, and occasioned the issue of a declaration of war by Lord Moira in November, 1814.

The army destined for the invasion of the enemy's frontier, formed four divisions, of which the first, under Major-general Marley, comprised 8,000 men, and was intended to march against Katmandoo. The other three divisions, under Maj.-generals Wood, Gillespie, and Ochterlony (4,500, 3,500, and 6,000 strong), were directed to attack different portions of the hostile frontier; besides which, Major Latter was furnished with a body of 2,700 men for the defence of the Purneah frontier, to the eastward of the Coosy river.† The campaign opened with the siege of the petty fortress of Kalunga or Nalapane, situated on an insulated hill, a few miles from Dehra, the chief town in the Doon (or valley.) The garrison consisted of about 600 men, headed by a nephew of Umur Sing. The English expected to carry the place by storm according to custom, and the gallant Rollo Gillespie, with fatal impetuosity, led an assault, in which, while waving his hat to cheer the troops, he was shot through the heart. The siege was discontinued pending the arrival of a battering train from Delhi;

* Styled by Fraser, Jirban Joodeber Bheem Sah; by Prinsep, Maharejah Kurman Jodh Bikram Sah Bahadur Shumsheer Jung. His father was assassinated by his own brother in full durbar, in 1803. The fratricide was slain in the ensuing barbarous affray, in which most of the chief nobles perished, and the

royal family was nearly extinguished. The present rajah (then an infant) was secreted in the zenana.

† Major (now General) Latter rendered good service by his negotiations with the rajah of Sikkim (a hill state east of Nepaul), and his small detachment "accomplished more than it was destined to attempt."

but even when a breach had been effected, the soldiers, dispirited by their former repulse, could not be induced to advance. It was not until the assailants had sustained a loss, in killed and wounded, considerably beyond the entire number of the garrison, that measures were taken to shell the fort, and cut off the supply of water obtained without the walls. The besieged were compelled to evacuate the place on the 30th November, 1814. The conquerors found in the mangled bodies of hundreds of men and women, dead or dying of wounds and thirst, fearful evidence of the determination of the foe with whom they had now to deal. This inauspicious commencement seems to have inspired three out of four of the leaders of the British army (including Martindell, the successor of Gillespie) with a degree of timidity and distrust, which can scarcely be disguised beneath the name of prudence; and General Marley was struck off the staff for neglect and incompetency. General Ochterlony displayed a quickness and energy which, combined with discretion, enabled him to cope with difficulties of a new and unexpected order, and, although opposed by Umur Sing in person, to obtain triumphs to counterbalance the disasters which attended the other divisions. He had formed from the first a just estimate of the character of the enemy, whom he met with their own weapons, especially by the erection of stockaded posts, before unknown in Anglo-Indian warfare. The opening movements of the English veteran were cautious and laborious. The making of roads, and diplomatic proceedings with wavering chiefs, occupied much time before his masterly policy could be developed; but its effects were manifested by the reduction of the Ramgurh and other forts, and by the withdrawal of Umur Sing, with his entire force, to the strong position of Maloun. The stone fort thus named, and that of Soorajgurh, formed the extremities of a line of fortified posts, erected on a lofty and difficult ridge projecting into the Sutlej. Of the intervening peaks, all were occupied by stockades except Ryla peak and Deothul. Of these two, Ochterlony, on his approach, succeeded in obtaining possession; the first without difficulty, the second after a sanguinary conflict

* The Goorkalese displayed throughout the campaign an unexpected amount of chivalry, and exhibited, in many ways, their confidence in the good faith of the British. After the battle of Deothul, they asked for the body of Bhukti Sing, whose loss they loudly bemoaned, declaring that the blade of

on the 15th April, 1815. Bhukti Thappa, a famous leader, above seventy years of age, who commanded at Soorajgurh, represented to Umur Sing the necessity of dislodging the British from Deothul; and on the morning of the 16th, an attack was made by the flower of the Goorkalese army on all accessible sides.* Happily, the previous night had been spent in throwing up defences in expectation of a renewed struggle. The enemy came on with such furious intrepidity, that several men were bayoneted or cut to pieces within the works; and their fire was directed so effectively against the artillerymen, that at one time three officers and one bombardier alone remained to serve the guns. A reinforcement, with ammunition from Ryla peak, arrived at a critical moment, and the British, after acting for two hours on the defensive, became in turn assailants; Bhukti was slain, his followers put to flight, and a complete victory obtained, at the cost of 213 killed and wounded. The enemy left about 500 men on the ground before Deothul. The event afforded a great triumph to the native troops, by whom it was almost wholly achieved. It was followed by the evacuation of Soorajgurh, and the concentration of the hostile force in Maloun, against which place a battery was raised by the end of the first week in May.

In the meantime, the governor-general had been actively employed in initiating a series of spirited operations on the side of Rohilcund. While visiting the north-western provinces, he had learned that the inhabitants of Kumaon were held in rigorous subjection by the Goorkalese, who frequently seized and sold their wives and children to enforce the most arbitrary exactions. To supply the place of regular troops, levies were made from the warlike Patans of Rohilcund, under the auspices of two commanders (Gardner and Hearsey), who had come over from Sindia at the time of the Mahratta war. The corps organised by Major Hearsey was dispersed by the enemy, and its leader made prisoner; but Lieutenant Gardner succeeded in making his way into the heart of the province of Kumaon, and took up a position in sight of Almora, the capital, where a force of regular infantry and artillery, under Colonel Nicholls, joined him in their sword was broken. Ochterlony complied with the request, and sent the gory corpse, wrapped in rich shawls, in acknowledgment of the bravery of the fallen chief. His two widows sacrificed themselves on the funeral pile next day, in compliance with his injunction.—(H. T. Prinsep's *Trans. in India*, i., 170.)

the middle of April. The Setolee heights, distant from the fort about seventy yards, were gained after a severe contest; and the governor, thus closely menaced, and straitened for want of supplies, signed terms of surrender for the whole province, and for the retirement of the Goorkalese troops to the east of the Kalee river—articles which were duly executed.

Tidings of the fall of Almora facilitated the conquest of Maroun. The dispirited Goorkalese entreated Umur Sing to make terms for himself and his son Runjoor, whom General Martindell had ineffectually besieged in the fort of Jythuk. The old chief refused, declaring, that the rainy season, now close at hand, would compel the British to withdraw; and he used the most severe coercion to retain the allegiance of the troops. But in vain: the majority of both officers and men came over to the British camp as prisoners of war; and Umur Sing, with but 250 remaining adherents, beheld the batteries ready to open upon the walls of Maloun. Convinced of the hopelessness of prolonged resistance, the proud chief resigned his last stronghold, together with all the territory from Kumaon westward to the Sutlej, including, of course, Jythuk. Thus a campaign which, in January, promised nothing but disaster, terminated in May with the conquest of the whole hilly tract from the Gogra to the Sutlej, a country hitherto deemed impenetrable to Europeans. The triumph was, in fact, mainly due to native troops; of whom, with the exception of a few artillerymen, Ochterlony's division was exclusively composed. It is important to add, that this force was extremely well officered, and that its operations were materially facilitated by the ability of the field engineer, Lieutenant Lawtie, who died, aged twenty-four, of fever, brought on by excessive fatigue and exposure endured before Maloun.*

Ochterlony received a baronetcy, and a pension of £1,000 a-year in acknowledgment of his services. The governor-general was rewarded by a step in the peerage, being created Marquis of Hastings. Various important arrangements attended the conclusion, or rather interruption, of hostilities. Many of the Goorkalese entered the British service, and were formed into what were

termed the *Nuseeree* battalions; a provincial corps was also raised for civil duties in Kumaon, which now became a British province. The Doon was retained, and ultimately annexed to the Seharanpoor district. The remaining hill country was restored to the several chiefs from whom it had been wrested by Umur Sing, with the exception of a few military posts; and the whole territory was declared under British protection.

The Katmandoo government was not, however, yet sufficiently humbled to accept the terms of peace offered by Lord Hastings. Umur Sing and his sons strenuously advocated the renewal of war, in preference to suffering a British resident and military establishment to be stationed at the capital. Another object of dispute was the fertile but insalubrious Turace and the adjacent Sâl (*shorea robusta*) forest, of which, according to a Goorkalese saying, "every tree is a mine of gold."† The proposed treaty was therefore rejected, and Sir David Ochterlony again took the field in January, 1816, at the head of nearly 17,000 effective men, including three European regiments. All the known passes through the first range of hills had been carefully fortified by the enemy; but, happily, a route was discovered through a deep and narrow ravine, by which the Cherea heights were gained without resistance, and the position of the Goorkalese completely turned. The British general marched on to the beautiful valley of the Raptee, and was moving up to Mukwanpoor, when a skirmish of posts paved the way to a general action, in which he obtained a signal victory; whereupon the royal red seal was hastily affixed to the rejected treaty of Segoulee, and a duly qualified envoy presented it on his knees at the durbar of General Ochterlony, in presence of all the vakeels in the camp.

By a politic concession, a part of the Turace was surrendered to the Nepaulese. The portion skirting the Oude dominions was retained, and, together with Khyreegurb, a pergunnah of Rohilcund, was made over to Ghazi-oo-deen, in payment of a second loan of a crore of rupees obtained from him during the war, and furnished out of the hoards of his father, Sadut Ali, the late nabob-vizier, who died in 1814.

During the Goorkalese war, indications

* General Ochterlony deeply lamented his brave coadjutor. The whole army went into mourning, and afterwards erected a monument to the memory of Lieut. Lawtie in the cathedral church of Calcutta.

† The timber is used in ship-building, though far inferior to the teak of Malabar and of the Burman empire. The elephant, rhinoceros, and buffalo abound in the forest, and ravage the plain.

of a desire to take advantage of any symptom of weakness in the British government were not wanting on the part of Sindia, or even of the peishwa, who now began to think himself strong enough to stand alone, and was well inclined to kick aside the ladder by which he had risen to fortune. The triumphant conclusion of the late hostilities checked the development of these feelings, and left Lord Hastings at liberty to direct his chief attention to the suppression of the predatory bands of Pindarries and Patans, who had arisen, "like masses of putrefaction, out of the corruption of weak and expiring states."* The chief difference between them was, that the Patans were military mercenaries, associated for the purpose of invading or plundering such states as they could overpower or intimidate; while the Pindarries were cowardly and desperate banditti, whose object was universal rapine. Against both these descriptions of marauders the English authorities were compelled to be continually on the alert. The most effectual defensive measure was considered to be the establishment of subsidiary troops in Berar. The death of Ragojee Bhonslay appeared likely to facilitate this arrangement; for his only son Pursajee, being paralysed and an idiot, the nephew of the late rajah Moodajee, commonly called Appa Sahib, assumed the regency; and the better to establish his ascendancy, sought the recognition of the English at the cost of entering upon the defensive alliance which they particularly desired. Appa Sahib was, at heart, decidedly opposed to the establishment of foreign influence at Nagpoor, and no sooner felt himself firmly seated on the *gadi*, than he sought the means of recovering the purchase-money of his position by entering into negotiations with the court of Poona, then the nucleus of a powerful confederacy forming against the English—a proceeding which he accompanied by the precaution of causing his young and afflicted ward to be strangled in the night of February 1st, 1817.

* Malcolm's *Central India*, i., 431. Sir John, on the authority of the Pindarry leader, Kureem Khan, gives the etymology of the term Pindarry—from *Pinda*, an intoxicating drink which they were constantly imbibing. Kureem Khan was a Rohilla.

† No fewer than twenty-five women drowned themselves to escape violation; many sacrificed also their young children. The ordinary modes of torture inflicted by the Pindarries were—heavy stones placed on the head or chest; red-hot irons applied to the soles of the feet; tying the head of a person into a tobra or bag for feeding horses, filled with hot

Before this event, the incursions of the Pindarries had alarmingly increased, and in 1816 they remained twelve days within the British frontier, during which time they were ascertained to have plundered 339 villages, put 182 persons to a cruel death, severely wounded 505, and subjected 3,603 others to different kinds of torture.† The losses sustained by individuals at Guntoor (in the Northern Circars) and elsewhere, were estimated at about £100,000 sterling. The peishwa, Sindia, and the divided authorities on whom the management of the Holcar principality had devolved, affected to desire the suppression of these enormities; but as it was notorious they favoured the perpetrators, it became necessary to take steps against such deceitful governments.

The policy pursued by the peishwa toward his English patrons, had become evidently hostile since the accession to office, in 1815, of one Trimbukjee Dainglia, a menial servant, who had found the path to power by promoting the gratification of his master's ill-regulated desires. The assassination of Gungadhur Shastree,‡ the representative of the Guicowar chief, who had come to Poona to settle a question of finance, under the express protection of the English, justified the resident (Mountstuart Elphinstone) in demanding the removal from office of the instigator of the crime. Bajee Rao, with characteristic indecision, first surrendered his favourite, and then unceasingly solicited his deliverance from the imprisonment which was the only punishment the English authorities desired to inflict. Artifice effected the deliverance of the prisoner. The Mahratta groom of one of the British officers in the garrison of Tanna, in the island of Salsette, while engaged in exercising his master's horse, sang beneath the window of Trimbukjee what appeared to be one of the monotonous ballads of the country, but which really communicated to the captive a plan of escape, of which he took advantage on the evening of the 12th of September, 1816. Having made an excuse for

ashes; throwing oil on the clothes and setting fire to them; besides many others equally horrible. Their favourite weapon was the long Mahratta spear.

‡ Gungadhur was the name of the ambassador; Shastree, a title denoting intimate acquaintance with the Shastras, a portion of the sacred writings of the Hindoos. Bajee Rao was himself supposed to have sanctioned the murder, to revenge an affront given by the Shastree in refusing to allow his wife to visit the palace of the peishwa, then the scene of licentiousness unparalleled during the sway of any of his predecessors.—(Duff's *Mahrattas*, iii., 374.)

quitting his rooms, he reached an embrasure, and lowered himself into the ditch by means of a rope, secured to a gun by one of his accomplices. This adventure greatly increased the reputation of Trimbukjee with his own countrymen, and he began to assemble troops on the Mahadeo hills to the north of the Neera. The military preparations of the peishwa, and his secret correspondence, and even interviews, with a subject against whom he affected to desire the co-operation of British troops, left little doubt of his perfidious intentions; and the governor-general considered himself justified in adopting a very summary mode of diminishing the power which he expected to see employed in counteracting his plans for the destruction of the Pindarries. Bajee Rao was treated as an avowed enemy, and required, as the only means of averting war, to surrender Trimbukjee, to renounce the right of supremacy over the Mahratta confederation, and to surrender certain territories in Malwa, Guzerat, and the Deccan, for the purpose of supporting a force of 5,000 cavalry and 3,000 infantry, to be maintained in lieu of the previous British contingent. Other humiliating concessions were exacted from Bajee Rao, by the treaty of Poona ratified in June, 1816, which in fact reduced him from the position of an independent prince to that of a mere vassal. The treaty of Bassein had been censured for the sacrifices it entailed on the peishwa; and "the extension of the subsidiary system in 1805, had led the way to the retirement of the most enlightened statesman who had ruled in India."* By this time the weathercock of public opinion had veered round, and the Court of Directors expressed themselves well satisfied with the course of events, and convinced "of the irrepressible tendency of our Indian power to enlarge its bounds and to augment its preponderance, in spite of the most peremptory injunctions of forbearance from home, and of the most scrupulous obedience to them in the government abroad."†

The sanction of the E. I. Cy. was likewise

given to offensive operations to the extent requisite to drive the Pindarries from their haunts on the Nerbudda and from Málwa. The views of the Marquis of Hastings were more comprehensive: he considered that the peace of Central India demanded the total extermination of these predatory bands; and to that end "did not hesitate boldly to assume the principle that, in the operations against the Pindarries, no power could be suffered to remain neutral, but all should be required to join the league for their suppression."‡

At this period (1817) the Pindarries, under their respective leaders, were stated, by the lowest computation, at 15,000 horse, 1,500 foot, with twenty guns. Other writers carried the estimate as high as 30,000; but authorities agreed, that when joined by volunteers and adventurers from other native armies, they often exceeded the latter amount. The Patans, under Ameer Khan, were estimated at 12,000 horse, 20,000 foot, and 200 guns. Supposing the contemplated confederation between the four Mahratta leaders (the peishwa, Sindia, Holcar, and the Bhonslay), the Nizam, Ameer Khan,§ and the Pindarries, to have been carried out, a force of above 130,000 horse, 87,000 foot, and nearly 600 guns might have been brought into the field to dispute British supremacy.||

Measures had been already taken to diminish the danger of hostility on the part of the peishwa, and the subsidiary alliance lately formed with Berar was expected to ensure neutrality in that quarter. The plan of the campaign, therefore, was principally formed with relation to the independent states of Sindia, Holcar, the Rajpoots, the nabob of Bhopal, and the chiefs of Bundelcund. Something after the fashion of the old "circular hunts" was to be attempted, by assembling armies round these countries which should, by simultaneous movements, close in so as to encompass the Pindarries and their abettors at all points, provision being made for the defeat of the project through the strength or cunning of the enemy, as well as for the defence of the

* Auber's *British Power in India*, ii., 528.

† Secret Letter of Directory to Bengal, Jan., 1818.

‡ Prinsep's *Military Transactions*, ii., 21.

§ Among the malcontents assembled under Ameer Khan was Dya Ram, a refractory *talookdar*, or zemindar of the Doab, who, in 1816, had been expelled by British troops from his fort of Hatras.

|| The peishwa had command over 28,000 horse; 13,800 foot; 37 guns. Sindia—14,250 horse; 16,250 foot; 140 guns. Holcar—20,000 horse; 7,940 foot;

107 guns. Bhonslay—15,766 horse; 17,826 foot; 85 guns. Nizam—25,000 horse; 20,000 foot. The Nizam himself was too weak and indolent, if not incapable, to be suspected of any intention to intrigue against the English; but his sons were turbulent youths, whose vicious practices it had been necessary to assist their father in restraining; and it was difficult to judge what might be the conduct of the numerous armed population of Hyderabad, in the event of reverses attending our arms.

British territory. The forces destined to carry out this extensive scheme comprised above 91,000 regular troops, and 23,000 irregular horse,* divided and subdivided in accordance with the plan of the campaign. On the 20th October, 1817, the marquis, in person, assumed command of the grand army at Secundra (near Kalpee), and after crossing the Jumna by a bridge of boats, proceeded to occupy a position south of Gwalior, where Sindia had established his permanent camp;† while another division of the Bengal troops took up its station at Dholpoor. Undoubted evidence had been obtained that Sindia had not only pledged himself to support the Pindaries, but had even attempted a treacherous correspondence with the Nepaulese. His intercepted communications proved him to be only wanting a favourable opportunity to take the field, and thus give an example which would assuredly have been followed by the open appearance in arms of Ameer Khan and his Patans, who were at present inclined to hold back from their Pindarry friends. Sindia had inherited the ambition without the judgment or decision of his predecessor. He had not anticipated the skilful movement by which he found himself menaced by a formidable force in front and in the rear. To bide the event of a siege in Gwalior, or to repair to his distant dominions and join the Pindaries, with the chance of being intercepted and compelled to risk the event of a general engagement, were both humiliating and dangerous measures, which he thought best to avoid by agreeing to the demands of the English. These involved active concurrence against the Pindaries, and the temporary surrender of the forts of Hindia and Aseerghur, as a pledge of fidelity. The treaty exacted from Sindia was followed by the submission of Ameer Khan, who agreed to disband his army, if confirmed in possession of the territory of which he was in the actual tenure under grants from Holcar. As this noto-

rious chief was a mere adventurer, whose demands could only be conceded by legalising the usurpations on which they were founded, it may be doubted whether temporary expediency, rather than justice, was not the actuating motive in the arrangement entered upon with him. Treaties with Zalim Sing of Kotah, and other minor potentates, were made in a spirit similar to those formed by Lake under the auspices of Lord Wellesley; and the nabob of Bhopal, especially, entered cordially into the intended expedition against the despotic freebooters from whose ravages his small territories had sustained almost irremediable damage.‡

The Pindarry chiefs, meanwhile, aware of the extensive preparations made against them, employed themselves during the rains in recruiting their respective *durrahs* or camps. The want of cordiality between the principal leaders—namely, Cheetoo, Kureem Khan, and Wasil Mohammed—prevented their forming any combined plan of resistance. With the exception of some *luhburs*, or plundering expeditions dispatched against the unprotected territory of the British or their allies, little attempt at opposition was made; and losing their usual activity, the majority of the Pindaries retreated passively before the advancing foe, fixing their last hope on the secret assurances of support received from Poona.

The governor-general does not appear to have anticipated any struggle on the part of the peishwa to recover his lost authority. Mr. Elphinstone, in his capacity of resident, had seen ample reason to take precautions against this highly probable event; but Bajee Rao, in an interview with the political agent, Sir John Malcolm, had conducted himself so plausibly, that Sir John, completely duped by professions of grateful attachment for early support, mingled with sad complaints of the harsh policy recently adopted, forgot the character of the arch-hypocrite with whom he had to deal, and actually advised the peishwa to continue

* The Deccan force, under Sir Thomas Hislop (including a reserve corps, the Guzerat division, and the troops left at Poona, Hyderabad, and Nagpoor) numbered 57,000 regulars, of whom 5,255 were cavalry. The Bengal force comprised 34,000 regulars, including 5,000 cavalry.—(Col. Blacker.)

† Sindia seized Gwalior upon the death of Ambajee Inglia, in 1808, and established his army in the neighbourhood, where he remained until his own demise in 1827. A city sprang up there which soon rivalled Oojein, if not in the costliness of its structures, at least in the amount of population.

‡ In 1797, two Pindarry leaders, named Heeroo and Burrun, who were also brothers, offered the services of themselves and their 5,000 followers to the state of Bhopal, as auxiliaries in the war then carried on with Berar. Being rejected, they went off and made a similar proposition to Ragojee Bhonslay, who received it favourably, and bade them lay waste Bhopal, then in a most flourishing condition. The order was obeyed with cruel and lasting effect. The chiefs were plundered by their employer the Berar rajah. Heeroo, the father of Wasil Mohammed, died in prison; Burrun at Aseerghur.

enlisting recruits for the laudable purpose of co-operating with his good friends the English. Thus encouraged, Bajee Rao openly levied troops from all quarters, and secretly endeavoured to induce the British sepoy stationed at Poona to desert their colours. The native officers and regulars were, without exception, proof against these solicitations, which in many instances were made known to their commanders. But the irregular battalions, under Major Ford, contained a large proportion of Mahrattas, and these were naturally more subject to temptation. It is asserted that the peishwa desired, before proceeding further, to be rid of the resident by assassination; but that Bappoo Gokla, the chief Mahratta leader, positively refused to suffer the perpetration of so base a crime, the more especially since he had received peculiar kindness from the intended victim. Happily, Mr. Elphinstone was on his guard alike against national and individual hostility, and waited anxiously the first symptom of undisguised hostility, in anticipation of which a regiment had arrived from Bombay. Thinking the cantonment in Poona too exposed, the station was changed to the village of Kirkee, four miles distant; a step which, being attributed to fear, greatly encouraged the Mahrattas, who began to plunder the old cantonments. At length, on the 4th of Nov., 1817, Moro Dikshut, the minister of the peishwa, actuated by personal attachment, warned Major Ford to stand neuter in the coming struggle, and thus save himself and his family from the destruction which was shortly to overwhelm the whole British detachment. Up to this moment the major, though in daily communication with the city, had been so completely hoodwinked by Bajee Rao, as to entertain no suspicion of intended treachery. On the following day, news of the approach of a light battalion from Seroor, determined the irresolute peishwa to defer the attack no longer. Efforts were continued to the last to throw the British off their guard; and an emissary, bearing some frivolous message from the court, had scarcely quitted the residency, before intelligence arrived that the Mahratta army was in movement. Mr. Elphinstone and his suite had just time to mount and retire by the ford of the Moola river, to join their comrades at Kirkee, before the enemy arrived and took possession of the residency, which was speedily pillaged and burned.

The British brigade, leaving their canton-

ments, advanced to the plain between Kirkee and the city, to meet the Mahratta troops. The peishwa, disconcerted by this daring movement, sent word to Gokla not to fire the first gun. Gokla, seeing the messenger, and suspecting the nature of his errand, waited not his arrival, but commenced the attack by opening a battery of nine guns, detaching a strong corps of rocket camels, and pushing forward his cavalry to the right and left. A spirited charge was made under his direction by Moro Dikshut, with a select body of 6,000 horse, bearing the *Juree Putka* or swallow-tailed golden pennon of the empire. They came down like a torrent on the British front, but were steadily encountered by the 7th battalion. Colonel Burr had "formed and led" this corps; and now, though completely paralysed on one side, he took his post by its colours, calm and collected. One ball went through his hat, another grazed the head of his horse, two attendants were shot by his side; but the infirm officer, unhurt and undismayed, continued to cheer and direct his men. The advance of the assailants was happily impeded by a deep slough (the existence of which was not previously suspected by either party), situated immediately in front of the British line. The cavalry, while scrambling out of the mire, were exposed to the reserved fire of Burr's detachment; Moro Dikshut was killed, the force of the charge broken, confusion spread through the Mahratta ranks, and the advance of the English proved the signal for a general retreat. The battle of Kirkee must ever remain conspicuous among the hard-fought fields of India, for the great disproportion of the combatants. The Mahratta force comprised 18,000 cavalry and 8,000 foot: their loss was 500 men killed and wounded;* beside which, a considerable number of their valuable and highly-cherished horses were disabled. The whole number of the British troops engaged in this affair, including Major Ford's battalion (part of which deserted), was 2,800 rank and file, of whom 800 were Europeans. Their loss was 186 killed and fifty-seven wounded.

During the engagement, the peishwa remained on the Parbuttee hill, with a guard of 7,000 men. At the first outbreak of hostilities, his orders were vindictive and ferocious in the extreme;† but he became

* Moro Dikshut was mortally wounded by a shot from a gun attached to Captain Ford's battalion.

† Several Europeans were killed in cold-blood;

alarmed by the unexpected turn of events, and gave over all power into the hands of Gokla, who was anxious to continue the contest. "We may have taken our shrouds about our heads," he said, "but we are determined to die with our swords in our hands."* This was not, however, the general feeling of the Mahrattas. They had little cause for attachment to the grasping and incapable Bajee Rao; and he displayed an utter want of confidence in their will or ability to protect him, by taking the approach of a British reinforcement, under General Smith, as the signal for a midnight retreat towards Sattara. Poona, thus a second time deserted by its sovereign, surrendered on the following day; and the necessary arrangements having been made for its retention, General Smith started off in pursuit of the peishwa, who, though a fugitive, was still at the head of a formidable army. He was further strengthened by the open adhesion of Appa Sahib, the rajah of Berar, between whom and the British force, under Colonel Scott, a severe conflict took place on the heights near Nag-poor, on the night of the 26th of November. The rajah being defeated, made terms of peace, for the fulfilment of which he was himself to be the guarantee, as a sort of prisoner in his own palace; but Mr. (afterwards Sir Richard) Jenkins, learning that Appa Sahib was only waiting an opportunity of escape, seized and sent him strongly escorted towards Benares. The captive, though treated heretofore without much ceremony, was suffered to choose his own escort; the result of which was, that the British officer on guard, having been made to believe that his charge was an invalid, gave a hasty glance at the bed on which Appa Sahib usually slept, and turned away after this slack performance of his nightly duty, without discovering that a pillow had been made to take the place of a person who was already many miles distant.

General Smith followed the peishwa through the Ghauts, but failed in bringing him to action. This much-desired object was, however, unexpectedly accomplished on the 1st of January, 1818, by a detachment proceeding to support Colonel Burr in resisting an expected attack on Poona. Captain Staunton, with one battalion of N. I. 600 strong, 350 irregular horse, and

two 6-pounders, manned by twenty-four Europeans, after a long night march, reached the hills above Corygaum, a village overhanging the steep bank of the Beema river, and beheld with surprise the whole force of the peishwa, estimated at 25,000 to 28,000 men, encamped on the opposite bank. Both parties pushed on for the village, and succeeded in occupying different portions; but the British gained possession of a small *choultry*, or place of refreshment, which had originally been a temple. Here the detachment remained, under a burning sun, cut off from the water from noon to nine o'clock, disputing every foot of ground, and repulsing repeated attacks with the bayonet. The peishwa ascended an adjoining eminence, and, with the rajah of Sattara by his side, awaited what seemed a certain victory. Gokla and Trimbukjee (who had now joined his master) directed the attacks; and the Arab mercenaries, whose superior courage was acknowledged by superior pay, at one time became masters of the choultry, but it was soon recaptured. The struggle seemed hopeless, but surrender was not thought of. "See," said Captain Staunton, pointing to the headless trunk of Lieutenant Chisholm, lying beside a gun, "the mercy of the Mahrattas!" The troops, though some were fainting and others nearly frantic with thirst, declared that sooner than fall into the hands of their foes, they would die to a man: and the result seemed probable. Happily, towards nightfall, a supply of water was procured. The firing gradually ceased; and at daybreak, when the brave band prepared to renew the conflict, the enemy was descried moving off on the road to Poona, in consequence of the rumoured advance of General Smith. Captain Staunton, who was unhurt, retreated to Seroor; and the government, in commemoration of this gallant affair, raised the corps engaged† to the much-coveted rank of grenadiers, and added "Corygaum" to the name of "Mangalore," previously borne by the first regiment of Bombay native infantry.

Sattara was besieged by a combined force under generals Smith and Pritzer, on the 9th of February, and capitulated on the following day. A manifesto was issued by Mr. Elphinstone, on behalf of the British government, taking formal possession of the dominions of the peishwa, with the view of

and the families of the native troops who fell into the hands of the Mahrattas were cruelly maltreated

* *Duff's Mahrattas*, iii., 429.

† The battalion (2nd of 1st Bombay N. I.) lost 153 killed and wounded; the artillerymen (26 in all), 18; cavalry, 96; officers, 5 out of 8, including 2 surgeons.

retaining all except a small tract to be reserved for the rajah of Sattara, who, with his family, was still in the hands of Bajee Rao. General Smith again started off in pursuit, and came up with the Mahratta force at Ashtee, to the north-westward of Sholapoor. Bajee Rao, as usual, thought only of making good his retreat, and left Gokla, with a body of eight or ten thousand horse, to fight the English. General Smith,* though in other respects a good officer, is said to have been ignorant of the art of manœuvring cavalry, and he was opposed by a leader of unrivalled skill in that favourite branch of Mahratta warfare. The English chief was cut down, and some confusion ensued; of which before Gokla could take advantage, he was himself slain—falling, as he had promised, sword in hand. There was no one capable of taking his place, and the Mahrattas fled in wild dismay, leaving elephants, camels, and baggage of all descriptions, to the victors.† The rajah of Sattara, with his mother and two brothers, voluntarily threw themselves on British protection; and being placed under the care of Mr. Elphinstone, and assured of the favourable intentions of the British government, the rajah assumed the state of a sovereign. The wound of General Smith did not prove dangerous, and he was soon enabled to resume the pursuit of Bajee Rao, which the excessive heat of the weather rendered an extremely arduous and depressing task. The men fell beneath sun-strokes more surely and speedily than in the recent engagements, and the hospitals became crowded. The fugitive peishwa had long been desirous to make terms of peace; and at length, when his intended passage across the Nerbudda was intercepted by Sir John Malcolm, he made proposals which that officer considered as affording satisfactory ground for an arrangement. The terms finally agreed to were the complete renunciation of every political right or claim by Bajee Rao, in return for an allowance of not less than eight lacs of rupees a-year. Beithoor, a place of sanctity near Cawnpore, was appointed for his future residence. Trimbukjee was soon after captured in his lurking-place by a party of irregular horse under Lieutenant Swanston (one of the vic-

* Afterwards Sir Lionel Smith, gov. of Jamaica.

† The British loss amounted to only nineteen killed and wounded; that of the enemy, to 200.

‡ *Transactions in India, 1813 to 1823*, i., 107—111. Mr. Prinsep was present at head-quarters, and lost seven servants and a *moonshee* in four days. During

tors at Corygaum), and sent prisoner to the fort of Chunar, in Bengal.

To revert to the operations simultaneously carried on against the Pindarries. Soon after the signing of the treaty of alliance with Sindia, on the 5th of Nov., 1817, the army under Lord Hastings was overtaken by a violent pestilence, since known as cholera,‡ which traversed the whole of India, from Nepaul to Cape Comorin. The year was one of scarcity, the grain of inferior quality, and the situation of the British cantonments low and unhealthy. For ten days the whole camp was an hospital; and the deaths in that short period amounted to a tenth of the total number collected. Towards the end of the month the troops removed to a healthy station at Erich, on the Betwa, and the epidemic had evidently expended its virulence. Notwithstanding this calamity, the object of Lord Hastings in advancing to Gwalior, was fully answered by the prevention of any co-operation between Sindia and the Pindarries. The latter, after being expelled from their haunts in Malwa, were compelled to retreat in various directions, and annihilated or dispersed, with the exception of those under Cheetoo, who being pursued by Sir John Malcolm, took refuge in the camp of Holcar, near Mahidpoor. The government of the Holcar principality at this time rested in the hands of Toolsae Bye, the favourite mistress of the late Jeswunt Rao, who had exercised the chief authority during his insanity. After his death, she placed on the musnud his infant son Mulhar Rao, and proceeded to give vent to all the cruel caprices which could suggest themselves to the imagination of a woman of thirty years of age, handsome and of fascinating manners, but of an imperious and merciless temper and most licentious morals. Her last favourite, who assumed *ex officio* the reins of government, was the Dewan, Gunput Rao. He wavered between fear of the English and a desire to take part with the peishwa, then in arms. The commanders of battalions, especially the Patans, were adverse to entering upon any treaty by which their consequence was likely to be lowered; and fearing that the force under Malcolm, to which the division under Sir Thomas Hislop one week, 764 soldiers and 8,000 camp followers perished. Total deaths of Europeans in camp in Nov.—148. The epidemic, called by the natives the "black death," visited Calcutta in September, 1817, and for a long time destroyed above 200 per diem in that city.—(Prinsep: Wilson, ix., 263.)

had since been added, would overawe their vacillating rulers into submission, they threw Gunput Rao into prison, enticed away the child, Mulhar Rao, from the tent before which he was playing, and carried off Toolsae Bye, by night, to the banks of the Seepra, where, despite her cries, she was decapitated, and the body thrown into the river.*

On the following day (21st of December, 1817), a pitched battle took place, in which the British were completely successful, though at the cost of nearly 800 in killed and wounded. The enemy lost 3,000 men, chiefly in the flight to Mundissoor. The mother of the child Mulhar Rao, though a woman of inferior rank, being now the acknowledged regent of the Mahratta state, made full submission to the English; and in return for the cession of all claims in Rajast'han and south of the Sautpoora range, was confirmed in the actual possession of the remaining territories of the principality, at the court of which a British resident was to be established. Many of the old leaders repudiated this engagement, and set off to join Bajee Rao—an attempt in which some succeeded, but others were intercepted, and cut off or dispersed.† The ministers, under the new order of things, “did not deplore an event which disembarrassed a bankrupt state of a mutinous soldiery, and cancelled a number of old and troublesome claims.”

The struggles of the Pindaries were nearly ended; Kureem Khan, and other chiefs, surrendered on the promise of pardon and a livelihood, and received small grants of land. Wasil Mohammed poisoned himself. Cheetoo for some time contrived to elude pursuit, but was surprised in Dec., 1817, with the main body of his followers, and dispersed by a detachment from the garrison at Hindia. The Bheels (aboriginal peasantry) and the Grassias (native land-owners), remembering the outrages they

had long passively sustained, now spared not a Pindarry who fell into their hands; but Cheetoo, with about 200 followers, still remained at large.‡ Though driven from place to place, the daring freebooter bore up against misfortune with a spirit worthy a better cause; till he suddenly disappeared—none, not even his son and few remaining followers, knew how or where; for they had parted from him to hunt the forest for food. After some days, his horse was discovered grazing near the jungles of Aseerghur (where Appa Sahib had sought refuge), saddled and bridled: at a little distance lay a heap of torn and blood-stained garments, and a human head, the remains of a tiger's feast. It was a fitting death for the last of the Pindaries—the last that is deserving the name; for these bold marauders, deprived of their leaders, without a home or a rendezvous, never again became formidable. After the termination of the war with the peishwa, they gradually merged into the ordinary population, following the example of their leaders. Many of them settled in the Deccan and Malwa, as cultivators; and some, employing their energies to a right use, became distinguished as active, improving farmers. The remaining Patan troops were conciliated or dispersed without further bloodshed.

The flight of Appa Sahib caused much anxiety, which terminated with the fall of the fortress of Aseerghur (April, 1819), whence the ex-rajah escaped disguised as a fakeer, and soon sank into a state of insignificance, from which he never emerged. An infant grandson of Ragojee Bhonslay was chosen to bear that name and fill the vacant *gadi*, or throne of Berar, with the title of rajah, under the nominal regency of his grandmother, the British resident being vested with the actual control of affairs during the minority. The remaining operations of the war were chiefly directed to the expulsion

* The career of Toolsae Bye resembles that of the heroine of a romance. She passed as the niece, but was generally supposed to be the daughter, of Adjeeba, an ambitious priest, who, though a professed mendicant, rose to rank and influence. He spared no pains in the education of Toolsae; and she, Malcolm not very gallantly remarks, was “tutored in more than the common arts of her sex.” Jeswunt Rao became enamoured with the fair *intrigante* at first sight. She was married, but that mattered little. In a few days the lady was in the palace of Holcar, her husband in prison, from whence he was released and sent home to the Deccan with some presents. Toolsae Bye had an artful waiting-maid, double her own age, who, after having attained high

station and amassed large sums by extortion (thereby exciting the envy of the minister on whom the fleeting affections of her mistress for the moment rested), was flung into prison, cruelly tortured, and driven to end her agonies by taking poison.—(Malcolm.)

† An excellent account of the Mahratta and Pindarry campaigns of 1817-'18-'19, has been given by an officer engaged therein—Lieutenant-colonel Blacker.

‡ Conditions of surrender were discussed on behalf of Cheetoo, but his terms were extravagant: moreover, he feared treachery and transportation; and even when dreaming, used to talk with horror of the sea, the hateful *Cala pani*, or black water. After his tragical end, a few fields were allotted for the subsistence of his son, a youth of weak intellect.

of various Arab garrisons from Candeish, a province which, though professedly under the sway of the Poona government, had been gradually usurped by Arab colonists. Malligaum, the strongest fort in the Candeish valley, was gained after an obstinate siege in June, 1819, at a cost to the successful besiegers of 200 killed and wounded.*

The E. I. Cy. evinced their sense of the conduct of the governor-general during the late "glorious and successful wars," by granting him the sum of £60,000 from the territorial revenues of India, for the purchase of an estate in the United Kingdom. Few remaining events in the administration of Lord Hastings need here be mentioned. Its commencement was marked by the renewal of the company's charter for twenty years; by the opening of trade with India to the nation at large; and by the formation of an ecclesiastical establishment for British India.† The occupation of Singapore, in 1817, was effected through the efforts of Sir Stamford Raffles, to whose zeal and discernment may be attributed the possession of the British portion of the Indian Archipelago. Protracted negotiations were carried on with Holland by Mr. Canning, then President of the Board of Control, which terminated in the Netherlands' treaty of 1824, by which the Dutch settlements on the continent of India, with Malacca, and the undisputed right to Singapore, were ceded to England in exchange for Sumatra, which was needlessly surrendered.

The financial dealings with Oude have been noticed. The pecuniary loans of the nabob aided in enabling him to assume the title of vizier without the sanction of the emperor; and, in 1819, the style of vizier was changed for that of king—an indiscreet admission on the part of the E. I. Cy. The chief blot upon the character of Lord Hastings' administration, was caused by the countenance lent by him to the nefarious transactions of certain persons who,

under pretence of mercantile dealings, obtained the sanction of government to the most shameless and usurious practices, carried on at the expense of the weak and incompetent Nizam. It was in fact a new version of the "Carnatic debt," conducted in the name of Messrs. Palmer and Co., one of the confederates or partners being Sir Thomas Rumbold, who stood almost in the position of son-in-law to the governor-general, having married a niece whom his lordship had brought up from infancy, and for whom he avowedly cherished the feelings of a father. Strong domestic attachment and excessive vanity conspired to induce Lord Hastings to defend a course into which he had been misled by the artifice of covetous men; and when his late secretary, Charles Metcalfe, on entering upon the duties of British resident at Hyderabad, set forth in very guarded and moderate language, the necessity of introducing a better order of things, the marquis manifested great annoyance, and subsequently addressed a most intemperate letter to the directory, in return for their very just animadversions on the nature of a firm which, without office or establishment, carried on "dealings to the extent of nearly £700,000, occurring under an imperceptible progress."‡ Payments for real or imaginary loans, at sixteen to eighteen per cent., were made by the Hyderabad government, by cash and by assignments of revenue; notwithstanding which, £600,000 were claimed by Messrs. William Palmer and Co., as the balance of accounts with the Nizam in 1820.

During the course of his prolonged administration, the Marquis of Hastings, involved in numerous and intricate military operations, found little opportunity to study with success questions connected with the civil administration of the empire, and the complicated and anxious question of revenue.§ His lordship resigned his office into the hands of the senior member of

* In the course of the Mahratta war, considerable service was rendered by Sir Thomas Munro, who, with a few hundred men, was deputed to take possession of the country ceded by the treaty of Poona, which was effected with some fighting, but chiefly by conciliation. Sir David Ochterlony likewise played a conspicuous part in the Pindarry war. His death, in 1825, occurred under painful circumstances. He was twice appointed resident at Delhi, and removed each time against his inclination: on the last occasion, vexation of spirit increased the morbid melancholy which hastened the close of his eventful career; and his last words, as he turned to the wall, were—"I die disgraced."—(Kay's *Life of Metcalfe*, ii., 132.)

† The first Bishop of Calcutta (Middleton) came out in 1814. He died in 1822, and was succeeded by Reginald Heber, who was cut off by apoplexy in 1826. Bishop James died in 1828. Turner in 1830.

‡ Auber, ii., 558 to 566. Thornton, iv., 583.

§ Sir Thomas Munro was sent to Madras in 1814, at the head of a commission formed for the purpose of revising the judicial system. He exerted himself very efficiently in the decision of arrears of causes which had been suffered to accumulate to a shameful extent. In 1821, he became governor of Madras, and carried out a settlement with a portion of the individual cultivators, called the ryotwar assessment, by which each small holder was not simply put in

council, Mr. Adam, and quitted India in January, 1823.* Though nearly seventy years of age, pecuniary embarrassments prevented him from spending his remaining days in his own country; and he was appointed governor of Malta, where he died, in consequence of a fall from his horse, in 1826.†

For six months the supreme authority rested in the hands of Mr. John Adam, an honest and able man, but somewhat prejudiced. He had uniformly dissented from the conduct adopted by the late governor-general with regard to the house of Palmer and Co.; and he was ready and willing to carry out the orders of the court for making the large advance to the Nizam necessary to free him from the hands of his rapacious creditors, who were forbidden to have any further dealings with the court of Hyderabad. The circumstances of the case are involved in mystery; but it is certain that the failure of the concern created a great commotion in Calcutta, many persons being secretly interested in these transactions whose names were never made public. The proprietors of East India stock called for documents calculated to throw light on the whole affair; and, after much tedious discussion during the next twenty years, political influence procured a decision more favourable to the claims of the European money-lenders, against various native debtors in Oude, than was consistent with the honour of the British government.

This provisional administration was marked by the deportation of Mr. Silk Buckingham, the editor of the *Calcutta Journal*, for a breach of the regulation forbidding editorial comments on public measures. The successful efforts of Mr. Adam for the reduction of expenditure, especially of the interest of the Indian debt, were highly meritorious,

the position of a mere yearly tenant, but was compelled to pay a fluctuating amount assessed annually at the pleasure of the collector for the time being, whose chief object was naturally the realisation of an immediate amount of revenue, without regard to the permanent welfare—indissolubly united—of the governors and the governed. This system, much praised at the time, reduced the Madras ryots to a state of extreme depression. Munro died of cholera near Gooty, in 1827.—(*Vida Life*, by Gleig.)

* The revenues of India rose from £17,228,000, in 1813-'14, to £23,120,000 in 1822-'3; but a considerable share of this increase is attributable to the accession of territory made under the Wellesley administration. The more than proportionate augmentation of military expense is no less clearly ascribable to the unjustifiable measures of Lord Cornwallis and Sir G. Barlow, and especially to the

as were also his unavailing attempts for the extension of native education.

AMHERST ADMINISTRATION: 1823 to 1827.

—The place of Lord Hastings was at first destined to be filled by Mr. Canning; but the changes in the cabinet, consequent upon the death of the Marquis of Londonderry, opened more congenial employment to the newly-appointed governor-general, and he remained at home in charge of the foreign office. Lord Amherst was selected for the control of Indian affairs, and arrived in Calcutta in August, 1823. The first object pressed on his attention was the open hostility in which a long series of disputes with the Burman empire abruptly terminated. The power of the Burmese was of comparatively recent growth. The people of Ava, after being themselves subject to the neighbouring country of Pegu, revolted under a leader of their own nation, in 1753. Rangoon, the capital of Pegu, surrendered to the Ava chief, who assumed the title of Alompra,‡ and the style of a sovereign; and during the succeeding eight years, laid the basis of an extensive state, which was subsequently enlarged by acquisitions on the Tenasserim coast taken from Siam, and by the annexation of the previously independent states of Arracan, of Munnipoor, and of Assam. Proceedings connected with the conquest of Arracan, brought the Burmese in contact with the British government; for, at the close of the eighteenth century, many thousand persons of the tribe called Mughs, sought refuge from the insufferable persecution of their oppressors in the British province of Arracan. The numbers of the immigrants excited apprehension, and attempts were made to prevent any more of them from crossing the boundary line formed by the Naaf river. But this was impracticable by means consistent with

sufferance long extended to the ferocious Pindarries and the encroaching Mahrattas. For five years (1817 to 1822), the average annual military expenditure was £9,770,000. In 1822-'3, the expenses still reached £8,495,000. The Indian debt increased from £27,002,000, in 1813-'14, to £29,382,000 in 1822-'3; showing an augmentation of £2,380,000. An able and comprehensive summary of the Hastings administration is given by Josiah Conder, whose history terminates at this point.

† Lord Hastings married Flora Campbell, Countess of Loudon, who lived with him in India in the full blaze of vice-regal splendour. In 1827, the sum of £20,000 was granted to the young marquis.

‡ Alompra (correctly, *Alaong-shura*), a term applied by the Buddhists of Ava to an individual destined to become a Budd'ha, and attain the supreme felicity of absorption into the divine essence.

ordinary humanity. In 1798, not fewer than 10,000 Mughs rushed to the frontier in an almost frenzied state, and were followed by another body still more numerous, leaving the capital of Arracan nearly depopulated. They had fled through wilds and deserts without any preconceived plan, leaving behind them abundant traces of their melancholy progress in the dead bodies of both old and young, and of mothers with infants at the breast. The leader of one party, when told to withdraw, replied that he and his companions would never return to Arracan: they were ready to die by the hands of the English, or, if forcibly driven off, would seek refuge in the jungles of the great mountains, the abodes of wild beasts. The wretched multitudes attempted no violence, but sustained life as best they could on "reptiles and leaves," numbers daily perishing, until the British government, taking pity upon their misery, provided the means of sustenance, and materials for the construction of huts to shelter them from the approaching rains. Extensive tracts of waste lands, in the province of Chittagong, were assigned to the refugees, whom, perhaps, it would have been advisable to have settled in a more central position, since a colony of 40,000 persons, established under such circumstances, would, as they grew stronger, be very likely to provoke hostilities with the already incensed and barbarous sovereign of Ava.

The surrender of the Mughs was repeatedly demanded by this potentate, but the Marquis Wellesley returned a decided refusal; qualified, however, by an offer to give up any proved and notorious criminals, and by a promise to prohibit any renewed immigration of Burmese subjects. Some communications took place of little importance; and the discussion might have passed off without producing further hostility, but for the restless spirit of the Mughs, and their natural longing to regain possession of their ancient rights and former homes. A chief, named Khyen-bran (miscalled Kingberring), arose among them inspired with an insatiable desire of vengeance against the Burmese,

which he manifested by annual irruptions into Arracan. The Calcutta government strove to check these aggressions, and Lord Hastings gave leave to the Burmese to pursue the depredators to their haunts in Chittagong; but this concession did not appease the King of Ava, who attempted to form a confederacy with Runjeet Sing and other Indian princes, for the expulsion of the English from India. After the death of Khyen-bran, in 1815, the border warfare greatly diminished, and the British authorities, considering the chief cause of contention removed, maintained a very conciliatory tone, which being interpreted by the nameless* majesty of Ava as significant of weakness, only rendered his representatives more insolent and overbearing. Still no actual rupture took place until September, 1823, when a thousand Burmese landed by night on the small island of Shahpoori, at the entrance of the Tek Naaf, or arm of the sea dividing Chittagong from Arracan. The islet was little more than a sandbank, affording pasturage for a few cattle. The guard consisted only of thirteen men, three of whom were killed, four wounded, and the rest driven off the island.

An explanation of this conduct was demanded, and given in the form of a vaunting declaration, that Shahpoori rightfully belonged to the "fortunate king of the white elephants, lord of the seas and earth," and that the non-admission of the claim of "the golden foot" would be followed by the invasion of the British territories. The threat was carried into execution, and a Burmese force actually took post within five miles of the town of Sylhet, only 226 miles from Calcutta. The governor-general entered upon the war with unfeigned reluctance, and its commencement was materially impeded by ignorance of the country, its routes, and passes. The advance from Bengal was at one time intended to have been made through Arracan, but this plan was set aside from regard to the health of the troops; and the main part of the force designed for the campaign, comprising about 11,000 men,† of whom one-half were Euro-

* The names of the kings of Ava, like those of the zamorins of Calicut, were kept secret until their deaths. The style of the Ava court, was to speak of "the golden presence," to address "the golden ear," or lay petitions before "the golden foot;" and on state occasions, the royal head was literally oppressed with the weight of a golden pyramid, and the body clothed in wrought gold.—(Trant's *Two Years in Ava*, 270; Havelock's *Ava*, 245.)

† This included the combined strength of Madras and Bengal; but the excessive repugnance manifested by the native troops in the service of the latter presidency to forsake their families and forfeit caste by embarking on board ship, rendered it impossible to employ any considerable portion of them. It appears, moreover, that great neglect existed on the part of those entrusted with the charge of the commissariat, as in the case of the refusal to march

peans, assembled in May, 1824, at Port Cornwallis, in the Great Andamans. Major-general Sir Archibald Campbell took command of the land, and Commodore Grant of the marine portion of the expedition, but the latter commander was speedily compelled, by ill-health, to give place to Captain Marryat. The forces safely reached Rangoon, the chief port of Ava, which was evacuated after a very feeble attempt at resistance.* On the 10th of June, a successful attempt was made on the fortified camp and stockades at Kemendine, on the Irawaddy river. The outwork was taken by storm; the first man to gain the summit being Major (afterwards Sir Robert) Sale. These conquests were followed by a disastrous expedition, which involved not only loss of life, but of character. A Burmese detachment had formed stockades, under cover of a fortified pagoda, at Kykloo, fourteen miles from Rangoon, and a body of Madras infantry was dispatched to drive them off, under Lieutenant-colonel Smith. The Burmese suffered the English to approach within sixty yards of the pagoda, and then opened their reserved fire with deadly effect. The sepoys may well be excused for quailing before the foe when British officers fairly lost all self-control, and lay down to screen themselves from danger. Colonel Smith ordered a retreat, which soon became a flight, and many lives would doubtless have been sacrificed had not the approach of reinforcements arrested the progress of both pursuers and pursued. A strong force was sent by Sir A. Campbell to drive the Burmese from Kykloo, but they had previously absconded. This affair, which occurred in October, 1824, was not calculated to cheer the army, or encourage them in a position daily becoming less endurable. No consideration of pity for the unfortunate people

against the Burmese, made by the 47th regiment (about 1,400 in number), at Barrackpore, in 1825. The men entreated to be dismissed and suffered to return to their homes, but without effect. The regiment was paraded, and the refusal of the men to march or ground their arms (which they held unloaded, though furnished with forty rounds of ammunition), was punished by a murderous discharge of artillery, which killed numbers of them. About 200 were taken prisoners, of whom twelve were hanged, and the remainder condemned to labour in irons. The court of inquiry appointed to report on the whole affair, declared the conduct of the unhappy soldiers "to have been an ebullition of despair at being compelled to march without the means of doing so."—(Thornton's *India*, iv., 113.) How military men can reconcile their consciences to such proceedings as these, is perfectly incomprehensible.

of Rangoon had prevented the complete devastation of the country by its sovereign, and the invaders were consequently disappointed in their hopes of obtaining supplies of fresh meat and vegetables, and compelled to feed on putrid meat and bad biscuit. The influence of dense jungle and pestilential swamp, aggravated by intense heat and deluges of rain, spread fever and dysentery through the camp: scurvy and hospital gangrene followed in their train; and by the end of the monsoon scarcely 3,000 men were fit for active duty. The King of Ava relied on the proverbial unhealthiness of Rangoon to aid the efforts of his ill-disciplined troops, and facilitate the performance of his command to drive the invaders into the sea, or bring them to the capital to suffer torture and ignominy. Notwithstanding this vaunting language, his majesty of the golden foot became extremely uneasy on witnessing the pertinacity of the English, and despite much affected rejoicing at their having fallen into a trap by taking up a position at Rangoon, he compared himself, in an unguarded moment, to a man who, having got a tiger by the tail, knew not whether to hold on or let go.† He is said to have been encouraged in "holding on," by an odd tradition (if any such did really exist) that the capital would remain invincible until a magical vessel should advance against it without oars or sails!‡

The *Diana* steamer, which accompanied the flotilla on the Irawaddy, though possessed of no magic power, did great service in capturing and destroying the war-boats and fire-rafts sent out by the Burmese. The arrival of reinforcements and supplies from Bengal restored the number of troops at Rangoon to about their original amount, and infused new life into the survivors, and spirit to resist the repeated but ill-

* Crawford's *Embassy to Ava in 1827*: App., p. 65.

† The Shwe-da-gon, a Buddhist temple of great size and remarkable sanctity, being deserted by its priestly guardians, was used by Sir A. Campbell as a military outwork. The building was of solid brickwork, elaborately decorated, and coated with gilding, whence its name—the Golden Pagoda. The portion deemed peculiarly sacred, was a solid cone 300 feet high, which was supposed to enshrine, or rather entomb, relics of the four last Buddhas—the staff of Krakuchunda, the water-pot of Gunaguna; the bathing-robe of Kasyapa, and eight hairs from the head of Gautama, or Sakyasinha.—(Wilson's *Mill*, ix., 50. Also Hough, Symes, Snodgrass, Trant, and Havelock.)

‡ Auber gives the tradition upon the authority of Col. Hopkinson, who commanded the Madras artillery in the Burmese war.—(ii., 579.) Trant also mentions it.—(*Two Years in Ava*, 241.)

directed attempts of the various forces dispatched against them from Ava.

The provinces of Assam and Cachar were captured by troops sent from Hindoostan, with the aid of native auxiliaries. In January, 1825, 11,000 men were assembled in Chittagong, and dispatched, under General Morrison, to Arracan, with instructions to reduce that province, and then join Sir Archibald Campbell on the Irawaddy. The first object of the mission was fulfilled; but ignorance of the Aeng Pass rendered the Youmadoung mountains an impracticable barrier, and prevented the performance of the latter order. By the close of the rainy season one-fourth of the men were dead, and more than half the survivors in hospital, from the unhealthiness of the climate. The remainder were therefore recalled, with the exception of a few divisions left on coast stations. Happily the war had been more successfully prosecuted in Ava. The whole of Tenasserim was conquered by detachments from Rangoon* before the close of 1824; and in the following February, General Campbell prepared to advance, by land and water, against Prome, the second city of Ava. On the 25th of March, the troops came in sight of Donabew, a fortified place, where the flower of the Burmese army lay encamped. Our flotilla was attacked without success. Bandoola, the ablest and most popular of the Burmese commanders, was killed by a shell; upon which Donabew was abandoned by the enemy and immediately occupied by order of General Campbell, who advanced against Prome, which was evacuated on his approach. The King of Ava had not yet lost hope: levies were raised in every part of the kingdom; and in November, a heterogeneous force marched under the command of the prime minister for the recovery of Prome. An engagement took place on the 1st of December, which terminated in the death of the Burmese leader and the dispersion of the entire force. The British general prepared to follow up his victory by marching on the capital, but his progress was delayed by overtures of peace, which proved to be mere pretenses to gain time. The same stratagem was repeated more than once; and even at the last, when the evident futility of resist-

ance seemed to attest the sincerity of the defeated Burmese, the boast of a military adventurer, that he would be answerable for the discomfiture of the invaders if enabled to lead an army against them, induced the renewal of offensive operations by the King of Ava. Troops to the number of 16,000 were assembled under the new leader, who was dignified by the name of Nuring Thuring, prince of Sunset (which our troops, being poor linguists, translated as prince of Darkness), and entrusted with the charge of covering the capital against the approach of the British army. The so-called "retrievers of the king's glory" encountered about 1,300 men, under Colonel Campbell (two brigades being absent on duty), and were dispersed with greater loss than had been sustained by their predecessors on any previous occasion. Their brave, though boastful leader, ventured to prostrate himself before the golden throne, and solicit a more powerful force, but was immediately put to death by the enraged and humiliated sovereign. No time could be spared now for procrastinating schemes if Ava were to be saved from the grasp of the English army, which marched on to Yandaboo, only forty-five miles distant. Two American missionaries (Messrs. Price and Judson), "the only negotiators in whom the king had any confidence," were dispatched to the British camp to conclude peace. General Campbell made no increase on the terms already stipulated for, and a treaty was finally concluded in February, 1826, by which the King of Ava ceded Arracan and Tenasserim to the English; agreed to pay them a crore of rupees (about a million sterling), to receive a resident at his court, and to grant to their ships the privileges enjoyed by his own. He likewise renounced all claim upon Asam, Jyntia, Cachar, and Munnipoor, which were to be placed under princes named by the British government.

The "peacock signet" was affixed to the treaty, the provisions of which were fulfilled, including the money stipulation, after some delay and discussion; and thus ended the first Burmese war. The dangers, disasters, and heavy cost of life and treasure involved therein, afforded strong arguments to both parties in favour of a durable peace.

* Among the expeditions sent against the English at Rangoon, was one under the immediate superintendence of the king's two brothers, and numerous astrologers. A band of warriors termed "invulnerables" by their countrymen, accompanied

the princes, and were remarkable for the elaborate tattooing of their bodies, which were covered with figures of animals, and literally inlaid with precious stones. Despite their name, and real though ill-directed valour, they fled before European musketry.

The main body of the invading force returned as they came, by the line of the Irawaddy; but a body of native infantry succeeded in finding a practicable route to the Aeng Pass, and thus clearly proved that nothing but ignorance of the geography of the country had, humanly speaking, been the sole means of preventing "a portion of General Morrison's army from wintering in Ava, instead of perishing in the mountains of Arracan."*

Before the termination of the Burmese war, proceedings had occurred in another quarter which involved a fresh appeal to arms. The successors of Runjeet Sing of Bhurtpoor, had faithfully observed the treaty of 1805. The latter of these rajahs, Baldeo Sing, had taken pains to ensure the protection of the supreme government for his son, Bulwunt Sing, a child of five years old, by entreating the political agent at Delhi, Sir David Ochterlony, to invest the boy with a *khelat*, or honorary dress, which was the form prescribed by Lord Wellesley as the official recognition necessary to legal succession on the part of all subsidiary and protected princes. The request of the rajah was granted early in 1824, in consideration of his infirm health; and his death a year after, not without suspicion of poison, was followed by a train of events which proved the justice of the precautions adopted on behalf of the heir. For about a month the reins of government rested quietly in the hands of the guardian and maternal uncle of the young rajah; but at the expiration of that time, the citadel was seized, the uncle murdered, and the boy made prisoner by Doorjun Sal (a nephew of the late Baldeo Sing), who assumed the direction of affairs. This daring usurpation involved a defiance to the British government, which Sir David Ochterlony felt keenly; he also knew on how slender a thread hung the life of the boy, for whose protection the honour of England had been solemnly pledged. An immediate demand for the surrender of Bulwunt Sing was refused; but the promptitude and determination with which it had been made, probably prevented another name from being added to the long list of Indian princes born too near a throne to escape death by a poisoned opiate, or the dexterous hand of an athlete. Sir David

was anxious to waste no time in inconclusive negotiation: he wished to march at once against Bhurtpoor, before the enemy should have opportunity to take measures of defence. With this intent, the veteran general, then in his sixty-eighth year (fifty preceding ones having been spent in India), set on foot the necessary preparations, which were arrested by counter-orders from the supreme government. The heavy pecuniary cost, and numerous disasters attendant on the early stages of the Burmese war, combined with mortifying recollections of the issue of the former siege of Bhurtpoor, rendered Lord Amherst reluctant to enter on an undertaking which, if unsuccessful, might, it was feared, add to existing embarrassments—that of "hostilities with every state from the Punjab to Ava."† The successful defence of this Indian fortress against Lake, was still the favourite vaunt of every secret and open foe to English supremacy: the repetition of such an event was to be avoided at any cost. The annulment of the recent measures may be vindicated as a necessary act; but there can be no excuse for the harsh and peremptory manner in which it was enforced, to the bitter mortification of Ochterlony, who after being before deprived of the position of Delhi resident by Sir Georga Barlow, was now compelled to tender his resignation, which he survived only a few months.‡

Doorjun Sal attributed the conduct of the British government to fear, and was consequently emboldened to drop the submissive tone which he had adopted while military preparations were in progress, and assert his claims, not as regent, but as rajah. The new Delhi resident, Sir Charles Metcalfe, advocated the same policy as that which had cost his predecessor so dearly; and his representations, in conjunction with the warlike proceedings of Doorjun Sal, induced the supreme government to resolve on espousing the cause of Bulwunt Sing. An attempt at negotiation having failed, an army, comprising about 21,000 men and above a hundred pieces of heavy ordnance, marched against Bhurtpoor in December, 1825, under the direction of Lord Combermere. The garrison was believed to comprise 20,000 men, chiefly Rajpoots and Jats, with some Afghans; but the best defence of the fortress consisted in its thick high walls of indurated clay, rising from the edge of a broad and deep ditch, flanked by thirty-five tower-bastions, and strengthened by the

* Trant's *Two Years in Ava*, 447. • Prof. Wilson's *Documents Illustrative of Burmese War*.

† Wilson's *Mill's India*, ix., 191.

‡ See Note to p. 421

outworks of nine gateways. Of these fortifications several had been added since 1805: one in particular, termed the Bastion of Victory, was vauntingly declared to have been built with the blood and bones of Englishmen there laid low. On the previous occasion the besieged had, nevertheless, enjoyed advantages far superior to those on which they now relied. An immense number of troops, stated, doubtless with exaggeration, at 80,000,* were then assembled within the walls, whence they could issue at pleasure to draw supplies from the adjacent country; for the limited number of Lord Lake's force confined his operations to a single point. Moreover, the English at that time trusted too exclusively to hard fighting, and neglected the resources of engineering skill, especially the construction of mines—a measure now adopted by Lord Combermere, at the suggestion of Major Galloway† and Lieutenant Forbes of the engineers, who was on duty at the siege. The communication between the moat of the fortress and the extensive piece of water by which it was supplied, was cut off, the ditch nearly emptied, and mines were carried across and above it; while the operation of powerful batteries covered the approaches and kept down the fire of the enemy. By the middle of January the walls had been effectively breached, and the army impatiently waited the order to storm. It was given on the 18th, the appointed signal being the springing of a mine containing 10,000 lbs. of powder. The foremost of the storming party, in their anxiety to advance immediately after the explosion, crowded too near the opening, and the quakings of the earth, and the dull tremulous sound beneath their feet, came too late to save several of them from sharing the fate of numbers of the enemy assembled to defend the breach, who perished in the convulsion which darkened the air with dense clouds of dust and smoke, and hurled disjointed masses of the hardened ramparts in all directions. The fate of their comrades gave a momentary check to the ardour of the assailants; but the order to advance was issued and obeyed—the troops scaled the ramparts, and after overcoming a resolute resistance at different points, gained possession of the town and outworks, at the cost of about 600 killed and wounded. The

loss of the enemy was estimated at 14,000, of whom 8,000 were slain in the assault; many being cut off by the British cavalry while attempting to escape through the gates on the western face of the fortress. The citadel surrendered in the afternoon. At the commencement of the assault, Doorjun Sal had quitted the fortress with his wife and two sons, escorted by forty horsemen, and sought refuge in an adjoining wood, where he remained for several hours, and then endeavoured to escape unperceived. The attempt failed; the fugitives were overtaken by a troop of native cavalry, and secured without opposition. Doorjun Sal was sent as a prisoner of state to Allahabad, and the young rajah reinstated on the throne of his ancestors; but though the nominal regency was made over to the principal widow of Baldeo Sing, and the partial management of affairs entrusted to his leading ministers, the paramount authority was vested in a British resident permanently appointed to Bhurtpoor. The army appropriated booty to the amount of about £22,000. Before the fall of Bhurtpoor, the conduct of the Ava war, though not entirely approved, procured an earldom for Lord Amherst. Lord Combermere was created a viscount. The diplomatic arrangements made during this administration were of some importance. In 1824, Malacca, Singapore, and the Dutch possessions on the continent of India, were ceded by the King of the Netherlands in exchange for the British settlement of Bencoolen, in Sumatra. Dowlut Rao Sindia died in March, 1827, leaving no son. His favourite, but not principal wife, Baiza Bye, was, in accordance with his wish, suffered to adopt a child and assume the regency—a procedure for which the consent of the company was solicited and obtained, provision for the continued maintenance of a British contingent being made by the advance of a loan or deposit of eighty lacs of rupees, the interest of which, at five per cent., was to be employed in the support of the troops.

Lord Amherst visited the titular king of Delhi early in 1827, and then repaired to Simla on the lower range of the Himalaya, which from that time became the favourite retreat of the governors-general of India, from its beauty and salubrity. While there, hostilities broke out between Russia and Persia, and the latter and of course much weaker power demanded the aid of the Calcutta government, in accord-

* Creighton's *Siege of Bhurtpoor in 1825-'6*, p. 152.

† Better known as Major-general Galloway, the author of a valuable work on the mud forts of India.

ance with the treaty concluded at Tehran in 1814. The point at issue regarded the boundary line between the two countries. The cabinet of St. Petersburg positively refused to accept the arbitration of British officers; and the result was, that a struggle ensued, in which the British took no part; and the Persians, being worsted, were compelled to make peace with Russia by the surrender of the contested territory, in February, 1828.

In the same month Lord Amherst resigned his position, and returned to England. The restoration of tranquillity had enabled him to pay some attention to civil matters; and the diffusion of education had been promoted by the formation of collegiate institutions at Agra and at Delhi, as also by the establishment of schools in various provincial towns. The pressure of financial difficulties impeded the full execution of these as well as of other measures required to lighten the burdens and stimulate the commerce of the people of India. The war with Ava had necessitated heavy disbursements. In two years (1824 and '25), the sum of nineteen million sterling had been raised; and at the close of the Amherst administration, "the financial prospects of the country were of a most alarming complexion."* Nearly eighteen months elapsed before the arrival of a new governor-general, and during that time the supreme authority rested in the able hands of the senior member of council, Butterworth Bayley, who busily employed himself in laying the foundation of various internal reforms, which were carried out during the ensuing—

BENTINCK ADMINISTRATION, 1828 TO 1835. —After his recall from the government of Madras, in 1807, Lord William Bentinck had remonstrated forcibly against the injustice of making him the victim of measures adopted without his cognizance; and his arguments being seconded by influential family connexions (with Mr. Canning and the Portland family), he eventually obtained the appointment of governor-general, and in July, 1828, arrived in Calcutta. At that time unaccustomed tranquillity prevailed throughout India, and the character of Lord William Bentinck was considered the best guarantee against its disturbance by any aggressive or domineering spirit on the

part of the English. A vivacious French traveller (Jacquemont) declared that the actual possessor of the sceptre of the Great Mogul thought and acted like a Pennsylvanian quaker: yet some of the acts of this administration would certainly not have been sanctioned by the great American coloniser. The influence of Lady Bentinck was unquestionably of the best description; and the improved tone of thought and feeling which pervaded the society of government-house, diffused itself throughout Calcutta and the British presidencies.† All the support derivable from a manly and conscientious spirit, was needed by one who came out burdened with the execution of immediate and sweeping retrenchments. No opposition was made to the extensive reduction of the army; but the old question of *batta* (extra pay) which had called forth the energies of Clive, became afresh the source of bitter discontent. The total diminution, on the present occasion, did not exceed £20,000 per annum; but it fell heavily on individuals; and although the governor-general could not avoid enforcing the accomplishment of stringent orders, he was thereby rendered permanently unpopular with the military branch of the service. The press commented freely on the *half-batta* regulations, and the discontented officers were wisely suffered to vent and dissipate their wrath in angry letters. The same forbearance was not manifested when the excessive flagellation, which at this period disgraced the discipline of the army, became the theme of censure; for Lord W. Bentinck, "though a liberal to the very core," held, as had been proved at Vellore, very stern notions on military affairs; and in this, as also in some other cases, showed himself decidedly "inclined to put a gag into the mouth of the press."‡

In 1829, a regulation was enacted, by which the practice of *suttee*—that is, of burning or burying alive Hindoo widows—was declared illegal, and the principal persons engaged in aiding or abetting it, became liable to trial for culpable homicide, and were punishable with imprisonment and fine. This enactment was far from exciting the expected degree of opposition. The same unlooked-for facility attended another measure (denounced still more de-

* Wilson's continuation of Mill, ix., 234.

† The altered tone of Calcutta society may be conjectured, from the fact of Jacquemont's going on Sunday to the house of the chief justice, Sir Charles

Grey, to hear some music, play chess, and seek a refuge from the general devotion of the English.—(*Letters from India*, i., 101.)

‡ Kaye's *Life of Metcalfe*, ii., 253.

cisively) in prospect, as a perilous innovation, not on "the rights of women" only, but on those of the entire Hindoo community; namely, the abrogation of the intolerant laws which decreed the forfeiture of all civil rights as the penalty of conversion to Christianity. The convert not only became an outcast, but an outlaw; incapable of inheriting personal or family property. The wonder was that a Christian government had not sooner put a stop to such bigotry. Now, the necessary steps were taken with much caution, and the alterations were so mixed up with other ordinances, as to create little commotion or excitement even when first published.

In 1831, active measures were adopted for the extirpation of the numerous and formidable gangs of depredators, known by the name of Thugs or Phansi-gars; the former term (signifying a cheat) being the more common, the latter (denoting the bearer of a noose or phansi, wherewith to commit murder by strangulation) the less general, but equally appropriate designation. The lasso was not, however, necessary to these miscreants, whose horrible dexterity enabled them, with a strip of cloth, or an unfolded turban, to destroy the unwary traveller speedily and surely;—the dead body was then buried in the ground, and every trace of the crime carefully obliterated. Hundreds upon hundreds of husbands and fathers perished none knew how, save the members of this horrible confederacy, who, whether of Hindoo or Mohammedan origin, were usually thieves and murderers by hereditary descent. Of the doctrines of the Koran they were wholly ignorant, and of Brahminism they knew nothing but its worst superstitions; which are those connected with the sanguinary worship of the goddess Doorga or Cali, the wife of Siva, whom they regarded as their peculiar patroness, and looked to for guidance and counsel, which they believed to be communicated through the medium of the flight and utterance of birds, beasts, and reptiles. Fearful oaths of secrecy were interchanged; and the difficulty of detection was enhanced by the consummate art which enabled the stealthy assassin to maintain the bearing of an industrious peasant or busy trader. Remorse seems to have been well-nigh banished from this community by the blinding influence of the strange predestinarian delusion that they were born to rob and kill their fellow-men—destined for

this end by Providence by a law similar to that which impels the savage beast of the forest to slay and devour human beings. "Is any man killed from man's killing?" was their favourite argument. "Are we not instruments in the hand of God?" The mysterious workings of that almighty and ever-present power, which controls the actions, but leaves the will free, was unthought of by these unhappy men, whose excesses rendered them a by-word of fear and loathing throughout India. Lord Hastings made some efforts for their suppression by military detachments, but with little effect. Summary and organised measures of police were adopted by Lord Bentinck, and ably carried out by Mr. Smith, Major Sleeman, and other functionaries. In the course of six years (1830 to 1835) 2,000 Thugs were arrested and tried at Indore, Hyderabad, Saugor, and Jubbulpoor, of whom about 1,500 were convicted and sentenced to death, transportation, or imprisonment. The strange *esprit de corps* which for a time sustained them, at length gave way; many purchased pardon at the expense of full and free confession: formidable gangs were thus reduced to a few scattered and intimidated individuals; and the Thugs became a bugbear of past times.

The most exceptionable feature in the Bentinck administration was the deposition of the rajah of Coorg, Veer Rajendra Wudiyar, and the conversion of his mountainous principality into a province of the Madras presidency. The immediate occasion appears to have been a domestic quarrel with his sister and her husband, which led them to seek the protection of the British resident at Mysoor. The rajah was described as fierce, cruel, and disposed to enter on intrigues against the supreme government with the rajah of Mysoor. These vague charges, together with some angry letters, demanding the surrender of his fugitive relations, and the imprisonment of a servant of the company, were considered to justify the dispatch of a powerful force for the subjugation of Coorg. The British advanced in four divisions, and entered the principality from as many quarters. The alleged unpopularity of the rajah was contradicted by the determination of his defenders, despite a proclamation offering protection to person and property as the price of neutrality; but the efforts of the brave mountaineers were rendered unavailing, less by the overwhelming superiority of

numbers and discipline on the part of the invaders, than by the avowed disinclination of Veer Rajundra to organised opposition against the powerful protectors of his ancestors. Merkara, the capital of Coorg, was captured in April, 1834, and the rajah, with his family, surrendered unconditionally. A committee of inquiry was instituted into the charges adduced against him, and the search made after the seizure of Merkara, brought to light the bodies of seventeen persons, including three relatives of the rajah, who had been put to death by decapitation or strangling, and thrown into a pit in the jungle. This was a melancholy revelation; but such severities are unhappily quite consistent with the ordinary proceedings of despotic governments; and it may well be doubted whether, even if proved beforehand, they could warrant the interference of a foreign state for the deposition of the prince by whom they were committed, in opposition to the will of the people he governed. Certainly the assumption of sovereignty over the Coorgs could be excused only by the most rigid adherence to the promise given, "that their civil rights and religious usages should be respected, and that the greatest desire should invariably be shown to augment their security, comfort, and happiness. How far these objects have been effected," adds Professor Wilson, "may admit of question; but the province has remained at peace, and the Coorgs have shown no disposition to reassert their independence."*

The rajah became a pensioner on the E. I. Cy. Some few years ago he came to England, bringing with him a daughter, a lady-like and intelligent child, to be educated as a Christian. Queen Victoria, by a graceful act of spontaneous kindness calculated to endear her to the vast Indian population beneath her sway, officiated in person as godmother to the young stranger, who, it is to be hoped, will live to merit and enjoy a continuance of the royal favour. The rajah himself has no trace, either in countenance or bearing, of the insane cruelty ascribed to him; and the satisfactory arrangement of the pecuniary question†

* Continuation of Mill's *India*, ix., 359.

† Relating to the proprietary right to a large sum of money invested by the prince and his family in the Anglo-Indian funds, the interest of which had been regularly paid to the rajah, Veer Rajundra, up to the time of his deposition, which the E. I. Cy. now appear disposed to regard as confiscated.

‡ The efforts of Lord W. Bentinck were especially

now at issue between him and the E. I. Cy. is desirable, as the best means of strengthening the confidence of Indian princes in the good faith of the nation in general.

Whatever view may be taken of the conduct of Lord W. Bentinck in this case, and of certain complex arrangements, of comparatively small interest, with Oude, Mysoor, Nagpoor, Jeypoor, and other Indian states, there can be no doubt that the general result of his administration was highly beneficial to the cause of religious civilisation.‡ Public institutions, whether for educational or charitable purposes, were warmly encouraged; and the almost exclusive agency of European functionaries, which had been the radical defect of the Cornwallis system, was to some extent remedied by the employment of natives in offices of trust and emolument,—not, indeed, to the extent which they have a right to expect eventually, but as much perhaps as the circumstances of the time warranted. The opening of the "overland route" by way of the Red Sea, Egypt, and the Mediterranean, and the consequent reduction of the length of transit from four or five months to forty or fifty days (an immense boon to the Anglo-Indian community), was effected mainly through the instrumentality of the late Lieutenant Waghorn, R.N.

The navigation of the Ganges by steam-vessels was attempted, and proved entirely successful.§ Measures were adopted to procure the unobstructed navigation of the Indus, with a view to the extension of British trade with the countries to the westward as far as the Caspian Sea, and also in the hope of establishing a commanding influence on the Indus, in order to counteract the consequences which might be anticipated from the complete prostration of Persia, and its subservience to the designs of Russia against British India. The orders of the cabinet of St. James were positive, and Lord W. Bentinck must therefore be acquitted of blame for the complex relations formed with the Mohammedan states of Bahawalpoor, Sinde, and Afghanistan, and especially with the wily and ambitious Seik, Runjeet Sing, to whom a present of several directed to the diffusion of the English language among the natives—a measure difficult indeed, but highly desirable in the sight of all their well-wishers.

§ The first voyage between Bombay and Suez, made by the *Hugh Lindsay* in 1830, occupied thirty days; the second, in the same year, only twenty-two. The passage between England and India now requires fewer weeks than it formerly did months.

English horses, of unusual size and stature, were presented by Lieutenant Burnes, in the name of William IV., in October, 1831.

The renewal of the charter of the E. I. Cy. for the term of twenty years (1833 to 1853), was attended with a complete change in the constitution of that powerful body, which, after commencing in a purely commercial spirit, now consented to place in abeyance its exclusive privileges of trade with China as well as with India, but retained its political rights; and, in conjunction with the Board of Control, continued to direct the affairs of Hindoostan. The fixed dividend guaranteed to the shareholders, and charged upon the revenues of India, the means of redeeming the company's stock, with other arrangements then made, are set forth in the opening page of this history. Lord William Bentinck resigned his position on account of ill-health, and quitted India early in 1835. The brief provisional sway of Sir Charles Metcalfe was distinguished by a measure which procured him much exaggerated applause and equally indiscriminate censure. This act was the removal of the restrictions on the public press of India, which, though rarely enforced, were still in existence. It is worthy of remark, that the liability to government interference was confined to Europeans; for native editors could publish anything short of a direct libel: and after the banishment of Mr. Silk Buckingham by Mr. Adam, his paper was continued by a successor of mixed race, an Anglo-Indian, whom the law did not affect. The views of Sir Charles Metcalfe, with regard to the precarious nature of our Indian empire, were of a decidedly exaggerated and alarmist character. In 1825, he had declared the real dangers of a free press in India to be, "its enabling the natives to throw off our yoke;" and a minute recorded by him in October, 1830, expressed, with some sharpness, the inconvenience attendant on the proceedings of government finding their way into the newspapers. Despite some apparent inconsistency, the strenuous advocacy of the freedom of the press, at all hazards, would have been a proceeding worthy his frank and manly character; but it would be difficult to justify his conduct in enacting a measure, however laudable in itself, in opposition to the will, and, as it was generally supposed, to the interests of his employers. The change could scarcely have been long delayed; for now that Englishmen were to

be suffered to settle at pleasure in India, it was not likely they would tamely submit to have summary deportation held over them as the penalty of offending against the prerogative of a despotic governor, in a time of external and internal tranquillity.

AUCKLAND ADMINISTRATION: 1835 to 1842.—The person first nominated as the successor of Lord William Bentinck was Lord Heytesbury; but the brief interval of power enjoyed by the Tory ministry having expired before his lordship could quit England, the appointment was cancelled, the large sum granted as usual for outfitting expenses being forfeited by the E. I. Cy.

The restored Whig cabinet, under Lord Melbourne, bestowed the Indian viceroyalty on Lord Auckland, a nobleman of amiable character and business habits, who, it was generally supposed, might be safely entrusted with the charge of the supreme government, which had certainly never been assumed by any preceding functionary under more favourable circumstances. Perfect tranquillity, a diminishing debt, and increasing commerce, seemed to promise an easy and honourable administration; unhappily, it proved the very reverse. The first event of importance was one which, though vindicated by an author whose impartiality reflects equal credit on himself and the E. I. Cy.,* nevertheless appears to the writer of the present work an act of cruel injustice, the blame of which rests chiefly on the Bombay authorities; for the new governor-general gave but a tardy and reluctant assent to their decision. The measure in question was the deposition of the rajah of Sattara, the legitimate successor of Sevajee, who had been placed on the musnud in 1819. The policy or impolicy of his reinstatement need not be discussed. Pertab Sein, then twenty-seven years of age, showed unbounded delight at his restoration to what he undisguisedly viewed as real power, and diligently set about improving his little sovereignty. Successive residents at his court—Grant Duff, generals Briggs and Robertson, and Colonel Lodwick—bore witness to the general excellence of his administration from 1819 to 1837-'8, the last gentleman with some qualification, the specified drawback being the new feature of weakness of mind manifested by an excessive addiction to Brahminical superstitions, and the employment

* Mr. Edward Thornton, head of the statistical department at the India House.

of women in the management of elephants, as guards, and in other unusual offices. These complaints were the first indication of an altered tone on the part of the local authorities, and were probably the earliest results of a conspiracy formed against the rajah in his own palace. The favourable nature of the testimony regarding his conduct previously sent to England, had drawn from the Court of Directors repeated expressions of warm and generous praise. In 1829 he was declared to be "remarkable among the princes of India for mildness, frugality, and attention to business;" in 1831, "his disposition and capacity for government" are again noticed; and in December, 1835, a letter was addressed to him, lauding the "exemplary fulfilment" of his duties as "well calculated to promote the prosperity of his dominions and the happiness of his people," and acknowledging "the liberality displayed in executing various public works of great utility, which has so justly raised your reputation in the eyes of the princes and people of India, and gives you an additional claim to our approbation, respect, and applause." This testimony was accompanied by a handsome sword, the most marked tribute of respect which could be offered to a Maharatta. The letter and sword were arbitrarily detained by the Bombay government, and never presented to the rajah, whose feelings about this time became irritated by a controversy with them regarding certain jaghires to which he laid claim. A conspiracy was, it is believed, concocted against him by a vindictive, ungrateful, and profligate brother, and the rajah was accused of endeavouring to procure the overthrow of British power by three extraordinary measures:—first, by striving to corrupt the entire Anglo-Indian army through two native officers of a regiment stationed at Sattara; second, by inducing the Portuguese at Goa to land 30,000 European troops in India, who were to be marched overland for the purpose; third, by corresponding with the fugitive ex-rajah of Nagpoor, who had neither character, influence, nor ability,—not a shilling, nor an acre of territory,—and was himself dependent

on charity. The seals of the rajah were forged, pretended correspondence produced, and other artful schemes successfully carried through. There was at this time a vague feeling of alarm throughout India relative to a general rising against British supremacy: the press at home and abroad gave countenance to the idea; and Sir Charles Metcalfe declared he should not be surprised "to wake some fine morning and find the whole thing blown up." Sir Robert Grant, then governor of Bombay, and some officials around him, fell into the trap, and despatches of several hundred paragraphs were written regarding the alleged application of the rajah for the aid of 30,000 Portuguese soldiers, when, at that time, *thirty* would have been an impossibility; and great alarm was professed lest 200,000 British soldiers—Mussulmen as well as Hindoos, who had ever proved themselves true to their salt—should be seduced from their allegiance by this petty prince, who was no warrior, but an excellent farmer and landlord. The supreme government of India at first treated the affair with the contempt it merited: but reiterated calumnies began to take effect; and the alarm once given, the most absurd stories, many of which carried with them the proof of their falsehood,* were believed by men who were afterwards ashamed to confess their credulity. Sir R. Grant died, and Sir James Carnac, then chairman of the Court of Directors, succeeded him. He went to Sattara in 1839, and required the rajah to acknowledge his guilt, sign a new treaty, and all would be forgiven. Pertab Sein refused to declare himself a traitor to the British government; asked for a copy of the charges against him, and demanded a fair hearing and a public trial. Sir J. Carnac was a kind and moderate man; but the strong prejudices—not to use a harsher term—of his associates warped his judgment, and led him to view the conduct of the rajah as the continued contumacy of a rebel, instead of the offended feelings of an innocent man. A body of troops marched at midnight into the palace, led by the successful plotter, Appa Sahib: the rajah was made prisoner in his bed, all his property seized; and ere morning

* Since the deposition of the Sattara rajah, on the evidence of forged documents and perjured witnesses, a similar case has come to light. Ali Morad, one of the Ameers of Sind, having been convicted of forgery, had a large portion of his territories confiscated by the British government. The accuser,

Sheik Ali Hussein, had been prime minister of the chief, and was dismissed for malpractices: at his death (8th May, 1853), he confessed that all he had sworn against Ali Morad was untrue, and that he had given false evidence for purposes of revenge.—(*Bombay Gazette*, 10th May, 1853.)

dawned, the victim of a foul conspiracy was ignominiously hurried away as a prisoner to Benares, where he died. The brother who had caused his ruin was placed on the throne. After a few years of profligacy and indolence Appa Sahib died, leaving no son, and the little principality of Sattara devolved, in default of heirs, upon the British government. The whole transaction is painful, and reflects little credit on any concerned therein: time, the revealer of truth, has exposed the folly and injustice of the procedure; and had the ex-rajah survived, some measure of justice would probably have been rendered him.*

The next and all-absorbing feature of the Auckland administration is the Afghan war, to understand the origin of which it is necessary to explain the condition of the territories on our western frontier. Zemaun Shah, the Afghan ruler of Cabool, against whom a treaty was negotiated with Persia in 1801, by Sir John Malcolm, was deposed and blinded in the same year by his brother Mahmood—treatment precisely similar to that bestowed by him on his immediate predecessor, Humayun. Mahmood was, in turn, displaced by a fourth brother, named Soojahool-Moolk. With unwonted clemency the conqueror refrained from inflicting extinction of sight, which, though not a legal disqualification to sovereign power, usually proves an insuperable bar to the claims of any candidate. Soojah could not keep the throne he had gained; but being expelled by the reviving strength of Mahmood, sought refuge with Runjeet Sing, who plundered him of all his valuables, including the famous Koh-i-Noor (the gem of the English Exhibition of 1851), and made him prisoner. By the exertion of an unexpected amount of skill and resolution, Shah Soojah succeeded in making his escape in the disguise of a mendicant, and reached the British station of Loodiana in September, 1816, whither his family, together with Zemaun Shah, had previously found refuge. Mahmood did not, however, possess the throne in peace. His vizier, Futteh Khan, an able chief, who had been mainly instrumental in carrying out the late revolution, evinced indications of a desire to elevate his numerous brothers to almost exclusive authority, and to make the Barukzye clan, of which

he was hereditary chief, the governing class. The youngest of his brethren, the afterwards famous Dost Mohammed, treacherously occupied the fortress of Herat, committed great excesses there, and even profaned the harem by seizing the ornaments of its inmates, and especially by violently tearing away a jewelled girdle from the person of one of the royal princesses.

The insulted lady sent the torn robe to her relative, Prince Kamran, the son of Mahmood Shah, with a demand for vengeance. Dost Mohammed fled to Cashmere, where his brother, Azim Khan, was governor. Futteh Ali was made prisoner, and blinded by the dagger of Kamran. Subsequently, on his refusal to call upon his brothers to surrender, the unfortunate vizier was literally hacked to pieces by the courtiers in attendance on the king and prince.

Dost Mohammed raised an army, and made himself master of the city of Cabool, in 1818. Shah Mahmood and Kamran established themselves in Herat, and the usurper turned his attention to the affairs of government, and proved a much better ruler than either of his predecessors. He had many difficulties to contend with, including the jealous intrigues of his brothers, several of whom became in fact independent princes. Their hostility encouraged Shah Soojah to attempt regaining possession of Cabool, but without effect. At the commencement of Lord Auckland's administration, Dost Mohammed reigned over the chief remaining portion of the Doorani kingdom founded by Ahmed Shah, which, at the time of the death of that ruler, extended from the west of Khorassan to Sirhind, and from the Oxus to the sea. Of the seventeen provinces it then comprised, only six now remained—namely, Cabool, Bameecan, Ghoreband, Ghuznee, Candahar, and Jellalabad. Beloochistan had become independent, under a chief named Mohammed Khan, in 1802; Khorassan had been recovered by Persia; Herat was retained by Prince Kamran, after the death of Mahmood; Balkh was taken by the King of Bokhara, in 1823; and the Punjab, Mooltan, Dera Ghaza Khan, Dera Ismael Khan, and lastly Peshawur, fell to the share of Runjeet Sing. Sindh was still nominally dependent on Cabool; but its rulers—three brothers

* Sir Charles Forbes, Bart., Mr. John Forbes, M.P., and several leading directors of the E. I. Co., with Mr. Joseph Hume, M.P., Arthur Lewis, of the chancery bar, and many other members of the Court

of Proprietors, who were the warm friends of the ex-rajah, never ceased to seek a hearing and trial for him, and entertained a strong and permanent conviction of his innocence.

who governed conjointly under the title of "the Ameers"—generally needed the presence of an army to compel the payment of their arrears of tribute. Cabool itself, and a considerable portion of the Hazerah country, was under the immediate sway of Dost Mohammed; Candahar, and the adjacent territory, was held by his three brothers, Kohen-dil-Khan, Rehem-dil-Khan, and Mehirdil-Khan, under the name of sirdars or governors.

The divided and independent governments beyond the Indus were in a condition well calculated to secure our power, without any infraction of the strict neutrality which the English rulers so ostentatiously declared it their desire to preserve, when, in 1838, an attack was made on Herat by the Shah of Persia, with the aid of Russian officers.* Herat has been called the key of Afghanistan: it is also the gate towards which all the great roads from Central Asia to India converge; and the Calcutta authorities became exceedingly alarmed at the probability of its falling under the influence of Russia. They became very solicitous that Afghanistan should maintain entire independence, and reject the proffered alliance with the Muscovite court. Lieutenant Burnes was dispatched on an embassy to Dost Mohammed, or "the Dost," as he was commonly called; but although the instructions of Burnes were explicit regarding the non-reception of Russian envoys, and other demands to be exacted on the part of the English, he had nothing beyond idle professions of regard to offer in return; not even mediation with Runjeet Sing for the restoration of Peshawur, which the Seik conqueror was willing to surrender to any one except to the ruler of Cabool, from whom it had been taken.

The contrast between the magnificent presents brought by Mountstuart Elphinstone to Afghanistan, on a former occasion, with the pistol and telescope, pins, needles, and playthings, now offered to the Dost for himself and the inmates of the zenana, could not but be painfully felt; yet the chief knew the value of British protection, and was not disposed to take offence lightly. But he could not afford to reject the direct offers of assistance, in men and money, made by the secretary of

the Russian legation, without some clear guarantee against the evil effects of such rejection; and as this was positively refused, he had literally no alternative but to accept the Russo-Persian alliance. It would have been only common prudence, on the part of the supreme government, to have waited the issue of the siege of Herat, before proceeding further; but Lord Auckland was unhappily enjoying the cool breezes of Simla, away from his legitimate advisers at Calcutta, and was, it is said, considerably under the influence of two or three clever and impulsive men, who may have been excellent secretaries and amusing table-companions, but were very ill-adapted for wary counsellors.† It would have been an easy matter to convert Dost Mohammed, the sirdars of Candahar, and the whole Barukzye clan, into firm allies; nevertheless, Lord Auckland, in an hour of weakness and indecision, was induced to seek the co-operation of Runjeet Sing for the restoration of Shah Soojah; and, although the defeat of the Persian army, and its withdrawal, after a ten months' siege,‡ secured the independence of Herat, and removed one main incentive to war, the projected invasion was carried out despite the apathy of the Seik ruler (now fast sinking to his grave, under the combined influence of age and the most hateful excesses) and the scarcely disguised distrust of Soojah, who could not comprehend why the assistance repeatedly refused by Lord W. Bentinck, was bestowed unasked by Lord Auckland.

Perhaps so perilous an enterprise was never more rashly and needlessly undertaken. It was wrong in principle, weak in execution, and appalling in its results. Shah Soojah was not even presumptive heir to the usurped dominions of his grandfather; for Kamran, the son of the elder brother Mahmood, had a prior claim. The professed object of the Tripartite Treaty now formed, viz., to restore a legitimate sovereign to the throne from whence he had been wrongfully expelled, was therefore absolutely false; and as if to make the spirit of the whole transaction more evident, Runjeet Sing affixed his signature to the treaty at Lahore, June, 1838, with the ill-gotten Koh-i-Noor gleaming on his arm.§ In return for furnishing a few thousand troops

* One of the alleged reasons being the activity with which the slave-trade was carried on at Herat.

† Mr. H. Torrens, and John Colvin, Lord Auckland's private secretary.—*Kaye's War in Afghanistan*.

‡ Lt. Eldred Pottinger cheered, counselled, and fought with the garrison throughout the weary siege.

§ This famous stone is said by several modern writers on the Afghans to have formed part of

to be paid by Shah Soojah, Runjeet Sing was to be confirmed in possession of all the territories (including Peshawur) wrested by him from Cabool.* As to the English, they were willing to lavish men and money on the trappings of war, and to get up "a grand military promenade," for the sake of terrifying Russia by a formidable demonstration of our power and energy. Those who ventured to speak of the dreary defiles, inclement climate, and, above all, of the warlike temper of the people upon whom a rejected yoke was to be reimposed by English bayonets, were censured as timid, prejudiced, or misinformed; and the assembling of the "army of the Indus" was a source of agreeable excitement, fraught with promotions and appointments, commissariat contracts, and honours from the Crown; for, despite the neutral policy urged by the home authorities, it was pretty evident that a brilliant campaign was no less certain to procure for its promoters rank and emolument, than to inflict new burdens on the Indian revenues, and increase the pressure of taxes which it was alike the duty and the interest of the government to mitigate.

A declaration of war was issued from Simla, in 1838, and a British force was speedily gathered of 28,350 men, partly from Bengal, partly from Bombay. It was deemed advisable by the governor-general that the Shah should "enter Afghanistan surrounded by his own troops;" and, for this end, about Shah Jehan's peacock throne, which was carried off from Hindoostan by Nadir Shah; but there does not seem evidence to support the statement. Several diamonds of extraordinary value were seized by different invaders, and one in particular was given by the exiled Humayun to his ungracious host the Shah of Persia.—(See p. 91.)

* The concessions made to Runjeet Sing at this period were no less undignified than unwise. At the meeting which took place with Lord Auckland at Ferozepoor, caresses were lavished on the "lion of the Punjab," who though now a decrepit and paralysed old man, continued to outrage public decency by the practice of shameful sensualities. There he sat in his golden chair, shaped like a hip-bath, with his attenuated limbs gathered beneath him, and his single restless eye flashing in rivalry of the Koh-i-Noor (the only ornament he wore, except a string of 300 pearls of the finest water and the size of small marbles), listening to the civilities of the English authorities, which happily did not extend to compliance with his previous demand for an English wife.—(Osborne's *Court and Camp of Runjeet Sing*, 199.) The fact that the old debauchee entertained some at least of his official visitors with the "burra tomacha" (great fun) of intoxicating "nautch" girls, for the sake of seeing them beat and abuse one another. [redacted] to the remark of a

4,000 camp followers† were levied from the E. I. Cy.'s military stations, and placed under the nominal command of Timur, the eldest son of Soojah-ool-Moolk; the whole being led by British officers, and paid from the British treasury. Runjeet Sing was to supply a contingent of 6,000 men, and to station 15,000 men as an army of observation in Peshawur. The commissariat arrangements were extremely deficient, and the enormous number of camp followers, amounting to nearly 100,000 persons, imparted new difficulties to a march of extraordinary length, through an almost unexplored and hostile territory. The invading force had only physical difficulties, and the depredations of certain mountain tribes, to encounter on the road to Candahar. It was expected that the Ameers of Sind would offer opposition on the score of the manifest infraction of the treaty of 1832, by which the E. I. Cy., when desirous to open the navigation of the Indus, expressly declared that it would be employed by them solely for mercantile uses. The Ameers, however, saw the folly of remonstrating with a powerful force thirsting for the plunder of the rich city of Hyderabad. They paid £100,000 as an instalment of the £280,000 demanded by Shah Soojah on the favourite plea of arrears of tribute, and surrendered the fortified island of Bukkur in the Indus, the possession of which was deemed necessary to the security of the English force. The army of the Indus

British officer, who, commenting on the indulgence evinced to the vices of Runjeet Sing, writes—"It was impossible not to feel that this complaisance was carried a little too far, when he was exhibited in the character of a Bacchus or Silenus, in the presence of an assemblage of English gentlewomen, and when their notions of decency were further outraged by the introduction, to whatever extent sanctioned by culpable usage in other parts of India, of bands of singing and dancing courtesans."—(Havelock's *War in Afghanistan*, i., 87.) After all the Seiks were not conciliated: they watched the Feringhees (foreigners) with extreme suspicion; and when their infirm old chief, in his anxiety to examine a present of two howitzers, fell prostrate before them, the accident was regarded as a fearful omen.

† In October, 1838, the author, deeply convinced of the unjust and perilous nature of the war, drew up a memorandum, which the Marquis Wellesley transmitted to Sir John Cam Hobhouse, then President of the Board of Control. His lordship addressed a subsequent communication to Sir John against the Afghan war, predicting that "our difficulties would commence where our military successes ended." The Duke of Wellington, Elphinstone, Edmonstone, Metcalfe, and other Indian statesmen, took the same view of the question.

‡ Col. Dennie's *Campaigns in Afghanistan*, 51.

traversed the weary Bolan Pass, and the dangerous and difficult Kojuck defile with success, but at a fearful cost of life,* especially on the part of the camp followers, from heat and want of water. Candahar (the capital of Western Afghanistan), was occupied without resistance by Shah Soojah and his allies, in April, 1839. Kohun-dil-Khan and his brother sirdars fled as the foe advanced; and English gold scattered lavishly on all sides, enabled the returning monarch to win the temporary suffrage of several Barukzye chiefs. In the following June the army under Sir John Keane and Shah Soojah left a garrison at Candahar and set out for Ghuznee. This ancient fortress proved stronger than had been expected; but a nephew of Dost Mohammed deserted from the garrison, and betrayed the important secret, that an entrance called the Cabool gate had not, like the rest, been built up with stone, but had been left slightly barricaded in the expectation of supplies. The besiegers, acting on this information, fastened bags of gunpowder upon the wooden door at night, and by setting them on fire effected a practicable breach, through which a storming party, led by Colonel Dennie, immediately secured an entrance, captured the town, and, after some hours' resistance, the citadel also, receiving little loss, but slaying 1,000 Afghans: 3,000 more were wounded or captured. Among the prisoners were about fifty fanatics of all ages, who had assumed the name of *Ghazee*, in right of being engaged in holy warfare against infidels. These men, the first taken in arms against Shah Soojah, "were hacked to death with wanton barbarity by the knives of his executioners."†

So much for the magnanimity of the restored monarch in his short hour of triumph. The campaign thus successfully opened, was to some extent overshadowed by tidings of the death of Runjeet Sing, in 1839; but notwithstanding the jealous dislike evinced towards the English by the new authorities at Lahore, the Seik contingent, wretchedly insufficient as it was, became serviceable in the hands of Colonel Wade; and this energetic officer, with his nominal coadjutor the Shahzada (Prince Timur), who was "an absolute cypher," contrived, partly by fighting,

partly by diplomacy, to traverse the formidable Khyber Pass, at the head of a motley assemblage of Hindoos, Seiks, and Afghans. Akber Khan, Dost Mohammed's favourite "fighting son," was recalled from his camp near Jellalabad, to join his father at Cabool, and the path being left open, Wade marched on and seized Jellalabad.

The position of Dost Mohammed was daily rendered more perilous by the desertion of his relatives and followers. Very shortly after the taking of Ghuznee, he attempted to compromise matters by offering to submit to the restoration of Shah Soojah, on condition of his own nomination to his late brother Futteh Khan's position of vizier. This proposition was of course rejected; for so far from being inclined to delegate authority to his opponent, Shah Soojah desired nothing better than to "hang the dog"—a procedure which the British envoy, Mr. Macnaghten, does not appear to have considered otherwise than advisable, provided they could catch him.‡

The Dost desired to give the invaders battle at Maidan, on the Cabool river, but treachery and disaffection surrounded him on every side, and his camp at Urghundeh fairly fell to pieces. The venal Kuzzilbashies (or Persian guard) forsook the master whose salt they had eaten thirteen years. In vain he entreated them to stand by him in one charge against the Feringhees, that he might die with honour,—the spirit-stirring appeal fell on the listless ears of men determined to purchase safety by desertion; and, attended by a few faithful followers, Dost Mohammed in despair turned his horse's head towards the Hindoo-Koosh, leaving his guns standing.

Cabool opened its gates with "sullen, surly submission;" and Shah Soojah entered the Balla Hissar or palace-citadel in triumph, while his British allies sounded a long loud note of triumph, the European echoes of which were destined to die away in the very saddest cry of anguish and humiliation ever uttered by the proud conquerors of India. The authorities at Cabool soon discovered that the foreign bayonets and foreign gold which had been the means of replacing Shah Soojah on the throne of Afghanistan, were likewise the sole method of keeping him there. Lord Auckland desired the return of the entire "army of the Indus;" but the unpopularity of the Shah was too evident to admit of such a step, unless we were willing to commit the whole affair a

* Of 100,000 camp followers, only 20,000 reached Candahar.—(Capper's *Three Presidencies*, p. 212.)

† Vide John William Kaye's graphic and fearless *History of the War in Afghanistan*, i., 445.

‡ *Idem.*, 561.

failure, and escort his majesty back to Loodiana, or if he thought fit, leave him to take his chance among his own countrymen. An open confession of error, however mortifying, would have been incalculably wiser than following up one false step with a multitude of others. In 1839 a portion of the troops returned to Calcutta. The commander-in-chief, Sir John Keane, immediately proceeded to England, where he was elevated to the peerage by the title of Baron Keane of Ghuznee, and further remunerated by a pension of £2,000 per ann. for himself and his two next heirs male. The governor-general, from a baron, was made an earl. Mr. Macnaghten was created a baronet, and orders of the Bath were bestowed, not with the most discriminating hand.*

The winter of 1839 passed in tolerable tranquillity. The British took military possession of the country by establishing garrisons in the cities of Cabool and Candahar, and in the principal posts on the main roads to Hindoostan—viz., Ghuznee and Quettah on the west, Jellalabad and Ali-Musjid on the east. Some minor detachments were left in various other isolated positions; thus dividing a force which, united, was scarcely sufficient for its own protection. Moreover, the military authorities in Cabool, instead of retaining their position in the Balla Hissar, were induced to build costly and indefensible cantonments on the adjacent plain, in compliance with the scruples of Shah Soojah, who soon began to feel his throne somewhat too closely hedged in by foreign troops. The first flush of triumph over, he could not but find it a weary thing to live shut up in a fortress, despised by his own subjects; and as he looked forth from the Balla Hissar on the city beneath, he said "everything appeared to him shrunk small and miserable; and that the Cabool of his old age in no respect corresponded with the recollections of the Cabool of his youth."

The yearnings of romance were soon swallowed up in real dangers. Insurrections took place in various quarters. Dost Mohammed again appeared, in arms, and several sharp encounters took place in the course of the year 1840; but the Afghans, despite some partial successes, offered no combined or systematic resistance. The Dost, after making a brave and successful stand at Purwan in November, thought the time had arrived when he

* Dennie's services at Ghuznee were overlooked.

might, with a good grace, surrender himself to the English (into whose hands the ladies of his family had already fallen.) Turning from the field of battle in despair, he galloped towards Cabool, and twenty-four hours spent on the saddle, brought him face to face with the British envoy, who was returning homeward from an evening ride. Dost Mohammed sprang to the ground, tendered his sword, and claimed protection as a voluntary captive. The kindly peace-loving nature of Sir William had been sadly warped since he had exchanged the ordinary routine of official duties and scholarly recreations for the arduous post of counsellor to Shah Soojah; and immediately before this unlooked-for greeting, he had been inquiring with regard to the Dost—"Would it be justifiable to set a price on this fellow's head?" for "it appears that he meditates fighting with us so long as the breath is in his body." But the chivalrous bearing of the defeated Ameer banished all harsh thoughts. Sir William refused the proffered sword; and when the Dost was sent as a state prisoner to Hindoostan, actually advocated his being provided for by the British authorities "more handsomely than Shah Soojah had been," for the following memorable reason:—"The Shah had no claim upon us. We had no hand in depriving him of his kingdom; whereas, we ejected the Dost, who never offended us, in support of our policy, of which he was the victim." Lord Auckland tacitly admitted the fact by receiving the deposed ruler with extreme courtesy, and burdening the Indian population with a new pension of two lacs, or about £20,000 per ann. for his support. At this time the revenues of Cabool, gathered by force of arms, did not exceed fifteen lacs, and barely paid the ordinary expenses of government. The Anglo-Afghan treasury was well-nigh exhausted, and there were grounds for doubting whether the E. I. Cy. would not think a million and a quarter a-year too dear a price to pay for the maintenance of their nominee at Cabool. The reduction of outgoings was attempted by the diminution of the "black mail" paid to certain Khilji chiefs for checking the excesses committed by the predatory tribes who infested the passes. The experiment proved very dangerous; the Khiljies assumed a haughty tone; the Kojucks, and many tribes of whose very names the English had until now remained in happy ignorance, rose in

what was misnamed "rebellion" against Shah Soojah. In Kohistan and the Khyber, that region of snowy precipices and roaring torrents, where every man is a good marksman behind his native rock, more than usual excitement prevailed. The British envoy, considering with some reason the state of Afghanistan to be at the best of times one of chronic unrest, paid too little heed to the numerous signs of an approaching crisis which alarmed Shah Soojah. The noses of the Dourani Khans (or lords) had, Macnaghten said, been brought to the grindstone, and all was quiet, from Dan to Beersheba.* Impressed with this agreeable conviction, he prepared to resign his position, and return to Hindoostan to fill the honourable station of governor of Bombay. His intended successor, Sir Alexander Burnes, had long ardently desired the office of envoy; but from the conflicting and contradictory character both of his official and private statements, it is difficult to say what his actual opinions were concerning the condition of the country and the feelings of the people. He must have known that the military occupation of Afghanistan (of necessity sufficiently unpopular) had been rendered peculiarly hateful and galling by his own unbridled licentiousness, and by that of other officers, whose example was closely imitated by the mass of the European soldiery. Lady Macnaghten, Lady Sale, and other Englishwomen resided within the cantonments, yet their presence did not check the excesses, the terrible retribution for which they were soon to share. Shah Soojah, whom Macnaghten declared to be "the best and ablest man in his dominions,"† and whose fidelity was evinced by the warnings he repeatedly gave the English authorities of the impending danger, and his entreaties that they would take up their abode in the Balla Hissar, remonstrated forcibly against the immorality of the officers, and pointed out the

indignation which it excited among his countrymen. "I told the envoy," writes the Shah to Lord Auckland, January, 1842, "what was going on, and was not listened to. I told him that complaints were daily made to me of Afghan women being taken to Burnes' moonshee (Mohun Lal), and of their drinking wine at his house, and of women being taken to the chaonee, and of my having witnessed it."‡ Kaye states, "the scandal was open, undisguised, notorious. Redress was not to be obtained. The evil was not in course of suppression. It went on till it became intolerable; and the injured then began to see that the only remedy was in their own hands."§

That remedy was the death of the leading offender, and the expulsion of the English from Afghanistan. Warnings of various kinds were not wanting; but they passed unheeded. The week fixed for the departure of the envoy arrived, and preparations were made for his journey, and for the comfort of his successor in office, and of the other functionaries during the coming winter, which was expected to pass like the two former ones, in a succession of pastimes, including shooting, card-playing, drinking,|| and various amusements, innocent or otherwise, according to the tastes and habits of those concerned. On the evening of the 1st November, 1841, Burnes formally congratulated Macnaghten on his approaching departure during a period of profound tranquillity.¶ At that very time a party of chiefs were assembled close at hand discussing in full conclave the means of redressing their national and individual wrongs. At daybreak on the following morning, Burnes was aroused by the message of a friendly Afghan, informing him of approaching danger, and bidding him quit the city and seek safety in the Balla Hissar or the cantonments. The vizier of Shah Soojah followed on the same errand, but all in vain; the doomed man sent to ask mili-

* News had arrived at Cabool, in the course of the summer, which greatly relieved the apprehensions of Macnaghten and Burnes, both of whom had a tendency to look out for dangers from afar, rather than guard against those by which they were immediately surrounded. The raising of the siege of Herat had only temporarily allayed their fears of Russian aggression, which were soon aroused by the dispatch of a powerful force, under General Peroffski, ostensibly directed against the man-stealing, slave-holding principality of Khiva, but it was believed, intended to act offensively against the English. Whatever the true design may have been, it was frustrated by the intense cold and inaccessible character

of the country, which, together with pestilence, nearly destroyed the Russian army, and compelled Peroffski to turn back without reaching Khiva.

† Kaye, i., 533. ‡ *Idem*, ii., 364. § *Idem*, i., 615.

|| Dost Mohammed prohibited the sale of a fiery spirit distilled from the grape. The English restored the Armenian manufacturers to full employment.

¶ It is asserted, that on the same day, intelligence so clear and full of a hostile confederacy had been given to Burnes, that he exclaimed the time had come for the British to leave the country. Burnes was impulsive, vacillating, ambitious, and unprincipled. It is possible that he deceived himself sometimes: it is certain that he constantly misled Macnaghten.

tary support, and persisted in remaining in his own abode, which adjoined that of Captain Johnson, paymaster of the Shah's forces. This officer was absent in cantonments, but the treasury was under the care of the usual sepoy guard, and they were ready and even desirous to fire on the insurgents. Burnes refused to give the necessary orders, in the hope of receiving speedy succour; meanwhile the crowd of stragglers grew into an infuriated mob, and his attempted harangue from the balcony was silenced by loud clamours and reproaches. Two officers had slept that night in the house of Sir Alexander: one of them, Lieutenant Broadfoot, prepared to sell his life dearly, and it is asserted, slew no less than six of his assailants before a ball struck him to the ground a corpse; the other, Lieutenant Charles Burnes, remained beside his brother while the latter offered redress of grievances, and a heavy ransom to the populace as the price of their joint lives. But in vain; the outraged Afghans loved vengeance better than gold; and after setting fire to the stables, a party of them burst into the garden, where they were fired upon by the sepoys under Lieutenant Burnes. Sir Alexander disguised himself in native attire, and strove to escape, but was recognised, or rather betrayed by the Cashmerian who had induced him to make the attempt. A fearful shout arose from the party in the garden on discovering his presence—"This is Secunder (Alexander) Burnes!" and in a few moments both brothers were cut to pieces by Afghan knives. The sepoys in charge of the treasury fought desperately, and surrendered their charge only with their lives. Massacre followed pillage; every man, woman, and child (Hindoo and Afghan) found in the two English dwellings perished;* finally, the buildings were fired; and all this with 6,000 British troops within half-an-hour's march of the city. The only energetic attempt made to check the insurrectionary movement emanated from the Shah, and was performed by one of his sons; but it proved unsuccessful, and the British authorities displayed an apathy quite inexplicable, even supposing the outbreak to have been directly occasioned by the ill conduct of its chief victim. General Elphinstone, the commander-in-chief, was an officer of high character, and of brave and kindly bearing;

* Moonshie Mohun Lal, who did "the dirty work of the British diplomatists," made his escape.—(Kaye.)

but increasing physical infirmities pressed heavily on him; and before the catastrophe he had applied for his recall from Afghanistan, where, indeed, he ought never to have been sent. Between him and Macnaghten no sympathy existed: they could not understand each other, and never acted in concert. The one was despondent and procrastinating, the other hopeful and energetic, but too much given to diplomacy. The consequence of this tendency was the adoption of various compromising measures when the occasion loudly called for the most active and straightforward policy. Post after post was captured from the British in the immediate vicinity of Cabool, and it soon became evident that the out-stations were in extreme peril; for the insurrection, from being local, speedily became general. The "frightful extent" of the cantonments (erected before Elphinstone's arrival), the loss of a fort four hundred yards distant, in which the commissariat stores had been most improvidently placed, together with the deficiency of artillery, so disheartened and unnerved the general, that he suffered day after day to pass without any decisive effort to gain possession of the city, and began to urge on Macnaghten the propriety of making terms with the enemy. The king remained shut up in the Balla Hissar, "like grain between two millstones." He was a man of advanced age and weak purpose, and the hostility of his subjects being avowedly directed against the Feringhees, he strove to keep his crown upon his head, and his head upon his shoulders, by a trimming policy, which rendered him an object of distrust to both parties, and cost him eventually life as well as honour. Avarice had grown on him, and he beheld with extreme annoyance the sums of money lavished by the British envoy in the futile attempt to buy off the more influential of the confederate chiefs. The urgent solicitations of Elphinstone, the growing difficulty of obtaining supplies for the troops, the unsatisfactory results of daily petty hostilities, and the non-arrival of the reinforcements of men and money solicited by Macnaghten from Hindoostan, at length induced him to offer to evacuate Afghanistan on honourable terms. The tone adopted by the chiefs was so arrogant and offensive, that the conference came to an abrupt termination; both parties being resolved to resume hostilities sooner than abate their respective pretensions. During the interview a strange

scene took place outside the cantonments. Thinking that a treaty of peace was being concluded by their leaders, the British and Afghan soldiery gave vent to their joy in mutual congratulations. The Europeans lent over the low walls (misnamed defences), conversing familiarly with their late foes, and even went out unarmed among them, and thankfully accepted presents of vegetables. The result of the meeting between the envoy and the chiefs was the renewal of strife, and the men whose hands had been so lately joined in friendly greetings, were again called on to shed each other's blood for the honour of their respective countries. The English troops showed so little inclination for the work, that Macnaghtan angrily designated them a "pack of despicable cowards," and was soon compelled to reopen his negotiations with the enemy. Affairs were in this precarious condition when Akber Khan returned to Cabool, after more than two years of exile and suffering. His reappearance caused no additional anxiety to the beleagured English; on the contrary, the fact that the ladies of the family of the young Barukzye were, with his father, prisoners in Hindoostan, inspired a hope that he might be made the means of procuring favourable terms from the hostile leaders who, on their part, welcomed the return of the favourite son of the Dost with extreme delight. Akber (styled by Roebuck the "Wallace of Cabool") was, beyond doubt, a favourable specimen of an Afghan chief, strikingly handsome in face and figure, full of life and energy, joyous in peace, fearless in war, freedom-loving, deeply attached to his father and his country, susceptible of generous impulses, but uneducated and destitute of self-control. For some time he took no leading part against the English, and neither aided nor opposed the dominant party in formally setting aside the authority of Shah Soojah, and proclaiming as king in his stead the Nawab Mohammed Zemaun Khan, a cousin of the late Cabool chief. The selection was fortunate for the English, the Nawab being a humane and honourable man, well inclined to grant them acceptable terms of evacuation; and his turbulent and quarrelsome adherents were, after much discussion, induced to sign a treaty, the stipulations of which, mutual distrust prevented from being fulfilled by either party. The English consented to surrender the fortresses they still retained in Afghanistan, and their cannon, on con-

dition of receiving a supply of beasts of burden from the enemy, to facilitate their march. Shah Soojah was to be allowed to return with them or to remain in Cabool, with the miserable stipend of a lac of rupees per annum; and one moment he resolved on accompanying the retreating army, while the next he declared it his intention to remain where he was, and wait a new turn of events. In either mood, he declaimed, with reason, against the folly of his allies in divesting themselves of the means of defence, asking indignantly whether any people in the world ever before gave their enemies the means of killing them? The officers in charge of Candahar and Jellalabad (Nott and Sale) took the same view of the case; and, arguing that the order of surrender must have been forcibly extorted from General Elphinstone, positively refused to abandon their positions. The treaty was thus placed in abeyance, and the troops in cantonment lived on from day to day, frittering away their resources, and growing hourly more desponding; while Macnaghten, Elphinstone, and the second in command, Brigadier Shelton, passed the precious hours in angry discussion. The ill-health of the general, increased by a painful wound caused by a musket-ball, obliged him to delegate many duties to Shelton, an officer of great personal courage, but overbearing and prejudiced, with the especial defect of being unable to sympathise with the sufferings, or appreciate the noble devotion of the much-tried native troops. The civilian is said to have been the truest soldier in the camp; but he had no confidence in his colleagues, and his own powers of mind and body were fast sinking beneath the load of anxiety which had so suddenly banished the delusion (sedulously cherished by the unhappy Burnes to the last day of his life) of the tranquil submission of Afghanistan to a foreign yoke. Never had day-dreamer a more terrible awakening. Incensed by the refusal of the holders of inferior posts to obey his orders, and by the non-fulfilment of the promises made by the Barukzye chiefs of carriage cattle, Macnaghten, chafed almost to madness, was ready to follow any *ignis fatuus* that should present a hope of escape for himself and the 16,000 men whose lives trembled in the balance. Although ostensibly bound by treaty with the Barukzyes, he was ready to side with Doorani or Populzye, Khilji or Kuzzilbash, or, in a word, to join any native faction able to

afford cordial co-operation. In this mood he lent a willing ear to a communication made to him on the evening of 22nd Dec., 1841. The proposal was that Akber and the Khiljies should unite with the British for the seizure of the person of Ameen-oollah Khan, a leading Barukzye chief, and a party to the late agreement, whose head, for a certain sum of money, would be laid at the feet of the envoy. Happily for his own honour and that of his country, Macnaghten rejected the proposition so far as the life of the chief was concerned,* but was prepared to aid in his capture without the preliminary measure of declaring the treaty void. The envoy gave a written promise for the evacuation of Afghanistan in the coming spring; Shah Soojah was to be left behind, with Akber for his vizier; and the representative of the British government further guaranteed to reward the services of Akber by an annuity of £40,000 a-year, and a bonus of no less than £300,000.

On the following morning Macnaghten sent for the officers of his staff (Capts. Lawrence, Trevor, and Mackenzie), and, in an excited but determined tone, bade them accompany him to a conference with Akber: lastly, he informed the general of his intentions, desiring that two regiments might be got ready for service, and, to some extent, explaining the matter in hand. Elphinstone asked what part Nawab Zemaun Khan, and other leading Barukzyes, were expected to take? "None," was the reply; "they are not in the plot." The old general was scrupulously honest, and the word grated on his ear. But Macnaghten would listen to neither remonstrance nor entreaty. Impatiently turning aside from the feeble but chivalrous veteran, he exclaimed—"I understand these things better than you;" and rode off to the fatal interview,—not, however, without some misgiving as to its result; for he declared to his companions, that come what would, a thousand deaths were preferable to the life he had of late been leading. The meeting commenced in apparent courtesy; Macnaghten offered Akber a noble Arab horse, which the young chief accepted with thanks, at the same time acknowledg-

* The same right principle had not been invariably adhered to during the Afghan war, and the chiefs had good grounds for suspecting that blood-money had been offered for their lives. John Conolly (one of three brothers who followed the fortunes of their uncle, Sir W. Macnaghten, and like him, never lived to return to India), addressed from the Balla Hissar repeated injunctions to Mohun Lal,

ing the gift of a pair of double-barrelled pistols, sent on the previous day, which he wore at his girdle. The whole party, English and Afghans, dismounted, and seated themselves on cloths spread on some snow-clad hillocks, near the Cabool river, and about 600 yards from the cantonments. Macnaghten stretched himself at full length on the bank; Trevor and Mackenzie seated themselves beside him; but Lawrence knelt on one knee, ready for action. There was abundant cause for suspicion: the presence of a brother of Ameen-oollah, the excited and eager manner of the Afghans, and the numbers gathering round the English, drew from Lawrence and Mackenzie a remark that such intrusion was not consistent with a private conference. "They are all in the secret," said Akber; and, as he spoke, the envoy and his companions were violently seized from behind. Resistance was hopeless: their slender escort of sixteen men galloped back to cantonments to avoid being slain, save one who perished nobly in attempting to join his masters; the three *attachés* were made prisoners; but Macnaghten commenced a desperate struggle with Akber Khan, and a cry being raised that the troops were marching to the rescue, the young Barukzye, in extreme excitement, drew a pistol from his girdle, and shot the donor through the body. A party of fanatical Ghazees came up, flung themselves on the fallen envoy, and hacked him to pieces with their knives. Trevor slipped from the horse of the chief who was bearing him away captive, and shared the fate of his leader; and the other two officers were saved with difficulty by Akber Khan, who, remorseful for his late act, "drew his sword and laid about him right manfully"† for the defence of the prisoners against the infuriated crowd.

While the mangled remains of the victims were being paraded through the streets and great bazaar of the city, the military leaders remained in their usual apathetic state; nor was it until the morrow that authentic information was received of the catastrophe. Major Eldred Pottinger, on whom the office of political agent devolved, entreated the authorities assembled in

to offer from ten to fifteen thousand rupees for the heads of certain leading chiefs; and, in the cases of Abdoollah Khan and Meer Musjedee, the rewards were actually claimed but not accorded; nor do the offers of Conolly appear to have been made with the concurrence or even cognizance of Macnaghten, much less with that of Elphinstone.—(Kaye, ii. 37—104.)

† Capt. Mackenzie's words.—(Lt. Eyre's *Journal*.)

council, either to take refuge in the Balla Hissar, or endeavour to force a way to Jellalabad, and there remain until the arrival of reinforcements from India, tidings of which arrived within two days of the massacre. But his arguments were not regarded, and new terms were concluded, by which the representatives of the Indian government engaged to abandon all their forts, surrender their guns, evacuate Afghanistan, restore the deposed Dost, and pay a ransom of £140,000 in return for the supplies necessary for the retreat. Hostages were demanded and given for the performance of these humiliating conditions; but Lawrence and Mackenzie were released. Akber Khan desired that the English ladies should be left behind, as security for the restoration of the female members of his family; but the married officers refused the advantageous offers made from head-quarters to induce them to consent, and "some (says Eyre) declared they would shoot their wives first." On the 6th of January, 1842, though deep snow already lay on the ground, the troops quitted the cantonments, in which they had sustained a two months' siege, to encounter the miseries of a winter march through a country of perhaps unparalleled difficulty, swarming with mountain tribes predatory by profession, and bitterly incensed against the foreign invaders. The records of that terrible journey are written in letters of blood. No circumstances could possibly have occurred under which regularity and discipline were more needed to ensure the safety of the retreating force; yet even the semblance of it was soon abandoned in one general attempt to keep on with the foremost rank: to lag behind was certain death from Afghan knives or Afghan snows. In the dark and terrible pass of Koord Cabool, five miles in length, through which a roaring torrent dashed on between blocks of ice, while its heights were crowned by the pitiless Khiljies, 3,000 persons perished. The Englishwomen rode through, on horseback or in camel-paniers, uninjured, except Lady Sale, who received a bullet in her arm; but, brave-hearted as they were, it

* Some of them had just become, or were about to become mothers. The widow of Capt. Trevor had seven children with her, and an eighth was born at Buddabad. The idea of a grand military promenade was certainly carried out, when not only ladies and children, but a pack of foxhounds, and one of Broadwood's best pianos, were brought through the Bolan Pass.—(Fane's *Five Years*; Bx-political's *Dry*

seemed scarcely possible they and their infant children could long continue to bear up against the intense cold and incessant fatigue.* The only alternative was to accept the protection of Akber Khan, who, it is said, promised to convey them to Peshawur; and to him the whole of the married Englishwomen, their husbands, and children, with Lady Macnaghten and her widowed companions, were confided. It was a tempting opportunity for barbarian revenge. The wives and babes of the proud Feringhees were at the mercy of the Afghans; yet there is no record of any insult having been offered to them, or any attempt to separate them from their natural protectors, now defenceless as themselves. On the contrary, Akber Khan earnestly craved the forgiveness of Lady Macnaghten, assuring her he would give his right arm to undo what it had done; while, in many ways, he strove to alleviate the hardships of the march by bearing the weaker of the party over fords on his own steed, binding up the wounds of the officers with his own hands, and suffering the ladies to encumber the march with the costly baggage which two or three of them still retained. The voluntary surrender of such a prize was of course not to be expected while his father, brothers, and wives were retained in exile. As it was, his "guests," as they were termed, had every reason to rejoice at finding in temporary captivity an alternative for the loss of life. On the very next day (10th January), the remnant of the doomed force was intercepted on the road to Jellalabad, in a narrow gorge between the precipitous spurs of two hills, and the promiscuous mass of sepoy and camp followers were hewn down by the infuriated Afghans. Elphinstone sent to Akber Khan, who, with a body of horse, still hovered on the flanks of the retreating force, to entreat him to stop the massacre; but he replied, that it was impossible,—at such times the Khiljies were uncontrollable even by their immediate chiefs: there was but one chance for the English—an immediate and unconditional surrender of arms. The general sadly resumed his march to the Jugdulluck

Leaves.) The troops in Cabool, though in many respects needlessly encumbered, do not seem to have been attended by a single chaplain; an omission which tends to justify the description given by a Beloochee of the Feringhee force, of whom one sort (the Hindoos) were idolaters; the white (English) had no religion at all; but the third were good Mussulmen, "and say their prayers as we do."—(Idem.)

heights, and there the troops who remained—of ranks all but destroyed by death and desertion—found a brief respite, and strove to quench their burning thirst with handfuls of snow, and to still the cravings of hunger with the raw and reeking flesh of three newly-killed bullocks. The night was spent at Jugdulluck; on the following day Akber Khan requested a conference with the General, Brigadier Shelton, and Captain Johnson. It is strange, with the recollection of the Cabool plot fresh in their minds, that the three military authorities should have accepted this significant invitation; but they did so, were courteously received, refreshed with food, provided with a tent, and—made prisoners. They entreated their captor to save the survivors of the force, and he really appears to have exerted himself for that purpose, but in vain. Captain Johnson, who understood the Persian language, heard the petty chiefs of the country between Jugdulluck and Jellalabad declaiming, as they flocked in, against the hated Feringhees, and rejecting large sums as the price of a safe conduct to Jellalabad. On the evening of the 12th, the wreck of the army resumed its perilous march. The sepoys had almost wholly perished, and of the Europeans only 120 of the 44th regiment and twenty-five artillerymen remained; but their movements were still impeded by a comparatively large mass of camp followers, who “came huddling against the fighting men,” thus giving free scope to the long knives of the Afghans. The soldiers, after some time, freed themselves from the helpless rabble, turned against their foes with the bayonet, drove them off, and pursued their way to the fatal Jugdulluck Pass, where their sufferings and struggles found a melancholy termination. A barricade of boughs and bushes arrested further progress; officers, soldiers, and camp followers desperately strove to force a passage, though exposed to the deliberate aim of the “jezails” (long rifles) of the enemy. Anquetil, Thain, Nicholl, and the chief

of the remaining leaders fell here. About twenty officers and forty-five European soldiers cut their way through, hoping to gain Jellalabad; but weak and wounded, with only two rounds of ammunition left, they could not make head against the armed villagers who came crowding forth against them from every hut. The majority fell at Gundamuck; a few escaped and struggled onwards: but even they fell—one here, one there; until a single European (Dr. Brydon), wounded and worn out by famine and fatigue, mounted on a jaded pōny, alone survived to announce to the gallant garrison of Jellalabad the total annihilation of the force of 16,500 men which had quitted Cabool only seven days before.*

The terrible tidings reached Lord Auckland at Calcutta while awaiting the arrival of his successor in office. He had previously seen reason to regret bitterly that ever British troops had crossed the Indus: he knew that the E. I. Co. had consistently opposed the Afghan war, and that the Peel cabinet, now in power, were of the same opinion; and he therefore refused to follow up the abortive attempts already made for the relief of the beleaguered garrisons by any efficient measures, lest his proceedings should controvert the views and embarrass the projects of his expected successor. The arrival of Lord Ellenborough, at the close of February, released Lord Auckland from his painful position, and he quitted India in the following month, leaving on record a finance minute which proved the war to have already inflicted a burden of eight million on the Indian treasury. The only remaining circumstances which occurred under his sway, were the annexation of the little principality of Kurnoul† and of Cherong, a fortified place in Bundelcund.

ELLENBOROUGH ADMINISTRATION: 1842 to 1844.—The opinions held by the new governor-general were well known. His lordship had been for years president of the Board of Control: he was a conservative, and agreed with his party and the majority

* A few straggling sepoys and camp followers afterwards found their way to Jellalabad.

† The Nawab (or nabob) of Kurnoul was suspected of entertaining hostile intentions against the English; the chief, though not very satisfactory evidence of which rests on his having accumulated a large quantity of warlike stores. He was likewise said to be a very oppressive ruler. At the close of the year 1848, the capital was seized by a British force without opposition, and the nabob, who had abandoned the place, was pursued, taken prisoner, and became a

dependent on the British government. He retired to Trichinopoly, and became a frequent attendant on the mission church. On the last occasion he was mortally stabbed by one of his Mohammedan followers. His eldest son, Uluf Khan, received a pension of £1,000 a-year until his death in 1848. The English enjoy the entire revenues of Kurnoul, estimated, in 1843, at £90,000 per annum, and control over a territory between 2,000 and 3,000 square miles in extent, with a population stated in a Parl. return for 1851, at 273,190.—(Thornton's Gazetteer.)

of unbiassed men, in considering the Afghan invasion "a blunder and a crime;" but he had likewise declared, that "India was won by the sword, and must be kept by the sword." These opinions, coupled with his adoption of an axiom of unquestionable truth, that "in war reputation is strength," served to convince the Indian public that his policy would probably aim at the complete and speedy evacuation of Afghanistan, performed in such a manner as to prove beyond question that England voluntarily resigned a position which an erroneous view of the feelings of the Afghans had induced her to assume; and this object, despite some glaring errors and inconsistencies, was, in the main, carried through by Lord Ellenborough. The first event in his administration was the surrender of Ghuznee, by Colonel Palmer, to Shums-oo-deen Khan, nephew to Dost Mohammed, on the 6th of March; the fear of a failure of water and provisions being the reasons alleged for the relinquishment of this strong fortress and the surrender of the officers,* who were treated with faithless cruelty by the conqueror. Nott and Sale still held their ground at Candahar and Jellalabad, against bitter cold, scarcity of fuel and provisions, and repeated though unskilful assaults, as did also the little garrison of Kelat-i-Khilji, under Captain Craigie. At Jellalabad, repeated minor shocks of earthquake were succeeded on the 10th February by a terrible convulsion, which levelled with the ground the defences which had been erected and rendered efficient at the cost of three months' intense labour of mind and body. Akber Khan, with the flower of the Barukzye horse, was at hand, ready, it was expected, to enforce the fulfilment of Elphinstone's order of surrender. But "the illustrious garrison," as Lord Ellenborough justly styled the brave band, did not abate one jot of hope or courage. The spade and pickaxe were again taken in hand, and the work of restoration went forward so rapidly that Akber, deceived as to the extent of the damage sustained, declared that English witchcraft had preserved Jellalabad from the effects of the mighty shock. The Afghans, having little inclination for a hand-

* Kaye says—"If there had been any one in Ghuznee acquainted with the use and practice of artillery, the garrison might have held out till April." He adds, "That among the officers of Nott's army [by whom the place was reoccupied in September], the loss of Ghuznee was considered even less creditable than the loss of Cabool."—(ii., 428-9.)

to-hand encounter with Sale's brigade, contented themselves with striving to maintain a rigid blockade; but the garrison sallied forth under Dennie, and swept away sheep and goats in the very front of the foe. The political agent, Capt. Macgregor, an able and energetic man, contrived to establish a system of intelligence far superior to that generally maintained by the English. Tidings arrived on the 5th of April, that General Pollock, with 12,000 men and supplies of all kinds, was fighting his way to their rescue through the Khyber Pass, opposed by Akber Khan. The garrison gallantly resolved to assist their countrymen by issuing forth to attack the Afghan camp. This unlooked-for enterprise was attended with complete success. The blockading troops were completely routed, and fled in the direction of Lughman. The victors lost only thirteen men; but that number included the gallant Colonel Dennie, who fell at the head of the centre column. On the 11th April, the army under General Pollock reached Jellalabad, and the garrison, whose five months' beleaguement had been already so brilliantly terminated, sent the band of the 13th light infantry to meet the troops, and marched them in to the fort to the tune of an old Jacobite song of welcome, of which the refrain runs, "Oh! but ye've been lang o' coming." General England was not successful in his early attempts to succour Nott and his "noble sepoy"† at Candahar. Having been repulsed in an attack on the Kojuck Pass, he fell back upon Quetta, and commenced fortifying that town; but General Nott imperatively demanded his renewed advance, and sent the best part of his force to aid England through the pass, who thus assisted, marched to Candahar, which place he reached with little loss; for the Afghans, though strongly posted at Hykulzie (the scene of his former discomfiture), were rapidly dispersed by a vigorous attack, and did not muster in any force to oppose his further progress.

No impediment now remained to the junction of the forces under Nott and England with those of Pollock and Sale. The only consideration was, what to do with them. Lord Ellenborough had wisely re-

† "My sepoy," Nott writes to Pollock in April, "have behaved nobly, and have licked the Afghans in every affair, even when five times their number." In the same letter he states that they had had no pay since the previous December. The fidelity and privations of the native troops throughout the Afghan war well deserve a special narration.

solved on the evacuation of Afghanistan; but he left to the military authorities the choice of "retiring" by the line of Quetta and Sukkur, or by that of Ghuznee, Cabool, and Jellalabad. Nott chose, the latter alternative; and in communicating his resolve, repeated with quiet sarcasm his lordship's phrase of "retiring" from Candahar to India by way of Ghuznee, Cabool, and Jellalabad; the said retirement, says Kaye, being like a man retiring from Reigate to London *via* Dover and Canterbury. Pollock entirely sympathised with General Nott. The former marched to Cabool, which he reached on the 5th Sept., after having encountered and put to flight the Afghans under Akber,* in the valley of Tezeen and the adjacent passes of Koord Cabool, where the English had been slaughtered in the previous January. General Nott proceeded to Ghuznee, which was evacuated on his approach; and after destroying the town as well as citadel by fire, he proceeded to the tomb of Mahmood, in obedience to the special instructions of the governor-general, to bear away the famous idol-destroying mace of the conqueror, suspended above the tomb, and a pair of sandal-wood gates, embossed with brass, which were said to have been carried away by him from the temple of Somnauth, in Guzerat, A.D. 1024. Burdened with these trophies, the general proceeded to Cabool, which city Pollock had entered unopposed on the 15th Sept., and planted the union-jack on the Balla Hissar.†

In the interval between the evacuation and reoccupation of the capital of Afghanistan by the English, another melancholy tragedy had been enacted. Shah Soojah, abandoned by his allies, for some months contrived to maintain himself in the Balla Hissar; but his position becoming at length insupportable, he resolved to attempt to join Sale at Jellalabad. Early on the morning of the 5th of April, the Shah left the citadel, escorted by a small party of Hindoostanees, intending to review the troops

and quit Cabool; but his passage was opposed by a body of Afghans, who opened a volley upon the royal *cortège*, which struck down the bearers of the state chair, and killed the king himself. Throughout his whole career, Shah Soojah had been a pompous man, speaking and thinking ever of "our blessed self." Now his lifeless body was stripped of its costly array, of its sparkling head-dress, rich girdle, and jewelled dagger, and flung into a ditch. His eldest son, Prince Timur, then about twenty-three years of age, was with the British at Candahar. The next in succession, Futteh Jung, was courted by the Barukzye chiefs, who hoped to find in him a shield from the vengeance of the advancing foe. The prince listened with undisguised distrust to the protestations made to him by the Seyed deputies; and in reply to offers of allegiance, to be sworn on the Koran, caused several exemplars of the sacred volume to be placed before them, bearing the seals of the Barukzye, Dourani, Kuzzilbash, and Kohistanee chiefs, with oaths of allegiance to his murdered father inscribed on the margin. "If there be any other Koran sent from heaven," he said bitterly, "let the Barukzyes swear upon it: this has been tried too often, and found wanting." The ambassadors were dismissed; but Futteh Jung, unable to maintain his ground, soon fell into the hands of the chiefs he so avowedly mistrusted, and after being robbed of the treasure which his father had contrived to accumulate, made his escape, and joined General Pollock at Gundamuck on the 1st of September, with only two or three followers.

The next feature in the campaign was a joyful one—the recovery of the captives. The ladies and children were alive and well, but General Elphinstone had expired in the month of April, worn out by incessant bodily and mental pain. On learning the approach of Pollock, Akber‡ confided his unwilling guests to the care of one

* The Goorkalese infantry fought most manfully, clambering undauntedly the steepest ascents, beneath the iron rain poured on them from Afghan jezails. —(Kaye, ii., 579.) It must have been a strange sight to see these daring, sturdy, but diminutive men, driving before them their stalwart foes; but stranger still the thought, how recently these valuable auxiliaries had done battle on their native hills, against the people for whom they were now shedding their life-blood, and ably wielding the British bayonet.

† Balla Hissar, the Persian for High Fort.

‡ The trials of the captives began when Akber became again a fugitive, and could no longer retain

them under his immediate protection. About this time an accident occurred which placed them in jeopardy. A servant in attendance on the chief, wounded him in the arm by the accidental discharge of a musket. No difference took place in the conduct of Akber himself; and even when weak and wounded, he gave up his litter for the accommodation of the ladies on their removal from Budeeshad. His countrymen, more suspicious, attributed the disaster to English treachery; and had the young Barukzye died, the lives of all the male captives and hostages would probably have been sacrificed as an act of retribution. Ameen-oollah Khan, especially,

Saleh Mohammed, who was directed to deliver them to the charge of a neighbouring Usbeck chief, styled the Wali of Kooloom, who had proved a stanch friend to Dost Mohammed. Saleh Mohammed had formerly been a subahdar in the service of the E. I. Cy., but being (by his own account) disgusted with the abusive language used towards natives by the European officers, he deserted with his company to the Dost. It was not a difficult matter to induce him to play the traitor over again, provided the risk were small and the temptation great. Tidings of the progress of the English army calmed his fears; and offers on behalf of government, backed by the written pledge of the captives to pay him 1,000 rupees a-month for life, and a present of 20,000 rupees, stimulated his hopes: from gaoler he turned confederate; and the soldiers (250 in number) were, by the promise of four months' pay as a gratuity, metamorphosed from guards to servants. Eldred Pottinger assumed the direction of affairs, levied contributions upon some merchants passing through Bamian, and hoisted an independent flag on the fort the party said that he knew a reward of a lac of rupees had been offered by Macnaghten for his life. Mohammed Shah Khan, and a "young whelp," his son, took advantage of the absence of Akber to pillage the captives, and is said to have obtained from Lady Macnaghten alone, shawls and jewels to the value of £20,000; but the jewels were soon voluntarily restored (Johnson and Eyre.) Considering that the daughter and sister of the plunderers (Akber's wife) had been carried into exile by the countrymen of Lady Macnaghten, there was nothing very extraordinary in their thus seeking means to carry on the war. Before the late crisis, the captives had enjoyed advantages very unusual for even state prisoners in Afghanistan. Five rooms in the fort of Budeabad, furnished by Mohammed Shah Khan for his own use, were vacated for their accommodation. During the three months spent here four European infants were born. The elder children passed the time in blindman's-buff and other games befitting their age; their parents in writing long letters to India and England, carrying on a great deal of cypher correspondence with Sale's garrison, and playing backgammon and drafts on boards of their own construction, and cards, by means of two or three old packs preserved among their baggage. From "a Bible and Prayer-book picked up on the field at Boothauk," the services of the established church were read every Sunday, sometimes in the open air; and this observance was, we are told, not lost on their guards, who, wild and savage as they were, seemed to respect the Christian's day of rest, "by evincing more decorum and courtesy than on the working-days of the week."—(Kaye ii., 489.) Who that really desires the spread of vital Christianity, can read this account without regretting that the captives of Budeabad had not been inspired with more of the devotional spirit which burned so

had entered as prisoners. To remain at Bamian was, however, deemed even more perilous than to attempt to join the army at Cabool; and on the 16th of September, the officers, ladies, and children set forth on their march. The next day Sir Richmond Shakespear, at the head of 600 Kuzzilbash horse, met the fugitives, who thus escorted, joyfully pursued their route, till, on the 20th, near Urghundeh, the column sent by Pollock to support Shakespear appeared in sight, and its veteran commander, Sir Robert Sale, came galloping on to embrace his wife and widowed daughter.*

The objects of the campaign were fully accomplished: the beleaguered garrisons had been relieved, the captives rescued; the last of them (Captain Bygrave) being voluntarily released by Akber; and the orders of the governor-general were stringent for the return of the entire English force to Hindoostan without incurring any unnecessary peril. The various Afghan chiefs, whose blood-feuds and factious dissension had prevented any combined action, now earnestly deprecated the vengeance of the Feringhees. The hostages left at Cabool were restored, strong and clear in the bosoms of two other English captives, then dying by inches in filth and misery at Bokhara, but evincing such unmistakable indications of true piety, that sorrow for the suffering is lost in veneration for the enduring faith of Colonel Stoddart and Arthur Conolly. The former I deeply respected on the ground of personal knowledge; the latter I know only by the touching records made public since his execution. The history of both is yet fresh in the minds of the existing generation. Colonel Stoddart had gone in an official position to Bokhara, and was detained by the Ameer, who had been angered by some real or apparent slight shown him by the British authorities; Conolly sought to procure the release of Stoddart, but was condemned to share his imprisonment. The touching letters written at this period, and forwarded to India through the intervention of a faithful servant, still remain to attest the patience in adversity of these illustrious sufferers. Stoddart, in a moment of weakness, after being lowered down into a deep dark well, tenanted by vermin, was forced into making a profession of belief in the false prophet; but Conolly never wavered. On the 17th of June, 1842, the two friends were brought forth to die, clothed in the miserable rags which five months' incessant wear had left to cover their emaciated and literally worm-eaten frames. The elder captive was first beheaded, and an offer of life was made to his companion as the price of apostasy, but without effect. "Stoddart," he said, "became a Mussulman, and you killed him: I am prepared to die." The knife of the executioner did its work, and another name was added to the glorious army of martyrs—the true soldiers of the Cross.—(Kaye, Wolfe, &c.)

* The widow of Lieutenant Sturt, of the engineers, a very active officer, who was mortally wounded by the Khiljies in the Koord Cabool Pass.

and bore testimony to the good treatment they had received from the nabob, Zemaun Shah. The "guests" of Akber Khan told the same tale; and Colonel Palmer and Mohun Lal* were almost the only complainants;—the one having fallen into the hands of the instigator of the murder of Shah Soojah, the unworthy son of Nawab Zemaun Khan; the other having provoked personal vengeance by repeated offers of blood-money for the heads of the leading Barukzys. The principal Cabool leaders proposed that a younger son of the late king's, named Shahpoor (the son of a Populzye lady of high rank), should be placed on the throne; and to this the British authorities consented. The object of the proposers was not accomplished; they hoped to turn away the vengeance of the invaders, but in vain. The military leaders pronounced that the destruction of the fortresses of Ghuznee, Jellalabad, Candahar, Khelat-i-Khilji,† Ali-Musjid, and many others of inferior note,—the sacrifice of thousands of villagers armed and unarmed, the wanton destruction of the beautiful fruit-trees (which an Afghan loves as a Kaffir does cattle, or an Arab his steed), with other atrocities almost inseparable from the march of an "army of retribution," were all too trifling to convey a fitting impression of the wrath of the British nation at the defeat, disgrace, and ruin which had attended its abortive attempt at the military occupation of Afghanistan. It is idle to talk of the savage ferocity‡ of the Khiljies, as displayed in the horrible January massacre, since that very massacre had been wantonly provoked. The English originally entered those fatal passes as foes; they marched on,

in the pride of conquerors, to rivet a rejected yoke on the neck of a free, though most turbulent nation: their discipline and union were at first irresistible; yet subsequently, strife and incapacity delivered them over into the hands of their self-made enemies. They had (to use an Orientalism) gone out to hunt deer, and roused tigers. What wonder that the incensed people, heated with recent wrongs, should crush with merciless grasp the foe in his hour of weakness, under whose iron heel they had been trampled on so recently. It was a base and cruel thing to slay the retreating legions; but have civilised nations—France and England, for instance—never done worse things in Africa or the Indies, and vindicated them on the plea of state necessity? The defeated invaders fell with weapons in their hands: they fought to the last—at a heavy disadvantage, it is true; but still they did fight; and the physical obstacles which facilitated their overthrow, surely could not make the difference between the combatants greater than that which has enabled nations acquainted with the use of cannon to reduce to slavery or deprive of their land less-informed people.

The English refused to surrender, and paid by death the penalty of defeat, which would, in all probability, have been inflicted by them in a similar case. The captives and hostages were, generally, remarkably well used; even the little children who fell into the power of the Khiljies were voluntarily restored to their parents.§

Yet now the military authorities, not content with the misery wrought and suffered in Afghanistan,|| gravely deliberated on the most

* Moonshee Mohun Lal was educated at the Delhi college, where the experiment of imparting secular education, without any religious leaven, was being tried by the British government. The same system is now in force throughout India. Mohun Lal was one of its first-fruits, and his cleverly-written work on Cabool is well worthy of the attention of all interested in tracing the effects of purely secular instruction. Shahamet Ali (author of the *Sikhs and Afghans*), the fellow-student of Mohun Lal, was a different character, and not a Hindoo, but a Mohammedan. His new acquirements were not, therefore, likely to have the effect of producing the same flippancy and scepticism which was almost sure to be occasioned by proving to such men as Mohun Lal, that modern Brahminism was the offspring of superstition and ignorance, without inculcating a knowledge of those doctrines which Christians hold to be the unerring rule of life, the only wisdom.

† Kaye, ii., 599. Khelat-i-Khilji, or "the Khilji Fort," situated between Candahar and Ghuznee, must not be confounded with the famous Khelat-i-Nuseer near the Bolan Pass, taken by Major-gen-

eral Willshire in November, 1839, and in the defence of which the Beloochee chief, Mehrab Khan, with hundreds of his vassals, perished. Several women were slain to prevent their falling into the hands of the enemy: others fled on foot with their infants.

‡ The author of one of the numerous *Narratives* of the war, relates an anecdote of an Afghan boy of six years old, being found by an English soldier striving to decapitate the corpse of a colour-sergeant who had fallen some time before when Pollock fought his way through the Khyber Pass. The soldier came behind the child, "coolly took him up on his bayonet, and threw him over the cliff." Lieut. Greenwood narrates this incident in "the war of retribution" as evidence of *Afghan* ferocity.—(176.)

§ The daughter of Captain Anderson, and the son of Captain Boyd, fell into the hands of the Afghans in the Boothauk Pass.

|| Lord Brougham sternly denounced the destruction of the "hundred gardens" of Cabool, by "our incendiary generals."

efficient mode of perpetuating in the minds of the Cabool chiefs the memory of deeds which all parties might have been glad to bury in oblivion. The peaceable inhabitants of the city had been induced to return and resume their occupations; and when they beheld the son of Shah Soojah on the throne, and the English in daily intercourse with the leading chiefs, and making avowed preparations for final departure, they might well think that the worst was over. But it was yet to come. General Pollock considered the death of the envoy still unavenged, and resolved on the total destruction of the Great Bazaar and the Mosque. These orders were executed, but with difficulty, owing to the massiveness of these magnificent buildings, which it was found impossible to destroy in any reasonable time without the use of gunpowder. As might have been expected, the victorious soldiery and licentious camp followers did not content themselves with fulfilling their destructive commission, but rushed into the streets of the city, applied the firebrand to the houses, and pillaged the shops; so that above four or five thousand people (including many Hindoos who had been enticed into the town by express promises of protection) were reduced to utter ruin. The excesses committed during the last three days of British supremacy in Cabool, were far more disgraceful to the character of England, as a Christian nation, than the expulsion and extermination of the ill-fated troops to her military reputation.

Popular feeling, both in India and in England, was strongly expressed against the needless injury done to the Afghans by the razing of the Great Bazaar, and especially against the extensive destruction of trees, by order of the commander-in-chief, by deeply ringing the bark, and leaving them to perish. Lord Ellenborough appears to have regretted these outrages; but this and all other drawbacks were for the time forgotten in the grand display with which he prepared to welcome the returning army. The homeward march commenced on the 12th of October, and proved singularly peaceful and uneventful. The old blind king, Zemaun Shah, with his nephew Futteh Jung, and the chief part of the family of the late Shah Soojah, accom-

panied the troops. The gates of Somnauth were not forgotten; and the governor-general gave vent to his delight at their attainment in a proclamation, in which he declared the insult of 800 years to be at length avenged, and desired his "brothers and friends," the princes and chiefs of Sirhind, Rajwarra, Malwa, and Guzerat, to convey the "glorious trophy of successful war" with all honour through their respective territories, to the restored idolatrous temple of Somnauth.

For this strange "song of triumph," as the Duke of Wellington styled the effusion, Lord Ellenborough may perhaps be excused, in remembrance of the honest and manly recantation of error which he published on behalf of the Indian government on the 1st of October, 1842, when directing the complete evacuation of Afghanistan,—this announcement being made from Simla precisely four years after the famous warlike manifesto of Lord Auckland. The whole of the Afghan captives were released. Dost Mohammed returned to Cabool to take possession of the throne vacated by the flight of Shahpoor immediately after the departure of the British force; Akber joyfully welcomed home his father and family; the Persians again besieged Herat; and all things returned to much the same position they occupied before thousands of lives (including that of the forsaken Shah) and about fifteen million of money had been wasted, in an abortive attempt at unauthorised interference. The only change effected was, that instead of respect and admiration, the Afghans (generally, though perhaps not justly, considered an unforgiving race) learned to entertain towards their powerful neighbours emotions of fear and aversion, excited by the galling memories inseparably connected with the march of a desolating army, whose traces were left everywhere, "from Candahar to Cabool, from Cabool to Peshawur."*

The annexation of Sindh—the next event in Anglo-Indian history—has been termed by its chief promoter "the tail of the Afghan storm." Such is the light in which Sir Charles Napier avowedly desires to place it; and his brother, General William Napier, in his account of the *Conquest of Sindh*, plainly declares the open encroachment on the in-

* Kaye, ii., 669. Among other authorities examined, in writing the above sketch of the Afghan war, may be named Eyre's *Cabool*, Havelock's *Narrative*, Dennie's *Campaigns*, Outram's *Rough Notes*,

Hough's *British at Cabool*, Fane's *Five Years in India*, Osborne's *Court of Runjeet Sing*, Taylor's *Scenes*, Nash's *Afghanistan*, Barr's *Cabool*, Burnes' *Cabool*, Allen's *Diary*, Thornton's *India*.

dependence of the Ameers, made by order of Lord Auckland, to have been a measure of which "it is impossible to mistake or to deny the injustice." Major (now Col.) Outram, the political Resident at Hyderabad, to some extent defends the proceedings which, though occasionally under protest, he was instrumental in carrying through; and brings forward a considerable body of evidence to prove that Sir Charles Napier, when vested with complete military and diplomatic authority in Sind, while denouncing the unauthorised aggression committed by Lord Auckland, used the despotic power vested in him by Lord Ellenborough to sap the resources of the Ameers, and then drive them to desperation; the results being their ruin, the annexation to British India of a fertile and valuable boundary province, and the gain to the invading army of prize-money to an enormous extent—the share of Sir C. Napier (an eighth) amounting, it is asserted, to £70,000. Taken together, the admissions and accusations respectively made and preferred by the two leading authorities, can scarcely fail to leave on the mind of the unprejudiced reader a conviction that the Ameers were very illused men, especially the eldest and most influential of them, the venerable Meer Roostum. They were usurpers; but their usurpation was of above sixty years' standing; and the declaration of Lord Ellenborough is not equally correct, that what they had won by the sword they had lost by the sword; inasmuch as their earliest and most important concessions were obtained amid "a sickening declamation about friendship, justice, and love of peace;" which declamation was continued up to the moment when Meer Roostum, bending under the weight of eighty-five years, and his aged wife (the mother of his eldest son) were driven forth into the desert, not by English bayonets, but by English diplomacy.

Such at least is the account given by Napier of the opening negotiations with Sind, and by Outram of their abrupt termination. To enter into the various points of dispute would be manifestly incompatible with the brief sketch of the leading features attending our occupation of the country, alone consistent with the objects and limits of the present work: even that sketch, to economise space, must be given in small type.

In the beginning of the 18th century, the Kalloras, military fanatics from Persia, became dominant in Sind, and though compelled to pay tribute

to the Dourani conqueror of Afghanistan, retained their position as rulers until about 1771, when a conflict arose between them and the chiefs of the Beloochee tribe of Talpoors, who had come from the hills to settle in the fertile plains. After some years' fighting the Talpoors became undisputed masters of Sind. Their head, Meer Futtch Ali, assigned portions of the conquered territory to two of his relations, and thus gave rise to the separate states of Khyrpoor and Meerpoor. The remaining part of Sind, including the capital Hyderabad, he ruled until his death, in amicable conjunction with his three brothers. The Talpoors, like their predecessors the Kalloras, evidently dreaded the encroaching spirit of the powerful Feringhees, and quietly but firmly opposed their early attempts at commercial intercourse. At length, in 1832, the pertinacious resolve of the English to open up the navigation of the Indus, prevailed over their prudent reserve, and a new treaty was formed through the intervention of Colonel (now Sir Henry) Pottinger, by the fifth article of which the contracting parties solemnly pledged themselves "never to look with the eye of covetousness on the possessions of each other." The very words betrayed the apprehensions of the Ameers; and that these were shared by their subjects is proved by the exclamation recorded by Burnes, as uttered in the previous year by the witnesses of his approach—"Alas! Sind is gone since the English have seen our river!"

The prediction was soon verified. In 1836, the ambitious designs of Runjeet Sing gave the Anglo-Indian government an opportunity of interference, which was availed of by the proffer of British mediation. At this time the original Talpoor rulers were all dead, and their sons reigned in their stead. Noor Mohammed wore the pugree or turban of superiority, and was the acknowledged rais or chief at Hyderabad; Sheer Mohammed at Meerpoor, and Meer Roostum at Khyrpoor, in Upper Sind. Meer Roostum was eighty years of age, and was assisted in the government by his numerous brothers. He was, however, still possessed of much energy; and so far from fearing the hostility of Runjeet Sing, or desiring the dangerous aid of the English, he exclaimed confidently—"We have vanquished the Seik, and we will do so again." It was, however, quite another thing to compete with the united forces of Runjeet Sing and the English; and the intimate connexion so unnecessarily formed between these powers in 1838, proved pretty clearly that the choice lay between mediation or open hostility. The Ameers chose the former, and consented to the permanent residence at Hyderabad of a British political agent, with an armed escort. Two months after the conclusion of this arrangement, the Tripartite Treaty was signed at Lahore, and involved a new question as to the route to be taken for the invasion of Afghanistan. Runjeet Sing, stimulated by his distrustful durbar or court, would not suffer his sworn allies to march through the Punjab. Advantage was therefore taken of the weakness of the Ameers to compel them to sanction the passage of the British troops; and the island-fortress of Bukkur was obtained from Meer Roostum, to be held "during the continuance of the war." These concessions paved the way for fresh exactions, and the Ameers were next required to contribute towards the expenses of the expedition. The demand was first urged on the plea of arrears of tribute claimed by Shah Soojah as their suzerain, but this was refuted by

the production of a formal release made by the Shah of all claims upon Sindé or Shikarpoor. The next pretext for oppression was, that the Ameers had tendered professions of submission to Persia, the evidence being a document of doubtful authenticity, ostensibly addressed by Noor Mohammed to the Persian monarch, and which, when freed from Oriental hyperbole, contained little more than expressions of unbounded respect for the Shah of Persia as the head of the Sheiah sect of Mohammedans. It was so improbable that the Ameers would comply with the present demands, except under the sternest compulsion, that preparations were made to punish their refusal by the storming of Hyderabad, and the army of the Indus turned out of its way for the express purpose, and menaced Sindé at four different points. Sir John Keane designated the anticipated siege of the capital, "a pretty piece of practice for the army;" and the officers generally indulged in sanguine expectations of pillage and prize-money. The Ameers were divided in opinion; and one of them proposed that they should defend themselves to the last, and then slay their wives and children, and perish sword in hand—the terrible resolve carried out not many months later by Mehrab Khan, of Khelat-i-Nuseer. More temperate counsels prevailed. Meer Roostum confessed that in surrendering Bukkur he had given the heart of his country into the hands of the foe; and the Ameers, with utter ruin staring them in the face, consented to the hard terms imposed by the treaty signed in February, 1839, which bound them to receive a subsidiary force, and contribute three lacs (afterwards increased to three and a-half) for its support, to abolish all tolls on the Indus, and provide store-room at Kurrachee for military supplies. In return, the Anglo-Indian government promised not to meddle with the internal affairs of the Ameers, or *listen to the complaints of their subjects* (a very ominous proviso.) These concessions, together with a contribution of £200,000, half of which was paid immediately, did not satisfy Lord Auckland. Kurrachee had been taken possession of during the war; and he now insisted on its permanent retention, despite the promises made by his representatives.

The Ameers had no alternative but to submit: yet, says General Napier, "the grace with which they resigned themselves to their wrongs, did not save them from the cruel mockery of being asked by Colonel (Sir H.) Pottinger, 'if they had the slightest cause to question the British faith during the last six months'" and the further mortification of being told, "that henceforth they must consider Sindé to be as it was in reality a portion of Hindoostan, in which the British were paramount, and entitled to act as they considered best and fittest for the general good of the whole empire."

Colonel Pottinger, created a baronet, continued Resident in Sindé until the beginning of 1840. He was succeeded by Major Outram, who, by the death of his coadjutor, Mr. Ross Bell, became political agent for the whole of Sindé and Beloochistan. Major Outram found the Ameers in precisely the state of feeling which might have been expected;—deeply irritated against the English, disposed to rejoice at any misfortune which might overtake them, and ready to rise up and assert their independence if the opportunity offered; but constantly let and hindered by the fear of consequences, and by the divided counsels arising from separate interests. With anxious care the Resident watched their feel-

ings and opinions—warning one, counselling another, reasoning with a third; and in the perilous moment when General England fell back on Quetta, after a vain attempt to succour Nott at Candahar, Outram strained every nerve to prevent the rulers of Sindé from making common cause with their Beloochee countrymen against the invading army. "Even their negative hostility," he writes, "evinced by withholding supplies, would have placed us in a position which it is fearful even to contemplate." The recollection of past wrongs did not, however, prevent the majority of the Ameers from actively befriending the troops in their hour of need; but some of them were suspected of being concerned in hostile intrigues; and though Meer Roostum behaved with accustomed candour, his minister, Futteh Mohammed Ghoree became implicated in certain suspicious proceedings. Towards the conclusion of the Afghan war, Major Outram proposed to Lord Ellenborough (the successor of Lord Auckland) a revision of the existing treaties, which were very vaguely worded, urging that precautions should be taken against the possible machinations of such of the Ameers as had betrayed hostile intentions during the late crisis, and advised that Shikarpoor and its dependencies, with Sukkur and the adjacent fortress of Bukkur, should be demanded in complete cession, in return for the relinquishment of the yearly tribute of £350,000, and of arrears due of considerable amount.

Lord Ellenborough was not content with this arrangement: he desired to reward the good service done to the forces in the late war by a neighbouring prince, the Khan of Bhawalpoor,* by the restoration of certain territories captured from him some thirty years before by the Ameers, who were considered to have rendered themselves "most amenable to punishment." To this Major Outram assented; but when his lordship proceeded to write denunciatory letters to the Ameers, threatening them with punishment for past offences, should any such be clearly proved, the Resident withheld these communications, believing that their delivery would gravely imperil the safety of the troops still scattered in isolated positions in dreary Afghanistan. The governor-general admitted the discretion of this procedure; but he had taken up, with the energy of a strong though often prejudiced mind, the popular notion of the day against political agents; and the prudence displayed by Colonel Outram did not exempt him from the sweeping measures enacted for the suppression of political by purely military functionaries.

Sir Charles Napier had just arrived in India, and to him was entrusted the task of gaining the consent of the Ameers to concessions amounting to their virtual deposition.† The sudden recall of the Resident, and the arrival of a military leader, at the head of a powerful force, alarmed the Ameers, and they strove to deprecate the impending storm by every means in their power. The testimonies of many British officers and surgeons are brought forward by Major Outram, to confirm his own evidence with regard to the characters of the unfortunate chiefs of Sindé, whom he describes as decidedly favourable specimens of Mohammedan princes, ruling after a very patriarchal fashion,—merciful, accessible to complainants, singularly temperate, abstaining not only from drinking and smoking, but likewise rigidly eschewing the accursed drug, opium, even as a medicine.‡ The

* *Vide* Shahamet Ali's *History of Bahawalpoor*.

† Thornton's *India*, vi., 423.

‡ Outram's *Commentary*, 529. Dr. Burnes' *Sinde*.

mere fact of so many chiefs living and bearing sway in the domestic fashion described by Pottinger, Burnes, and Outram, was a strong argument in their favour; yet Sir Charles Napier unhappily lent a credulous ear to the mischievous rumours which a longer residence in India would have taught him to sift narrowly, or reject wholly: and his entire conduct was in accordance with his undisguised opinion, that the Ameers were "thorough ruffians" and "villains," drunken, debauched, capable of fratricide, "any one of them," and determined to assassinate him and "Cabool" the troops. Accustomed to the courtesy of British officials (one of whom had stood unshod in their presence, some ten years before, to crave permission to open the navigation of the Indus), they were now startled by the tone of contemptuous distrust with which they were treated by the dark-visaged little old man, who, despite his unquestioned courage in the field of battle, avowedly suffered personal fear of treachery to prevent his according a friendly hearing to the "benign and grey-headed monarch who had conferred the most substantial benefits on the English nation."

Major Outram states that Sir Charles Napier scrupled not to add exactions to the treaties not desired by Lord Ellenborough: and further, that he incited the most ambitious and able of the Khyrpoor brothers (Ali Morad), to intrigue against their venerated rais or chief, Meer Roostum, who, perceiving the offensive and threatening attitude assumed by the British forces, asked the advice of the general what to do to preserve peace, and offered to take up his residence in the camp. Sir Charles Napier advised, or rather commanded him to join his brother. The aged rais complied, and the result was his being first, as Sir Charles said, "bullied" into resigning the puggree to Ali Morad, and then induced, by artfully-implanted fears of English treachery, to seek refuge with his family in the wilderness. This step was treated as an act of hostility, and immediate preparations were made for what was vauntingly termed "the conquest," but which was expected to be little more than the occupation of Sind. The customary form of a declaration of war was passed over; and it being suspected that the fugitives had taken refuge in Emaunghur, Sir Charles marched, with 400 men mounted on camels, against that fortress in January, 1843. Emaunghur belonged to a younger brother of Roostum—Mohammed of Khyrpoor, one of the reigning Ameers, who had never "been even accused of a single hostile or unfriendly act,"* but who had the unfortunate reputation of possessing treasure to the amount of from £200,000 to £360,000, stored up in Emaunghur.† No such prize awaited the general; he found the fort without a living inhabitant, but well supplied with grain, of which the troops took possession, razed the walls, and marched back again.

At this crisis, Major Outram returned to Sind, at the especial request of both Lord Ellenborough and Sir Charles Napier, to aid as commissioner in settling the pending arrangements. Having vainly entreated the general not to persist in driving the whole of the Ameers of Upper Sind to open war, by compelling them to take part with Meer Roostum and his fugitive adherents, Major Outram centred his last efforts for peace in striving to persuade the Ameers

* Outram's *Commentary*, 39. † First Sind B. B., 469.
‡ Outram deemed himself "bound to vindicate his (Napier's) conduct in my communications with his victims."—(*Commentary*, 325.) § *Idem*, 439.

not yet compromised by any manifestation of distrust, to throw themselves at the feet of the English, by signing the required treaty. The task is best described in the words of the negotiator:—"I was called upon to obtain their assent to demands against which I had solemnly protested as a positive robbery: and I had to warn them against resistance to our requisitions, as a measure that would bring down upon them utter and merited destruction; while I firmly believed that every life lost, in consequence of our aggressions, would be chargeable on us as a murder."[§]

The arguments of Major Outram succeeded in procuring the signature of the chiefs of Lower Sind; but the prohibition he had received against any promise of protection for Meer Roostum, however clearly his innocence might be proved, excited uncontrollable indignation on the part of the Beloochee feudatory chiefs; and but for the efforts of the Ameers, the commissioner and his party would have been massacred on their return to the Residency. Major Outram was warned to quit Hyderabad. The vakeels or ambassadors dispatched to the British camp to offer entire submission, failed to procure even a hearing; and they sent word to their masters—"The general is bent on war—so get ready." In fact, Napier had been so long preparing to meet a conspiracy on the part of the Ameers, that he seems to have been determined either to make or find one, if only to illustrate his favourite denunciation of—"Woe attend those who conspire against the powerful arms of the company: behold the fate of Tipoo Sultan and the peishwa, and the Emperor of China!" Therefore he continued his march; and the terrified Ameers, on learning their last and deepest humiliations had been endured in vain, gave the rein to the long-restrained fury of their followers,—just fifty-three days after the commencement of hostilities by General Napier. On the 15th of February, a horde of armed Beloochees attacked the residence of the British commissioner. After a few hours' resistance, Major Outram and his escort evacuated the place, and retreated in marching order to meet the advancing army, which continued its progress to a village called Meanee (six miles from Hyderabad), which he reached on the 17th. Here the Ameers had taken up their position, with a force stated by Sir C. Napier at 25,862 Beloochees, hastily assembled and ill-disciplined; but than whom, he says, "braver barbarians never gave themselves to slaughter." And very terrible the slaughter was; for, if General W. Napier may be trusted, the Ameers "were broken like potsherds," and 6,000 men "went down before the bayonets of his (brother's) gallant soldiers, wallowing in blood." The English lost 264 killed and wounded.

Immediately after the battle, Meer Roostum and two others of the Khyrpoor family, with three of the Ameers of Hyderabad, influenced by the representations of Major Outram, abandoned all intention of defending Hyderabad, and delivered themselves up as prisoners; and on 20th of Feb., Napier entered the capital as a conqueror. Although there had been no declaration of war, and no sign of defence,—not a shot fired from the walls,—the prize-agents immediately set about the plunder of the city, in a manner happily unparalleled in the records of Anglo-Indian campaigns. The ladies of the imprisoned Ameers were exposed to the insulting search of one of the most abandoned of their own sex, the concubine of an officer on duty in Sind. Everything belonging to them, even to the coats on which they slept, were seized and sold by public auction; and several of

these unfortunates, driven to desperation, fled from the city barefoot, overwhelmed with shame and terror.

On the 24th of March, the army marched from Hyderabad against Sheer Mohammed, Ameer of Meerpoor, with whom a pitched battle took place near that city, in which the British were victorious, but lost 267 men in killed and wounded. Meerpoor was occupied without resistance, and the desert fortress of Ameroot (the birthplace of Akber, conquered by the Ameers from the Rajpoots) surrendered at the first summons. The brothers Shah Mohammed and Sheer Mohammed were defeated in the month of June, by detachments respectively commanded by captains Roberts and Jacob; and the success of these officers in preventing the junction of the brothers, and defeating them, materially conduced to the triumphant conclusion of the campaign; for had their forces been able to unite and retire to the desert, and there wait their opportunity, heat, pestilence, and inundation (in a land intersected by canals), would have been fearful auxiliaries to the warfare of predatory hands, against an army already reduced to 2,000 effective men, who could only move in the night, and were falling so fast beneath climatorial influences, that before the intelligence of Captain Jacob's victory, orders had been issued for the return of all the Europeans to head-quarters.

The Ameers were sent as prisoners to Hindoostan, and stipends were eventually granted for their support, amounting in the aggregate to £46,614. Ali Morad was rewarded for his share in sending his aged brother to die in exile, by an addition of territory, which was soon afterwards taken away from him, on a charge of forgery urged against him, and it was thought clearly proved, by a vengeful minister. The rest of the province was annexed to British India, and divided into three collectorates—Shikarpoor, Hyderabad and Kurrachee. There is some consolation in being able to close this painful episode, by stating that the latest accounts represent the country as improving in salubrity, the inhabitants (considerably above a million in number) as tranquil and industrious, canals as being reopened, waste land redeemed, new villages springing up, and even the very mild form of slavery which prevailed under the Ameers, as wholly abolished. This is well; for since we are incontestably usurpers in Sind, it is the more needful we be not oppressors also.*

The sword had scarcely been sheathed in Sind before it was again drawn in warfare against the Mahratta principality formed by Mahadajee Sindia. The successor of Dowlut Rao, and the adopted son of Baiza Bye, died childless in 1813. His nearest relative, a boy of eight years of age, was proclaimed Maharajah, with the sanction of the British government; and the regency was nominally entrusted to the widow of the late prince, a wayward and passionate, but clever and sensitive girl of twelve years of age. Great disorders arose in the state; and the turbulence of the mass of 40,000 soldiers, concentrated at Gwalior, rendered them an object of anxiety to the government general. The doctrine openly inculcated by

Lord Wellesley—of the rights and obligations of the British government, as the paramount power in India—was urged by Lord Ellenborough as the basis of his proposed movements with regard to Gwalior. An army was assembled at the close of 1843; and while one division, comprising about eight or nine thousand men, marched from Bundelcund, and crossed the Sind river at Chandpoor, the main body, about 14,000 strong, under the command of Sir Hugh Gough, accompanied by the governor-general, crossed the Chumbul near the town of Dholpoor, and on the 26th of December encamped at Hingona, twenty-three miles north-west of the fort of Gwalior. Marching thence on the 29th, the British force came in front of a Mahratta host, about 18,000 in number, encamped fifteen miles from Gwalior, near the villages of Maharajpoor and Chonda. The details of the ensuing engagement are unsatisfactorily recorded. That the British came unexpectedly on the enemy, is proved by the fact that Lord Ellenborough (not a military man, as he sorrowfully said) was on the field, and also the ladies of the family of the commander-in-chief. The conflict was desperate, and the English suffered severe loss from the numerous and well-served artillery of the foe; but they prevailed, as usual, by sheer hard fighting, marching up under a murderous fire to the mouths of the cannon, bayoneting the gunners, and driving all before them. Flinging away their matchlocks, the Mahrattas fell back on Maharajpoor, where they held their ground, sword in hand, until General Valiant, at the head of a cavalry brigade, charged the village in the rear, and dispersed the foe with much slaughter. The survivors retreated to Gwalior, leaving on the field fifty-six pieces of artillery, and all their ammunition waggons. The total loss of British troops was 106 killed and 684 wounded. On the same day, Major-general Grey encountered 12,000 Mahrattas at Puniar, twelve miles south-west of Gwalior, captured all their artillery, and slew a large number of them, his own loss being twenty-five killed and 189 wounded. The victorious forces met beneath the walls of the ancient stronghold, which, on the 4th of January, 1844, was taken possession of by the contingent force commanded by British officers. At the base of the temple stood the Lashkar, or stationary camp, where about 5,000 Mahrattas, being amply

* *Vide Napier's Sind; and Outram's Commentary.*

supplied with artillery, held out until the offer of liquidation of arrears, and three months' additional pay, induced them to surrender their arms and ammunition, and disperse quietly.

The native durbar attempted no further opposition to the views of the governor-general, and a treaty was concluded on the 13th Jan., 1844, by which the Maharanee was handsomely pensioned, but excluded from the government; and the administration vested in a council of regency, under the control of the British Resident, during the minority of the Maharajah. The fortress of Gwalior was ceded in perpetuity, and the sum of twenty-six lacs, or an equivalent in land, was demanded by Lord Ellenborough, in payment of long-standing claims; the subsidiary force was increased, and the maximum of the native army fixed at 9,000 men, of whom not more than one-third were to be infantry. The good conduct of the young rajah led to his being permitted to assume the reins of power before the expiration of the stated interval, and at its close, in 1853, he was formally seated on the musnud, and confirmed in the authority he had previously exercised on sufferance.*

The hostilities carried on with China, however important in themselves, have no place in the already overcrowded history of India; but it would be unjust to Lord Ellenborough, to omit noticing his vigorous and successful exertions for the dispatch of troops and stores to the seat of war. The reasons for his recall by the E. I. Directory in July, 1844, were not made public; and it would be superfluous to speculate upon them in a work the object of which is to state facts, not opinions.

HARDINGE ADMINISTRATION: 1844 to 1848.—Lord Ellenborough's successor, Sir Henry Hardinge, employed the brief interval of tranquillity enjoyed by the Anglo-Indian government in promoting public works, in

* Churut Sing founded the fortunes of his family by establishing a sirdaree or governorship, which his son, Maha Sing, consolidated by the capture of the fort and town of Ramnuggur, from a strong Mohammedan tribe called Chettas. Maha Sing died in 1780, leaving one son, a child then four years old, the afterwards famous Runjeet Sing. The mother and mother-in-law of the young chief ruled in his name until the year 1793, when Runjeet became impatient of control, and sanctioned, or (according to Major Smyth) himself committed the murder of his mother, on the plea of her shameless immorality—a procedure in which he closely imitated the conduct of his father, likewise a matricide. The conquest of Lahore, in 1798, from some Seik chiefs by whom it was conjointly governed, was the first step of the

improving the discipline of the army, ameliorating the condition of the native troops, and endeavouring to produce a more friendly spirit between the military and civil services.

The progress of much-needed reforms was soon arrested by the outbreak of war on the north-western frontier, which was met by the governor-general in a firm and decisive spirit. Upon the death of the old Lion of the Punjab—the mighty robber-chief who had raised himself from the leadership of a small Jat tribe to the rank of Maharajah of the Seiks,—the kingdom he had founded was shaken to its base by a series of durbar intrigues and midnight assassinations, exceeding in atrocity the worst crimes committed at the worst periods of Hindoo or Mohammedan history. Kurruck Sing, the successor, and, it was generally believed, the only son of the deceased ruler, was deprived, first of reason and then of life, by the hateful machinations of the minister Rajah Dehra Sing and his profligate and abandoned son Heera (the pampered minion of Runjeet), the leading members of a powerful family, generally known as the Lords of Jummo, a principality conquered from the Rajpoots.† The incrimination of Kurruck Sing was scarcely ended, when some loose bricks fell on the head of his son No Nchal Sing, who was placed in a litter and carried off by the arch plotter Dehra, before the extent of the injury could be ascertained by the bystanders, and kept from the presence of his family until the crime had been completed, and the young rajah was a corpse. Murder followed murder: men and women, the guilty and the innocent, the vizier in the council-chamber, the general at the head of the army, the lady at her toilette, the babe in its cradle, were by turns the victims of unscrupulous ambition, covetousness of wealth, lust, cowardice, or vengeance. Dehra and ladder by which Runjeet mounted to power. Moul-tan and Peshawur were captured in 1818; Cashmere in the following year; and Runjeet's career of plunder and subjugation ceased not until a wall of impenetrable mountains closed its extension northward, in a manner scarcely less decisive than the check to his progress southward and eastward, previously given by the English, when their prudent interference compelled him to find in the Sutlej a barrier as impassable as the Himalayas themselves.—(Prinsep's *Seiks*; Smyth's *Reigning Family of Lahore*; Shahamet Ali's *Seiks and Afghans*; Hügel's *Travels in Cashmere and the Punjab*.)

† The almost independent power which Runjeet Sing suffered the Lords of Jummo and other favourite chiefs to assume, was one of the causes of the fierce civil war for which his death gave the signal.

Heera Sing fell, each at a different crisis, while holding the office of vizier. Sheer Sing, the son of one of Runjeet's wives, obtained for a time the throne; but was murdered in 1843, after which a state of wide-spread anarchy prevailed throughout the Punjab, the chief remaining semblance of authority being vested in the person of Ranee Chunda, a concubine of the late Runjeet Sing, and the mother of a boy named Duleep Sing, who, though notoriously not the son of the Maharajah, had been in some sort treated by him as such. Dehra Sing, wanting a puppet, had drawn this child from obscurity; and his mother, under the title of regent, became the head of a faction, the opposers of which took their stand by declaiming truly against the spurious origin of Duleep Sing, and the shameless immorality of Ranee Chunda; and untruly, with regard to her alleged efforts to intrigue with the English against the independence of the Seik nation. Now, in fact, the only point upon which the various Seik parties had ever shown any degree of unanimity, was that of enmity to the British; and much evidence has gradually been brought to light of the actual treachery, as well as passive breach of treaty committed by them during the Afghan war. The intemperate language of Sir Charles Napier in *Sinde*, and his undisguised anticipation of war in the Punjab, had been published, doubtless with exaggeration, throughout that kingdom; and the general feeling of the Seiks was anxiety to assume an offensive position, and meet, if not anticipate, the expected invasion. The French officers in the Seik service (Ventura and M. Court), appear to have borne little part in the past commotions; but their exertions, together with those of Allard and the Neapolitan Avitabile, on whom Runjeet conferred the government of Peshawur, had been sedulously and successfully employed in casting cannon, organising artillery, and disciplining troops after the European fashion.

The preparations made at Lahore for the passage of the Sutlej by a Seik army, could not long be concealed from the governor-general, who, with all practicable expedition and secrecy, concentrated 32,000 men and sixty-eight guns in and about Ferozepoor, Loodiana, and Umballa. Towards the middle of December, the Seiks crossed their boundary, bringing with them large quantities of heavy artillery; and one body of 25,000 regulars and eighty-eight guns, took up a

position near the village of Ferozshah; whilst another force of 23,000 men and sixty-seven guns, encamped opposite Ferozepoor. Both divisions commenced throwing up earthworks around their camps, and preparing for a vigorous contest.

The governor-general had hastened to the frontier to superintend the necessary preparations at the various cantonments. On learning the passage of the Sutlej by the Seiks, in direct contravention of existing treaties, he issued a declaration of war, and, in conjunction with the commander-in-chief, Sir Hugh Gough, advanced with the main column from Bussean (the military depôt) towards Ferozepoor. On reaching the village of Moodkee (18th December, 1845), tidings were received of a hostile encampment some three miles off, comprising a large body of troops, chiefly cavalry, supported by twenty-two guns. It was mid-day, and the English were weary with marching; nevertheless they started forward, after a brief interval for refreshment. The Seik artillery being advantageously posted behind some low jungle, fired briskly upon the advancing columns, but could not hinder the approach of the British horse artillery and light field batteries, which opened on them with steady precision, and caused a degree of confusion in their ranks, soon utterly broken by a sweeping charge of cavalry, closely followed by a continuous discharge from the muskets of the infantry. The Seiks were driven off by the bayonet whenever they attempted to make a stand, and fled leaving seventeen guns and large numbers of their dead comrades on the field. The slaughter would have been greater but for the weariness of the victors and the gathering darkness. The British returned to their camp at midnight, with the loss of 216 killed and 648 wounded, out of a force of 1,200 rank and file. Among the slain was Sir Robert Sale, who fell with his left thigh shattered by grapeshot. The victory was followed up by an attack on the intrenched camp of the enemy at Ferozshah. The Seiks were estimated at 35,000 rank and file, and eighty-eight guns; while the British numbered less than 18,000 men, and sixty-five guns. The disparity was sensibly felt, for the Seiks had proved themselves far more formidable opponents than had been expected; and their artillery (thanks to the labours of Ventura, Allard, Avitabile, and Court, and to the policy of encouraging foreign adventurers to enter

the service of native princes, and prohibiting Englishmen from a similar proceeding) excelled ours in calibre as much as in number, was in admirable order, and thoroughly well served. The British advanced from Moodkee, and reached the hostile encampment about eleven o'clock on the 21st of December. The engagement commenced with an attack by the artillery on the Seik lines, which extended nearly a mile in length and half a mile in breadth. An order was given to the infantry to seize the enemy's guns; and the terrible task was effected with so much success, that the battle seemed almost gained, when the sudden fall of night obliged the combatants to cease fighting, because they could no longer distinguish friend from foe. The main body of the British forces was withdrawn a few hundred yards, and while resting under arms, some of the Seik guns which had not been taken possession of, were brought to bear on the recumbent troops. The governor-general mounted his horse and led the gallant 80th, with a portion of the 1st Bengal Europeans, against the hostile guns, carried them at a charge, caused them to be spiked, and returned to his previous station. The remainder of the night was one of extreme anxiety to the British commanders: their loss had been most severe; and the reserve force, under Sir Harry Smith, had been compelled to retire; while reinforcements were believed to be on their way to join the Seiks. The "mettle" of the troops and of their dauntless leaders was never more conspicuous: at daybreak they renewed the attack with entire success, secured the whole of the seventy-six guns opposed to them, and cleared the entire length of the hostile works; the enemy falling back on the reserve, which arrived just in time to prevent their total destruction. Thus strengthened, the vanquished Seiks were enabled to recross the Sutlej without molestation. The English found full and melancholy occupation in burying their dead and nursing the wounded. Nearly 700 perished on the field; and of above 1,700 placed in hospital at Ferozepoor, 600 died or were disabled from further service.

The great loss thus sustained, and the want of a battering train, prevented the conquerors from marching on Lahore, and bringing the war to a summary conclusion. Many weeks elapsed before the arrival of reinforcements enabled Sir Hugh Gough again to take the field; and in the interval, the Seiks threw a bridge of boats

across the Sutlej, and encamped at Sobraon, on the left bank of the river, where, under the direction of two European engineers, they constructed an almost impregnable *télé-du-pont*. Another body crossed the river and took post at the village of Aliwal, near Loodiana. Sir Harry Smith was dispatched from Ferozepoor to relieve Loodiana, which having effected, he marched against Aliwal with a force of about 10,000 men, and advanced to the attack on the 28th Jan., 1846, with his entire line. A brief cannonade and a cavalry charge was followed by the onset of the infantry: the village was carried by the bayonet, the opposing guns captured, and the foe driven with great slaughter across the river. Smith returned to Ferozepoor on the 8th of February, and on the following day the long-expected heavy guns reached the British camp. Before daybreak on the 10th the troops marched forth to attack the formidable intrenchments of an enemy estimated at 54,000 men, and supported by seventy pieces of artillery. The British numbered 16,000 rank and file, with ninety-nine guns. They advanced under a murderous fire from cannon, muskets, and camel guns, and in more than one place were repeatedly forced back, but the charge was invariably renewed. Line after line was carried, in the accustomed manner, by the bayonet, and the victory was completed by the fierce onslaught of a body of cavalry, under General Thackwell. The Seik guns, camel swivels, and standards were abandoned, and the retreating mass driven over their bridge of boats across the river, hundreds perishing by the fire of the horse artillery, and many more being drowned in the confusion. The English lost 320 killed (including the veteran Sir Thomas Dick, with other officers of note), and the wounded amounted to 2,063. The victorious army marched to Lahore; and there, beneath the city walls, dictated the terms of peace. The governor-general was disposed to recognise the claims of the boy Duleep Sing as Maharajah, and 10,000 men were left at Lahore (under the command of Sir John Littler) for his support and the preservation of peace. The Seik government, or durbar, consented to defray the expenses of the war, amounting to a million and a-half sterling, and agreed to the disbandment of their turbulent soldiery, of whom the majority had been already temporarily dispersed. Sir Henry Hardinge returned to England, and was rewarded for zealous and successful service by eleva-

tion to the peerage; a similar mark of royal favour was conferred on Sir Hugh Gough.

DALHOUSIE ADMINISTRATION: 1848 to 1855.—The recent Seik treaty was not carried out, and appears to have been merely signed as a means of gaining time. A new series of crimes and intrigues commenced; and, as before, hatred of the English was the only common feeling of the various leaders of factions. The first signs of open hostility appeared in the ancient city of Mooltan, the capital of a petty state between the Indus and the Sutlej, conquered by Runjeet Sing in 1818. The British assistant Resident (Mr. Vans Agnew) and Lieutenant Anderson of the Bombay army, were assassinated in the fortress by Moolraj the governor, against whom hostile operations were immediately commenced; the earlier of which were characterised by a remarkable display of energy and judgment on the part of Major Herbert Edwardes, then a subaltern, "who had seen but one campaign."* The strong fortress of Mooltan was besieged in August, and would probably have been captured in the following month, but for the treacherous defection of a large body of Seik auxiliaries, which, with other unmistakable indications of hostility, left (in the words of Lord Dalhousie) "no other course open to us than to prosecute a general Punjab war with vigour, and ultimately to occupy the country with our troops."

In November, 1849, a British army, under Lord Gough, again took the field, and marched from Ferozepoor to Ramnuggur, near the Chenab, where a Seik force lay encamped. The attack of the British proved successful, but their loss was heavy, and included the gallant General Cureton, Colonel Havelock, and Captain Fitzgerald. The Seiks retreated in order towards the Jhelum, while Lord Gough prepared to follow up his victory by an attack on Lahore. The siege of Mooltan, conducted by General Whish, was brought to a successful issue on the 2nd of January, 1849. The fortress was most vigorously defended, until its massive fortifications were completely undermined, and several practicable breaches effected. Orders had been given to storm the citadel at daybreak, and the troops were actually forming, when Moolraj presented himself at the chief gate, and proceeding straight to the tent of the English general, surrendered the keys and his own sword.

* *Year on the Punjab Frontier*, pp. 381-'2.

A garrison was left in Mooltan, and the remainder of the army marched off to join the commander-in-chief, but arrived too late to share the peril and the glory of the much-criticised battle of Chillianwallah. Events so recent are hardly fit subjects of history. It is seldom until the chief actors have passed away from the stage that the evidence brought forward is sufficiently clear and full to enable the most diligent investigator to form a correct judgment on their merits and demerits.

Early in January, Lord Gough proceeded towards the Chenab, and found, as he expected, the Seiks strongly posted near Chillianwallah, with their artillery planted in a commanding and safe position, under cover of some low but dense jungle. The British marched to the attack, as they had often done before, amid a storm of grape and shell, and after a long and sanguinary engagement, which lasted till after nightfall, carried the murderous guns with the bayonet, and purchased victory with the loss of 757 killed and above 2,000 wounded. The carnage among the Seiks must have been yet more terrible; nevertheless, being joined by a body of Afghan horse, they prepared to renew the contest. The final struggle took place on the 21st of February, a few miles from the town of Gujerat. The battle was opened by Lord Gough with a fierce cannonade, which was maintained without intermission for nearly three hours. At the expiration of that time the Seiks made a retrograde movement, upon which the whole British force rushed forth on the foe, and with bayonet, lance, and sword completed the overthrow commenced by the heavy guns. Chutter Sing, Sheer Sing, and other leaders, surrendered to the victors; the Afghans fled across the Indus; the Seik forces were disbanded; and there being in truth no legitimate heir to the usurpations of Runjeet Sing, the Punjab was unavoidably annexed to British India. Its present satisfactory and improving condition will be found described in an ensuing section.

Second Burmese War.—Nearly two years were passed by the governor-general in active usefulness, without any interruption of the general tranquillity; the only occasion for military interference being to suppress the inroads of the Afreedees and other predatory tribes in the vicinity of Peshawur. The sole quarter from which hostility was anticipated was Burmah, the very one from which it was most earnestly to be depre-

cated by all inclined to take warning by past experience.

The Earl of Dalhousie was deeply impressed with this conviction, and scrupled not, with characteristic frankness, to declare his opinion, that "conquest in Burmah would be a calamity second only to the calamity of war."* The deeply disordered finances of India had been rapidly improving under his peaceful and able administration, and he looked forward with sincere repugnance to a contingency which would assuredly produce "exhausted cash balances and reopened loans."† Nevertheless, a series of unfortunate events produced the renewal of war. The treaty of Yandaboo had been preserved inviolate by the sovereign with whom it was made; but his deposition, in 1837, gave a new turn to affairs. His usurping brother, known to the English as a military leader by the name of Prince Therawaddi, manifested great annoyance at the presence of a political agent at Ava, and the residency was in consequence removed to Rangoon, and subsequently altogether withdrawn from Burmah. The British continued to trade with Rangoon for the following twelve years; and during that time many complaints of oppression and breach of treaty were brought against the Burmese government, but none of these were deemed of sufficient extent or significance to call for the interference of the Calcutta authorities, until the close of 1851, when the commanders of two British vessels laid before Lord Dalhousie a formal statement of oppressive judgments delivered against them by the governor of Rangoon in his judicial capacity. Commodore Lambert was dispatched from Calcutta with full and very clear instructions regarding the course to be pursued—namely, first to satisfy himself regarding the justice of these allegations, and then to demand about £900 as compensation.

On reaching Rangoon, numbers of resident traders (styled by Lord Ellenborough the Don Pacificoes of Rangoon) pushed off in their boats with a strange assortment of complaints against the governor; whereupon Commodore Lambert, without waiting to consult Lord Dalhousie on the subject, broke off all intercourse with the local functionary, and commanded him, in very peremptory language, to forward a letter to the King of Ava, stating the object of the British mission, and demanding the disgrace

of the offending intermediary. The letter was dispatched, and an answer returned, that the obnoxious individual had received his dismissal, and that the required compensation would be granted. A new governor arrived at Rangoon, whose conduct induced the commodore to doubt the sincerity of the professions made by the Burmese authorities; and so far he was probably correct. But, unfortunately, his peculiar position as a Queen's officer,‡ is alleged to have given him a sort of independence, which induced the violation of Lord Dalhousie's express injunction, that no act of hostility should be committed by the British mission, however unfavourable its reception, until definite instructions had been obtained from Calcutta. The refusal of the governor to receive a deputation sent by the commodore at mid-day on the 6th Jan., 1852,—offered by the Burmese attendants on the plea that their master was asleep, according to custom, at that hour (and afterwards excused on the plea that the deputies were intoxicated, which has been wholly denied),—was immediately resented by a notice from the commodore for all British subjects to repair to the squadron—an order which was obeyed by several hundred men, women, and children. No opposition was made to their embarkation, but those who remained behind were thrown into prison. The next and wholly unauthorised measure was to take possession of a painted war-hulk, styled the "yellow ship," belonging to the King of Ava, which lay at anchor a little above the British vessels. This procedure, which has been almost universally censured, produced a declaration from the governor of Rangoon, that any attempt to carry away the property of the king, would be forcibly resisted. The British persisted in towing the vessel out of the river; and on passing the great stockade, or battery, a fire was opened on them, but soon silenced by a broadside from the squadron, which "must have done great execution."§ Commodore Lambert declared the coast of Burmah in a state of blockade, and left in a steamer for Calcutta, to seek other instructions than those he had violated in ill-judged retaliation.

The notoriously hostile spirit of the Burmese government, probably induced Lord Dalhousie to confirm the general proceedings of Lambert, despite his undisguised disapproval of the seizure of the "yellow ship."

* Further (Parl.) Papers on Burmese war, p. 44.

† *Idem*, p. 87.

‡ Cobden's *Origin of Burmese War*, 7.

§ Lambert's Despatch. Further Papers, 41.

The previous demand for compensation was reiterated and received with a degree of evasion which was deemed equivalent to rejection; and both parties made ready for an appeal to arms. The British commander-in-chief, Lord Gough, was absent at Simla; but though a brave soldier, he was a man of advanced age; and the ability of Lord Dalhousie and his council abundantly sufficed to overcome all deficiencies, including those encountered in the raising of the Madras contingent, through the insubordination of the governor, Sir Henry Pottinger, who tacitly opposed Lord Dalhousie at every point,—not through any conscientious feeling regarding the war, but simply from personal irritation, caused by some petty jealousy of office.* The Bombay authorities, aided by the head of the Indian navy (Commodore Lushington) and his able subordinates, captains Lynch and Hewett, bestirred themselves actively in the preparation of the steam fleet, and on the 2nd of April the Bengal division arrived at the mouth of the Rangoon river; the previous day having been fixed by the governor-general as that on which the King of Ava was to decide whether he would avoid war by the payment of £100,000 in consideration of the expenses incurred by the British, and sanction the residence of an accredited agent at Rangoon, in compliance with the treaty of Yandaboo. The steamer dispatched to Rangoon to receive the reply of the Burmese government, was compelled to retreat under a shower of shot from the stockades lining the river; and the campaign commenced. Martaban was stormed with little loss, and occupied by a strong garrison. The Madras division arrived soon after; and the united forces amounted to about 8,000 men, commanded by General Godwin, an active and fearless veteran, who had served under Campbell in the previous war, but whose projects were sadly fettered by an exaggerated respect for the proceedings of his predecessor. Rangoon was blockaded on the 10th of April, 1852, and the following day (Easter Sunday) witnessed a desperate and prolonged struggle. The intense heat, under which many officers dropped down dead, impeded operations; and it was not until the 14th that the fall of the Golden

Pagoda completed the capture of Rangoon, which was obtained with the loss to the victors of about 150 killed and wounded. Bassein (once the head-quarters of the Portuguese in Eastern India) was carried with ease in June, and strongly garrisoned; but the dilapidated city of Pegu, which next fell into the hands of a British detachment, though evacuated on their approach, was abandoned by them, owing to insufficiency of troops. General Godwin sent to Calcutta for reinforcements, and especially for light cavalry, horse artillery, and a field battery. These were assembled and dispatched with all possible celerity; and the governor-general, probably dissatisfied with the progress of hostilities, himself visited the seat of war. Prome was taken possession of in July, but abandoned, like Pegu, for want of men, upon which the enemy returned, and made preparations for its defence. The reinforcements which reached the British cantonments in September, raised the army under General Godwin to nearly 20,000 efficient troops, and might, it was considered, have amply sufficed for more extensive enterprises than were attempted. Prome was recaptured, with little difficulty, in October, and Pegu in November; and both places were permanently occupied. An effort was made for the recovery of Pegu by the Burmese, which proved ineffectual; and an engagement with a body of the enemy, near Pegu, was chiefly remarkable for the gallantry displayed by the irregular Seik horse, who proved valuable auxiliaries to their late conquerors.

In December, 1852, the governor-general declared the province of Pegu annexed to the British empire, and intimated that no further hostilities would be pursued by the Anglo-Indian government, if the Burmese were content to submit quietly to the loss of territory which, it must be remembered, they had themselves acquired by usurpation. A new revolution at Ava, caused by the deposition of the king, Therawaddi, by one of his brothers (a procedure similar to that by which he raised himself to the throne), occasioned a cessation of foreign hostilities,† and it would appear that the Burman court and people are really solicitous for the

* See an able article entitled "Annals of the Bengal Presidency for 1852," *Calcutta Review*, Mar., 1853.

† The assassination of Captain Latter, the deputy commissioner at Prome, in December, 1853, has been variously attributed to the treachery of the Burmese government, and to the vengeance of a petty chief, in whose subjugation to British autho-

rity he was personally instrumental. The murder was committed in the dead of night, and nothing but life was taken. The assertion that a woman's garment was found on the body, though often repeated, has been authoritatively denied; and of the whole mysterious affair nothing is certain but the death of a brave, scientific, and energetic officer.

continuance of peace. Some disappointment was occasioned by the embassy voluntarily dispatched by the King of Ava to the governor-general, and the mission sent in friendly reciprocity to Ava, resulting in no treaty of alliance or commerce. The governor-general, however, had from the first "depreciated the reconstruction of any treaty relations with the court of Ava at all;" and at the close of his administration, he declared, that he still considered "peace with Ava as even more likely to be maintained in the absence of all commercial or friendly treaties, than if those conventions had been renewed as before."*

Sattara.—On the death of the rajah, on the 5th of April, 1848, the principality was annexed to the British territories by right of lapse, the rajah leaving no male heir.

Jhansie, a small Mahratta state in Bundelcund, lapsed in a similar manner to the British government on the death of its last chief, in November, 1853.

Hyderabad.—On the 21st of May, 1853, the Nizam signed a treaty, which provided for the liquidation of his heavy and long-standing debt to the company, and for the maintenance of the stipulated military contingent, by the cession of the districts of Berar Payeen Ghaut, the border districts from thence down to Shorapoor, and the territory of the Dooab between the Kistna and the Toombuddra.†

Nagpoor, or Berar.—This kingdom, which had been made over to Rajah Ragojee by the British government after it had been forfeited by the treachery of Appa Sahib, was left without an hereditary heir on the death of the rajah in December, 1853. There remained no male of the line, descended from the stock, and bearing the name of Bhonslah. The dominions of Berar, or Nagpoor, were therefore considered to have lapsed, and were incorporated in the Anglo-Indian empire. There were other annexations of less importance, such as the raj of *Ungool* (in the Jungle Mahals), and a portion of the land of the rajah of *Sikkim* (a hill chieftain, on the borders of Nepal.)

In *Sinde*, Ali Morad, of Khyrpoor, was accused of having forged a clause in a treaty,

whereby he had wrongfully obtained possession of land which of right belonged to the British government; and his guilt being held to be proved, his lands were confiscated.

Oude.—The closing act of Lord Dalhousie's administration was the annexation of Oude, the government of which country was assumed by his lordship, February 7th, 1856. The reasons for this measure, and the mode of its accomplishment, have been so much discussed in connexion with the military mutiny of the Bengal army, which broke out in the following year, that it may perhaps best suit the convenience of the reader, to postpone the relation of the annexation until a subsequent section. The chapters immediately succeeding the present one will, it is hoped, afford an insight into the physical and topographical character of the country—a view of the numbers and distribution of the vast and varied population of India—the mode of government—extent of army—amount of commerce and revenue—the field of missionary and educational operations, &c.; which will make the narrative of the mutiny, and its attendant circumstances, more easily understood than it could be without such previous information.

In reviewing his eight years' administration, Lord Dalhousie adverted to the rapid progress of civilisation in India; to the establishment of railways at the three presidencies and in *Sinde*; of telegraphic communications between the chief cities; of cheap and uniform postage; the improved means of conveyance by land and water; encouragement to agriculture and irrigation; the reduction of impost dues; the creation of a loan for public works; and the open discussion of governmental projects and acts. Before his departure, the insurrection of the *Sonthals* (an aboriginal race, located near the Rajmahal hills in Bahar), in 1855, was repressed, and precautions taken to prevent a recurrence. Finally, Lord Dalhousie took his leave, declaring, that he "left the Indian empire in peace without and within;" and "that there seemed to be no quarter from which formidable war could reasonably be apprehended at present."‡

* Minute by the Marquis of Dalhousie, dated 28th February, 1856, reviewing his administration in India from January, 1848, to March, 1856.—(Parl. Papers, 16th June, 1856.)

† Parl. Papers—Commons, 26th July, 1854; pp. 34; 144.

‡ Minute of 2nd of February, 1855.

460 CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF PRINCIPAL BATTLES AND SIEGES

Date.	Usual Name of Battle or Place.	Under whose Administration.	Enemy against whom Fought.	Strength of British Army.						
				Europeans.				Native.		Total.
				Artillery.		Cavalry.	Infantry.	Cavalry.	Infantry.	
				Guns.	Men.					
14th Nov., 1751	Siege of Arcot— <i>see</i> p. 264.	Mr. Sander-son, Govr. of Madras.	Reza Sahib, son of Chunda Sahib, the Nabob of Arcot.	6	—	—	200	—	300	500
23d June, 1757	Plassey; in Nuddea dist.— <i>see</i> p. 278.	Clive.* . . .	Surajah Dowlah, Nabob of Bengal.	10 eight 6-pds. and 2 howts.	150	—	850	—	2,300	3,300
15th Jan., 1761	Battle of Patna— <i>see</i> p. 293.	Mr Vansit-tart.	Shah Alum, Empe-ror of Delhi.	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
2nd Aug., 1763	Geriah; near Soot-ee, Moorsheda-bad—p. 297.	Ditto . . .	Meer Cossim, ex-Na-bob of Bengal.	—	—	—	750	750	1,500	3,000
5th Sept., 1763	Oodwanulla Fort; Bhaugulpoor dis.	Ditto . . .	Ditto	—	—	3,000	—	—	—	3,000
6th Nov., 1763	Patna taken by storm—p. 298.	Ditto . . .	Ditto	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
23rd Oct, 1764	Buxar—p. 299 . .	Ditto . . .	Vizier of Oudo . .	20	—	—	857	918	5,297	7,072
6th Mar., 1799	Sedaseer; near Pe-riapatam—p. 379.	Marquis Wel-lesley.	Tippoo Sultan . .	—	—	—	—	—	—	6,420
27th Mar., 1799	Malavelly; in My-soor—p. 379.	Ditto . . .	Tippoo	{	756	912	4,608	1,766 2,726 20,000	11,061 Gun L Nizam	41,649 ascars. 's Con. 20000*
4th May, 1799	Seringapatam, Storm of, p. 381.	Ditto . . .	Ditto	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
4th Sept., 1803	Allyghur Fort, Storm of, p. 396.	Ditto . . .	Mahrattas, command-ed by French officers	—	—	—	—	—	—	3,000
11th Sept., 1803	Delhi—p. 396 . . .	Ditto . . .	Ditto	—	—	—	—	—	—	4,500
23rd Sept., 1803	Assaye; in Hyder-abad ter.—p. 395.	Ditto . . .	Ditto	—	—	—	—	—	—	4,500
1st Nov., 1803	Laswarree—p. 397.	Ditto . . .	Ditto	—	—	—	—	—	—	4,500
28th Nov., 1803	Argaum—p. 398 .	Ditto . . .	Ditto	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
14th Dec., 1803	Gawilghur Fort—p. 398.	Ditto . . .	Ditto	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
13th Nov., 1804	Deeg; nr Bhurt-poor—p. 402.	Ditto . . .	Mahrattas (Holecar)	—	—	—	—	—	—	4,648*
24th Dec., 1804	Deeg Fort—p. 401	Ditto . . .	Rajah of Bhurtpoor .	—	—	—	—	—	—	3,000*
9th Jan., 1805	Unsuccessful storm of Bhurtpoor.	Ditto . . .	Ditto	—	—	—	—	—	—	3,382*
21st Jan., 1805	Second do. } pp.	Ditto . . .	Ditto	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
20th Feb., 1805	Third do. } 401-2.	Ditto . . .	Ditto	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
21st Feb., 1805	Fourth do. }	Ditto . . .	Ditto	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
31st Oct., 1814	Unsuccessful at-tack of Kalunga Fort—p. 411.	Marquis Hast-ings.	Goorkhas.	—	—	—	—	—	—	2,737
27th Nov., 1814	Do. assault, p. 412.	Ditto . . .	Ditto	—	—	—	—	—	—	2,477
27th Feb., 1816	Muckwanpoor—p. 413.	Ditto . . .	Ditto	—	—	—	—	—	—	10,000*
5th Nov., 1817	Kirkee, nr. Poona —p. 417.	Ditto . . .	Mahrattas	—	—	—	—	—	—	2,800

* In the fifty days during which the siege was protracted, the British loss in defeating the attempt to storm was only four Europeans killed and two sepoy wounded.

† This number includes the sick; the number that actually repulsed the storm on the 14th November amounting to 80 Europeans and 120 sepoy.

‡ On the 14th November; there are no means of ascertaining previous casualties.

§ Of these 150 were French.

|| The powers of the governor and council of Calcutta, in civil and commercial affairs, were preserved to them, but in all military matters Clive was invested with independent authority.

¶ Some say 35,000 infantry, 15,000 cavalry; also forty Frenchmen with four light pieces of artillery.

‡ One of the remarkable events of this battle was the capture of Monsieur Law, who, with a few French troops, had hitherto been the chief support of the native armies against the English.

§ Worked by 170 Europeans.

¶ Exclusive of large bodies of irregular cavalry.

‡ Of these 2,000 were drowned in the Caramnassa.

§ This includes sixteen missing.

¶ The number is stated between 40,000 and 50,000.

‡ This was the whole force employed in the siege; the two divisions which carried the place did not number more than 4,000 men.

§ These numbers include the casualties during the whole period of the siege, from 4th April to 4th May.

¶ The number estimated to have fallen in the assault.

‡ Exclusive of the Rajah of Berar's infantry and Sindia's irregular corps.

BY THE ENGLISH IN INDIA, FROM THE YEAR 1751 to 1852. 461

Guns.	Enemy.			British Army Killed and Wounded.								Enemy.		Artillery captured.	Name of British Commander.
	Cavalry.	Infantry.	Total.	Killed.				Wounded.				Killed.	Wounded.		
				Europeans.		Natives.	Total.	Europeans.		Natives.	Total.				
				Offi- cers.	Men.			Offi- cers.	Men.						
9	3,000	7,150 ^a	10,150	1	45	30	76 ^a	2	22	5	227 ^a	40	0 ^a	8	Captain (afterwards Lord) Clive.
54 24 & 32- pds	18,000	50,000	58,000 ^a	—	6	16	22	2	10	36	48	60	0	50	Clive.
—	10,000	10,000	20,000	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	Major Carnac.
—	20,000	8,000	28,000	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	17 ^a	Major Adams.
—	60,000	60,000	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	100	Ditto.
—	—	10,000 ^a	10,000	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	Major Carnac
—	40,000	40,000	—	—	—	—	—	—	kill. & wond. 847	—	—	—	4,000 ^a 2,000	133	Major Munro.
—	40,000	40,000	—	—	—	—	45 ^a	—	—	—	98	—	—	—	General Stuart.
—	45,000 ^a	45,000	—	—	—	—	—	—	kill. & wond. 66	—	—	2,000	—	—	General Harris.
—	—	—	48,000	22	181	119	322 ^a	45	622	420	1,087 ^a	8,000 ^a	—	—	Lord Harris.
—	—	—	—	6	49	—	55	11	19	4	205	2,000	—	281	General (afterwards Lord) Lake.
—	—	—	19,000	5	102	—	107	11	33	5	346	3,000	—	68	General Lake.
—	35,000	10,500	45,500 ^a	23	Mis- sing 8 403	—	426	30	1,106	—	1,136	1,200 ^a	—	98	Gl. Wellesley (Duke of Wellington.)
72	4,500	9,000	13,500	11	Mis- sing 18 161	—	172	25	626	—	651	7,000	—	71	General Lake.
—	—	—	—	—	46	—	—	9	291	—	300	—	—	38	General Wellesley.
—	—	—	—	1	—	—	—	2	kill. & wond. 123	—	125	—	—	52	Colonel Stevenson.
—	—	—	15,000	5	—	—	—	17	kill. & wond. 621	—	638	2,000 ^a	—	87	Major-general Fraser.
—	—	—	—	2	41	—	43	13	171	—	184	—	—	100	Lord Lake.
—	—	—	—	5	38	42	85	23	183	165	371	—	—	—	Lord Lake.
—	—	—	—	3	—	—	—	15	kill. & wond. 573	—	588	—	—	—	Ditto.
—	—	—	—	1	48	113	162	27	456	556	732	—	—	—	Ditto.
—	—	—	—	6	63	56	125	27	452	452	862	—	—	—	Ditto.
—	—	—	400	5	4	23	32	15	60	163	228	—	—	—	Major-general Gillespie.
—	—	—	550	4	15	18	37	7	215	221	443	48	0	—	Colonel Mawbey.
—	—	—	12,000	1	11	34	46	1	19	166	176	80	0	—	Major-general Ochterlony.
—	—	—	25,000	—	17	2	19	1	55	11	67	50	0	—	Lieutenant-colonel C. B. Burr.

* A large number of the wounded were scattered over the country.

* The amount of the British force is not stated; it must, however, have been considerable, as a junction had been effected between the forces of General Wellesley and Colonel Stevenson. The force placed at the disposal of the former, at the commencement of the campaign, amounted to 9,000; that of the latter to 8,000 men.

* Major-general Fraser's force consisted of H.M.'s. 76th regiment, the Company's European regiment, and four battalions of sepoy, exclusive of two battalions left for the protection of the baggage. The strength of the four battalions and the two European regiments engaged in the attack, may be estimated at the amount stated in the Table.

* Thorn says twenty-four battalions of infantry, besides a considerable body of horse. Captain Thornton states that the cavalry, swelled by numerous adventurers, amounted to 60,000, to which were added 15,000 well-disciplined infantry. The numbers specified in the Table are those of the infantry alone.

* Besides a large number drowned in a morass.

* This number has reference only to the strength of the storming party. Lord Lake appears to have been present with his whole army, which consisted of upwards of 10,000 men.

* The enemy's extensive intrenchments were occupied by a large force, but the numbers are not stated. The troops are represented to have consisted of several of the Rajah of Bhurtpoor's battalions, and the remaining infantry of Holcar.

* This number comprises only the storming party. See Note to Deeg.

* The Bombay division, consisting of four battalions of sepoy, H.M.'s. 86th regiment, eight companies of the 65th, with a troop of Bombay cavalry, and 500 irregular horse, had now joined Lord Lake's force before Bhurtpoor.

* Sir David Ochterlony had a force of near 20,000 men, including three European regiments. He divided this force into four brigades, with two of which he marched to Muckwanpoor.

462 CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF PRINCIPAL BATTLES AND SIEGES

Date.	Usual Name of Battle or Place.	Under whose Administration.	Enemy against whom Fought.	Strength of British Army.						Total.
				Europeans.				Native.		
				Artillery.		Cavalry.	Infantry.	Cavalry.	Infantry.	
				Guns.	Men.					
26th and 27th Nov., 1817.	Seetabuldee; near Nagpoor—p. 418.	Marquis Hastings.	Mahrattas	—	—	—	—	—	—	1,400
21st Dec., 1817	Mahidpoor, p. 420	Ditto	Ditto	—	—	—	—	—	—	11,305
1st Jan., 1818	Corygaum, Defence of—p. 418.	Ditto	Arabs in pay of Peishwa.	2	—	—	—	—	—	750
20th Feb., 1818	Ashtco Combat—p. 419.	Ditto	Peishwa	—	—	—	—	—	—	419
27th Feb., 1818	Talneir, Storm of	Ditto	Arabs	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
17th April, 1818	Soonee Battle . .	Ditto	Mahrattas	—	—	—	—	—	—	513*
20th May, 1818	Chanda Assault .	Ditto	Ditto	—	—	—	—	—	—	6,600*
18th to 29th May, 1818.	Malligaum taken by Storm.	Ditto	Arabs in Native employ.	—	—	—	—	—	—	2,630
8th to 10th June, 1818.	Satunwarree Fort; unsuccessful attack.	Ditto	Mahirattas	—	—	—	—	—	—	550*
31st Jan., 1819	Nowah; Hyderabad.	Ditto	Arab Garrison . .	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
9th April, 1819	Asserghur taken by Storm—p. 420.	Ditto	Sindia's Commandant, Jeswunt Rao Laar.	—	—	—	—	—	—	20,000†
10th June, 1824	Kemendine, p. 424	Lord Amherst	Burmese	100	—	—	—	—	—	—
30th Oct., 1824	Martaban—p. 425	Ditto	Ditto	—	—	—	—	—	—	219*
18th Jan., 1826	Bhurtpoor Storming—p. 427.	Ditto	Rajah of Bhurtpoor	—	—	—	—	—	—	25,000
19th Jan., 1826	Melloone Storming—p. 427.	Ditto	Burmese	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
23rd July, 1839	Ghuznee Capture—p. 436.	Lord Auckland.	Afghans	—	—	—	—	—	—	4,863
13th Nov., 1839	Kelat; in Beloochistan.	Ditto	Ditto	—	—	—	—	—	—	1,261
7th April, 1842	Jellalabad Defence	Lord Ellenborough.	Ditto	—	—	—	—	—	—	1,360
13th Sep., 1842	Tezzen Battle . .	Ditto	Ditto	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
17th Feb., 1843	Meanee; Sind—p. 451.	Ditto	Beloochees	—	—	—	—	—	—	2,600
24th Mar., 1843	Hyderabad; Sind—p. 452.	Ditto	Ditto	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
29th Dec., 1843	Puniar; Gwalior—p. 452.	Ditto	Mahrattas (Sindia)	—	—	—	—	—	—	2,000
29th Dec., 1843	Maharajpoor—p. 452.	Ditto	Ditto	40	—	—	—	—	—	14,000
18th Dec., 1845	Moodkee; left bank of Sutlej—p. 454.	Lord Hardinge.	Seiks, under Rajah Lall Sing.	—	3,850	—	—	8,500	—	12,350
21st and 22nd Dec., 1845.	Ferozshah; on the Sutlej—p. 454.	Ditto	Seiks	65	5,674	—	—	12,053	—	17,727
28th Jan., 1846	Aliwal; on the Sutlej.	Ditto	Seiks, under Runjoor Sing.	24	—	—	—	—	—	10,000
10th Feb., 1846	Sobraon; on the Sutlej.	Ditto	Seiks	90	—	—	—	—	—	16,224
2nd Jan., 1849	Mooltan, Siege of .	Lord Dalhousie.	Seiks, under Moolraj.	150	—	15,000	—	17,000	—	32,000
13th Jan., 1849	Chillianwalla; in the Punjab.	Ditto	Seiks	125	—	—	—	—	—	22,000
21st Feb., 1849	Gujerat; in the Punjab.	Ditto	Ditto	96	—	—	—	—	—	25,000
14th Apr., 1852	Rangoon	Ditto	Burmese	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Sept., 1852 . .	Prome	Ditto	Ditto	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Dec., 1852 . .	Pegu	Ditto	Ditto	—	—	—	—	—	—	—

* In Col. Blacker's *Memoir*, p. 18, Holar's force is estimated at 20,000 horse and 8,000 foot.

† The numbers here given have reference to the strength of the cavalry. In addition to this, there appears to have been a detachment of horse artillery.

* The force consisted of 1,000 native cavalry, a troop of horse artillery, a company of European foot artillery, 3,000 native infantry, 2,000 irregular horse, with three 18-pounders, four brass 12's, six howitzers, and twelve 6-pounders.

† Native garrison.

Guns.	Enemy.			British Army Killed and Wounded										Enemy.		Artillery captured.	Name of British Commander.
	Cavalry.	Infantry.	Total.	Killed.				Wounded.				Killed.	Wounded.				
				Europeans.			Total.	Europeans.			Total.						
				Off-icers.	Men.	Natives.		Off-icers.	Men.	Natives.							
—	12,000	8,000	20,000	4	120	—	124	11	230	—	—	241	300	—	—	Lieutenant - colonel H. Scot.	
70	—	—	—	3	171	—	174	35	566	—	—	601	3,000	—	—	L.-gen. Sir T. Hialop.	
—	—	—	—	2	62	—	64	3	113	—	—	116	—	—	—	Captain Staunton	
—	9,000	—	9,000	—	—	—	19	1	—	—	—	—	200	—	—	Sir Lionel Smith	
—	—	—	300	2	5	—	7	5	13	—	—	18	250	—	—	L.-gen. Sir T. Hialop.	
—	—	—	2,000	1	12	—	13	4	51	—	—	55	1,000	—	—	Colonel Adams.	
—	—	—	350	5	29	—	34	7	168	—	—	175	200	—	—	Ditto.	
—	—	—	250	1	10	—	11	1	74	—	—	75	—	—	—	Lieutenant - colonel MacDowell.	
—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	Major Lamb.	
—	—	—	500	—	—	—	22	6	174	—	—	180	400	—	—	Major Pitman.	
—	—	—	1,350	1	46	—	47	9	257	—	—	266	43	95	119	Brigadier - general Doveton.	
—	—	—	3,000	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	150	—	—	Sir A. Campbell.	
—	—	—	3,500	—	—	—	7	1	13	—	—	14	—	—	—	Colonel Godwin.	
—	—	—	—	—	61	42	103	—	283	183	—	466	4,000	—	—	Lord Combermore	
—	—	—	10,000	—	—	—	5	3	17	—	—	20	—	—	—	Sir Archibald Campbell.	
—	—	—	3,000	—	—	—	17	—	—	—	—	170	514	—	—	Sir John Keane.	
—	—	—	2,000	1	31	—	32	8	99	—	—	107	400	—	—	Major-general Willshire.	
—	—	—	6,000	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	Sir Robert Sale.	
—	—	—	16,000	—	—	—	32	3	127	—	—	130	—	—	—	General Pollock.	
15	—	—	35,000	6	60	—	66	13	201	—	—	214	5,000	—	—	Sir Charles Napier	
—	—	—	—	2	—	—	—	10	kill. & wond. 255	—	—	—	—	—	—	Ditto.	
—	—	—	12,000	—	—	—	35	—	—	—	—	182	—	—	24	Major-general Grey	
100	—	—	18,000	—	—	—	113	—	—	—	—	684	3,500	—	56	Lord Gough.	
22	—	—	12,000	16	200	—	216	48	609	—	—	657	—	—	—	Ditto	
—	—	—	35,000	48	8	206	694	1,103	618	1,721	—	—	—	—	88	Ditto.	
—	—	—	19,000	—	—	—	176	—	—	—	—	413	—	—	68	Sir H. Smith.	
—	—	—	34,000	—	—	—	320	—	—	—	—	2,063	—	—	—	Lord Gough.	
—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	General Whish.	
—	—	—	60,000	26	731	—	757	66	1,446	—	—	1,512	4,000	—	12	Lord Gough.	
59	—	—	60,000	5	87	—	92	24	658	—	—	682	—	—	57	Ditto.	
—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	General Godwin.	
—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	
—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	

* This was the number of men of which the storming party was composed.

† The British force present at the conclusion of the siege, consisted of—horse artillery, one troop and a-half; native cavalry, eight squadrons; foot artillery, five companies; European infantry, two battalions and a-half; native infantry, eleven and a-half battalions; irregular horse, 5,000; sappers and miners, thirteen companies; and probably exceeded, in the aggregate, the amount stated in the Table.

‡ The strength of the storming party.

[The above Table was prepared by order of the Court of Directors, at the request of the Author. The particulars which should appear in the columns left blank, cannot be furnished with perfect accuracy.]

CHAPTER II.

TOPOGRAPHY—MOUNTAINS AND PASSES—RIVERS—PLATEAUX—PROVINCES AND CHIEF TOWNS—CLIMATE AND DISEASES—GEOLOGY—SOIL—MINERALOGY.

Asia, — the largest and most diversified quarter of the globe, has for its central southern extremity a region of unsurpassed grandeur, comprising lofty mountains, large rivers, extensive plateaux, and wide-spread valleys, such as are not to be found within a like area in any other section of the earth. This magnificent territory, known under the general designation of India,* is in the form of an irregular pentagon, with an extreme extent, from north to south and from east to west, of 1,800 miles; a superficial area of 1,500,000 square miles; and a well-defined boundary of 9,000 English miles.†

The geographical position of India possesses several advantages. On the north, it is separated from China, Tibet, and Independent Tartary, for a distance of 1,800 miles, by the Himalayan chain and prolongations termed the Hindoo-Koosh, whose altitude varies from 16,000 to 27,000 feet (three to five miles), through which there is only one pass accessible to wheeled carriages (Bamian.) This gigantic wall has at its base an equally extended buttress, the sub-Himalaya and Sewalik hills, with, in one part, an intervening irregular plateau (Tibet) of 90 to 150 miles wide: on the *West*, the Hindoo-Koosh is connected by the low Khyber ranges with the lofty Sufed-Koh, and its conjoint the Suliman mountains, which rise 10,000 feet, like a mural front, above the Indus valley, and have a southerly course of 400 miles; the Suliman are connected by a transverse chain with the Bolan mountains, which proceed nearly due south for 250 miles, and become blended with the Keertar, Jutteil, and Lukkee hills; the latter terminating in the promontory of Cape Monze, a few miles to the north-west of the Indus mouth. This *western* boundary of 900 miles, supports the table-lands which constitute a large part of Afghanistan and Beloochistan: to these there are four principal ascents—the Khyber, Gomul, Bolan, and Gundava passes, readily defensible against the strategetic

movements of any formidable enemy. On the *East*, an irregular series of mountains, hills, and highlands, extend from the source of the Brahmapootra, along the wild and unexplored regions of Naga, Munneepoor, and Tipperah, through Chittagong and Arracan to Cape Negrais (the extremity of the Youmadoung range), at the mouth of the Iravaddy river; to the southward and eastward of Pegu and Martaban, the Tenasserim ridge commences about one hundred miles distant from the coast, and prolongs the boundary to the Straits of Malacca, along the narrow strip of British territory which fronts the Bay of Bengal. The length of this *eastern* frontier is 1,500 miles, and it forms an effectual barrier against aggression from the Burmese, Siamese, or Malays, with whose states it is contentious. On the *South*, the shores of the above-described territory are washed by the Bay of Bengal, the Straits of Malacca, the Indian Ocean, and the Arabian Sea, for 4,500 miles. The natural frontiers of this extensive region may be thus summarily noted:—north, along the Himalaya, 1,800; west, along Afghanistan, &c., 900; east, along Burmah, Siam, &c., 1,800: total by land, 4,500; by sea, 4,500 = 9,000 English miles.

No pen-and-ink description can convey an adequate idea of India as a whole; the mind may comprehend separate features, but must fail to realise at one view a complete portraiture, especially if devoid of unity of configuration: in several countries a mountain ridge and a main conduit form an outline, around which the chief topographical peculiarities may be grouped; but the region before us contains several lines of great length and elevation, with diverse axis of perturbation, and declinations to three of the cardinal points, causing numerous rivers, flowing S.W. (Indus); S.E. (Ganges); S. (Brahmapootra and Iravaddy); W. (Nerbudda, Taptee, and Loonee); E. (Godavery, Kistnah, Cauvery, and Mahanuddy); and in

* See p. 13 for origin of word: old geographers designate the country as India *within* (S.W. of), and *beyond* (S.E. of) the Ganges.

† The reader is requested to bear in mind through-

out this work, that round numbers are used to convey a general idea, easy to be remembered; they must be viewed as approximative, and not arithmetically precise. Indian statistics are still very imperfect.

other directions according to the course of the mountain-ranges and the dip of the land towards the ocean, by which the river system is created and defined.

Irrespective of the circumscribing barriers, and of the bones and arteries (hills and streams) which constitute the skeleton of Hindoostan, three features, distinctively delineated, deserve brief notice. The snowy ranges on the north give origin to two noble rivers, which, as they issue from the lesser Himalaya, are separated by a slightly elevated water-shed, and roll through widely diverging plains—the one in a south-easterly direction to the Bay of Bengal, the other south-westerly to the Arabian sea; each swollen by numerous confluent rivers, which, altogether, drain or irrigate an area equal to about half the superficies of India Proper. The Gangetic plain is 1,000, that of the Indus (including the Punjab), 800 miles in length; the average breadth of either, 300 miles; the greater part of both not 500 feet above the sea; the height nowhere exceeding 1,000 feet. Intermediate, and bifurcating the valleys of the main arteries, there is an irregular plateau, extending from north to south for 1,000, with a breadth varying from 300 to 500 miles, and a height ranging from 1,500 to 3,000 feet above the sea-level. Midway between Cape Comorin and Cashmere, this table-land is bisected from west to east, for 600 miles, by the narrow Nerbudda valley: the *northern* section, of an oblong shape, comprising Malwa, East Rajpootana, and Bundelcund, has for its south-eastern and north-western buttresses the Vindhya and Arravulli ranges, and a declination towards the Jumna and Doab on the north-east, and to the Guzerat plain on the south-west: the *southern* section, constituting what is erroneously* termed the Peninsula, contains the Deccan, Mysoor, Berar, and adjoining districts; forms a right-angled triangle,† supported on the north by the Sautpoora mountains, and on either side by the Western and Eastern Ghauts and their prolongations; the declination is from the westward to the eastward, as shown by the courses of the Godavery and Kistnah.

These prominent physical characteristics

* There is no partial insulation—no isthmus.

† The northern and western sides are about 900 miles in length; the eastern 1,100.

‡ A full description of the geography of India would require a volume to itself; but the tabular views here given, and now for the first time prepared, will, with the aid of the maps, enable the reader to trace out the topography of the country.

may be thus recapitulated. 1st. The extensive mountain circumvallation, east to west, from the Irawaddy to the Indus. 2nd. The two great and nearly level plains of the Ganges and Indus. 3rd. The immense undulating plateau, of 1,000 miles long, in a straight line from the Jumna, to the Cauvery. To these may be added a low coast-line of 4,500 miles, skirted on either side of the Bay of Bengal, and on the Malabar shore of the Indian Ocean, by receding *Ghauts* and other lofty ranges, backed by inland ridges of hills, and mountains traversing the land in diverse directions, such as the Vindhya, Sautpoora, and Arravulli. These salient features comprise many varieties of scenery; but for the most part wide-spread landscapes extend on the east,—teeming with animal and vegetable life; sandy wastes on the west, where the wild ass obtains scanty provender; on the north, an arctic region, whose snowy solitudes are relieved from perpetual stillness by volcanic fires bursting from ice-capt peaks; on the south, luxuriant valleys, verdant with perpetual summer; a rocky coast at Kattywar, swampy sunderbunds at Bengal, jungly ravines in Berar, and fertile plains in Tanjore;—*here* Nature in sternest aspect,—*there* in loveliest form,—*everywhere* some distinctive beauty or peculiar grandeur: while throughout the whole are scattered numerous cities and fortresses on river-bank or ocean-shore, adorned with Hindoo and Moslem architecture, cave temples of wondrous workmanship, idolatrous shrines, and Mohammedan mausoleums, wrought with untiring industry and singular artistic skill; cyclopean walls, tanks, and ruins of extraordinary extent, and of unknown origin and date; but whose rare beauty even the ruthless destroyer, Time, has not wholly obliterated. These and many other peculiarities contribute to render India a land of romantic interest, which it is quite beyond the assigned limits of this work to depict: all within its scope‡ being a brief exposition of the various mountain-ranges and passes, the plateaux, the river system, coast-line, islands, &c., with an enumeration of the principal cities and towns, which are more numerous and populous than those of continental Europe.§

§ Autumnal tourists, in search of health, pleasure, or excitement, and weary of the beaten paths of the Seine and Rhine, might readily perform, in six months (September to March), the overland route to and from India,—examine the leading features of this ancient and far-famed land, judge for themselves of its gorgeous beauty, and form some idea of the manners and customs of its vast and varied population.

Mountain Chains of India, their Extent, Position, Elevation, &c.

Name.	Extent and Position of Extremities.	Elevation above the Sea.	Remarks.
HIMALAYA, or "abode of Snow."	This stupendous mass extends in an irregular curve over 22° of lon., from the defile above Cashmere, where the Indus penetrates into the plains of the Punjab, lon. 73° 23', to the S. bend of the Sanpo, lon. 95° 23'. It is 1,500 m. long, with an avg. breadth of 150 m.	1. Dairmal, 19,000 ft.; 2. Bal Tal, 19,650; 3. Ser and Mer, 20,000; 4. Hanle, 20,000; 5. Gya, 21,764; 6. Porgyal, 22,600; 7. Kaidang, 20,103; 8. St. Patrick, 22,798; 9. St. George, 22,654; 10. The Pyramid, 21,579; 11. Gangotri, 22,906; 12. Jannoutri, 21,155; 13. Kedarnath, 23,062; 14. Badrinath, 22,954; 15. Kamet, 25,550; 16. Nanda Devi, 25,749; 17. Garia, 23,900; 18. Dhawalagiri, 27,600; 19. Gonsanthan, 24,740; 20. Junnoo, 25,311; 21. Kinchinjunga, 28,176; 22. Chomolomo, 19,000; 23. Kanchan Jhow, 22,000; 24. Chumalari, 23,929; 25. Three peaks on lower bank of Deemree, 21,000; 26. Kailas, 22,000. Average elevation, 18,000 to 20,000 ft.	Limit of perpetual snow, or congelation, on S. slope, 15,000 to 18,000 ft. Deep narrow valleys, separated by ranges running either parallel or at right angles with the main ridge, contain the numerous sources of the rivers flowing into the Ganges, the Indus, and the Brahmaputra. The steep face is towards the plain, and, to the N. the chain supports the lofty table-land of Tibet. The greater part of the grant peaks, which rise to an elevation of 25,000 or 28,000 ft., are situate not on the central axis, but to the south of it. Viewed from Patna, at a distance of about 150 miles, these mountains present a long line of snow-white pinacles, which, on a nearer approach, are seen towering above the dark line of lower but still lofty mountains.† With the exception of a strip of land at the foot of the mountains, the whole of Bootan presents a succession of the most lofty and rugged mountains on the surface of the globe. It is a series of ridges, separated only by the narrow beds of roaring torrents.
HINDOO-KOOSH, † Kouen-lun, or Moos Taugh.	About 850 m. long. From Kara-korum, lat. 35°, lon. 77°; to Bamian, † lat. 34° 50', lon. 67° 48'. ¶	1. Hindoo-Koosh, 35° 40', 68° 50', 21,000 ft.; ‡ 2. Summit N. of Jelalabad, 20,248; 3. Koushan Pass, 15,200; 4. Khawak Pass, 13,200; 5. Akrobat, 10,200 feet. Laram Mountains, 35° 20', 62° 54'; about 60 m. from N.E. to S.W., dividing the valley of Suwat from that of Panjkora; and Laspisor Mountains, S. of, and subordinate to, Hindoo-Koosh, about 50 m. from E. to W., 36°, 70'—little known.	Limit of perpetual snow on S. slope (lat. 37°), 17,000 ft. The most remarkable feature of Hindoo-Koosh is, that to the S. it supports the plains of Kabool and Koh-Damaun, 6,000 to 7,000 ft.; while to the N. lies the low tract of Turkestan. Koondooz town, distant in a direct line 80 m. N. of Hindoo-Koosh, only 900 ft. above the sea. The Hindoo-Koosh is a distinct mountain system, its parallelism being from S.W. to N.E., while that of the Himalaya is from S.E. to N.W. •• It is a vast rounded mass, the culminating ridge ascending in lofty peaks, covered with perpetual snow, stretching as far as the eye can reach—further to the W. it sinks into the mazy mountains forming the Huzareh highlands. Supposed to be the Parapamisus of the Greeks.
KOH-i-BARA	About 60 m.—along lat. 34° 30' between lon. 67° 30' and 68° 30'. At the S.W. extremity of Hindoo-Koosh, with which it is connected by the transverse ridges of Kallao and Hajeguk.	Variously estimated. According to Burnes and Lady Sale, 18,000 ft.; Ourram, 20,000 ft.; Humboldt, 2,800 toises, or 17,640 ft.; the most probable is 16,000 ft. Highest accessible point, 34° 40', 67° 30'; 13,200 ft. Hajeguk Pass, 11,700 ft.	Always covered with perpetual snow. Generally of primary formation, consisting of granite, quartz, gneiss, mica-slate, and primary limestones. The Soorkh Kood, the Kara Su, and many other shallow but impetuous streams rush down its northern face, and are discharged into the Kabool river, which conveys their water to the Indus. The two lowest ranges are covered with pine forests; the highest and most distant has a very irregular outline, is steep and rocky, yet furrowed by many beautiful valleys.††
SOOTY-KOH, Snowy or White Mountains.	Near Attock, lon. 72° 16' W. to lon. 69° 36', proceeding nearly along the parallel of lat. 33° 50'; then sinking into a maze of hills stretching to the Kohistan of Kabool.	There are three ranges, running nearly parallel to the S. of the Kabool River; they rise in height as they recede from the river, the highest between 69° 40', and 70° 30' attaining an altitude of 14,000 ft.	Always covered with snow. Its south-eastern brow overhangs the delightful region of Koh-Damaun and Kabool; its northern face forms the southern boundary of the Ghorbund valley.
PUGHAN, or Pamghan Range.	Subordinate to Hindoo-Koosh, running along its S. base, generally from N.E. to S.W.	Estimated at 13,000 ft. Oona Pass, 34° 23', 68° 15'; 11,920 ft. Erak Summit, 34° 40', 68° 48'; 12,480 ft.	

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KURKUTCHA MOUNTAINS.	Separate valley of Kabool from plain of Jelalabad; and connect Hindoo-Koosh with Suft-Koh.	From 1,000 to 2,000 ft. above Kabool, and the highest part, 31° 25', 69° 30'; 8,000 ft. above the sea.	Four routes over this range; practicable only for a man and horse at Lattabad Pass, 4,000 British troops were destroyed in their retreat, in 1842. Cold intense in winter, the frost splitting the rocks into huge shattered fragments. Appear at first irregularly grouped, but the distinct arrangement of a chain is afterwards observable. Four passes through this range. The hills generally consist of slate and primary limestone, with overlying sandstone.
KHYBER MOUNTAINS.	Length, about 50 m.; breadth, about 20 m. Between 33° 30' and 34° 20', and 71° 10' and 71° 30'. They connect Hindoo-Koosh with Suft-Koh.	Tatara summit, highest point, 4,800 ft. Summit of Khyber Pass, 3,373 ft.	
GOOLKOO MOUNTAINS.	Lat. 33° 22', lon. 67° 50'; 30 m. S.W. from Ghuznee.	Estimated at 13,000 ft.	
AKRAN MOUNTAINS.	Lat. 30° 50', lon. 69° 30'.	General elevation, about 8,000 ft. Highest part, 30° 50', 66° 30'; about 5,000 ft. Kojuck Pass, 7,457 ft.	Bounds the table-lands of Shawl and Pisheen on the W., as the Hala range does to the E.
TORA MOUNTAINS.	Length, 150 m. Between 30° 40' and 32° 40', and 66° 40' and 68° 20'; extending N.E. from the N. side of Pisheen valley.	General elevation, 9,000; above Pisheen, 3,500 ft. Tukato Hill, 30° 20', 66° 55'; 11,500 ft.	Country, though generally rugged, fertile.
PURB MOUNTAINS.	Length, about 50 m. From C. Monze to lat. 26°.	Supposed to equal those of W. Scinde, viz., 2,000 ft. Highest part, about 25° 30'.	In 25° 3', 69° 50', they are crossed by the Guncloba Pass, described as stony, and of easy ascent and descent.
SINDH RANGES, VIZ.—	60 to 70 m. S.W. from Sehwan to Dooba. Between 25° 32', 26° 20', and 67° 48', 68° 8'.	Steep—in few places less than 2,000 ft.	The road from Sehwan to Kurrachee lies between them, and Keertar more to the W.
I. KEERTAR.	Parallel with the Juttee, more to the W., between 25° 50', 26° 40', and about 67° 40'.	Average height, probably below 2,000 ft.	Imperfectly explored.
III. LUKKEE.	Length, about 50 m. From Juttee, S.E. towards Hydrabad. Centre of range, 26°, 67° 30'.	Highest part, 1,500 to 2,000 ft. Between Lukkee and Sehwan, the mountains have a nearly perpendicular face, towards the Indus, above 600 ft. high.	They are of recent formation, containing a vast profusion of marine exuvia. Huge fissures traverse this range, and hot springs and sulphureous exhalations are of frequent occurrence.
HALA, Brahooick, or Bolan Range.	Length, about 400 m. From Tukato to Arabian Gulf, forming the E. wall of Beloochistan table-land.	Average height, 5,000 to 6,000 ft. Kurkiekee Mountains, that part which borders on the Bolan Pass, from 29° 20' to 30° 10', 67° to 67° 30', where the crest of Bolan Pass intersects them, 5,793 ft.	The range is crossed by the Bolan Pass, through which the route lies from Shikarpoor to Kandahar and Ghuznee, which though very important in a military point of view, is inferior in commercial interest to the Goolaree farther N.
STULMAN RANGE.	Length, about 350 m. From 33° 40', they run nearly S. in the 70th merid. of lon., to the mountains about Hurund and Kahun, in lat. 29°.	Highest elevation, Takht-i-Suliman, called also Khalissa-Ghar, lat. 31° 35'; 11,000 ft.	E. face dips rather steeply to the Indus, but the W. declivity much more gradual, to the table-land of Sewestan. Sides of mountains clothed nearly to the summits with dense forests; valleys overgrown with a variety of indigenous trees, shrubs, and flowers.
KALA, or Salt Range.	Stretch from the E. base of Sulman Mountains to Jhelum River, N.E. to S.W., in lon. 32° 30' to 33° 30'.	Highest elevation, 2,500 ft.	Vegetation scanty, and the bold and bare precipices present a forbidding aspect. About 32° 50', 71° 40', the Indus makes its way down a narrow rocky channel, 350 yards broad; and the mountains have an abrupt descent to the river.
SEWALIK RANGE.	Length, 155 m., greatest breadth, 10 m. From Hurund to Roopur, S.E. to N.W.	From 3,000 to 3,500 ft.; highest part, 30° 17', 77° 50', between the Timli and Lal Derwaza Passes.	In many places each hill might be represented by a right-angled triangle, the base resting on the pass, perpendicular facing towards the plains; hypotenuse sloping towards the Dhoona, in the opposite direction.
Nepaul Mountains, AND TABLE-LAND.	500 m., breadth from 90 to 150 m. From Kumaon to Sikhim.	Diversified by several inhabited valleys, from 3,000 to 6,000 ft. above the plains of Bengal. The hills rise towards the culminating ridge of the Himalayas. Katmandoo, 4,628 ft. above sea, in a valley surrounded by stupendous mountains.†† Bynature, 29° 35', 79° 20'; 5,615 ft.	Hills consist of limestone, hornstone, and conglomerate. Notwithstanding its low latitude, Nepal, from its elevation, enjoys a climate resembling that of S. Europe. Snow lies on the mountain-chain which surrounds the capital, in winter, and occasionally falls in the valley. The whole is well-watered.

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Name.	Extent and Position of Extremities.	Elevation above the Sea.	Remarks.
ABRAVILLI RANGE . . .	Length, 200 m.; average breadth, 10 to 15 m. Extend from 22° 40' to 26° 50', and from lon. 74° to 75°.	Average 3,000 ft. Highest elevation, Mt. Aboo, 5,000 ft. Crest of Koulmar Pass, 3,353 ft. Twelve m. from Beawar; country one mass of hills, intersected by small vales.	Forms the western buttress of the plateau of Central India. The mountains at Pokur are of a rose-coloured quartz, displaying bold pinnacles and abrupt rocky sides. The geological formation of Mt. Aboo is granitic.
KATTIWAR MOUNTAINS . . .	The peninsula lies between 20° 42', 23° 10', 69° 5', 72° 14'; area 19,850 sq. m.	The Gir, a succession of ridges and hills, some 1,000 ft.; elevation diminishing towards N. Girnar, a granitic peak, 3,500 ft. Palithana Mt., 1,500 ft. Group near Poorbunder, 2,000 ft. Low ridge running from Chokela to Gir, 400 ft. The centre of peninsula is the highest, and here all the rivers take their rise.	Caverns, deep ravines, and other fastnesses, very numerous in the Gir. The base of Girnar Mt. is clothed with jungle, diversified with black rocks, which appear through the vegetation. After this, the mount rises an immense bare and isolated granite rock, the face being quite black, with white streaks; and the N. and S. sides nearly perpendicular scarps.
VINDHYA CHAIN	From Guzerat on the W. to the basin of the Ganges on the E.; and comprised between the 22nd and 25th parallels of latitude.	Avg. height 1,500 to 2,000 ft. Chumpaneer, 22° 31', 73° 41'; 2,500 ft. Crest of Jam Ghaut, 2,300 ft. Mountain in Bhopal, 2,500 ft. Mahadeo Mountains, between 21° 30' 22° 40', 78° 80'; Doulaghore, said to be the highest; Ambarph, estimated at 2,500 ft. Chindward, 2,100 ft.; and Patchmar, vaguely stated to be 5,000 ft.; but this is probably an exaggeration; Dargur, stated to be 4,800 ft.; Puta Sumbha, and Choura Doo, the highest, conjectured at 5,000 ft. Amarkantak, a Jungly table-land, hill, 21° 45' 80' 25'; 2,300 ft.; another of the same hills, in 21° 40' 80' 35'; 2,400 ft. None more than 2,000 ft. Average between the Tara and Kutra passes, about 520 ft. The Tara falls over the brow by a cascade of 200 ft.; Bliohi, 393 ft.; and Bouti, 400 ft.	The chain forms the southern buttress of the plateau of Malwa, Bhopal, &c. In the Sangor and Nerbudda territories, its crest is but the brow of this table-land; but in the western part, it rises a few hundred feet above the high land on its northern side. The passes that have been made over this range, are, for the most part, bad. The geological formations are the granitic and the sandstone, overlaid by trap rock.
BUNDMLCUND RANGES, THREE. VIZ.— I. BINDYACHAL	Commence near Soudah, lat. 28° 14', lon. 78° 50', proceeds S.W. to Naras, 25° 30' 17' 52'; S.E. to 24° 12'; N.E. to Ajgarh, 24° 53' 80' 20'; and Kalleenjuri, in the same vicinity, and E. to Barghar, 23° 10' 81' 36'. Rises S. of the Bindyachal plateau.	Average elevation between Kutra Pass and Lohargoon, 1,050 ft. Elevation between Lohargoon and the foot of the hills near Patteriya, about 1,200 ft.	The lower parts are primary, overlaid by sandstone, in many places trap, or other formations of volcanic origin. The plateau, which surmounts the range, is from 10 to 12 m. wide.
II. PANNA	Separated from the Panna range by the valley of Lohargoon, rising from a platform from 10 to 20 m. wide. Rise about 20 m. S. of the Ganges; stretch S. and S.W. to the Vindhya range and the highlands of the Deccan. They terminate at the pass of Sikrigali.	Average elevation, 1,700; on some of its undulations, amounting to 2,000 ft.	Summit an undulating platform, about ten miles wide. Where deep ravines allow examination, an enormously thick bed of sandstone is found with primary rock superincumbent, itself overlaid by volcanic rocks.
III. BANDAIR		Of moderate elevation. Cluster on the W. of the Phalgu, one on the E. of that river, a third near Shukpoora; 700 ft. Hills towards the S. probably that elevation. Railway sweeps round the eastern extremity of the range.	Generally of sandstone, intermixed with ferruginous gravel. The basin of Lohargoon is of lias limestone. The outer limit of this hilly tract is marked by abrupt isolated hills.
RAJMAHAL HILLS			In the E. the rock is of trap; in one place there is a conical hill, having at the top a cavity resembling the crater of an extinct volcano. A neighbouring hill sends forth smoke, luminous at night. In the W. and S.W. the rock is of quartz, or coarse jasper and flint, containing ore of iron and lead.
SIBGOOJAH MOUNTAINS	Length, 90 m.; breadth, 85 m. Lie between 22° 34', 23° 54', 82° 40', 84° 8'.	Rugged and mountainous, from 500 to 600 ft. above adjoining table-land of Chota Nagpore.	Drained by the rivers Kunber and Rbern, with its feeder the Mohan, flowing in a direction generally northerly. These rivers are mostly shallow, except during the rains, when they become rapid torrents.

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PACHET HILLS	Length, 105 m.; breadth, 95 m. Lie between 22° 56', 23° 54', 35° 46', 87° 10'.	Imperfectly known. N. part described as marked by hills from 400 to 600 ft. About 23° 35', 85° 50', a mountain conjectured at from 2,500 to 3,000 ft. Near the centre of dist. some hills about 900 ft.	Formation generally primitive, of either granite, gneiss, or schist. Coal has been found near Jeria, 23° 44', 86° 25'; and iron-ore exists at a short distance. The chain unites the N. extremities of the W. and E. Ghats, and forms the base of the triangle on which rests the table-land of S. India. By the Moghils the country to the N. was called Hindoostan, and that to the S. the Deccan.
SATPOORA MOUNTAINS	Divides the Nerbudda from the Taptee valleys, extending from 21° and 22° and 73° 40', to 78°, when it becomes confounded with the Vindhya.	Avg. elevation, supposed, 2,500 ft. Asseerghur hill-fort, 1,200 ft. They form the northern base of the Deccan table-land.	S. declivity towards Taptee abrupt; N. towards Nerbudda, gentle. They rise into peaks, or swell into forms denoting a primitive origin. They are volcanic.
WESTERN GHATS, called by the natives Syadree in its N. part; and Nubhet in its S. part.—MALABAR COAST.	Length, about 800 m. From about 21° 15', to 73° 45', 74° 40', where they terminate almost precipitously, forming the N. side of the Gap of Palgatcheri.	Avg. height, 4,000 ft. About 21°; 2,000 ft. Mahabulish-wur 18°; 73° 40'; 4,700 ft. Poorundher, 4,472 ft. Singhur, 4,162 ft. Hurrechundhur, 3,894 ft. About 15°; 1,000 ft. Vardis Coorg; Bonissun Hill, 7,000 ft. Tandianmole, 5,751 ft. Papagiri, 5,682 ft.	Seaward face though abrupt, not precipitous, but consists of a series of terraces or steps. Chasms or breaks in the range, give access to the highlands, and are denominated <i>ghats</i> or passes, a name which has become generally applied to the range itself. The core is primary, inclosed by alternating strata of more recent origin. Scenery delightful and grand, displaying stupendous scarps, fearful chasms, numerous waterfalls, dense forests, and perennial verdure.
NEILGHERRY GROUP	Length, about 50 m.; breadth, about 20 m.; area from 600 to 700 sq. m. Between 11° 10' and 11° 35', and 76° 30' and 77° 10'.	Elevation from 5,000 to 8,000 ft. Dodabetta, 8,760 ft. Kudlakad, 8,502 ft. Kundah, 8,353 ft. Duvurababeta, 8,380 ft. Beroyabeta, 8,488 ft. Murkurti, 8,402 ft. Ootacamund, lat. 10° 50'; 7,361 ft. General surface, an undulating table-land.	The foundation rocks are primary. Principal mineral,—iron-ore. Neither calcareous nor stratified rocks, nor organic remains are found. So steep are the precipices, that in many parts a stone dropped from the edge, will fall several thousand feet without striking anything. Neighbour-ries from "neil," blue, and "gherries," hills; blue hills, The W. brow N., with little exception, abrupt; on the E. side the declivity is gradual. Such a conformation would seem to indicate a volcanic disturbance along the W. precipitous face.
PALGHAT GHATS	Length, about 200 m. From the Gap of Palgatcheri nearly to C. Comorin.	Elevation from 4,000 to 7,000 ft. A spacious table-land, 4,740 ft. A peaked summit, 6,000 ft. Another, 7,000 ft. Vurgherry ms., 5,000 to 6,000 ft. Near C. Comorin, in the extreme S., 2,000 ft. Several, not measured.	Graite constitutes the basis of the range; and clay, horn-blende, limy and primitive slate, or crystalline limestone, forms the sides of the mountains; and the level country, as far N. as the Pennar, appears to consist of the debris, when the laterite formation covers a large surface. From the Kistmah, northward, the granite is often penetrated by trap and greenstone. To Vizagapatam and Ganjam schist and gneiss predominate, occasionally covered by laterite.
EASTERN GHATS, along COROMANDEL COAST	Length, about 1,000 m. From Balasore, S. V. to Ganjam; hence to Naggeri, near Madras; where it joins the range which crosses the country in a north-easterly direction, from the W. Ghats, N. of the Gap of Palgatcheri.	Average elevation, about 1,500 ft. Cauvery Chain, 4,000 ft. Contadipilly, 1,700 ft. W. of Madras, estimated, 3,000 ft. Hills seen from the Moghalbundli, between Pt. Palayras and Chilkla Lake, appearing in irregular scattered groups, 300 to 1,200 ft.	The country is a wild unexplored tract. The measures adopted by the British government to restrain the outrages committed by the Nagas within British territory, have led to their submission.
ASSAM MOUNTAINS, VIZ.—I. NAGA HILLS	Length, about 250 m. On the S.E. border of Assam, stretches to the mountain-range forming the N.W. boundary of Burmah. Centre, about 26° 30', lon. 95°.	In th. Khaibund range, supposed 4,000 ft. Some peaks are almost inaccessible.	The face of Assam presents an immense plain, studded with clumps of hills, rising abruptly from the general level. The mountains on the N. are composed generally of primitive rocks. Those to the S. of tertiary and metamorphic.
II. DUTRALA AND ABOR HILLS.	Mountains N. of Assam, inhabited by Bhooteans, Dupas, and Abor tribes.	From 5,000 to 6,000 ft. above the surrounding level.	Character of country, wild. The rock formation is supposed to be chiefly of gneiss, or stratified granite.
III. GARROW HILLS	On the N.E. frontier of Bengal	A confused assemblage, from 1,000 to 6,000 ft. Estimated }	
IV. COSSYAR HILLS	Estimated area, 7,230 sq. m. Between 25° & 29°, and 91° & 92°.	Chirra Poonjer, 4,100 ft.	

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Name.	Extent and Position of Extremities.	Elevation above the Sea.	Remarks.
V. JYNTSAH HILLS . . .	80 m. in length from N. to S. and 40 in breadth. Extends from lat. 24° 55' to 26° 7', and from lon. 91° 35' to 92° 48'.	About 16 m. on the Sihet side, and about the same on that of Assam, consists of low land interspersed with small hills. In the interior, about 50 m. in extent, is an undulating hilly table-land, from 1,500 to 2,500 feet high.	Coal is said to abound in the hills of Jynteah.
YOMADOUNG, or Arracan Mountains.	Length, about 600 m. From N. to S. lat. 22° 20' to C. Negrais, lat. 16°.	Average height, 3,000 to 5,000 ft. Blue Mountain, 22° 37', 93° 11'; 8,000 ft. Pyramid Hill, 3,000 ft. Crest of Aeng Pass, 4,517 ft. Pass from Fotangmew to Remre, 4,000 ft. From Blue Mountain there is a gradual slope to C. Negrais, where it is only about 300 ft. From Promie to Ava, characterised by unevenness and general elevation. Northerly, it is decidedly mountainous. Mountains 4 m. N. of Ava, 4,000 ft. Zygait Mts., forming a kind of elevated doab between the Saluen and Sit-tang rivers.	It is a continuation of the great mountain chain commencing at the S. of Assam, in 26° 30'; and extends S., running parallel with the river Irrawaddy, and forms a natural barrier between Arracan and Ava. Gold, silver, iron, tin, lead, antimony, and other metals, are met with. Quarries of marble are worked near Ummerna-poor. Coal has been discovered on the Irrawaddy.
BURMAH MOUNTAINS . . .	Little known.		
TENASSERIM MOUNTAINS . .	Length, about 500 m., breadth nowhere exceeds 80 m. Area, 30,000 sq. m.	Siamee Mts., running N. to S. along Tenasserim provinces, 3,000 to 5,000 ft. Mountains in Ye province, three parallel ridges, from 3,000 to 4,500 ft., gradually diminishing towards the coast, about 500 ft. Buffalo Mts., about 70 m. from Moulmein, 1,543 ft.	Coal of excellent quality has been discovered. Iron, tin, and gold are frequently met with.

* The two sections of the Himalaya furnish points of resemblance, in presenting almost insurmountable obstacles to communication between the countries which they divide, thereby separating the Bots or people of Tibet from the Hindoo family of India. Major Cunningham considers the distinction of climate not less positively marked, both ranges forming the lines of demarcation between the cold and dry climate of Tibet, with its dearth of trees, and the warm and humid climate of India, with its luxuriance of vegetable productions. Some analogy, moreover, may be traced between the drainage systems of the two sections; the one separating the waters of the Sanpoo from those of the Gauges and its affluents; and the other intervening between the Indus, flowing at its northern base, and the subsequent tributaries of that river rising on its southern slope.

+ Any view of the Himalaya, especially at a sufficient distance for the snowy peaks to be seen overtopping the outer ridges, is very rare, from the constant deposition of vapours over the forest-clad ranges during a greater part of the year, and the haziness of the dry atmosphere of the plains in the winter months. At the end of the rains, when the south-east monsoon has ceased to blow with constancy, views are obtained, sometimes from a distance of nearly 200 miles.

† It has often been observed, the Koh Koh, or mountain of Kosh, offers a plausible etymology for the Caucasus of the classical writers. It is supposed by Ritter and Willford to be that mentioned by Pliny, under the name of *Graucacas*, but slightly deviating from the Sanscrit *Grawakass* (shining rock).

‡ Remarkable for its mass and elevation. Viewed from the Koushan Pass, distant ten miles south, its appearance is very sublime. The outline is serrated, it being crowned by a succession of lofty peaks, with sides often perpendicular, and it is wrapped in a perpetual covering of snow, in all parts not too steep to admit its lying.

¶ All the series appear to diverge from the apex of the plain, expanding "like the sticks of a fan."

¶ Humboldt regards it as the "most striking phenomenon amongst all the mountain-ranges of the old world." He considers that it may be traced from Taurus, in Asia Minor, across Persia, then, in the Huzarch mountains, to Hindoo-Kosh, and to the frontier of China, and that it is distinct from the Himalaya. The two ranges are physically discriminated by the depression down which the Indus flows, which, with its numerous irregularities, it is not easy to believe could have been hollowed out by the water's force even of that great river.

** "The elevated expanse of Pamoor," to the north of Hindoo-Kosh, observes Humboldt, "is not only a radiating point in the hydrographical system of Central Asia, but is the focus from which originate its principal mountain chains, being common to India, China, and Turkestan; and from it, as from a central point, their several streams diverge," which pass between Suifed-Koh and Hindoo-Kosh. It is divided into a series of plains by narrow ranges (Khyber, Kurkuch, &c.), which has to make its way by narrow passages.

†† Valley of Cotmandoo, nearly of oval shape: length, N. to S., 12 m.; E. to W. about 10 m. Bounded on the N. and S. by stupendous mountains. To the E. and W. by others less lofty, the western end defined principally by a steep ridge, called Nuga-Arjoon, which passes close behind Sumbloo-Nath, and is backed by a more considerable one named Dhoanook. To the eastward, the most remarkable hills are those of Ranichouk and Mahabut, but they do not reach the elevation of Palchouk (the highest on the south), or of Shoyouk, which is by far the highest mountain. The bottom of the valley is uneven, intersected by deep ravines, and dotted throughout with little hills.

‡‡ The number of peaks which crown this mountain is variously stated. According to Tod, there are six, the most elevated of which is that of Gorucknath, having on its summit an ash or only summit is the ancient place of Khyber, and numerous Jain temples.

¶¶ Ascent from Indore (1,938 feet), gradual; descent, to the Nerubudda, steep and abrupt.

MOUNTAIN PASSES ON INDIAN FRONTIERS.

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Mountain Passes on the Indian Frontiers, from the Indus to the Irawaddy—so far as known.

Name and Position.	Lat. and Lon. of Extremities; Length and Breadth.	Heights, in Feet.	Remarks.
MOOLA or GUNDAYA—CUTCH GUNDAYA.	Lat. 28° 10', lon. 66° 12'; lat. 28° 24', lon. 67° 27'—About 100 m. Open spaces, connected by defiles.	Bapow, 5,250 ft.; Peete Bheut, 4,600; Nurd, 2,550; Bent-i-Jah, 1,850; Kullur, 750 ft.	Descent, 4,650 ft., average 46 ft. per m. Water abundant. Practicable for artillery.*
BOLAN—BELOCHISTAN . . .	Lat. 29° 30', lon. 65° 40'; lat. 29° 52', lon. 67° 4'—55 m.; $\frac{1}{2}$ m. wide at entrance.	Entrance, 800 ft.; Ab-i-geom, 2,540; crest, 5,795 ft.	Average ascent, 90 ft. per m.† Ditto.
GOMUL or GOOLAIR—DE-RAJAT.	Lat. 32°, lon. 70° 30'—About 100 m.	20 m. from entrance road N.W., then 80 m. S.W., then N.W. to Ghuznee.	Winding course.‡
KHYBER—PESHAWUR . . .	Lat. 33° 55', lon. 71° 30'—About 53 m.	Crest, 3,373 ft. Ali Musjid, 2,433 ft.	Rises gradually from the E., but has a steep declivity westward§
BAHIAN—AFGHANISTAN . . .	Lat. 34° 50', lon. 67° 45'—About 1 m. wide, bounded by nearly perpendicular steep.	Bamian, 8,496 ft., over a succession of ridges from 8,000 to 15,000 ft.	Only known route over Hindoo-Koosh for artillery or wheeled carriages.
KOTSCHAN—HINDOO-KOOSH	Lat. 35° 37', lon. 68° 55'—over principal shoulder of Hindoo-Koosh, peak—About 40 m.; narrow.	Crest, 15,000 ft.	Road rocky and uneven; descent, 200 ft. per m. Three entrances.¶
KHAWAK—HINDOO-KOOSH	Lat. 35° 38', lon. 70° —About 15 m.	Crest, 13,200 ft.	Ascent on N. side, an uniformly inclined plane.**
BUL TUL or SUCR-JI-LA—CASHMERE.	Lat. 34° 10', lon. 75° 15'	Crest, 10,500 ft.	
HARANUTA—CASHMERE	Lat. 34° 10', lon. 74° 30'		
BARA LACHA—TIBET . . .	Lat. 32° 44', lon. 77° 51'		Only pass into Cashmere practicable for an army.
ROTANG—HIMALAYA . . .	Lat. 32° 53', lon. 77° 12'		
MANERING—HIMALAYA . . .	Lat. 31° 35', lon. 75° 24'		
CHARUNG—HIMALAYA . . .	Lat. 31° 24', lon. 78° 35'		
BURENDA—HIMALAYA . . .	Lat. 31° 25', lon. 78° 12'—Length of crest, 50 paces	Crest, 18,612; source of Darbung, 15,000 ft.	Very difficult.
BULCHA—KUMAON . . .	Lat. 30° 28', lon. 80° 14'	Crest, 17,948 ft.	Extremely difficult.
NUTI—KUMAON . . .	Lat. 30° 57', lon. 79° 51'	Crest, 13,059 ft.	Most elevated part a narrow glen, very steep.††
KABACHEN—NEPAUL . . .	Lat. 27° 38', lon. 83°	Crest, 16,814; village of Niti, 11,464 ft.	Over a high ridge extending E. and W.
CHOONFERA—NEPAUL . . .	Lat. 27° 33', lon. 83° 1'	Crest, 15,770 ft.	Open from the end of June to October.‡‡
WALLAKHOON—NEPAUL . . .	Lat. 27° 52', lon. 87° 14'	Crest, 16,000 ft.	Broad shelf of snow, bet: rocky eminences.§§
		Crest, 16,755 ft.	Temperature 24° 5 P.M.
			Path leading up the pass for eight miles, a narrow stony, and steep gorge. Top, a low saddle, between two ridges of rock.
TUNKRA—SIKIM . . .	Lat. 27° 38', lon. 88° 56'	Crest, 16,100 ft.	Ascent on N.W. side, gradual, over a snow-bed and glacier; descent, on S.E., steep, but grassy.
DONKIA—SIKIM . . .	Lat. 27° 56', lon. 88° 48'	Crest, 18,600 ft.	View of Tibet from summit.
ARNG—ARACAN . . .	Lat. 19° 49', lon. 94° 9'—34 miles.	Crest, 4,517; Khen-Kyomig, 3,777; Aeng, 147 ft.	Avg. rise, 290 ft., avg. descent, 472 ft. per m.¶¶
MYTHE—ARACAN . . .	Lat. 19° 14', lon. 94° 30'		Mythe village, a police-station.

* In 1839, the Anglo-Indian detachment marched through it. It is preferable to the Bolan Pass in a military point of view.
† A continuous succession of ravines and gorges. The air in the lower part of the pass is in summer oppressively hot and unhealthy.
‡ Called the Key of Afghanistan. At Ali-Musjid, merely the bed of a rivulet, with precipices rising on each side at an angle of 70°.
§ The great commercial route from Kabul to Turkestan; the several passes to the eastward are less frequented on account of their difficulty and their elevation.
|| Most frequented east of Bamian; impassable for wheeled carriages.
¶ Scarcely frequented, yet may be considered the most practicable.
** Passes over the Outer Himalaya range—Sugla, 31° 13' lat., 78° 29' lon.—elevation, 16,000 ft.; Kimlia, 31° 15', 78° 25', 17,000; Siga, 31° 16', 78° 20', 16,000; Marga, 31° 16', 78° 21', 16,000; Lumbia, 31° 16', 78° 20', 16,000; Hargu, 31° 16', 78° 19', 15,000; Nulgun, 31° 19', 78° 13', 14,891; Rupin, 31° 2', 78° 10', 15,480; Ghumli, 31° 21', 78° 8', 15,851; war there are fifteen passes, at elevations varying from 15,000 to 17,000 ft.

‡‡ Considered the best pass between Kumaon and Tibet, and is one of the principal channels of trade between Chinese Tartary and Hindoostan.
§§ Ascended by Dr. Hooker, December, 1848. The distance to which the voice was carried was very remarkable: he could hear distinctly every word spoken at from 300 to 400 yards off.
¶¶ Considerable trade carried on over this pass between Ara and Aracan.

172 RIVERS OF INDIA—SOURCE, COURSE, DISCHARGE, AND LENGTH.

Rivers of British India—their Source, Course, Discharge, and Length; Tributaries or Confluents; and estimated area, in sq. m., drained; Forty-nine Main Streams, having their outlet in the Sea; and large Tributaries, having their outlet in other Rivers.

Name.	Source, Course, Discharge, and Length.	Tributaries, and their Length in British Miles; and Area drained	Remarks.
1. GANGES.—BHAGERUTTEE at its source, and FODDA near the sea.	Gangotri, Himalaya, 1,400 ft. above the level of the sea. N.W. to Jubbiloi; W. and S.W. 13 m.; S.W. 36 m.; S. 15 m.; S.E. 39 m.; S. 8 m.; W. 21 m.; S.W. 15 m.; S. 130 m.; S.E. to Allahabad, E. 270 m.; E. to Sikrigaie; S.E. remainder of course into Bay of Bengal, by numerous mouths. The Ganges gives off some of its waters to form the Hooghly, and also anastomoses with the Megna.—Length, 1,514 m.	<p> Jumna, 860; Ghogra, 606; Gunduck, 450; Goontee, 482; Sone, 465; Coosy, 325; Ramgunga, 373; Mahananda, 240; Karumassa, 140; Koniae or Jamuna, 130; Aluknunda, 80; Billung, 50 m.—398,000 sq. m. drained, exclusive of Hooghly. </p> <p> Damoodah, 350; Dakisore, 170; Coosy, 240; Mor, 130.—About 49,000 sq. m. drained. </p>	<p> Navigable for river craft as far as Hurdwar, 1,100 m.; steamers ply as far as Gurmuk, 383 miles above Allahabad, distant from Calcutta via Delhi, 930 miles; at Cawnpore, 140 m. above Allahabad, the navigation is pleted with great activity. The breadth of the Ganges at Benares varies from 1,500 to 3,000 ft. Mean discharge of water there, throughout the year, 250,000 cub ft. per second. Formerly navigable for a line-of-battle ship to Chandernagore; now, vessels drawing more than 17 ft., not safe in passing from Calcutta to the sea, by reason of shoals. </p>
2. HOOGHLY	Formed by junction of Bhageeruttee and Teellinghee, two branches of Ganges. S. to Calcutta; S.W. to Diamond Harbour; E. and S.W. into the sea at Saugor roadstead, by an estuary 15 m. wide.—Length, 160 m., by winding of stream.		
3. INDUS, or NILAB ("blue river.")	Tibet, behind Kailas range, to the N. of Kailas peak, 22,000 ft. above the sea. N.W. to Dras R.; more northerly to Shy-yok; W.N.W. 115 m. to Makpon-i-Shagron; S.S.W. and S. to Attock; a little W. of S. to confluence with Punjind; S.W. to Khayrpoor; S. to Schwan; S.E. to Hyderabad; W. of S. to Arabian Sea, Indian Ocean.—Length, 1,800 m.	<p> Bekrun-Choo, 110; Hanle, 70; Zanskur, 150; Dras, 75; Shy-yok, 300; Shy-gbur, 70; Ghilgit; Cabool, 320; Sutlej, 830; Chenab, 765; Jhelum, 490; Ravee, 450; Punjind, 60 m.—About 390,000 sq. m. drained. </p>	<p> Navigable to Attock, 942 m. from sea, there from 500 to 800 ft. wide; depth, 60 ft. Breadth and depth varies much after junction with Punjind; breadth, 1 to 30 m.; depth, 12 to 186 ft. </p>
4. BRAHMAPOOTRA—MEGNA, near the sea.	N.E. extremity of Himalaya range; lat. 28° 30', lon. 97° 20'. S.W. 63 m.; W.—S.W.—S.E.—S.W., and E. to Bay of Bengal, through three mouths, Hatia, Ganges, and Shebarpoor.—Length, 933 m.	<p> Sanpo, 1,000; Dibong, 140; Noh-Dihong, Monas, 189; Bagnee, 150; Guddala, 160; Durlah, 148; Teesta, 313; Barak, 200; Goomtee, 140 m. In lat. 23° 10', lon. 89° 43', it gives off the Konise. — 305,000 sq. m. drained. </p> <p> Khyendwen, 470; Shwely, 180; Moo, 125 m.—164,000 sq. m. drained. </p>	<p> The branches of the Brahmapootra, together with those of the Ganges, intersect the territory of Bengal in such a variety of directions, as to form a complete system of inland navigation. </p>
6. ISAWADDY	E. extremity of Himalaya, lat. 28° 5', lon. 97° 58'. Nearly N. to S. through Burmah, and the recently acquired British territory of Pegu, into the Bay of Bengal, by numerous mouths.—Length, 1,060 m.	<p> Wein-Gunga, 439; Manjira, 330; Poorna, 160; Peira, 105; Inderaotee, 140 m.—130,000 sq. m. drained. </p>	<p> In 1846, the sanction of the Court of Directors of E. I. C. was given to the construction, at an expense of £57,500, of a dam of sufficient height to command the delta, and to supply the rich alluvial soil of which that tract is composed, with the means of constant irrigation. The experiment of navigating the Godavary by steam, has been entertained by the Madras government, and means for carrying it into effect are under consideration. </p>
6. GODAVERY	E. declivity of W. Ghauts, near Nasik, 3,000 ft. above the sea. S.E., 200 m.; E., 100 m.; S.E., 85 m.; 170 m.; S.E., 200 m.; into Bay of Bengal, by three mouths.—Length, 838 m.		

N.B.—Where no tributaries or area drained are mentioned, it is because, as regards the former, there are none of note; and the other is small, and imperfectly defined.

No.	Name.	Western side of India.		Remarks.
		Lat.	Long.	
7.	KISTNAH, or KRISHNA	18° 11' N.	73° 41' E.	Mahabulishwar table-land, Deccan, lat. 18° 11' N., lon. 73° 41' E., 4,500 ft. above the sea. S.E., 145 m.; N.E., 60 m.; S.W., 105 m.; N.E., 180 m.; S.E. to Chentapilly; S.E., 70 m. further; then, parting into two arms, one flowing S.E. 30 m., the other S.E. 25 m., into Bay of Bengal. —Length, 800 m.
8.	NEERUDDA	22° 39' N.	81° 49' E.	Amarkantak, a jungly table-land, lat. 22° 39' N., lon. 81° 49' E., to 3,500 ft. above the sea. Nearly due W., with occasional windings, to Gulf of Cambay, by a wide estuary.—Length, 801 m.
9.	LOONER	26° 37' N.	74° 46' E.	Arravulli Mts., near Pokur, lat. 26° 37' N., lon. 74° 46' E., nearly parallel with Arravulli range, into Runn of Cutch, by two mouths, principal in lat. 24° 42', lon. 71° 11'—Length, 320 m.
10.	BURNAS	27° 18' N.	71° 18' E.	In a cluster of summits in the Arravulli range, lat. 24° 42', lon. 73° 28' S.W., into Runn of Cutch, by several small channels.—Length, 150 m.
11.	BRADER	22° 10' N.	71° 18' E.	Kattywar, lat. 22° 10' N., lon. 71° 18' S.W., into Indian Ocean, near Poorbunder, lat. 21° 38', lon. 69° 46'—Length, 135 m.
12.	GOOL	21° 31' N.	70° 50' E.	Kattywar, lat. 21° 31' N., lon. 70° 50' E. Circuitous, but generally W., into backwater, behind Poorbunder.—Length, 75 m.
13.	AYER	22° 10' N.	76° 31' E.	Kattywar, lat. 22° 10' N., lon. 76° 31' N.W., into Gulf of Cutch.—Length, 60 m.
14.	SETBOONJEE	21° 15' N.	70° 25' E.	Kattywar, lat. 21° 15' N., lon. 70° 25' E., into Gulf of Cambay.—Length, 60 m.
15.	GYLA	23° 18' N.	71° 20' E.	Kattywar, lat. 23° 18' N., lon. 71° 20' E., into Gulf of Cambay.—Length, 60 m.
16.	GOOMA	21° 30' N.	71° 30' E.	Kattywar, lat. 21° 30' N., lon. 71° 30' E., into Gulf of Cambay.—Length, 88 m.
17.	TAPTEE	21° 46' N.	78° 21' E.	Saunpoora Mts., near Mooltas, lat. 21° 46' N., lon. 78° 21' E., into Indian Ocean.—Length, 441 m.
18.	MYTH, or MAE	22° 32' N.	75° 5' E.	Vindhya Mts., lat. 22° 32' N., lon. 75° 5' E., 1,850 ft. above the sea. N.W., 145 m.; W., 25 m.; S.W., 180 m., into Gulf of Cambay.—Length, 350 m.
19.	WASHIKTEE	17° 50' N.	73° 36' E.	W. Ghats, lat. 17° 50' N., lon. 73° 36' E.—S.W.—S.E.—W., into Indian Ocean.—Length, 55 m.
20.	SAVITREE	18° 17' N.	73° 27' E.	W. Ghats, lat. 18° 17' N., lon. 73° 27' E.—W., into Indian Ocean.—Length, 70 m.
21.	TAUNSA	19° 41' N.	73° 29' E.	W. Ghats, lat. 19° 41' N., lon. 73° 29' E.—S.W.—W.—S.W.—W., into Indian Ocean.—Length, 58 m.
22.	SOOBLA	19° 54' N.	73° 24' E.	W. Ghats, lat. 19° 54' N., lon. 73° 24' E.—W.—S., into Indian Ocean.—Length, 68 m.
23.	DAMGUNGA	20° 11' N.	73° 42' W.	W. Ghats, lat. 20° 11' N., lon. 73° 42' W.—N.—W.—N.W., into Indian Ocean.—Length, 58 m.
24.	PAE	20° 30' N.	73° 43' W.	W. Ghats, lat. 20° 30' N., lon. 73° 43' W., into Indian Ocean.—Length, 50 m.

474 RIVERS OF INDIA—SOURCE, COURSE, DISCHARGE, AND LENGTH.

Name.	Source, Course, Discharge, and Length.	Tributaries, and their Length in British Miles; and Area drained.	Remarks.
25. EEE	W. Ghauts, lat 20° 50', lon. 73° 42'. W. into Indian Ocean.—Length, 70 m.		Nothing worthy note.
26. POORNA	W. Ghauts, lat 20° 33', lon. 73° 44'. W. into the Indian Ocean.—Length, 60 m.		
27. GUGAVULI	Plain of Dharwar, lat. 13° 43', lon. 73° 10'. S.—S.W., into Indian Ocean.—Length, 100 m.		Navigated by the largest patimars for 20 m. From Mullapoor to Shedshegur, rendered easy by uniformity of channel.
28. CAULY NUDDEE	Plain of Dharwar, lat. 13° 33', lon. 74° 47'. S. 61 m.; W., 30 m., into Indian Ocean.—Length, 91 m.		Navigable for canoes as far as Palghat, 63 m. from the sea.
29. PONANY	Coimbatore, lat. 10° 19', lon. 77° 6'. N.W.—W., into Indian Ocean.—Length, 128 m.		The large aicuts upon it are Conoor, diverting a stream of same name, Paree Anai, & Chittanaik.
30. VYGAH	Madura, lat. 10° 17', lon. 77° 37'. S.E., into Bay of Bengal.—Length, 130 m.		
31. VELLAUR	Base of E. Ghauts, lat. 10° 28', lon. 78° 21'. E., into Gulf of Manar.—Length, 80 m.		
32. GOONDAH	Vellandhee hills, Madura. S.E., into Gulf of Manar.—Length, 95 m.		
33. CAUTERY	Coorg, lat 12° 25', lon. 75° 34'. N. 33 m.; N.E., 28 m.; S.E., 95 m.; N.E.—E.—S.E., 47 m.; S., 47 m.; S.E.—E.—N.E., into Bay of Bengal. Length, 472 m.		Navigable for craft through the low country during the inundation. Gungan Zooka fall, 370 ft. Burr Zooka, 460 ft.
34. VELLAUR	Base of E. Ghauts. E., into Bay of Bengal, near Porto Novo.		The river is small at its mouth, and admits only coasting craft.
35. PALAR	Mysoor table-land, lat. 13° 20', lon. 78° 2'. S.E., 55 m.; E., 87 m.; S.E., 48 m., into Bay of Bengal.—Length, about 220 m.	Pony, 40; Sheyaroo, 90 m.	The entrance of the Palar, near Sadras, is contracted by a bar or narrow ridge of sand, inside of which the river becomes of considerable width.
36. SOORNAMOOKY	Mysoor table-land, lat. 13° 23', lon. 79° 11'. N.E., to Bay of Bengal.—Length, 99 m.		
37. PENNAR—(N.)	Nundidroog table-land, lat. 13° 23', lon. 77° 43'. N.W., 30 m.; N., 95 m.; E., 230 m., into Bay of Bengal.—Length, 355 m.	Chittravutti, 107; Paupugnee, 130; Chittair, 75 m.	
38. PENNAR—(S.)	N. of Nundidroog table-land, lat. 13° 32', lon. 77° 45'. S. to Mootahalli, 55 m.; S.E., 190 m., into Bay of Bengal, a mile N. of Ft. St. David.—Length, 245 m. Lat. 15° 40', lon. 78° 49'. Very circuitous; E.—N.E.—S.E.—S.E., into Bay of Nizampatnam.—Length, 155 m.		Gold is found in its sands, in its passage through the Carnatic.
39. GUNDALACAMA	Table-land of Orissa, lat. 19° 39', lon. 83° 27'. S., into Bay of Bengal.—Length, 130 m.		
40. BONDSDORA	Table-land of Orissa, near source of Bondsora. S., into Bay of Bengal.—Length, 133 m.		
41. LAIGLAH	Native state of Nogarudda, lat. 20° 30', lon. 89° W. 30 m.; N.E., 110 m.; S.E., 300 m., to Bay of Bengal by numerous mouths.—Length, 520 m.	Hutsoo, 130; Aurag, 117; Tell, 130; Bang Nuddee, 60 m.—About 46,000 sq. m. drained.	From July to February, navigable for boats for 450 m.
42. MAHANUDDY	Palnaw table-land, lat. 23° 25', lon. 84° 13'. S.—E. S.E., into Bay of Bengal, near Pt. Palmyras.—Length, 410 m.		
43. BRAHMINY	Near Madraga, lat. 23° 29', lon. 84° 55'. N.—E.—S.—S.W.—S.E., into Bay of Bengal, by Dhumrah river.—Length, 345 m.	Sunk, 95 m.—About 26,000 sq. m. are drained by Brahminy and Byturnee.	Sacred in the Hindoo mythology, more especially at its source.
44. BYTURNER			

RIVERS OF INDIA—SOURCE, COURSE, DISCHARGE, AND LENGTH. 475

45. SOOBUNREKA (En. India)	Chota Nagpur table-land. N.E.—E.—S.E.—S.—S.E. 98° 57'. S. into Bay of Bengal.—Length, 280 m. Near Blue Mountain, Youmadoung range, lat. 22° 27', lon. 92° 51'. S. into Combermere Bay.—Length, 160 m.	Karow, 80 m.—About 12,000 sq. m. drained. Myoo; Lemyo.	<p> Navigable within a few miles of Arracan town, for ships of 250 tons burden. 90 m. above Akyab, the stream is narrow, and navigable only for canoes. 10 m. broad at its mouth. It is a navigable river. For about 190 m. forms the boundary between the Tenasserim provinces and Pegu. </p> <p> It enters the British dominions about lat. 13° 40'. </p>
46. ABRACAN, or COLA-DYNE	Burmah, lat. 21° 40' lon. 96° 50'. S. into Gulf of Martaban.—Length, 420 m.	Yennan, 115; Saar, 120 m.	<p> Upper part of course through a wild and uncultivated tract, sometimes between high and perpendicular banks. It afterwards opens on extensive plains. On many parts of its banks exist forests of fine teak, and the valuable sapan wood. </p> <p> In consequence of its bed being obstructed by shoals and rocks, navigation is not practicable for craft above Dabhi except by means of the canal. Its banks are lofty and precipitous, and ridges of rock in many places advance into the stream, combining with its general shallowness and strong current to render navigation extremely difficult and dangerous. </p> <p> Butler describes it as navigable for the largest class of boats in all seasons. </p>
47. SITTING	N. of Yunnan provinces, China; about lat. 27° 10' lon. 98° 57'. S. into Gulf of Martaban, by two mouths, formed by Pelawgewen Island.—Length, 430 m. Supposed to lie in the mountains to the N.E. of Tavoy. Between the 14th and 15th parallel of latitude. S. to Metamio, lat. 14° 13'; S.E. and S. to Tenasserim town; N.W. into Bay of Bengal, by two mouths.—Length, 270 m.	Attaran or Weingo, 110; Thong-yin Myit, 225; Meloun, 90 m.	<p> Tonse or Supin, about 100; Hindan, about 160; Hansoutee, 90; Banganga, 220; Chumbul, 570; Sunde, 260; Betwa, 360; Cong, 230; Baghin Nuddlee, 90; Seyagur, 210; Urrund Nuddlee, 245 m.—About 105,000 sq. m. drained </p>
48. SALTEN, or SALWEEN	Junnoutri, Himalaya, lat. 31° lon. 78° 32'; 10,849 ft. above the sea. S.W.—S.E., to Gangas, at Allahabad.—Length, 860 m.	Baing-Khauang; Little Tenasserim; Kamaun Khauang.	<p> Rantees, 134; Kurnalli, 225; Bhytree, 70; Dhauli, 45; Goringunga, 60 m.—About 49,000 sq. m. drained. </p>
49. TENASSERIM	N. of Kumaon, lat. 30° 25', lon. 80° 40', probably between 17,000 and 18,000 ft. S.E., 33 m.; S.W., 70 m.; S.E., 12 m.; S., 30 m.; S., 23 m. further; S.E., to Gangas, near Chupra.—Length, 696 m.	<p> In the rainy season, boats of 1,000 or 1,200 maunds (40 tons) burthen, are sometimes seen proceeding to Lucknow. </p>
JUMNA, tributary to GANGES	In a small lake or morass 19 E. of the town of Pil-labheet. Lat. 28° 35' lon. 80° 10'; 520 ft. above the sea. S.—S.E., into Gangas, 30 m. Below Benares.—Length, 482 m.	<p> The navigation of the river is not considered available for purposes of important utility higher than Daudnagar, 60 m. from the confluence with the Gangas. </p> <p> Though navigable continuously through its whole course downwards from Bhelaunji, there are in the part of its channel nearer that place many rapids and passes, where, the course being obstructed by rocks, navigation becomes difficult and dangerous. </p> <p> It does not appear to be used for navigation, which is probably incompatible with the average declivity of its bed (2 ft. 5 in. per m.), and still more so with the general rugged and rocky character of its channel. Its average volume of water is so considerable, that on its junction it has been known to raise the united stream 7 or 8 ft. in 12 hours. </p>
GHOGRA, tributary to GANGES	Amarkantak table-land, lat. 22° 41' lon. 82° 7'; from 3,400 to 5,000 ft. above the sea. N.; 30 m.; N.W., 80 m.; N., 40 m.; N.E., 123 m.; E., 47 m.; N.E., into the Gangas, 10 m. above Dinapoor.—Length, 465 m.	Koel, 140; Kunher, 130; Fohila, 100 m.—Including the Phalgu and other rivers falling into the Gangas above Rajmahal, about 42,000 sq. m. drained.	<p> Trisula-gunga, 100; Marachangdi, 100; Naling, 110 m.—About 40,000 sq. m. drained. </p>
GOOMTEE, tributary to GANGES	Near Dinwagher peak, Himalaya. S.—S.E.—S.W.—S.E., into Gangas, near Fatma.—Length, 407 m.	<p> Chumbela, 70; Seepra, 120; Parbutty, 220; Kallee Sind, 225; Banas, 320; Chota Kallee Sind, 104 m.—About 56,000 sq. m. drained. </p>
SONE, tributary to GANGES	Melwa, lat. 22° 26' lon. 75° 45'; 8 or 9 m. S.W. from Mhow, which is 2,019 ft. above the sea. It rises in the cluster called Jnapava. N., 105 m.; N.W., 6 m.; S.E., 10 m.; N.E., 23 m.; N.W., 25 m.; N. to junction with Kallee Sind; N.E., 145 m.; S.E., 78 m., to Jumna.—Length, 670 m., described in a form nearly semicircular, the diameter being only 330 m.	<p> </p>
GUNDUCK, tributary to GANGES	<p> </p>
CAUMBUL, tributary to JUMNA	<p> </p>

Name.	Source, Course, Discharge, and Length	Tributaries, and their Length in British Miles; and Area drained.	Remarks.
RAWONGGA , tributary to GANGES.	Kumaon, lat. 30° 6', lon. 79° 20'; about 7,144 ft. above the sea. S.E. 20 m.; S.W. 70 m.; S. to Moradabad—S.E.—S. into Ganges.—Length, 373 m.	Kosse, 150; Gurra, 240 m.	Fordable at Moradabad, at 15 m. below confluence with Kosse; but not usually fordable below Jellalabad.
COOSY , tributary to GANGES.	Himalaya, Munim, lat. 28° 25', lon. 80° 11'. S.W.—S.E.—S.—S.E.—S. into Ganges.—Length, 325 m.	Arun, 310; Tambur, 95; Gogaree, 235; Dud Coosy, 50; Yiljuga, 40 m.—46,000 sq. m. dr.	Where narrowest, and when lowest, stream 1,200 ft. wide and 15 ft. deep. It is larger than the Jumna or the Ghogra.
MAHANANDA , tributary to GANGES.	Near Darjeeling, in the Sikkim hills, lat. 26° 57', lon. 88° 20'. S. 40 m.; S.W. 60 m.; S.E. 50 m.; S. 20 m.; In the Kymore range, lat. 24° 38', lon. 83° 11'. N.—N.W., into the Ganges, near Ghazeepeer.—Length, 140 m.		Navigable during the dry season for craft of 8 tons as far as Kibhengunge; for those of much larger burthen during the rains.
KARUMNASSA , tributary to GANGES.	Lat. 21°, lon. 80° 30'. N.W.—E.N.E.—N. into the Ganges, a few miles below Allahabad.—Length, 165 m. Lat. 30° 33', lon. 79° 38'. N.W.—S.W.—S.W.—S. into the Bhageeruttee, at Deorayag.—Length, 80 m. Lat. 30° 46', lon. 78° 53'. S.W., into the Bhageeruttee.—Length, 50 m.	Satni, Beher, Mahana, Belun, and Seodi.—Including small streams, 13,000 sq. m. drained. Doulee, 35; Vishnuganga, 25; Mundakni, 32; Pindur, 60 m.	At confluence with Bhageeruttee, 142 ft. broad; rises 45 ft. during the melting of the snow. Between 60 and 70 ft. wide in the beginning of May, 5 m. from its mouth.
TONS , tributary to GANGES.	Ranghur district, lat. 23° 55', lon. 84° 53'. E. and S.E. to Burdwan; S. to Diamond Harbour.—Length, 350 m.	Barrachur, 155 m.	Crossed by a ferry, 50 m. above its mouth. At Raneegunj, 135 m. from mouth, 500 yds. wide, fordable, with a rapid current about 1 ft. deep in December.
ALUKNUNDA , tributary to GANGES.	Ranghur district, lat. 23° 35', lon. 85° 58'. Circuitous, but generally S.E., into Hooghly.—Length, 240 m.	Comaree.	It is crossed at Ameenugur, 80 m. from source, & at Kailaghat, 40 m. from mouth, by fords during the dry season, and ferries during the rains.
BIHLENG , tributary to GANGES.	Pachete district, lat. 23° 30', lon. 85° 34'. S.E.—S.—S.E., into Hooghly at Diamond Harbour.—Length, 170 m.		Crossed at Bancora, 50 m. from source, and at Juhannabad, by means of fords.
DAKMOONAH , tributary to HOOGHLY.	Near Kara-korum Pass. S.E.—N.W., into Indus, near Isard.—Length, 300 m.	Chang-Chemmo, 58; Nubra, 66 m.	Not navigable along the N. base of Khyber Mts. except on rafts and hides. Navigable for boats of 40 or 50 tons to Doodunee.
COOSY , tributary to HOOGHLY.	Lat. 34° 15', lon. 68° 10'; near Sir-i-Chuma, in Afghanistan; elevation, 8,400 ft. Generally E., through the valley of Cabool, and plains of Jellalabad and Peshawar, into the Indus.—Length, about 320 m.	Panchshir, 120; Tagao, 80; Alichang, 120; Soorkh-Rood, 70; Kooner, 230; Suwat, 150 m.—About 52,000 sq. m. drained.	At Roopur, 30 ft. deep, and more than 500 yds. wide. Navigable as far as Floor in all seasons, for vessels of 10 or 12 tons burthen.
SHY-YOK , tributary to INDUS.	N. declivity of Bara-Lacha Pass, lat. 32° 47', lon. 77° 33'. N.W.—W.—N.W.—N.E.—N.W.—N.E., into the Indus, a few miles below Le.—Length, 150 m.	Trarap, 42; Zingchan-Tokpo, 22 m.	
CAROOI , tributary to INDUS.	Remote sources, Lakes Manasarovar and Ishwan Hrad, lat. 30° 8', lon. 81° 53'; 15,200 ft. above the sea. N.W., 180 m.; S.W., through Bussahir; W. to junction with Beas; S.W. to Punjind.—Length, 550 m., to junction with Beas; 300 m. farther to Punjind; total, 850 m.	Spiti, 120; Buspa, 52; Beas, 290 m.—About 29,000 sq. m., or, including Ghara and Beas, about 63,000 sq. m. drained.	
ZANSKAR , tributary to INDUS.	On S. verge of Rotang Pass, S. 80 m.; W. 50 m.; then a wide sweep to N.W. for 80 m.; S. 80 m., to Sutlej, at Endreesa.—Length, 290 m.	Parbati; Saiji, 38; Gomati, 55 m.; Ul; Gaj.—About 10,000 sq. m. drained.	
SUTLEJ , tributary to INDUS.	Near Bara-Lacha Pass, lat. 32° 48', lon. 77° 27'. N.W. to Murumurdwan; S.W. to confluence with Jhelum, thence S.W. to Ghara, or continuation of Sutlej.—Length, 605 m. to Jhelum, 765 m. to Ghara		Becomes navigable for timber-rafts at Aknur. Descends at the average rate of 40 ft. per m. for the first 200 m. Estimated elevation at Kishewar, 5,000 ft.
BEAS , tributary to SUTLEJ.			
CHENAB , tributary to INDUS.			

NUMBER OF MAIN RIVERS AND TRIBUTARY STREAMS—INDIA. 477

JHELUM, tributary to CHENAB.	The Lidur, in N.E. mountains of Cashmere, near Shesha Nag. Through valley of Cashmere, and into Punjab by Baramulla gorge; S. to Chenab confluence, in lat. 33° 10' lon. 75° 05'. Length, 409 m.	Lidur, 50; Vishnu, 44; Sindhu, 72; Lolab, 44; Kishenganga, 140; Kunhar, 100; Pirpanjal, 115 m.—About 280,000 sq. m. drained.	Navigable for 70 m. through Cashmere. Navigable from the Indus to the town of Ohind.
RAVET, tributary to CHENAB.	Lat. 32° 26', lon. 77° in the Pirpanjal or Mid-Himalaya range, to the W. of Rotang Pass. S.W. about 40 m. to Lahore; S.W. to junction with Chenab.—Length, 450 m.	Nye, 20; Sana, 36; Chakki, 50 m.—About 22,000 sq. m. drained.	Tortuous course: fordable in most places for eight months of the year.
SANPOO, tributary to BRAHMAPOOTRA.	N. face of Himalayas, lat. 30° 25', lon. 82° 5'. E., winding its way through Tibet, and washing the borders of the territory of Lassa. It then turns suddenly S., and falls into the Brahmapootra, under the name of Dihong. Length, about 100 m.	Sanki-Sanpoo, Niamtsion, Zsangtsion, Lalee Nuddie.	
TERST, tributary to BRAHMAPOOTRA.	About lat. 27° 59', lon. 88° 50'. S.—S.E., into Brahmapootra.—Length, 333 m.	Lachong, 23; Rungbo, 23; Rungcet, 23 m.	
BARAK, tributary to BRAHMAPOOTRA.	It is an offshoot from the Jere, which leaves in lat. 24° 43', lon. 92° 13'. W. through Cachar and Silhet; S.W., into Megna.—Length, 200 m.		Navigable for craft of 6 or 7 tons as far up as Puharpoor, 15 m. beyond the divergence of the Atree. Banks low and marshy along the valley of Cachar.
MONAS, tributary to BRAHMAPOOTRA.	Himalaya range, lat. 28° 20', lon. 91° 18'. S., 40 m.; S.W., 110 m.; S.W., into Brahmapootra.—Length, 189 m.	Deemree, of greater length than itself.	
KHYENDWEN, tributary to IRRAWADDY.	Burma, lat. 26° 28', lon. 96° 54'. Generally S., into Irrawaddy, near the town of Amyenmyo.—Length, 470 m.	Myitia Khyoung, 170 m.	
WEIN-GUNGA, or PRENHETA, tributary to GODAVERY.	Madiao Mountains, lat. 22° 25', lon. 79° 8'. E., 80 m.; S., 34 m.; S., 25 m.; S.W., 80 m.; S., 100 m.; into Godavery.—Length, 439 m.	Pench Nuddie, 150; Kanhan Nuddie, 130 m.—About 21,000 sq. m. drained, exclusive of Payne-Gunga and Wurda.	Elevation at Bundara, lat. 21° 12', 872 ft. above the sea.
WURDA, tributary to WEIN-GUNGA.	Satpootra Mountains, lat. 21° 44', lon. 78° 25'. Generally N.W. to S.E.—Length, about 250 m.	Payne-Gunga, 320 m.—About 8,000 sq. m. drained.	Fordable, except at the height of the rains; then navigable for 100 m. above its mouth.
PAYNE-GUNGA, tributary to WEIN-GUNGA.	Lat. 20° 32', lon. 75° 4', in Candeish. Very circuitous, but generally E., into Wurda.—Length, 320 m.	Araun, 105; Koony, 65 m.—About 8,000 sq. m. drained.	
MANJERA, tributary to GODAVERY.	Lat. 18° 44', lon. 75° 30'. S.E.—S.W., into Godavery.—Length, 330 m.	Thairya, 95; Narinja, 75; Munnada, 100 m.—About 11,000 sq. m. drained.	
BARMAN, tributary to KISTNAH.	Lat. 19° 5', lon. 75° 33', in the table-land of the district of Poona; 3,090 ft. above the sea. S.E., into Kistnah.—Length, 510 m.	Goor, 100; Neera, 120; Seena, 170; Tandoor, 85 m.—About 29,000 sq. m. drained.	
TOONGARUDRA, tributary to KISTNAH.	Lat. 14° lon. 75° 43', junction of Toonra and Budra rivers. N.—N.E., into Kistnah.—Length, 325 m.	China Hungry; Hundry, 225 m.; Wurda.—About 28,000 sq. m. drained	Rocky obstacles to navigation in upper part of course. Fine teak forests on banks.
POORNAB, tributary to TAPTEE.	Lat. 21° 35', lon. 77° 41'. S., 65 m.; W., 95 m.; into the Taptee.—Length, 160 m.		
GHANA, tributary to TAPTEE.	E. slope of W. Ghats, lat. 20° 37', lon. 73° 25'. E., 120 m.; N., 50 m.; into the Taptee.—Length, 160 m.		
BHOYANI, tributary to CAUVERY.	Among the Kundaah group, lat. 11° 15', lon. 78° 4'. E., into Cauvery.—Length, 120 m.		
NOYAL, tributary to CAUVERY.	E. slope of W. Ghats, lat. 10° 59', lon. 76° 44'. E., into Cauvery.—Length, 95 m.		
HURSOO, tributary to MAHANUDDI.	Lat. 23° 18', lon. 82° 32'. S., into Mahanuddy.—Length, 130 m.		
TELA, tributary to MAHANUDDI.	Lat. 19° 54', lon. 82° 41'. N.W., into Mahanuddy.—Length, 130 m.		

NOTE.—Of the above-named rivers, forty-nine main streams flow to the sea; the chief tributaries to these number 210, of which thirty flow for 200 m. and upwards; sixty-three have a course of 100 to 200 m.; and the remainder under 100 m.

478 RIVERS IN AFGHANISTAN, AND COUNTRIES ADJACENT—INDIA.

Rivers in Afghanistan, and in the Countries adjacent to India on the North-west—so far as known.

Name and Length.	Source, Course, and Discharge.	Tributaries or Confluents; and their Length in English Miles	Remarks.
HERAT-UD.—650 miles . . .	Pughman range, lat. 34° 40', lon. 68° 2'; at an elevation of 10,076 ft. above the sea. Westerly; south-westerly to Pullaluk; north-westerly; in the Hamoon marshy lake, and that of Duk-i-Teer, by numerous channels.	At 25 m. below Girishk receives the Urgundab, 250 m.; Turnak.	At Girishk, 350 m. from source; banks, about 1,000 yards apart; in spring, spreads beyond these limits—up to 10 or 12 ft.—with a rapid current. At Pullaluk it was crossed by Christie, who found it at the end of March, 400 yards wide, and very deep. In April the water (which is briny) is 7 or 8 yards wide, and 2 ft. deep. It is crossed on the route from Shawl to Kandahar.
LOBAN.—About 80 miles . .	Shawl table-land, lat. 39° 49', lon. 67° 20'. South-westerly, until lost in the sands of the desert of Khorasan.		
KOONDOR.—About 300 miles	Valley of Bamshan, about lat. 34° 52', lon. 67° 40'. Easterly; northerly; north-easterly; northerly; and north-westerly; into the Amoo or Jinoon River.		
HARI ROOD, or HORY.—About 600 miles.	Husareh Mountains, lat. 34° 50', lon. 66° 20'; 9,500 ft. above the sea. Generally westerly to Herat, where it turns north-westerly, forming a junction with the Moorgish; the united stream is ultimately lost in the desert of Khorasan.		
POORALLINE.—100 miles . .	Jhalawan province, about lat. 27° 23', lon. 65° 21'. Southerly, through Lus province into the Indian Ocean, in lat. 25° 23', lon. 65° 20'; near Soumeuse.		
GHUJNE.—About 60 miles .	Husareh Mountains, about lat. 33° 50', lon. 68° 20'. Generally southerly, as far as lat. 33°, afterwards south-westerly; into Lake Abisada, in lat. 32° 42', lon. 68° 3'.		
BOLAN.—About 70 miles . .	Sir-i-Bolan, Bolan Pass, lat. 29° 51', lon. 67° 8'; 4,494 ft. above sea. Remarkably arid, but generally south-easterly; forms a junction with the Nari River.		
MOOLA.—About 150 miles .	A few miles S. of Kelat, in Beloochistan. South-easterly, about 80 miles; north-easterly; and easterly; ultimately absorbed in the desert of Shikar-poor.		
URBUNDAR.—280 miles . .	Husareh Mountains, about lat. 33° lon. 67°. South-westerly to 25 m. past Kandahar; westerly remainder of course,—falls into the Helmand River.	Turnak	Where crossed 12 m. from Kandahar, it is, ordinarily, about 40 yards wide, from 2 to 3 ft. deep, and fordable; but in inundations, becomes much increased. Greater part of its water drawn off to fertilise the country. Its bed for a great distance forms the Goolaree Pass or great middle route from Hindoostan to Khorasan, by Dera Ismael Khan and Ghuznee: crosses the Suliman range lat. 32°.
GOZUL.—About 150 miles .	Afghanistan, about lat. 33° lon. 69° 6', at the foot of an offshoot from Sufied-Koh. S.; W.; and a little E. of S. to Goolkuts; thence E., N.E., and S.E., until absorbed by the sands of the Daman.	Zholbe, about 170 m.	

N.B.—The tributaries of these rivers, in the countries adjacent to India, are as yet very imperfectly known,—as indeed are also the origins and courses of the rivers themselves, or the countries through which they flow.

Liable to inundations; and as its bed, in some parts, occupies the whole breadth of the ravine, travellers are frequently overtaken by the torrent. Falls 3,751 ft. in 50 m., from source to Dadur. The Moola or Gundava Pass winds along its course.

TABLE-LANDS OF BRITISH INDIA—EXTENT AND HEIGHT. 479

Table-lands of British India—their Extent, Height, &c.

Name.	Locality.	Elevation, in Feet.	Remarks.
CENTRAL INDIA, including OODYPOOR, BHOPAL, MALWA, BHOPAL, BINDER, OOD, and SHARABAD.	Extends by the Aravalli, Dongurpoor, Vindhya, Bindachal, Panna, and Ban-dair ranges—78° to 84°; about 700 m. long; breadth, very various,—greatest from Amjhera to Ajmeer, 250 m.; from Mhow to Mokundura, 160 m.; at Saugor and Dumoh, 75 m.; afterwards very narrow.	Highest towards S. and W.: average of Oodypoore, 2,000 ft. Malwa, 1,500 to 2,000. Bhopal, 2,000. Bundelkund about 1,000. Shahbad, 700. Plain of Ajmeer, 2,000. Oodypoore town, 240 37; 73° 49'; 2,064 ft.—slope to N. E., Banas River flowing in that direction; gradual fall also to valley of Chumbul River, where it rises to Malwa; Mhow 2,019. Decan, 1,881. Dhar, 1,908. Indore, 1,988. Crest of Jaum (Jaum), 2,328. Ojeyan, 1,698. Adjy-gurh, 1,240. Amjhera, 1,890. Saugor, 1,940. The Chasagurh, 700. Sonar River, source, 1,900 ft. From the Vindhya range the surface has a generally gradual, but in some places abrupt, descent; as at Mokundura, and the Bindachal hills, where rivers occasionally fall over the brow in cascades. Shahbad district very rocky and uneven.	Tin and copper are found in Oodypoore. In Bhopal the prevailing geological formation appears to be trap over-lying sandstone. Minerals are few and unimportant. Water is very plentiful. The mineral resources of Bundelkund appear to be considerable.
	Supported as it were by a triangle formed by the Sauppoora or sub-Vindhya on the N., W. Ghauts on the W., and E. Ghauts on the E.; the Sauppoora range constituting the base. Length, from Sauppoora River to Salem, about 700 m.; breadth from Mahabulshwar to Sirgoo-jah, about 700 m. If Chota-Nagpoor be considered as part of this great table-land, it may be said to extend nearly 250 m. farther in a north-easterly direc-tion.	Highest parts, those nearest N. Ghauts, and in centre of Mysore. Mahabu-lshwar 189° 73° 45'; 4,700 ft. Source of Goda-very, 3,000. Poona, 2,623. Source of Manjira, 3,019 ft. Rivers rising in ravines between spurs of W. Ghauts, and their way through E. Ghauts across the Deccan, the slope being in that direction. Plains of Nagpoor, 1,000 ft.—slope to S. E.; drained by Vindhya range, which falls into Godavery. Hyderabad, 1,800 ft. Secunderabad, 17° 26' 33"; 1,807 ft. Beder, 17° 53' 77° 38'; 2,359 ft. From the Vindhya range the surface rises towards N. E., where Rypoor, 21° 12' 81° 40'; 1,747 ft. Source of Mahanuddy, 2,111; and Konkar, 20° 16' 81° 33'; 1,933 ft. V. undy-droog, highest in Mysore, 4,856 ft.; slope from hence on all sides—S. to Bangalore, 3,000; E. to plains of Carnatic—Chittoor, 1,100; N. Ghauts, 1,162; and those of Bellary, 1,600 ft. Colar, 139° 8'; 769 ft. Mysore town, 12° 18' 76° 42'; 2,450 ft. Seringapatam, 13° 25' 76° 45'; 2,412;—from hence, there is a gradual rise to Coorg, where Veragundpetta is 3,399, and Merikara, 4,506 ft. From Bangalore, descent to S. by rather abrupt steeples to plains of Salem, 1,400 and Channarayana, 1,483 ft. Bellary plains, 1,500 ft. 36', 2,500 ft. there is a gradual fall to the E. Bellary plains, 1,600 ft. Gooty plains, 1,182; Cuddah hill, 507 ft. E. part of Cuddapah dist., 450 ft. Sirgoo-jah, mountainous, rising to 700 ft. above level of Chota-Nagpoor; Mysnat table-land, about 330 m. S. E. from Sirgoo-jah town; area not ascer-tained—about 3,000 or 3,500 sq. m. Palamow dist., very mountainous—little known. Hazarebagh town, 24° 85' 24'; 1,730 ft. Slope of country to S., and even depressed towards Mahanuddy. Surbulpoor town, only 400 ft. Orissa table-land then rises on the other side of Mahanuddy, in some places to 1,700 ft., backed by the main chain of E. Ghauts. Amarkantak, jungle table-land, 22° 40' 81° 50'; 3,500 ft.	Hypogene schists, penetrated and broken up by prodigious outbursts of plutonic and trappean rocks, occupy by far the greater portion of the superficies of Southern India. The central part of the Deccan is com-posed of waving downs, which, at one time, present for miles a sheet of green harvests, but in the hot season, bear the appearance of a desert, without a tree or shrub to relieve its gloomy sameness. The seaward face of the table-land towards the W., though abrupt, is not precipitous, but consists of a succession of terraces or steps. On the Coromandel side the slope to the sea is gentle, exhibiting the alluvial deposits borne down from the higher portions of the table-land. The soil in the plains is generally fertile, producing abundant crops of wheat, barley, rice, pulse, excellent vegetables, cotton and sugar-cane. The uncultivated parts are overrun with a coarse grass. A great part of the region is quite unknown to us.
SOUTHERN INDIA, including DECCAN, MYSOOR, &c.	Between 22° 30' and 24° 30'; and easterly, from about 85° to 82°.	The surface generally consists of valleys varying from 4,000 to 5,000 ft. above Bengal plains. Khatmandoo (in an oval-shaped valley 12 m. long), 27° 42', 85° 18'; 4,628. Bhayatur, 29° 34'; 80° 30'; 5,615 ft. Slope to S. drained by Ghogra, Gunduck, and Coosy.	The geological formation of the hill tract—limestone, hornstone, and con-glomerate. Vegetable productions of most remarkable stateliness, beauty, and variety. Climate resembles that of southern Europe.
	At the foot of the Himalaya range, be-tween Himalaya and the Farai; 500 m. long; E. to W., 160 m. broad; area, 54,500 sq. m.		
SOUTH-WEST FRON-TIER OF BENGAL, including CHOTTA-NAGPOOR, SIRGOO-JAH, PALAMOW, RANGSHU HILL, HAZAREBAGH, MYNAPAT and AMARKANTAK.			
NIPAUZ			

Table-lands of Afghanistan and the Countries adjacent to India, on the North-west.

Name.	Locality.	Elevation, in Feet.	Remarks.
WESTERN AFGHAN- ISTAN.	From about Ghuznee or Sufted-Koh, to Amran Mountains, N. to S.; and from near Kandahar to the Suliman range.	Crest of highland of Ghuznee, lat 30° 43', lon. 68° 20'; 9,000 ft. Ghurnee, 67° 56'; 10,883. Youart or Oord, 31° 22', 68° 11'; 10,618. Goolitoot, 34° 31', 68° 5'; 10,500. Shibbertoo, 34° 50', 67° 20'; 10,500. Shah Sothah, 34° 34', 68° 8'; 10,488. Gurdan Dewar, 34° 25', 68° 8'; 10,076. Topcheh, 34° 40', 67° 50'; 9,839. Khawak Fort, 34° 38', 70° 5'; 9,300. Topcheh, 34° 45', 67° 44'; 9,085. Chargo, 35° 43', 68° 22'; 8,697. Bamian, 34° 50', 67° 45'; 8,496. Huftasaya, 33° 49', 68° 15'; 8,420. Sir-i-Chusma, 34° 21', 68° 20'; 8,400. Zohak's Fort, 34° 50', 67° 55'; 8,186. Killa Sher Mahomed, 34° 16', 68° 45'; 8,051. Kot-i-Asruf, 34° 28', 68° 35'; 7,749. Maidan, 34° 22', 68° 43'; 7,747. Urgundee, 34° 30', 68° 50'; 7,628. Khoord Kabool, 34° 21', 69° 18'; 7,466. Kabool, 34° 28', 69° 5'; 6,396. Boothauk, 34° 17', 69° 15'; 6,247. Jungduluk, 34° 25', 69° 46'; 5,374. Gundamuk, 34° 17', 70° 5'; 4,616. Crest of Khyber Pass, 34° 8', 71° 15'; 3,373. Ali-Musjid, 34° 3', 71° 22'; 2,433. Jellalabad, 34° 25', 70° 28'; 1,964 ft.	Afghanistan, for four-fifths of its extent, is a region of rocks and mountains, interspersed with valleys of great fertility, and in many places containing table-lands, cold, bleak, and barren. It has a surface as rugged as that of Switzerland, with summits of much greater height. General slope of country, from N.E. to S.W. Slope from W. to E.; Kabool River flowing in that direction: lofty mountains enclosing valley of Jellalabad on N. and S. sides. Course of river obstructed, and bed contracted by rugged rocks connecting them. City of Kabool surrounded by hills on three sides. Jellalabad, on a small plain.
NORTHERN AFGHAN- ISTAN.	Between Hindoo-Kooh on the N., and Sufted-Koh on the S.; and Huzareh country on the W., and Khyber hills on the E.	Khojok Pass, Amran Mts. 30° 45', 68° 30'; 7,449 ft. Pisheen, from 5,000 to 5,000. Shawl exceeds 5,000. Town of Shawl, 5,663. Dasht-i-Bedowlat, 30° 57'; about 5,000. Siriah, 30° 3', 66° 53'; 5,793 ft.	Wildest parts of enclosing mountains.—haunts of wild sheep and goats; more accessible tracts yield pasture to herds and flocks. Orchards numerous. Dasht-i-Bedowlat (<i>wretched plain</i>), destitute of water. Coast craggy, but not elevated; in some places a sandy shore; inland surface becomes higher. Most remarkable features of Beloochistan, rugged and elevated surface, barrenness, and deficiency of water. It may be described as a maze of mountains, except on the N.W., in which direction the surface descends to the Great Desert on the S., where a low tract stretches along the sea-shore. Mountains enclosing Cashmere vale, basaltic. Ranges on each side of Beloochistan valley rugged, bare, and nearly inaccessible; formation generally of gneiss; that of the valley, shingle and sand.
SHAWLAND PISHEEN	Between Hala and Amran ranges, on the N. frontier of Beloochistan.		
BELOOCHISTAN	S. of Afghanistan	Kelat, 28° 58', 66° 27'; 5,000 ft. Sohrab, 28° 22', 66° 9'; 5,800. Munzilakah, 23° 55', 67° 5', 5,793. Aseera, 28° 10', 66° 12'; 5,250. Bapow, 28° 16', 66° 20'; 3,000. Peasee Bhoat, 28° 10', 66° 35'; 4,600. Sir-i-Bolan, 29° 50', 67° 14'; 4,494. Putkee, 28° 5', 66° 40'; 4,250. Paesht-Khana, 27° 59', 66° 47'; 3,500. Nur, 27° 52', 66° 54'; 2,850. Ab-i-goorn, 29° 46', 67° 23'; 2,540. Jungkoosht, 27° 55', 67° 2'. 2,150. Bent-i-Jah, 28° 4', 67° 12'; 1,850. Beebee Nance, 29° 39', 67° 28'; 1,695. Kohow, 29° 20', 67° 12'; 1,250. Gurnab, 29° 36', 67° 32'; 1,081. Kullar, 28° 18', 67° 15'; 750 ft.	
CASHMERE and BUT- TISTAN, or LITTLE TIBET.	Western Himalaya	Average of Cashmere valley, between 5,000 and 5,000 ft. Huramak Mt. 13,000. Pir-panjal, 15,000. Small elevations in valley, 250 to 500 ft. Average of valley of Indus (N. of Cashmere vale) 6,000 to 7,000 ft. Slope from S.E. to N.W. Mountains on each side rising from 5,000 to 8,000 ft. higher.	

PRINCIPAL CITIES.*—A description of the cities and towns in India would occupy several volumes: all that can here be given is a brief note on some of the best known.†

Calcutta,—on the left bank of the Hooghly, about 100 m. from the sea; present seat of supreme government; a village when acquired by the English in 1700. Length, about 4½ m.; breadth, 1½ m.; area, nearly 8 sq. m. Beyond the Mahratta Ditch (an intrenchment intended as a defence against the incursions of the Mahrattas), are the suburbs of Chitpoor, Nundenbagh, Bahar-Simlah, Sealdah, Eutally, Ballygunge, Bhowanepoor, Allipoor, and Kidderpoor. On the opposite side of the river lie the villages of Seebpoor, Howrah, and Sulkea. The city is defended by Fort William, a large and strong fortress, built on a plain, of an octagonal form, somewhat resembling that of Antwerp: it mounts 619 guns.

In May, 1850, the population of Calcutta, exclusive of suburbs, was 413,182; number of residences, 62,565; of huts, 49,445. Among the public buildings are the Government-house, a magnificent structure; the Town-hall, a handsome edifice; the Supreme Court of Judicature, the Madrissa and Hindoo colleges, Metcalfe Hall, and the Ochterlony monument. About three miles below the city, on the Howrah side, there are extensive botanical gardens, laid out with good taste and effect.

The most elevated part of Calcutta (Clive-street) is only thirty feet above the sea-level at low-water. It appears to me very probable that the whole city will some day be submerged by the shifting beds of the Hooghly or Ganges.

Madras,—on the Coromandel coast, consists of three broad streets, running north and south, dividing the town into four nearly equal parts; they are well built, and contain the principal European shops. On the beach is a line of public offices, including the Supreme Court, the Custom-house, the Marine Board Office, and the offices and storehouses of the principal European merchants. The other buildings are, the Mint, the Roman Catholic Cathedral, the Church Mission Chapel, Armenian Church, Trinity Chapel, the General Hospital, and Medical School. Fort St. George is in form an irregular polygon, somewhat of a semicircle, of which the sea-face, which is well armed with heavy guns, is nearly a diameter.

No part is probably more than twenty feet above the sea-level. Population, 720,000, including the Black Town and suburbs.

Bombay,—The old town, built on the island, is about 2 m. in circuit, and strongly fortified; the recent increase of the calibre of the guns has completed the means of defence. Few remarkable buildings. There is a Government-house, an excellent dockyard and foundry for steam-vessels, a church within the fort, and one on the island of Colaba, where there are considerable cantonments: several banks, insurance companies, the Steam Navigation Company, Bombay branch of Asiatic Society, Bombay Geographical Society, &c.; and the leading merchants have their offices within the fort. Population, 566,119, including the widely-scattered suburbs.

Agra,—formerly a large city; the old walls remain, and mark out a space extending along the Jumna,

* The several positions of these places, and their elevation, will be given in a Topographical Index.

† Full details will be found in Thoratou's excellent *Gazetteer*.

about 4 m. in length, with a breadth of 3 m.; the area is about 11 sq. m.; but not one-half is at present occupied. There is one wide street running from the fort in a north-westerly direction. The houses are built chiefly of red sandstone. Within the fort is the palace of Shah Jehan, and his hall of audience; the Motee Masjid or Pearl Mosque, and other structures. The celebrated Tajmahal, or mausoleum of Shah Jehan, is outside the city, and about a mile east of the fort. Adjacent to the city, on the west, is the Government-house, the official residence of the lieutenant-governor of the North Western Provinces. Population, 66,000.

Ahmedabad,—on the left bank of the Sabarmuttee, 5½ m. in circumference, surrounded by a high wall, with irregular towers every fifty yards. The noblest architectural relic is the Jumma Masjid or Great Mosque, built by Ahmed Shah of Guzerat, the founder of the city. Near the city wall is a tank a mile in circumference. Population said to amount to 30,000.

Ajmere,—a city of great antiquity and celebrity—situate in a picturesque valley, surrounded by hills, on the base and slope of one of which the town is built. A wall of stone, with five strong gateways (all on the north and west sides), surround it. The town contains several large mosques and temples. Some of the streets are wide and handsome. The houses of the wealthy are spacious, and generally well built: the habitations of the poorer classes are more commodious than ordinary. The strong fort of Taraghur, with a walled circumference of 2 m., surmounts the hill rising above the city: it contains two tanks, and commands another outside.

Allahabad,—at the confluence of the Ganges (here 1½ m. wide) and Jumna, (½ of a m. in width.) The fort on the east and south rises directly from the water, and is in form a bastioned quinquangle, 2,500 yards in circuit, and of great strength. The town extends along the Jumna, to the west of the fort. Notwithstanding the advantageous position, it is an ill-built and poverty-stricken place. The Jumma Masjid is a stately building, but without much ornament. Population, 70,000. [This ought to be the seat of Supreme Government for India.]

Almora,—Principal place of the British district of Kumaon, situate on the crest of a ridge running from east to west, consists principally of one street, ¼ of a m. long, secured by a gate at each end, and forming two bazaars, divided from each other by Fort Almora, and by the site of the ancient palace of the rajahs of Kumaon, now occupied by a gaol. Detached houses, chiefly inhabited by Europeans and Brahmans, are scattered along each face of the mountain below the town. Fort Moira is at the western extremity, and adjoins the military lines.

Amritsir,—A walled city, about half-way between the Beas and Ravee rivers. It owes its importance to a *Tulao* or reservoir, which Ram Das caused to be made here in 1581, and named it Amrita Saras, or "fount of immortality." It is a square, of 150 paces, containing a great body of water, pure as crystal, though multitudes bathe in it: it is supplied, apparently, from natural springs. On a small island in the middle is a temple, to which are attached 600 or 600 priests. On this island Ram Das (the founder) is said to have spent his life in a sitting posture. City very populous and extensive; streets narrow; houses lofty. Manufactures—cloths, silks, and shawls. There is besides a very extensive transit trade, and considerable monetary transactions. Most striking ob-

ject, the fortress Govinghur; its great height and heavy batteries, rising one above the other, giving it a very imposing appearance. Population, 80,000 or 90,000.

Bangalore.—Town tolerably well built, has a good bazaar, and is inclosed by a wall, a ditch, and a broad fence of thorns and bamboos. Fort oval, constructed of strong masonry: within it is the palace of Tippoo Sultan, a large building of mud. Manufactures—cotton and silk; but the present importance of the place results from its being the great British military establishment for the territory of Mysoor. The cantonment is nearly 2½ m. in length, and 1 m. in breadth. Population, 60,000.

Bareilly.—situate in a pleasant and well-wooded country in the N.W. provinces. It is a considerable town, the principal street or bazaar being nearly 2 m. long, has a brisk and lucrative commerce, and some manufactures, of which the principal is that of house furniture, cotton-weaving, muslins, silks, jewellery, gold, silver, and metal working, besides numerous others. Population, 92,208. Cantonment at south side of town, near the new fort, which is quadrangular, and surrounded by a ditch: it is the head-quarters for the Rohilcund division.

Baroda.—situate near the river Biswamintri, which is here crossed by a stone bridge. The town is surrounded by numerous groves containing many mosques, mausolea, and tombs of Mussulmen, which give an impressive solemnity to the scene. The fortifications, of no great strength, consist of slight walls, with towers, and several double gateways. Town intersected and divided into four equal quarters, by two spacious streets, meeting in the centre, at a market-place. Houses, in general, very high, and built of wood. Population, 140,000.

Beejapoor.—The walls, which are of hewn stone and very lofty, are entire, but inside all is desolation. The deep moat, the double rampart, and the ruins of the palaces in the citadel, attest its former magnificence. The Great Mosque is a grand edifice, and the tomb of Ibrahim Adil Shah, remarkable for elegant and graceful architecture. The chief feature of the scene is the mausoleum of Mohammed Adil Shah, the dome of which fills the eye from every point of view. The fort has a rampart flanked by 109 towers. The works surrounding it, and the citadel in the interior, are very strongly built; the parapets are 9 ft. high, and 3 ft. thick. The ditch is from 40 to 50 ft. in breadth, and about 18 deep: the curtains, which appear to rise from the bottom of it, vary from 30 to 40 ft. high, and 24 ft. thick. A revetted counterscarp is discernible, the circuit of which is 6½ m., and its ground-plan deviates little from a circle. To the westward of the fort there is a vast mass of ruins, from the numerous edifices of every description scattered around. Beejapoor was evidently one of the greatest cities in India. It was formerly divided into several quarters, one of which is 6 m. in circumference. Among the various wonders of this ruined capital, is the gun called Malik-i-Maidan, or "the King of the Plain," one of the largest pieces of brass ordnance in the world.

Beskaner.—capital of the Rajpoot state of the same name, viewed from without presents the appearance of a great and magnificent city. The wall, which is built of stone, is 3½ m. in circuit, 15 to 30 ft. high (including parapet), 6 ft. thick, surrounded on three sides by a ditch 15 ft. deep and 20 ft. wide; there are five gates and three sally-ports. The interior exhibits a rather flourishing appearance;

many good houses, neat and uniform, with red walls, and white doors and windows. Eighteen wells within the city; depth of each about 240 ft. Citadel situate ½ a m. N.E. of the city, and quite detached from it; defences, about ¾ of a m. in circuit, constructed of good masonry. The rajah's residence occupies nearly the whole of the inside. Population, stated by Boileau and Tod, 60,000.

Belgaum.—Southern Mahratta country. Fort of an oval ground-plan, 1,000 yards long, 700 broad, and surrounded by a broad and deep wet ditch, cut in very hard ground. In 1848, the inhabitants formed a committee, and in four months reconstructed all the roads of the town, extending to a length of between 9 and 10 m. Belgaum was selected as the site of the educational institution for the instruction of the sons of natives of rank: in February, 1853, the number of pupils exceeded 50.

Bellary.—The fort, or fortified rock, round which the cantonment is situate, is a hill of granite: length, 1,150 yards; height, 450 ft.; circumference, 2 m.; eastern and southern sides precipitous; western face slopes gradually towards plain. Lower fort, ¾ a m. in diameter, contains barracks, arsenal, and commissariat stores, church, two tanks, and several on the top of the rock. Native population in 1836, exclusive of military, 30,426.

Benares.—on the Ganges, 3 m. long, 1 m. broad. Streets very narrow, and access gained to the river by noble ghats, extending along the bank of the river, in the city. Numerous Hindoo temples, which render it a celebrated place of pilgrimage. Population, 300,000.

Bhagulpoor.—on the right bank of the Gangea here 7 m. wide during the rains. Though represented to be 2 m. long and 1 broad, it is a poor place, consisting of scattered market-places, meanly built; it is, however, ornamented by European residences and by mosques. Cavalry barracks, occasionally occupied; 4 m. from them are those of a native corps formed of the highlanders (Sonthals or Puharees) of the Rajmahal wilds. There is also a court of justice, a gaol, and an educational institution.

Bhoj.—the capital of Cutch, at the base of a fortified hill. When viewed from the north, has an imposing appearance. Rajah's palace, a castle of good masonry. A large tank has been excavated at the west end of the city. Population, about 20,000.

Bhopal.—Town surrounded by a wall of masonry about 2 m. in circuit, within which is also a fort of masonry. Outside, a large *gunja* or market, with wide straight streets. The fort of Puttyghur is on a rock S.W. from the town. S.W. of the fort is Bhopal Tal, or Lake, 4½ m. long, 1½ m. broad: another tank, 2 m. long, is on the east. They are deep, and abound with alligators, but both appear to be artificial. The Bess river has its rise in the former. Bhopal is the seat of the British political residency.

Bhurtpoor.—Town 3 m. long, 1½ broad, and about 8 in circumference. Its site is somewhat depressed; and this circumstance, in a military point of view, contributes to its strength; as the water of a neighbouring *jhil*, being higher than the ditch of the town, can be discharged into it in such a volume, as to render it unfordable. The defences are now shapeless piles of mud.* This measure of repair was permitted to the young rajah, after attaining majority, in 1844, and the walls allowed to be maintained in a condition (in the rajah's words) "to keep out thieves and wild beasts;" and the town itself is

* See Historical Section, 1805-'6, and 1824-'5.

merely a great collection of hovels; but it is a thriving place, having a trade in the Sambhur Lake salt. Population estimated at 100,000.

Burdwan,—on the left bank of the Damoodah. The rajah's residence is a great collection of buildings of various sizes and colours, and without symmetry or regularity: the town an assemblage of crowded suburbs, wretched huts, a few handsome houses, but no temple of striking effect. Contiguous to the town is an artificial piece of water, having an estimated area of 30 acres, and much frequented by the natives for bathing. Burdwan contains the civil establishment of the district, and two English schools.

Cawnpore,—on the right bank of the Ganges; area of the city, 690 acres; contains about 11,000 houses, and nearly 69,000 inhabitants. Population of cantonments, 49,975; making a total of 108,796, exclusive of the military. Commerce—busy and important; the Ganges (which is here 500 yards wide when lowest, and 1 m. wide when swollen by the periodical rains) being navigable to the sea, a distance of 1,000 m., and upwards to Sukertal, a distance of 300 m.

Coimbatore,—situate near the left bank of the Noyel, a tributary of the Cauvery, in a dry and well-cultivated country, near the base of the Neilgherry group of mountains. Streets wide, airy, and neatly built; European quarter eastward of the town, and detached from it. In the time of Hyder Ali it is said to have contained 4,000 houses, but it suffered much in the wars between the British and Mysoor.

Cuttack,—situated on a tongue of land near the bifurcation of the Mahanuddy. Fortifications in a ruinous state, their materials fast disappearing, the stones being carried away, and used in various public works; among others, in the lighthouse at False Point, and in the macadamization of the cantonment roads. Within the fort is an old mosque. Town straggling, and exhibits evident signs of decay. The Jumma Masjid, and the "Kuddum Russool," Moslem buildings, are inelegant, and Brahminical temples small and ungraceful. Manufactures—brass cooking-vessels and shoes. Population estimated at 40,000.

Dacca,—on the Burha Gunga, an offset of the Koniae or Jabuna; 4 m. long, and 1½ m. broad. It is at present a wide expanse of ruins. The castle of its founder, Shah Jehangir, the noble mosque he built, the palaces of the ancient newaubs, the factories and churches of the Dutch, French, and Portuguese, are all sunk into ruin, and overgrown with jungle. The city and suburbs are stated to possess ten bridges, thirteen ghauts, seven ferry-stations, twelve bazaars, three public wells, a variety of buildings for fiscal and judicial purposes, a gaol and gaol-hospital, a lunatic asylum, and a native hospital. Population, 200,000.

Delhi,—about 7 m. in circumference, is inclosed on three sides by a wall, and on the other, the river. Streets mostly narrow; the principal one is ½ of a m. long, and 50 yds. wide, with good shops on each side. Population, 137,977.

Dinapore.—Important military station on the right bank of the Ganges. Remarkable for the barracks, which are magnificent buildings, and of great extent. Church, spacious and handsome.

Golconda.—Fortress and ruined city, in the Nizam's dominions. Fortress on a rocky ridge of granite, is extensive, very strong, and in good repair, but is commanded within breaching distance. Being the depository of the treasures of the Nizam, and also used as a state prison, it is very strictly guarded, and

entrance cannot be obtained by any but officials. The ancient mausolea form a group about 600 yards from the fort, the stern features of the surrounding, rocky ground heightening the impressiveness and grandeur of those astonishing buildings. These tombs were erected at great expense, some of them being said to have cost £150,000. The diamonds of Golconda have obtained great celebrity throughout the world. (See Minerals.)

Gwalior,—the capital of the possessions of Sindia's family. The rock on which the celebrated Hill Fort is situate, is completely isolated: greatest height at the north end, 342 ft. The approach, by means of steps cut in the rock, is so large, and of such gentle acclivity, that elephants easily ascend. The passage, protected by guns pointing down it, has a succession of seven gates. Within the enclosure there are several tanks, capable of supplying an adequate garrison, though 15,000 men would be required to man the defences. The town lies along the eastern base of the rock; it is large, but irregularly built, and contains a cannon-foundry, and gunpowder and firework manufactory.

Hurdwar, or sometimes Gangadwara, the "Gate of the Ganges,"—a celebrated place of Hindoo pilgrimage. Town evidently of great antiquity, is situate close to the western bank; the foundations of many of the houses in the bed of the river.

Hydrabad (Deccan.)—The ground plan is a trapezoid, the longest or north-western side of which, extending along the river Musli, is about 2½ m. in length; the south-eastern, 2 m.; the southern, 1 m.; the south-western, 1½ m. A suburb on the river side communicates with the city by a stone bridge. Streets, some paved; narrow; houses close together, and displaying little or no taste. The most remarkable structures are the principal mosque, and the British residency. Population, probably not exceeding 200,000.

Hydrabad (Sinde),—on the Gunjah hills, 4 m. from the Indus. Outline of fortress irregular, corresponding with the winding shape of the hills. Walls built of burnt bricks, thick at the base, but taper towards the top, and weakened by loopholes. There are about 5,000 houses; bazaar extensive, forming one street the entire length of the town. Manufactures—arms, and ornamental silks and cottons. Population (supposed), 24,000.

Indore,—capital of the possessions of Holcar's family. Outline of city, nearly a square of 1,000 yards; area, about 216 acres: ill-built, the houses disposed in irregular winding streets, constructed with sun-dried bricks, and covered with clumsy tiles laid on bamboos. It contains a few mosques, but has no architectural pretensions. The British residency, east of the town, has a pleasing scene.

Jessulmere,—built at the base of the south end of a rocky range of hills. Ramparts and bastions of uncemented stone; circuit, about 2½ m; height, 14 ft., including a parapet of 6 ft.; thickness of ramparts, 4 ft.: these defences are in many places so obliterated by sand-drifts, that they may be crossed on horseback. There are four gateways and three sally-ports. Outline of citadel an irregular triangle, about ½ths of a mile in circumference; interior occupied by the palace, and several temples and dwellings. At the time of Boileau's visit, in 1836, there were 6 guns, a large howitzer, and 3 field-pieces.

Jeypoor,—in a small plain surrounded by hills on all sides, except the south. It is about 2 m. long, E. to W.; 1 m. broad, encompassed by a wall

of masonry, with lofty towers and well-protected gateways, and considered to be the most regularly built of the cities laid down by native Indians. A main street, 2 m. long and 40 yards wide, extends from E. to W.; this is intersected by several streets of the same width; and at each point of intersection is a *chauk* or market-place; and the whole is portioned out into rectangular blocks, the palace and royal premises being in the centre. Houses in the principal streets are generally built of stone, and, with the fine temples, add to the architectural splendour of the town. Population, 300,000.

Joudpoor,—on the north-eastern edge of a cultivated but woody plain. Site striking, being at the southern extremity of a ridge 25 m. long, between 2 and 3 m. broad, and from 300 to 400 feet above the average level of the plain. Built on an irregular surface, sloping upwards towards the base of the rock surmounted by the citadel, and inclosed by a rampart 5 m. in circumference. There are several tanks within the walls; but all fail in long-continued droughts, except the Rani Sagur, which is reserved exclusively for the garrison, being thrown open to the citizens only on extreme emergency. North-east of the city is the suburb Mahamandir. Population, 60,000.

Khatmandoo.—Capital of Nepal, situate in a valley,* and on the east bank of the Bishnmutty river. Length, about 1 m.; average breadth, scarcely $\frac{1}{2}$ of a m. Streets narrow; houses brick, with tiled roofs, and though of several stories, are of mean appearance. Town adorned by several temples, the gilded pinnacles of which have a picturesque effect. The river is crossed by two bridges, one at each extremity of the town. Population estimated at 50,000; number of houses, 5,000.

Lahore,—surrounded by a brick wall, and defences 7 m. in circumference: fort at the north-west angle; there are several large and handsome mosques, besides Hindoo temples. Streets narrow; houses lofty; bazaars contracted and mean. Population, 100,000, or 120,000.

Loodiana,—four miles from left bank of the Sutlej: town ill-built, and without a wall, but having a fort of no great strength, which was constructed in 1808, on the north side, situate on a bluff, rising about 30 ft. above the *nullah* or watercourse. It is a thriving place, the residents including several capitalists, among whom are corresponding bankers; and as the mart lies on one of the principal routes between Hindoostan and Afghanistan, it has a considerable transit trade. Manufactures—cotton, cloth, and shawls. Population estimated at 20,000; chiefly Mohammedans.

Lucknow,—extends about 4 m. along the bank of the Goomtee. Streets, with few exceptions, crooked and narrow; number of brick-built houses small—palaces of showy architecture. The great ornament is the Imambarah, a Moslem cathedral, and the mosque attached to it. Population, 300,000.

Masulipatam,—on a plain stretching to the base of the E. Ghauts. Fort built on a swamp overflowed by the sea at spring-tides. Ground-plan, an oblong rectangle, 800 yards long and 600 broad, with high ramparts and a wide and deep ditch. The native town is situated south-west of the cantonment, and has some wide and airy streets, tolerably straight, and well built. Population, in 1837, 27,884.

Meerut,—situate in the Dooab, and nearly equidistant from the Ganges and the Jumna. Ruined wall of the town extensive, inclosing a considerable

space. Streets narrow, and houses ill-built. Most important structure, the English church. Cantonments 2 m. north of the town. Population, 29,014.

Mhow.—In the territory of Indore. Its appearance is that of an European town, having a church with steeple on an eminence, a lecture-room and library, and a theatre. A considerable force is stationed at the cantonments, which are situate $1\frac{1}{2}$ m. S.E. from the town.

Mirzapoor,—consists mainly of three long, wide, straight streets, along the side of which are rows of trees and wells. The houses, seldom more than two stories high, are for the most part built of mud or unburnt brick: those of the Europeans, which are the best, occur only at considerable intervals. It derives its present importance principally from its being the greatest cotton mart in India; military cantonment situated three miles north-east of the city. Population, 55,000.

Mooltan.—An ancient city, 3 m. east of the Chenab, whose inundations reach the fort. It is built on a mound of considerable height, formed of the ruins of more ancient cities. Bazaars extensive; about 4,600 shops. Manufactures—silks, cottons, shawls, loongees, brocades, tissues. Banking constitutes a large proportion of the business, and the merchants are considered rich. Population estimated at 80,000.

Moorshedabad,—extends about 8 m. along both banks of the Ganges, with an average breadth of 4 m. Though a place of considerable commerce it consists but of mud buildings, lying confusedly together. Unapproachable by craft of above a foot draught, during the dry months of spring. Population about 150,000.

Multra,—extends along the Jumna in the form of a crescent, and, with its great ruined fort, has a very picturesque appearance; but its streets are steep, narrow, winding, and dirty. Population, in 1846, 49,672.

Nagpoor.—About 7 m. in circumference, but very irregular in shape. There is but one good street, the others being mean and narrow. Throughout the town no specimen of fine architecture; the rajah's palace, which is the most considerable building, is devoid of symmetry or beauty; it is merely a large pile of masonry, completely obscured by the encroachments of mean mud huts built against its walls. Population, 111,231.

Oodeypoor, Rajpoot city,—situate on a low ridge, in a valley, where extends an artificial lake 5 m. in circuit. Town ill-built; palace, a noble pile of granite, 100 ft. high, and overlooking the city.

Oojein,—in the territory of Gwalior, on the Seeptra. It is of oblong outline, 6 m. in circumference, surrounded by a stone wall with round towers. Houses crowded together, and built either of brick or wood. Principal bazaar, a spacious street. There are four mosques, and many Hindoo temples. City well supplied with water. The head of the Sindia family has a spacious palace here, but of little exterior magnificence. At the southern extremity of the town is the observatory constructed by Jai Sing, the scientific rajah of Jeypoor. Principal trade in cotton fabrics, opium, and the wares of Europe and China. It is one of the seven sacred cities of the Hindoos, and the first meridian of their geographers.

Patna.—City extends about $1\frac{1}{2}$ m. along the Ganges, inclosed by a rectangular wall, and has extensive suburbs; the principal one, on the east, called Maruganj, contains the chief market, and many store-

* See Note at end of "Mountains."

houses for grain. This is joined by another, denominated Giafir Khan. On the other side of the city is a long, narrow suburb, extending to Bankipoor, a distance of about 4 m.; this is the European quarter. The better class of houses in the city are built of brick, but the greater number of mud, and generally tiled. Population, 284,132.

Peshawur,—built by Akber, who fixed the name, signifying "advanced post," in reference to its being the frontier town of Hindoostan towards Afghanistan, is situate on a plain about 18 m. east of the eastern extremity of the Khyber Pass, and 44 m. from the Indus. In the early part of the present century, when visited by Elphinstone, it was a flourishing town, about 5 m. in circuit, and reported to contain 100,000 inhabitants. Twenty years later, Runjeet Sing demolished the Balla Hissar, the state residence, injured the city, and laid waste the surrounding country. The fortress, erected by the Seiks on the site of the Balla Hissar, is a square of about 220 yards, with round towers at each angle, and surrounded by a wall of mud 60 ft. high, fausse-bras 30 ft., and a wet ditch. The city is now improved under the British government. Population, 56,045; Hindoos, 7,700; remainder, Mussulmen.

Poona,—an ill-built city, without walls or fort; bazaars mean, streets irregular; recent improvements have somewhat changed its appearance. Between 1841 and 1846, 400 new houses were built, and several more were in the latter year in course of construction. A bridge over the Nagjurree Nullah was completed, and a stone one replaced for the old Mahratta bridge over the Moota Moola; there is another called the Wellesley bridge; the streets in the eastern part of the city have been macadamized, and a full supply of water secured to the population. The most remarkable building is the palace, formerly the residence of the Peishwa; situation picturesque. Population, 100,000.

Rangoon, or the "City of Victory,"—situated about a mile from the river of the same name. Ground-plan, a square of about $\frac{3}{4}$ ths of a m., having at its northern side a pagoda as a citadel. It has been twice burnt (in 1850, when it was entirely destroyed, and in 1853); but conditions have been prescribed by government for ensuring its protection against future conflagrations.

Sattara,—situate amidst the highlands of the Deccan, and where the country, though rugged, inclines to the eastward. The fort, on the summit of a steep mountain, has an area extending about 1,000 by 500 yards. The town lies immediately under it, in a valley.

Saugor,—built along the west, north, and north-east sides of a lake nearly a mile in length, and three-quarters in breadth, which occupies the lowest part of a valley, or rather basin, surrounded by hills. There is a large fort, now used as an ordnance depôt. The mint stood about a mile from the lake, but the business of the establishment has been transferred to Calcutta. In 1830, an iron suspension-bridge was erected over the Bessi, a river running near the town. Population, 70,000.

Seringapatam,—a celebrated fortress (built 700 years ago) and town, once the capital of Mysoor, situate on an island in the Cauvery. Town ill-built, having narrow streets; houses ill-ventilated and inconvenient: water supplied abundantly from the river, which washes the walls on the northern and south-west sides. Ground-plan, an irregular pentagon, $1\frac{1}{2}$ m. by $\frac{1}{2}$ of a m. Palace of Tippoo

Sultan within the fort, and is surrounded by a strong wall of stone and mud. The Shehr Gangam, a suburb detached from the fortified town, was demolished by Tippoo on the eve of the investment of the place, but was afterwards built with considerable regularity. Population of the island, during his reign, estimated at 150,000; in 1800 it was only 31,895, exclusive of the garrison.

Shikarpoor.—The most important commercial town in Sind. It is situate 20 m. west of the Indus. A branch of the Sind canal passes within 1 m. of the city. Circuit of wall, which is now in ruins, 3,831 yards. The character of the place is thoroughly commercial, almost every house having a shop; mansions of the opulent Hindoo merchants large, inclosed and secluded by high brick walls; but the streets are narrow, and the houses generally small. The bazaar extends about 800 yards through the centre of the city, and contained, in 1837, 884, and in 1841, 923 shops. Transit trade important, as it is on the route to Afghanistan through the Bolan Pass. Population estimated at 30,000; viz., 20,000 Hindoos, and 10,000 Mohammedans, of whom 1,000 are Afghans. The town was founded in 1617.

Surat.—Outline of town an arc, nearly semicircular, the river forming the chord; circuit, about 6 m. Castle, though small, has bastions, covered way, and glacis; streets narrow and winding; houses high, upper stories projecting beyond the base. Population, in 1838, 133,544.

Tanjore.—Town consists of two forts; the greater, 4 m. in circumference, surrounded by a fortified wall and a ditch; streets within it irregularly built. Adjoining is the smaller fort, 1 m. in circuit, and very strong; within it is the great pagoda, considered to be the finest of the pyramidal temples of India.

Trichinopoly.—Rock very striking when viewed from a distance at any point, it being 600 ft. above the surrounding level. The fort is situate on part of the rugged declivity of the rock, and 2 furlongs from the Cauvery, which is embanked, but the works sometimes give way and inundate the country. The fort, with its strong and massive walls, bear the appearance of having been regularly and strongly built; they are from 20 to 30 ft. high, of considerable thickness, and upwards of 2 m. in circumference. Within is an extensive *petta* or town, arranged into tolerably straight, wide, and regular streets, many of which have bazaars. On the rock is a pagoda. The natives manufacture hardware, cutlery, jewellery, saddlery, and cheroots. The cantonment is from 2 to 3 m. south-west of the fort, and the troops generally there form a force of between 4,000 and 5,000 men.

Umballa.—On the route from Hindoostan to Afghanistan. It is a large walled town, situate in a level and highly cultivated country. Houses built of burnt brick, streets narrow. Fort at the N.E. of the town, and under its walls the encamping ground of the British troops.

Vellore.—A town in the Carnatic, with a strong extensive fort, on the south side of the Palar river; ramparts built of large stones, with bastions and round towers at short distances. A deep and wide ditch, cut in the rock, filled with water, surrounds the whole. Within are barracks, hospitals, magazines, and other buildings. Town situate between the fort and some rocky hills on the east, is clean and airy, and has an extensive and well-supplied bazaar. Most remarkable building, a pagoda dedicated to Crishna. Government, in 1846, sanctioned the erection of a church within the fort.

CLIMATE.—A country extending through six-and-twenty degrees of latitude, and with elevations from the coast-level to the height of three or four miles above the sea, must necessarily possess great variety of temperature. About one-half of India is inter-tropical, comprising within its limits the three principal stations of Calcutta, Madras, and Bombay; in fact, all the country south of a line drawn from Burdwan on the east, through Bhopal, to the gulf of Cutch on the west—a distance from Cape Comorin of about 1,000 miles. All the region north of this line, and extending 800 miles from Cutch to Peshawur, is outside the tropic of Cancer: the area of the inter and extra-tropical territory is nearly alike. Mere distance from the equator will not convey an adequate idea of the climate of any district: other circumstances must be taken into account; such as elevation above the sea,—aspect in reference to the sun and the prevailing winds,—more or less vegetation,—radiation of terrestrial heat,—quantity of rain falling,* or siccidity of atmosphere,—proximity to snow-covered mountains or great lakes,—drainage, ventilation, &c.†—all these, varying in collateral existence or in degree of operation, cause a variety of climate and thermometrical range, which latitude will not indicate. Regions contiguous to the equator, at or near the sea-level, possess a high but equable temperature: the mercury, on Fahrenheit's scale, exhibits in the shade at Singapore, a flat island in $1^{\circ} 17' N.$, a heat of 73° to 87° throughout the year. As we recede from the equator north or south, a wider caloric range is experienced, not

* The quantity of rain in the tropical or temperate zones is effected by the elevation of the land above the sea. In India the maximum fall is at 4,500 feet altitude; beyond this height it diminishes. This is shown by the present scientific chairman of the E. I. Co., Colonel Sykes, in his valuable *Meteorological Observations*: thus, on the western coast of India the fall is at sea-level (mean of seven levels)—inches, 81; at 150 ft. altitude (Rutnagherry in the Concan), 114; at 900 ft., Dapoollee (S. Concan), 134; at 1,700 ft. (Kundala Pass, from Bombay to Poona), 141; at 4,500 ft. (Mahabulishwar—mean of 15 years, 254; at 6,200 ft. (Augusta Peak, Utray Mullay range), 194; at 6,100 ft. (Kotagherry, in the Neilgherries, one year), 81; at 8,640 ft. (Dodabetta, highest point of Western India, one year), 101 inches. The same principle is observable in the arid lofty table-land of Thibet, and in the contiguous elevated regions where rain seldom falls. So also in Chili and other parts of the Andes. The distinguished meteorologist, Dr. John Fletcher Miller, of Whitehaven, adduces evidence, in his interesting account of the Cumberland Lake District, to demonstrate the existence of a similar law in England, where he considers the

only throughout the year, but within the limits of a single day. In the N. W. Provinces of India, and in the S.E. settlements of Australia, the mercury not unfrequently rises in the summer season to 90° and even 100° Fahr., and shows a fluctuation, in twenty-four hours, of 24° : but this extreme torridity—when the circumambient fluid seems to be aeriform fire—is but of brief duration. Animal and vegetable life are reinvigorated, for a large part of the year, by a considerably cooler atmosphere. Indeed, at New York and Montreal, I found the heat of June and July more intolerable than that of Jamaica or Ceylon; but then snow lies on the ground, at the former places, for several weeks in winter. Again, moisture with heat has a powerful and injurious effect on the human frame, though favourable to vegetation and to many species of animal life. Speaking from my own sensations, I have lain exhausted on a couch with the mercury at 80° Fahr., during the rainy season, in Calcutta, Bombay, and Hong Kong; and ridden through the burning forests of Australia, on the sandy Arabian plains, and over the sugar-cane plantations of Cuba, with the mercury at 100° Fahr. So, also, with reference to elevation: in the East and West Indies, at a height of several thousand feet above the sea, I have enjoyed a fire at night in June; and yet, in April and September, been scorched at mid-day in Egypt, Northern China, and Eastern Europe. These observations are made with a view of answering the oft-recurring inane question, without referring to any locality, "What sort of a climate has India?" In order, however, to

maximum fall of rain to be at the height of 2,000 feet.

† In 1829, I wrote and published in Calcutta a small brochure, entitled *The Effects of Climate, Food, and Drink on Man*. The essay was prepared in the hope of inducing the government to adopt sanitary measures for the drainage and ventilation of Calcutta, where cholera had become permanently located. I predicted that unless the *nidus* of this fearful malady were destroyed in the Indian cities by the purification of their respective atmospheres, the disease would be extensively generated and wafted with the periodical winds from Asia to Europe. The prognostication was ridiculed: sad experience may now perhaps induce corporations and citizens of large towns to adopt timely-effective sanitary measures. By so doing a healthy climate may everywhere be obtained; but no altitude or position will avail for the prevention of endemic diseases, or for lengthening the duration of life, wherever large masses of human beings are congregated, unless complete drainage, free circulation of air, and the removal of all putrescent animal and vegetable matter be made an urgent and daily duty.

TEMPERATURE & RAIN-FALL AT DIFFERENT DISTRICTS IN INDIA. 487

convey some idea of the thermometrical | different stations, the following table has range, and the quantity of rain falling at | been collated from different sources:—

Meteorological Monthly Observations for different parts of India; showing the Latitude, number of feet above the level of the sea, average Thermometer, and Rain in inches.

Places, Latitude, and Elevation above sea.	THERMOMETER.												Mean of Year.
	Jan.	Feb.	March	April.	May.	June.	July.	Aug.	Sept.	Oct.	Nov.	Dec.	
Calcutta, 22° 34', 18 ft. . .	69	73	78	87	88	83	82	82	82	82	71	67	79*
Madras, 13° 5', sea-level . .	78	78	82	88	92	87	88	86	86	84	82	78	83
Bombay, 18° 57', sea-level†	77	77	80	82	85	85	81	84	79	84	84	80	84
Tirhoot, 25° 26', 26° 42', little elevated . . .	60	66	76	85	89	86	84	85	81	73	—	61	78
Gurgaon, 28° 28', 817 ft. . .	70	72	80	—	104	98	85	84	89	87	75	66	—
Delhi, 28° 41', 800 ft. . .	53	62	70	79	82	82	82	80	80	73	62	56	72
Rajpootana, ‡ about 500 ft.	70	73	82	82	74	90	85	—	—	—	90	66	—
Nagpoor, 21° 10', 930 ft. . .	68	75	83	89	90	84	79	79	79	79	73	72	79
Hyderabad, 17° 22', 1,800 ft.	74½	76½	84	91½	93	88	81	80½	79	80	76½	74½	81½
Bangalore, 12° 58', 3,000 ft.	71	73	79	78	79	75	74	74	74	71	71	70	74
Hawilbagh, 29° 38', 3,887 ft.	47	55	61	60	73	76	78	79	75	69	60	52	—
Kotagherry, 11° 27', 6,100 ft.	59	60	61	62	62	61	64	65	64	62	60	59	61
Ootacamund, 11° 24', 7,300 ft.	54	56	60	64	64	59	56	56	56	56	55	53	57
Mussorie, 30° 27', 6,282 ft.	—	—	—	—	77	70	68	68	67	61	56	—	—
Landour, 30° 27', 7,579 ft. .	41	46	55	65	68	66	68	66	64	57	46	47	—
Darjeeling, 27° 2', 8,000 ft.	40	42	50	55	57	61	61	61	59	58	50	43	53

	RAIN IN INCHES.												Total.
	Jan.	Feb.	March	April.	May.	June.	July.	Aug.	Sept.	Oct.	Nov.	Dec.	
Calcutta	0.05	0.48	1.77	3.52	12.86	3.04	12.44	8.15	8.19	3.68	0.06	2.57	56.61
Nagpoor	0.40	0.50	3.84	1.01	0.21	6.25	14.93	7.51	16.32	—	2.89	0.13	53.99§
Bangalore	—	—	35	4.16	6.89	3.24	5.88	4.13	13.07	5.10	1.30	—	—
Kotagherry	2	3	6	10	2	2	4	2	2	10	2	5	50
Ootacamund	1	1	2	5	6	8	7	6	7	9	5	3	60
Darjeeling	1	—	1	2	9	26	25	29	15	8	—	—	122

The monsoons or prevailing winds within the tropics, as on the Coromandel and Malabar coasts, are denominated the *South-west* and the *North-east*; but owing to modifying circumstances, the direction is in several places changed: at Arracan, the S.W. blows more frequently from the S., and the N.E. more to the W. of N. Lower Bengal, including the country around Calcutta, has a climate more trying than that of any other part of India. November, December, and January are tolerably cool, and Europeans may walk out during the day. In February, March, April, and May, the heat daily

increases, until, during the last month especially, it becomes almost intolerable; not a cloud appears in the heavens to mitigate the burning rays of the sun, which seem to penetrate into the very marrow of an European. I have known men and beasts to drop dead in the streets of Calcutta. When the monsoon is on the eve of changing, before the *chota bursaut* (little rain) set in, the nights as well as the days are oppressive; respiration becomes laborious, and all animated nature languishes: the horizon assumes a lurid glare, deepening to a fiery red; the death-like stillness of the

* Abstract of the mean annual summaries of a meteorological register kept at Calcutta, for ten years:—

Years.	Sunrise.	2.40 P.M.	Sunset.
1841 . . .	72.7	89.0	82.4
1842 . . .	73.3	88.0	82.1
1843 . . .	73.3	87.6	82.5
1844 . . .	72.7	87.6	82.3
1845 . . .	73.7	86.9	82.3
1846 . . .	74.3	86.3	81.9
1847 . . .	73.2	86.1	81.1
1848 . . .	74.1	87.4	82.5
1849 . . .	73.6	86.7	81.8
1850 . . .	73.1	86.1	81.4
Mean . .	73.4	87.2	82.0

The annual fall of rain at Calcutta, during six years, commencing with 1830, averaged 64 inches. In the wet season evaporation is very slight.

† Amount of rain at Bombay for six years:—

Inches.	Inches.
1845 54.73	1848 73.42
1846 87.48	1849 118.88
1847 67.31	1850 47.78

Average annual fall during thirty years, 76.08 inches.

‡ At Madras, average for eight years, 66.59 inches.

§ Between lat. 26° 54' and lat. 29° 23'.—(Boileau's *Tour in Rajpootana*, pp. 304—317.)

¶ Situation, about 350 m. from nearest part of Bay of Bengal, and 420 m. from Indian Ocean. In 1826, and in 1831, the fall of rain slightly exceeded 65 inches; the greatest registered fall was 72 inches, and that was in 1809. Average fall of rain for eight years, 48.10 inches. Proceeding westward towards the Ghauts and Indian Ocean, the rains become heavier until reaching Mahabulishwar, where the fall is probably unexampled in amount; in 1849 it was 294 inches. The mean annual quantity is 239 inches, of which 227 fell in the four monsoon months. The greatest annual fall was in 1834, when it amounted to 297 inches. Another report gives the mean annual fall, as deduced from the observation of ten years, at 229 inches; and the number of days on which rain falls, at 127.

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air is occasionally broken by a low murmuring, which is responded to by the moaning of cattle: dense, dark masses of clouds roll along the Bay of Bengal, accompanied with occasional gusts of wind; streaks of lightning, after sunset, glimmer through the magazines where the electric fluid is engendered and pent up; the sky becomes obscured with mist, and lowering; next, broad sheets of lambent flame illumine each pitchy mass, until the entire heavens seem to be in a blaze; while peal after peal of thunder reverberates from cloud to cloud, like discharges of heavy artillery booming through cavernous hills, or along an amphitheatre of mountains; thin spray is scattered over the coast by the violence of the increasing gale,—the rain commences in large drops, augments to sheeted masses, and sweeps like a torrent from the sky; the surf roars along the beach,—the wind howls furiously, screaming or groaning piteously; and every element seems convulsed with the furious conflict: at length the S.W. monsoon gains the victory, and the atmosphere becomes purified and tranquil. The monsoon is felt with varying degrees of intensity at different parts of the coast; but at Madras and at Bombay the scene is one of awful grandeur. During the rains the air is saturated with moisture; and the pressure on each square inch of the human frame causes extreme lassitude and mental depression: along the sea-shore the pernicious effects are mitigated by a sea-breeze, called the "Doctor," which sets in about ten, A.M., and lasts until sunset. As the country is ascended above the ocean-level, varieties of climate are experienced; but on the plains of the Ganges and of the Indus, and in some parts of Central India, hot winds blow nearly equal in intensity to those which are felt in Australia. In few words, some idea may be conveyed of the climate of several districts:—

Bengal Proper.—hot, moist, or muggy for eight months—April to November; remainder cool, clear, and bracing.

Bahar.—cool in winter months: hot in summer; rain variable.

Udupe.—fluctuating temperature and moisture; therm. range 28 to 112°; rain, 30 to 80 inches.

Benares.—mean temperature, 77°; winter cool and frosty sometimes; therm. at night, 45°, but in the day, 100°; rain variable—30 to 80 inches.

Agra.—has a wide range of temperature; in mid-winter night-frosts and hail-storms sometimes cut off the cotton crop and cover the tanks with ice; yet at noon in April, therm. reaches the height of 106° in the shade.

Ghazeepoor.—range in coldest months, 58 to 71°—April, 86 to 96°; May, 86 to 95°; June, 85 to 98°; July, 86 to 96°. In the *Dehra Doon*—range 37 to 101°. In the year 1841, December mean heat, 60°; June, 88°; whole year, 74°. In 1839, total fall of rain, 67 inches; of which in July, 15; August, 26.

Cuttack and opposite coast of Bay of Bengal,—refreshed by a sea-breeze blowing continuously from March to July.

Berar.—moderate climate, according to elevation.

Madras.—cold season of short duration in the Carnatic. Mercury in therm. higher than in Bengal, sometimes 100° Fahr. Heat tempered by the sea.

Arcoot.—high temperature, 110° in the shade, sometimes 130° Fahr. Few sudden vicissitudes; storms infrequent.

Salen.—fluctuating climate—in January, 58 to 82°; March, 66 to 95°; May, 75 to 96°.

Trichinopoly.—has a steady high temperature, a cloudless sky, dry and close atmosphere, with much glare and intense radiation of heat.

Vizagapatam.—on the coast is hot, moist, and relaxing; inland equally sultry, but drier.

Bellary is characterised by great aridity; rain, 12 to 26 inches; therm. falls in January to 55 or 50°; thunder-storms frequent in summer months.

Cuddapah.—average max. temperature for several years (in the shade), 98°; minn., 65°; mean, 81°: mean temperature during monsoon, 77°; max., 89°.

Madura.—on the hills mild and genial in summer; therm. seldom below 50° or above 75°; in the plains, reaching 115° and even 130°.

Travancore.—owing to proximity of mountains, humid but not oppressive.

Mysoor.—table-land cool, dry, and healthy; at Bangalore (3,000 ft. high), therm. range from 56 to 82°. The monsoons which deluge the Malabar and Coromandel coasts, have their force broken by the Ghauts on either side, and genial showers preserve the Mysorean verdure throughout the year.

Neilgherries.—the climate resembles that of the intertropical plateaux of America; at Ootacamund (height 7,300 ft.), mean temperature rather above that of London, but ann. range very small; not sufficient sunshine to bring the finer European fruits to perfection, but corn and vegetables thrive. Lower down the vales enjoy an Italian clime; at Coimbatoor (height 4,483 ft.), during the cold season, max., 59°; minn., 31°; in April, average 63°; May, 64° Fahr.; there are no sultry nights, a blanket being acceptable as bed-covering in all seasons. In the higher regions, the air beyond the zone of clouds and mists is clear and dry, as evidenced by the great distance within which sound is heard, and by the buoyancy of the human frame.

Coorg is a bracing mountain region. Daily range, 2 to 6°; ann., 50 to 80° Fahr.; annual rain, at Mercara (4,500 ft.), 119 inches; in June, about 40 inches.

Malabar coast.—warm but agreeable; therm. 68 to 88° Fahr.; ann. rain, 120 to 130 inches.

Canara and the Concan.—beneath the Ghauts are not, tropically speaking, unhealthy, except where marsh and jungle prevail, when malaria is produced.

Bombay.—tropical heat diminished by sea-breezes.

Broach.—December to March, cool; average rain, 33 inches.

In *Guzerat*, which is the hottest part of W. India, the westerly winds are burning in May, June, and July; temperature high for nine months; average fall of rain, 30 inches.

Mahratta country,—near the Ghauts the clouds are attracted from the Indian Ocean, and a profusion of rain falls for three or four weeks without intermission, but often not extending 30 m. to the E. or S.

The *Deccan* table-land is salubrious; at Sattara, mean ann. temperature, 66°. Even in September I enjoyed the air of Poona, as a great relief from the sultry heat of Southern China. Ann. range of therm., 37 to 94°; fall of rain, light and uncertain—22 to 30 inches; among the Ghauts, 300 inches. Proceeding westward towards the Ganges, and northward through *Central India* plateau, there is a modified temperature (at Meerut, therm. falls to 32° Fahr.), with occasional hot winds, which prevail as far as Sind and the Punjab. Sind is dry and sultry; at Kurachee, 6 or 8 inches rain; at Hyderabad, 2 inches; at Larkhana, farther north, there was no rain for three years. Mean max. temperature of six hottest months, 98° in the shade.

Punjab,—more temperate than Upper Gangetic plain; from November to April, climate fine; summer heat, intense; hot winds blow with great violence, and frequent dust-storms in May and June render the air almost unbreathable. Rains commence in July; August and September, sickly months. The Great Desert to the S. of the Punjab has a comparatively low temperature; at Bickaneer, in winter, ponds are frozen over in February; but in summer the heat is very great; therm. 110 to 120° in the shade.

Candeish has a luxurious climate like that of Malwa. *Upper Assam* has a delightful temperature; the heat bearable, and the cold never intolerable. Mean temperature of four hottest months, about 80°; of winter, 67°; mean ann., 67°; heavy rains, which commence in March and continue to October. The quantity which falls is unequal; at Gowhatty, it is about 80; at Chirra Poonjee, 200; and in the Cossya country, 500 to 600 inches = 50 ft. At this latter place there fell in 1850, no less than 502 inches = 42 ft.; in August, 1841, there were 204 inches = 22 ft., in five successive days—30 inches every 24 hours. [Let it be remembered that the annual fall in London is 27; in Edinburgh, 24; in Glasgow, 32 inches.] The eastern side of the Bay of Bengal, to the Straits of Malacca, is more genial and agreeable than that of the Coromandel coast: the greatest heat is in April; therm., at Mergui, 100°; the monsoon is mild, but violent to the northward.

Lower Assam and Arracan are similar to Bengal.

This rapid sketch will indicate the variety of climates in India; but it is in the loftier adjoining regions that the greatest extremes exist.

The *Himalaya* and *Hindoo-Koosh* slopes and valleys exhibit a very varied temperature, and corresponding diversity of products, from the loftiest forest trees to the stunted lichens and mosses, when the last trace of vegetable life disappears as effectually as it does at the Arctic or Antarctic Poles, snow being equally perpetual at an elevation of four to five miles (20,840 to 25,000 ft.) above the sea, as at the extreme northern and southern parts of our globe. On the southern, or Indo-Gangetic side of the Himalaya, which rises like a wall from the sub-Himalaya, the snow-line commences at 12,000 to 13,000 ft. on some of the spurs or buttresses; on the northern side of the same range,—table-land of Tibet 10,000 ft. above the sea; the snow-line commences at 16,000 ft., but in some places is

not found at 20,000 ft. On the southern slope cultivation ceases at 10,000 ft.; but on the northern side, cultivation extends to 14,000 ft., where birch-trees flourish; the limit of furze-bushes is at 17,000 ft. Vegetation, to some extent, indicates the more or less severity of this mountain climate: the *Deodar* has its favourite abode at 7,000 to 12,000 ft.—attains a circumference of 30 ft., and of great stature, and the wood will last, exposed to the weather, for 400 years. Various species of magnificent pines have a range of 5,000 to 12,000 ft.; the arborescent rhododendron, every branchlet terminated by a gorgeous bunch of crimson flowers, spreads at 5,000 to 8,000 ft.; the horse-chestnut and yew commence at 6,000 ft., and end at 10,000 ft.; the oak flourishes at 7,000 to 8,000 ft.; maple, at 10,000 to 11,000 ft.; ash, poplar, willow, rose, cytusus, at 12,000; elm, at 7,000 to 10,000; birch commences at 10,000, ceases on S. slope at 13,000 ft.; on N. side fine forests of this tree at 14,000 ft. Juniper met with occasionally at latter-named height; the grape attains great excellence at Koonawur, 8,000 ft., but does not ripen beyond 9,000 ft.; the currant thrives at 8,000 and 9,000 ft.; apricot, at 11,000 ft.; gooseberry and raspberry, at 10,000 to 12,000 ft.

The decrement of heat in proportion to latitude and elevation is, as yet, imperfectly ascertained. Dr. Hooker* allows one degree of Fahrenheit's thermometer for every degree of latitude and every 300 ft. of ascent above the sea; at Calcutta, in 22° 34', the mean ann. temperature is about 79°; that of Darjeeling, in Sikhim, 27° 2'; 7,460 ft. above Calcutta, is 53°, about 26° below the heat of Calcutta. The decrease of temperature with elevation is much less in summer than in winter: in January, 1° = 250 ft., between 7,000 and 13,000 ft.; in July, 1° = 400 ft.; the decrement also less by day than by night. The decremental proportions of heat to height is roughly indicated by this skillful meteorologist—

1° = 300 ft. at elevation	1,000 to 8,000 ft.
1° = 320 ft. "	8,000 to 10,000 ft.
1° = 350 ft. "	10,000 to 14,000 ft.
1° = 400 ft. "	14,000 to 18,000 ft.

This must be effected by aspect and slope of elevation; by quantity of rain falling, and permeability of soil to moisture; by amount of cloud and sunshine, exposure of surface, absence of trees, undulation of the land, terrestrial radiation, and other local influences.

Within the tropics, in the northern hemisphere, the limits of perpetual concretion is 10,000 to 17,000 ft. above the sea; in lat. 30°, 14,000 ft.; in 40°, 10,000 ft.; in 50°, 6,000 ft.; in 60°, 5,000 ft.; in 70°, 1,000 ft.; and in 80° and further north, at the sea-level. In the southern hemisphere, Georgia, which is in lat. 56°, exhibits perpetual frost.

At Kumaon, winter rigour is moderated by great solar radiation, and somewhat tempered by contiguous snow-capped mountains, whence a diurnal current of air sets in as regularly as a sea-breeze on a tropical shore, and with a nearly equally invigorating effect. Snow commences to fall at the end of September, and continues until the beginning of April. During the absence of snow for five months, the mercury ranges at sunrise, 40 to 55°; at mid-day, 65 to 75° in the shade—90 to 110° Fahr. in the sun. The heat of course diminishes as height increases, except during the cold season. At Almora town, in 29° 30', 5,400 ft. elevation, the therm. before

* In his valuable work, *Himalayan Journals*, ii., 404.

sunrise is always lowest in the valleys, and the frost more intense than on the hills of 7,000 ft. elevation, while at noon the sun is more powerful; extreme range in 24 hours, sometimes from 18 to 51° Fahr. Snow does not fall equally in every season; the natives say the greatest fall is every third year. On the Ghagor range, between Almora and the plains, snow remains so late as the month of May. At Mussoorie, 6,000 to 7,000 ft. high, the mean ann. heat is only 57° Fahr.; indeed, at 4,000 ft. hot winds cease, and vegetation assumes an European character. Annual fall of rain at Almora, 40 to 50 inches.

The northernmost part of Nepal valley, between 27 and 28°, and elevation of 4,000 ft., has a climate somewhat similar to that of the southern parts of Europe. In winter a hoar-frost commonly covers the ground, occasionally for three or four months, freezing the standing pools and tanks, but not severe enough to arrest the flow of rivers. In summer noon, the mercury stands at 80 to 87° Fahr. The seasons are very nearly like those of Upper Hindoostan; the rains set in earlier, and from the S.E. are usually very copious, and break up about October, causing excessive inundations in some places from the mountain torrents. In a few hours, the inhabitants, by ascending the sides of the enclosing mountains, may exchange a Bengal heat for a Siberian winter.

At Darjeeling the atmosphere is relatively more humid than at Calcutta; the belt of sandy and grassy land, at the foot of the Himalaya, only 300 ft. higher than in Calcutta, and 3½° N. of that city, is, during the spring months, March and April, 6 or 7° colder; and though there is absolutely less moisture in the air, it is relatively more humid; this is reversed after the rains commence. The south wind, which brings all the moisture from the Bay of Bengal, discharges annually 60 to 80 inches of rain in traversing 200 m. of land; but the temperature is higher in advancing north-west from the Bay of Bengal: which may be caused from the absence of any great elevation in the Gangetic valley and plain, and its being walled in to the northward by the Himalaya mountains.

Elevation causes in Afghanistan a corresponding diversity of climate: at Cabool, which is considered to be very salubrious, and 6,396 ft. above the sea, the air is warmer in summer and colder in winter than that of England; and the diurnal therm. range is great, amounting to 40°. June, July, and August are the hottest; December, January, and February the coldest months,—the mercury falling several degrees below zero Fahr.; but the sun possesses sufficient power at mid-day to melt the surface of the snow, which, however, is again frozen at night. The seasons are very regular; the sky is unclouded, the air bright and clear, with scarcely any rain; in November a few showers are followed by snow; and from the middle of March till the 1st of May, there is incessant rain, which melts the snow rapidly, and causes a sudden transition from winter to summer (with but little spring), when thunder and hail-storms occur; earthquakes are not unfrequent during winter in the immediate vicinity of the lofty ranges, but are said to be unknown at Candahar. Prevailing winds, N.N.W. and W.; E. seldom; winter, calm; variable at breaking up of the season.*

* Notes of observations, 1st April, 1838, to 31st March, 1840, in Afghanistan.—(*Calcutta Jour. Nat. Hist.*)

† The Choora district (valley of the Pabur, 4,800 feet)

Cashmere valley, by its elevation (5,000 ft.), has a cool climate; in winter the celebrated lake is slightly frozen over, and the ground covered with snow to the depth of 2 ft.; hottest months, July and August, therm. 80 to 85° at noon, when the air is sometimes oppressive from want of circulation.

But it is in the loftier regions that the peculiarities caused by altitude are most observable: at—

Bussahir,—the climate varies from that of the intertropical at Rampoor, 3,260 ft.† above the sea, to that of the region of perpetual congelation: in parts bordering on the table-land of Tartary the air is at one season characterised by aridity greater than that of the most scorching parts of the torrid zone. In October, and later in the year, when the winds blow with the greatest violence, woodwork shrinks and warps, and leather and paper curl up as if held to a fire; the human body exposed to those arid winds in a few minutes show the surface collapsed, and if long left in this condition life becomes extinct. Vegetation with difficulty struggles against their effects. Gerard found tracts exposed to them to have a most desolate and dreary aspect; not a single tree, or blade of green grass, was distinguishable for near 30 m., the ground being covered with a very prickly plant, which greatly resembled furze in its withered state. This shrub was almost black, seeming as if burnt; and the leaves were so much parched from the arid winds of Tartary, that they might be ground to powder by rubbing them between the hands. Those winds are generally as violent as hurricanes, rendering it difficult for the traveller to keep his feet. The uniform reports of the inhabitants represent the year as continual sunshine, except during March and April, when there are some showers, and a few clouds hang about the highest mountains; but a heavy fall of rain or snow is almost unknown. The excessive cold and aridity on the most elevated summits cause the snow to be there so light, loose, and powdery, that it is continually swept like smoke through the air by the tempestuous winds. The limit of perpetual congelation in Bussahir ascends to the northward.

The direct rays of the sun are extremely hot at great elevations: insomuch, that Jacquemont found the stones on the ground on the table-land of Tartary, at an elevation of 15,000 or 16,000 ft., become so hot in sunshine, as to be nearly unbearable by the hand; at an elevation of 18,000 ft., Gerard found the rays of the sun so oppressive that he was obliged to wrap his face in a blanket.

At *Buli* or *Little Tibet* the atmosphere is very clear and dry. But though rain is almost unknown, snow falls, and lies from the depth of 1 to 2 ft. The cold in the elevated parts is intense in winter; on the high and unsheltered table-land of Deotsuh, it at that season totally precludes the existence of animal life. The heat in the lower parts in summer is considerable, the therm.† ranging from 70 to 90° in the shade at noon.

At *Ladakh* the climate is characterised by cold and excessive aridity. The snow-line is so usually high in Spiti and Ruphsu, at the south-eastern extremity of Ladakh, as to show the utter futility of attempting to theorise respecting the so-called isothermal lines, in the present scanty and imperfect state of our information as to the data from

is a beautiful and fertile tract, with a delightful climate.

† Thornton's *Gazetteer: Afghanistan*, &c., vol. i., p. 120.

which they should be determined. Gerard says, respecting Spiti, in lat. 32°, that the marginal limit of the snow, which, upon the sides of Chimborazo, occurs at 15,700 ft., is scarcely permanent in Thibet at 19,000, and upon the southward aspect has no well-defined boundary at 21,000 ft.; and one summit, 22,000 ft. high, was seen by him to be free of snow on the last day in August. This absence of snow probably results, in part, from the very small quantity of moisture kept suspended in the highly rarefied atmosphere, in part from the intense heat of the direct rays of the sun, the latter cause being in some degree dependent on the former. "Wherever we go," observes Gerard, "we find the sun's rays oppressive." In one instance, in the beginning of September, at an elevation of 15,500 ft., a thermometer, resting upon the rocks, marked 158°; in another, at 14,500 ft., the instrument, placed on sand, marked 130°; and in a small tent, at an elevation of 13,000 ft., it indicated 110°. These phenomena he attributed to the rarefaction and tenuity of the atmosphere, from elevation and the absence of moisture,—circumstances which allow of such immediate radiation of heat, that at the same moment there will be a difference of more than 100° between places only a few hundred yards asunder, occasioned by the one receiving, and the other being excluded, from the direct rays of the sun. At Rupshu, at the elevation of 16,000 ft., it freezes every night, even at Midsummer; but the heat of the day so far countervails the cold of night, that the Lake Chamoreuil is free from ice during the summer months. At Le, having an elevation of about 10,000 ft., frosts, with snow and sleet, commence early in September and continue until May; the therm. from the middle of December to February, ranges from 10 to 20°; even in June, the rivulets are often, at night, coated with ice. Moorcroft, during his Himalayan travels, found the therm., when exposed to the sun's rays at mid-day in July, to range from 134 to 144°. The atmosphere is in general dry in all parts of the country.

In the works of Gerard, Lloyd, Moorcroft, Vigue, Jacquemont, and Hooker, useful details are given on the meteorology of these lofty regions.

The climate of India is not inimical to the European constitution: that of Bengal and other low districts is very trying, especially to those who do not follow a strictly temperate course in all things; but there are many instances of Englishmen living for a quarter of a century at Calcutta, and on returning to England, enjoying another quarter of a century of existence, preserving, to old age, a vigorous mental and bodily frame.* In the hot and moist parts of India, abdominal diseases,—in the warm and dry, hepatic action or congestion prevail. Exposure at night, especially to malaria or the effluvia arising from intense heat and decomposing vegetable and animal matter, causes a bilious remittent (popularly called

jungle fever), which operates as a poison on the human system, and becomes rapidly fatal if not counteracted by mercury or some other poison, or unless the morbid matter be expelled, and the patient have strength of frame to survive the fever.

The direct rays of a nearly vertical sun, and even those also of the moon, cause affections of the brain which are frequently fatal; and when not so, require removal to the temperate zone for their relief. The establishment of sanatoria at elevated and healthy positions, has proved a great benefit to Anglo-Indians, who at Darjeeling, Simla, Landour, Mussoorie, Mount Abo, the Neilgherries, and other places, are enabled to enjoy a European temperature and exercise,—to check the drain on the system from the cutaneous pores being always open,—to brace the fibres and tone the nerves, which become gradually relaxed by the long continuance of a high temperature. As India becomes more clear and cultivated, and facilities for locomotion by railroads and steam-boats are augmented, the health of Europeans will improve, and their progeny will derive a proportionate benefit: but it is doubtful whether there is any part of the country where a European colony would *permanently* thrive, so as to preserve for successive generations the stamina and energy of the northern races.

The diseases that prevail among the Indians vary with locality: low, continued fever is most prevalent in flat, and rheumatism in moist regions. Leprosy and other skin disorders are numerous among the poorest classes. *Elephantiasis*, or swelling of the legs; *berri-berri*, or enlargement of the spleen; torpidity of the liver, weakness of the lungs, and ophthalmia, are common to all ranks and places: goitre is found among the hill tribes; cholera and influenza sometimes decimate large masses of the people. Numerous maladies, engendered by early and excessive sensuality, exist among rich and poor, and medical or surgical skill are consequently everywhere in great request. The inhabitants of India, generally speaking, except in the more elevated districts, have not the robust frames or well-wearing constitutions which result from an improved social state, or from the barbarism which is as yet free from the vices and defects of an imperfect civilisation: the inhabitants of the torrid zone do not enjoy a longevity equal to those who dwell in the temperate climates of the earth.

* Mr. W. C. Blaquiere, for a long period police magistrate at Calcutta, died there in 1854, æt. 95: he arrived at Bengal in 1774.

GEOLOGY.—It will require many more years of scientific research before an accurate geological map can be laid down for India.* Immense tracts covered with impenetrable forests,—the few Europeans in the country occupied with military and civil governmental duties,—the lassitude of mind and body which, sooner or later, oppresses the most energetic,—and the malaria which inevitably destroys those who attempt to investigate the crust of the earth, overrun with jungle, or immersed in swamp;—these, and other obstacles render the prosecution of this science a matter of extreme difficulty. All that can be attempted in a work of this nature is to collate the best known data, and arrange them in outline, for reference and future systematic exposition.†

Representatives of all the series found in Europe and other parts of the world, are traceable in India. Mr. Carter has industriously noted the observations of various investigators; and the following summary is partly abstracted from his compilation:—

OLDER METAMORPHIC STRATA.—*Gneiss, Mica Schiste, Chlorite Schiste, Hornblende Schiste, Quartz Rock, Micaceous Slate, Tulose Slate, Clay Slate, Granular Limestone.*

Gneiss.—Most general and abundant,—occurring in different parts of the Himalaya; Oodeypoor; near Baroda; Zillah Bahar; Rajmahal hills; Phoonda Ghaut; Northern Circars; and more or less throughout "peninsula" (?) Deccan to the Palghaut, and probably to Cape Comorin: it is frequently veined by granite, contains in most places specular iron ore: beds of garnets common everywhere; corundum in southern India, and beryl in Mysoor. Composition varied in texture, compactness, and with more or less mica; colour—speckled, black, brown, reddish gray to white; sometimes tinted green where chlorite replaces mica: when very fine-grained and decomposing, gneiss bears a close resemblance to fine-grained sandstone.

Mica Schiste—Southern Mahratta country, and western extremities of Vindhya range, passes into micaceous slate at the Phoonda Ghaut: veined with quartz, but no granite: being associated with gneiss and hornblende schistes, they pass into each other.

Chlorite Schiste.—Southern Mahratta country: it also contains garnets.

* The late eminent geologist, J. B. Greenough, has made an excellent beginning by his large map on this subject, and by the voluminous materials he collected.

† See a valuable *Summary of the Geology of India, between the Ganges, the Indus, and Cape Comorin*; by H. J. Carter, Asst. Surg. Bombay Establishment, Aug., 1853: reprinted from Journal of Bombay British Asiatic Society, p. 156.

‡ In the neighbourhood of Calcutta a series of boring experiments to find water, were carried on at intervals between 1804 and 1833; the results were—artificial soil at surface; next, as follows: a light blue or gray-coloured sandy clay, becoming gradually darker from decayed vegetable matter, until it passes at 30 ft. deep into a 2 ft. stratum of black peat, apparently formed by the debris of Sunderbund vegetation, which was once the delta of the

Hornblende Schiste, forms the sides of the Neilgherries, where it is from five to seven miles in breadth: garnets found in it. Southern Mahratta country, Salem; and often passes into mica schiste on the Malabar coast.

Quartz Rock.—Hills between Delhi and Alwur, and between Ajmere and Oodeypoor; mountains around Deybur Lake, Chittoor, and at the western part of the Vindhya range, with mica slate; southern Mahratta country; more or less in the granitic plains of Hyderabad, and in the droogs of Mysoor. The rock is compact and granular in the Ajmere mountains; and of a red, violet, gray, or brown colour; brilliantly white in the Mahratta country. Mica is frequently disseminated throughout the rock in large masses; talc and chlorite, occasionally.

Micaceous Slate and Chlorite Slate.—Both at the Phoonda Ghaut; and the latter in the Mahratta country. The micaceous occurs in the Indo-Gangetic chain, Koonawur; and in the Soolumbur range, Oodeypoor.

Clay Slate, appears to be of great thickness, and considerable extent, viz., from the Arravulli range, the lower part of which is composed of this formation; thence to Oodeypoor, *via* the Soolumbur range, across the Durgawud valley to Malwa, on the Kistnah; southern Mahratta country, Nellore; and in the Eastern Ghauts at Jungamanipenta, a ferruginous clay-slate overlies the trap at Mahabulishwar. In the Arravulli it is massive, compact, and of a dark blue colour. The Soolumbur range is almost entirely composed of this and chlorite slates. Micaceous passes into clay-slate at the Phoonda, and, farther south, the Saltor passes (Western Ghauts.) This also occurs at the Carrackpoor hills (Bahar), where the clay-slate is about twenty miles wide, and extends in the direction of the strata.‡

PLUTONIC ROCKS.—*Granite, Diorite or Greenstone.*

Granite.—Himalaya; Ajmere and around Jeypoor, traversing the mountains in veins and dykes; the Arravulli range consists chiefly of granite, resting on slate; Mount Abo; from Balmeer across the sands to Nuggur Parkur; the Gir; Girnar; between Oodeypoor and Malwa, are all varieties: it extends more or less southward to the Nerbudda; on that river between Mundela and Amarkantak, Jubbulpoor, Kalleenjur, Zillah Bahar, Carrackpoor hills; in Bhaulpore and Monghyr districts; near Baitool; Nagpore territory; Cuttack; Orissa; Northern Circars; Hyderabad; between the Kistnah and Godavery; Gooty; Neilgherries; Malabar coast at Vingorla; Coromandel; between Madras and Pondicherry; ending at Cape Comorin. The granitic rocks vary in structure and composition, as they do in colour: thus there are *syenitic, pegmatitic, and protogenic*. It is gray at Ramteak in Nagpore, red generally in

Ganges; below the peat a black clay, and in this and the gray clay immediately above the peat, logs and branches of yellow and red wood, found in a more or less decayed state. In one instance only bones were discovered, at 28 ft. deep. Under blue clays, at 50 to 70 ft. deep, *kunkur* and *bagiri* (apparently small land shells, as seen in Upper India.) At 70 ft. a seam of loose reddish sand,—75 to 125 ft. beds of yellow clay predominate, frequently stiff and pure like potter's clay, but generally mixed with sand and mica: horizontal strata of *kunkur* pass through it, resembling exactly those found at Midnapore. Below 128 ft. a more sandy yellow clay prevails, which gradually changes to a gray, loose sand, becoming coarser in quality to the lowest depth yet reached (176 ft.), where it contains angular fragments, as large as peas, of quartz and felspar.



The struggle with a numerous enemy resolved on following this system, was necessarily tedious and harassing, and required an incessant watchfulness in even minor operations; the slightest intermission being followed by disastrous consequences. Sir Colin and General Mansfield—men whose minds and bodies were models of sustained, disciplined power—maintained admirable order and accuracy in all their proceedings; but officers in detached commands were occasionally betrayed into acts of fatal rashness.

Sir Colin, after amply providing for the tenure of Lucknow, divided his force into columns, which were ordered to proceed by different routes converging on Bareilly. On the 9th of April, General Walpole, at the head of about 5,000 men of all arms, marched from Lucknow for the purpose of clearing the left bank of the Ganges, and securing the passage of the Ramgunga at Alighuj, in anticipation of the arrival of the division under the commander-in-chief. On the 15th, General Walpole reached a jungle fort, named Royea, near the village of Rhodamow.

Nirput Sing, the Rajpoot owner of the fort, was an old man and a cripple. He had as yet shown no hostility to the British; but, according to the reports of our spies, he had just received a letter from the Begum, and had resolved on espousing her cause. On receiving the summons of General Walpole, he "did not come in, or send any satisfactory reply."*

The attack on the fort was immediately commenced. General Walpole states, that he "sent forward some infantry in extended order, to enable the place to be reconnoitred, when a heavy fire was immediately opened upon them, and an occasional gun." The consequence was, that the attempted examination was abandoned; and notwithstanding Sir Colin's prohibition of any attack on fortified places except with heavy artillery, part of the 42nd Highlanders and 4th Punjab regiment were suffered to attempt to storm the fort. It is said that they had nearly succeeded, and were desperately clambering up the walls, helping each other by hand and leg and fire-lock, when the general sent to desire them to retreat; and Brigadier Hope, while engaged

in restoring order and getting the men together to retire, was mortally wounded by a musket-ball, fired by a man posted in a high tree inside the walls. The brigadier said to his aide-de-camp, as he fell, "They have done for me: remember me to my friends;" and died in a few seconds. As many men were lost in the retreat as in the advance. Lieutenant Willoughby, the brother to the officer who took a prominent part in firing the small-arm magazine at Delhi, was killed at the head of the Sikhs; and the 42nd left Lieutenants Douglas and Bramley behind, mortally wounded. Sergeant Simpson rushed back, and recovered both the bodies; and two men, in striving to rescue others of their comrades, were killed by the fire from the fort; which the triumphant garrison (whose numbers were stated, or guessed, at from 300 to 1,500) poured forth unceasingly, amid shouts and yells of victory. In this miserable business, above a hundred casualties occurred; forty-two Highlanders and forty-six Sikhs were killed or wounded. The fallen leaders were all popular men, especially Adrian Hope; and the officers of the 42nd and 93rd, "themselves in a state of furious wrath, and discontented with their general," declared, "the fury of the men was so great, that they were afraid of mutiny, or worse, when poor Hope was buried!"† The "worse" than mutiny, here alluded to, is elsewhere explained as meaning personal threats against Walpole, for having needlessly sacrificed many lives.‡ Altogether, this first procedure against the mud forts of the chiefs of Oude, was extremely discouraging.

After the withdrawal of the storming party, preparations were made for investing the place, which was nothing more than a wall enclosing some houses, with loopholes for musketry, some irregular bastions at the angles, and two gates, both on the same face of the work. The enemy disappeared during the night; and in the morning the British marched in. "A few bodies which seemed to have been overlooked, and three large funeral fires, with the remains of the bodies smouldering,"§ afforded all the evidence that could be obtained as to the loss of life on the part of the enemy. Only five guns were found in the fort; but the track of wheels was followed to a deep well, down which other guns were supposed to have been thrown.

On the 22nd of April, General Walpole

* General Walpole's despatch, April 16th, 1858.—*London Gazette*, July 17th, 1858.

† Russell's *Diary in India*, vol. i., p. 393.

‡ Russell.—*Times*, June 17th, 1858.

§ Walpole's despatch, April 15th, 1858.

had a successful encounter with a body of Rohilcund rebels at Sirsa; and, on the 27th, he reached Tingree. Here the united force, under the commander-in-chief, crossed the Ramgunga by the bridge of boats which Walpole's victory had prevented the enemy from destroying, and British troops set foot in Rohilcund for the first time since the mutiny. Sir Colin was anxious to conciliate the country-people by just and considerate dealings. The most stringent orders were issued against plundering; and it was no unusual thing to see the veteran general, with the flat of his sword, or a cudgel, personally chastising the thievish camp-followers. At Jellalabad (the first halt made in Rohilcund) there was an old mud fort, which had been hastily abandoned by the enemy. A native official, who had acted as tehsildar (deputy-collector) to the Company, came in and surrendered himself, on the assurance of an officer (Captain Carey) that his life should be spared. Mr. Money, the civil officer with the force, seized the man, and ordered him to be hanged, which was accordingly done; the tehsildar meeting his fate "with calmness and even dignity;" but declaring, with his last breath, that he had been snared by the false promise of a British officer. "Sir Colin was extremely indignant at the transaction, which he characterised in the severest way;"* and spoke to Mr. Money in a sharp and decided tone, calculated to prevent such occurrences in the camp for the future.

The force reached Shahjehanpoor on the 30th of April, and found it recently evacuated by the Nana, who had gone to Bareilly to join Khan Bahadoor, the Begum of Oude, and Prince Feroze Shah of Delhi. The Moolvee of Fyzabad had proceeded to Mohumdee. Shahjehanpoor was half empty; and the church, the English cantonments, and stations had been destroyed by the mutineers. On the 2nd of May, Sir Colin marched thence upon Bareilly, through an almost abandoned country, where the fields but too often bore no promise of a second crop. A few very old and very miserable people were alone seen in the villages; the houses were all fastened up, bolted, padlocked, and deserted—a mortifying sight to a commander, who suffered no plunder and

no injury, that he could prevent, to be done to the unarmed natives; but a certain consequence of the conduct of the so-called "avenging columns," sent forth at an early stage of the war, when few distinctions were made between the innocent and the guilty. While Sir Colin marched from the north, Brigadier John Jones came south from Moradabad; and a third force, under Colonel H. Richmond Jones (lately commanded by General Penny), advanced from the west, to concentrate on what was now viewed as the metropolis of the revolt. General Penny was a good soldier and a careful leader; but, blinded by false intelligence, he, "for the sake of sparing his troops, neglected some common military precautions,"† and fell while leading a loosely-ordered night march through Budaon, at a village called Kukrowlee, from whence grape and musketry were suddenly fired by an ambushed enemy. Penny, whose bridle-hand was probably disabled, seems to have been carried by his frightened horse into the midst of a party of Ghazis hidden in a ditch, by whom he was killed, and several other officers and men were wounded. The village was shelled, and carried by the bayonet, and the dead body of the general was found stripped and covered with wounds.

Bareilly.—On the 5th of May, the united force advanced upon Bareilly; and an outlying suburb, two miles from the city, was attacked by some Seik companies, followed by the 42nd and 79th regiments. The Seiks pressed forward to explore a ruined mass of one-storied houses in front of the British lines; but finding themselves exposed to a heavy fire of musketry from 700 or 800 concealed matchlockmen, they fell back in disorder on the advancing Highlanders, closely followed by a body of Ghazis—grey-bearded, elderly men, who, sword in hand, with small round bucklers on the left arm, and green cummerbunds, rushed out with bodies bent and heads low, waving their tulwars with a circular motion in the air, and uttering their war-cry—"Bismillah Allah! deen, deen!" (Glory to Allah! the faith, the faith!) At first, the fanatics were mistaken for Seiks, whose passage had already disturbed the British ranks. But Sir Colin was close beside the 42nd, and had just time to say, "Steady, men, steady! Close up the ranks. Bayonet them as they come." A short but sanguinary struggle ensued. Colonel Cameron was pulled off his horse, and only saved by the

* Russell.—*Times*, June 17th, 1858. *Diary*, vol. i., p. 398. "Lord Canning subsequently approved of Mr. Money's act, as he proved the man was a ringleader in rebellion."—*Ibid.*, p. 399.

† Despatch of Adjutant-general, May 6th, 1858.

prompt courage of Sergeant Gardiner. Brigadier Walpole was also seized by two or three Ghazis, and received two cuts on the hand; but he was rescued by the quick bayonets of the 42nd; and, in a few minutes, the dead bodies of the devoted band (133 in number), and some eighteen or twenty wounded on the British side, were all the tokens left of the struggle.*

While the Ghazis were making their fierce onslaught in front, the hostile cavalry swept among the sick and camp-followers in the rear, and seemed as if they intended to make a dash at the baggage, but were soon driven off by the fire of the British guns. The movement had, however, created a panic among the camel-drivers and bazaar people; and elephants, bullocks, camels, and horses rushed wildly across the plain. Mr. Russell, Sir David Baird, and Captain Alison scrambled out of their dhoolies on to their horses, and rode off, very scantily clad, to the shelter of the guns, hotly pursued by the sowars, by whom "the special correspondent"† was severely wounded, but rescued through the devotion of his native servants.

* Sir Colin himself had a narrow escape. As he was riding from one company to another, his eye caught that of a Ghazi, who lay, tulwar in hand, feigning death, just before him. "Guessing the ruse, he called to a soldier, 'Bayonet that man.' The Highlander made a thrust at him; but his weapon would not enter the thick cotton quilting of the Ghazi's tunic; and the impostor was just springing to his feet, when a Sikh, with 'a whistling stroke of his sabre, cut off the Ghazi's head with one blow, as if it had been the bulb of a poppy.'"—Russell's *Diary in India*, vol. ii., p. 14.

† Mr. Russell was lame from the kick of a horse; Sir David Baird was ill of a fever; and Captain Alison suffering from small-pox. At this time Sir Colin had no staff: he had "used-up" more than one set of officers completely; and Captain Hope Johnstone alone remained with General Mansfield.—*Times*, July 6th, 1858.

‡ Despatch of Sir C. Campbell, May 8th, 1858.—*London Gazette*, July 28th, 1858. Sir Colin's approval was greatly valued, because of the conscientiousness with which it was given. He never courted popularity by lavish praise; and the manner in which he abstained from recommending officers for the Victoria medal, was often discussed as a grievance in his camp. It is probable that the spirit of the order seemed to him injudicious, as tempting men to seek for distinction by a single daring act, rather than by steady perseverance in ordinary duty. In his own breast, physical courage was an instinct which required repression rather than encouragement; and he sedulously checked every approach to fool-hardiness in both officers and men. At this time, moreover, there was a great tendency to vulgarise the decoration by its too hasty and indiscriminate bestowal. One man was

The enemy abandoned the suburbs; but it was believed they were concentrating upon some point in the city; and Sir Colin, not deeming it advisable to expose troops, exhausted with thirst and intense heat, to the fatigue and hazard of a series of street fights, secured the cantonments and advanced posts, and bivouacked for the night on the tentless plain.

Brigadier John Jones arrived with his column from Moradabad (which city the rebels evacuated at his approach), and took up his position on the north side of Bareilly, just as the conflict in the suburbs terminated. The commander-in-chief, when he advanced into the cantonment on the following morning, heard the welcome sound of the brigadier's guns; and declared that "this officer had obeyed his instructions with great judgment and spirit; defeated a portion of the enemy on the 5th instant, taking three guns; and finding himself resisted on his approach to the town on the 6th, took three more which were in position against him; entered the town, and took three advanced positions without delay."‡ On the morning of the 7th,

alleged to have received it for running his sword through the body of a dying Ghazi, who stood at bay in a patch of jungle. Another was recommended for it by his comrades, because he "was the sergeant who served out the grog."—*Times*, April 2nd, 1859. Among many instances of the unsatisfactory manner in which the Victoria Cross was given and withheld, may be cited the case of Major Anderson (25th N.I.), the assistant-commissioner of Lucknow, and one of the annalists of the siege. The officer maintained his own house, as an outpost, from the 30th of June till the 22nd of November, 1857. Until the relief in September, he, with only ten men of H.M. 32nd, and ten volunteers held a sand-bag breastwork four-and-a-half feet high, from which a 9 and an 18-pounder gun had been withdrawn, as artillerymen could not load them, on account of the deadly fire from the adjacent houses. General Outram, on his arrival, erected a battery on the spot, where Major (then Captain) Anderson continued till the end of the siege. The men were relieved every week. He remained there nearly five months, employed, day and night, in the defence; and having, besides, to chop wood, cook, wash his own clothes, and dig in the outworks; and all this in a building on which nine guns of different sizes were constantly playing. A desperate attempt was made by the enemy to escalate this outpost; but was most gallantly repulsed. Brigadier Inglis, in his memorable despatch, and the various chronicles of the siege, have borne testimony to the patient, unflinching zeal of Major Anderson; yet when an opportunity occurred for conferring on him an honourable distinction, his services were left unnoticed. The occasion was this. The pillars of the verandah of his house were shot away, and a civilian (Mr. Capper) was

the town was finally reduced, with trifling loss to the victors, except by sun-stroke, under which many more fell than by the tulwars of the Ghazis, of whom detached bodies remained in the houses, and fought to the last. The completeness with which the concentration of the columns was accomplished, excited much admiration for the commander-in-chief's power of organisation. All parties concurred in lauding the masterly manner in which the three columns were brought to bear on a great city, which, though without walls, was believed to be filled by thousands of men, who, hopeless of victory, only desired to die in a hand-to-hand struggle with the infidel. A powerful and well-organised force was needed to crush these dangerous foes, with little loss of the lives Sir Colin was so chary of imperilling. He succeeded in convincing Khan Bahadoor of the fruitlessness of protracting the struggle; and the consequence was, that he and the other rebel leaders fled, leaving the city to fall an easy prize into the hands of the British.

The great political advantage gained by the reoccupation of Bareilly, was enhanced by the precautions taken by the commander-in-chief to check plunder (for which there was comparatively but little opportunity, as the fugitives had removed all available property), and by the procla-

mation of an amnesty to all but notorious rebels—a measure which was only common justice to the people of Rohilcund; who had been left, ever since the outbreak of the mutiny, entirely in the hands of the recognised representative and legitimate descendant of their former rulers.

The chief events of this important campaign have now been narrated. At its close, the rebels had ceased to possess a single city or fortified town. The British flag had been replanted on the towers of Delhi, Lucknow, Cawnpoor, Bareilly, and numerous less important places, by dint of extraordinary efforts, which had been attended with no less extraordinary success. Mutinous troops, rebel princes, and revolted citizens, had been overcome by men fighting on a foreign soil, with frames tried by an uncongenial climate, and liable to be prostrated, amid the din of battle, by sun-stroke, fever, and pestilence. Compassed about by danger and discouragement, they had steadily held on their course—plodding wearily through sandy plains; wading through swamps, or groping among dense jungles often filled with ambushed foes; fighting battles and besieging cities, as it were, incidentally; until, in June, 1858, when no more pitched battles remained to be fought, nor cities to be besieged, the victors might well retire to rest in their cantonments for a short season.

CHAPTER XXVI.

CAMPAIGN IN OUDE; FATE OF LEADING REBELS; MOOLVEE OF LUCKNOW; LALL MADHOO SING, OF AMETHIE; BAINIE MADHOO, RANA OF SHUNKERPOOR; DABEE BUX, RAJAH OF GONDA; NIRPUT SING, OF ROYEA; TANTIA TOPEE; MAUN SING; MEHNDIE HOSSEIN; FEROZE SHAH, PRINCE OF DELHI; BEGUM OF OUDE, AND BIRJIS KUDDER; NAWABS OF FURRUCKABAD, BANDA, AND JHUJJUR; RAJAHS OF MITHOWLEE AND BULLUBGHUR; TRIAL, SENTENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION OF THE KING OF DELHI; SURRENDER OF KHAN BAHADOOR KHAN; PENAL SETTLEMENT FOR SEPOYS, FORMED AT THE ANDAMANS; TERMINATION OF THE RULE OF THE E. I. COMPANY; PROCLAMATION OF THE SOVEREIGNTY OF QUEEN VICTORIA, NOV., 1858; CONCLUSION.

THE course of action adopted by Sir Colin Campbell, in July, 1858, for the reduction of Oude, was similar to that which he had

followed in the Doab, after the battle of Cawnpoor. By never committing the troops to a forward movement until they could be

completely buried under the ruins. Major Anderson, with three other persons, immediately set to work to rescue the entombed man; and after labouring for three-quarters of an hour, under a heavy fire of round shot and musketry, succeeded in getting him out

alive. A corporal who shared the perilous enterprise, received the Victoria medal as a reward. The major, who commanded and co-operated with him, remained undecorated. Of course, a case like this can only be accounted for as occurring through inadvertence.

supported on every side, he converted a march into a thorough process of occupation; and, at the beginning of the year 1859, was able to report to the governor-general, that there was "no longer even a vestige of rebellion in Oude."*

The campaign was wearisome to the troops; but at its close, nothing remained for them to do, except to continue the pursuit of the few insurgent leaders who seemed resolved never to be taken alive. This small number included the noblest, bravest, and ablest of the rebels—such as the Begum of Oude, with a small band of devoted Rajpoots; Prince Feroze Shah, of Delhi; and Khan Bahadoor Khan: it likewise comprehended the Nana, and his hateful associate, Azim Oollah; both of whom were of course beyond the pale of mercy. Their cruel treachery at Cawn-poor was denounced by the Begum, and Prince Feroze Shah, as having brought a curse on the native cause. Yet the offer of £15,000 failed to induce the people to betray the Nana; and when, at the close of 1858, his fortunes were utterly desperate, a hill chief, named the rajah of Churda, sheltered him and his family for weeks in his jungle fort, and, on the approach of the British troops, fled with him into the Terai, the atmosphere of which was pestilential to natives, and fatal to Europeans.

There were, however, exceptional cases, in which rebel chiefs fell through the treachery of two or three compromised individuals. The first of these betrayals was that of the Moolvee of Lucknow or Fyzabad, for whose apprehension £5,000 and a free pardon was offered. On the 15th of June, he arrived before Powayne, a small town, sixteen miles north of Shahjehanpore. The rajah of the place was, it is said, extremely anxious to improve his position with the British, which he had reason to

fear was a dangerous one; therefore he caused the Moolvee to be shot while engaged in a parley; delivered over the dead body to the nearest British magistrate, and received the blood-money.†

Among the chief leaders who surrendered themselves to the commander-in-chief, was the head of a powerful Rajpoot clan—Lall Madhoo Sing, of Amethie. Sir Colin (or rather Lord Clyde, for he had by this time been made a peer, in acknowledgment of the public service rendered by the relief of Lucknow) appeared before the fort of Amethie on the 11th of November, 1858; but hostile operations were stayed by the submission of the rajah, whose antecedents have been already related,‡ and who protested against the decree for the disarmament of his followers and surrender of his arms; urging, with truth, that his fort had sheltered English men, women, and children when in danger; and his arms, which were very few, had been used for the same purpose. He likewise complained boldly of the seizure of his property at Benares, and the refusal of all redress or explanation of the matter.

Bainie Madhoo, the Rana of Shunkerpoore (another Rajpoot of similar rank to Lall Madhoo Sing, and whose son had married the daughter of Koore Sing), abandoned his fort on the approach of Lord Clyde (November 15th), and marched off, with his adherents, treasure, guns, women, and baggage, to join the Begum of Oude and Birjis Kudder, who was, he said, his lawful sovereign, and must be obeyed as such. He proved his sincerity at heavy cost; for though offered his life, his lands, the redress of injuries, the full investigation of grievances—he rejected all, and became a homeless wanderer in the Terai, for the sake of the Begum and her son, to whom he had sworn fealty.§

* Lord Clyde's despatch of January 7th, 1859.

† Russell.—*Times*, February 11th, 1859.

‡ At page 233: where a mistake has been made in the name of the rajah, arising from the confusion which existed in the accounts sent home to England at the time the erroneous paragraph was published. Lall Madhoo Sing is the name of the Rajah of Amethie; Bainie Madhoo Sing, that of the Rana of Shunkerpoore.

§ One of the causes which are said to have strengthened the resolve of Bainie Madhoo, is as follows:—"A kinsman and great friend of his resided, at the time of the outbreak, on his estates between Allahabad and Futtehpore. The commissioner (Chester), aware of his character, wrote to him to say that he was to remain in his house, and give us such aid as

he could render. He did so: he provided coolies, transport, and stores for our troops. Some Sikhs quarrelled with his villagers; and in the fight, it is said, a few men lost their lives. The zemindar was called in to Futtehpore, and he and his elder son were hanged. The second son fled to Bainie Madhoo for protection, and was assured that he would never be abandoned. Out of the 223 villages on Bainie Madhoo's estates, 119 were taken from him on the second revision, after annexation; but, as he was assured that any complaints of unjust treatment in former days, would be considered in the event of his submission, it must be supposed he had some strong personal feeling at work [to account] for the extraordinary animosity he has displayed against us."—Russell: *Times*, January 17th, 1859.

Dabee Bux, Rajah of Gondah, was another of the most determined rebels. A native chief predicated of him and of Bainie Madhoo, that they would not surrender—the latter because he had promised not to desert Birjis Kudder (and he never broke his word); the former because he was fond of fighting, and had done nothing else all his life.*

Nirput Sing, of Royea, a Rajpoot chief of inconsiderable rank before the mutiny, raised himself to eminence by the unflinching resolve with which he stood aloof from proclamations and amnesties; partly, perhaps, because they were so vaguely worded, and so tampered with,† as to inspire little confidence in the intentions of the British government for the better administration of India. It was currently reported of him, that he had vowed (alluding to his crippled condition), "that as God had taken some of his members, he would give the rest to his country."‡

Tantia Topee held out, fighting as he fled, and flying as he fought,§ until the 7th of April, 1859, when he was captured while asleep in the Parone jungles, ten miles from Seepree, by the treachery of Maun Sing; heavily ironed, tried by court-martial, and hanged. His bearing was calm and fearless to the last: he wanted no trial, he said, being well aware that he had nothing but death to expect from the British government. He asked only that his end might be speedy, and that his captive family might not be made to suffer for transactions in which they had had no share.

* Since the above page was written, the prediction has been verified. In November, 1859, Jung Bahadur marched his forces into the Terai, and encountered Bainie Madhoo, who, with 1,200 men, withstood the Goorkas, but was killed with half his followers. The death of the Gondah Rajah, and the surrender of the Gondah Ranees, with eighty-nine followers, have been officially reported. Also the deaths of Bala Rao, of Cawnpore; General Khoda Buksh, Hurdeo Panshau, Chackladar of Khyrabad, and many others.—*Times*, January 21st, 1860.

† Certain leading civilians, although "old, valued, and distinguished" public servants, evinced their repugnance to the amnesty in a most inexcusable manner. Mr. Russell gives a case in point. "It will be credited with difficulty, that a very distinguished officer of the government, whose rank in the councils of the Indian empire is of the very highest, actually suggested to one of the officers charged with the pacification of Oude, that he should not send the proclamation till he had battered down the forts of the chiefs; and yet he did so. Had a military officer so far contravened the orders of his superior, nothing could save him from disgrace and the loss of his commission. A more disgraceful suggestion could scarcely have been made to a man

Maun Sing himself had been driven, many months earlier, from his pretended neutrality by Mehndie Hussein, who had summoned him, in the name of the Begum of Oude, to join her cause in person, at the head of his retainers; and not receiving a satisfactory answer, had besieged him in his fort of Shalgunj; whereupon the intriguer had been compelled to seek aid from the British, and decisively join the cause which, by that time (July, 1858), was beyond question the stronger. This chief and his brother, Rugber Sing, have played a winning game, in a manner quite consistent with the account of their previous lives, given by Colonel Sleeman. Mehndie Hussein, "a fine, tall, portly man, with very agreeable face;" his uncle, Meer Dost Ali, and several other of the Oude leaders, surrendered themselves into the hands of the commander-in-chief in January, 1859, encouraged by the conciliatory tone the government had gradually been induced to assume. "I was twenty-five years in the service of the King of Oude," said Mehndie Hussein as he entered the British camp; evidently implying that he could not, as a man of honour, help fighting in the cause of one he had served so long. Lord Clyde behaved with frank courtesy to the fallen chiefs; invited them to be seated; and expressed his hope that they would now settle down as good subjects of the British Crown. "I have been fifty years a soldier," he said; "and I have seen enough of war to rejoice when it is at an end."

of honour; one more ruinous to our reputation, more hurtful to our faith, certainly could not be imagined."—*Times*, December 21st, 1858.

‡ Russell.—*Times*, February 11th, 1858. Nirput Sing is said to have been slain at the same time as Bainie Madhoo.

§ Mr. Russell, December 4th, 1858, wrote—"Our very remarkable friend, Tantia Topee, is too troublesome and clever an enemy to be admired. Since last June he has kept Central India in a fever. He has sacked stations, plundered treasuries, emptied arsenals, collected armies, lost them; fought battles, lost them; taken guns from native princes, lost them; taken more, lost them: then his motions have been like forked lightning; for weeks he has marched thirty and forty miles a-day. He has crossed the Nerbudda to and fro; he has marched between our columns, behind them, and before them. Ariel was not more subtle, aided by the best stage mechanism. Up mountains, over rivers, through ravines and valleys, amid swamps, on he goes, backwards and forwards, and sideways and zig-zag ways—now falling upon a post-cart, and carrying off the Bombay mails—now looting a village, headed and turned, yet evasive as Proteus."—*Times*, January 17th, 1859.

Other well-known Oude chiefs, including Pirthee Pal Siug,* had previously thrown themselves on the mercy of the government, and were, in several instances, treated with less severity than might have been expected. When the vengeance fever subsided, the Europeans began to draw distinctions between the insurgent leaders, and to admit, and even praise, the courage and steadfastness with which certain of them endured prolonged suffering. This change of feeling is very marked in the case of Prince Feroze Shah, of Delhi: his military daring, hair-breadth escapes, and skilful horsemanship, are spoken of with admiration; and even Anglo-Indian journals (the *Delhi Gazette*, for instance) plead his cause, urging his reported intercession on behalf of the European ladies and children massacred at Delhi by the mutinous sepoys of the East India Company. Few persons, now, but would regret to hear that the prince had perished either by jungle fever or the hands of the executioner. A still stronger interest attaches to the Begum of Oude; of whom it has been said, that she, "like all the women who have turned up in the insurrection, has shown more sense and nerve than all her generals together."†

The fate of the Nana and Azim Oollah is still a matter of uncertainty. It is said they are both dead of jungle fever; but nothing short of the identification of the bodies, will quench the desire for their capture cherished by the British public.

No estimate has been attempted of the number of insurgents who have perished by the civil sword; indeed, there are no records from which a trustworthy approximation could be framed. It is a subject on which few but those personally interested possess even limited information; and they, of course, are silent as the grave.

In the middle of the year 1858, Mr. Russell wrote—"Up to this time, there has certainly been no lack of work for the executioner. Rajahs, nawabs, zemindars, have been 'strung up' or 'polished off'

* See p. 330, *ante*. † *Times*, Nov. 29th, 1858.

† Russell's *Diary*, vol. i., p. 214.—*Times*, July 19th, 1858; January 17th, 1859. An Umballah civilian boasted to Mr. Russell, that he had hanged fifty-four men in a few hours for plundering a village; enjoyed the work, and regretted that he had not had "more of it."—*Diary*, vol. ii., p. 82.

§ *Friend of India*, November 18th, 1858.

|| See account of proceedings of Renaud, when he moved from Allahabad in advance of Havelock's force: p. 374, *ante*; and Russell, ii., 402.

¶ For instance. Colonel Bouchier, of the Bengal

weekly, and men of less note daily." The conquests of the Great Moguls were marked by pyramids of heads, piled up like cannon-balls; our path may be traced by topes full of rotting corpses—not the remains of enemies slain in war; but the victims of "the special commissioners, who, halter in hand, followed in the wake of our armies," with excited passions, and "armed with absolute and irresponsible power."‡

At the close of the year 1858, their proceedings were denounced even in Calcutta, and they themselves became "the objects of incessant attack. Some of them, it is said, spilt blood like water. Many were inattentive to the rules of evidence. One stated, on a requisition made by government, that he had sentenced 'about' 800, but had kept no exact account."§ The excesses of civilians cannot, however, throw into the shade those committed by military leaders; some of the most notorious of which were perpetrated before the fearful provocation given at Cawnpore;|| while others were prevented by the humanity of civilians attached to the forces.¶

The sentence of government on certain influential leaders, whose names have been mentioned in previous chapters, remains to be stated. The Nawab of Furruckabad came voluntarily to head-quarters. A price of £10,000 had been set upon his person; and he was expressly shut out, by proclamation, from all favour and amnesty, on account of his being deemed, in some measure, responsible for the massacre of women and children at Futteghur. On being reminded by the commissioner, Major Barrow, of the position in which he stood; the nawab replied—"The best proof I can give that I do not consider myself guilty is, that I come here to take my trial, though you have already pronounced me guilty, and I have to prove my innocence." In this, however, he failed, notwithstanding the strongly favourable testimony of two Christian ladies (mother and daughter), the wives of British officers; who had been known to the nawab in former artillery, blamed Mr. Sapte, the civil officer with his column, for not calling on him to punish the town of Khoorja, on account of a headless skeleton found outside that place, near Alighur; which Colonel Bouchier took to be that of a European female, and Mr. Sapte that of a sepoy. The case gave rise to some discussion; and Mr. Sapte asked—"Even had the skeleton been that of a European, would it have been just to have shelled the town, and indiscriminately killed men, women, and children, the innocent and the guilty? An officer proposed this."—*Friend of India*, Nov. 11th, 1858.

times, and were received in his zenana at the outbreak. The special commission assembled for his trial at Furruckabad, found him guilty of being "accessory after the fact," to the murder of the Europeans, and sentenced him to be hanged; but the governor-general commuted the sentence to banishment from India for life, because the nawab had surrendered on the faith of the written assurance of Major Barrow, that he would be pardoned, if not personally concerned in the murder of English people. The life of the nawab was therefore spared: he was allowed to take leave of his children, but not of his wife; was heavily fettered, lifted into a covered cart, and £100* given to him, wherewith to provide for his future subsistence when he should arrive at Mecca, his self-chosen place of exile.

The life of the *Nawab of Banda* was spared by government, and a pension of 4,000 rupees per annum allotted for his subsistence. The *Rajahs of Banpore and Shahghur* surrendered, and were directed to reside at Lahore under official control. The *Rajah of Mithowlee*, a sick, old man, has been transported to the Andamans.

The *Nawab of Jhujjur*,† and the *Rajah of Bullubghur*, were both executed at Delhi, although they pleaded that they had aided the fugitive Europeans as far as they could, but had been powerless to resist the sepoy.

Khan Bahadoor Khan, of Bareilly, held out in the Terai until the close of 1859; and then, hemmed in by the Goorkas on one side, and the British forces on the other, was captured by Jung Bahadur. The Khan is described as an old man, with a long white beard, bent double with rheumatic fever. His life is considered forfeited by his alleged complicity in the Bareilly murders, but his sentence is not yet pronounced. *Mummoo Khan* surrendered himself, having been previously dismissed the service of the Begum, "for want of courage and devotion."‡ *Oomar Sing* (the brother of Koor Sing) has surrendered; so also has

Jowallah Persaud, one of the Nana's chief leaders. At the close of the year 1859, the *Begum* and *Feroze Shah* were the only leaders of any note still at liberty. The prince was believed to have escaped into Bundelcund, with a very small following. The Begum had less than 1,500 adherents, "half-armed, half-fed, and without artillery."§

Into the history of British India, in the year 1859, the writer does not attempt to enter. The date of his conclusion is a twelvemonth earlier. He has narrated the rise and progress of the Mogul Empire and of the East India Company; and his task now terminates with the expatriation of the last of the Moguls in a convict ship to a semi-Chinese prison, and the extinction of the sovereignty of the Merchant Adventurers. The two events were nearly simultaneous.

After a protracted captivity, the King of Delhi was brought to trial. The guarantee given by Hodson for life and honourable treatment, was regarded just so far as to save an octogenarian from the hands of the executioner: how he survived the humiliation, terror, grief, hardships, insufficient food, and filth, of which Mr. Layard and others were eye-witnesses, is extraordinary. The trial was conducted by Major Harriott, of the 3rd Native cavalry—the deputy judge advocate-general, whose proceedings in connection with the Meerut outbreak have been noticed.|| The European officers, who desired to give testimony in favour of their men, had been then peremptorily silenced; and evidence, exculpatory of the King of Delhi, was now received in a manner which convinced his servants that, to offer it, would be to peril their own lives, without benefiting their aged master. Major Harriott announced, at the onset, his intention of leaving "no stone unturned" to present the evidence against the prisoner in its strongest light; and he kept his word.

Important statements—such as that noticed in the *Friend of India* (Oct. 8th,

* The forfeited pension of the nawab exceeded £10,000 per annum, besides accidental stipends accruing to him by lapses, as well as several houses, gardens, jaghires, villages, and lands, which were granted or secured to the family, in consideration of the cession of the province of Furruckabad to the Company in 1802.—Russell: *Times*, Aug. 20th, 1859.

† The Nawab of Jhujjur was hanged on the 23rd of September, 1857. A visitor, then staying in Delhi, enters in her diary, that her host, "Captain Garstin, went to see the execution, and said the nawab was a long time dying. The provost-mar-

shal who performed this revolting duty, had put to death between 400 and 500 wretches since the siege, and was now thinking of resigning his office. The soldiers, inured to sights of horror, and inveterate against the sepoy, were said to have bribed the executioner to keep them a long time hanging, as they liked to see the criminals dance a 'Pandie's hornpipe,' as they termed the dying struggles of the wretches."—*Mrs. Coopland*, p. 269.

‡ *Times*, January 14th, 1860.

§ *Times*, January 30th, 1860.

|| See pages 144 and 264, *ante*.

1857), that the prisoner had endeavoured to interfere on behalf of the Cawnpore captives, and had "suggested to Nana Sahib, that he should treat them well"—were not inquired into: and the wretched king, prostrate in extreme weakness, was, for twenty-one days, compelled to attend the court, being occasionally roused by his gaolers from the stupor natural to extreme age, to listen to the charges brought against him. Among the witnesses was his late confidential physician, whose "life was guaranteed, on the condition of his answering, satisfactorily, such questions as might be put to him."*

The king's brief defence was, that he had been perfectly helpless in the hands of the mutineers; that he had opposed them as long as he was able, by closing the gateway under the palace windows; by giving warning to the European commandant of the palace guards; and by sending an express to the lieutenant-governor at Agra,† stating what had occurred: all of which he was admitted to have done.

With regard to the European massacre, he declared that he had thrice interfered to prevent it at the hazard of his own life, which, together with that of Zeenat Mahal, was threatened by the sepoys; and that he never gave his sanction to the slaughter. Of the greater part of the mass of orders and proclamations brought in evidence against him, he declared he had no recollection whatever. In conclusion, he reminded the court of his refusal to accompany the sepoys, and voluntary surrender.

Major Harriott commented on the evidence, in an address of three hours' duration; in the course of which he adduced much irrelevant matter; drew some deductions, which were evidently foregone conclusions regarding the cause of the mutiny; and endeavoured, at considerable length, to demonstrate, that neither "Muslim nor Hindoo had any honest objection to the use of the greased cartridges"—an assertion intended to vindicate his own conduct at Meerut.

The court found the king guilty, as a "false traitor" and a rebel to the British government; and as an accessory to the massacre. Sir John Lawrence concurred in the finding of the court; and suggested, that "the prisoner be transported beyond

the seas as a felon, and be kept in some island or settlement, where he will be entirely isolated from all other Mohammedans."‡ He refuted Major Harriott's assumptions respecting pretexts and causes of disaffection; declaring, that the cartridge question had been the proximate cause of the mutiny, and nothing else; that the Native army did really believe that a sinister, but systematic, attempt was about to be made on their caste; and he accounted for "the bitter mistrust" evinced at Meerut, by the fact, that the cartridges which the 3rd cavalry refused to accept, were enveloped in paper of a different colour to that previously used.

A difficulty arose, as to where to send the old king. The Andaman Islands were pre-occupied; for when the Draconian policy of death for every degree of mutiny gave place to a more discriminating system, transportation was substituted in the case of the less guilty offenders; and a penal settlement for sepoys was formed on those islands.

The propriety of isolating the king from any Indian community being much insisted on, British Kaffraria was proposed for his place of exile; but the Cape colonists (who had resolutely refused to receive European convicts) declined to admit even an Indian state prisoner. At length, a station in Burmah, named Tonghoo, 300 miles inland from Rangoon (represented as a most desolate and forlorn district), was selected; and the king, on the 4th of December, 1858, with Zeenat Mahal, Jumma Bukht and his half-brother Shah Abbas (a mere child), with some of the ladies of the zenana, embarked in H.M. steamship *Megara*. The destination of the captives was kept secret until after their departure.

The general impression at Calcutta appears to have been, that the Great Mogul had been very cleverly dealt with. The Calcutta correspondent of the *Times* (not Mr. Russell), after describing the manner in which the king was carried on board, remarked—"Two hundred years ago, the agents of the East India Company stood before this man's ancestor, then the absolute ruler of 100,000,000 of people, with folded hands, begging permission to exist at a single town upon the coast. As the natives say, it was the foothold granted to a nephew to the amount of £100,000.

* Sir John Lawrence's letter to governor-general, April 29th, 1858. † See page 159, ante.

‡ Major Harriott quitted India shortly afterwards, and died suddenly at Southampton, on landing

giant." But the same storm which drove the last of the Moguls from Delhi, to die in exile, destroyed the power of the giant whose sovereignty had been founded on the ruins of the Mogul empire. The simultaneous increase of debt and revenue; the repeated financial crises; the undeveloped resources of India; the feeble commerce; the absence of suitable means of traffic and communication; and the abject misery of the mass of the people, had long been commented on in England, as proofs of ill-government. The defection of the Bengal army, followed by the insurrection of whole provinces, bringing great monetary difficulty upon the government, and destitution (to the extent of absolute starvation in very many cases) upon the agricultural population, decided the question. The "double government" of the Crown and the Company had failed, and the entire administration was therefore assumed by the nation. On the 1st of November, 1858, a royal proclamation, issued throughout British India, declared the sovereignty of Queen Victoria.

The decree for the transfer of power from the Company to the Crown, was passed by the British parliament, August 2nd, 1858, under the title of an "Act for the better government of India."

It was therein provided, that a principal secretary of state, with under-secretaries, should be appointed, and their salaries paid out of the revenues of India. A "Council of India" was likewise established, consisting of fifteen members, with salaries of £1,200 per annum, to be paid out of the Indian revenues.

Seven of the members were to be nominated by the Court of Directors of the E. I. Company, from their own body; and the remaining eight by the Crown. It was de-

clared indispensable that the major part of the council (nine at least) should have served or resided ten years in India, and should not have left that country more than ten years preceding the date of their appointment.

Every member was to "hold his office during good behaviour;" with the provision, that it should be lawful for the Crown to remove any one from his office upon an address of both houses of parliament. No member was to be capable of sitting or voting in parliament. The secretary of state might or might not consult the council on any proposed measure; and he might act in opposition to the expressed wishes of the council, recording his reasons for so acting. The members, also, were to be at liberty to record their opinions.

By this act the E. I. Company remained an incorporated body, without duties or rights, excepting the receipt of dividends, due from time to time, on the capital stock of the proprietors.

The difficulties and dangers inseparable from a foreign rule, have been fearfully aggravated by the rebellion. It is easier to conceive the means of meeting the additional monetary embarrassments caused thereby, than of bridging over the deep broad gulf which separates the Europeans and the natives. The royal proclamations and the conditional offers of amnesty promise well; but Indian statesmen concur in considering that these documents produce very little effect on the people at large, and are, at best, viewed as applying to the circumstances of the present moment, and conveying no guarantee for the future. There is much said of radical reforms, and initiation of measures; but the men, the departments, the detail, are the same.* And in India,

* *Times*, November 29th, 1858.—The author regrets that limited space precludes the quotation, at full length, of a proclamation issued by the Begum of Oude, with the object of counteracting the effect of the amnesty proffered, on certain conditions, by the Queen of England, on assuming the sovereignty of India. The Begum asked, what there was in the supersession of the power of the E. I. Company by that of the Crown, which could benefit the people of Hindoostan, seeing that "the laws of the Company, the settlement [of land] of the Company, the English servants of the Company, the governor-general, and the judicial administration of the Company, are all unchanged?" She commented on the ill-treatment which native princes—Hindoo and Mohammedan—had met with; dwelt especially on the violation of treaties involved in the annexation of

Oude; warned the people against being deluded by a proclamation, couched in such vague terms, that "everything was written, and nothing was written" in it; and declared, in bitter despair, "No one has ever seen in a dream that the English forgave an offence." With regard to Christianity, the Begum seized on its most mysterious and complicated doctrine, and asserted—"That religion is true which acknowledges one God, and knows no other. When there are three gods in a religion, neither Mussulmans nor Hindoos—nay, not even Jews, Sun-worshippers, or Fire-worshippers, can believe it true." Then followed an attempt to prove that interference with the religion and caste of the people of Hindoostan had originated the rebellion. Altogether, the document deserves careful perusal, as a summary of native grievances, real and alleged.

where the power entrusted always greatly exceeds the responsibility imposed, the character of the official must materially affect the working of the measures he is appointed to carry out. The well-earned reputation of Lord Clyde for justice and mercy, has done more towards the pacification of Oude, than even his consummate military combinations have effected for its subjugation: proclamations and amnesties have been effective in his mouth, because the chiefs had faith in the truthful, fearless veteran—a master of strategy, but no diplomatist.

In the discussions regarding India, the real question at issue appears to be this:—On what principle is the future government to be based? Are we simply to do what is right, or what seems expedient? If the former, we may confidently ask the Divine blessing on our efforts for the moral and material welfare of the people of India; and we may strive, by a steady course of kind and righteous dealing, to win their alienated affections for ourselves as individuals, and their respect and interest for the religion which inculcates justice, mercy, and humility, as equally indispensable to national as to individual Christianity. The adoption question* is still open, and is viewed by the native princes as a touchstone of our future policy. The recognition of the ancient Hindoo law of adoption, not as a favour,

but as a right, would be received by every one of our Indian allies with unqualified pleasure.†

If, however, the "iron-roller" system is to be resumed, and we are to keep our footing—if we can—on the necks of the people, it is high time to count the cost of our past experiments, and estimate our future outlay.

Long before the late rebellion, the existence of a standing army, which swallowed up nearly half the net revenue, had been a chronic source of Indian deficit. The main part of that force—that is, nearly the whole of the Bengal sepoys, who were supposed to secure our military tenure of the country—revolted; and of these, at least 40,000 have perished. The amount of life sacrificed is not usually much considered by politicians: the native soldiers and citizens who perished, cost the state nothing; and by the revolt of the chiefs, pensions were forfeited, and estates confiscated; but every European killed, was a hundred pounds lost; and the new levies raised to replace the mutineers, were extremely costly in their details. The army, European and Native, is now larger than ever; and few will deny, that the hastily enlisted Seiks and Goorkas, gorged with blood and plunder, are less easily disciplined as mercenaries, and more to be dreaded as foes, than their predecessors, the ill-fated Poorbaha.

* One of the latest tragedies in the mutiny is said to have been the direct consequence of the denial of the right of adoption to Baba Sahib, chief of Nurgood, a little place in the Southern Mahratta country, which had been in the possession of the same family for 200 years. Baba Sahib being childless, urged that he should be allowed to adopt an heir, in accordance with a treaty made with his ancestor in 1820; but his request was peremptorily rejected. He joined the rebels as late as June, 1858; and Mr. Manson, the political agent, who proceeded to the district to restore order, was killed, with all his escort. Nurgood was subsequently captured, and the chief was hanged.—*Bombay Times*.

† The annexation policy, though denounced in England by the highest authorities, is still clung to by the Indian government. Dhar is a case in point. This little principality was held by the Puar or Powar family until the year of the mutinies. In May, 1857, the last ruler, Jeswunt Rao Powar, a young and energetic man, was seized with cholera, and died, after having, in the intervals of agony, adopted his brother, Bala Sahib, as his heir, and entreated that the government would sanction his succession. The political agent declared, that the deceased prince "had secured the esteem and respect of the people and chiefs of Western Malwa, as well as the approbation of successive residents and agents," and urged the granting of his last request. It was granted; and Bala Sahib, a boy of

twelve years of age, was proclaimed rajah. On the 2nd of July, the 23rd N.I. mutinied; and the contagion soon spread to Mhow, which was only thirty miles distant. The Dhar troops revolted against the boy-prince, and seized the city fortress, which they were compelled to surrender to Brigadier Stuart, November, 1857. The Bengal government directed that the principality should be immediately attached; and announced to the young prince, that "he must never hope to see it restored to his hands." The Court of Directors condemned the injustice of this proceeding; and declared, June 22nd, 1858—"We do not perceive how we could consistently punish this, or any other weak state, for its inability to control its troops, when it was patent to the whole world that the more powerful states of Gwalior and Indore, and even the British government itself, were unable to control theirs." The reinstatement of the native ruler was therefore decreed; but the Bengal authorities quietly ignored the command (as they had done many previous ones), leaving the directors either to conclude that it had been obeyed, or to satisfy their consciences with having made a well-sounding but unmeaning protest against an act of glaring injustice. However, as in March, 1859, the order for the restoration of Dhar was repeated by the secretary of state for India (Lord Stanley), it may be concluded it will be ultimately obeyed.—*Parl. Papers on Dhar*, April 8th, 1859.

The native officers are equally numerous, powerful, and ill-paid, as at the commencement of the year 1857. Altogether, the revolt is calculated to have increased the Indian debt by forty million sterling; this sum raising the total to one hundred million, spent by the E. I. Company almost exclusively in getting and keeping military possession of the country. Their stewardship is condemned by the fact of the millstone they have hung round the necks of the people. They, as foreigners, have resorted, without scruple, to the selfish expedient of modern times, whereby one generation relieves itself from the consequences of its own extravagance or mismanagement, at the expense of posterity. As individuals, the directors and servants of the Company have prospered, their salaries and pensions have been secured as a first charge upon the revenues of India, unconnected with the public welfare or adversity; war, famine, pestilence, or abject want might decimate the governed, without affecting the incomes of the governors.

The case is different with the English nation at large; for its commerce is seriously impeded by every cause which checks the demand for British manufactures.

The poverty of the Indian masses is admitted to be the result of misgovernment, ill-regulated taxation, and undeveloped resources. But the evil is not irremediable. The debt with which the E. I. Company has burdened the empire is oppressive, not on account of its intrinsic weight, but because of the paralysed condition, the unnatural depression of the labouring community. Under a wise and fostering administration, every one of the extensive countries we call provinces, could furnish its needful share of revenue with ease. A general and radical reform in our financial and administrative system, speedily initiated, and firmly carried through, is the only conceivable means by which the Crown and Parliament can be expected to grapple successfully with difficulties under which, in a less aggravated degree, the East India Company have succumbed.

THE END.



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| <p>Page 4, Col. 1, inverted commas placed in line 8, instead of line 1, where quotation begins.</p> <p>" 17, " 2, line 25, for <i>made</i>, read <i>rendered</i>.</p> <p>" 18, " 1, lines 9 and 10, for <i>at once</i>, read <i>both</i>.</p> <p>" 65, " 2, line 23, for <i>secluded</i>, read <i>private</i>.</p> <p>" 69, " 2, line 53, for <i>exordium</i>, read <i>exhortation</i>.</p> <p>" 72, " 2, note, line 5, for <i>wrote</i>, read <i>written</i>.</p> <p>" 112, " 1, transfer reference † from line 42, to line 37.</p> <p>" 118, " 1, line 25, for <i>Captain</i>, read <i>Lieutenant Battye</i>.</p> <p>" 118, " 2, line 10, and note, † for <i>Freere</i>, read <i>Frere</i>. Same error twice in following column, p. 119.</p> <p>" 169, " 2, line 15, instead of <i>on the morning of the 19th</i>, read <i>at a much later period</i>.</p> <p>" 208, " 2, line 26, for <i>Hissar</i>, read <i>Hansi</i>.</p> <p>" 210, " 2, note §, for <i>Ratlon</i>, read <i>Rotton</i>.</p> <p>" 234, heading: for <i>Bainie Madhoo</i>, read <i>Madhoo Sing</i>.</p> | <p>Page 249, Col. 2, line 47, instead of <i>an English officer</i>, read <i>an English traveller</i>.</p> <p>" 301, " 1, note *, line 1, for <i>thatched</i>, read <i>thatch</i>.</p> <p>" 326, " 1, line 34: <i>the friendly thakoor native</i>, omit the word <i>native</i>.</p> <p>" 330, " 2, for <i>Rajah of Banpore</i>, read <i>Rajah of Banpore</i>: same error recurs in the column.</p> <p>" 360, " 1, line 13, for <i>Haringford</i>, read <i>Harington</i>.</p> <p>" 426, " 2, line 30—31, for <i>at length assumed a prominent place</i>, read <i>was believed to have assumed a place</i>.</p> <p>" 435, " 1, note, for <i>suspected</i>, read <i>accused</i>.</p> <p>" 450, " 1, line 12, for <i>61st regiment found in holes</i>, read <i>61st regiment found dead in holes, &c.</i></p> <p>" 456, " 1, line 37, for <i>takes its character</i>, read <i>takes its character</i>.</p> <p>" 484, note §, for 366, read 336.</p> <p>" 495, col. 1, line 26, for <i>severely wounded</i>, read <i>nearly surrounded</i>.</p> |
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